

**Wilfrid Sellars Notre Dame Lectures:  
1969-1986  
The Bootleg Version**

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## **The Notre Dame Lectures: Wilfrid Sellars 1969-1986**

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### **Introduction**

“A flower in the crannied wall,” Sellars describes these Lectures while plucking his philosophy out of the crannies, roots and all. “One of the basic tasks that philosophy has to do is to raise questions,” he remarks, “to open up conceptual possibilities...philosophers should not regard themselves as merely owls of Minerva who come back in the night after the day is done. They should also be “heralds of the dawn” who create the categories in terms of which science is rejuvenated. In this, the Notre Dame Lectures do not disappoint. As a measure of the fruition of the monumental changes Sellars envisions and his hope of a reunification of science and philosophy, the lectures stand alone. From the pointed critiques of Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle and Wittgenstein, to the playful scolding of Carnap, Bergman, Firth, Chisholm and Quine, Sellars encourages philosophers to take up the challenge of giving direction to the future of the cognitive sciences.

Time and the world order provide a recurring theme for the lectures. Yet they unfold into the nature of time itself, events, facts, existence, conceptual change and meaning—all of them play a critical role. The Notre Dame Lectures even illustrate Sellars’ exasperation with himself because he was slow to recognize the ineluctable development of his own theory of events, facts, and time.

Often funny and relentlessly metaphysical, the Notre Dame Lectures aim at Sellars' favorite targets: *Relationalism* and *Givenness*. But like a master craftsman determined to clean out the toolshed, he is equally determined not to throw anything out. If an idea served but can serve no longer, perhaps it's time to understand why it worked as well as it did for so long? So, disappointment will likely greet those looking for a new system to replace the old system: for Sellars, getting there is definitely the fun. If anything, what strikes us as remarkable about these Lectures is the display of Sellars' ability to cut right to the heart of an issue. "Turn him to any cause of policy, The Gordian knot of it he will unloose," and once cut, he is on to another. At times, the Notre Dame Lecture's playful common sense overshadows the fact that they provide a cross-section of Sellars' views during a time of energetic development. Since the lectures include portions of published papers, they present the priceless opportunity to see the lectures with embellishments by the author. The running commentary, supplemented by shrewd questions from an historically proficient and insightful audience<sup>1</sup> provides subtle clues to Sellars' thinking on the future of a variety of core topics. Although the tapes were at times virtually unintelligible and, of course, contained no diagrams, the text is as accurate as it could be made. Regrettably some tapes in this long series were unavailable but perhaps one day they will be transcribed. With the notable exception of contributions by RWS (Sellars' father) and the anonymous participants in the Q&A, most of the available tracks are included. The transition from track to track is included for reference purposes.

It was Sellars' habit to develop his views in the course of ongoing presentations to graduate students and graduate faculty and to give them a debut at Notre Dame. My own work with Sellars overlapped many of the lectures that appear here. Sellars' running commentary on published papers provides insights that would otherwise have been lost.

1 McMullin, for example.

## Events

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The evolution of WS's theory of events serves as the keystone of this introduction. It isn't that time and events provided an unusual challenge to Sellars. It is rather more like Kant, who saw that once all the other problems were solved, the nature of time and space flowed from the solutions. While he acknowledges the evolution of the views in *EPM*, the treatment of events is the only case where he acknowledges a mistake.


WS begins "Time and the World Order" by recalling his discovery that the 'problem of time' was rivaled by only the 'mind-body problem' in the degree to which it immediately tangled him in all the major concerns of philosophy. As we read *TWO*, our exegetical task becomes doubly difficult because, while he sees the argument in "Time and the World Order" as commencing with familiar puzzles about truth and time, from our perspective, the context has receded into the history of philosophy. The essay begins by addressing C. D. Broad's attempt to respond to McTaggart's work on the unreality of time. And naturally, like any period piece, it begins right in the middle of the story: WS examines Broad's response to McTaggart almost *ad seriatim* as these responses appear in portions of the *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy* volumes I and II.<sup>2</sup> As a result, it makes *TWO* a work to be avoided by those without a sense of history. Some of the dialectic appears to come "out of the blue" for anyone unfamiliar with the contemporary texture of the debate. Sellars frequently characterized time in ways that were common during those exchanges but which often leave a contemporary audience with a sense that they have missed an important ingredient in a recipe. Since it is not necessary for us to start from scratch, our progress will not be slowed by a need to reconstruct the analytical machinery from the earlier period.

As WS admits, during the course of the Notre Dame Lectures, *TWO* incorporates a mistaken theory of events. His remarkable apology for the error acknowledges the significance of the mistake:

2 *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy* by C. D. Broad, volume I and II, (Oxford University Press, 1933).

a metaphysical mistake about the ultimate nature of reality. The far-reaching changes that his new theory of events bring about were never carried out. However he does provide enough suggestions on how to proceed so that we are able to do some of the renovation ourselves.

It will be necessary to presuppose a basic familiarity with the use of dot-quoting as a means for tackling thorny ontological issues. A “dot-quote primer” is provided in an appendix for those unfamiliar with the machinery WS puts in place. Historically, familiarity with Carnap, Wittgenstein and a modest appreciation of the history of philosophy suffice to bring out the effect of the dot-quotes. Speaking from the 1st person, phenomenological point



Here “type,” “quality,” “kind” are on par as are the trio “the ‘city’,” “triangularity,” “the lion” and descending to the world, as are the trio made of the three cities, the three triangles and the three lions. First, imagine replacing the single quotes with dot-quotes, then, “triangularity” would be treated like “the ‘city’” on the left but would be playing the *classical* conceptual role played by the kind term, ‘the lion’ on the right. Hence, “triangularity” is a disguised “the triangular” functioning like lionkind but we call it a quality. Climbing the semantical ladder another rung, yields thoughts of the ‘ the city ’ which merely reflects the classical distinction between “being triangular” one step down, and “being triangularity” up a step. The scholastics reserve this third level for “logical universals” or “metaphysical universals.”

of view, we have concepts pertaining to things (1st intentions), concepts pertaining to concepts of things (2nd intentions) and so on up the semantic ladder. ‘Concepts’ are misnamed because, being nothing more than varieties of conceiv-ings, there is nothing *static*

about them: each is resolved into, as the peripatetic scholastics would say, a role or “office” which *constitutes* what it is to know the very thing to which the concept pertains. It is knowledge classically construed as the mind becoming like the object—knowledge at its best, what it is *like* to be a knower. But the feature of Sellars’s account that would have the peripatetics hurling themselves out of windows is his insistence that the interesting features of thought are beyond the reach of introspection, intuition, self-consciousness, self-*anything* really. That of which we can be immediately aware are leftovers from the Pleistocene—chunks of colored stuff—and *even that* his contemporaries got wrong. Thus, when one thinks about the semantic functioning of “thoughts” or “words” and the way their “office” is constituted by the “privileges and duties” that make up the office (the “web” that makes them what they are), one needs an entirely new metaphor. As we move up the semantics ladder, introspection is as dead as a door nail but that’s where all the interesting things are happening. As his metaphor for “concepts” Sellars uses the metaphor of Chess and Tess (Texas-chess) but the pieces of any formal game will serve; even Battleships firing Guns in Conway’s Game of Life works as a healthy intuition pump. The idea is to wean oneself away from the Relationalism—relational theories of meaning, reference, denotation, standing for, exemplifying etc.—and change to a diet of incredibly complex relations, that is, the syntactic activity that brings about the semantic activity. Sellars view is easy to understand but difficult to internalize: introspection and reflection, however mentally challenged, seems so good and served so well that it is a shame to see them go. A diagram serves to illustrate how Sellars’ dot-quotes relate ordinary quotes:

The best way to introduce the story of Sellars’ change of heart on events, is to relate how my own puzzles about the theory of events came about. While studying WS’ analysis of meaning, a question developed that couldn’t be resolved, the more I thought about it, the more confused I got. During a discussion, I asked him the following question, “the theory of events presented in *TWO* complements the discussion of meaning that occurs in, for example, *Truth and Correspondence*, because in both, events are objects

“in the world”—basic derivative objects in the one and linguistic events in the other—but in your later work, for example, *MCP*,<sup>3</sup> events are not in the world.

WS’s immediate response will have to wait because unless one knows the relevant background it is impossible to get his joking reply. Instead, it’s necessary to spell out the conflict between the later theory of events and the analysis of meaning before giving WS’ solution to the problem. We can begin by looking at the theory of meaning and linguistic events. This will allow us to abstract away from the philosophy of time to which we will return after finishing with the problem regarding events.

The first point is methodological and concerns a preferred strategy that WS uses to great effect— due to his singular genius for striking right at the heart of a problem. WS’ comments that Reichenbach gives us a procedure for going from statements about events to statements about things. A procedure found in the “Introduction” to Reichenbach’s *Elements of Symbolic Logic*.<sup>4</sup> What WS appears to mean is that the method of “rational reconstruction” that Reichenbach uses (following Carnap) in regimenting language can be used. The actual application of Reichenbach’s method occurs later, in section 48, where Reichenbach describes what he thinks of as a means for regimenting conversational language.

We can see the method of rational reconstruction playing a part when we realize that the primary application of the notion of meaning is not to speech as currently conceived. Thought is not modeled on our current concept of speech or thought. Our current concept of thought already contains the resources that Sellars is trying to explain so, he rationally reconstructs our current model of speech into one that is not in use. In the reconstructed version, thought is construed as the level of overt, meaningful linguistic expression which is mere event and not action (i.e., not underwritten by inner thought episodes). The rational reconstruction puts aside our current explanation of speech in terms of thought. According to Sellars, the reconstructed version does not presupposes the concept of thought.

3 I will use ‘MCP’ for “Metaphysics and the Concept of a Person” instead of the standard, ‘MP’.

4 TWO, 542.

Thus, the reconstructed application of the concepts of meaning and picturing are not to the notion of speech as currently conceived. The rational reconstruction is motivated by a “myth” that allows us to see the plausibility of an “evolutionary” scenario in which it was reasonable to adopt our current model of thought.<sup>5</sup> The subsequent reconstruction of our model of speech occurs at the end of our story of conceptual development.

Armed with appropriate warnings about the methodology, it is apparent that in the late 50’s, Sellars thought of events as objects in the world *in a narrow* sense that includes Socrates, Caesar, and Cassio but not triangularity which is in the world *in a broad* sense.

Names, he notes, connote criteria and name the objects which satisfy these criteria. We have distinguished between two radically different kinds of object which we may illustrate, respectively, by Socrates and by Roundness. Roughly the distinction is between those objects which are concepts and those which are not.

26. Non-conceptual objects can be roughly divided into *basic* and *derivative*. Derivative objects can be informally characterized as those which are referred to by noun expressions that can be eliminated by contextual definition. In this sense events are derivative objects in the physical-thing framework. Statements about the events in which physical things participate can be reduced to statements in which all the non-predicative expressions refer to physical things.’ In the framework of kinetic theory, as classically presented, the basic objects (granted that we *can* speak of theoretical objects) would be individual molecules.<sup>6</sup>

In terms of the developing treatment of abstract entities from “Grammar and Existence: A Preface to Ontology” in 1960 through “Abstract Entities” in 1963, Sellars position above can be put by contrasting two ways of *being in the world*:

(a) an item is in the world in the *narrow sense* when it does not involve linguistic norms and roles (*it is not* “dot-quoted”)

5 One of WS’s lectures on the “myth,” the Myth of Jones is included in this introduction.

6 LT, 1961, paragraph 26.



(b) an item is in the world in the *broad sense* which does involve linguistic norms and roles (*it is* “dot-quoted”) from the standpoint of a fellow participant.<sup>7</sup>

On this view, Sellars circa 1957, would say

Circularity and triangularity are in the world in the broad sense

but,

Caesar’s crossing and Cassio’s loving are in the world in the narrow sense.

Sellars continues:

Actually, the relation between an episode expressions and tensed statements which are about *things* rather than *episodes* [events] is quite simple, and has been formulated with reasonable clarity by more than one philosopher.<sup>8</sup>

The “philosopher” is Reichenbach whose “transformations” Sellars finds illuminating are worth pausing to consider.

Reichenbach

The distinction between events and things, according to Reichenbach, plays a role in daily life. An inauguration, an assassination, a marriage are events, not things; language contains event-expressions which are often descriptions, not proper names. For example,

the inauguration of Kennedy took place in Washington,

or

the assassination of Kennedy followed the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The first contains a two-term relation between an event and a thing, the second, a relation between two events. It is often possible to

<sup>7</sup> WS comments on the care with which in the world should be handled, TTC, 65. Here the formal category, state of affairs, has the material category, event subsumed under it.

<sup>8</sup> TWO, 542.

eliminate event-expressions as in the case above which can be stated in equivalent form

Kennedy was inaugurated in Washington

In the second, Reichenbach thinks that the equivalent statement must contain a time. As a result, although the event-expressions can be eliminated, new event arguments in the symbols for time, ' $t_2$ ' and ' $t_1$ ' cannot be eliminated and time points are, events ("classes of simultaneous events" as he refers to them):

Kennedy was assassinated at  $t_1$  and the Bay of Pigs was invaded at  $t_2$ .

Indeed, time sequence can be formulated only as relations between events.

Using the term 'situation' to refer to the object corresponding to a proposition, by describing a situation in a proposition composed of a function and argument, the situation splits into argument-object and predicate-object (i.e., property or attribute). As seen above, a situation can be split in two ways.

Thus, a sentence that is about "things" ('Kennedy was inaugurated') can be transformed into a sentence about events, an E-sentence ('Kennedy's inauguration took place') by means of the following. Suppose the '\*' stands for a meta-linguistic function taking thing-sentences into event predicates. So, 'is the inauguration of Kennedy' is the value of the function for the argument 'Kennedy is inaugurated.' The event term 'the inauguration of Kennedy' is a definite description that is symbolized using the ' $v$ ' and where ' $v_i$ ' denotes the event:

$$(v)[f(\text{Kennedy is inaugurated})]*(v)$$

To symbolize 'the inauguration of Kennedy took place' we have:

$$(\exists x)(x = (v)[f(x_1)]*(v))$$

using ' $f(x_1)$ ' to stand for the thing-sentence and the brackets to indicate the scope of the asterisk '\*'. The procedure is completely general. According to Reichenbach, references to events can be replaced by references to things (and *vice versa*): The general transformation rule (§48) is

$$f(x_I) \quad g(v_I)$$

where ' $v_I$ ' denotes the event, and ' $g$ ' the event property. The unusual ' $\quad$ ' (not reproduced here) indicates that the connective involved might include P-implications (see §60). The transformation for ' $f(x_I)$ ' and ' $g(v_I)$ ' is *wholistic* in the sense that *wholes* are equivalent to each other without a direct correspondence between the parts.

By the equivalence, an event and its property can be defined in terms of a thing and its property; the examples above illustrated the two ways of splitting a situation; these he calls, *thing-splitting* and *event-splitting*. Switching to the metalanguage, we can show that an event-argument and its predicate can be defined as a function of a thing-argument and its predicate.

Let ' $f(x_I)$ ' mean 'Kennedy is inaugurated', ' $g$ ' is the predicate 'inauguration of Kennedy', that is a function of both the predicate 'is inaugurated' and the argument 'Kennedy'. Reichenbach uses an asterisk for the indicator of the transition to event-splitting and writes the function ' $g$ ' (from the transformation rule above) in the form ' $[f(x_I)]^*$ '. Thus, the expression ' $g(v_I)$ ' can be replaced by ' $[f(x_I)]^*(v_I)$ '. The argument ' $v_I$ ' is the name of the event that has the property ' $[f(x_I)]^*$ ' and has a value given the predicate 'is inaugurated' and the argument 'Kennedy'. Since descriptions are used to denote events using the function ' $[f(x_I)]^*$ '; the event-argument sign ' $v_I$ ' can be written in a form prevalent in conversational language, according to Reichenbach, namely,

the inauguration of Kennedy took place

or,

$$(v)[f(x_I)]^*(v)$$

Similarly, in a case of thing-splitting, we might have the following

The destruction of Carthage made Rome the ruler of the Mediterranean.

Let  $x_1$ =Carthage,  $d$ =be destroyed,  $y_1$ =Rome,  $z_1$ =Mediterranean,  $r$ =ruler,  $m$ =make and,

$$v_1 = (v)[d(x_1)]^*(v)$$

$$u_1 = (u)r(u, z_1)$$

To express event-splitting we have,

$$m(v_1, y_1, u_1).$$

Ontology: Sellars 1957

Returning to the discussion of events of the late 50s, WS gives a simplified version of Reichenbach's transformations in dealing with the statements with which *TWO* began, namely,

- (1) S was  $\_1$
- (2) S is  $\_2$  now
- (3) S will be  $\_3$

which he modifies<sup>9</sup> for the purposes of discussing episodes to be

- (1 ) S became  $\_1$
- (2 ) S is becoming  $\_2$  (now)
- (3 ) S will become  $\_3$

for which we have an equivalence schema that serves to show "how the language of 'episodes' or 'events' is related to a simple tensed statement"<sup>10</sup> with which *TWO* began. Namely,

- |                                |                    |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|
| (1 ) S became $\_1$            | S's becoming $\_i$ |
| took place                     |                    |
| (2 ) S is becoming $\_2$ (now) | S's becoming $\_i$ |
| is taking place                |                    |

<sup>9</sup> Taking advantage of Reichenbach's idea of "event-splitting."

<sup>10</sup> *TWO*, 541.

Caesar's crossing the Rubicon took place

is reduced to

that eliminates the reference to an event via the expression, ‘Caesar’s crossing,’ in favor of a tensed statement about a changing thing, namely, Caesar. Thus, we have a general recipe, a *transformation schema*, for replacing event statements in favor of the statements involving changing things:

is taking place	Vs		
S's V-ing			took place
			Ved
		will take place	Will V

we note that there are two kinds of *singular term* which can be derived from tensed statements of the kind represented on the right-hand side of [the above]: that-clauses, thus

- (a) that S will become  $i$ ,  
and episode-expressions, thus,  
(b) S's becoming  $i$ .<sup>12</sup>

11 TWO, 542.  
12 TWO, 542.

This being so, we can appreciate the truth contained in the idea that episodes are more basic than facts; *for episode-expressions, unlike that-clauses, are in the object language.*<sup>13</sup>

However, we are cautioned against supposing that episodes are the entities of which the world is ‘*made up*,’

for although it is correct to say that episode-expressions ‘refer to extralinguistic entities—indeed, to episodes—the above account tells us that episodes are derivative entities and rest on referring expressions which occur in tensed statements about things.’<sup>14</sup>

In an effort to drive this point home, WS warns against thinking that causal relations obtain between events.<sup>15</sup> Since episode expressions occur in the object language and in P-implications (physical implications) like the singular terms in

The litmus paper’s being put in acid (physically) implied its turning red

this wrongly gives the impression that physical implication is a relation *in re* between events. In fact, episode-expressions are grounded in tensed statements about things which “must be *that*-ed (in effect, quoted) to serve as the subject of statements to the effect that something physically implies something else.”<sup>16</sup> WS cautions us against and overzealous reliance on the existence of events:

We must now remind ourselves that although we have permitted ourselves to speak above without qualification of a framework of events, these events have a derivative status in the sense that singular terms referring to events are contextually introduced in terms of sentences involving singular terms referring to things. And we must remind ourselves that in the framework of things it is *things* which come to be and cease to be, and that the event which is the coming to be or the ceasing to be of a thing itself neither comes to be nor ceases to be but (like all events) simply takes place. On the other hand, all metricizings in the framework of things is a matter of the locat-

<sup>13</sup> TWO, 542.

<sup>14</sup> TWO, 542.

<sup>15</sup> Here he is explicitly parting company with Reichenbach’s analysis.

<sup>16</sup> TWO, 543.

ing of *events*, including the events which are the coming to be and ceasing to be of things.<sup>17</sup>

Once again, we see that events are introduced through contextual definitions but that ultimately, events are the coming to be or ceasing to be of things, the *onset* of changes, as it were.

### Events: Sellars 1934

Sellars often pointed out that one cannot put everything in jeopardy all at once, after all, we have to stand *somewhere*. Still, it should be obvious that although the precise texture of the notion of an episode is key, he relegates it to a footnote

The term ‘episode’ will be used, for the time being, in a broad sense in which no distinction is drawn among episodes, events, states, etc. These distinctions will be subsequently drawn to a degree of precision which suffices for the purposes of this paper.<sup>18</sup>

The “degree of precision” is in evidence later,

To begin with, something must be said about the status of the very term ‘episode.’ That it is a common noun, and that “There are episodes” has the same general form as “There are lions,” is clear. But more than this we can say that ‘episode,’ like ‘property’ and ‘relation,’ is a ‘category word’; and to say this is to say that like the latter pair it is the counterpart *in the material mode of a logical pigeonhole for a certain class of expressions in our language*. Thus,

(77) E is an episode

tells us no more about E than is exhibited by

(78) E is taking place or has taken place or will take place

and serves to indicate that the singular term represented by ‘E’ is the sort of term which belongs in this type of context. Thus, to say that there are episodes is, in effect, to say that *something* either is taking place, has taken place, or will take place: And as saying this it is equivalent to (though it does not have the same sense as) a statement to the effect that something is either present, past, or future.<sup>19</sup>

For anyone keeping score, it ought to feel as if the use of ‘episode’ hovers just at the *edge* of the light as well as on the edge of being in

<sup>17</sup> TWO, 572.

<sup>18</sup> TWO, 535.

<sup>19</sup> TWO, 547.

the world in the *narrow sense* and in the world in the *broad sense*.  
For, on the one hand, WS writes,

This being so, we can appreciate the truth contained in the idea that episodes are more basic than facts; for episode-expressions, unlike that-clauses, are in the object language.<sup>20</sup>

But, on the other remarks,

But first a terminological remark is in order. It will undoubtedly have been noticed that in the preceding sections the term 'episode' has, with a minimum of warning, been stretched to cover items which would not ordinarily be so designated. Thus, we would not ordinarily say that the statement 'The soup is salty' reports an episode, even though it does report something that "comes to pass." Thus, we distinguish, for example, between 'episodes' and 'states.' It is no easy task to botanize the various kinds of temporal statement, or to find a plausible term for the broader category to which both episodes ('the salting of the soup') and states ('the being salty of the soup') belong. Perhaps they might be lumped together under 'outcome.' For the time being, however, I shall avoid any discussion of states, and limit myself to episodes proper.<sup>21</sup>

"Well," one is inclined to ask, "are they or aren't they?"

Sellars 1934, in his thesis provides some clues:

...it seems wise to define an event as a selected portion of the behavior of a physical system. It is an implication of this definition that an event may be complex both in the sense that more than one existent is concerned, and in the sense that a complex change is involved. An event is not an *ontological unit* or *quantum* of being... Thus we speak of (the event of) the apple's rotting, and, in the case mentioned above, of (the event of) the automobile accident. Such usage is entirely legitimate. However, the important fact is that the behavior of the apple is no more a self-existent entity than its structure. Thus the ontological situation meant when an event is referred to consists of changing physical continuants... It is this capacity of the human mind to perceive and experience change, that renders possible the type of reference to things involved in the concept of an event. Ontologically there are no events. However in a sense there are events, just as, to use an analogy there are structures or forms, for the human mind is able to discriminate aspects of

<sup>20</sup> TWO, 542.

<sup>21</sup> TWO, 541.



reality, while at the same time recognizing the categorial features of existence. We refer a behavior to things just as we refer a spatial structure to things, and just as in the latter case we speak of the squareness of the peg, so we speak of the death of Queen Anne.

According to the Physical Realist that Sellars defends, change is in-the-world in a narrow sense. But, as WS notes in another context,

For the term ‘episode’ is elastic enough to cover a great deal of territory. If anything which occurs or takes place is to count as an episode, then whenever an object changes from having one disposition to another, the change is an episode.<sup>22</sup>

What more can be said?<sup>23</sup>

### **Meaning: Sellars 1962**

Rather than concocting a direct answer, let’s examine another context in which ‘episode’ or ‘event’ plays a central role: the theory of meaning. An excursion into the core theory of meaning develops insight into the WS’s position on events better than any other. The Notre Dame Lectures contain enough introductions to the mechanics of the theory of meaning to suit most appetites: the appendix “A Dot-Quote Primer” provides a detailed summary of the machinery.

<sup>22</sup> SRTT, 108.

<sup>23</sup> See Chrucky’s account of the WS’s images, Andrew Chrucky, Fordham Dissertation, 1990, Chapter 2-4, see [www.ditext.com/chrucky/chru-0.html](http://www.ditext.com/chrucky/chru-0.html), provides a eminently accessible account of the Manifest and Scientific Images and how they fit into the Sellarsian scheme. One can disagree with much of what Chrucky has to say and still regard it as an interesting way of looking at WS’s project. When Chrucky argues that in events in the narrow sense belong to both the Manifest Image and the Scientific Image, he parts company with Sellars. Perhaps it would help to point out that over the years, I heard WS invent and populate countless versions of the Images: they were creations of the ongoing dialectic, to be used in order to gain the higher ground which, when done, meant that the Images served but could serve no longer. It was often like that. Once, when I was giving a version of what I thought he was saying in TTC, by “If there is knowledge of spatiotemporal objects, then these objects conform to general truths satisfying such and such conditions” is, as a whole, an analytic statement belonging to transcendental philosophy,” he said, chuckling, “yes, that’s all there, perhaps like the oak is in the acorn!” “Right,” I replied, “but your acorns have acorns inside of them.” One of the great benefits of the Notre Dame lectures is that we get to see how this dialectic unfolds and pieces of the lectures appear and reappear in various other works, polished and remastered. Except for his apology over the mis-steps by “Sellars 1957” in the theory of events, I don’t remember any other episode of philosophical contrition.

It was previously noted that WS's model of language contains crucial simplifying assumptions in the manner of Carnap and Reichenbach but also other central assumptions occur:

It must not be forgotten that *the semantical characterization of overt verbal episodes is the primary use of semantical terms, and that overt linguistic events as semantically characterized are the model for the inner episodes introduced by the theory.*<sup>24</sup>

Again, recall that WS works with a “myth” if you will, a rationally reconstructed notion of thought and linguistic episodes so here he emphasizes the parasitic character of *thought*: it is parasitic upon *linguaging*. But, he also claims that the linguistic *episodes* themselves *in their primary sense* as bearers of meaning are not to be confused with *inscriptions* or *utterances* which are the *product* of linguaging. The point that the events are the bearers of meaning is often repeated:

It is often said that it is people rather than utterances which mean. But utterances are people uttering; the claim in question is true only in the trivial sense in which certain movements are a waltz only in so far as a person moving in certain ways is a person waltzing.<sup>25</sup>

Episode expressions that pick out the verbal behavior of language users are in the object language:

The familiar saw that words have meaning only because people mean things by them is harmless if it tells us that words have no meaning in abstraction from their involvement in the verbal behavior of language users.<sup>26</sup>

Words are meaningful because they comprise verbal activity, verbal episodes. Inscriptions or utterances objects that are not events—have meaning only in the derivative sense, in the sense that they are parasitic upon the episodes that give them life. The mere inscriptions or the words, abstracted from the linguistic episodes are objects but not events. They cannot have meaning in the primary sense. “But why?” we might ask, “why is that sense that they have meaning dependent on something more primary?”

*Truth and Correspondence* (1962) gives the most comprehensive account of the theory of meaning during the period and WS

<sup>24</sup> EPM, 188.

<sup>25</sup> FD, 151, 1966.

<sup>26</sup> LTC, 523, 1969.

continues to refer to the explanation there all the way to the end of the Notre Dame Lectures.

### Relationalism

The Notre Dame Lectures could not contain a more sustained attack on a philosophical position than the attack on *Relationalism*. And of course, the engine of *Relationalism* is the “means rubric” construed on the familiar relational model. “Relations, relations, relations!” Sellars says, striking the podium, “I want to get rid of all of them!” Indeed. The purge begins with the “means rubric.”

Sellars offers a reconstruction of the “means rubric” that has since become part of the philosophical landscape. WS attacks the keystone of *Relationalism*: namely, that meaning statements of the form

S (in L) means *p*

that is, the *means rubric*, are relational statements that assert a relation between linguistic and nonlinguistic items. For WS, both the terms in the meaning relation must have meaning and therefore must both belong to the linguistic order. Meaning statements, he argues, are specialized theoretical devices that function to say that one linguistic entity is a counterpart of another or, as he frequently puts it, that two words, sentences, or linguistic items have the same use or role.

Sometimes referred to as the “network theory of meaning,” it invokes the metaphor of words as meaning what they do because of their complete role in the “cognitive economy,” the complete actualization of transactions and exchanges—the web—in which a term is caught—on analogy with the way that the rules of a game, say Chess, constitute each piece by “virtue of the patterns they make” when producing in a “chessing-around” frame of mind.<sup>27</sup>

However this should not leave us with the impression that there is a similarity between

<sup>27</sup> SM, 76.

‘Rot’ (in German) means *red*

and

‘rot’ and ‘red’ have the same use.

Aside from the fact that the second mentions the word ‘red’ but the latter does not, the differences Sellars focuses upon rest on his view that the former presupposes that the speaker knows how to use the word ‘red’. In using the means rubric, one is being asked to rehearse their use of the word ‘red’, so the theme is one of *meaning as translation*: if one wants to know what ‘Rot’ means, sit down, brew a cup of coffee and rehearse the use of ‘red’ in English if we want to understand how to use ‘Rot’. “The translation use of ‘mean’ gives expression to the fact that the same linguistic role can be played by different expressions.”<sup>28</sup>

To explore the difference between the context of the means rubric and ordinary translation statements, Sellars introduces his notion of dot-quotes to represent a special form of quotation and argues that meaning statements can be regarded as if they embody this special form of quotation which is an extension of the historical conventions that developed into ordinary quotation. While ordinary quotes form expressions that have an intra-linguistic use, dot-quoted expressions have an inter-linguistic use. Furthermore, dot-quoted expressions are more general than ordinary quoted expressions because they pick out similarities of role, and ignore the empirical differences between the expressions which play the role in different languages.

Thus,

‘Rot’ (in German) means *red*

is analyzed as a phrase which actually involves a specialized form of quotation,

‘Rot’ (in German) means •red•.

Sellars takes the second to be a way of saying

<sup>28</sup> LT, 110.

‘Rot’s (in German) *are* •red•s

so he takes the “means rubric” to be a specialized form of a copula the chief advantage of which comes when we realize that dot-quoting functions as a perspicuous replacement for the nominalization *redness*:

we get an interpretation of abstract singular terms which is a powerful tool for dealing with problems in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. For to make this move is to construe ‘stands for’ as a specialized form of the copula ‘to be’, the surface features of which (a) indicate that the subject matter is linguistic rather than, for example, military or religious; (b) make possible such contrasts as those between ‘stands for’, ‘connotes’, ‘denotes’, ‘refers to’ and ‘names’...<sup>29</sup>

In TC, WS develops the idea that learning to use words requires learning the many-layered rules of a language and, as a result, exhibiting the uniformities in linguistic behavior brought about through those rules.<sup>30</sup> The network of roles, that is, the network which constitutes the meaning of the terms in a language bring it about the language pictures the world, the central and essential function of language,

the *sine qua non* of all others, is to enable us to picture the world in which we live.<sup>31</sup>

While the shifting, dynamic uniformities that constitute the picturing are brought about by the normative structure we characterize as the web of meanings, picturing itself is a matter-of-factual relation between systems of items that are in-the-world in the *narrow sense* in a way that does not involve norms:

<sup>29</sup> SM, 81.

<sup>30</sup> Levels of language mirror movements up and down the semantic ladder. WS uses his contemporaries inability to know where they are on the ladder to great effect. To his ears, their pronouncements must have sounded like a beginning philosophy student confusing use and mention.

<sup>31</sup> TC, 46.

If picturing is to be a relation between objects in the natural order, this means that the linguistic objects in question must belong to the natural order. And this means that we must be considering them in terms of empirical properties and matter-of-factual relations, though these may, indeed must, be very complex, involving all kinds of constant conjunctions or uniformities pertaining to the language user and his environment. Specifically, although we may, indeed must, know that these linguistic objects are subject to rules and principles—are fraught with “ought”—we abstract from this knowledge in considering them as objects in the natural order.<sup>32</sup>

The distinction involving linguistic objects in the natural order, that is, objects *in the world* in the *narrow* sense that does not involve norms, contrasts with linguistic objects that are *in the world* in the *broad* sense—the dot-quoted counterparts—which involve the conception of norms and standards.

The notoriously Janus-faced dot-quoted expressions cannot be viewed in isolation because, although as natural linguistic objects, they are treated as if discrete items in the world in the *narrow* sense, like any other functionally characterized object, it is an illusion borne of the “abstraction” mentioned: a prolate spheroid that happens to be an American or Canadian football makes an abysmal Soccer ball. Similarly, the items that constitute a world-map cannot be broken-off and regarded independently. In other words, one must not lose sight of the fact that the dot-quoted expressions giving rise to the natural linguistic objects are *in the world* in the *broad* sense. As Sellars notes in a related context, while natural linguistic objects are in the world in the narrow sense, the corresponding dot-quoted expressions,

are “in the world” only *in that broad sense* in which the ‘world’ includes linguistic norms and roles

32 TC, 44.

viewed (thus in translating) from the standpoint of a fellow participant.<sup>33</sup>

Thus, when WS remarks that “the only objects in the world are particulars,” by that, he means, *in the world* in the *narrow sense* that excludes linguistic norms and roles.<sup>34</sup> In a sense, there *really are no* linguistic objects in a broad sense—in the sense that they are entities of which the world is ‘made up’—to steal a phrase from *TWO*. The distinction between the ways items can be in the world presupposes the distinction between the normative and the non-normative so the world includes only linguistic objects in their empirical, descriptive or matter-of-factual terms.<sup>35</sup>

While the terms in the means rubric are both in the world in the broad sense because they involve the conception of norms and standards, “picturing is a complex matter-of-factual relation.”<sup>36</sup>

Picturing...is a relation, indeed, a relation between two relational structures. And pictures, like maps, can be more or less adequate. The adequacy concerns the ‘method of projection’.<sup>37</sup>

The “relational structure” is spatial in, as it were, a *coarse sense* which we’ll consider later. The crucial point is that the natural linguistic objects underpinning meaning itself are in the world in a *narrow sense*:

A statement to the effect that a linguistic item pictures a nonlinguistic item by virtue of the semantical uniformities characteristic of a certain conceptual structure is, in an important sense, an object language statement, for even though it mentions linguistic objects, it treats them as items in the order of causes and effects, i.e. *in rerum natura*, and speaks directly of their functioning in this order in a way which is to be sharply contrasted with the metalinguistic statements of logical se-

33 NS, 7, 1962, italics PA.

34 NS, 11, Indeed, NS can be taken as an attempt to make clear the two sense of being in the world.

35 WS often exhibits a Kantian playfulness when dealing with the semantic and syntactic ladders. Once, during an argument over one of the Pittsburgh Pirates being overpaid, I said that it doesn’t really matter because debts aren’t in the world in the narrow sense, to which WS replied, “Sure they are, I pay debts with dollar bills [as he pulled one out of his pocket and waved it in my face] and this dollar bill is in the world!”

36 SM, 136, 1966.

37 SM, 135.

mantics, in which the key role is played by abstract singular terms.<sup>38</sup>

The Strategy is clear (ignoring the exaggerated appeal to ‘the order of causes’): WS drives home the point that the traditional construal of the means rubric ignores the distinction between meaning and picturing, the distinction between forms of reality—being in the world in the *broad* and the *narrow* sense—and confuses the uniformities brought about by norms and standards with the norms and standards themselves.

### Events: Sellars 1957

Suppose now that we take the 1957 analysis of meaning and turn it on the statement made earlier about the “familiar saw” that words mean because of their involvement in verbal behavior, that is, we turn it on the theory of events? In particular the event,

Jones says ‘fa’.

Linguistic events, episodes of uttering or inscribing have meaning in the primary sense—they are in the world in the narrow sense. Of course, linguistic events taken in the full-blooded normative sense that constitutes roles are not in the world in the narrow sense. But, *linguistic events insofar as they constitute the complex matter-of-factual picturing relation as natural linguistic objects are in the world in the narrow sense*. We are reminded of the topic in TC:

My topic, therefore, can be given a provisional formulation as follows: Is there a sense of ‘correspond’, other than that explicated by semantic theory, in which empirical truths correspond to objects or events in the world?<sup>39</sup>

Ultimately, although *TC* vacillates between the correlate of the product of the *inscribings* of the perfect inscriber, namely, the inscriptions, and the *inscribings* themselves as linguistic events, the inscriptions are involved in a merely secondary or derivative sense.

Earlier, WS provided an account of what it means to say that events are derivative objects and therefore, talk about events can be eliminated by means of Reichenbachian transformations (context-

<sup>38</sup> SM, 137.

<sup>39</sup> TC, 30.



tual definitions) in favor of talk about changing things. How do the transformations work on a linguistic event? For example,

Jones says 'fa'.

Recall that WS introduced a transformation schema:

$$S's \ V\text{-ing} \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{is taking place} \\ \text{took place} \\ \text{will take place} \end{array} \right. \quad \equiv \quad \begin{array}{l} Vs \\ Ved \\ Will \ V \end{array}$$

The transformation schema, however, *does not apply* to the following episode expression:

Jones saying that fa

which would reduce to,

Jones says that fa

because it is not one of the appropriate forms:

$$\dots \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{is taking place} \\ \text{took place} \\ \text{will take place} \end{array} \right.$$

These forms will reduce, for example,

Jones saying that fa took place

to

Jones said that fa

but will go no further.

Since events are *derivative objects*, the expectation would be that statements about the linguistic event of *Jones saying that fa* are eliminable in favor of statements about Jones which, given the underlying ontology, seems bizarre.

The theory of meaning exacerbates the problem because in addition to people *linguaging*, linguistic *events*, as we have just seen, occur in the picturing relation

... pictures 0<sub>1</sub>

yet not only does the linguistic event of Jones saying ‘fa’ *fail* to fit the recipe for elimination via contextual transformations, it contains an element that is, as WS says in the lectures, *that-ed*. While Reichenbach’s transformations will take us from an *event-argument* to a *thing-argument*, the transformation itself is a *wholistic transformation* which, for our purposes, means that *that-ed* item is ineliminable.<sup>40</sup> To this point, the theory provides no recipe for transforming empirical descriptive expressions referring to events into expressions for language-users.

Indeed, one searches in vain for a way of handling,

...is an event

because, for *Sellars 1957*, there is no need for an *Abstract Entities*-type treatment, events *are* in the object language, after all. What, then, are we to make of

Jones’ V-ing is an event,

which, as a derivative object, is supposed to be reducible to a statement that mentions only Jones? Reichenbach’s transforms weren’t designed to deal with categorizing statements. But where do we turn, then, when we leave the necessary abstraction of *inscriptions* and look for cash in terms *inscribings* and *utterings*?

The upshot is that the recipe for treating linguistic events, presented in WS 1957, does not work in the picturing relation. As a result, the transformations, the contextual definitions, in short, all the *machinery* associated with statements that have meaning in the *primary sense* which are also events does not cohere with the treatment of picturing. It is as if Sellars, having been hypnotized by the treatment of the derivative objects—inscriptions and utterances, for example—focused on what he himself regarded as an abstraction. The corresponding linguistic events, which, as the primary bearers of meaning should have been the primary target of the discussion, remain unanalyzable by the available transformations.

### **Events Redux: Sellars 1969**

<sup>40</sup> Reichenbach, §48, p. 269.

By the late 60s, WS had grown increasingly dissatisfied with the 1957 analysis of events—a dissatisfaction that first finds expression in *MCP*.<sup>41</sup> That it bothered him is evident in these lectures when, many years later, he still regards the early treatment of events as a significant mistake. By the early 70s, there were questions about the ontology of events.<sup>42</sup> As a result of WS's dissatisfaction, the ontology of events is brought in line with the treatment of abstract entities generally. Still, WS proved to be fairly coquettish about the way the 1957 treatment of meaning should be reformulated now that he had taken the primary bearers of meaning *out* of the world in the narrow sense.<sup>43</sup> Since it seemed to me that the reformulation of the event analysis and the theory of meaning were on a collision course, it led to some fairly persistent badgering. My exasperation amused WS but one day, he pointed out the general direction that a solution would take. The story goes like this.

In Sellars 1957, events are in the world in the *narrow* sense,

Caesar's crossing the Rubicon

is another way of saying,

Caesar crossed the Rubicon.

Thus, characterizations of events, as derivative objects, can be replaced by statements mentioning only the “changing things” participating in those events. *Linguistic* events, on the other hand,

<sup>41</sup> See footnote 6, p. 230.

<sup>42</sup> Jack Norman was working on events, WS refers to his work much later in FMPP (7, p. 64) yet Jack's treatment meshes with the 1957 analysis. Jack worked with Barry Hamilton on the ontology of events, Hamilton got me interested. To say that I was completely baffled by the direction of WS's thinking at the time would be the understatement of the century. Chrucky's event2 is not exactly what WS has in mind for “event” in the Piercean ideal framework in which events are processes. For one thing, Broad's phenomenological approach to deriving events2 does not work for WS. WS uses Pritchard's strategy—as he mentions in the lectures—we easily mistake certain experiences for events. Indeed, part of the problem with the relativistic interpretation of time and events rests on just this sort of confusion. The ontology Broad wants is completely wrong as it brings events and time into the ground floor. Similarly, WS introduces events in the fine-grained sense as part of our regulative ideal—not as Chrucky implies, as part of the thing-kind framework.

<sup>43</sup> In addition, linguistic events started to play a more prominent role as he pushed the VB model of mental events.

considered in matter-of-factual terms and standing in the complex matter-of-factual relations to objects in the world so as to constitute a dynamic picture are objects in the world. If the former gives us “events” in the Pickwickian sense, surely the latter gives us events in the Cheshire cat sense.

Sellars 1969, in confronting these issues, puts events in the world in the *broad* sense and tells us that the pair above involve the “truth move.”

Thus the next thing to note is that the concept of truth is the head of a family of what might be called alethic concepts: exemplification, existence, standing in (a relation), (an event’s) taking place, (a state of affairs) obtaining, being in (a state), and many others.<sup>44</sup>

Thus,

There clearly are such things as events; and the events in which a person participates do constitute a series. But if we look at one such event, say, the event of Caesar crossing the Rubicon it becomes apparent that what can be said by referring to the event in which Caesar participated can also be put without such reference. Thus, instead of saying,

the event of Caesar crossing the Rubicon took place

we can simply say,

Caesar crossed the Rubicon.

Indeed, it is clear that in ordinary discourse event-talk is in some sense derivative from substance-talk.<sup>45</sup>

While WS wants to hold the line on the “derivative” status of event-talk, the concept of “derivative” undergoes a metamorphosis:

28. Turning now to the ontological implications of the above analysis, the next point to be noticed and

<sup>44</sup> NAO, 100.

<sup>45</sup> MCP,226; AAE,53,

stressed is that according to it events are not objects, save in that very broad sense in which anything that can be talked about is an object. Thus the only objects proper involved in Socrates' running are Socrates himself... talk about events is a way of talking about things changing. Thus there are no events in addition to changing things and persons.

73. In other words we must take into account the fact that according to that analysis, 'running' as an event sortal is a metalinguistic nominalization of 'to run', as 'being red' is a metalinguistic nominalization of 'is red'... while, of course, there are events, there really are no events, for events are not basic items—atoms—in the furniture of the manifest image. This claim was supported by two lines of thought: (a) we can always retreat from statements which involve event locutions, and which ostensibly make a commitment to a domain of events as objects in the world, thus

A running by Socrates took place  
to statements which do not, thus  
Socrates ran.

(b) Since (a), by itself, is compatible with the claim that it is events, rather than things, which are primary, the dominant consideration was, according to our analysis, that event locutions belong one step up the semantic ladder and refer to linguistic or conceptual items, rather than to items in the world.<sup>46</sup>

As he puts it in Perspectives II,

So what we have then is the sentence  
Socrates runs  
and we also have the event sentence  
a running by Socrates took place.

The latter is what I want to focus attention on because what you can say in a simple subject predicate sentence like 'Socrates runs', we can also say by means of the locution,

<sup>46</sup> FMPP, II.

a running by Socrates took place.

Now ‘taking place’, it should be clear, is a cousin of ‘exemplifies’. The last time I was characterizing *exemplification* as equivalent to “true of”, for example

**a** exemplifies triangularity

is a higher order semantical statement to the effect that certain abstract entities namely triangularity, is true of a. I called ‘exemplifies’ an alethic expression, referring to the word ‘true’ and what I want to suggest now is that when we say that

a running by Socrates took place

what we are really doing is saying

that he runs is/was/will be true of Socrates.

Thus ‘taking place’ is an alethic expression.

The earlier transformation schema from *TWO* is replaced:

The generic form of events, sentences, and, hence, of action sentences is:

S’s V-ing  $\begin{cases} \text{took place} \\ \text{is taking place} \\ \text{will take place} \end{cases}$

I have proposed that this generic form be reconstructed as:

$\begin{cases} \text{was true} \\ \text{That } S \text{ Vs } \begin{cases} \text{is true} \\ \text{will be true}^{47} \end{cases} \end{cases}$

Thus, for Sellars 1969,

Socrates’ running too place

has, the form

That Socrates runs was true

which is perspicuously analyzed as

The •Socrates runs• was true

and tells us that statements of that type were once correctly assertible. The transformation of event-talk turns out to be a special case of the truth move.

Events, for Sellars 1957 conflated a metalinguistic statement with the statement that it is about. While in the earlier theory it was

47 AAE, 60.

*events* in the world in the *narrow* sense that were derivative objects and dependent on substances, it is now event-talk that gives us derivative sortal expressions applying to items that are in the world in the *broad* sense. Indeed, events are a species of proposition. Yet, propositions are a type of linguistic event! As WS remarks,

The proposition that-p...would rather be an event-or action-type which ‘involves’, in a manner by no means easy to analyze, the proposition that-p...<sup>48</sup>

And, according to the theory of meaning, the primary use of dot-quoted expressions is the classification of linguistic events:

Thus what we are really classifying are linguistic activities...when all the proper moves have been made,

Jones said that snow is white  
becomes

Jones •snow is white•ed.<sup>49</sup>

We can form contrived verbs that serve as the basis for the propositional expressions:

Thus, in

Jones says that it is raining

the “it is raining” is being used to form the name of a linguistic type of which, if the statement is true, some Jonesean verbal behavior is a token. Otherwise put, some Jonesean verbal behavior is an •it is raining•.<sup>50</sup>

So,

to •it rains•

will be the available verb that applies to items that are in the world in a *broad* sense.

The *problem* is that picturing requires objects in the world in the *narrow* sense so linguistic events could not enter into the picturing relation *except* when considered in matter-of-factual terms (as natural linguistic objects). The exception works for Sellars 1957 because events could be so construed. But it doesn’t work for Sellars 1969.

<sup>48</sup> AAE, 10.

<sup>49</sup> MP, 237.

<sup>50</sup> PP, 287.

The event

Caesar crossing the Rubicon

is analyzed by the dot-quoted expression,

the •Caesar crossed the Rubicon•

which is to be understood in terms of the linguistic role and governing norms of the phrase that is illustrated. Events have been moved *up* the ladder *away* from picturing and, if we were to take the approach given above from the lecture *Perspectives II*, the expressions involve “a higher order semantical statement to the effect that certain abstract entities namely [an event], is true of [Caesar].” Events are no longer in the world in the *narrow* sense *nor* are they “derivative objects.” Indeed, they are not “objects” at all except in the sense in which they are treated as “formal universals” or used “in second intention.”<sup>51</sup>

## The Truth Move

Although Sellars provides clues as to the resolution of the tension between the 1957 treatment of events and the 1969 treatment, the basic insight is contained in the “truth move” as he calls it in the lectures “Conceptual Change” and also in lecture “Existence.”<sup>52</sup> WS comments,

38. How does ‘that-fa’ function in ‘Jones says that-fa’ (where ‘says’ is used in the sense of ‘thinks-out-loud’)? To answer this question, we must ask a prior question:

How does “ ‘fa’ ” function in “Jones says ‘fa’”? The answer is that “ ‘fa’ ” functions as an adverbial modifier of the verb ‘says.’ Language can be written, spoken, gesticulated, etc., and ‘says’ serves to pin down the modality of a languaging to utterance. If speech were the only modality, or if we abstract from a difference of modality, we could replace

<sup>51</sup> I have discussed this in the appendix “A dot-quote primer.”

<sup>52</sup> The systematic treatment alluded to in AAE, 63 and CC, 25, was merely on the horizon.



Jones says 'fa'

by

Jones 'fa's,

i.e., use the expression-cum-quotes as a verb.

Roughly, to 'fa' would be first to 'f' and then to 'a.'

39. It is because there is a range of verbal activities involving the uttering of 'fa', e.g., asserting, repeating, etc., that we give it the status of an adverb and hence, in effect, require that even in the case of sheer thinking-out-loud there be a verb which it modifies.<sup>53</sup>

Consider, then, the linguistic event of

Jones' •Snow is white•*ing*

that pictures the snow. To do this job it must be an object in the world, and, under the analysis, the expression becomes,

the •Jones •Snow is white•s•

Compare,

that x Vs is true of Jones Socrates

which reduces to

•Jones •Snow is white•s•s

referring to sentences consisting of the contrived verbs that we constructed earlier.

Or, making the alethic character clear,<sup>54</sup>

(The event of) Jones V-ing took place

has, in the first place, the form

That Jones Vs was true

and, made more fully explicit, has the form

The •Jones Vs• was true.

and carries us, via the truth move, to

•Jones •Vs•s•                      •snow is white•s/Vs<sup>55</sup>

<sup>53</sup> NAO, VI, 38.

<sup>54</sup> MCP, 229.

<sup>55</sup> Sellars-Rosenberg, 300.

“Which tells us, in first approximation,” WS says, “that expressions consisting of a •V•s appropriately concatenated with an •Jones• are true<sup>56</sup> and, by Wittgenstein’s insight, the expression applies to

•Jones•s

having a certain character. “I am indeed committed to the following,” WS writes, “•a•s [•Jones•s] are STs...” but “not *mere* STs but PROPSs.”<sup>57</sup> Granted, WS goes on to say, the instances of •Jones•V•s•s are object, they are “not objects which, considered as a linguistic role players, are *mere* singular terms.”<sup>58</sup> But, since

•Jones•s are singular terms,

the material mode equivalent of which is

Jones is an object

indeed, a basic object, then the analysis reveals the sense in which

(The event of) Jones •snow is white•ing

is *Jones* (as a language user). Linguistic events are language users and, in the primary sense, it is *persons* (the ultimate objects so to speak, the particulars named by BSTs) as language users that picture the world:

the primary mode of being of “expressions” is people speaking...Thus what we are really classifying are linguistic activities.<sup>59</sup>

Thus, for Sellars 1969, for reasons similar to those given for the existence of states of affairs,

There really are events

is true but, in the final analysis,

<sup>56</sup> CC, 87.

<sup>57</sup> Sellars-Rosenberg Correspondence, 301, they are ATPROPSs according, 312.

<sup>58</sup> Sellars-Rosenberg, 301. Compare SM, 105.

<sup>59</sup> MP, 237; CC, 24; MFC, 429; NO, 75§48; Rosenberg-Sellars, 316.

There *really are* no events in the world (in the narrow sense)

which is the material mode formulation of the realization that the singular terms which ostensibly name events turn out, in the formal mode, to be *metalinguistic* predicates.<sup>60</sup>

“On the revised theory of events,” I asked WS, “if linguistic events aren’t in the world in the narrow sense, how can they picture?” He replied, “Events don’t picture, people do!”

And that is my story. Whereas triangularity is an easy move up the semantic ladder because it arrives at the familiar form of *being triangular*, there’s no *run-ity*, *run-ness* or *run-hood* that stands above *run* so, instead, we lean on *running* that manages to disguise its metalinguistic or conceptualistic pedigree. If we aren’t on our guard, events tend to escape into the world and become nightmares like 9/11 from which we must be protected by Homeland Security.

## Time

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Time is in trouble. For, just as Sellars 1969 revisited events, the treatment of time in Sellars 1957 must be revised. As one can anticipate, Sellars 1957 takes *time* to be derivative as he construed events to be.<sup>61</sup> While he rejects the view that concepts pertaining to time are explicitly definable in terms of relations between events (and, therefore, not derivative entities in his technical sense), he defends the notion that time is the counterpart of empirically ascertainable relationships between events. WS poses the problem,

“But,” it will be said, “even granting that something like the position you have been sketching can stand the gaff, you have not yet shown how metrical relations between empirically ascertainable episodes can be derivative from nonrelational temporal facts concerning things. For, as you yourself have insisted, if things are the only basic individuals, then all rela-

<sup>60</sup> Rosenberg-Sellars, 318.

<sup>61</sup> TWO, 551.

tional temporal facts pertaining to episodes must rest on nonrelational temporal facts pertaining to things.”<sup>62</sup>

WS’ first view is consistent with this early treatment of time because events are in the world in a narrow sense. So what happens when, as Sellars 1969 avers, there aren’t even any episodes in the world in the narrow sense upon which to hang temporal facts? What of time then?

### Changing Things: Sellars 1949

An issue has been waiting in the wings since the start: why isn’t talk about “changing things” smuggling in the concept of an event? For the historically sensitive philosopher, the answer to that question is bound up with a peripatetic slogan famously ridiculed by Descartes: *motus est actus entis in potentia, quatenus est in potentia*.<sup>63</sup> And often finds expression in WS’ claim that mental “acts” are not “actions” (events).<sup>64</sup>

The treatment of events in *TWO* takes place within the explanatory framework of *kinds of things*. A good idea of what WS has in mind emerges in APM.<sup>65</sup>:

It is especially significant to the historian of philosophy that the thing-nature framework, though historically prior to and more “natural” than the event-law framework which was to dominate science from the seventeenth century on, could be correctly analyzed only by a philosopher who has a clear conception of a law of nature...the language of things and properties, states and circumstances, where it is appropriate sums up what we know.<sup>66</sup>

Now, he notes, the elaboration of concepts within the thing-nature framework may be roughly hewn common sense but it is an *explanatory* framework:

<sup>62</sup> TWO, 552

<sup>63</sup> Motion is the act of being in potency, inasmuch as this is in potency.

<sup>64</sup> In case one wonders why WS worries so little about determinism, the answer is rooted in his rational reconstruction of talk about “mental events” which, once defanged, become “actualities” which “take place” but aren’t events. And, of course, for him, since there are no events in the narrow sense, a determinism that rests on relations between particulars can’t get off the ground.

<sup>65</sup> Aristotelian Philosophies of Mind, 1949.

<sup>66</sup> APM, n 22 .4.

It follows from what we have been saying that concepts of *kinds of things* are the ways in which common sense crystallizes its experience of the world, and that this crystallization contains the common-sense grasp of natural laws, crude and incomplete though this grasp may be. To the philosopher it is an interesting and important fact that common sense thus formulates its understanding of the *world order* in terms of a framework which, when correctly analyzed, is seen to be logically more complicated than that of a functional correlation of events...I conclude, then, that the concept of the nature of a thing, in so far as it is a coherent one, can be analyzed in terms of the concept of dovetailing set of dispositional properties which specify both the states by which it has responded to its historical circumstances, and the states by which it *would* have responded to other circumstances.<sup>67</sup>

How then, do the dispositions get called into play? WS remarks,

Process must not only *depend on*, it must also somehow be *derived from* factors which are intrinsically immune from change or becoming... Now, things or substances change; but it does not even make sense (except metaphorically) to say that the natures or forms of things change. Thus, change is impossible unless there is more to things than their forms.

In the thing-nature framework the specific correlation of states and circumstances, the ontological fruitfulness, the overflow, arises from the powers, the potentialities of things which are the “more” to which WS refers.<sup>68</sup>

*Motion* in the thing-nature framework is defined by elements common to all categories of being. There are two such elements: *potency* and *act*. As the Aristotelian—the progenitor of the thing-nature framework—sees it, motion is not a purely passive

<sup>67</sup> APM 22 .

<sup>68</sup> WS acknowledges his indebtedness to C.D. Broad’s discussion of dispositional properties and the concept of the nature of a thing in *An Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy* (1933), Vol I. pp. 142-151, 264-278. See also chap. X of his *The Mind Its Place in Nature*.

potency; for there can be rest in what is simply possibility. A house, prior to being built, can remain indefinitely in the state of mere possibility. Motion is not perfect act, either; for once the house is built it remains in permanent act and all the motion has ceased. Motion, then, is not purely a potency nor purely an act, and yet we can define it only through potency and act. Hence it must necessarily be an admixture of act and potency, it must participate both in act and in potency.<sup>69</sup> As Aquinas summarizes it:

We must realize, then, that something may be in act only, something may be in potency only, and something may be midway between pure potency and perfect act. What is only in potency is not yet being moved; what is already in perfect act is not being moved but has already been moved.<sup>70</sup>

Hence a thing that is being moved is something that is in between pure potency and act, something that is partly in potency and partly in act.

The slogan, which Descartes scorns, rests on a significant piece of the explanatory machinery peculiar to the thing-kind framework of common sense—a framework dominated by the biological metaphors ( “metaphors” to *us*) of growth and decay. *Changing things* are things in motion. Things move because of the dovetailing set of dispositional properties.<sup>71</sup> *Actualities* are not acts or events, WS is fond of accusing historically challenged determinists of confusing “mental actualities” with “mental events” but the concept of an event is not framework neutral and does not have a place in the basic thing-kind framework. The discussion of time must begin with statements about changing things:

It is time, therefore, that we faced the fact that if we are going to take *things* as our only primitive logical

<sup>69</sup> I am borrowing from DeRegnon’s legendary discussion here.

<sup>70</sup> Physics, III, lesson 2.

<sup>71</sup> Actuality and potentiality are not non-explained explainers but the trip down that rabbit-hole can just as easily be found in C.D. Broad who, by the way, warns against using motion in the manner we have but, goes on to use it anyway. Suarez, in particular, was famous for his attempt to drill down from actuality and potentiality to the more basic but that is a discussion for another occasion.

individuals, we must find a *nonrelational* way of talking about *changing things* by the use of tensed verbs which provides a logical basis for statements about topological and metrical *relations* between events when it is translated into the derived framework of episodes and events which we have been concerned to analyze.<sup>72</sup>

It helps to draw a distinction between talk about ‘event’ in a *course-grained* sense and ‘event’ in a *fine-grained* sense. In the Sellars of *TWO*, the distinction between the Manifest Image and the Scientific Image had not yet crystallized. As a result, it is easy to confuse cases which would later be split neatly between the two. A problem exacerbated by the fact that many of the interesting cases, involve the issue of failing to distinguish between cases in which one is moving on from an image and when one is abandoning an image.<sup>73</sup> If one reads the referenced sections of C.D. Broad *through* Sellarsian eyes tuned to the character and differences between conceptual frameworks, one comes up with a reasonable approximation of what WS has in mind by ‘event’ in the *coarse-grained* sense of the thing-kind framework. The general distinction between a course-grained explanatory framework and the “fine-grained” explanatory framework persists throughout WS’ works.<sup>74</sup>

However, where C.D. Broad finds *facts* and *events* as ultimate ontological categories<sup>75</sup>, WS takes seriously the idea of an *event* as *motion* in the classical sense described above and therefore talk about events is often replaced by talk about actuality and potentiality. The concept of an event, we might say, evolves with WS’ theory of events and moves from being a member of the “motion” family (where it is “in the world” in the narrow sense) to being a member of a conceptual category of items “in the world” in the broad sense until their final transposition into the ultimate regulative (Piercean) scientific framework as *pure processes*. Not, mind you, the *processes* of C.D. Broad unless Broad has first been

<sup>72</sup> *TWO*, 551.

<sup>73</sup> When I was pestering WS about this question, the answer came in the form of CC.

<sup>74</sup> 2 MFC, 418; NO, 64; SM, 53; OAFP, 309, for example.

<sup>75</sup> C.D. Broad, especially, 151.

squeezed through the Manifest Image *cum* Scientific image repertoire of categorial distinctions.<sup>76</sup>

The emerging Aristotelian thing-kind framework that includes events in a merely *coarse-grained* sense cannot even support determinism—it would be incoherent.<sup>77</sup> The actuality-potentiality distinction, by which Aristotle eloquently solved the Heraclitean problem of change, underwrites event-talk.

### Time: Sellars 1957

Returning now to the problem of time—now that we have some idea of the *coarse-grained* concept of an event—what is the status of time in the common-sense world? Since it is a question that WS sets out to answer in *TWO*, one expects an answer to be forthcoming.<sup>78</sup> Since Time is bound up with events, one would expect that as with events, Time finds a place in the common-sense world in a coarse-grained sense:

What is of somewhat greater interest, however, is that our analysis throws light on the sense in which ‘there are’ temporal relations at all. For while there clearly are temporal relations between events, the latter (we have argued) have a derivative status in the sense that statements about events are, in principle, translatable into statements about changeable things. If we put this somewhat misleadingly by saying that ‘ultimately’ or ‘in the last analysis’ there are no such things as events, we must also say that ‘ultimately’ or ‘in the last analysis’ there *are* no such *things* as temporal *relations*.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>76</sup> A difference which should be apparent when reading, say, C.D. Broad, 142.

<sup>77</sup> Sellars would argue that the concept of an event required for determinism doesn’t arrive on the scene until after the Cartesians. If one invokes a relation between particulars to ground determinism, WS argues against the idea at length in his treatment of Spinoza, see KPT for his discussion. For a discussion of episodes as actualities, see, for example, Sellars-Aune Correspondence; SM, 31, 70-71, 156-157; FD, 153; ME, 3; MP§45.

<sup>78</sup> *TWO*, 527.

<sup>79</sup> *TWO*, 550.



### Events: Sellars 1969

But, we must ask, “By dragging events, in the *narrow sense*, out of the world by the scruff of their metaphysical necks, and putting them in the world in the broad sense, haven’t we done the same to time? After all, if events aren’t objects, there is nothing for their to be temporal relations between.” Given the discussion above, we can feel comfortable with the ontological implications:

Turning now to the ontological implications of the above analysis, the next point to be noticed and stressed is that according to it events are not objects, save in that very broad sense in which anything that can be talked about is an object. Thus the only objects proper involved in Socrates’ running are Socrates himself, and such other unproblematic objects as sand and gravel.<sup>80</sup>

And, indeed, on the new theory of events, although events aren’t objects in the world in the narrow sense, we have a means of talking about them:

With a qualification to be considered in the next section, talk about *events* is a way of talking about things changing. Thus there are no events *in addition* to changing things and persons.

And since this is so, it would seem that temporal relations must follow their relata up the metaphysical ladder and out of the world in the narrow sense. Indeed, WS follows up with the remark:

Another, but closely related, ontological point:  
*There are no temporal relations.*<sup>81</sup>

Nor, for that matter are there instants,

Instantaneous C#ings are to be construed not as building blocks in the world, but rather as *entia rationis* [linguistic/conceptualistic entities] tailored to fit the *entia rationis* which are instants.<sup>82</sup>

Later we will have to consider how WS incorporates Prichard’s reasons for challenging the view that time, events or motion can be

<sup>80</sup> FMPP, II, 28.

<sup>81</sup> FMPP, II, 30.

<sup>82</sup> FMPP, II, 120.

profitably characterized as perceivables. For now, let's continue with the present line of thought. Although the words WS uses differ slightly, the idea remains the same: events are in the world in the broad sense—the notion of *entia rationis* allows him to touch bases with the *philosophia perennis* in a way that he finds essential. But, whereas in Sellars 1957, the temporal relations were not in the world in the narrow sense because there were no events, Sellars 1969 takes a different strategy: *C*#ings don't *really* have duration because there aren't any in the requisite sense and there are no temporal relations because, aside from the fact that their ostensible *relata* are gone, temporal expressions are not *relational*. In *FMPP*, they are “connectives” which is as it should be: on the later view of events, events are sentences, not singular terms: the material mode

that S Vs is an event

is analyzed by

the •S Vs• is an event sentence (EPROP),

connectives, as WS goes on to point out, are needed to “connect” them. Although,

The•the •S Vs•• is a ST,

and, thus, an object, in the material mode, it is not an item that can stand in temporal “relations,” it is a kind.

WS was, at the time, unable to give an adequate formalization of event-talk, so he never discusses further, the “connectives” in the appropriate sense except to point out some of the logic required of them:

In the passage referred to in [*TWO* and *NO*], note 5 above, I characterized the above expressions as ‘temporal connectives’ to emphasize that like the logical connectives they are not relation words. I now think it better to construe them as adverbs, and await an adequate theory of adverbial modifiers for further illumination.<sup>83</sup>

So what are we to make of the earlier claim,

<sup>83</sup> *FMPP*, II, 34. Although WS refers to Jack Norman's work, Jack continued along the lines of Reichenbach who regarded events as in the world in the narrow sense.

I have argued elsewhere that tense—in that broad sense which includes both tensed verbs and such indicator words as ‘now’—is an irreducible feature of temporal discourse. In other words, the temporal aspects of the world cannot be captured by discourse from which all ‘tensedness’ has been eliminated. I shall not reargue this thesis which, after all, is widely held, on the present occasion. I shall simply take it to be an essential part of the larger story I am trying to tell.

Earlier, we came to grips with the sense in which events are *in the world* in the *broad* sense and, in our discussion of motion in the thing-kind framework, we have pointed out a sense in which “events” are in a coarse-grained way, in the world in a narrow sense. Can we do the same for time? Sellars remarks,

...there is the idea that time has the status of a quasi-theoretical entity the ultimate particulars of which are moments. According to the latter interpretation, metrical relationships between periods and moments of time would be ‘idealized’ counterparts of empirically ascertainable metrical relationships between episodes pertaining to everyday...things.<sup>84</sup>

In the lectures, WS addresses the sense in which time is introduced as a metrical framework rather than as part of the content of the world. So, how then, is time bound up with “statements concerning empirically ascertainable metrical relations between episodes [in the coarse-sense] pertaining to things of everyday life?”<sup>85</sup>

The use of tensed statements is a basic feature of the thing-kind framework and, even if one could pry it loose from the framework of time,

tensed discourse with these [temporal] connectives, but without the framework of time, would constitute a most primitive picture of the world.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>84</sup> TWO, 551.

<sup>85</sup> TWO, 551.

<sup>86</sup> TWO, 552.

WS argues for the ineliminability of tensed discourse and the ultimate incoherence of those who argue for “timeless facts” the detensed language of which constitutes the neutral foundation for these more basic items.<sup>87</sup>

Leaving aside the dismantling of proponents of a basic detensed language (contained in the text), it isn’t difficult to see what WS has in mind by the claim,

This makes it doubly important to see that episode-expressions are grounded in tensed statements about things, where these statements, since they are not singular terms, must be *that*-ed (in effect, quoted) to serve as the subject of statements to the effect that something physically implies something else.<sup>88</sup>

And indeed, on the theory of events for Sellars 1969, recall that in the analysis of events, events are propositions, and so, are a subcategory of PROP, e.g., EPROP.<sup>89</sup>

*Jones putting the litmus paper in acid* is an event,  
not an object

which is analyzed in the material mode as

*That Jones put the litmus paper in acid* is an event,  
not an object

and becomes, in formal mode,

The •*Jones put the litmus paper in acid*• is an  
EPROP, not a ST.<sup>90</sup>

Coincidentally, on the fine-grained analysis in the later theory of events, as WS says in *TWO*, ‘The •*Jones put the litmus paper in acid*•’ is not a singular term once it has been suitably “*that*-ed” and causal statements are metalinguistic in character.

87 *TWO*, 531-532. The “irreducible element of tensed discourse about things which is at the heart of our world picture,” 577. That there is a place for the detensed language is shown by Sicha in his *Mathematics*.

88 *TWO*, 543.

89 Exploiting the terminology of the Sellars-Rosenberg correspondence, January 16, 1973.

90 If events are propositions, then the expression which translates ‘event’ into the formal mode must stand for a species of sentence. Here we are coining the phrase ‘E-sentence’ for that species of sentence.

Turning to time in the coarse-grained sense, WS offers the following,

The temptation to think of the continuum of events topologically conceived apart from specific metrics as the basic reality which includes these metrics as specific patterns of topological relationship is a mislocation of the fact that metrical discourse about events is rooted in premetrical tensed discourse in which we talk about doing this or that while (before, after) other things do this or that in our immediate practical environment.<sup>91</sup>

Leaving aside the issue of events in the broad sense that constitute the topologically ordered continuum, let's examine how they are "rooted."

For the Kantian, time and space are the mediums by which we encounter things doing this or that, here or there.

**Time: 1957-1966**

What we've got so far creates a tension between Time as a relation between events which are *not* in the world in the narrow sense—in which case there *really are* no temporal relations—and Time as a relation between events in the broad sense—in which case there are temporal relations. And we need to point to WS' view about features of the Manifest Image that help make sense of these claims. In other words, what he is getting at when he remarks above, "temporal aspects of the world cannot be captured by discourse from which all 'tensedness' has been eliminated." It isn't necessary to go far because the relevant distinctions can be found in *Science and Metaphysics*:

Let me begin by drawing familiar distinctions. In the first place, between: (a) what I shall call, for reasons which will shortly emerge, 'fine-grained' or 'theoretical' Space... (b) Contrasting with this there is what I shall call 'coarse-grained' or empirical Space. It, too, is an infinite individual, but it is an individual the elements of which are *possibilities*—roughly, possible relations of perceptible material things.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>91</sup> TWO, 573.

<sup>92</sup> SM, 53, 'crude geometrical' concepts in ME, 204.

...Coarse-grained (or empirical) Space *consists of* possible relations of coarse-grained material things to one another. Here, the relation of ‘occupying a place’ is a special case of that interesting kind of relation which is ‘realizing a possibility’.<sup>93</sup>

WS makes a great deal out of the fact that Kant’s confusion about the status of coarse-grained space, was reflected in both his ontology about space and his ontology about time—a point that will turn out to be crucial later on. But, for now, it suffices to explore the coarse-grained or *empirical* space that finds its way into our everyday, manifest-framework-physics. For certainly, *empirical space* must be in the world in the *narrow* sense otherwise “picturing” wouldn’t exist nor would the Jumbies be able to say anything.

C.D. Broad’s discussion of McTaggart provides the context within which WS’ discussion of time and the world order takes place. Since the account itself takes place within the phenomenology of time, it is possible to mine it for insight without getting lost in Broad’s distinctions: pressing issues of his day have been exchanged for problems of our own. Aside from that, Broad presupposes the ontology of facts and events which we don’t want to presuppose. Thus, much of what he has to say needs to be transposed to a different key.

### Coarse-Grained Time and Space

Time and space are the mediums by which we experience thing-kinds.<sup>94</sup> WS accepts the Kantian approach with the significant modification that objects are *represented* in space and time. For our purposes, this will give us useful metaphors to talk about time. Time appears in tensed English in the form of Tense (5) and aspect: a change unfolds in a way (aspect) and “takes place” yesterday, tomorrow or now (tense). In this respect, “tense” bears a resemblance to the spatial “place” by locating change relative to a

<sup>93</sup> SM, 54.

<sup>94</sup> I will follow ideas suggested by Steven’s Pinker’s lectures on his work. To me, his Kantian sentiments and joy with the function of verbs make his work easy to reconstruct as suitably Sellarsian.

viewpoint (either the speaker moment or a reference event relative to the speaker) and “aspect” resembles the way possible relations of material things are distributed throughout the change (the way things might be “manys” or “ones”): the “shape” of a change, so to speak. The precision of the *ordering* in a change, like that in space, can be refined to an extent that depends on only the limits of one’s metaphysical microscope—adverbs (yesterday), complex noun phrases (*Stardate -314063.34746888274, 3<sup>rd</sup> house on the left under the overpass*). For our coarse-grained empirical space, it is enough that change is determinable relative to a “viewpoint.” It need not be fixed like a digital clock as long as the general flow—“coming abouts” in time extruded into the flow things—is observed (there-then, here-now), the coarse-grained measure of change (empirical time) doesn’t wait for precision, and ignores absolute detail (*it was there-then at 42.19N 122.51W elev. 5304’ at Stardate -314063.34746888274*).<sup>95</sup> It is aspect and not tense that often plays a key role in illustrating empirical time much in the way that shape plays a key role for empirical space. It often figures in WS’s (and Broad’s) examples as an open-ended present progressive (*crossing*) or closed-ended complete motion (*ran*) while the “instantaneous” or “momentaneous” punctual verbs (*kick, smack*) typically give way to the explicit appearance of ‘now’. The ‘now’ as a crude metrical concept works like the notion of a point-boundary on a simplified empiricist’s account of a line that has a boundary. For example, in a black cross drawn on a white page, one line is limited at the juncture by the horizontal line; they intersect at the point, the limit.<sup>96</sup>

The point here can be thought of as the limit of the boundary and it coincides, as it were, with the limit of the white. There is a limit there. We actually experience the white as limiting the black and the black as limiting the white: the experiencing of a limit. By ‘point’ is not meant something like a dot that has extensity; the point is the intersection of the

<sup>95</sup> WS doesn’t discuss cases that use a reference time, the perfect tenses, “The CEO of GM will have been fired by then,” “The CEO of Morgan Stanley had earned a billion dollar bonus by the crash.”

<sup>96</sup> ME, 205.

lines which are boundaries: they would be limits.  
 One vertical line is limited at the juncture by the  
 horizontal line; they intersect at a point.<sup>97</sup>

Space carries time along with it: if the course-grained notion of a line is treated as the end or boundary of a one-dimensional ribbon (in which, linguistically speaking, the other features are ignored), “cut the end off the leader,” makes perfectly good sense. “Time stuff,” then, when treated as a thing-kind taking up residence in coarse-grained space, develops similar “boundaries” as when one is asked “to begin their lecture when Jones is finished.” For the participant in the manifest world, time is parasitic in the sense that tense and aspect treat stuff and things in the thing-kind framework as stretching along dimensions with a certain shape (aspect) and somehow relative to the operant viewpoint (tense). Locations in coarse-grained time, like locations in coarse-grained space while digitized (near/far), stretch nebulously and indefinitely backward and ineluctably forward from me, the speaker, or form part of the present scenery with adverbs often keeping track of the details (yesterday, a long long time ago).

Granting with Sellars<sup>98</sup>, that time is encoded in tense and aspect, that tense works like prepositions and other spatial terms to locate relative to a viewpoint while aspect provides a “shape” for changes and that the “happenings in time are packaged like the flow of matter”<sup>99</sup>, we have a reasonably comfortable picture of the way that the manifest image account of *coarse-grained time* and *coarse-grained space* in the *narrow sense* are embedded in the language of common sense.

### **Absolute Becoming**

From this it follows that C.D. Broad’s notion of “goings-on,” “happenings” and the like, his *processes*, Sellars does not pry loose

97 ME, 205.

98 Steven Pinker provides commentary on verbs from which one can extrapolate ontological considerations

99 See Steven Pinker’s Google lecture on the Stuff of Thought.



from thing-kinds.<sup>100</sup> Indeed, while Sellars finds a place for processes, Broad's *absolute processes* do not belong to phenomenological reduction taking place within the Manifest Image: Broad's absolute processes represent the core of the *change* of conceptual frameworks as we move *away* from the Manifest Image. One can see that while WS 1957 locates events in the world in the narrow sense, C.D. Broad's flavor of *event* is not part of his basic furniture of the world as they are for Broad. WS is clear about the *derivative* status of events even if he hasn't realized a means of articulating "...is an event" in a way that works for both the Manifest and Scientific framework. Once events move one step up the semantic ladder, their treatment falls under the approach taken to conceptual change in general.

"Absolute Becoming" which Broad must treat as a non-explained explainer, WS treats gingerly in TWO<sup>101</sup> because, as he thought at the time, it is one of the fundamental forms of event expressions in the thing-framework where events are in the world in the narrow sense:

While things are referred to by names, the fundamental form of event expressions in the thing framework is indicated by the following:

‘S’s being     ,

‘S’s becoming     ,

‘S’s V-ing (or being V-ed )’ (where ‘V’ represents an appropriate verb).

Both ‘S’ and ‘S’s being V’ are singular terms, but their statuses within this category are radically different. We have already had quite a bit to say about the ‘existence’ of events and, indeed, of past, present, and future events within the framework of things. It is time we said something about the ‘existence’ of things themselves.<sup>102</sup>

100 C.D. Broad, I, 142ff.

101 TWO, 567, C. D. Broad, 277.

102 TWO, 561.

Thus, he remarks, these existence statements about things are “irreducibly tensed as statements about the qualitative and relational vicissitudes of things.” Putting,

(135)  $S \{ \text{is, was, will be} \}$  <sup>103</sup>

in parallel terms that make explicit the existential claim, gives us

(135)  $S \{ \text{exists, existed, will exist} \}$  <sup>104</sup>

The question, “What is the analysis given to these existence statements?” is answered, in part, in the monumental *GE*.

In the pivotal (1958), the examination is directed against the then current dogmatic reading of existential claims: that, for example,

$S$  is a man

is to be understood as,

$(\exists K) S$  is a  $K$

which gives the appearance of a commitment to the existence of entities of a higher order. Interestingly, WS notes,

Even if we could take it as established that to quantify over adjective-common noun- and statement-variables is not to assert the existence of qualities, kinds or propositions, we would sooner or later have to face the fact that ordinary language does involve the use of the singular terms and the common nouns which raise the spectre of Platonism—and, indeed, that we do make the existence statements which the Platonist hails as the substance of his position. For we do make such statements as ‘There is a quality (thus triangularity) which . . .’ ‘There is a class (thus, dog-kind—or the class of white things) which. . .’, and ‘There is a proposition (thus, that Caesar crossed the Rubicon) which . . .’. These statements, genuinely existential in character, make forthright ontological commitments. Or are these commitments, perhaps, less

<sup>103</sup> TWO, 561.

<sup>104</sup> TWO, 561.

forthright than they seem? Can they, perhaps, be ‘reduced’ to statements which make no reference, explicit or implicit, to ontological categories ?<sup>105</sup>

To put it somewhat differently,

that Caesar crossed the Rubicon is a proposition  
is the material mode, or categorial counterpart of the formal mode,  
that Caesar crossed the Rubicon is a sentence  
which WS suggests leads the way to extricating ourselves from Plato’s beard:

That existential quantification over predicate or sentential variables does not assert the existence of abstract entities. I then suggested that if the only contexts involving abstract singular terms of the forms *f*-ness, *K*-kind and *that-p* which could not be reformulated in terms of expressions of the forms ‘*x* is *f*, *x* is a *K*’, and ‘*p*’ were categorizing statements such as ‘*f*-ness is a quality’, ‘*K*-kind is a class’, ‘*p* is a proposition’, then we might well hope to relieve platonistic anxieties by the use of syntactical therapy.<sup>106</sup>

Aside from the general treatment of categorial statements such as  
( $\exists K$ ) *S* is a *K*

as

*S* is something,

*GE* brings us no closer to an account of

...is an event

and it seems clear that the status of events continues to elude because there is a reluctance to press the point. What would account for the hesitation?

An answer, of sorts, suggests itself by following the treatment of existence statements in *TWO*.

Once we realize that ‘existence’ is not to be confused with ‘existential’ quantification, we are in a position to note that whereas such radically different existence statements as

(147) Eisenhower exists

<sup>105</sup> *GE*, 519.

<sup>106</sup> *GE*, 533.

and  
 (152) Triangularity exists,  
 not to mention  
 (153) Lions exist  
 and  
 (154) Numbers exist,  
 have in common the general form  
 (155)  $(\exists x) x$  satisfies the criteria for being called  
 (an) N,  
 there is a radical difference between the first and  
 second member of each pair, a difference which  
 concerns the nature of the criteria. And once we re-  
 flect on these differences we note that whatever may  
 ultimately be true of (152) and (154), the existence  
 statements concerning Eisenhower and lions essen-  
 tially involve a relation to the person making the  
 statement. For to say that Eisenhower exists is to im-  
 ply that he belongs to a system (world) which in-  
 cludes us as knowers (i.e., language users). In other  
 words, such statements as that Eisenhower exists  
 have an intimate logical connection with statements  
 which give expression to their own location in the  
 framework to which belongs the referent of the  
 statement (in this case Eisenhower), i.e., token-re-  
 flexive statements. And the token-reflexive state-  
 ments in question are those which formulate the  
 nexus of observation and inference in terms of  
 which the claim that there is something which satis-  
 fies the criteria for being called Dwight D. Eisen-  
 hower would be justified.<sup>107</sup>

WS is doing more than deplatonizing syntactic therapy, he suggests that existence statements reveal something about the character of our companions in this world, but what sort of thing would that be? We gain some insight into the features of our observational framework that are being revealed:

<sup>107</sup> TWO, 564. Sicha gives a comprehensive account of the move that WS makes with respect to existential quantification, *A Metaphysics of Elementary Mathematics*, 102ff., 143ff.

Again,

(159) There are future things  
is to be understood as a derived statement which  
rests on

(160) S is future  $\cdot \equiv \cdot$  'S will exist' is true

and, hence, on

(161) S will exist.

here we find a crucial difference between things and  
events (in the thing framework), for, as we saw,

(95) There are future episodes

does not rest on

(162) E will exist

but rather on

(163) E will take place

which is equivalent to a statement of the form

(164) S will V.<sup>108</sup>

We take “‘There are episodes’” to be equivalent to ‘Something is taking place, or has taken place or will take place.’

In other words, as already mentioned, events (of the first theory) have a derivative status in the sense that singular terms referring to events are contextually introduced in terms of sentences involving singular terms referring to things.<sup>109</sup> From which it follows that the “coming to be and passing away” in the thing framework does not mean the coming to be or passing away of *events* (as Broad or Reichenbach saw it) because although events *take place*, events are contextually introduced, not named, although they are not, in Sellars 1957, *linguistic entities*, neither are they primary existents.<sup>110</sup> Broad’s puzzle ‘How can temporal relations obtain between an item which exists and one which doesn’t exist if  $aRb \supset (\exists x)(\exists y) xRy?$ ,’ (i.e., in the Manifest image, the relata must exist), does not arise unless one confuses existence statements with existential quantification and ‘...exists’ with ‘...takes place’.<sup>111</sup>

The family of concepts (earlier, later, past, present, future, now, then and so on) which make up the framework of ordinary

<sup>108</sup> TWO, 566.

<sup>109</sup> TWO, 572.

<sup>110</sup> TWO, 594.

<sup>111</sup> Sicha has an extended discussion of this point in the Mathematics.

temporal discourse rests on an irreducibly perspectival structure.<sup>112</sup> But time as a measure of events is a measure of things, the foundations of temporal discourse is rooted in premetrical tensed discourse and nonrelational temporal connectives of talk about things or persons doing this or that while, before, after, other things or persons doing this or that in our perspectively immediate environment, the relevant ur-concepts pertaining to the temporal:<sup>113</sup>

it seems to me to be perfectly clear that the basic individuals of this universe of discourse are things and persons—in short the ‘substances’ of classical philosophy.<sup>114</sup>

Happenings in time come prepared like the continual flow of substance-stuff that gets chopped into segments and relabeled in the flow of experience as ‘events’. The irreducibly perspectival character exerts its influence in the relatively few segments into which the happenings in time are packaged. Leaving aside aspect—how happenings begin, unfold and end—our tensed language locates relative to a viewpoint in fairly coarse terms that are sensitive to direction (before, after) ignore absolutes (much like the spatial near/far from me or from a reference point) and collect globs of change with the imprecise signposts of temporal adverbs (now, yesterday, while) and the tracking concepts (before-and-after, at-the-same-time).

Time as expressed in the *premetrical* grammatical machinery of language is easily run together with the metricization of a precise topological system of relations but the latter is a *reaxiomatization* of the framework of changing-things-in-temporal-discourse. To be premetrical means that missing is time as a continuous, precisely measurable economy. Relative to the ‘now’ of speaking, changes without duration (hit, jump, swat, kick, knock) are as precise as necessary for our “being in the world” in the specious present, but the present in this sense, for those uncorrupted by philosophy, is often no more than the duration of the stable state before the brain

112 TWO, 593.

113 TWO, 573, FMPP, II, §142.

114 TWO, 594.

shakes itself off the present bias by moving on to the “What’s new?” stage:

It is often said that we must avoid ‘spatializing’ time. Statements to this effect are invariably confused, for in so far as they imply that we should not think of time in metrical terms they are actually a contradiction. But they do contain insights which account for their vitality. These are the insights that changing things are not to be identified with their histories, that time as a measure of events is also a measure of things, and that the foundation of temporal discourse is the use of tensed verbs and nonrelational temporal connectives.<sup>115</sup>

Although not explicitly recognized as such, *aspect* plays a key role in the absorption of the temporal into the premetrical grammatical machinery of the rationally reconstructed tensed language of *TWO*. For, not only does it appear throughout the *corpus* in the form of examples cast in the present progressive (*crossing the Rubicon*, *S’s V-ing*), but it also bears the weight of the keystone concept of the *perspectival*.<sup>116</sup> As we have seen, the two gatekeepers of the temporal in WS’ regimented thing-nature framework are tense and aspect. Where language employs *tense* to encode the “location” of a happening, so to speak, in time (*Caesar crossed, crosses, will cross the Rubicon*), *aspect* encodes the perspectival features of our encounter with the world, its structure as point-of-viewish.<sup>117</sup> To make the Kantian point, knowability essentially invokes a perspectival relationship between the person seeing and the object encountered<sup>118</sup> and this relation is encoded in grammar as aspect. A person can *take a swing* in their instantaneous present, or *jog over the field*, which is continuous or atelic, and they can *slide into home* which, for many (the “it’s not how you play the game, it’s whether you win or lose” crowd), is the end-point of the whole enterprise. Importantly, aspect implicitly expresses *the point of view* taken on a changing

<sup>115</sup> *TWO*, 574.

<sup>116</sup> For example, in IKTE, Paragraph 25; KIT, paragraph 49; TTC, 51; and throughout *TWO*.

<sup>117</sup> See IKTE, paragraph 25; KTI, 49.

<sup>118</sup> We are leaving aside inferential dimension at this point, TTC, paragraph 51.

thing (from its Latin roots, *aspicere*). How many monolingual English speakers have been overwhelmed in learning a foreign language that uses different verb forms if one is watching a developing, ongoing change from the inside (so, *He was crossing the Rubicon*) or, as complete from the outside as in *he crossed the Rubicon*? Tense and aspect are independent: *S becomes* can happen a long time ago, today or sooner or later (tense) no matter what our point of view (aspect). Aspect encodes one's viewpoint on something coming-about. In ordinary discourse, it does duty for the philosophers' "now."

The characterizing of a happening *from a certain point of view* divides into "states" and "episodes."<sup>119</sup> The latter are either telic or atelic (*crossing the Potomac* vs *rowing around*). And, from our point of view, episodes can be durative (*jogging*) or momentaneous (*punching the time card*). When the view is from the inside, *here-now before my eyes*, as it were, the imperfective aspect appears as the present progressive, the progressive aspect (*the Decider is deciding*) in contrast to the *completed* or *perfect* aspect (*the Decider has/had decided*) when the view is from the outside, *there-then before my eyes*, so to speak, the primary picture of the world in the framework of things is a *tensed* picture of which *aspect* is an irreducible part. Indeed, together, they constitute time and the world order.<sup>120</sup>

The existence of the world as well as of the 'events' which make it up is irreducibly perspectival. The structure of the world as a temporal structure is irreducibly perspectival—though not, as we have seen, 'subjective' in any pejorative sense.<sup>121</sup>

The theory of events of Sellars 1957, is not antithetical to the spatial character of extruded substance-stuff before the reality of a person's utterances which includes *this*, *here* and *now*: one must be comfortable with "cutting of the end," "moving the meeting time

119 On several occasion, WS directs us toward an analysis of states.

120 TWO, 591.

121 TWO, 593, 594.



forward” (meaning “backward”) or extending “too far over the boundary” and, of course, the ineluctable flow of time-stuff.

However, events as non-propositional singular terms did not accommodate the intuition that they are to be located in the fabric of connectives which operate on sentences.

In any case, there is no doubt that spatial relations, the media of outer sense are central to the picturing relation. Is it not also the case that in some sense, the use of tensed language rests on the existence of the media of time in outer sense? We are reminded of Renatus<sup>122</sup> who locates space and time, in some sense, among the characteristics of receptivity as such—which is what, WS notes, should be meant by the forms of sensibility.<sup>123</sup> Indeed, that there are such characteristics in the world in the *narrow* sense (as features of complex nonconceptual representations) underwrites the ability to have conceptual representations to guide minds.

These characteristics, and the  $\tau$ -dimension in particular, give WS’ an answer to Kant’s awkward problem of accounting for objective succession: as Weldon notes, the problem of producing “a cerebral occurrence which can make possible any discrimination between a succession of apprehension and an apprehension of succession.”<sup>124</sup> Or, as WS puts it,

In the case of Time a careful Renatus would distinguish between,  
a conceptual representation of a bang following a whiz  
and,  
a conceptual representation of a bang following a conceptual  
representation of a whiz...

A Renatus who has pondered the way in which our conceptual representations of the spatial structure of physical states of affairs are guided by ‘counterpart’ features of our sense impressions will be led to speculate concerning what it is about our nonconceptual representings which guides the un-

<sup>122</sup> KSU, 486.

<sup>123</sup> KSU, 490.

<sup>124</sup> T.D.Weldon, *Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason* (Oxford, 1944), 265. See also Prichard’s account of the error in trying to resolve a succession of sounds into what we take to be successive sounds, 48.

derstanding in its representation of temporal relations.<sup>125</sup>

For WS, it is possible to capture the respect in which a sequence of impressions becomes an impression of a succession by introducing a highly theoretical concept: the  $\omega$ -dimension.<sup>126</sup> The  $\omega$ -dimension is itself 2-dimensional, *in some sense*, as WS represents it. His disagreement with C.D.Broad arises from the fact that Broad's treatment is unapologetically phenomenological<sup>127</sup> and not, I think, because he thinks the  $t$ -dimension must be impoverished. While struggling with the notion of persistence, in response to my question, "how does a C#-ing have dimension?," WS responded, "sound fills a room doesn't it?"

While the  $\omega$ -dimension is not part of the thing-framework, it does help one understand why WS held onto the view of how the primary picture of the world order reflected in the thing-framework is irreducibly tensed and therefore, as temporal in the coarse-grained sense.

The phenomenological account of time that Broad offers, once appropriated by WS, tends to straddle the interface between the coarse-grained premetrical Manifest Image and Scientific Image while Broad regards the account as rigorously phenomenological. In other words, WS would deny Broad the fruits of his phenomenological analysis and argue that, if anything, it constituted an attempt to *move on* from the Manifest Image. Thus, Sellars would reject what for Broad, was a ground floor distinction, namely that

Spatial extension and the occurrence of spatial relations *presuppose* temporal duration and a certain determinate form of temporal relation.<sup>128</sup>

For WS, not only is time not in the world in the narrow sense (as it is for Broad) but it is, as we have seen, nonrelational.

<sup>125</sup> SM, 231.

<sup>126</sup> FMPP, II, ¶133-137 contains the explanation for Weldon's problem.

<sup>127</sup> "A Reply to My Critics," in *The Philosophy of C.D.Broad*, (Tudor, NY, 1959), p. 772.

<sup>128</sup> Reply, 269.

With respect to the specious present, Broad mistakenly supposes, notes WS, that the ordering in the temporal dimension must be one which “involves an introspectable (sensory or quasi-sensory) feature.”<sup>129</sup> Naturally, of course, Broad’s approach is through-and-through phenomenological so WS’s point must be granted. And, as much as one might want to cheer for Broad’s eloquent defense of his critique in the *Examination*, WS’s parsimonious account may work given that it is embedded in the complex relationship between frameworks and very powerful ontological considerations.<sup>130</sup> I say “may” work simply because WS did not have the time to elaborate on the Carus’s lectures claim that

In addition to continuing through the period  $t_1$   $t_2$  at the zero point, the C<sup>#</sup>ing is continued in another manner. Metaphorically it moves to the right in the -dimension.<sup>131</sup>

The weight upon the use of “metaphorically” here can be seen from the fact that it is the explication of the phenomenology of this very notion that leads Broad to his 3-dimensional representation of time. Could it be open for Renatus to argue that within the coarse-grained premetrical discourse of changing things, our tensed discourse provides the seeds for something like what Broad regards as presentness? As far as concerns the counterpart of the Specious Present in the Scientific Image, its length appears to be dependent on temporal intervals that recur in studies of visual timing.<sup>132</sup> This complexity may have as its Manifest counterpart a part of what makes our experience of the world irreducibly perspectival. It is the perspectival idiosyncrasies of speakers and thinkers, which, in relation to different points of view, have the perspectival (‘subjective’) characteristics of pastness, presentness, and futurity that find a home in tensed discourse.

Why, after all, is it the “World Order”? Because the primary picture of the structure of the world is irreducibly tensed and perspectival where time, in the coarse-grained sense as a measure

<sup>129</sup> FMPP, II, §146.

<sup>130</sup> Vol. II, Part I, of the examination (281-288) and his Reply, 772.

<sup>131</sup> FMPP, II, §133.

<sup>132</sup> For example, I’ve mentioned the 3-second rule that averages the brain’s switching of a task and asking, metaphorically speaking, “What’s new?”

of events in the coarse-grained sense, is also a measure of things. The premetrical temporal connectives or adverbials (while, before, after) involving statements about things. It is the allure of the perspectival that may have lulled Kant into the view that Time was the medium for inner sense and, therefore, of only inner *representings*.

As characterized before, the premetrically temporal comes in coarse packages of indefinite gobs of time. The speaker's *now* orders the time-gobs relative to it by even more open-ended way-points: before-and-after, at-the-same-time, this-while-that. Unlike the way-points of a compass, however, these show no evidence of a continuous, respectably measurable commodity. A discrete happening (*cross the street*) contrasts with a non-discrete or continuous one (*strolling around the park*) with frayed edges instead of perfect endpoints (*come over after the end of your walk*). The analogue would be like talking about space simply (*near to me, far from me*) rather than in terms of sophisticated metrical concepts.

Thus it appears that the reconstructed Specious Present, not only yields Weldon's sequence of representings as a representation of a sequence but also must account for whatever Broad has in mind by his "presentness." WS complaint against Broad lies in the phenomenological characterization of "degrees of presentness" but might there not be a deeper insight here that accounts for WS's own use of "metaphorically-to-the-right"? It is not hard to be persuaded that Broad brings in the *intensive* magnitudes of presentness as an antidote for the *extensive* characterization of changing things.

Perhaps there is *something* about the intrinsically point-of-viewishness of our egocentric imposition on the world order that would account for the coarse-grained premetrical urgency of what is "metaphorically moving to the right" in the -dimension? From our point of view, we carve happenings in the world at the joints (whimsically, it's stuff that can slip away, *we're running out of time*) but no tenses exist for a greater precision than the trichotomized locations: three amorphous regions defined relative to our perspectival idiosyncrasy. We have (1) the specious present that exists as the fundamental unit within which premetrical temporal distinctions are *irrelevant* relative to the occasion of speaking. Swirling behind our present location, we have (2) the past stretch-

ing backward indefinitely and we have (3) the future that goes from now until Adam's *Restaurant at the End of the Universe*. Our irreducibly perspectival experience is embedded in the tense and aspect of our tensed discourse about the world. Although not as robust as the qualitative dimension sought by Broad, it suggests that *somehow* there is a coarse-grained, non-conceptual counterpart of what we come to feel is the moving image of eternity even if, beyond this, there is little we can say within the resources of the Manifest Image. In the coarse-grained sense, Time is change, but in the fine-grained sense it is, as WS says in echoing Aristotle, the measure of change:

I want to suggest that time is the real number series, the series of real numbers as correlated with certain measuring procedures.<sup>133</sup>

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### Phenomenology of Mind

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An alarming feature of WS's phenomenology of mind finds residence in the fact that he does not think that the mysteries of the mind yield to phenomenological analysis. "But," someone immediately responds, "doesn't that mean that there is no such thing as introspection, self-awareness, indeed, consciousness!? But why, then, do people persist in having such responses?" Like Kant's "thing in-itself," for WS, one can actually have to say a *great deal* about "introspectibles" but the results probably won't meet the expectations of common sense. After all, a new explanation that doesn't tell a story about why the old one worked as well as it did isn't going to be workable.

<sup>133</sup> Perspectives, Lecture III. For an account of number in a manner congenial to WS' project, see Jeffrey Sicha's admirably clear account in *A Metaphysics of Elementary Mathematics*, (U. Mass Press, 1974). It is clear that WS used Sicha's approach as a resource for parts of his formalism and, for this reason, Sicha's text fills lacunae in the Sellarsian dialectic, see Sicha's "Reconstruction of the Natural Numbers," p. 141, in his *Metaphysics of Mathematics*.

Like the wealth of Tantulus, the fruits of our mental participation are out of reach not for practical reasons but, to put it roughly, they are categorially out of reach:

34. It is a most significant fact, as I have pointed out elsewhere, that the classification of thoughts, construed as classical mental episodes, permits of no such easy retreat to a non-functional level. Roughly, our classification of thoughts, construed as episodes which belong to a framework which explains the kaleidoscopic shifts of sayings and propensities to say, is almost purely functional. We have only the foggiest notion at what kinds of episodes, nonfunctionally described, perform the relevant functions, though philosophers of a scientific orientation are prepared to characterize them generically as neurophysiological. As a result, philosophers unaware of this alternative strategy have the illusion of an ultimacy of the conceptual functioning of thoughts which is responsible for continuing philosophical puzzles about how mental acts are to be fitted into a naturalistic picture of the world.<sup>134</sup>

The implicit defanging of an introspective approach to analysis is delivered with kid-gloves but, to consign centuries of surveying the mental landscape to the “foggiest notion,” cannot be construed as faint praise. As he remarks in the Carus Lectures,

To put it bluntly, the fruits of painstaking theory construction in the psychology and neuro-physiology of sense perception cannot be anticipated by screwing up one’s mental eye (the eye of the child within us) and “seeing” the very manner-of-sensing-ness of a volume of red.<sup>135</sup>

Doubtless, WS’s position is not meant to warm the hearts of those who have the “eye-as-a-camera” viewpoint or the “mind-as-the-mirror-of-nature” approach to time and the world order. In WS’ hilarious attack on all flavors of *Relationalism* in the

<sup>134</sup> AAE, 189.

<sup>135</sup> FMPP, I, 82, p. 19.

Notre Dame Lectures, he undermines every support that gives aid and comfort to those who would “survey” the furniture of the mind. *ME* consists, in large measure, of an equally sustained attack on every canonical variety of apprehension under virtually every descriptive metaphor that has been mobilized to capture this immaculate conception of the mind.

For those whose theological persuasion demands “events,” “time” and “causality” to be in-the-world in the narrow sense, the preceding discussion of this triune world order has them running for the door. WS’s apparent assault on our “access” to our own mental states offers them all the more reason to flee. Sicha’s patient elaboration of the difference between what we see and what we see “of” something in *KTM* as well as a similar account by WS in *ME* is not likely to assuage anybody’s fears. However, it does offer a glimpse into WS’s view without it being clouded by the fears of those who have a desperate need for the real to exert its presence.

H. A. Prichard provides a good place to start because, in the Notre Dame Lectures, WS remarks that he responded to charges that, somewhere along his metaphysical walk, he lost the world!

It goes without saying that the last thing to do is to minimize the difficulty. If there is any sphere in which we seem exempt from the possibility of error it is [inner and outer] perception. How can we, it is natural to ask, make a mistake as to what we see or feel or hear? And how is it possible to do so not merely sometimes but normally, if not always?<sup>136</sup>

The tongue-in-cheek tone notwithstanding, Prichard takes seriously the task of talking his audience out of their difficulties. He puts his finger on the breaking-point:

The analysis, it seems to me, is quite mistaken, since it resolves the having or experiencing a sensation or, as I would rather say, the perceiving it, into a particular way of knowing it, which, so far as I can see, it is not.<sup>137</sup>

<sup>136</sup> Knowledge and Perception, (Oxford, 1950) from lectures and essays during 1927-1938, p.62.

<sup>137</sup> Prichard, 63.

That the attempt to drive a metaphysical wedge between “apprehending,” “getting-at” what is sensed and the mere having an impression, sensory state and so on, occupies center stage in *ME* is hardly worth repeating. Prichard thinks

what is ordinarily called perception consists in *taking*, i.e., really *mistaking*, something that we see or feel for something else;<sup>138</sup>

a point which WS sympathetically relates during the course of the Notre Dame Lectures. Although Prichard expresses the hope that we could work ourselves out of this habitual mistaking, he notes with mock seriousness, that no matter how hard we try, the sun will always appear to rise and to set. Furthermore, he finds the target of such metaphysical therapy remarkably elusive in the case of touch:

I confess that I cannot get farther than saying that when, for example, that occurs which we should ordinarily call my feeling a hard, smooth, and lumpy oblong-shaped with my hand, I am taking certain extended feelings of a kind with which everyone is familiar for a hard, smooth, lumpy oblong body. It looks, no doubt, as if on the general view it ought to be possible to say more than this.<sup>139</sup>

For Prichard, the moral of the story for which he has been arguing is, like WS argues in *ME*, that what we call seeing or feeling a body consists in mistaking something for a body—a position that we strenuously resist because,

first, the almost universal tendency to take it for granted, without serious consideration, that perception in its various forms is a particular way of knowing something, with the consequent implication that no mistake is possible as to the character of what we really see or feel; and, second, the reluctance to admit that colors and feelings of touch, though dependent on us as percipients, are extended.<sup>140</sup>

138 Prichard, 52.

139 Prichard, 64.

140 Prichard, 68.



Now WS, of course, wants to replace the entire edifice of apprehension or 24-carat access to the facts but, unlike the case of fine-grained space and time which he doesn't find in the world, phenomenological reduction bears fruit. That is, as he puts it in the Notre Dame Lectures, the conceptual analysis that drills down, roughly, to the proper sensibles, yields *something* that lies at the non-conceptual core of experience. The fact that our phenomenological resources have reached the end of their explanatory tether does not erase the fact that there is *something, somehow* present in our phenomenological confrontation with the world. WS spends a considerable amount of time in *ME* dismantling Prichard's type of *sensa*, so he obviously doesn't accept Prichard's commitment to "objects" and all that this involves. On the other hand, as he points out during the Lectures, the "new new materialists" whether they know it or not, court *idealism* with their rejection of secondary qualities. To these idealistic tendencies, WS responds that as a *Scientific Realist*, he is committed to the existence of color and, therefore, since the current categorial structure of Cognitive Science cannot accommodate the successor of color, the philosophical task is to engage in the conversation necessary bring about a structure that can. He notes, somewhat ruefully, that the tendency of contemporary philosophy to disengage itself from the ongoing scientific developments is a terrible mistake. He calls for philosophical activism.<sup>141</sup>

Just what the successor of color will be requires, as Sicha explains in his introduction to *KTM*, the exploration of the current stage of the Manifest Image in an effort to articulate the character of the projection of this framework (the relevant framework features)

<sup>141</sup> Dennett, for example, tries to avoid the charge of "idealism" when remarks "When your kite string gets snarled up, in principle it can be unsnarled, especially if you're patient and analytic. But there's a point beyond which principle lapses and practicality triumphs. Some snarls should just be abandoned. Go get a new kite string. It's actually cheaper in the end than the labor it would take to salvage the old one, and you get your kite airborne again sooner. That's how it is, in my opinion, with the philosophical topic of qualia, a tormented snarl of increasingly convoluted and bizarre thought experiments, jargon, in-jokes, allusions to putative refutations, "received" results that should be returned to sender, and a bounty of other sidetrackers and time-wasters. Some messes are best walked away from." CE, 369.

into the scientific image. What is the current stage of the manifest image? As Rosenberg once said in response to this question, “if you ask a kid, “what’s water,” he says, “H<sub>2</sub>O.” But, if you ask him, “what’s milk?” he says, “white stuff that comes from a cow.”

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### Consciousness

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WS’s frequent comments about the nature of consciousness are likely to go unnoticed. Even when dealing with the issue of consciousness, *ex professo*, after plowing through such a work, the student is likely to ask, “What does that have to do with consciousness!?” Indeed. After all, in the kind of hard-nosed variant of Prichard’s take on introspection that WS develops, what goes for outer sense, must go for inner sense. Worse yet, the *fons et origo* of the myth of the given has to be inner sense—if it isn’t rooted out at its source, we’ll never be rid of it. Once again, as in the case of color, and like the Kant’s thing-in-itself, a great deal can be said about the nature of consciousness.

In *DKMB*, WS remarks on the two common deployments of the word ‘consciousness’. First, consider a specific question, “What Is Sensory Consciousness?” That’s an easy one.

On the one hand, ‘consciousness’ is a generic term for the qualitative character of various kinds of perceptual experience itself. The qualitative character, i.e., the contentual character, is the qualitative dimension of the existential content of a physical system.<sup>142</sup> Although the Notre Dame Lectures bring out the fact that this view more closely approximates that of RWS, we can let it stand for the moment.

When we believe in ourselves to be in an irritable mood, the irritations which confronts this belief are elements of the very irritability believed. In this sense, we participate in what is believed in.<sup>143</sup> What we participate in is part of that qualitative dimension of the content of our being. Consciousness as underlying our “beliefs

<sup>142</sup> *DKMB*, 18.

<sup>143</sup> *DKMB*, 10.

in” forms the contentual aspect of our direct confrontation with the world, our participation in it—we have beliefs about it (second level beliefs) but not as such. Rather, it is the subject of our perceptual belief which, because it is a state of the self, it is part ourselves.

On the other hand, when we go on to talk about our sensations and beliefs being in consciousness, we use the term “consciousness” in a very different sense, a sense which pertains, not to first level belief but to second order belief.<sup>144</sup> Consciousness in this second sense does not pertain to perceptual experience and does not, then, pertain to what we see *of* objects (i.e., consciousness as the material mode of what we see *of* an object). Of course, what some find so abraded (Chrucky, for example) according to Sellars,

Concepts pertaining to mental acts are functional and leave open the question of their qualitative or contentual character." (This lack of specific contentual aspect is what makes us want to think of mental acts as “diaphanous.”)<sup>145</sup>

Thus, beyond the determinable “consciousness” nothing more can be said even by Prichard’s somewhat relaxed standards.

### History

A brief look at the history of “consciousness” will prepare us for the next stage in the dialectic. Consider peripatetics in the tradition of Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes, on the intellect. The *active intellect* functions in a certain sense as light does: natural light transforms potential color into actual colors and also imparts to the pupil of the eye the quality of transparency which allows it to see them. Question: What is the phenomenological counterpart that descends from this? It is “consciousness” in the second sense: consciousness *in*.

“Consciousness” in the first sense is a Cartesian metaphor. Of course, the Cartesian invention regards all judgment or cognitive awareness as taking an object. So, consciousness is essentially re-

<sup>144</sup> It is in the latter sense that Dennett, for example, used it.

<sup>145</sup> MCP, 248.

flexive. In our terms, it is second-order and involves taking the subject of belief as its object. But in the sense in which “consciousness” is the term for the qualitative dimension itself, we have Descartes to thank. Although Descartes’ invention was enabled by the then current use of thought *in actu exercito*, it was Descartes that harnessed the notion of “conscience” (as in the little voice that says, “brush your teeth”) and appropriated it for the qualitative dimension itself, *consciuis*. A brilliant move although he didn’t develop this “phenomenological turn” beyond using it as the non-representative awareness upon which his entire theory of mind rested.

There was, of course, a parallel development that springs from the platonic tradition and brings with it the metaphor of cognitive acts as manner of cognizing.<sup>146</sup> It is the platonic tradition that bears an ancestral relationship to theories of the “adverbial” type (or the use of what was once the philosophical reading of subjective genitive in which the marker indicates a “variety” of the head word of the phrase rather than possession). The Rationalist tradition rejected this “objectless” approach and adopted the act-object model of consciousness in the first sense. I will return to the other strand subsequently. According to classical sense-datum theories, since physical objects can’t have the qualitative characters that we see them to have, we must postulate the existence of a sense datum in us, something that

can, in short have the qualities we take physical objects to have. Sense datum theorists distinguish between the sensory characteristics which do present themselves and the fact that the item in our perceptual field is a sense datum as opposed to the facing surface of a physical object. That the thing is a sense datum is a matter of theory. They say that we can get directly at the sensory characteristic or qualitative aspects, but we can only represent or have beliefs about its being a sense datum. But, if we don’t experience *sensa* as states of ourselves, i.e., as sensations, how do we know there are any? We know red

<sup>146</sup> KPT, 3-4.

items, triangular items, sweet items, how do we know there are sense data or sensations in us? They recommend exercises. If you work at it, you will begin to see that what you take to be the facing surface of a physical object is really, upon closer inspection, a state of yourself.

### Sellarsian Phenomenology

At this point in the discussion, we stand at the threshold of WS's phenomenological approach. Yet, in his paper for professional philosophers, "phenomenology" is noticeable by its absence. As in *ME* and *PKT*, it plays a far greater role in the Notre Dame Lectures once one knows what to look for. To this end, it is worthwhile retracing WS's steps to the lectures by echoing the *informal* approach taken in *ME* and *PKT*.

The stories told by Manifest Image and Post-Modern Materialists invoke a distinction between the qualitative and conceptual aspects of experience and both reach astounding conclusions:

one denying the existence of the qualitative dimension of experience while the other claims that *sensa* exist but we might not know that.

WS points out that both theories have left a job undone: a philosophical theory must explain why any intelligent person could have failed to see it. The key issue revolves around the notion of *seeing as*.

The solution to the impasse involves getting clear about the separation between the representational and qualitative content in perceptual experience.

Pain can be used to clarify the distinction between the non-cognitive or qualitative features of experience and the representational or cognitive aspects of experience.<sup>147</sup> Pain is not cognitive, it is not an act of knowing, believing or conjecturing. A pain is a pain. It is not a cognition, and it doesn't classify itself. It is of a certain kind—it has dimension, but it doesn't tell the truth about itself, it doesn't say, "Oh, by the way, I'm an impacted upper-left mo-

<sup>147</sup> ME, 110.

lar.” Some truths about it are manifest: its qualitative character is manifest. It is this *manifestness* that is analogous to the rectangular in our experience of a book. When we say that we feel pain, feeling is not a relation in which we stand to pain. Feeling is verb which concerns a certain dimension of our experience, the word ‘pain’ really functions as a specifier. *Feels-pain* is really *feeling-in-a-certain-way*, a kind of feeling. So don’t confuse between feeling pain (which is qualitative) and recognizing a pain (which is representational, as in *I feel pain*).

Pain actually has two aspects—having a pain and a recognition of it *as* a pain. For example, if you go to the dentist expecting it to hurt like heck, only to discover that over the weekend, painless dentistry has become a reality, you can say, “ah ha! It was my excitement or my tension that I was confusing with pain! It doesn’t really hurt!” We can have mistaken beliefs about pains. We can miscategorize items as pains as Prichard advertizes. The question is, how could such a mistake be possible?

According to WS<sup>148</sup>, we can figure out what is going on by taking the case of a pink ice cube. We don’t see its coolth, its very coolness. We *take* it as cool. WS suggests<sup>149</sup> that when you are experiencing an item as something, as, say pink and cubical, it results from the pink and cubical being built, so to speak, into the subject term of your thinking. It is not part of the predicate. What you see something as is a matter of how you respond to it in a believing that is evoked in you by your direct confrontation with the world. Thus, what classical philosophers thought of as “directness of apprehension,” WS thinks is really the *directness of evoking*.

In short, what you see something as is what is packed into the subject term of your experience. It is whatever is not in question. When we see something, we “straight off *mistake* it for something else” according to Prichard, and it is this sort of “immediacy” that WS emphasizes by invoking Cook Wilson’s notion of “thinking without question”<sup>150</sup> when a novel circumstance makes us erupt with a spontaneous blurting-out-loud (*I missed the bus!*). The “be-

148 SSOP, 35.

149 ME, 130.

150 Prichard, 97.

believing in” is a special kind of occurrent believing —thinking without question. The rest, what might be called into question, belongs in the predicate. We can isolate what we take for granted, what is not up for grabs and we separate that from what we can go on to ask about it or how it seems to us.

We want to take seriously the idea that the difference between what is taken for granted and not up for grabs, i.e., what is believed in, the subject term of our thinking, is not the same as what we believe about it, i.e., the way it *seems*: *believing-as* (in the case of believing in) must be distinguished from seeming.

The subject of a perceptual belief, what is *believed in*, is given by a complex demonstrative, for example, this-grayish-black-smooth-pavement with the jagged facing edge. The complex subject is the first order of a perceptual experience. A perceptual experience in which there is an actual quality of grayish black, i.e., it is not merely believed in. As WS might put it using RWS’s terminology, the actuality involved constitutes our existential confrontation with the world, however, it does not, *pace* Chrucky, constitute the very *somehow* presence participated in—that is non-conceptual.

The predicate of our belief, what comes after the “is” contains that which we believe *about* the subject, it contains the second order of belief.

What is believed in, what evokes the belief, that there are such items we respond “to” is *not in question*.<sup>151</sup> We can say something about the items using transcategorical terms. Phenomenology reaches the end of its descriptive tether at this point.<sup>152</sup>

## Taking Stock

The Post-Modern tradition of the New New Materialists is driven by a fear of a myth, the myth of the Given. According to WS, the myth hinges on two questions: (a) How do we become aware of

<sup>151</sup> It is not clear to me that Prichard understood the radical character of his viewpoint: the one that WS exploits but, from WS’s remarks in the Lectures, Prichard was more radical in his talks.

<sup>152</sup> Carus, 21.

immediate experience as of a certain sort? (b) How do we know the sorts in sensory experience? To put it crudely, the Myth says, let's pitch in, and examine our sense experience. Our awareness of certain sorts, the myth goes, is a primordial, nonproblematic feature of immediate experience.

So, WS argues that the myth is supported by the classical theory of meaning in which there is a temptation to suppose that 'red' means the quality red because (a) it is a response to red objects, (b) it has the syntax of a predicate. This temptation exists even when we abandon the idea that the ability to use 'red' requires antecedent episodes of the awareness of red. The myth insists<sup>153</sup> that awareness of X with categorical status C is an awareness of X as C: "the analysis, it seems to me, is quite mistake, since it resolves the having or experiencing a sensation or, as I would rather say, the perceiving it, into a particular way of knowing it."<sup>154</sup> The myth involves the concept of 'red' as a conceptual atom. Its 1-1 relational picture of apprehension and item apprehended leads to the idea that inferential relationships (material implications), or language-language moves, are not essential features of basic concepts. For WS, on the other hand, the whole edifice of Relationalism is radically false.<sup>155</sup>

<sup>153</sup> BLM, 125.

<sup>154</sup> Prichard, 63.

<sup>155</sup> It is worth quoting Prichard in entirety: "It goes without saying that the last thing to do is to minimize the difficulty. If there is any sphere in which we seem exempt from the possibility of error it is perception. How can we, it is natural to ask, make a mistake as to what we see or feel or hear? And how is it possible to do so not merely sometimes but normally, if not always? Moreover, plainly, if we are to understand the possibility of taking, say, a colour for something else which it cannot possibly be, viz. a body, it will not be enough to make out that a colour and a body would be indistinguishable. For that would only explain how on seeing a colour we were doubtful whether what we were seeing was a colour or a body. Yet the fact is that in ordinary life our state is not one of doubt; we actually think what we see to be a body. In other words, if we really see colours, then in ordinary life we are under what would ordinarily be described as an illusion, and where this is the case somehow the thing which we take for something else, viz. a colour, must somehow manage to look more like the something else than like itself. It must, so to say, be a sham; it must resemble, for example, a forged ancient coin, which by being specially treated looks at least as like an ancient coin as does an ancient coin, and more like an ancient coin than like the piece of modern brass which it really is. Moreover, if we are



## Cognitive Cartography

‘Pain’ and ‘Red’ don’t stand for items as atoms related by a 1-1 mapping with objects of apprehension. Rather, we construct maps of the self in its environment, the elements in this cognitive cartography are not like places on a fixed map but rather the dynamic togetherness of all the accumulated transitions. So, instead of thinking of ‘pain’ as a place on a map, we should take it as the map itself. Exactly how the map is realized or how it is integrated into the conceptual economy so that it forms a unified system of meaning integrated with other maps is an open question. It might occur because of the complexity of the token itself, as in a symbolic system, or it might be made possible by a unique mode of pick up built into the brain. What is important is that there is no greater temptation to think of ‘pain’ as an atom than as a map.

Although we are putting the point quasi-linguistically, I see nothing that hinges on the matter. It makes talking about it tractable and lacks a realistic competitor. ‘Black,’ ‘pain,’ and ‘rectangular’, in the context of perceptual experience have a derivative meaning which is appropriate to sensings but gets its original meaning from the cognitive cartography that is our brain’s projection of the world. These words have a parasitic meaning. The myth of the given is hovering around in (a) the temptation to suppose that our categories of intentionality take up residence in any system that is representational and (b) the claim that representation is representation as the kind of state that it is even at the naturalistic level.

The Myth is wrong. ‘Red’ neither stands for nor labels. To be a ‘red’ is to function in a certain way that is constituted by the uniformities of performances and semantic activity that the word ‘red’ is

to make out that what we call seeing a body consists in mistaking a colour which forms what we really see for a body, we shall have to allow that, contrary to what we usually think, to see something is not to know. that something in a particular way usually called seeing. For if to see a colour is to apprehend that colour, in seeing a colour we shall be apprehending it as a colour, and if we are doing this we cannot possibly think of it as being, i.e. mistake it for, something which it cannot possibly be, viz. a body. To do so will no more be possible than it is possible to mistake a piece of modern brass for an ancient coin, if we apprehend it as a piece of modern brass. A similar argument, of course, applies whatever else that be said to be which we mistake for a body.”

bound up with: its relation to other words, its belonging to a system of other words to which it is related in various ways. ‘Red’ occurs in patterns characteristic of perceptual situations, aesthetic arguments, and the like: that part of its cognitive cartography.

I see no attraction in the view that the words are atoms. When WS advocates cognitive maps, after constructing elaborate justifications for the maps, falls back on the Myth’s 1-1 correspondence. I found this tendency misleading although I could appreciate the necessity of it. When WS was being clear, he would say that it is not the tokens that picture the world, it is the maps that do so. “Unpacking a word is like pulling on a string in a knitted sweater,” he would say, “the whole sweater begins to unravel.” The subject term of perceptual takings are enactments of the records of the continual co-determination of perceiver and environment. On this view we find no “out there” in contrast with “here”: each is an extension of the other changing the world by being in the world.

### **Putting Colors and Pains Into Experience**

When we feel a pain, the direct apprehension involves an existential confrontation of the apprehending by that which is apprehended, whereas what we believe about it, normally does not.<sup>156</sup> What we perceive of an object—the believed in—the demonstrative, consists of qualitative features of the image model that are present as ‘believed that’ in the predicate.<sup>157</sup>

The categorical features of occurrent qualities change as we switch conceptual frames. Color is not a relation, it characterizes. The task of philosophy is to say what conceptual structures could evolve. We don’t have adequate categories for the mind-body problem and we do not have a theory that postulates a different categorial structure. In the Cartesian recategorization, the *pinkness* of physical objects became the pinkness\* of sensation not by being a different quality but by being the same content in a different cate-

<sup>156</sup> Carus, 281.

<sup>157</sup> Carus, 38.

gorical form.<sup>158</sup> The historical controversy over the status of secondary qualities is a series of attempts to recategorize the proper-sensible features of experience.<sup>159</sup> What does it now mean to say we see the very pinkness of the pink ice cube? It is to say that something, somehow cubical and pink in physical space is present other than as merely believed in (first order) or as believed that (second order).<sup>160</sup> As Prichard contends,

...the moral...is that these difficulties cannot be removed by anything short of allowing that what we call seeing or feeling a body consists in genuinely mistaking certain sensa for a body...our reluctance to allow this [is due to assuming] that perception in its various forms is a particular way of knowing something...and second, the reluctance to admit that colours and feelings of touch, though dependent on us as percipients, are extended.<sup>161</sup>

Of course, WS's extended analysis includes the characteristics that objects embedded in a perspectival world must have—Sicha's analysis in KTM attempts to adumbrate what they are. Simply put, the pink is something actual which is somehow a portion of pink stuff, somehow the sort of item which is suited to be part of the content of a physical object but it is not, in point of fact, a portion of physical stuff.<sup>162</sup> According to WS, "Phenomenology nears the end of its descriptive tether when it points out what we ostensibly see."<sup>163</sup> He holds, in the spirit of Prichard, the necessity of distinguishing between the "subject" (the believed in) and the "predicate" of the perceptual taking seeing, as he points out in *ME*, consists in seeing in a tough sense + believing. Where Prichard advocates an approach to solving the problem, largely based on good-natured commonsense, WS provides a Myth to kill a Myth and an alternative to Relationalism in which his Myth can be embedded. In addition, as presented in *ME*, the *immediacy of evoking*

<sup>158</sup> Carus, 73

<sup>159</sup> Carus, 47

<sup>160</sup> SSROP, 8.

<sup>161</sup> Prichard, 68.

<sup>162</sup> Carus, 91.

<sup>163</sup> Carus, 21, 89.

replaces the directness of apprehension within the Manifest Image: it is meant to be a reasonable alternative speaking from within the Image. When common-sense statements, as ordinarily understood, are held to be false because the objects to which they refer don't exist, something, WS would argue, has gone terribly wrong. When Prichard points out that what we call seeing a body move cannot really be seeing a body *move*, but is at best seeing *bodies which move* and not seeing *bodies move*, it provokes the question, 'What then in this process *do* we really see?'<sup>164</sup> A question for which WS, famously, has two answers—one for each Image. And, as indicated, the answer for the Manifest Image will be an expansion of Prichard's distinction between seeing in the narrow sense (*mis-taking*, through believing in), and merely believing the rest. On occasion, WS would say that Kant's great insight was to see that perceptual intuition had the form

[A] is  $\Phi$

where [A] was the sheer receptive core of the experience (and, therefore, non-conceptual). In terms of the discussion in *ME*, this would involve the idea that in the case of the evoking of a spontaneous belief

this-cubical-chunk-of-pink<sub>132</sub> is  $\Phi$ <sup>165</sup>

the complex demonstrative subject forms a unique togetherness with [A]. It would be open to the Evolutionary Naturalist like RWS to argue that whatever ur-concepts are invoked by the subject must have been the by-product of the plasticity of the perceptual system embedded in a hostile environment. But WS was more interested in cases like *bodies which move* in our egocentrically perspectival world-view which could not be reduced without remainder through ingenious phenomenological reduction and, therefore, remained tables, chairs, and boats going down stream. While the remnants of adaptive changes brought about in the Pleistocene are significant, for one of a Kantian persuasion who thinks of vision as a construction project, *watching the elevators move*, despite saccadic suppression, transaccadic memory, and the rest of evolutionary

<sup>164</sup> Prichard, 43.

<sup>165</sup> *ME*, 125ff.

toolbox, it is an observation that is a real work of art. It's a long way from the big city denizen's *watch out for red lights* to George of the Jungle's *red things are ripe and edible*. WS tries to be sensitive to both.

## Metaphysics of Consciousness

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As noted above, "Consciousness" as WS points out in the Lectures, is often used as a generic term for the qualitative character of various kinds of perceptual experience itself. The qualitative character, i.e., the contentual character, is the qualitative dimension of the existential content of a physical system (DKMB,18). When we find ourselves to be in an irritable mood, the feeling of irritation which confronts this *belief in* is an aspect of the very irritability believed in. It isn't necessary to have the theory of language from Plato's Cratylus to think this, most people would resist any suggestion otherwise. People know when they are angry and, by the time the philosopher badgers them into saying, "I feel angry," they probably aren't any longer. We *participate in* what is *believed in*.<sup>166</sup> What we participate in is part of that qualitative dimension of the content of our being for RWS. Now, it is easy to see why WS expresses some discomfort with his father's position.

Consciousness as underlying our "beliefs in" forms the contentual aspect of our direct confrontation with the world, our participation in it—we have beliefs about it (second level beliefs) but not as such. But, "consciousness" is used in a very different sense,

When we go on to talk about our sensations and beliefs being *in consciousness*, we use the term "consciousness" in a very different sense, a sense which pertains, not to first level belief but to second order belief. Consciousness in this sense does not pertain to perceptual experience and does not, then, pertain to what we see *of* objects—i.e., consciousness as the material mode of what we see *of* an object.

It was noted that the history of philosophy splits into to metaphors with respect the nature of consciousness. The Cartesian in-

<sup>166</sup> DKMB,10.

vention regards all judgment or cognitive awareness as taking an object. So, consciousness is essentially immediately reflexive. In our terms, it is second-order and involves taking the subject of belief as its object. But on this model, it is subject to the same sort of *mis*-taking as outer perception. Indeed, the root metaphor is one of inner perception. On this model, according to Sellars, Concepts pertaining to mental acts are functional and leave open the question of their qualitative or contentual character.

This lack of specific contentual aspect contributes to the historical theme of mental acts as “diaphanous.”<sup>167</sup>

The other dominant theme does not break down into the act/object scheme. For example, an awareness of pain is not an apprehension with an object: an awareness of pain *is* a pain. Its qualitative character is manifest. This *manifestness* is not a relation in which we stand to pain. ‘Feeling’ is a verb for a certain dimension of our experience, the word ‘pain’ functions as a specifier. *Feels-pain* is really *feeling-in-a-certain-way*, a kind of feeling. Feeling-pain (which is qualitative) is not recognizing a pain (which is representational, as in *I feel pain*).

WS refers to the latter kind of consciousness as the adverbial theory. However, it has a significantly longer pedigree than that and the distinction occupied the philosophical discussion of intentionality until well into the last century. As I mentioned, it grows out of the Platonic tradition which distinguished kinds of cognitive states rather than the Aristotelian tradition that came to treat all mental acts as identical *qua* form.

### **Movement and Time**

In ME, WS recasts Prichard’s contention that with respect to seeing movement and apprehending time, the Manifest Image, by its own resources, collapses in difficulties that can only be removed by allowing that what it calls seeing or feeling a body, hearing a sound (a process in time) consists in a *radical mistake*:

<sup>167</sup> MCP, 248

The interesting thing about this theory is that it holds that we have a natural tendency to make a *radical mistake*. To experience sensation and to take those sensations, as it were, to be features of external material objects. That is the most convenient way nature could think of to get us to discriminate between objects. After all, this mistake is a useful mistake because we would be experiencing objects in terms of qualities which discriminate between them: some are green, some are red, some are here, some are there, some are circular, some are rectangular. Does it matter that in the course of discriminating between objects, we are making this basic mistake of taking (from a philosophical, not physical, point of view) our perceptions to be actual constituents of the world out there? As I said, there is no reason to suppose that this is impossible. Let us be very careful here. I said there is a radical mistake involved and that was taking the sensation to be attached to a material object. But there's a sort of aura of truth in here because we also believe that there is a blue book in a certain place. And that is true. So this is a mixture between a radical mistake and a humdrum truth; our beliefs would be a curious mixture of an exciting, surprising mistake and a humdrum truth.<sup>168</sup>

The source of the mistake is twofold: the Manifest tendency to take the various forms of perception as particular ways of knowing something (and so no mistaken identity is possible) and the reluctance to grant that cubes-of-pink, though dependent on percipients are seen and felt.

WS offers the suggestion that we, however reluctantly but in the face of crushing objections, give up the view that perception can be a flavor of the sort of apprehending, introspection, consciousness and so on that provide 24 karat access to the world and we grant that it is cubes-of-pink that are seen and felt. A discussion that parallels Prichard's treatment helps to see what WS has in mind.

Consider Jones stopped next to you at a traffic light wildly gesturing and pointing toward the intersection. Your light is red, you've set your parking brake and nothing seems to be out of order except that Jones is rolling backward toward the car behind *him*. It's clear to you that Jones thinks it is *you* who moves dangerously

<sup>168</sup> ME, 38.

toward the intersection and into oncoming traffic. He is trying to be helpful until, at least, he impacts the car behind him. Since there is a little Jones in all of us, we shall establish a dialogue with him.

We can analyze, remarks WS, “seeing the car” into seeing and believing. In seeing the front surface of the right fender of the car (the car as it is whittled down by phenomenological reduction), the idea would be that the seeing consists in: (1) seeing the surface of the right front fender and (2) believing that there is a car. The spirit of the view is that we distinguish between  $see_1$  and  $see_2$ .  $See_2$  is not analyzed in terms of seeing and believing because it is supposed to be the tough sense of ‘see’. Jones sees the car in the weak sense,  $see_1$ . In the tough sense,  $see_2$ , there is something about the car that he does see; otherwise it would not be a case of seeing the car. For philosophers that try to analyze the weak in terms of the strong, we get the equation,

$$seeing_1 = seeing_2 + believing.$$

As Descartes said, we all naturally distinguish seeing a body move from judging or believing that the a body which we are seeing is moving. We might remark, WS points out, “I see a plane in the sky” when we don’t really see the plane, we believe that there’s a plane from the contrails. In the case of Jones and the intersection, what he regarded as seeing a car move cannot really be seeing a car *move*,

cannot, be the seeing a body *move*, in the sense in which ‘seeing’ is usually understood, i.e., in the sense of a process or activity which not only is of a special kind but also constitutes, or is, an apprehension of a special kind indicated by the word seeing.<sup>169</sup>

From our example, we see that whether it be cars or parallel glass elevators at a shopping mall (a favorite for people who want to terrify children), we see within an irreducibly perspectival and “proprioceptive” framework as it were and therefore, it is this point that moves, and not that it is the body (the car, the other elevator) we see that is moving. Although it follows that Jones does not see the car *move*, he is unconvinced because in his manifest-mind, he

<sup>169</sup> Prichard, 41.



thinks of the car as moving and himself as just seeing, dispassionately observing *it* moving. Clearly, however,

it becomes a matter of *certainty*, on further reflection that what is thus rendered intelligible is at best the seeing *bodies which move* not seeing *bodies move*...The implication is that we cannot possibly *see* a body move, or for that matter, see a body at rest, and that the nearest approach to this possibility is that during a certain time we should see a body which is moving or at rest and judge from the appearance...that it is moving in a particular way or that it is at rest.<sup>170</sup>

*Resolving* seeing bodies into *believing* or judging is just *not* what we mean by seeing a body move. As is particularly clear in the case of Jones where he still *sees* your car move although he straightaway believes that it is stopped. No matter how many times we look at the Two Table Tops illusion we still see them to be of different sizes. So, if in the case of seeing the body move, he does not *really* see the body move, but

that provokes the question ‘What then in this process do we really see?’<sup>171</sup>

Nor does Jones fare any better with respect to hearing the sound of a bell or the buzzing of a bee since sounds have duration and with a little obvious drilling, it emerges that not only can’t we hear a *present* sound (because it has no duration) but when it’s over, it can’t be *heard*. If we try the Kantian answer (synthetic unity), we get stuck in the difficulty of the difference between successive notes and a succession of notes—thinking inevitably creeps into an account that was supposed to belong to perception. For a common-sense wedded to the view of the eye-as-camera/mind-as-the-mirror-of-nature paradigm a distinction between ostensible perception and real perception won’t help: seeing<sub>2</sub> won’t go away. If there are really cases of seeing cars and hearing bells then it is impossible to imagine how a state can be *like* it without *being* that. When we are truly “taken in,” when we “think-with-

<sup>170</sup> Pirchard, 42.

<sup>171</sup> Prichard, 43.

out-question,” reflecting on it doesn’t make it go away as if it were an *illusion* that could be overcome given the right perspective. As we now think of what *used* to be called illusions, we confront the fact that metaphor of the eye-as-camera can serve no longer because “illusions” aren’t illusory. They are cases in which the perceptual apparatus is doing what it was meant to do but getting tripped up by experimental supra-natural manipulation of the environment. What anamorphic (3-dimensional) street painting makes us realize is that what we normally take to be seeing something consists in seeing something else and mistaking it for something radically different: there really are no cases of seeing cars move or bells chime. What we have, instead, are cases of mis-taking:

This view is, of course, difficult; for it involves maintaining that what we ordinarily call seeing something consists in seeing something else and mistaking the something else for something quite different.<sup>172</sup>

The view is *difficult*

because involves the idea that we can experience something and yet directly and completely *miscategorize* it. After all, perception is something we have acquired, through evolutionary stages, as a practical dodge, as it were, which enables us to get around in the world. The point of perception is not to give us ontological truth. You can make a similar point about pain. Pain was not given us, so to speak, by nature in order to illuminate the ontological structure of being; pain was given us so that we would pull our hands away from hot stoves. We should not expect ordinary perceptual experience to be regulatory of what the actual nature of the world is like. Of course, it would be nice if it were. If so, we could look around and say “Yeah, that is the way things really are.”<sup>173</sup>

If WS were to describe the immediately preceding claim of Pritchard’s, it would be to say that although there was a radical mis-

<sup>172</sup> Pritchard, 61.

<sup>173</sup> ME, 38.

take involved in taking the sensation to be attached to a material object (the Cartesian claim), there's a "sort of aura of truth in here." Indeed, what we perceive are cubes of pink, colors, tastes, smells, and sounds in the *aesthetically interesting sense*. Thus, if there were cases of really seeing or feeling cars, rainbows, tickles and itches, it would be impossible to understand how our state of ostensibly seeing or feeling could be *like* seeing or feeling cars, rainbows, tickles and itches in the aesthetically interesting sense without being it.<sup>174</sup> But since perception consist in *mis*-takings that miscategorize, there is no seeing cars, pink-ice-cubes. But what about states of the self? WS does not try to answer this question directly. Instead, he provides the Myth of Jones in an attempt to show how we could have evolved into our present circumstance. He thought it possible to do so without second-guessing the development of evolutionary biology or cognitive science. Nonetheless, his myth relies on the plasticity of the brain and, as we see in the Lectures, a thoroughgoing Kantian constructivism: a scientific realist finds a place in the world for qualities in the aesthetically interesting sense not because they always existed to be discovered but because they exist for us and we are the aspect of the world that is discoverable. The Myth of Jones tells the story, the Darwinian story, of how this might have come about.

### **The Phenomenology of Mind**

WS's treatment of the phenomenology of mind—consciousness in the two sense adumbrated—resembles Kant's treatment of the *ding an sich* in that it turns out that a great deal can be said about such an intrinsically inaccessible item. Nonetheless, what can be said isn't likely to give aid and comfort to WS's opponents: givenness has been around a long time and isn't like to go quietly into that good night.

WS's public relations problem arises either because of his summary rejection of "introspection," "intuition," "consciousness," "immediate introspection" etc., as a 24-Karat awareness of reality, that is, as revealing *anything* that would be a useful starting point

<sup>174</sup> See Prichard, 50.

for belief but, interestingly, it does not follow that “experience at its very inception” (to use Santayana’s phrase) consists of sensations vacantly stared at by an untutored mind! So WS grants that phenomenology can take us all the way to the somehow-presence *of*. He grants that the ripening accumulations from evolution during the pleistocene emerged, through the plasticity of the brain, as the “unique togetherness” that is ultimately responsible for the “of-ness” of thought.<sup>175</sup>

Now might it not be the case that this mental state here has both the character of being a sense impression of a cube of pink and also the character, whatever it is, by virtue of which it intends this cube the paint? It would be, in terms which I will be exploring later on, a kind of natural, unlearned way which matures and a reference, an intending occurs...on but rather the sense impression is, as I put it, the very vehicle of the intending. (Lecture II, Perceiving)

Cognitive Science is in the business of figuring out the “material aspect” of the “sensuous dialectic” that evolved—philosophy suggests the appropriate categories.

WS proposes the most fruitful way of looking at classical theories of mental activity: it is to see that concepts pertaining to mental activity are purely functional and that the lack of specific contentual content (quality or aspect) cannot be completely overcome by “mental exercises.”<sup>176</sup>

Nevertheless, the “patterns” associated with the functional/logical relationships of the game-playing Texas Chess biocomputer constitute the “semantic activity” of the system and have a non-functional characterization.<sup>177</sup> The resulting cascade of “shifting propensities” dispositions, and *thinkings* inevitably have a unique “material counterpart” and it isn’t much of a stretch to think of this as an element in what evokes the response ‘I am con-

<sup>175</sup> In Unamuno’s useful metaphor.

<sup>176</sup> It is “completely” because it is obvious that WS takes phenomenological reduction seriously. Epistemology Lecture III; MP249; as well as the numerous references to Kant’s concept of the “I”, for example, IKTE, 275.

<sup>177</sup> Haugeland explores the notions of semantical and syntactic activity in his discussion of automatic formal systems in *Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea* (MIT, 1985) and, at the time, it was the best account of what WS had in mind with his Chess metaphor.

sciousness.’ As consciousness unfolds, the contentual character thus experienced would be an element in the pure presence of the very consciousness participated in. At the moment, cognitive science doesn’t have the explanatory resources to beyond this definition of consciousness (in one sense). Indeed, while it is easy to imagine that this understanding of consciousness might work for thoughts<sub>1</sub>, it would be “pretty thin beer” when extended to thoughts<sub>2</sub> (or higher).


## The Myth of Jones

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*In November of 1973, Sellars gave the following Darwinian account of the Myth of Jones in terms of pain. Sellars had been discussing his exchanges with Firth and wanted to reflect on states of the self and his thought on pain—a topic upon which he had written a great deal but never published. My notes of 11/14/1973 follow.*

### Feeling Pain

Even if an ostensible seeing consists a conceptual and a non-conceptual component (figure 1), it doesn't present itself to us as a sense impression. We can understand why classical philosophers identified *cogitationes* with sense impressions, i.e., Cartesian thoughts. They needed an object of perception which was characterized minimally in terms of proper *sensibles*. They, ran together the conceptual and the non-conceptual. We will consider an analysis of feeling to spell out our analysis of sense impressions.



We have intersubjectivity: intersubjective contexts which we are fairly confident about such as:

*Jones and Smith can touch the same thing.*

Thus, we can start out with something that already has an *intersubjective* base and introduce states of a perceiver as a theoretical item to *explain* certain behavioral facts. States of a perceiver are brought about, *ceteris paribus*, by an object thus and thus qualified with *naïve realist properties*. The Manifest Image (Jones) is not introducing an *object* by talking about the *state of a person* because we are not postulating new objects because they are adverbial states of perceivers—in this sense we are




Figure 2. What is it to feel something? The myth of Jones starts out with an intersubjective context.




Figure 3. 'a' is the non-inferential 'my hand is hot' that WS customarily dot-quoted and called '1st order' while the level of "seeming" or "feeling" was called '2nd order'. Both sensation and the 1st order, it emerges, are elements in the "seeming".

not postulating any new objects.<sup>1</sup> Persons have states, in some

<sup>1</sup> They are not singular terms. They are adverbial. We have things in the Manifest Image with objects which are not correlational (inductive= lightning thunder) and not postulational. The categorial part of the Manifest Image: what sort of objects are in the Manifest Image? Objects in the world in the broad and narrow sense. Basic objects are basic in that they are perceptible, we have direct knowledge of them.

sense. The crucial step in *feeling* is (*figure 3*) that, say, Jones knows non-inferentially that his hand is hot.

Notice that Jones hand being hot is *intersubjective* in the obvious sense that other people can feel it, i.e., feel its *very* heat. We can train people to respond to certain states of themselves (a rapidly warming hand) by ‘my hand is hot!’ In this way we can speak about a response being *evoked* by the environment. Like a child (a proto-theory) that can respond to anger by ‘I’m angry’. We already have a crude theory of a sense impression of warmth (we use the ‘*of...*’ locution to characterize the sense impressions). So we can extend the theory since we already have a crude theory of sense impressions, a crude theory which can be extended to include a sense impression *of* my-hand-being-warm.

We have a case of a sense impression of one’s own hand being warm or hot where it is understood that it is different from a case in which we have an impression of anything being hot—like a stone. In our proto-theory, we have a sense impression of a hand being hot which we might formulate crudely as,

a hand felt being hot—felt from the inside.

The point of saying this is that just as we have the *somehow* character of being-a-cube-of-pink *present* to the perceiver *somehow* other than just merely being believed in or thought of, so that hand being hot is *somehow* present in us beyond merely believing it is hot.<sup>2</sup> So that just as we have the *somehow* presence of being a cube-of-pink present to the perceiver, so we have the hand being hot *somehow* present in us beyond merely believing it is hot. So, we need to account for Jones knowing non-inferentially his hand is hot. Thus, the notion of *feeling* is *extended* to this case pictured here (in *figure 4* below).

We say “extended” because our explanation takes

### **feeling my hand is hot**

2 That is, we take hot-hand on the model of the phenomenal character of cube-of-pink, being actually present in the experience as it is on the sense datum model.



as 2<sup>nd</sup> order instead of its traditional role as 1<sup>st</sup> order—as our dia-




Figure 4. The non-inferential knowing, the feeling according to WS, consists of the sensation and the evoked taking here given the subject-predicate form 'My hand is hot' instead of the complex demonstrative in the taking (for the sake of simplicity).

gram indicates.

Consider the case of

Jones' hand hurts.

There is a conceptual tie between a hand *hurting* and certain propensities to *behave*: avoidance and relief behavior. It is a conceptual truth that there is a causal connection and we have to explain the fact that there is a causal connection which is different from explaining the causal connection. The language games that govern the use of 'pain' involve it with certain types of behavior.




Figure 5.

Suppose Jones' hand is impinged upon by heat—*extreme* heat (figure 5).

We get avoidance behavior and relief behavior initially so that pre-theoretically, the feelings of pain is not at issue yet. Now think of hurting as a theoretical state of the hand with reference to which one *explains* avoidance and relief behavior. These are criteria in the sense that it is these which we want to explain. Therefore, we come up with a theory in which *heating of the hand* brings about certain states which in turn cause behavior and, on the standard account of theories, the states which we appeal to are *unobservables*.

We tend to think of *a hurt* as analogous to a sound or a color in a naive realist's sense, or, in general terms, as *sensible characteristics of a physical object*. What is interesting is that we can construe it on the model of qualitative features even though it is not public. Yet we do construe hurting as a theoretical state. Hurting is a positive state of the hand and it can be construed on analogy with the perceptible qualities. We postulate a state of hurting: hurting is responsible for behavior. This is not very informative but we note that not only can we tell there is this state using the theory by inference but Jones can be trained to respond by 'my hand hurts'. But, this still doesn't lead us to believe hurting is analogous to a perceptible quality. Let us spell it out.

The hypothesis we work with is that my hand hurts because it is heated. So,

hand is hurting because it is becoming too hot.

*Hurting* is brought in to explain the behavior and *becoming hot* is already there because it is public. One can know *non-inferentially* that the hand is hot which involves sense impressions of heat.<sup>3</sup> The theory says the hand is hurting because it is hot. So that one responds, 'my hand hurts because it is hot' which can be known (*figure 6*):

3 ME, 113ff.



Figure 6. “Hurts” are brought in to parallel the role played in manifest objects by occurrent properties: occurrent, intersubjective, explanatory.

We suppose that there is a sense impression of heat and, naturally, of becoming *too* hot (*getting warm, warmer...ouch!*) Of course, just as there can be a case of ostensible seeing, so one's hand can *ostensibly hurt* too.<sup>4</sup>




Figure 7. *a* is the 1st order *mis*-taking, believing-in, moving up a level to the 2nd order “seeming” I (seem to) feel pain that is “frameworkly” warranted and can be endorsed by the 3rd level ‘I see it.’ Introspection only gives “seeing to see.” We get the breakdown of the 1st order by reflection.

4 Compare the case of the toothache in ME, Ibid. The example of the “felt” progression from warmth or brightness, to pain occurs in the Rationalists and Empiricist but it was vintage Aristotelian.

Just as we can have a sense impression of a cube of pink, we can have a sense impression of a *hurting-hand*. Consequently, we are led to say that one's hand can *ostensibly* hurt too so that we can bring in the concept of *feeling a pain* (figure 7).

So, we account for a conceptual tie between hurting and the behavior. *Hurting* is analogous to *color*. *Feeling a pain* is analogous to *having a sense impression of color*. Hurting is taken<sup>5</sup> to be an *occurrent* character of the *hand*—a qualitative feature which is a non-relational occurrent state which I conceive on analogy with its cause—a stabbing pain. There is a conceptual tie between that which is explained by the theory and belief and avoidance behavior. Within our theory, belief and avoidance behavior are criteria for hurting where *hurting*, is an item in a theoretical explanation, and *feelings of pain* are brought in to explain the *ostensible* feelings of pain. Our account explains why, we see, there are observation generalizations which people obey to the extent that they do.

*There are two steps of theory.*

Feelings of pain are tied to public objects or *observables* because it is a theory of the behavior of people. We can't have a *hurt* neck without a neck but we can have a *feeling of a pain in the neck* without a neck since *hurting* (as opposed to feeling) is a state of the perceiver which is analogous to the color as a quality of perceptible things.

We can know non-inferentially that a hand hurts and it hurts *because* it is hot. The heat evokes the belief in us. We have non-inferential knowledge because the *whole* theory, has been internalized.<sup>6</sup> Certain modes of behavior are criteria for pain (hurting) and we are trying to spell that out. Wittgenstein is leery about explanation here because he wants to *describe* and not explain—which is legitimate if we don't minimize the role of explanation in the Manifest Image. The Common sense contains in it a certain amount of explanation.<sup>7</sup>

5 It would be mis-taken as later described in the Lectures.

6 With the help of Darwinian development and the linguistic community.

7 WS is describing the commonsense framework but he sees that there is explanation in there so it too must be part of the description. Wittgenstein thinks on ly description is necessary and explanation is not part of description as he points out during the lectures.

Belief and avoidance behavior are public and provide criteria but the *internalization* of the theory itself is what ultimately gives rise to the non-inferential knowledge. When we come to persons we tend, as Berkeley saw, to talk in terms of subject-verb, when we talk about physical objects, on the other hand, we speak in terms of subject-stuff. Our view of persons as having *quasi-parts* (a person having a hand, or a person *handwise*) allows us to part with the basic tendency without too much damage.<sup>8</sup>

Consider.

Knowledge is justified true belief and when we say that there is non-inferential knowledge, we mean a special sort of believing. Not, of course, a self-presenting of facts modeled on Cartesian direct knowledge. The occurrent thought ‘I am angry’ [ 1<sup>st</sup> order, or “I seem to be angry”—2<sup>nd</sup> order or “I *am* angry!” 3<sup>rd</sup> order—] is *likely*




Figure 8. If the 2nd order obtains, it is likely to be true: frameworkly warranted. The 1st order is a *believing in* or a taking about which Jones has a belief. When we endorse the 2nd order by saying, ‘I see an f’, we appeal to a sense of knowledge that reflects the discussion of “knowledge” occurring in the lectures.

*to be true* by virtue of the way that we are taught to respond to our own states [frameworkly warranted].<sup>9</sup> But I would not be *inferring* I was angry. It is just the nature of our conceptual structure that it is


<sup>8</sup> Thus, attributing “hurts” or “owie!” to a quasi-part like attributing “warmth” to an object.

<sup>9</sup> The brute matters of fact evoke spontaneous beliefs and that is how we learn to believe that we are in certain states and that certain objects are in front of us. In the ordinary sense, our perception is direct in a way derived (historically, at least) from the position of a sense datum theorists like G.E. Moore who held that there was an epistemic act of apprehension characterized by two important features. WS carefully illustrates in what way this ancestral relation occurs in ME.

extremely likely to be true that I am. If challenged, I back up a level where I can use the schema, I would say ‘Well, I believe that I’m angry.’ And *that* kind of candid belief is extremely likely to be true. Frameworkly warranted.

I learn to use the word ‘anger’ when I am. In learning to use the word ‘anger’ it becomes extremely likely that we say the word ‘angry,’ candidly, when we are. It is a *higher level* truth about 2<sup>nd</sup> beliefs that they are likely to be true.

“Pain” and “hurts” are usually run together. The amputee is



*feeling a pain* but there is only an *in-the-left-foot-kind-of-pain* but his foot isn’t *hurting*.

We must distinguish three things

- (1) meaning of ‘anger’
- (2) criteria for anger
- (3) fact that people can avow anger.

What is the relation of verbal behavior to mental acts?

The nature/criteria distinction comes in only at the level of theoretical states and their relation to overt behavior. Episodes are postulated to account for behavior. Even at the verbal behavior level there is “privileged access”. That is, one has a reliable belief about his propensities which need not be inferred by someone—or inferred at all as far as he is concerned—although *we* may have inferential beliefs *about* what *he* is thinking (when we get into the domain of the logically possible, we are in the domain of the infinite).

Is having the concept of pain being able to respond correctly? Not exactly. When I respond correctly *part* of the function of con-

cepts is their role in response, that is, to be responses to certain objects. There is no special apprehending: there is no apprehending which is independent of our conceptual framework. It is wrong to think that we first experience *red* and then get the *concept*.

## Language and Meaning 1969

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### Lecture I

#### Introduction

One of the topics that I do hope to discuss is the concept of *conceptual change*. I want to show the philosophical apparatus—and indeed it is an apparatus—that I have set up enables one to cope with this problem in a way which is both illuminating and reasonably formalizable, that is, capable of being given some definite technical structure.

So I will be concerned with the *problem of conceptual change* and the *problem of realism* because ultimately when you raise the problems of ontology, the problem of realism simply cannot be avoided

Now the two things that I understand that you have read would be “Toward a Theory of Categories” paper and “Scientific Realism or Irenic Instrumentalism” paper. Those two papers contain a large canvas which I want to explicate. If I can, I want to smooth out some of the difficulties which some of you may have found in these writings.

I’m also going to be discussing the *semantical theory* developed in *Science and Metaphysics*, the theory of meaning and truth which we have there but ultimately, I want to come back to the problems of *existence* and the relation of the concepts of existence to the problem of realism and of conceptual change.



We all know that philosophy of science is really nothing more than philosophy which takes science seriously and there is no such separate subject as philosophy of science, similarly, there is simply, epistemology taking seriously not only perceptual knowledge but scientific knowledge, inductive and theoretical, there is no, as it were metaphysics alone, metaphysics must include not only the metaphysics of the perceptual world but the metaphysics of the scientific framework, or scientific frameworks: perhaps a comparative metaphysics. And, in some sense, to assess the way in which a metaphysics of the commonsense framework and the metaphysics of a scientific framework or perhaps *the* scientific framework might fit together in one coherent scheme.

Philosophy has taken a linguistic turn and philosophers explore the conceptual structure of language. We have a rough division between ordinary language philosophers so-called, and those philosophers who concentrate on extraordinary language but actually what we have here is a division in linguistic terminology between philosophical analysis or reconstructions of actually “used,” I won’t say “nonscientific language,” but at least language which though it is very subtle and refined—as Austin points out—doesn’t contain the subject matter of sophisticated scientific theories. And then on the other hand, we have those philosophers of language who concentrate on the language of science often to the brutal neglect of its nestling relationship in the framework of actual usage of a sophisticated but still nonscientific type.

### **Philosophical Method**

I think I might begin by commenting briefly on the sort of method that I believe philosophy must follow because I’m going to be *illustrating* this and I’m quoting here from an essay which I read here two and a half years ago and which I have not yet published but which I hope someday to get around to polishing for publication.<sup>1</sup>

The method is easy to characterize but difficult in the extreme to follow. One begins by constructing simple models which are understood because we have constructed them, fragments of the mul-

1 The Epistemology Lecture later published as “The Structure of Knowledge.”

tidimensional framework which *is* actual usage and these initial models are inevitably oversimplified and largely false but the alternative to this path with all its oversimplification and error is to sketch the shifting surfaces of the functioning framework as a whole and hope that insight comes by pasting the sketches together.<sup>2</sup> This receptivity, however sensitive, and however important it may be as an element in philosophical method, must itself fail to yield understanding. In much the same spirit Plato warns us that the poets by concentrating on appearances are precluded from understanding the actions and characters of men which they so contagiously depict. The real danger of oversimplified models is not that they are over simple but the we may be satisfied with them and fail to compare them with the regions of experience other than those which suggested them and indeed the ultimate justification for system building in philosophy is the fact that no model for any region of discourse perceptual, discursive, practical and theoretical can be ultimately satisfying unless its connection with each of the others is itself modeled. To press the metaphor to its limits, the completion of the philosophical enterprise would be a single model the workings of which we would understand because we had constructed it which would reproduce the full complexity of the framework in which we were once, unreflectively at home.

It's quite clear of course, that this must inevitably be a *regulative ideal* and one of the themes I want to discuss in my concluding lecture is the role of regulative ideals such as the *Peircean* domain in philosophical method.

### What There Is

Now I'm going to be concerned with *meaning*, *truth* and *existence* and since the *final cause* obviously comes first, I might remark briefly on what it is to worry about "what there is."

"What kinds of things are there?" Ontology is said to ask. But of course, Ontology doesn't ask this question with respect to matter-of-factual or empirical kinds, ontology tends to speak in terms of *categories* and draw a contrast between categories and empirical

2 Language and Meaning I, track 0 (#1).

kinds. Perhaps it's not going to be obvious in the long-run what exactly the difference is between a category and an empirical kind, although I hope to shed some light on this question. But I want to comment on the very question, "what kinds of things there are?"

There's one kind of way in which the answer to this question, as it were, presents itself to us as something obvious. Are there qualities? Of course there are qualities! Are their relations? Of course there are relations! Are at their states of affairs? Of course there are states of affairs! Are there "sakes"? Of course there are "sakes" because 'sakes' is just another word for purpose. And if there aren't purposes then I don't know *what* there is? So there are certainly purposes and therefore, Quine to the contrary, there are "sakes."

Now as I said there's one way of asking this question in which the answer is obvious, "obviously there are thus and so." But then, there is another kind of answer, another kind of way of raising the question which is characteristic of the philosopher. He doesn't say "Are there qualities?" because in a sense obviously there are qualities, he says, "are there *really* qualities?" and the problem is, then, what is the difference between the question "Are there qualities?", and "Are there *really* qualities?" In one sense, it is obvious that there are qualities and in another sense it isn't obvious that there are qualities. And this distinction has something to do with the distinction between what is *basic* and what is in some way *derivative*. What there really is, is what is basic. Now this is a kind of picture we are getting, and as Wittgenstein emphasized, philosophers work with pictures, and I'm going to be sketching a picture today and then gradually dismantling the picture step-by-step.

The question as to what there is, is not, for example, the question "are their rabbits?" Are there *really* rabbits? Well, yes that's a good question philosophically because, for example, as Quine points out, we might say, "no there aren't really rabbits, what there really is, is *instances* of rabbithood." Or, what there really is, is *wholes* of rabbits parts. Or what they're really is, is *sequences* of rabbit events. So here you see when we ask, "are there really rabbits?" we are asking a "category-kind" of question. We are asking, "are rabbits basic objects or are rabbits less basic than something

else?” And roughly, one picture we get of “more basic than” is that something is more basic than something else if discourse about the one can be paraphrased away in terms of discourse about the other.<sup>3</sup>

I’m going to be concerned with *rabbits*, *instances* of rabbithood, *wholes* of rabbit parts, and *sequences* of rabbit events, in the course of my discussion. It’s interesting to note, of course, that Quine construes the situation as one in which entities are to be *countenanced* or not. We *reject* them, we *discount* them, we turn our faces away from them so to speak, like the Lord *turning* his face away from somebody. Quine *turns* his face away from attributes and states of affairs, and on the other hand, Quine turns his countenance on classes and classes of classes. As a matter of fact, Quine toys with the idea that one’s ontology might consist of classes and indeed of numbers... Pythagoreanism coming once again to the front.

I’m going to be discussing whether we should construe this situation as one in which we ask, “should we reject or accept?” He also provides another alternative that we can “paraphrase away.” I’ve already indicated that, so that we can perhaps reject attributes or perhaps paraphrase away statements about attributes. What I want to do is to show, in a certain sense, that attributes are already nice tidy entities. You see one of the problems Quine raises—it has been raised long before for Quine—is “What are the identity conditions for attributes?”, “what are the identity conditions for states of affairs?” “what are the identity conditions for these objects which he discountenances?” And he puts forward the slogan, which I think is very good one, “no entity without identity.”

What I want to show, in a way then, is that attributes are already tidy, as tidy as they can be expected to be because obviously the world contains many untidy items concerning which we would be hard put to specify identity conditions. But at least we would know what sort of thing identity for such things would be, and we can see why it’s vague or why there’s an open texture with the question of identity concerning them, and ultimately what I want to show is that

3 Language and Meaning I, track 3 (#4).

in this sense, attributes and other intentional entities are *already* acceptable.

Quine has been discussing problems concerning *translation* and ultimately the issue that is involved here is akin to Carnap's problem, a problem Carnap discusses under the heading of the distinction between "*internal*" questions and "*external*" questions. Thus Quine raises the question, "what does a culture using a certain language mean by the word 'rabbit'?" Once again, Quine's problems concerning *translation* are not problems concerning whether for example the word 'gavagai' means the same or has the same sense or reference as our word 'rabbit'. There *are* problems about how to translate given expressions of a language but *his* problem isn't that, his problem is the ontological one, "how can we determine whether or not, when users of the foreign language use the word which they utter in the presence of rabbits, whether they have a *rabbithood* ontology, a *rabbit-part* ontology, a *sequence-of-rabbit-event* ontology, or a *whole-of-rabbit-part* ontology?" There are empirical problems pertaining to translation but for Quine the crucial issue concerns the ontology of another language.

Of course this problem, as he points, out arises in terms of our *own* language because we also have, in a way, the language of parts, we can talk about rabbit parts, we can talk about rabbit events, we can talk about instances of rabbit-hood, instances of rabbit, we can talk about rabbits. For Quine, ultimately, the issue comes down to how are we going to decide whether to accept an ontology of rabbits, rabbit parts, instances of rabbit-hood, or sequences of rabbit events, for *ourselves*. And ultimately his answer here is a pragmatic one, but it also involves Quine's theory of quantification and his distinction between objectual and substitutional quantification.<sup>4</sup> I want to touch on those issues again later on because according to Quine, ontological issues are ultimately to be handled in terms of a theory of quantification.

I think that according to Quine, once we decide what *our* ontology is going to be, and do it on pragmatic and logical grounds, grounds pertaining to the ability to set up an adequate theory of numbers, once we determine our own ontology, then we would

4 Language and Meaning I, track 4.

have *a* reason, at least, for translating the other fellow's language one way or the other.

For example if we ultimately plumb for an ontology of attributes and say *rabbithood* is more basic than rabbits, then we would have reason to suppose that when other people learn their language and build up their language, they are also building up a language which is a rabbithood kind of language, and if we decide to have a language in which *concreta* like rabbits are the basic objects, then presumably this would give us *some* reason for interpreting other languages as similarly having that kind of ontology.

Because we can distinguish between philosophers of the culture who can be Platonists and what are the philosophical implications of a given language, what is the correct way to clarify it and analyze it and as I said, if we could come to terms about our own ontology then presumably this would give us some grounds for interpreting the ontology of the language of those who use the word 'gavagai'.

So I want to throw some light on this question of how we decide what our own ontology is to be and as I said for Quine, quantification theory and pragmatic grounds play a very key role.




Figure 1.  $R_1$  the relation between mind and body.

## Relationalism

Let me get then down to the business of elaborating the framework in terms of which I'm going to approach these questions. The standard classical way of looking at the world, the perennial way, can be characterized as a *relational picture*.

A relational picture of the world with respect to certain basic categories. For example, consider the person.

Here we find a contrast between two types of positions. I'm using this as an illustration to get the argument off the ground and I think, however, it will provide us with a first and juicy example of a

certain way of picturing the world. According to one analysis, a person consists of mind and a body. We have the Cartesian position. Which once again comes to be playing a very vigorous role in philosophical argument. Here we have a *relational* account, the mind is one thing, the body is in another and of course they interact or in some way they are related in such a way that they are coordinated in their behavior.

Now according to a different kind of approach, the relational approach, and put,  $R_1$ , here, according to a different approach, the approach belonging to the Aristotelian tra-

dition and represented today by Strawson, we have a view according to which a person is a basic object, it doesn't consist of a mind and body, rather the mind is a person *qua* capable of acting, capable of thinking and engaging in intellectual conceptual activities and a body would be a person *qua* having certain characteristics, like the ability to fall out of a window, the ability to displace water when swimming and so on. The body would be a person *qua* having certain other characteristics. Of course Strawson puts this in terms of P-predicates for the mental and M-predicates for material or bodily aspects.

Thus, here we have a contrast between a *relational* picture and a *nonrelational* picture. I am, of course, deeply involved in the mind-body problem and the family of problems that it involves—that actually involve a number of subproblems, the sense-body problem, the conceptual-activity-body problem but the most I can hope to do in this lecture is to make familiar the strategy I




Figure 2. Relationalism: ontological dictionary.  $R_1$ : Mind-body relation.  $R_2$ : Meaning relation.  $R_3$ : Apprehending relation.  $R_4$ : Exemplification relation.  $R_5$ : Correspondence relation.

would use in handling it. Let's look at some other elements of this *relational* picture in the world.<sup>5</sup>

In the first place there are languages  $L_1, L_2, \dots, L_N$ , and these languages are cultural phenomena and they have meanings and we get a relational theory of meaning. The relational theory of meaning, classically, developed in connection with the development of attributes.

We had expressions in the language standing for attributes,  $A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n$  and so on, and different languages would contain different expressions for the same attributes. We would have a relation here,  $R_2$ , a relation between language and attributes, and of course, they could be called "meanings" in this respect, this would be the *meaning* relation.

Then of course minds are related to these attributes and we have a *relation* of awareness or apprehension, a relation whereby the mind can cope with the attributes of the things. We have again another relation,  $R_3$ .

Furthermore we have, in this picture, another relationship, in addition to the domain of meanings or intelligibles, we also have concreta. Different philosophers give different ac-

counts of what are concreta and that's going to be a deep concern of ours but roughly in the first instance concreta would be things located in space and or time. We have a theory then of relation here, there is a relation holding between concreta and attributes, call that  $R_4$  (see *figure 2*). This is the relation of *exemplification*. So, relation! Relation! Relation! Relation!

The domain of intelligibles began, as I said, essentially, as the domain of attributes. But as you know, over the years its inherent Meinongian tendencies led it to include *possible* individuals, and




Figure 3.

<sup>5</sup> Language and Meaning I, track 4 (#5).



led it to include *propositions*, first of all, and then among propositions, those which are *states of affairs*.

Then, we have the notion of a *fact* which comes in: the domain of facts. And the domain of facts has tended, philosophically, to sort of *hover* between the status of being a resident of this domain, representables, and being a concretum, as a matter of fact, some philosophers with respect to concreta hold what we call “object” ontologies and others what we call “fact” ontologies. So facts have tended to hover between the domain *intelligibilia* and the domain of *concreta*. The problem there is obviously going to be the problem of truth.

Hence there is a tendency to think of truth as a relation, there has been traditionally and you find this for example in Chisholm, there has been a tendency to take a fact ontology and to think of a proposition as true if it corresponds to a fact. Thus, you would have the correspondence relation call that,  $R_5$  (see *figure 2*). One takes facts as concreta and doesn’t distinguish clearly between facts and objects and then has a relation of correspondence between propositions and facts.

And here, then, is the “Relational Picture” and what I wanted to do is to really *reject* all those relations! *All of them!* Now what is it to reject them? Well here I’m going to come up with something more than *just* discountenancing them, I’m going to attempt to come up with an analysis which explains exactly why they are not relations. It is going to countenance them but point out that they are not relations and this is essentially going to hinge on the difference between *logical constants* and *predicates*.

What this means is that I’m going to take seriously the surface grammar of all these expressions that seem to designate relations of these various kinds here. And then I want to persuade you that they can be rationally reconstructed in a way which shows them not even to be relations, not to be relational words *at all* but to have a different kind of function. And in the cases that I am going to be concerned with, to show them directly to be logical constants including, in here, the quantifiers as well as the connectives. Now I’m going to start out with the “meaning.”<sup>6</sup>

6 Language and Meaning I, track 6 (#7).

### Meaning

I am going to show that we can accept the meaning statements at the face value without committing ourselves to a relational theory of meaning. Now you see, what this boils down to is, for example Quine draws a distinction—it's nice how people like dichotomies if it is their *own* dichotomy and dislike dichotomies that are somebody else's. Quine is enamored with the dichotomy between the theory of meaning and the theory of denotation and he rejects meaning theory and accepts a logic, a semantics of denotation. There is a dichotomy then which he works with and as I said he discountenances the analytic/synthetic dichotomy and the other. I'll have something to say about those topics as well.

Let me then emphasize the basic step I make that runs throughout the whole argument is the account that I'm going to give of meaning. As I shall argue, if we can get an account of meaning which does justice to the way the word functions, and yet doesn't require meaning to be a relation, this will enable us to have the theory of intentionality and of mental acts which is not a relational type and it enables us to have a nonrelational theory of truth and so on.

So the crucial step concerns the meaning. Now I need a little machinery here. The first thing I'm going to do is to call attention to some things that are obvious—then work from those elements. Well...things that “should” be obvious because as you know, what's obvious to one person is it either unintelligible or absurd to another. But now consider for example the following statement, “yellow is an adjective.” Okay. Now this is a sentence which has a subject, copula and it has a predicate, it's a *sortal* predicate. What we have here is a verb which is singular and this suggests that “yellow” here is functioning as a *singular term*.

There's no reason why we shouldn't except that because in some sense it is obvious that “yellow” is a singular term here, but then everything hinges on what our conception of a singular term is. What our paradigm for being a singular term is. We may have a “*name paradigm*” or a “*definite description*” paradigm, in which case we may tend to assimilate all singular terms to the paradigms we have. Thus a philosopher who is already Platonistically inclined will tend to think of this singular term as the name of an attribute if

you will, or the name of a Platonic entity. An entity which is, after all, a Platonic entity pertaining to the English language but then Plato has a Platonic entity of Justice, there can be Platonic entities which concern forms of human activity and since the English language, as a language, is intelligible, there must be, for a Platonist, a form for the “intelligibilities” of it and the word ‘yellow’ is, in some sense, one of intelligibilities of the English language. One might have the notion that the word ‘yellow’ is functioning as the name of a Platonic object.

There is an alternative obviously. But one which has to be looked at carefully. I want to recommend it to you, I want to recommend another way of looking at it. That is that the word ‘yellow’ here is functioning as short for “a yellow” or “the yellow is an adjective.” I call this type of singular term, a “distributive singular term” and I call it a distributive singular term because it enables us to make a remark about all the members of a certain group. In other words, this in effect is tantamount to “‘yellow’s are adjectives.” In other words, the alternative to the Platonic way of construing this singular term.<sup>7</sup>

The Platonic way of construing this singular term is to make use of the special kind of singular term which we all recognize to exist in a language. So “‘yellow’ is an adjective” can be, with a minimum of Procrusteanizing, can be “rationally reconstructed,” with a minimum of torment, into a statement which involves a distributed singular term as a subject. Once this little gnat has been swallowed, I think you’ll be ready for the camel.

All right, according to the form here, we could say then in logical terms, using the including sign, “yellow is an adjective”:

$$\text{yellow} \in \text{adjective}$$

This would have the same form as “Dogs are lions.” Which would be

$$\text{dogs} \in \text{lions}$$

7 Language and Meaning I, track 7 (#8).

“dogs are included in Lions.” Where this is equivalent, in quantification theory, to

$$\forall x (x \in \text{dog} \rightarrow x \in \text{lion})$$

So, this would have the form for every  $x$ ,  $x$  is a yellow implies  $x$  is an adjective

$$\forall x (x \in \text{yellow} \rightarrow x \in \text{adjective})$$

Now I should, to be more precise here, put “ ‘yellow’ in English is an adjective” because, of course, one has to have reference to the fact that ‘yellow’ is functioning not here simply as a noise but as a word in the English-language, a word which has a certain kind of function and that brings me to my next theme.

There are sortal words like ‘lion’ and ‘dog’ which classify according to biological traits, traits of interest. And there are words which classify in terms of function. Furthermore, there are words which classify both with respect to the “function server” and the function, in other words, let me put it this way. Consider the word ‘pawn’ as a word in chess, something is a Pawn not by virtue of its shape or size but by virtue of having a certain function in the game of chess. A function which is expressed by means of the rules concerning what it is correct and incorrect to do in chess. Rules which constitute chess as opposed to rules of strategies for winning. Well ‘pawn’ is a word which clearly is a sortal word, we have the function, the form “ $x$  is a pawn.”

Pawn is a classifier according to function but it is also, to many people who have been familiar with a particular kind of chess set involving certain shapes, the word ‘Pawn’ would have as its criteria of application not only a certain kind of functioning but also a certain empirical kind of shape, for example, or material. We can imagine that the word ‘pawn’ can become a classifier which classifies in a purely functional way and by this I mean that it makes reference to empirical characteristics only *so* generically as to specify what kinds of similarities and differences and “moveabilities” there must be in order for something to serve the function. You might say the minimal descriptive generic characterization which is implied by the functioning.

The word *pawn* is a functional classifier and it can be so used in such a way that the criteria are, I will call them, *purely functional* because I will put in that phrase “purely functional” an allowance for the minimal generic characterization of the kinds of similarities and differences there must be among the objects in the domain in order for them to serve that kind of function.

Obviously something which cannot be in some sense moved couldn’t change its place, couldn’t be a pawn. Although even here we can, speaking very abstractly, we can think of all kinds of weird games, weird ways in which a game of chess could be played and I don’t mean that old example I use of Texas chess.<sup>8</sup>

An example in which I use with LBJ playing, using a Cadillac as a piece and counties as the chess board. But let’s just sit down and think of all the weird ways in which you can play chess: by means of light flashes and sounds and so on. Played on the piano, use a sort of Strawsonian world to play chess in if you want to.

All right, now in the case of language also there are classifier’s with respect to, as you might call it, the “matter,” in other words, you can classify linguistic items materially in terms of their phonemes, in terms of their sound structure or their visual display. So that there is such a thing as classifying linguistic items according to what is traditionally called their sign designs. But there also are *functional* ways of classifying expressions.

And what I want to suggest is that we understand meaning statements in terms of a special way of forming *functional classifiers*. Consider the example which I often use

‘Und’ (in German) means *and*.

The first thing to note is that the word ‘and’ is performing a very peculiar kind of function here. It’s obviously not functioning as the connective. As the connective, the word ‘and’ belongs in such contexts as, “it is raining and the streets are getting wet,” in other words you take sentences, there are other uses of course in which the word ‘and’ occurs as joining predicates or subjects, “Jack and Jill went up the hill,” “This man is wise and happy.” There are many ways in which ‘and’ occurs but those are its normal functions. Here it is

8 Language and Meaning I, track 8 (#9).

performing a very special kind of function and I want us to review what that function might be.

I'm suggesting that when we speak of the German word as meaning "and," we are giving a functional characterization of it, we are not, as it were, describing the functioning of it, I'll talk about that a moment, but we are enabling the person who hears this sentence, to whom we offer the sentence, to figure it out for himself. He will be enabled to understand how the German word functions by rehearsing his own use of this word here.

I'm suggesting that we regard the word *and* here as functioning as a *metalinguistic* classifier. It's a cousin of ordinary quotes, but ordinary quotes not only indicate that something performs a linguistic function, but they also concern the materials which actually embody that kind of functioning. What I want you to do is to think of the dot-quote as like an ordinary quote except that it doesn't simply refer to the materials, as a matter of fact, it is not concerned with the materials in the sense that anything to which it is correctly applicable has this kind of material here because it is going to be a purely functional classification in the sense that I've mentioned before. So that we are going to have a sortal word which is specifically concerned to classify items in languages, which perform the job done in any language by the materials done inside. So that I can say "und in German means and," "et" in a French means "and" and so on. And these are all classifying expressions and so we would get the following then,

'Und' (in German) means *and*

is going to be reconstructed as

The 'und' (in German) is an •and•

Let me just make that plural, so I can move right to the point that I want to make but I'm going to need one more technical device before I go further.

'Und's (in German) are •and•s

I had also said,

'Et's (in French) are •and•s

and so on.<sup>9</sup>

According to this strategy, then, the word “means” and that’s the first and *crucial* point I want to make, the word “means” is a *specialized form of the copula*. And therefore not a relational predicate word, if this analysis is correct, *meaning* is not a relation because to say what a word means is to *classify* it and therefore,

‘Und’ (in German) means *and*

has the form

Und (in German) is a •and•

And this has the same form as

Dog is an animal

In the sense that logically, it involves the “inclusion” sign. This would have the form, therefore

$$x(x \in \text{und}_G \rightarrow x \in \bullet\text{and}\bullet)$$

As I indicated, to say what a word means is to classify it and this involves that the word “means” is a specialized form of the copula.

Let me press this one step further, because not only do we speak of “meaning” but we have specialized meaning words in semantics. We distinguish for example between “standing for” and “denotes.” I’m going to be explicating this distinction subsequently and relating it to the problem of classes and attributes. But now let’s consider the following example.

I’m going to first of all, give a contrived example in order to show how this works and then I’m going to generalize it. I’m going to compare

‘Und’ (in German) means *and*

with

‘Und’ (in German) stands for *andness*.

9 Language and Meaning I, track 9 (#10).

Because when we use the expressions “stands for” in standard semantics, of the Fregean type, what we have here is something that goes along with an expression here which ends in “-ity,” “-hood,” “-ness,” or prefixed by ‘that-’. And I could’ve done this in terms of conjunction but conjunction is a Latin verbal noun and what we have here is another abstract term, and I’m coining this expression *andness* and I want to give an account of *it*.

Now I want you to consider the following paradigm showing again how important a role distributed singular terms play in language.

Consider for example,

The muskox is the Indian workhorse.

Now here is an interesting sentence because it involves two distributed singular terms, one is the subject and one is the predicate. I want to suggest that

The muskox is the Indian workhorse

is equivalent to

muskoxen are Indian workhorses

So that this sentence involving the two distributed singular terms can be regarded as a way—using *singular* terms—of saying something which can be said in terms of a straightforward use of the copula.

And indeed I want, therefore, to suggest that we have the following as our first formulation

The ‘Und’ is the German •and•

The suggestion I am now going to make is that *andness* is equivalent to

The •and•.



In other words I'm going to suggest as my rational reconstruction here (we'll see if it works) that *-ity*, *-hood*, *-ness* and *that-*, do *two* things. In the first place they are *quoting* devices.<sup>10</sup>

But like my dot quotes, they are pure functional quotes and that means that they abstract from linguistic materials.

In the second place, *-ity*, *-hood*, and *-ness* obviously form singular terms and what I'm suggesting is that the singular terms they form are not names but are what? Distributed Singular Terms. Platonism is built on the notion that *-ity*, *-hood*, and *-ness* words if they are taken seriously as singular terms must be construed as what? Names! What I'm proposing is that we can *do justice* to their singular "termishness" without accepting them as names and of course they don't come to us blowing bugles and say, "we are names!" They simply present themselves to us as singular terms and I'm suggesting that if we reconstruct them as distributed singular terms then we can understand their peculiar role.

Let me draw a distinction between two degrees of "*objectivity*." First of all there is objectivity in an absolute sense: something is *absolutely* objective if it is independent of mind. An idealist naturally, would deny that there is anything absolutely objective. Let me put it this way, let me contrast absolute objectivity with what I would call the weaker sense of "objectivity" which I will call *publicness* or *intersubjectivity*. Obviously institutions are *objective* but of course they are not *absolutely* objective because if there were no persons there would be no institutions. The existence of institutions involves the existence of persons and of minds.

What I want to suggest is that words like *triangularity*, *circularity*, *justice* and so on look as though they were absolutely objective because in point of fact they obviously don't refer, at least they don't appear to refer to our own language or to any particular language and therefore the temptation is to think of them as nonlinguistic *period*. And what I want to suggest is that what gives them their peculiar character is not there being absolutely objective but there being *public* in this sense of applying to expressions in a number of languages, indeed any of a family of languages—a family of languages which contains a certain kind of function.

10 Language and Meaning I, track 10 (#11).

According to this analysis, when we say that

‘Und’ (in German) means *and*

we can also say

‘Und’ (in German) stands for *andness*.

This comes down to, when you press the analysis,

‘Und’ (in German)  $\in$  •and•

Thus I’m suggesting, then, that to say what a word *stands for* is *also* to classify it. But we are going to see that “stands for” is a specialized word, it is *specialized* even further than “means” because “stands for” is introduced by logicians to contrast with the “denotes.” Where it is appropriate. As a matter of fact, philosophers tend not to think of “und” as standing for anything because they are so concerned with that contrast between intension and extension and “und” doesn’t obviously have any extension.

When I say for example that

‘Dreieckig’ (in G) stands for triangularity

According to this analysis this has the effect of

The ‘Dreieckig’ (in G) is •triangular•<sup>11</sup>

And again “stands for” turns out *not* to be a relation at all, if this reconstruction is correct. The key to the reconstruction is to see triangularity not as a purported name, but to recognize its character as a singular term and to view it as a way of classifying, functionally, linguistic expressions.

According to this account, then, both “means” and “stands for” are specialized forms of the copula.

I said that to classify, to say what a word stands for, is to classify it functionally. But now what is the function of ‘dreieckig’? You see one is often tempted to say, “I grant that the word ‘dreieckig’ has a function but surely its function is to stand for triangularity,” and to get into a circle here, obviously.

11 Language and Meaning I, track 11 (#12).

Now there are two ways in which you can give an explanation. You can explain to someone the function of a word. For example, suppose, to use an analogy, if I were to go down to Texas where LBJ is playing “Tess” and I might say—as I see a Cadillac steaming from County A County B—I might say, “what’s that?” And somebody might say, “that’s a King.” Now you see, I’ve told you, in a sense, what its function is but of course I’ve done it by giving you a classifier which classifies it functionally. In order to explain in another sense what that is, I would have to say, “well it is the sort of thing that can go from county to county, one at a time and...and then go give him the rules of Texas Chess of “LBJ Chess.”

Again suppose I were to ask what is the function of the pawn? Well it would be unilluminating to answer the question by saying the function of a pawn is to play the pawn role. The function of the Pawn is to play the Pawn. What I’m suggesting is that to say that the function of ‘dreieckig’ is to stand for triangularity is to do the exact same thing, to say that is to give stone in place of bread just as if someone were to say what is the function of the pawn, “Ah the function of the pawn is to play the pawn role.” It is to play the pawn. There are many ways in which we have specialized copula’s and playing as for example in Texas chess, Cadillacs play the King “play” there is a copula and you can in effect in Texas chess, Cadillacs play the King, Cadillac’s playing the King is equivalent to Cadillacs in Texas chess are Kings.

The statement that the function of ‘dreieckig’ is to stand for triangular is unilluminating in a way in which it would contrast with the illuminating way of discussing the axiomatic structure which governs the correct use of the word triangular. And I’m going to be discussing using the example of triangular in a number of ways and ultimately to clarify the notion of *conceptual change*.

Let me illustrate this point again because it’s a crucial one. Suppose I say that

‘Und’ (in German) stands for *andness*,

and then I explained to you that’s really giving you a classification of the German word ‘und’, telling you that ‘und’s in German are •and•s. And you say well that’s a functional classification but what function does the word ‘und’ in German play? Well I might say, “well it plays the ‘and’ function” but that wouldn’t be very illumi-

nating unless you can rehearse your word ‘and’ and know how you use it. In effect, then, what I could do more explicitly was to tell you the basic rules in accordance with which the connective ‘and’ functions in logic. In other words the cash for a functional classification ultimately consists in laying down what the rules are in terms of which one evaluates correct or incorrect usage of an item.<sup>12</sup>

One explains what it is for something to be a pawn by explaining the rules to which pawn users are subject in playing chess.

I’m arguing that meaning is not a relation between linguistic items and nonlinguistic items. And I’m arguing, similarly, that the objectivity of intelligibles is intersubjectivity and “interlinguisticity” and not absolute objectivity. On the other hand, I want to insist that some words would not mean what they do unless they stood in matter-of-factual relations to absolutely objective entities in a sense. Thus, for example, unless the word ‘Socrates’ stood in some matter-of-factual relation to a person who lived in Athens 2,000 and some years ago, unless names stood in matter-of-factual relations to objects, they couldn’t have the meaning they do. The meaning statements would not be true. But this doesn’t mean that the word “means” stands for a relation. Again, the word ‘yellow’ wouldn’t have the meaning it does, in other words, it wouldn’t function as it does unless the word ‘yellow’ functioned in perceptual responses, what Quine calls “word-object relationships” with objective, absolutely objective entities. This again doesn’t mean that the word ‘means’ or the word ‘stands for’ in semantics, stands for a relation.

### Attributes

We have then a *nonrelational* theory of meaning and of standing for. The next move is to apply this to the case of the purported relation between mental acts and intelligibles, attributes. Let’s commit ourselves to keep this ambiguity of the Cartesian scheme [dualism] versus the Strawsonian. We would have a relational theory again, this is  $R_3$  where we would have an attribute and we have a mind standing in relation to the attribute. Now what I’m suggesting

<sup>12</sup> Language and Meaning, track 12 (#13).

here is that we construe mental acts on the analogy of linguistic items so that to say what a mental act is about is to classify it. We are already, by our account of meaning, committed to the view that to say what a person says, is to classify it. When you say that Jones said that Tom is tall you are classifying Jones' utterance in a functional way, when you quote what somebody says, of course, you are not characterizing it or classifying it in a purely functional way because when you use direct quotes you are classifying it in terms of the linguistic material of a certain language but when you use indirect discourse you are classifying it in a purely functional way.

The suggestion here then is that just as when you classify the utterance by quotes or by indirect discourse, you are classifying it functionally so when you say what a mental act is about, you are classifying it in a functional way. Thus to say Jones thought that Tom is tall you are classifying Jones' thought in a certain way. How? You are classifying it with respect to how you would classify the corresponding utterance, the utterance which would express that thought. Thus we classify mental acts in terms of how we would classify, functionally, the utterances that would express the mental act. Once again we have a classifying account of "aboutness" or meaning as contrasted with a relational theory of aboutness or meaning.

One final point and that is (this is a point that is elaborated in the paper on "categories") that we have here the basis for a general account of abstract singular terms.<sup>13</sup>

It is the basis for a general account of abstract singular terms because the word 'triangularity' occurs not only in contexts as 'Dreieckig' (in German) stands for triangularity but also occurs in the contexts, for example

**a** exemplifies triangularity.

And if we follow through with the same theme that triangularity equals the •triangular•, then we can see a strategy for handling the supposed relation of exemplification. This looks like a relation, it has the surface grammar of a relation, and to see how its depth

<sup>13</sup> Language and Meaning I, track 13 (#14).

grammar appears, let's rewrite it in terms of something that is clearly equivalent to it, namely,

Triangularity is true of **a**

To say that something exemplifies triangularity is equivalent to saying that triangularity is true of it. This would then become

The •triangular• is true of **a**

Now this is a very special use of the word 'a'. For example if I say "wisdom is true of Socrates," this is a very special use of the word 'Socrates' just as in the case of

'Und' (in German) means *and*

We have a special use of the word 'and'. Here I am not using 'Socrates' as I normally would in a simple subject-predicate sentence as for example

Socrates is wise.

I'm using it to make the sentence involving this concept of truth. There is clearly a close relationship between

Wisdom is true of Socrates

and

That Socrates is wise is true.

Obviously if wisdom is true of Socrates then that Socrates is wise is true and vice versa. Now that Socrates is wise is true according to the account that we have given of the function of the word 'that' would come out as

The •Socrates is wise• is true.

Now if that Socrates is wise is true, is equivalent to an expression which mentions the word 'Socrates' this is a hint to us that in "wisdom is true of Socrates," the word 'Socrates' is also mentioned. And we have another case here of a *hidden metalinguistic* reference. And I will for the time being express this as

A •wise• concatenated with a •Socrates• is true.

In other words this is a way of making it a truth statement which breaks up what is being characterized as true in two parts because of what one wants to do in the context. So that after all we can put down this general principle here a  $\bullet$ Socrates is wise $\bullet$ , in other words, here we have a functional classification which applies to sentences in any language which do this “Socrates is wise” job, we can certainly say then, *a Socrates is wise* is

a  $\bullet$ Socrates $\bullet$  concatenated with a  $\bullet$ wise $\bullet$

and the exploration of this point would take us into an account of the subject-predicate connection.

If this is correct, then the supposed relation of *exemplification* turns out to be a special use of the concept of truth. And we would, in order, then, to see whether we can get away from a *relational theory of exemplification*, we have to see what we can do with the concept of truth. And if it turns out that the word *true* doesn’t stand for a relation, then by this strategy we would have shown that *exemplifies* is not a relation and we would have boxed the compass on the relations which I built into the picture of the world which I characterize as the “perennial picture.”<sup>14</sup>

Here is the basic material that I’m going to be working with in the course of this exploration of meaning, truth, and existence.

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#### Questions and Answers

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Let me write down here,

Und (in German) is a  $\bullet$ and $\bullet$

and I characterized this as

$(x)(x \in \text{und}_G \rightarrow x \in \bullet\text{and}\bullet)$

[Can the connective in the means rubric be construed as a relation of some sort?] What I said was that there is no relationship here whatsoever because this is a logical connective and not a relation. Now if you want to call connectives “crypto relations,” you’re enti-

<sup>14</sup> Language and Meaning, track 14 (#15).

tled to do so but there is a fundamental difference between logical connectives and predicates in that predicates take referring expressions and singular terms. For example, consider even the word *implies* which is a predicate, it is a predicate, not a connective and this is shown by the fact that we have to say is that Socrates is wise implies that he has a mind and so on.

The •and• is a sortal word and every sortal word has criteria of application, what are the criteria that anything must satisfy to be a •and•? It must be an item in some language or other which is under the controls and doing the job that is done in our language by the expression that is contained between the dot quotes. That's the way we form the dot quoted expression, in other words, its formation involves the use of something which is doing a certain function but this doesn't involve the relation between entities. I use this very complicated locution—this is a sortal expression which applies to anything which functions in a way as what's in between the quotes functions in our language but that doesn't mean this is an abbreviation for that, we mustn't construe the criteria for a sortal expression as if it were a part of the definition of the sortal expression.

## Lecture II

### Introduction

Let us step back, let us consolidate, see what we've done.<sup>15</sup> I was attempting last time to get you first of all to swallow the gnat, and at least begin to swallow the camel. I don't know that even the gnat has been swallowed. I hope that you are entertaining the gnat.

I began you'll remember with a certain picture of thought and the world. A picture which has had and continues to have, a domi-


<sup>15</sup> Language and Meaning II, track 0 (#1).



nating influence on the kinds of answers that are given to problems in philosophy generally, and to problems in the philosophy of science. For example, it is this picture of the world, and knowledge of the world, the picture of the relation of thought to the world which underlies instrumentalism. I will be pointing that out today. Essentially the picture is one which is historically associated with the Platonic tradition but by no means limited to what would generally be called the Platonic tradition because it's a picture that can be held with all kinds of qualifications, all kinds of footnotes, all kinds of commentary which attempts to blunt it, which attempts to sidetrack it, but yet the picture is often operating even where the picture is being explicitly rejected.

For example Carnap, in his *Meaning and Necessity* is in a sense in which I'm using the term, a *Platonist*, and I'll be bringing this out as we go along. The reason he doesn't call himself a "Platonist" is because he associates the term Platonism with the additional little pictures which have gotten tied to the notion of Platonism. For example a Platonist is not *merely* one who holds that there is the triangle itself, the circle itself, these attributes that are absolutely objective entities which would be there and exist and would have there being even if there were no minds.

But of course the Platonist is one who holds that the chair itself is a chair, the table itself is a table and so on, the notion being that these forms are perfect particulars and when Carnap denies that he is a Platonist, he is denying that he believes the chairness is a chair that's—what it comes down to. But of course since in any serious sense, the Platonic tradition does not have as part of its essential core self-predication or self instantiation of attributes, it's misleading for a philosopher—it shows his historical ignorance—to hold essentially Platonic positions and yet say he is not a Platonist on the ground that he doesn't think that triangularity is a perfect triangle. So I would use Carnap in *Meaning and Necessity* as a paradigm example of the Platonist.



**Relationalism**

In this relational picture, remember, I started first of all by pointing out that the Cartesian tradition has a *relational picture* of mind and body, mind is one ultimate subject, body is another ultimate subject and the two are related: a mind-body relationship.<sup>16</sup> I contrasted this with a *double aspect theory* found in Strawson according to which mind is a person *qua* having certain activities and abilities, *qua* engaging in certain activities and having certain abilities: the body is a person *qua* having certain other abilities and carrying on certain other activities.

Then of course I came to the heart of the matter: the notion of a domain of essences, intelligibles, of abstract entities, as they are called, the kind of entities referred to by *-ity*, *-hood*, *-ness* and “*that-*” clauses: that Tom is tall, that Socrates is wise, that  $2 + 2 = 4$ , and so on. And of course, then, according to this picture, language gets its meaning by standing in a *meaning relation* to this domain of entities. We have, then, a relational theory of meaning.

Now remember as I emphasized yesterday afternoon, in one of the discussion sections, I love relations and I’m mean that literally and figuratively. I am not against relations. I’m against a relational theory of meaning and I deny that the word ‘means’ stands for a relation. In order for an expression to mean something there must be lots of relations involved but I’m just denying that the word ‘means’ itself functions as a relation word.

I’m afraid that some of you may have a gotten the impression last time that I was *down* relations. I assure you that this is not so. I’m down on a theory of meaning according to which words have meaning by virtue of standing in a meaning relation to a domain of entities called meanings, or essences, or intelligibles, or abstract entities.

**Intentionality**

We have a theory of intentionality according to which mind stands in relations to these intelligibles, these essences, these ab-

<sup>16</sup> Language and Meaning II, track 1 (#2).

stract entities. For a person to believe that Socrates is wise is for him, as it were, to apprehend, or stand in a relation of noticing or awareness to an entity called “that Tom is tall,” “that Socrates is wise.” Or, to be thinking of triangularity just because he is standing in a certain sort of relationship to that essence. So we have the “aboutness” relation, a thought is *about* an entity, *intends* it, is about it, stands in relation to it: where this is construed as a relation.

### **Exemplification**

And then of course as I pointed out in this domain there are concreta, in the real world there, are concreta, and here are the attributes, the *-ity*, *-hood* and *-ness* here and the concreta *partake of*, *exemplify*, *instantiate*, are *instances of* etc. attributes, and we have the “exemplification” relation. I’m using the word ‘exemplification’ but you remember all the terms that have been used here throughout history. We have a relational theory of attributes and concreta. The concreta stand in an exemplification relation to attributes.

### **Facts and Meaning**

Then as I indicated that “facts,” somehow hover around in here, they are often treated as concreta and at other times “facts” are distinguished from concreta but then in any case, we have a relational theory of truth according to which a belief or thought is true if it corresponds to a fact. So we have a correspondence relation between a belief and the fact and I’m going to be discussing that. That will break down usually into a product of the relationship between a thought and a state of affairs or a proposition in the domain of abstract entities and then some kind of character of existing or obtaining or being the case which would make that a fact: we get various accounts of truth in the traditional correspondence form.

I want to offer a radically different way of looking at this situation. One, in effect which is *nominalistic*, or if you will,

*conceptualistic*, I prefer to say, but it's very different from the standard kind of nominalism because it takes seriously the idea of there being such things as triangularity and abstract entities. It reinterprets their existence. It reinterprets their status, it gives a different account of them and one which is in general in the spirit of Wittgenstein's claim that the meaning of an expression is its use. He uses that as a kind of slogan and I would be prepared to use it as a kind of slogan—the fundamental difference is that in the *Investigations* for Wittgenstein, when Wittgenstein's speaks of the meaning of the expression as its use, he has in mind a whole range of uses of kinds that are quite unlike like those I concentrate on or stress.<sup>17</sup>

For example he has in mind what I would call the use of language in communicative roles, influencing people, commanding people, telling people to do things, and so on, asserting, making statements. Whereas the kind of the *use* that I want to concentrate on is what I would call semantical use, the kind of use which gives expressions their meaning and which is presupposed by the communicative uses of language and the use of language to influence people, to win friends and influence people, that is, the Dale Carnegie aspect of language which Wittgenstein stresses so much and which Austin stressed so much in his discussion of how to do things with words.

My argument last time was that meaning is not a relation, and when we say for example that

'Und' (in German) means *and*

we are not talking about a meaning relation between the German word 'und' an entity called "and" or conjunction, and when we say that the German word 'und' means *and* we are classifying, as it were, we are classifying it by means of a sortal expression and an underlined expression (as we would ordinarily represent it)

'Und' (in German) means *and*

The word "and" is functioning in a peculiar way here and I suggested that we construe that as a quoting device. It forms out of the

<sup>17</sup> Meaning and Language II, track 2 (#3).

word ‘and’ a metalinguistic expression just as any ordinary quote is a metalinguistic, a way of referring *to* the language. This would be a way of referring to language, it is a way of classifying linguistic expressions and the dot-quoted expression is a sortal expression which applies to any concrete linguistic occurrence which in any language does the kind of functioning which the word ‘and’ does in our language. I call it an “illustrating” use of quotes because it is, what the word ‘and’, in here, is doing is not functioning as the word ‘and’—its related—it is functioning however in a way which is related to the word ‘and’ in the following sense. That it functions in a way by rehearsing which, we can discover how other languages perform that function, what expressions in other languages perform that function.

So we have here a sortal expression and I said that ‘Und’s (in German) means *and* has the logical form

‘Und’s (in German)  $\in$  •and•s

Now of course in logic we leave the ‘s’ of here and let the context provide the plural. Thus for example

if this were ‘man’ and ‘animal’, this would be ‘men are animals’.

And that would be analyzed as

$x(x \in \text{man} \supset x \in \text{animal})$

so,

$x(x \in \text{‘und’ (in German)} \supset x \in \text{•and•})$

It is a functional classification and furthermore it’s a pure functional classification in that in order to be a •and• something doesn’t have to look like the word ‘and’ or sound like it, it can be ‘und’ or ‘et’ in Latin and so on. And then I gave the same account of the related expression “stands for” which again has the surface grammar of a relational word. We tend to think of “stands for” statements as having the form

something *are* something.

I analyze this in such a way that

‘Und’s (in German) stands for conjunction (or *andness*)  
has the form, first of all,

The ‘und’ (in German) is the •and•

And this becomes again,

‘Und’s (in German) are •and•s.

Thus, that the depth grammar of “stands for” statements is the same as the depth grammar of meaning statements, they both serve the function of classifying functionally the expressions about which they are talking.

This led me to a general account of expressions ending in *-hood*, *-ity*, and *-ness* or beginning with *that*.<sup>18</sup> I said that these are all *quoting devices*, and they look as though they were names of nonlinguistic entities, why? Because what they are quoting is, they are performing a metalinguistic function in a way which abstracts from the differences between particular languages, English, French and so on. And this is misinterpreted by the philosopher to mean that they are not meant to be metalinguistic at all, but they are metalinguistic in that they deal with a whole family of languages which later on I’m going to call a *conceptual system*.

In a sense German, French and English and so on, are different ways of writing and speaking the same conceptual system, the conceptual system being characterized by the semantical rules considered abstractly, just as Texas Chess and ordinary Chess and Chess played on all of the different ways that we play, different pieces, of course, can all be regarded as special embodiments governed by an abstract set of rules which applies to them all. A set of rules that characterizes them in very generic terms with respect to their materials and moves. So it is *-ity*, *-hood* and *-ness* and *that-* are quoting devices.

‘Triangularity’, although it is a singular term and looks like a name, in Platonism essentially you take it to be a name and that’s the crux of the matter. That’s why the reinterpretation of these

18 Language and Meaning, track 3 (#4).

terms is so important because once we see that there is an alternative to construing this as a name, then we are enabled to see that we are not dealing with a peculiar domain of abstract ultimate objects. When we talk about triangularity, it is to talk about conceptual items, linguistic items and I am going to be including in language, as I indicated at the end of the last lecture, inner speech, Ockhamite inner speech as well as overt speech because I think that what we understand by the word “thought” is something analogous, an internal process that is analogous to, in its functioning, in its functional respects, it is analogous to overt language.

When we talk about triangularity we are talking about *the triangular*. That is the analysis of it, the *-ity* does two jobs, first of all it does the quoting, makes it a metalinguistic term and it makes it, however, a purely functional metalinguistic term and secondly the *-ity* does the job of making it into a singular term so that triangularity is a *distributed singular term*, ‘the •triangular•’ and therefore to talk about triangularity is to talk about •triangular•s. To talk about triangularity is to talk about •triangular•s in exactly the sense in which to talk about the pawn is to talk about pawns.

There is nothing to the pawn over and above pawns, there is not an entity over and above pawns which is “the pawn,” statements about “the pawn” are statements about pawns and similarly statements about triangularity, although they looked like they are statements about an object having a name, they are really statements about a conceptual items. Namely, any concretum whether it be in the mind or in overt language which is doing the functioning, which is functioning in a way which, in English, the word ‘triangular’ functions.

Talking about triangularity *is* talking about concreta. Talking about triangularity is not talking about triangles, it is not talking about triangular concreta, it’s talking about *conceptual* or *linguistic* concreta. But this is why it is *nominalism*. Because according to it even the reference of abstract singular terms is concreta.

Now you see Quine looks at words like ‘triangularity’, ‘circularity’, and so on and he construes them as it reporting names. Therefore all he does is to throw them away and say we can do without them. Now I say, “No! We don’t need to throw them away because they are not names, they are not names of non-concreta, they are special ways of referring to *conceptual concreta*.” That is the

fundamental difference between my nominalism and Quine's. He wants to refer to concreta, although strictly speaking, between you and me, what he loves to refer to are classes. I don't, I like concreta, I'm a *real* realist. But for him the most concrete items there are, are classes.<sup>19</sup>

The most concrete items there are seem to be classes and numbers, however, if Quine wants an ontology of classes and numbers then let him have it, I regard that as much too Platonistic. I have an ontology of concreta. And yet I countenance triangularity because for me talking about triangularity is talking about •triangular•s just as talking about the pawn is talking about pawns.

That was the basic message of what I was trying to get across.

### Linguistic Events

Let's take a moment to reflect upon the linguistic expressions since I am leaning so heavily on language here. There are linguistic expressions in primary and derivative senses. Aristotle pointed out of course, expressions are used in families of ways. For example take the word 'healthy' to use Aristotle's example, the primary use of the word 'healthy' is in connection with persons, Jones is healthy, a person is healthy but as Aristotle pointed out we can speak about medicine as being healthy, we can speak about a climate as being healthy, we can speak of an activity as being healthy. Well, linguistic expressions in the *primary sense* are actual *use-ings* of language by persons, let's be clear about that. It is *people speaking* and people, as it were, writing and people reading which are the *primary mode of being of language*. Pieces of ink on paper are linguistic expressions in the *derivative* sense. They are derivative because they are in a conventional and cultural way related to the *language events* in the primary sense of linguistic expressions. And if somebody were to ask you, "suppose that I was to go out to the Sahara Desert and there by an accident of the wind, I see the word 'heaven' inscribed. Now is that a word? Is that a linguistic expression?" Well, we can imagine a heated bull session going, some people will say, "no that's a linguistic expression

19 Language and Meaning II, track 4 (#5).



clearly.” “Well look at it! You can see, h-e-a-v-e-n.” You can see it happen and others will say, “not at all, that’s not a linguistic expression, that’s merely a random happenstantial collection of grains of sand.” The answer is “okay it is a linguistic expression if you are willing to extend the meaning of the word to include it.” There is a kind of decision that is involved here because obviously although is not intentionally there as a product of any communicating-being nevertheless it is related to languaging in the sense that it is the sort of thing that will bring about in standard conditions a reading of the word ‘heaven’ and a saying of the word ‘heaven’ and so on.

I take it that these considerations are familiar and obvious, the same thing applies of course to recordings as well as to printed pages. I want to emphasize that linguistic expressions in the primary sense are actually pieces of living human verbal behavior. Where the word ‘behavior’ now, by the way which has been appallingly mishandled by psychologists, is used in the original sense of “behavior.” It is not used in the sense of the motions or twitches, “verbal behavior,” if we use the expression at all, should be used in the ordinary sense of the word ‘behavior’ as something *people do* that is essentially involving the whole atmosphere and implications of personal activity.

### **Thought**

Meaning statements then, are functional classifications of linguistic expressions. Now what about thought? The first thing I want to emphasize is that actual “languagings”—I’ll use that instead of verbal behavior because “behavior” has such bad overtones—meaningful *languagings* are meaningful in their own right. A *languaging* as such is not simply a production of noises, of utterings; it’s utterings that are functioning in certain ways.

If a person is speaking as one who knows the language, his *speaking* is *engaged* with the world, engaged with his other activities, it forms part of the system with them.<sup>20</sup> Speaking has meaning as functioning in these ways. It has meaning not because it is the expression of thought although it is the expression of thought. Speak-

20 Language and Meaning, track 5 (#6).

ing has meaning because it functions in the appropriate ways. To say what a person says in the sense of “languages,” is to classify the *langulings* and if this person here says “Tom is tall” then he is not merely uttering a noise, he is uttering sounds which are functioning in a certain way. Thus the word ‘Tom’ functions in such a way that it picks out an individual.

The word ‘tall’ functions in such a way that it characterizes the individual picked out. Now that is a very *promissory-note-ish* way of talking, yet one that is intuitively clear but philosophically very puzzling. In any event, if we know how the words ‘Tom’ and ‘tall’ do function, the word ‘Tom’ functions to pick out a concretum and the expression ‘tall’ by being placed in the same sentence with ‘Tom’ serves to characterize the item picked out. The difference between merely uttering noises and genuine *languaging* is the difference between a parrot producing noises where there is *no* functional relationship whatever between what he does and the world and its contexts and its behavior and the way in which the same sentence functions in the case of somebody who knows the language and is thinking as a user in the language.

When we say here , let’s take Jones:

Jones said ‘Tom is tall’.

What we are doing is classifying his utterance, we are classifying it functionally but furthermore, we are classifying it with respect to its materials also because we are using ordinary quotes here and thus we are implying that he’s using English materials and that he said something that sounds like

‘Tom is tall’

As opposed to

‘Tom is fat’ or ‘Tom ist dick [fett]’.

On the other hand, if I said Jones said “that Tom is tall,” here we have the “that clause” and that’s an indication that we have here a *pure* functional classification in the sense that we are not committing ourselves to the idea that he used those particular verbal materials. As a matter of fact, if we say, “Jones said that Tom is tall” that even permits him to have said it in Latin, French, German and so on.

What we are doing however, in each case, is classifying his languaging. This is just an outgrowth of the account of meaning that I have given where by saying what an expression means it is to classify it.

Expressions in their primary role, in their *primary* sense are persons *languaging*, so that the point then carries over to say what “languagings” *say*, is to classify them. And to classify them functionally. To say that Jones said that Tom is tall is to tell us, convey, the information that he used an expression which picks out a certain individual and that he characterized the individual as tall. A philosophical account of what predication is, and what characterizing is, is one of the \$64,000 questions in philosophy.

The second point I want to make then is that the same holds true of the mental acts. If to say what a person says is to classify it, functionally, then to say what a person thinks also is to classify his thinking. What I suggested as a first approximation, is that we classify mental acts of thinking with reference to the way in which we would classify functionally, what? The utterance, the languaging that would be brought about by its being given overt expression. When we say,

Jones thought that Tom is tall

we would be classifying the thinking. And not doing what? Here again, according to the relational picture<sup>21</sup> one who thinks that Tom is tall, that’s because his mental act of thinking is related to a certain entity here *that Tom is Tall*.

The *relation* being that of *intending* or *being about* or so on. I’m arguing that to say what a person thinks is not to talk about a relation between an act of thinking and a Platonic entity, it is to classify the thinking as having a certain species or essence if you will, being of a certain kind, it is to classify the mental act in a purely functional way.

Just as a sort of footnote here and to give you a little cash on a promissory note with which I began, once we understand that talking about the intentionality of thought or *aboutness* of thought is a way of functionally classifying the thought, then when we can to

21 Language and Meaning, track 6 (#7).

face the question “what is it that *performs* this functions, that *embodies* this function?”, the possibility arises that this might be a neurophysiological process. Because our concepts of thought are *purely functional* concepts so that once we see that, we might become more friendly toward an identity theory of the mental and physical. But that is still very much of a promissory note but I have discussed this in a number of places.

According to this then, we don’t, then, need a relational account of thinking. That’s incorrect because you see immediately a person might say, “well, surely a thought has some relation to the world?” It’s *very* important here, therefore, to remember that I’ve been insisting that in the case of the meaning, that meaning *itself* is not a relation, but for certain expressions to have the meaning they do, many *subtle relations* may be involved. And I am going to be discussing that in a moment.

All I’m saying here is that to say what a thought is *about* is not to express a relationship between the act of thought and a proposition, a state of affairs, an attribute, or an abstract entity or any of these kinds here. Nevertheless, it might all be true and indeed would be true that in order for the thought to be a thought that •Tom is tall•, to say that this is a thought that Tom is tall, is to say that it is a Tom-is-Tall-thought. As it were, classifying it, we are saying it is Tom-is-tall-thought and in order for it to be a Tom-is-tall-thought there will have to be certain *existential, natural* relations, relations in the *natural order* between the thought and Tom.

But that comes in because of the specific functions that are involved, they are the functions that involve a relation to the world. All I’m denying is that the word “about” as when we have

Thought is about such and such

that the word “about” stands for a relation, that *intentionality* as such is a relation. It is exactly analogous to the point that meaning is not a relation. As I put it earlier, if I say for example that Parigi (to use an example I offered in the paper on categories), if I say that Parigi in Italian stands for Paris, according to my analysis, the “stands for” here does not stand for a relation, is not a relation-word. It merely tells us that

‘Parigi’<sup>s</sup> (in Italian) are •Paris•<sup>s</sup>.

In other words that the expression ‘Parigi’ in Italian does the job that is done in our language by ‘Paris’. It doesn’t say what that job is—to find out what that job is we have to look at what? Rehearse our uses of this and say, “aha, Paris is the place that you go to by going across the Atlantic and visiting France.”<sup>22</sup> Indeed, it is the capital of France.

The word ‘stands for’ is not a relational expression but in order for the word ‘Paris’ to have the meaning that it does, the word ‘Paris’ must have existential relations in the natural order with a certain object, what object? A big sprawling metropolitan object. If you feel that obviously relations come in to meaning, well, here is an example where relations do come into meaning but they come in via the specific jobs done by the specific words.

On the other hand if you consider,

‘Und’ (in German) means *and*

that says that

‘und’<sup>s</sup> in German are •and•<sup>s</sup>.

When you rehearse the job of the word ‘and’ in English that doesn’t involve any relations between you and the external world. The word ‘and’, as Wittgenstein put it, does not stand for an object in the world. ‘Paris’ does. The word ‘and’ doesn’t. But we can make a “stands for” statement or a meaning statement in each case. Consequently, the relations that are involved in meaning come in with the specific functions done by the expressions on the right-hand side of the meaning statement.

Relations to natural objects come in here because the word ‘Paris’ functions in such a way that if we follow our nose in certain directions we will get to Paris. Relations to the natural order don’t come in here [in second case above] because the word ‘and’ doesn’t “stand for,” as we would say, a natural object, it is not a name of a *concretum*. It is a connective and to understand the functioning of

<sup>22</sup> Language and Meaning, track 7 (#8).

‘and’, we have to look to the way the word ‘and’ functions in the propositional calculus for example. To understand what a pawn is we have to look to the rules of chess, to understand what conjunction is, we don’t study the world, we study the principles of logic, correct inference.

Language clearly has relations to the world by virtue of its empirical terms. And thought too has an existential relation to the world by virtue of the *functions* that the *empirical concepts* that are involved in thought have.

### Conceptual Change

To say the pawns exists is to say there are pawns, to say triangularity exists, is to say there are •triangular•s, that is, there are items which are doing the triangular job.

Once again to sum up, what is triangularity? To talk about triangularity, is to talk about •triangular•s. They are concrete items which function in a certain way. What is redness? To talk about redness is to talk about •red•s, concrete linguistic items which function in a certain way. Again, to talk about negation, what’s that? To talk about negation is to talk about •not•s, items which function in a certain away.

Let us consider identity criteria for attributes in these terms. You see, if you take seriously the idea that *-ity*, *-hood*, *-ness* and *that-* expressions are names, then you are going to assimilate the problem of identity conditions for attributes to the problem of identity conditions for concreta. You are going to be puzzled, but once you understand that talk about attributes is talking about, is a way of talking about whole batches of concreta, of linguistic concreta, then we see that the following is true

F-ness =  $\frac{g}{f}$ -ness iff the rules for •f•s are the same as the rules for •g•s.<sup>23</sup>

Since talk about attributes is talk about linguistic pieces, so to speak, using that as a way of bringing in the analogy with Chess

23 See “Conceptual Change,” p. 88, in *Conceptual Change* (D. Reidel, 1973).

which is so helpful, and not talk about Platonic objects, identity means<sup>24</sup> sameness of function. It's not identity in the ordinary sense of  $a=b$ .

Where we have here names of concreta or definite descriptions of concreta. To talk about the identity of attributes is to talk about the sameness of function of linguistic concreta or conceptual concreta. And therefore belongs in a continuum with similarity of function, we can not only speak of sameness of function we can speak of similarity of function.

Compare identity conditions for pieces in a game. Suppose that we go to Romania.

We see people sitting around playing a certain game and we notice that it is played on the board that looks like a Chess board but we notice of course that being anti-monarchists there is no queen, there is a piece in there but it is a good husky peasant woman. We call her "The Lady." And we study the game because who knows what these Communists will do with games. Is nothing sacred? And so we talk about The Lady and in chess we know that the Queen moves in this way and it's a dangerous piece and we watch the way the lady functions in this game here and, by golly, after awhile we decide that The Lady does the same kind of job that the queen does in Chess.

We would now say, "well after all the Queen does the same job as The Lady, The Lady does the same job as the Queen." They obey the same rules but of course they might indeed have changed the rules. Having all that power is too authoritarian, there is anti-Stalinists movement on we'll say, nobody should have that much power. We need Democratic centralism of some kind so we notice that The Lady doesn't quite have all the powers that the Queen does and in this case we would say that the rules for the Queen and the rules of The Lady are not the same but they are similar. We could say then that the Queen is functionally similar to the lady or the lady is functionally similar to the queen and that's an interesting point to reflect on. If The Lady, as Austin and Wittgenstein point out, functions very, very like the Queen, we might be inclined to say, "well after all, it's the Queen." And if it functions quite differently from

24 Language and Meaning, track 8 (#9).

the Queen, we would say, “no it isn’t the Queen its just a similar piece” and that’s worth pondering because particularly with respect to the *problems of conceptual change*. Suppose the game has changed, just consider when the Romanians were watering down The Lady, well there’s a sort of continuum there which relates to how we would classify the piece. As I said when the changes are slight we would say, “well the lady really is *a* queen,” Notice that expression “*a* queen.” And then they make a radical changes and we would say, “well the lady is no longer a queen.”

That is going to relate to the question “when does a mass<sup>25</sup> expression change so much that we would no longer call it a “mass” expression? The notions of velocity as we move from Newtonian to relativistic mechanics—I’m going to be discussing that later on—but I want you to notice that the little gnat that I’m getting you to swallow here in preparation for the camel is the idea of *similarity* of function. In other words it might well be true that very rarely do two expressions serve exactly the same function. As a matter of fact as linguistics has often pointed out there is a kind a principle you know that if two expressions are doing exactly the same job, they tend to diverge and take on different jobs. There is sort of pressure in language for words not to be synonymous. And again in very rare cases are there—except in cases of the sciences—direct, easy, translations from one language to another even leaving aside the ontological issues raised by Quine.

I gave an example last time,

‘Leider’ (in German) means *alas*.

But okay it’s not doing exactly the same job it, it needn’t do exactly the same job as ‘alas’ does in English. And you can all think of examples of expressions that do similar jobs, function in closely similar ways but don’t function in exactly the same way. But you see this doesn’t disturb us. Because once we see that abstract singular terms are classifying expressions, we realize that problems of classification are in part pragmatic. And to say that an expression stands for triangularity, is to classify it. We can be tougher or more

25 Language and Meaning II, track 10 (#9).



lenient in regard to the criteria that we would demand of something in order to classify it as a •triangular• (and I want to discuss Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry soon in that connection).

Alright then,

$$Fness = Gness$$

has the sense of

*Fness* is functionally identical with *Gness*

And we must contrast that with *Fness* is functionally similar to *Gness*.

And remember that we are not speaking of an identity of single objects here when we speak of *Fness* and *Gness*, that's the important thing.

Let's consider an example I used earlier in anticipation that I was going to talk about this, because this provides a neat example of the kind of point I want to make. Consider

'Nicht' in German stands for *notness* (or *negation*)

Now we take this to have the sense of

'Nicht' (in German) is a •not•

But what are the criteria for being a *not*? We have been idealizing here in the following sense, that we've been specifying as our criteria for being •not• functioning *exactly* as the word 'not' does in our language. But now suppose that the Germans use the word *not* in intuitionistic way<sup>26</sup> and we use the word 'not' in a classical way?

We are classical "notters" and they are intuitionistic "notters." As a result, their word doesn't function exactly as our word 'not'. What are we going to do? how or are we going to allow for that? There is an obvious sense in which the German word 'nicht' stands for negation but it doesn't stand, we are tempted to say, for quite the same negation as our negation is. Here we tend to use the following, we would say

'Nicht' (in German) stands for *a negation*

<sup>26</sup> Language and Meaning, track 10 (#11).

Now that's an interesting locution. What we are doing now is allowing in our semantical statements for *likeness* of function as opposed to *sameness* of function.

There are two senses in which there are species of triangularity. Consider for example,

Isosceles triangularity, scalene triangularity

We can say that isosceles triangularity and scalene triangularity are species of triangularity. Note that we are making a point about conceptual relationships here, we are not talking about contingent relations, we are talking about conceptual relationships.

How does this appear in the formalism that I have developed? What we have is

isosceles triangularity, now this is a way of talking about triangularity: the •isosceles triangular•.

What does it mean to say that is the species of triangularity? It is to say that

'Isosceles'  $\in$  •triangular•DIFF<sub>is</sub>

This is an expression on a kind that I'm going to be explaining very shortly which is a *non-illustrating* functional classification. You see the kind of functional classification that I have been stressing so far are all of the illustrating kind. They involve the use of dot-quotes. But there are also functional classifications of language, of conceptual structures which are not illustrating, which are not formed by the use of dot-quotes. Philosophically the key ones to understand are the dot-quote ones because in terms of them only will we understand truth—which is the core notion of semantics: a topic that I want to discuss tomorrow.

When we say that isosceles triangularity is a species of triangularity, we are saying that anything which is an •isosceles• is a differentia functioning expression concatenated with a •triangu-

lar•. The •isosceles• here is a differentia functioning classification.<sup>27</sup>

To say that isosceles triangularity is a species of triangularity is to say that there is a differentia functioning which has been concatenated with the illustrating functional classification •triangular•. And to say that scalene triangularity is a species of triangularity is to say that a •scalene• is another differentia, call that  $\text{DIFF}_1$ , concatenated with the same genus functioning expression. The •triangular• here is a genus functioning expression and “isosceles triangular” is a species functioning expression falling under it.

Thus, when we speak of a species of triangularity, one thing we can mean is that we have a genus-species relationship here in the sense that one expression, ‘•isosceles triangular•’, consists of two concatenated illustrating functional relationships, one of which is functioning as a differentia and the other is functioning as a genus. It follows from this, the fact that this relationship holds, that if anything is an isosceles triangle then it is a triangle. And if anything is a scalene triangle then it is a triangle. This could be contingently true and what this does is to make it clear that this is a conceptual truth. In other words, in the very the meaning—remember what meaning is—in the very meaning of isosceles triangle is contained the meaning triangle.

I’m going to be coming back to that expression ‘DIFF’ in a moment. Now, I want to tie this together with my discussion of negation here that there is another sense in which we can speak of species of triangularity. And that is when we speak, for example of Euclidean triangularity and Riemannian triangularity. Euclidean and Riemannian triangularity are not species of triangularity in the same sense in which isosceles and scalene triangularity are species of triangularity.

Obviously when we say that they are both species of triangularity, we have in mind a sense of triangularity which is defined by a weaker set of postulates than those of Euclidean and Riemannian geometries respectively. And roughly we can speak here of *absolute* geometry.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Language and Meaning, track 11 (#12).

<sup>28</sup> Language and Meaning, track 12 (#13).

Suppose we have here a body of a geometrical text which has the Riemannian postulate and we have here a geometrical text which is Euclidean. We find the word ‘triangle’ in both. The semantical rules governing the word ‘triangle’ in one are different than the semantical rules governing the word ‘triangle’ in the other because the word ‘triangle’ in the one is bound up with the commitments made by Euclidean postulates and the word ‘triangle’ in the other is bound up with the non-Euclidean character of the Riemannian postulates. As a result, the word ‘triangle’ is not functioning in one in exactly the same way as the word ‘triangle’ functions in the other. There are the things that are conceptually true of triangles in one that are not conceptually true of triangles in the other.

What we want to say in this case is that

Euclidian •triangular•s

and

Riemannian •triangular•s

are sortals under the •triangular<sub>a</sub>•.

We are saying that to classify an expression as doing the Euclidean •triangular• job is to classify it as doing the job for which the criteria are weaker in the sense in which absolute geometry is weaker than Euclidean geometry. In other words there are sortals under it in the sense that the criteria for being an “absolute triangular” are included in the criteria for being a Euclidean •triangular•. That merely means that the logical commitments involved in being a Euclidean •triangular• include the criteria for being a *triangular* in the absolute geometrical sense. And the same would be true of the criteria for being Riemannian •triangular•.

Those criteria include the criteria for being triangularity in the system of absolute geometry.

So we have an inclusion relationship between criteria. We can say that the •Euclidean •triangular• and the •Riemannian •triangular• are sortal’s under the •the •triangular<sub>a</sub>• in the sense that the criteria for being a Euclidean •triangular• and the criteria for being a Riemannian •triangular• include the criteria for being a •triangular<sub>a</sub>•. And this is what is going to enable us to define a generic sense

of triangularity which is other than the generic sense which we have in the case of isosceles and scalene.

We can put this in traditional language by saying that Euclidean •triangular•s and Riemannian •triangular•s are varieties of triangularity,<sup>29</sup> are

sortal's under the •triangular<sub>a</sub>•

This would tell us that if x is a Euclidean •triangular•, then x is a •triangular<sub>a</sub>•, because if something does the one function, it does the other but it doesn't go the other way around.

If an expression has the logical powers of the word 'triangular' in Euclidean geometry, than it has the logical powers of the term 'triangular' in absolute triangularity but not vice versa.

We can put this by saying,

Euclidian •triangular •s are included in •triangular<sub>a</sub>•

We have a relatively neat example here which gives us a useful paradigm for understanding what we might mean when we speak of two kinds of velocity. There are two kinds of velocity, there is Newtonian velocity and there is Einsteinian velocity having obviously different addition laws. There are two velocities. What I'm doing is suggesting that we construe the sense in which there are two kinds of velocity with the sense in which there are two kinds of triangularity. There is Euclidean triangularity and Reimannian triangularity, so there is Newtonian mass, Newtonian length, Newtonian velocity, there is Einsteinian length, mass, velocity. Now these are species of velocity but they are species of velocity not in the sense in which Isosceles triangularity and Scalene triangularity are species of triangularity but in the sense in which Reimannian and Euclidean geometry are species of absolute geometry.

Now a similar point can be made about negation. When I said that 'nicht' stands for *a* negation that means a species of negation and that means for example that we would say 'nicht' stands for a species of negation namely, intuitionistic negation. Intuitionistic negation is to classical negation you might say roughly as Euclidean geometry is to non-Euclidean geometry. The point is

<sup>29</sup> Language and Meaning, track 13 (#14).

that we can explain the difference in terms of the axiomatics of the system in which the negation functions and from which it derives its peculiar powers.

Next time I will develop this in connection with a theory of conceptual change. Obviously a paradigm case of conceptual change is the change from Newtonian length to Einsteinian length and I hope to indicate to you that the conceptual apparatus that I built up here enables us to understand it as being analogous to the change of a piece in Romania from being a queen to being a lady. [End of Tape]

## Conceptual Change 1969

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### Change in Belief

#### Entities

...Conceptual or abstract entities generally, what is their status, what sort of the items are they, are abstract entities absolutely objective entities à la Plato or are they cultural entities in the broad sense, are they objective in the sense in which institutions and language games are objective?<sup>1</sup> I have been arguing that they are objective in the sense in which an institution is objective. In the sense, if you will in which a language game or a form of life is objective. There is a fundamental sympathy in what I am doing with what Wittgenstein was doing although as I indicated, when he is talking about linguistic *functionings* and so on, he has in mind a much broader spectrum of things which I think blurs certain crucial distinctions and makes his work less interesting than I think it otherwise would have been. He runs together under linguistic functioning or usage all those things which come in when one deals with language as a *means* of communicating or influencing people which I called last time the Dale Carnegie aspect of language.

I want to, in a more classical style, deal with those aspects of language and conceptual systems which concern the very meanings which one would be concerned to communicate when communica-

1 The tape starts in mid-sentence.

tion is one's aim in using language as an instrument. I have argued that *linguaging* is primarily itself thinking, it is conceptualizing and it is not simply a device which is externally related to thinking. The primary mode of being a thinking as far as we understand it and seek to know what it is, *is* actually using language, we construe thought in the more classical Cartesian-Ockhamite sense, we construe it on the basis of language so that the actual functioning use of language is our basis for understanding what sort of thing thought is.

I was making this point about conceptual entities in general but I have been taking as my illustration, *triangularity* and pointing out that the talk about *triangularity* is to talk about *concreta*, items which function in a certain way and are, by the use of illustrating quotes, classified as •triangular•s and so on.

•Triangular• is an illustrating functional term, it classifies items according to their function in a way which involves a special use of an item which is doing that function in our language so that I call this an "illustrating sortal expression," an illustrating classifying expression. But of course there are ways of classifying items according to their semantical functions which are not illustrating and the two belong in the same family but they are just formed in different ways. For example, •triangular• is an illustrating sortal expression applying to anything in any language which does the job done by the expression within it but now consider for example,

INDCON

or "individual constant" which is the abbreviation I use here.<sup>2</sup> Now INDCON is a classifying expression, it classifies items which do the job in the language of being a basic *referring* expressions, actually it is more general than that but I will just use it here in this context to pertain to *basic* referring expressions because actually "individual constant" covers non-basic referring expressions as well. But the point I want to make is that we can say for example, if I write down the word, 'Socrates',

Socrates

2 See :Abstract Entities" for a discussion of the use of this non-illustrating common noun. Sellars changed notation to suite the ongoing dialectic and enjoyed experimenting.



I have written down a *concretum*, a concrete linguistic item, and if I call this item

I can say not only that

is a •Socrates•,

but I can also say

is an INDCON.

Both of these are functional classifications, when I classify something as a •Socrates•, I am classifying it functionally, it is doing the job which we would explicate in terms of a *picking out* activity or connection between the word and an individual who lived 2000 years ago.<sup>3</sup>

When I classify it as an INDCON, I am classifying it more generically. If I write the word ‘dreieckig’ in a German context, I can call that and I can say,

(in German) is •triangular•.

But I can also say of that it is a predicate, but notice that we are using the word ‘predicate’ in a way which indicates a certain kind of functioning which can be performed in any number of languages. So I can say,

is a PRED

and I am classifying it functionally and as a matter of, it is useful, for purposes, to use the symbol ‘ATT’<sup>4</sup> for attribute, because I can write down

triangularity is an ATT

<sup>3</sup> Conceptual Change, track 1 (#2).

<sup>4</sup> Science and Metaphysics contains a more regimented treatment of these terms in the context of conceptual change.

and this becomes on the reconstruction that we are offering

the •triangular• is an ATT.

Now being an attribute carries with it this emphasis on *not being in a particular language*. That is one of the functions of *-ity*, *-hood*, and *-ness* words, remember it is to abstract from particular linguistic materials. Thus the word ‘attribute’ carries with it that notion of being independent of particular languages and the Platonists, of course, by construing triangularity as a name, construe this as a matter of being independence of languages period.

On this analysis, we can say ‘the triangular is a predicate’,

•triangular•s are PREDs

or we can also say that they are attributes. It is useful to use the letters ‘ATT’ here simply to remind us that we want to gear our reconstruction into an explication of the use of the word ‘attribute’ in the special kind of context in which you have the abstract singular term. We are going to use ATT as a functional classification, I can say that

is a •triangular•,

I can say that it is a predicate but if I want, again, to maintain the connection of the analysis with the analyzandum then I would say

is an ATT.

So we have Socrates as an INDCON and as a matter of fact, it will turn out that we could use the word ‘individual’ here to preserve the same thing. If I were developing a theory of substance, I would then go into a discussion of primary being and things of that kind but here I won’t bother and just say ‘individual’ and concentrate on the explicit constant which carries with it the overtone of language.

But in the case of predicates, in this context, it is useful to use the word *ATT* and then what we have here is a functional classification of expressions in any language which do the *predicative* kind of job in our language. Then of course there is also going to be PROP, suppose I have

That Tom is tall is a proposition.

We could also say

that Tom is tall is a state of affairs.

When we discuss truth, we will talk about states of affairs “obtaining” which is the sort of things that states of affairs do: they obtain or fail to obtain.

Philosophers in the Platonic tradition use the word, as you know, ‘proposition’ as a generic notion of which states of affairs are<sup>5</sup> one variety. There would be the mathematical proposition

that  $2+2 = 4$  is a proposition

but it wouldn’t be a state of affairs. You wouldn’t speak about the state of affairs of  $2+2$  being 4.

“State of affairs” like “attribute” carries with it this aura of absolute objectivity. We also have for example,

that Socrates is wise is a *fact*.

You all know that the word ‘fact’ carries with it a big problematic exactly with respect to objectivity. Are facts absolutely objective or are facts only objective in the sense in which institutions are objective? I am going to argue that facts are objective only in the sense in which cultural entities are objective, they are *framework dependent*. The notion of facts as framework independent is a *mistake*. This will turn out to be a good point around which to fasten certain kinds of issues. But now we would have,

proposition,

fact,

we have

that Socrates is wise is a fact

and a fact is going to turn out to be a true proposition. We will understand that better when we look at what true propositions are.

We have linguistic classifications here, which are *non-illustrating*. We can also have variables that take illustrating functional sortals as their substituends. These, INDCON, ATT, PROP, FACT and so on, these are functional classifications and they are

5 Conceptual Change, track 2 (#3).

full-fledged classifying terms, they are not variables, they are classifying predicates in the metalanguage.

We can introduce variables, let us use variables that correspond to these categories because we want various kinds of variables. We can use as a general variable that takes dot-quoted expressions as its substituends, the variable *S* which is to be taken as short for the word ‘sense’ because in effect what this semantics is doing is reconstructing in a *functionalist way*, *Frege’s* semantical theory. It is interesting to note that Frege himself was puzzled about the status of attributes, properties and propositions and so on and he emphasized, when the chips were down, their intersubjectivity, their publicity, their objectivity with respect to the individual, as far as I know he never committed himself *explicitly* to the view that they are absolutely objective in Plato’s sense. There is a kind of open texture to *Frege’s ontology* when it comes to the kind of objectivity that senses have.

We can quantify with *S*, for some *S*, for all *S*. and so on. Then we have specialized variables for different categories, functional categories, for example we can use *I* as a variable which would take •Socrates• as a substituend. In other words, this would be the variable, *I*, examples of things that could be substituted for it would be •Socrates•, •Plato• and so on. In addition, expressions like •the teacher of Aristotle•, this is a variable than which takes as its substituends dot-quoted expressions which belong to the category of individual constants.

We could use as a variable which takes dot-quoted expressions of the predicate kind as its substituends, for example •triangular•.<sup>6</sup> Here is a variable, *ATT*, and here is what can be substituted for it. It could be read roughly,

“for some ,” that could be “for some attribute”<sup>7</sup>

but then of course this is in terms of this philosophical account of attributes. And for propositions we could use ,

for some Jones believes .

<sup>6</sup> Conceptual Change, track 3 (#4).

<sup>7</sup> For a comprehensive account of quantification, see Sicha’s *Metaphysics of Elementary Mathematics*.

We could have for

for some *I*, Jones is thinking about *I*.

As a matter of fact, this framework provides a context in which one can discuss contexts of belief, quantifying into belief contexts and so on and in *Words and Objections*, the Quine volume, you will find a paper of mine called “Some Problems About Belief” in which I apply exactly the apparatus which I am developing here to problems of quantifying into belief contexts.<sup>8</sup>

For example, the following would be an illustration of a quantified statement that could be made involving quantification over attributes,

for some attribute,    is true of •Socrates•

and a substitution instance of that would be,

wisdom,

which would of course come out as

wise is true of Socrates

[The ( [INDCON]) is true of •Socrates•].

That tells us wise (Socrates) is true. I want to discuss truth later on, I am going over this point because I want to pick up now where I was at the end of the last period. With respect to the identity conditions for attributes and problems there.

I pointed out that since to talk about attributes is to talk about linguistic pieces and not about the Platonic objects, “identity” here means sameness of function and belongs in a continuum with *similarity of function*. Remember in that context I discussed similarities of function in the context of chess. What we want to find then is a place for *similarity* in a *functional* similarity. What I then did was to call attention to the fact that there is a very curious use that we make of abstract singular terms which, to my knowledge, has never been

<sup>8</sup> Philosophical Logic, edited by J.W. Davis, D. T. Hockeny, and W.K. Wilson (D. Reidel, 1969): 45-65.

given *the serious attention that it deserves* because I think is *crucial* to the kind of problem that we are concerned with.

We do speak of something as being *a negation*. In the sense of “a form of” or “a species of” negation or, as I put it, “a form of triangularity.” I pointed out that the ordinary classical account here can handle very straightforwardly the sense in which isosceles triangularity and scalene triangularity are species of triangularity. Because there, this becomes,

- isosceles triangular• is included in Triangularity
- isosceles triangular• is an ATT

you could have different conventions here depending on what is convenient... but •triangular•INDCON stands for any expression which consists of an attribute concatenated with a •triangular•. For example, here we have a perfect example,<sup>9</sup> this consists of an attribute expression, this is an item which applies to any expression which is an attribute expression concatenated with •triangular• because it consists of an •isosceles• concatenated with •triangular•. For example if I write down

isosceles (triangular),

here we have a token, this item here falls under this sortal expression because this is something that applies to any expression which consists of •isosceles• concatenated with a •triangular• and that is what we have here, this is an expression which consists of •isosceles• concatenated with •triangular•. And of course anything which is one of these [ATT] is also one of these because if it consists of •isosceles• concatenated with •triangular• it obviously consists of an attributive expression concatenated with a •triangular•. Because this is just a more generic classification than that. So when we say that isosceles triangularity is a species of triangularity what we are doing is calling attention to the fact that isosceles triangularity consists of two expressions both of which are attributive and one which modifies the other.

We have here a more generic classification which applies to this and here we have a more specific classification which applies

<sup>9</sup> Conceptual Change, track 4 (#5).

to this. We can also say that scalene triangularity is a species of triangularity and that comes out here, we have again the same truths. In effect what we are getting here is an analysis of the concept of scalene triangularity in terms of its breakdown into two parts one of which is generically characterized as an attributive expression and the other of which is the functional sortal which applies to items which do the job of the word triangularity.

This is in general how we are going to analyze a genus-species relationship. This is an easy case because here we don't have to make use of definitions because the species, as it were, shows its structure on the face of it.

Consider on the other hand, the sense in which,

Euclidian triangularity is a species of triangularity.

When we took the isosceles triangularity then when we formed the dot-quoted expressions we included both of the items in the dot-quoted expression, •isosceles triangular•s. But here it turns out that the word 'Euclidian' is going to be a modifier *to* a dot-quoted expression, it is going to be

Euclidian •triangular•s are triangulars.

The interesting thing about the word 'triangular' as it is used here, is that it is serving the illustrating function but it is not being used, as it were, vis-à-vis the Euclidian system. In other words, suppose we have Euclidian and Riemannian geometries. Now if the word 'triangular' occurs in both, then of course if we were taking the way it occurs in here<sup>10</sup> as specifying its function, the function we were interested in picking out by means of it, then only Euclidian •triangulars• could be triangulars.

The problem is, "what are you going to take as the criteria to which that illustrating expression is going to apply?" We can use a more generic or a more specific set of criteria. If we made the basis of our use of •triangular• that in order for something to be a •triangular• it has to function exactly like the word 'triangular' does in the Euclidian system, then of course only Euclidian uses of the

<sup>10</sup> Conceptual Change, track 5 (#6).

word ‘triangular’ could be triangulars. But of course what we can do is to require that in order for something to be a •triangular•, it doesn’t have to function *exactly* as the word ‘triangular’ does in Euclidian geometry, it need only function in those ways which are common to another different geometry, those ways which are such that one is committed, conceptually, only to a *part* of what one would be committed to about triangles with respect to the Euclidian geometry if one took into account all that can be proved about triangles.

What we do to indicate this, if we are wise, is to put a little ‘G’ down here [on the word] that although we are taking actual usage of the word ‘triangular’ as our basis for coining the sortal expression, we are using as our criteria for being a •triangular<sub>G</sub>• not the specific functioning that is tied to Euclidian or to Riemannian geometry but using the illustrating term in such a way that the criteria we require of anything to be a •triangular<sub>G</sub>• is weaker, the weaker criterion is that it only satisfy those characteristics which are in common to the functioning of •triangular•s in both of these. So that we would have roughly, Euclidian •triangular•s, Riemannian •triangular•s and then we would have •triangular<sub>G</sub>•s in this more generic sense and this, you see, would be a Euclidian •triangular• and this would be a Riemannian •triangular• but both of them would be [varieties of] triangular<sub>G</sub>, they would both stand for varieties of triangularity:

Euclidian •triangular•s and Riemannian •triangular•s both of them would be [varieties of] triangular<sub>G</sub>

thus,

Euclidean triangularity and Riemannian triangularity are varieties of triangularity.<sup>11</sup>

So we can speak of *a* triangularity and I can say that Euclidian triangularity is *a* triangularity or a *form* of triangularity or a *variety* of triangularity where what we are doing is still using an illustrating devise but we are weakening the requirements that something has to satisfy in order to be classified.

<sup>11</sup> It is difficult to tell what pictures are being drawn, Sellars often used the sign for set inclusion.



### Change of Meaning

This is going to give us our framework for dealing with change of meaning. Now of course we can also do the same sort of thing without using illustrating expressions at all. Take the notion of a geodesic for example. The notion of a geodesic is something that cuts across geometrical systems just as this more generic notion of triangularity cuts across geometrical systems. ‘Geodesic’ is not itself an illustrating expression so we do have ways of talking about conceptual functions in systems which go beyond particular systems and cut across them. We can say, for example, that in spherical geometry, great circles are geodesics. We can say that in Euclidean plane geometry, straight lines are geodesics. There are certain expressions, then that give us a way of classifying similarity of function across systems. It is intuitively clear that we do this but it is not the sort of thing that has been developed into a useful semantical form.

We can call these *meta-theoretical notions*. We have here a genuine way of classifying functional classifications as similar or dissimilar. We can say that the functions performed in Euclidean geometry by the word ‘triangular’ and the function performed in Riemannian geometry by the word ‘triangular’ are interestingly and importantly similar and we would explain the similarity<sup>12</sup> and the difference in terms of the common principles and the differentiating principles that obtain in the two cases.

Let me give another example: instead of geometry let us try examples of *simultaneity*. We can say Newtonian simultaneity is a species of simultaneity. Here again the word ‘Newtonian’ comes out of the dot-quotes, it forms a functional classification which is not purely illustrating: Newtonian •simultaneous•s. Notice that the functional classification consists of two parts, ‘Euclidian’ and •triangular•s and ‘Euclidian’ gives us a way of classifying the function in terms of its historical genesis and the system which is associated with that historical genesis.

We are concerned here to pick out the function, not just in terms of something that does the function, but in terms of the kind of contexts in which that functioning occurs and is to be understood. Now

<sup>12</sup> Conceptual Change, track 6 (#7).

similarly when I speak of Newtonian simultaneity, I can say that Newtonian simultaneity is a simultaneity relationship. A ‘simultaneity relationship’ notice, makes use of the illustrating job, ‘simultaneity’. We are using the abstract singular term but we say that is *a* simultaneity relation and that again means that we have a more generic notion of *simultaneity* and that more generic notion of *simultaneity* is something that would be explained in terms of what postulates must a relationship satisfy, what principles must it satisfy in order to be properly called a simultaneity relationship.

We can speak of an equality, there are lots of ways in which we talk meta-theoretically or meta-systematically about conceptual functions in different systems. We can say, ‘in this system, this is the equality relation, in this system, this is an equality relation, in this system this is a congruence, in this system this is a congruence’ and so on. So these are meta-systematic terms and it is important to note, as I said, that we can refer to these similarities of function both by means of illustrating functions and non-illustrating functions. Many of the *puzzles* that arise here occur because *illustrating* functions are used and it is not understood *how* they are used.

Newtonian simultaneity is a species of simultaneity. Newtonian simultaneity is *a* simultaneity. Relativistic simultaneity is *a* simultaneity. And we can take other examples, Newtonian mass is *a species* of mass. Newtonian length is *a species* of length and so on.

We classify attributes in terms of their similarity and differences with respect to higher-order attributes and the attributes of attributes are explained with reference to the principles which give the expressions which stand for them their function. In the case of a geometrical system, the postulates, the definitions of a geometrical system, in the case of a physical theory, in first approximation, the postulates and the correspondence rules and as a matter of fact, given the importance of the role of models here, I would emphasize that models play a logical role in the meaningfulness of theoretical expressions. We would have to say that the similarities and differences of theoretical attributes are explained in terms of the principles and the correspondence rules and the *model* in terms of which the functioning of the expressions is explained.

Notice that there *is* a neutral framework in terms of which, functioning can be compared, functions can be compared. This neutral

framework is not an observation language, this is a completely different issue. The point is that the comparison of similarities and differences between functions in different systems is done by means of syntax, syntactical theory. General syntax which can be arithmatized. So we do have an apparatus here<sup>13</sup> that will enable comparisons.

The crucial issues here concern *how similar* is relevant? In other words, there are problems here about when are two functions similar enough so that it is worthwhile forming an illustrating expression of this kind here, so that we can say that they are both forms of, for example triangularity, or both forms of mass, or both forms of simultaneity, or forms geodesic. How similar is relevant? That of course is a problem that arises in connection with any program of classification. There have to be criteria of relevance, relevant degrees of similarity.

I think it is obvious that in the case of triangularity it is perfectly sensible and reasonable to classify the word 'triangular' as it occurs in Euclidean geometry and as it occurs and Riemannian geometry together. To say that they are both forms of triangularity. I think it is obvious again that is relevant to classify 'straight line' in Euclidean plane geometry and 'great circle' in spherical geometry as forms of geodesic. And as I said, one would do this in terms of a careful analysis of the similarities and differences in the principles that held of the terms in question. Let me give a concrete example.

Suppose we consider Jones Newton. Jones Newton presents us with a verbal context in the course of developing his theoretical remarks in which the word 'simultaneous' occurs. Here also, we have Smith Einstein and they both use the same noise but that is not the important thing here. What can we say about them semantically? Call this one  $\alpha$  and this one  $\beta$ . We can say that  $\alpha$  is a Newtonian •simultaneous•. We can say that  $\beta$  is an Einsteinian •simultaneous•.

What this is in effect saying is that

Newtonian •simultaneous•

13 Conceptual Change, track7 (#8).

stands for Newtonian simultaneity, that is the Newtonian *kind* or *variety* or *species* or *sort* or *form* of simultaneity. We can say that this token,

Einsteinian •simultaneous•

stands for the Einsteinian *variety* of simultaneity and that means that we have this *generic* notion, we are operating with this generic notion of what it is to be *a* simultaneous, roughly what are the conditions that must hold with respect to an expression such that we can say that it stands for *a* simultaneity relationship whether Newtonian or Einsteinian? By virtue of what does it stand for *a* simultaneity relationship. And we can also say that and are both •simultaneous<sub>G</sub>•s, that is, they are both expressions which are doing the kind of job which, as we would put it, words which stand for *a* simultaneity relationship do. The same things can be done with length, mass, velocity and so on.

### Change of belief or Change of Concept

What we want to illuminate here by means of this apparatus<sup>14</sup> is the distinction between *change in belief* and *change of concept*. We want to be able to distinguish the following two situations, first, Jones has *changed* from one belief to a conflicting belief about the same thing in the *same* conceptual framework. And two, Jones has *changed* from one belief to a conflicting belief in a *different* conceptual framework. Remember that to say what a statement says is to classify it. It is because of the “classifying” apparatus that we now have, that we can express the fact that Jones has acquired an incompatible belief in a new conceptual framework in a way which makes it *look* as though he had simply changed his belief about the same thing. In other words, there is a certain way of formulating a change in belief that makes it *look* as though it were change in belief about the same thing in the same conceptual framework when actually, when you study what is being said, it really is explicitly talking about a change of *conceptual framework*. Let me work this illustration out as follows.

<sup>14</sup> Conceptual Change track 8, (#9).

Suppose we have

at time  $T_1$ , Jones utters, inscribes, or writes, ...  $l$  ...

and

at  $T_2$ , ...  $l$  ....

Now roughly Jones is Newtonian at  $T_1$  and he is going to become converted to relativity mechanics. At  $T_1$  then, he is Newtonian, he is using  $l$  in accordance with the principles of Newtonian mechanics and of course *length* is not a function of *velocity*. At time  $T_2$ , Jones is now speaking as a persuaded Einsteinian, relativity, and now he is talking in such a way that *length* is a function of *velocity*. So that there is a functional relationship between *length* and the relative *velocity* of the object to the frame of reference in terms of which the measurements are made. How are we going to describe this?

First let us call one ‘ $l$ ’ and the other ‘ $l'$ ’, we can say that ‘ $l$ ’ stands for *Newtonian length* and ‘ $l'$ ’ stands for *Einsteinian length* but they both stand for *a length*, and . ‘Length’ is an abstract singular term like ‘triangularity’, here, remember, and this means that ‘length’ is to be understood in terms of roughly, so and so *long* but then

•long<sub>G</sub>•

would have subscripted ‘G’ because we are dealing with this generic notion of what it is for something to do the “length” kind job in a theory. And although  $l$  here and  $l'$  here don’t do exactly the same job, they both do enough of similar jobs so that they both count as doing a *length* job. We could say, that

(1) at  $T_1$  Jones believes that length is independent of velocity

and you can also say that

(2) at  $T_2$  Jones believes that length is a function of velocity.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Conceptual Change track 9 (#10).

If we put it this way, it makes it look as though there is an *entity* called 'length' and that Jones first believes one thing about it, and that at another time he believes something else about it. We have simply a change of belief. Some people will die in the last ditch for the claim, "there is no change in conceptual framework here, 'length' means exactly the same thing here as it does here and all we have is a change of belief about length." Actually that would be completely to misrepresent the situation.

In the first place, Jones has a belief about length, only here, as far as we have committed ourselves, in the sense that he is making statements involving the word 'length'. He has beliefs involving a length concept. So that what we mean really is that

(1 ) at  $T_1$ , Jones has *a belief* involving *a* length concept which is not functionally related to velocity.

And

(2 ) at  $T_2$  Jones has *a belief* involving *a* length concept which is functionally related to velocity.

That would be the correct way, in the first instance, to describe this situation. He has a belief involving *a length concept*, i.e. an expression which stands for *a* length concept in which length is independent of velocity first, later he has a belief involved in a concept of length, which involves an expression which stands for *a length concept* which is dependent on the function of velocity.

But we can make another statement, because suppose we now imagine a situation to be one in which we ask Jones at  $T_1$ ,

Is length a function of velocity?

We have to distinguish between a belief *involving* a length concept and a belief *about* a length concept. Those are two things that have to be distinguished here. Now we are getting Jones to express a belief about the length concepts. So we ask Jones, "is length a function of velocity?" He would say, "No. Length, as I conceive it, is not a function of velocity." That is to say, "the length concept in *my* highly confirmed theory is not a function of velocity."

Notice that this is a *higher order* belief, he is making an autobiographical statement, or thinking about his community of science.

tists, he says, “No. Our length concept is not a function of velocity, does not involve a functional relationship to velocity.” At time  $T_2$  we ask him the same question, “is length a function of velocity?” He now says, “Yes, my length concept *is* a function of velocity.”<sup>16</sup> He would now continue, “the length concept in my new theory is a function of velocity.” What has he changed his belief about? He has changed his belief about which *species* of length *generically construed* belongs in the best available theory. In other words, he now has a belief which involves a generic notion of a length attribute, and he has changed his belief concerning which *variety* of length attribute belongs in the best available theory and he now holds that the relativistic species of length concept is the one that belongs in the best available theory.

How do we determine whether or not two concepts are both *length* concepts? We all know in general how to do this. As I indicated, if we work with an initial breakdown of the structure of the theory into deductive system, correspondence rules and model, then we would say that one of the crucial features that make both ‘*l*’ as used by Jones at  $T_1$  and ‘*l*’ as used by Jones at  $T_2$ , one of the things that makes them both stand for *length concepts* is their ultimate relationship to *operations* of using clocks and meters. In other words, there we can say as an initial way of making the point, that one of the crucial things is the fact that both Newtonian length and relativity length tie up with certain operational procedures in the observation framework. I think this is an




Figure 1. (a) is a belief in the proposition  $M_1$  that obtains in  $F_1$ , (b) is a belief in the proposition  $M_2$  that does not obtain in  $?$ .  $R$  is the relation between the  $M_i$  and what they makes them true or false.

<sup>16</sup> Conceptual Change, track 10 (#11).

answer that takes one a good long part of the way, but of course it raises all the familiar puzzles which I am sure you have been arguing about concerning the validity of this whole carving up of theoretical explanation.

I argue that it is because the word 'length' can be used in two ways, intra-epistemically and generically. Both times as an illustrating word built on 'long'. It is because of this that it looks as though in describing the situation, we can simply say that Jones believes that length is independent of velocity on the one hand and Jones believes that length is a function of velocity on the other and make it look as though there were no *change* of framework at all. But as I said, if we look at this more closely, we can see that this way of talking involves the distinction between the criteria for being a length relationship in general and then the specific ways in which something can be a length expression, an expression that stands for length.

I hate to take up a whole new topic but I really have to move on.<sup>17</sup>

### Problems Pertaining to Truth

I want to go want to discuss some problems pertaining to truth. Therefore, at least, I'll continue the task of boxing the compass with respect this *relational picture* that I presented to you. The classical correspondence theory holds that a sentence is true, that the belief it expresses is true and then the belief is true if the belief corresponding to a fact. So that we tend to get this kind of picture (see *figure 1*)

Here is a person, here is a belief that Tom is tall, there is going to be a fact that Tom is tall, the belief that Tom is tall would be true because it accords with or corresponds to the fact. A fact which is expressed by the same that-clause. As Moore points out that is a very important feature of the correspondence that seems to be involved here. Of course according to the classical correspondence theory of truth, facts are absolutely objective. They are not framework dependent. Remember, I raised the question about the difference be-

<sup>17</sup> Conceptual Change track 11 (#12).



tween facts and concreta and pointed out that realists are often torn between a *fact ontology* and an *object ontology*. According to the *relational model*, which is lurking here, it breaks down as follows.

We have the relation of the belief to a state of affairs or proposition. Now a belief in a state of affairs or a proposition will be true if the state of affairs obtains, and the state of affairs is the case. So we get a picture from this point of view of there being propositions which have the character of being the case which we will represent by  $M_1$  here and another proposition,  $M_2$ , which doesn't. And a belief, **a**, would be true if it were a belief in a proposition,  $M_1$ , which is the case,  $F_1$ , and a belief would be false, **b**, if it were a belief in a proposition,  $M_2$ , which isn't the case, represented by "?".<sup>18</sup>

Propositions or states of affairs would again be construed as, in the Platonic tradition, being absolutely objective as I said, Carnap is a standard case in point. You will remember in "Meaning and Necessity" when Carnap is talking about propositions, he says he means by proposition things which are actually in nature and they are objective and they are indeed absolutely objective and they are such that they either are the case or are not the case.<sup>19</sup> We then have the correspondence relation, **R**, that we started out with, breaking up into really, an identity between the object of belief and the fact,  $F_1$ , because the fact would be a proposition which obtains or is the case. The proposition here is a state of affairs. You get a beautiful formulation of this position in Chisholm's little book *Theory of Knowledge*.<sup>20</sup> But in the latter part of the book, Chisholm is discussing truth and this is *exactly* the theory of truth that he gives. According to him, there are states of affairs, some of them exist or obtain or are the case, others are not, and a belief is true if its object is a state of affairs which is the case or obtains or exists. Chisholm doesn't give us an analysis, really, of mental acts of believing but he does give us an *objective ontology* of *states of affairs* and therefore facts because facts are states of affairs which have this character of existing or obtaining.

18 Letters had to be introduced to keep the example clear because Sellars is pointing to the board.

19 Conceptual Change track 12 (#13).

20 For Sellars longer discussion, see *Metaphysics of Epistemology*.

The puzzling thing about this view and it must've hit almost everybody at some time or other, is that there is a fascinating similarity between the way in which a state of affairs is the case and a proposition is true. They have very similar structures. As Carnap himself admits, *obtaining* or *is the case* is what he calls truth in what he calls the extra-linguistic or absolute sense. In other words, he says there is an absolute notion of truth which is not relative to languages. It is equivalent to *being the case* or *obtaining* and then for him, a belief would be true if its object is a proposition which has this character of being absolutely true. Nowhere does the Platonic position come out more vividly and more committedly than in Carnap in *Meaning and Necessity*. It is fascinating that Carnap denies that he is a Platonist. The only way that we can account for this is, again, the weird notion that Carnap has, not knowing much history of philosophy, that to be a Platonist is to believe that the ideal bed is a bed. And that you can sleep on it if you can only get there... So Carnap is a paradigm of a Platonist.

You can see that the strategy that I have been implying here is going to require quite a reinterpretation of all this. Because states of affairs and propositions are, remember, according to the analysis that I have been offering, *linguistic* and indeed *conceptual* items. They are relative, therefore, to the framework in which they exist. And for Carnap, facts and states of affairs are *absolutely* objective, for me the facts and states of affairs are objective only in the sense in which attributes and so on are objective, they are intersubjective or in Wittgensteinian terms, they are ways of classifying role players in our language game, or "form of life."

For Carnap, we must distinguish between a particular language and this domain of propositions which are independent of language. Thus, if we want to say, for example,

that snow is white (in English) is true,

we would have to say, for Carnap,

‘snow is white’ (in English) stands for that snow is white

and

that snow is white is the case or

that snow is white is true (in this nonlinguistic sense).<sup>21</sup>

Of course on interpretation that I have offered of the that-clause here, it is not functioning as the *name* of an *absolutely objective entity*, à la Carnap or Plato or Russell in his Platonic period, what this says is

snow is white (in English) are •snow is white•s

and

•snow is white•s are true.

What does this mean? It means •snow is white•s are *semantically assertable*. That is, correctly assertable in accordance with the semantical rules of the framework.

This doesn't mean that the framework by itself authorizes it, because the rules involve rules pertaining to observation and so on as well as just internal principles. The point is that the assertability, the correct assertability is not a matter of politeness or tact or any of the other kinds of "propriety" that come into language. It is a correctness which concerns the meaning rules of the expressions involved.

I have put this by saying that the predicate *true* is a predicate which says, in effect, *you can de-quote*, you can remove the quotes and just assert the thing that is in the quotes. And I've been interested to know that Quine is now coming around to the position that 'true' functions essentially as a de-quoting device. This means then that if I say

snow is white is true

that means

that snow is white is semantically assertable,

this is a license, the statement is a license to go down and write the sentence 'snow is white'.

In other words, you have an illustrating quote here, so what you do is just to write down what you have here in between the quotes.

21 Conceptual Change track 13 (#14).

And that is what the predicate ‘true’ says that you can do. So that a true statement in its basic function is an authorization of inscribing or stating that which is contained within the quotes. Of course, in ordinary language this would be

that snow is white is true

and remember, again, according to my analysis *that* is a functional quoting. The crucial thing about it is that it is an *illustrating* device and that is why truth is such a basic feature of discourse because at that level where you use the illustrating device, you know exactly what to assert when you’re told that something is true.

### The Truth Move

The *truth move* is a crucial move. I call it the “*truth move*,” the move from

snow is white is true

to

snow is white.

It is a special kind of move. It is not a premise, because in inference you follow an authorization which is not self-contained, it’s not itself contained when you put down what you put down when you are doing the inference.<sup>22</sup> For example suppose I have

All men are mortal,

Socrates is a man

therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Of course, the principle which *authorizes* this sequence—the principle is the principle of the syllogism—is not written here, that is something which, as it were, we can formulate outside and use as a criteria for the correctness of that. But notice that when you go from here [first part of the truth move] to here [second part of the truth move], what you do here [in the second part] is authorized by what

<sup>22</sup> Conceptual Change track 14, (#15).

you have there [in the first part]. So that is why this is not an inference. That is why I call it a *truth move*. And as I said you can easily call it a kind *de-quoting move*. The truth move takes us from the level where we are talking *about* a sentence to one in which we are *using* it.

### The meaning of truth and truth condition

It is very important to distinguish between the *meaning of truth* and *truth conditions*. This is a classical distinction and almost everybody accepts it in one form or another, the meaning of truth and the criteria of truth, the meaning of truth and truth conditions. It is characteristic of modern semantical theory to give a recursive account of truth conditions. A typical example of this would be, using corner quotes, what I am doing is bypassing the illustrating aspect but then I want you to think of this as a way of picking out any particular illustrating use of quotes that you want to.

I will use the letter 'P' or 'Q'. You can regard this as covering the following dot-quote: •Tom is tall or Tom won't make the team• or any other "alternation." We can say of this that...I have been hinting here that we are going at some stage or other, we are going to have to put in a *relativity to conceptual structures*. If there is no relativity to conceptual structure put in, we imply that it is the conceptual structure that *we actually use*. We can also, however, talk about *other* conceptual structures but let us put in, CSO, our conceptual structure,

•Tom is tall or Tom won't and make the team• is true if and only if  $\lceil P \rceil$  (in CSO) is true or  $\lceil Q \rceil$  (in CSO) is true.<sup>23</sup>

In other words, we explain that truth conditions for a disjunctive statement in terms of the truth value of the elements of which the disjunctive statement consists. And we can say

P & Q is true if and only if P (in CSO) is true and Q (in CSO) is true

and we would have [dropping the corner quotes for simplicity]

<sup>23</sup> The brackets will be omitted below but bear in mind the generality involved. The machinery here is incorporated into Science and Metaphysics, chapter 5.

$\sim P$  (in CSO) is true if and only if  $P$  (in CSO) is not true.

We can also give<sup>24</sup> a recursive account of the truth conditions for quantified statements and I want to touch on that next time. But in general this is a requirement that is laid down on any theory of truth, any specification of truth conditions must result in the following principle about the system

that  $p$  (in CSO) is true if and only if  $p$ .

The two key problems that remain with respect to truth are the problem of specifying truth conditions for basic sentences, because you see, if you have a recursive account of truth conditions, you are explaining the truth conditions of more and more complicated expressions in terms of simpler expressions. Here is a paradigm of it, you are explaining the truth conditions of alternation in terms of truth conditions of the elements but then this is going to take you to a ground floor of the basic sentences and the problem is how do you specify truth conditions for the basic sentences?

Roughly basic sentences would be statements which are not unpackable in terms of quantification and logical connectives and a sort of crude paradigm would be 'Tom is tall' and take the standard pattern where you have ' $fa$ ' where ' $a$ ' is a basic referring expression and ' $f$ ' is a basic undefined predicate and then, given that you can specify truth conditions for these, then you could explain the truth conditions for all the more complicated statements because the truth conditions are all explained in terms of the truth conditions for basic ones. This is the standard pattern of semantic analysis. So the problem then becomes, what are the truth conditions for basic sentences, how are they to be understood?

Of particular interest to those who are concerned with ontology is the question, "what about the truth conditions for quantified statements?" And this is of great importance to, for example, Quine because for him quantification statements are the bearers of ontology. Now I am going to stop there today and make use of this machinery to discuss some of the many important issues which remain. [End of tape.]

<sup>24</sup> Conceptual Change, track 15 (#16).

## Epistemology 1969

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### Lecture I

#### Perceptual Knowledge

There is of course, a broad but technical sense in which even persons are things though not *mere* things.<sup>1</sup> Thus in ordinary usage to treat a person as a thing is to treat him, in Kant's phrase, as a means only and it is to act in ways which either disregard or do not value for their own sake the traits by virtue of which we distinguish between a merely physical object and a conscious subject of purposes and intentions. In this lecture, I shall be primarily concerned with our perceptual knowledge of material things turning my attention in the following lecture to our knowledge of those things which, however physical they may be, have in addition, the and features by virtue of which they are persons.

Before I zero in on my top, some remarks are in order on the broad if technical sense in which both material things and persons are things. Epistemology cannot be severed from ontology as with a knife and it is necessary to give some account of the basic catego-

<sup>1</sup> Epistemology I, track 0 (#1) Introduction of Sellars. After the introduction, Sellars begins his discussion here on track 1 (#2), 1:25. The Epistemology lectures evolved into the Machette Foundation Lectures for 1971 at the University of Texas and were printed as "The Structure of Knowledge" in *Action Knowledge and Reality: Studies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars*, ed. by Hector Castaneda, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril Co., 1975). The published version cannot convey the vigor of the presentation, the spirited questions or the concepts Sellars introduces but leaves out of the published version.

ries that I shall be using in order to provide a framework to help you interpret what, after all, is but a fragment of a larger story.

The ideal aim of philosophy is to make one reflectively at home in the full complexity of the multidimensional conceptual system in terms of which we suffer, think and act. I say “reflectively” because there is a sense in which by the sheer fact of living our lives however unsatisfactory they may be, we are at home in this complexity. It is not until we have eaten the apple with which the serpent philosopher tempts us that we begin to stumble on the familiar and to feel that curious sense of alienation which some think to be peculiar to the contemporary scene. This alienation or strangeness, this stumbling all over our own understanding, can only be resolved by pressing on and eating the apple to the core. For after the first bite there is no return to innocence. There are many anodynes but only one cure. We may philosophize well or ill but we must philosophize.

### **Philosophical Method**

The method is easy to characterize but difficult in the extreme to follow. We begin by constructing simple models which we understand because we have constructed them of fragments of this multidimensional framework. These initial models are inevitably over simple and largely false. But the alternative to this road of oversimplification and error is to attempt to depict the shifting surfaces of complexity and by doing so to fail to understand, as according to Plato, the poets by concerning themselves with appearances failed to understand the actions and character of man which was their very subject matter. The real danger of over simplified models is not that they are over simple, but that we may be satisfied with them. And fail to compare them with regions of experience other than those which suggested them. And indeed the ultimate justification for system building in philosophy is the fact that no model for any region of discourse: perceptual, discursive, practical can be ultimately satisfying unless its connection with each of the others is itself modeled.<sup>2</sup> To push the metaphor to its limits, the completion of the philosophical enterprise would be a single model the working of which again we understand because we have constructed it

2 Epistemology I, track 2 (#3).



which would reproduce the full complexity of the framework in which we were once unreflectively at home.

The region within the encompassing framework with which I shall be concerned is that of “merely” physical things...and our knowledge of them. This knowledge is in the first instance, perceptual. Or it is better to say at the perceptual level. For there is a widespread misconception, no longer as prevalent as it used to be, according to which perception in what is often called the strict or basic sense of the term, yields a knowledge of singular truths which presupposes no knowledge of general truths. According to this misconception all knowledge of general truths at the perceptual level is inductively grounded in the *deliverances* of perception.

Now I have no objection in principle to drawing a distinction between that which we perceive in the *strict* sense and that which we perceive in a loose sense of the term for according to the very methodology I have sketched above, one is entitled to regiment discourse by constructing simple models. But any such distinction must in Plato’s words carve reality at the joints. And as I hope to show, no way of validly making this distinction supports the idea that there is a level of perceptual knowledge of singular truths which presupposes no knowledge of general truths about material things and our perception of them.

In short knowledge at the perceptual level essentially involves *both* knowledge of singular matters of fact and of general truths neither is possible without the other. But enough by way of anticipation and methodology, the promised sketch of basic categories remains to be drawn. I shall be making use of them in all three lectures and while they will not loom too large this evening, it will be useful to get them out into the open so that questions can be asked about them from the beginning.

## Material Things

What is a *merely* material thing? It is in the first instance an individual. As is of course a person. But what is an individual? Questions of this ontological kind arouse a strong temptation to say that here we are at that level of discourse at which things must be shown rather than said and the temptation is not without insight. However

as is illustrated by Wittgenstein's own work, there are things which can be *said* which aid the showing. And perhaps the most useful thing to say is that the linguistic correlates of individuals are singular terms.

Is everything an individual? The above remarks would suggest not. Since not every linguistic expression is a singular term. It would therefore be wise to have a broader category in reserve for which we might use word 'entity'. Accordingly, we countenance the possibility that not all entities are individuals. One might go on to ask the question is everything an entity? Surely, every term has a contrast, every predicate has a contrast. Are there non-entities? Occasionally it seem so and I think that there are but to give a theory of non-entities would take us to the widest reaches of ontology. And I shall not attempt to do that this evening. I keep that in reserve. So at least we countenance the possibility that not all entities are individuals.

Now some individuals are, in an important sense, *reducible*. We feel comfortable about saying that they consist of simpler individuals which are their parts. One is tempted therefore to introduce the idea of a *basic individual* as one that has no individuals for parts.

Are there any individuals in this sense?<sup>3</sup> Why might not individuals have parts and these again have parts and so on ad infinitum. Like the famous fleas which have fleas to bite'em. If one thinks of mathematical lines as individuals, do these not have parts which are lines which have parts? But in the first place a mathematical line is a set of points and while it has subsets which have subsets and so on ad infinitum, it is doubtful whether sets are properly construed as individuals and in any case, there remained the points which if they can be construed as individuals, serve as parts which themselves have no parts, and would therefore seem to be candidates for basic individuals.

But I mentioned this only to remind you of the dubious analogy which metaphysicians have often drawn between physical objects and mathematical entities. For my present purposes I shall simply lay it down that physical objects do have ultimate parts. This dogma

3 Epistemology I, track 3 (#4).

will shortly become more palatable, I hope. When I explain what I have in mind by the term “physical object.”

To this I must add though it is scarcely necessary to do so with this audience, that it is of vital importance to distinguish between actual and potential parts. Thus an object, *O*, which has no actual parts may be divisible and when divided would be superseded or in one sense of the term, become, two individuals: *O*<sub>1</sub> and *O*<sub>2</sub>. These new individuals may well be quite different from the original individual and the composite which consists of them may be quite different from the original undivided individual. To use a classical example, a living thing divided may become a nonliving composite. I hint at topics which I shall explore in my second lecture.

### Individuals

I have distinguished between *basic* individuals and *reducible* individuals. I think of the concept of a basic individual is a good candidate for an explication of the traditional concept of *substance*. But my account of reducible individuals has been much too restrictive. For I have taken as my paradigm of a reducible individual, an individual consisting of actual parts, presumably spatial. This account must be remedied. In the first place, we must allow for temporal parts. By this I do not mean that every physical object, for example, whether spatially composite or not has temporal parts. For at least as I am using the term “physical object” this is false. I simply want to allow for such cases as that for example of a regiment which at different times has different soldiers as its parts. Some philosophers think of you and me for example or Jones, as consisting of Jones stages, there is Jones at *T*<sub>1</sub>, Jones at *T*<sub>2</sub> and he, therefore, is a *temporal composite* in a very metaphysical sense. But I am not at the moment countenancing temporal parts in that sense.

In the second place, not every reducible individual is in any ordinary sense a whole of parts. Thus the *average man* is a reducible individual, in the sense that statements about the average man can be paraphrased in a way which replaces reference to the average man by a general reference to particular men. Again, to use a really standard example, the present king of France is a reducible individual in that sentences involving reference to the present king of

France can, in Russellian terms, be paraphrased in ways which refer not to the present king of France but to again, without pressing the limits of analysis, particular men. Again, the elephant as in for example ‘the elephant has a long memory,’ the elephant is a reducible individual. It is a singular term ‘the elephant is’ I mean what is a singular term but something that is followed by the word is, I will qualify that in a moment.

The elephant is a reducible individual in that statements about the elephant can be paraphrased in a way which replaces reference to *the elephant* by a general reference to particular elephants.<sup>4</sup> It is in this sense also that conjunctive individuals are, *perhaps*, reducible. Thus although surface grammar obscures the fact, consider this sentence

Jack and Jill and Tommy are or constitute a family.

The expression ‘Jack and Jill and Tommy’ functions as a singular term for the conjunctive individual “Jack and Jill and Tommy” which the statement characterizes as a family. This example should be carefully distinguished from ‘Jack and Jill and Tommy are human’ which is short for a conjunction of three sentences sharing the same predicate. Statements about conjunctive individuals *may be paraphraseable* by a conjunction of statements but not of this simple form.

I have indicated that conjunctive individuals *may be* reducible. For it turns out that unlikely although it may seem, they pose one of the central problems in the metaphysics of persons and of sentient things generally. For to say that conjunctive individuals are reducible is to say that statements about them can be paraphrased in ways which refer only to their constituents or their conjuncts. For example, to take the example I gave, ‘Jack and Jill and Tommy are a family’ roughly ‘is a family’ it should be, can be paraphrased by a conjunction of statements which do not have conjunctive subjects. For example ‘Jack is male’, ‘Jack is adult’, ‘Jack is married to Jill’, ‘Jill gave birth to Tommy’, etc..

Now when it is said that some wholes have attributes which do not consist in their *parts* having such and such qualities and stand-

4 Epistemology I, track 4 (#5).

ing in such and such relations, it is in effect being denied that all conjunctive individuals are reducible.

It might be thought that by speaking of wholes and parts rather than of conjunctive individuals and their conjuncts, I have changed the subject but this is not the case. For a whole or composite is simply a conjunctive individual, the elements of which are presupposed to satisfy certain qualities and relational conditions. Thus a regiment is a conjunctive individual which consists of soldiers which stand in certain relations to one another which constitute a military pecking order. But more of this later, this is a problem of *emergence*, roughly, that's a technical formulation of a very classic issue in ontology. I am going to be discussing that next time.

Given some such distinctions between basic individuals or substances and reducible individuals, what shall we include in the former category, what are our basic individuals? For the most part, I shall commit myself as I go along but I shall begin by laying down that some physical objects are basic individuals. As are such *quasi-physical objects* as *noises* and *flashes*, for example flashes of lightning. More paradoxically I shall also stipulate that *persons* are basic individuals.

What of scientific objects? The individuals postulated by micro-physical theory? Since I am usually classified as a Scientific Realist, it might be thought that in stipulating above that some physical objects are basic individuals, I was tacitly taking these basic individuals to be micro-physical particles. If so, the above claim that persons are basic individuals must have been a puzzler. For are not micro-physical particles actual parts of persons? At least if persons are not to be equated with Cartesian minds?

## The Manifest Image

The answer is that although I am indeed a Scientific Realist and think that the domain of basic individuals consists of the basic individuals which scientific theory will in the *long run* (in which we are all dead) find it necessary to postulate, I also regard the conceptual framework in terms of which man experienced himself and the world before the dawn of the revolution in physics is a coherent delicately articulated whole which it is necessary to understand before

one can be in a position to determine the precise sense in which it or a part of it is replaceable by the world picture presented by theoretical science.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, for methodological reasons I shall, to borrow Husserl's useful term, *bracket* the theoretical picture of the world and concern myself with explicating what I have called elsewhere the *manifest image* roughly that commonsense conception of the world where the phrase "commonsense" indicates a framework of categories, a way of conceiving man and the world rather than a collection of uneducated beliefs. I use the word 'commonsense' in the tradition of G.E. Moore and the Scottish Realists.

In this commonsense picture of the world, physical objects have perceptible qualities, roughly the proper sensibles and common sensibles of Aristotle, and these qualities are to use a familiar technical term "occurrent" qualities as contrasted with dispositional or causal properties or propensities and the like.<sup>6</sup> Now a dispositional property can be explicated by an "if then" thus water solubility, to be water-soluble is to be such that if put in water, then it dissolves. Dispositional properties are iff properties, they can be explicated in terms of hypothetical conditionals. Notice other examples would be the property of being magnetized, to be magnetized is to be understood in terms of the "if then" pertaining to filings, for example, rushing towards it. Notice that an occurrent properties isn't just one that occurs to an object for being magnetized is a property that occurs to soft iron when placed in a helix and you can run the current through the helix and it is magnetized, not magnetized, you can change it with infinite rapidity and of course this means then that we are dealing with a conceptual point about the nature of a positional property and not sheerly with the notion of what occurs and what doesn't occur. An occurrent property then is one that is not explicated by a hypothetical.

## The Pink Ice Cube

<sup>5</sup> Epistemology I, track 4, 4:33.

<sup>6</sup> Epistemology I, track 5 (#6).

Thus consider my favorite example of the pink ice cube. Many are tempted to identify its *pinkness*—and I want you literally to visualize in front of yourself a pink ice cube—as a matter of fact that will be relevant throughout the rest of the lecture so if you can hold it in your imagination, you will have an intuitive grasp of what I’m trying to say. Many philosophers are tempted to identify the pinkness of the pink ice cube with a causal property, a dispositional property: the property of causing normal observers in standard conditions to have sensations of pink or perhaps sensations of a pinkish cube or, a pink cube. Now there may be a place for such a move somewhere when the scientific revolution is taken accurately into account. But it is a revisionary proposal and is in my opinion a sheer mistake to think of it as a correct analysis of commonsense, of commonsense notions of color. The commonsense notion which functions in our basic perceptual experiences. Different conceptual strata can and indeed do coexist in our ordinary experience of the world but this coexistence, peaceful though it is, at least until philosophical issues are pressed, must not be confused with compatibility in any deeper sense. Compare the peaceful coexistence which even Mao’s China has recently accepted as a guideline in international affairs.

### Occurrent Properties

Only a theory intoxicated philosopher could look at a pink ice cube in daylight and suppose that to see it to be pink is to see it you have “the power to cause normal observers to have sensations of pink when they look at it in daylight.” And it is at least as absurd if not quite the same absurdity to suppose that to *see* it to be pink is to see it to look pink to normal observers in daylight. Even though it is a conceptual truth that pink things look pink to normal observers in standard conditions which will, until we become dwellers in modern caves, include daylight.<sup>7</sup>

It should be noted that if physical objects are genuine individuals they can scarcely have *only* powers. Propensities, causal properties, dispositional properties and the like, solubility, *magnetizability*, elasticity, the the power to turn litmus paper red

<sup>7</sup> Epistemology I, track 6 (#7).

etc., they *must* have some non-dispositional or occurrent attributes. Nor as Whitehead reminds us, will it do to limit these occurrent attributes to such primary qualities as shape and size for to use an Aristotelian turn of phrase, geometrical qualities are formal qualities or structural and presuppose a content or a matter thus color. Things which have primary qualities without content qualities would have in Whitehead's phrase vacuous actuality. Now that Whitehead found the content to consist in feeling rather than color is a symptom of the revisionary character of his metaphysics.

Let me propose then as my paradigm of a physical object a pink ice cube. It is colored, smooth, transparently pink and cubical in addition to these occurrent attributes, it has many causal properties. It can make a splash in milk, for example. Let us bring into the picture now, a person who sees it.

In the manifest image, the commonsense world, a person is a basic individual. It is clear that I regard Aristotle as *the* philosopher of the manifest image and Strawson as his contemporary disciple. That which distinguishes man from merely material things and from brutes is his ability to think. But the word 'think' is used in a number of distinguishable but related senses. Thus for example, the word think has a dispositional sense in which it is closely related to believe. What does *he* think about the war in Vietnam, what does *he* believe about the war in Vietnam. A person can be asleep and have beliefs about Vietnam. Many people I think... thinking is often on the other hand a deliberate action as if thinking about a problem. Again there is the sense of thought in which thoughts just occur to one, *it just occurred to me that...* we say. Sometimes we might say for no reason. The importance of all this is that whereas we often contrast perception with thinking, there is nevertheless a proper sense in which perception essentially is or involves a thinking. It doesn't involve reasoning, inferring, pondering but it involves thinking. Having a thought, having the thought occur to one, roughly seeing this to be a pink ice cube involves a thinking this to be a pink ice cube.

I propose that we take very seriously the view that a thought in the broad sense, in the sense in which thoughts can occur to us, as the occurrence in the mind of sentences. Sentences in the language of inner speech. Or as I shall call it *mentalese*. Thinking is as Pierce was one of the, not the first, but certainly one of the great philoso-



phers to insist, thinking is a symbolic process and I am asking you to take that seriously.

## Thought and Language

I am going to be discussing this theme next time when I talk about persons and thought, today I want simply to say, to lay down certain basic features of mental activity because I need them for my discussing of perception. Thinking must not be confused with verbal imagery. Thinking, our thought occurs with much greater reach than any imagery we might have. So we must not even think of verbal imagery as the vehicle of thinking. As a matter of fact, I think it is clear once we avoid certain temptations, that thinking can even occur subconsciously and in a literal sense thinking is occurring but again I shall be discussing that next time.<sup>8</sup> I want you to think of thought as language, a special kind of language, the occurrence of sentence events or as Pierce would call them tokens, of this language, in the mind. Language in the ordinary sense of overt linguistic behavior, expresses meanings it is clear. I mean language is not merely noises, language, linguistic episodes have meaning. In the case of mental language, we are tempted to say that mental language or inner speech in this technical sense in which I am using the term, doesn't have a meaning but somehow *is* its very meaning, roughly if you are thinking that two plus two equals four, this is to token the mentalese sentence two plus two equals four and this doesn't simply mean that two plus two equals four, it *somehow* is this *very meaning* itself. So that whereas ordinary language we are tempted to say, *has* a meaning. We want to say that the language of thought somehow *is* its meanings. This is all metaphor and let me indicate that in my next lecture I shall be giving an account of these rather paradoxical statements which preserves them but places them in a context which deprives them of their perhaps somewhat paradoxical and certainly, rather archaic air.

I said a moment ago that seeing this to be pink or to be a pink ice cube involves a thinking, a thinking in my example, *this to be a pink*

8 Epistemology I, track 7 (#8).

*ice cube*. In the above terms this means that seeing this to be a pink ice cube involves a *tokening* of something like the mentalese sentence, *this over there is a pink ice cube*. Again this is not a matter of verbal imagery. Yet this can scarcely be all for as we are inclined to expostulate surely there is all the difference in the world between seeing something to be a pink ice cube and merely thinking or having the thought occur to one that something is a pink ice cube. Imagination is a special case, I am not talking about imagining, I am talking about simply thinking that something in the corner is a pink ice cube. Imagine yourself thinking that in the corner is a pink ice cube and you are not imagining it at all. Surely there is all the difference in the world between merely *thinking* something is a pink ice cube and *seeing* that something is a pink ice cube, or even *imagining* because imagining is like perception.

Now how are we to understand this difference between seeing a pink ice cube and seeing that there is a pink ice cube in that corner, and merely thinking that there is a pink ice cube in the corner. Even though we grant, as I stipulated, that the seeing there is a pink ice cube in front of one involves the thought because it involves the grasping of truth. It involves something that is propositional in character, something that is or has the structure of a predication. So what is the difference between seeing something to be the case and thinking something to be the case? That is my problem.

### Seeing and Thinking

Even if we add to the above that perception involves a causal dimension which it surely does, and that given our ability to think of something as a pink ice cube and given that we are not blind and given that the circumstances are propitious, daylight, unobstructed view and so on, the pink ice cube is in a relevant sense of the phrase, the cause of the thought occurring to us that over there is a pink ice cube surely perception does involve this causal dimension, it involves the thought and it involves the cause. Still surely this is not enough. We haven't captured yet the distinctive feature of seeing, how it differs from thinking, even being caused to think something, even being caused to think something by the thing itself.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Epistemology I, track 8 (#9).

Consider another example, I see that there is a red book in the corner. This time since the book is not transparent, I do not see the other side of the book yet clearly I think of it in the sense that in thinking of the book I think of it as having an opposite side, if a book didn't have an opposite side, it would be pretty cheap. Thus we are tempted to say most of the book is present to us as merely thought of. I see the book and yet I don't see the other side. So it would seem that in seeing the book most of the book is something that I am *merely* thinking of. Furthermore, I am in the circumstances caused to think of the opposite side as red given my set, given what I have in the way of a conceptual apparatus, I look over there and as it were the book brings from the thought "the book is red" and that includes the other side. So I am caused to think it, yet there is a difference between the other side and the facing side. Is it merely that the facing surface is perhaps the proper cause of the whole experience, after all the back of the book doesn't sneak around and cause, the whole causal influence is coming from the front of the book. So that in so far as I am thinking of the facing side as red, my thinking corresponds to the proper cause, is this what makes the seeing of the facing surface more than a mere thinking of the facing surface as contrasted with the fact that I merely think of the other side? Surely not.

Perhaps what we should do is to recognize that the propositional act, the thinking, the internal occurrence of the sentence, "there is a red book over there" or "a book over there which is read on the facing surface" is of a unique kind. It is a visual thinking. Now this could be meant in two ways, it could be claimed that the propositional act, the thinking, involves a unique concept, perhaps a perceptual operator, something corresponding in the thought to the "behold", "*behold* there is a red book over there," "*behold* there is a pink ice cube over there," of ordinary speech. Or perhaps "*hark* the sound of a bell," perhaps there is a special "hark" as it were that goes on in our thought when we hear something. That would be interpreting uniqueness of the experience which does involve the propositional element a thinking element in terms of a special thought but surely even if we grant that thoughts involved in perception have a special content and I think they do, it is difficult to see how the addition of *another* conceptual item could account for

the difference between seeing and thinking. We just add another thought. Now the second alternative is more interesting.

It is that over and above its *propositional* character as the occurrence of a mental sentence, of a mental symbol, the thinking has an additional character by virtue of which it is a *seeing* as contrasted with a *mere* thinking. It has an additional character by virtue of which it is a seeing. As you can see, this is a move that is not incorrect but it is simply classifying the problem rather than answering it. This is the approach taken by Gustav Bergman in his recent conversion to realism. And if we suppose this additional character to be that of being a seeing, it runs into the objection that the same difference between a perceptual experience and a mere thinking is found where the experience is not a seeing. For example suppose that I had the experience of, which I would formulate by saying “I see a red book over there” when there is no red book over there because I am having a hallucination. Well the word ‘see’ as we ordinarily use it, certainly implies truth. You can’t see what isn’t so and therefore it is misleading to use the word “see” even if it didn’t do much anyway. But we can overcome this objection by the following move, which is actually the one that Bergman makes, we can refer to the character of the thinking as that of being an *ostensible* seeing, an *appearing* or a *looking* to be the case. We now introduce the words “appear,” and “seems,” and “ostensible seeing,” in other words, we remove this truth claim which is contained in the meaning of the word ‘see’.<sup>10</sup>

An ostensible seeing is an experience which would be a seeing if it were veridical, in other words we often have experiences which we would unhesitatingly be willing admit were *seeings* if they were true but they are just hallucinatory or they are misperceptions. So an *ostensible seeing* is an experience that *would* be a seeing if it were true. Just as an ostensible memory is a memory experience that would be a memory if it were true. Because when you say you remember something, you again imply truth, you can’t remember what isn’t so. You will withdraw the claim to have remembered something if you found out that it wasn’t true. So I am going to introduce the word “ostensible” seeing to refer to an experience which would be a seeing if it were true. And I will also use the

<sup>10</sup> Epistemology I, track 9 (#10).

words “looking to be the case,” “appearing to be the case,” as equivalent to it. Thus since our problem concerns that which distinguishes both seeing and ostensible seeing alike from mere thinkings, it amounts to the problem, what distinguishes ostensible seeings or lookings from *mere* thinkings? And to answer the character of being an ostensible seeing is scarcely illuminating. Can’t we say something more than that the difference between an ostensible seeing and a mere thinking is, well it is the character of being an ostensible seeing? I hope that we can say something more. But as I said, in Bergman’s position, that’s it.

On the other hand Bergman’s answer is on the right track in so far as it recognizes that the character of being an ostensible seeing or looking or appearing is a character which belongs to experiences which do essentially involve this thinking or propositional core. This tokening, this symbolic episode, this tokening of a mental sentence. On the other hand, by ascribing the character of being and appearing or a looking or an ostensible seeing to the propositional component alone, as though it were an intrinsic character of it, we feel that this is misguided because surely the propositional item itself is a looking or appearing only in the derivative sense that it is the propositional or “thought” component of a total experience, a total experience involving more, surely, than the thinking. And it is misleading to express this difference between a *seeming* and a *merely* thinking in terms of an intrinsic character of a thought. On the other hand, it is equally mistaken to ascribe the character of being an ostensible seeing or of “appearing to be the case” to a non-conceptual, a non-thinking component because what is a seeming or ostensible seeing is the *whole* experience. And we should not ascribe the character of being an appearing or a seeming to either part alone. And what I want to do is to zero in on what I shall be calling the *non-propositional component* of perceptual experience.

It is important to see that such words as “appear,” and “seem,” and “ostensibly see,” refer to the *whole* experience because they all require a propositional completion. Words like “he ostensibly saw,” “it appeared to him,” “it looked to him.” For example, “Jones ostensibly saw that there was a red book in this corner.” Notice that “that there was a red book in the corner” has this propositional character. Or it looks to Jones that there is a red book in the corner. Again the propositional structure is involved there. So it is quite

clear that we cannot refer to a non-thought aspect of perception by means of words like “seem” and “appear” and “look.”

Thus if there is a non-propositional component, it would be incorrect to refer to it by such words as “looks,” “appears,” “ostensibly sees,” unless they are given a new and technical usage.<sup>11</sup> And one who does so would first have to make clear that there is a non-propositional component, a non-thinking component and give some account of what it is.

Roderick Chisholm in his various formulations of his views on the sensible appearances of things seems to me to *race* over these distinctions. The phenomenological appeal is made but since the language of *looks, seems, appears, ostensibly sees, thinks he sees*, is used to characterize the discriminated items, the implication that they are propositional states is never explicitly discounted. In other words, Chisholm notices that there is the *non-propositional core* of perceptual experience but he permits himself to use the words like “appears,” “looks,” “seems,” and “thinks he sees,” in that context and never explicitly recognizes the non-propositional character of this essential component for which we are searching. Although it is clear that he thinks of his “looks” and “appears” as non-conceptual states but by failing to make an explicit distinction between the *appearings* which are propositional states and the *appearings* in his technical sense, which he surreptitiously introduces, the latter acquire an *unearned* non-problematic character because it is clear that there is the propositional feature of experience and by making this quick move, by talking about the non-propositional element in words which he borrows from talking about the *whole* experience, he makes this non-propositional component, *non-problematic* in a way in which, as I see it, is essentially problematic. In other words I’m going to argue that the *phenomenology* does *not* give us the kind of thing that Chisholm is talking about when he talks about sensible appearances or sensing.

I think it’s clear that *phenomenologically* speaking there is a *non-propositional component* to perception. But I also think that in the absence of what amounts to a relatively sophisticated theory construction, it can only be characterized in a way which raises more problems than it solves. Chisholm correctly sees that the pri-

11 Epistemology I, track 10 (#11).

mary use of “appears” is non-comparative. For in the comparative use we say, for example, this appears as white objects appear in such and such conditions, that is a comparative statement. And while the whole sentence compares one appearing with another not every sentence involving the word ‘appears’ is comparative. And certainly there are some contexts in which we simply say, “this appears white,” “this appears rectangular,” “this appears straight.” He is absolutely right about this but on the other hand, of course, one can grant this without granting that the appearing in this sense, is the non-propositional element which Chisholm is attempting to clarify.

### Somehow Presence of Pink

I argued in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” that the non-propositional element in perception which is common to seeings and ostensible seeings is primarily identified simply as that. In other words, it is that which is common which distinguishes them from mere thinkings. But if we explicate that now, we find a clue. So far we are little better off than if we simply said that it is looking to us that there is an object over there which is red and triangular on the facing side differs from merely thinking that there is an object which is red and triangular on the facing side by being a thinking which is a looking. But we can say more. For phenomenologically speaking, the feature consists in the fact—and now *here I bring out the problem*—this is what phenomenology gives us: *something in some way* red and triangular is present to the person, to the perceiver *other* than being merely thought of. This explicates it but it does it in a way which is fruitful as I will attempt to show. This is more fruitful than simply saying well looking differs from thinking in that it is a looking. You see that is a blind alley.<sup>12</sup>

Now the indefiniteness of this description is disconcerting: something in *some way* red and triangular is in *some way* present to the perceiver. The indefiniteness is disconcerting and makes it clear that the concept is a problematic one in the sense of posing problems. But then I have argued in a number of places that the

<sup>12</sup> Epistemology I, track 11 (#12).

commonsense picture of the world in spite of its delicate coherence is such as to pose problems which it lacks the resources to resolve. On the other hand the above account of the non-propositional core is definite in its rejection, in its negative aspect: the mode of presence is not that of being thought of.

A Scholastic might say that in perception and ostensible perception the relevant proper and common sensibles have being-for-sense as well as being for thought. Thus when I see or ostensibly see there to be a pink ice cube over there, a pink cube has not only being for thought but also being for sense. The somehow presence of the pink cube can be called *sensing* and remember the *problematic nature* then of sensing because that is just a word now for this somehow presence of the pink cube which is other than merely being thought of. But until the indefinite “somehows” are cashed by an articulated theory the concept of being for sense is almost as much a label as opposed to a solution as characterizing or ascribing to the propositional element the additional character of being an ostensible seeing or looking, is a label rather than a solution.

What are the boundary conditions that such a theory, now I am saying that the answer is to be given here not by phenomenology but by theory construction where my model for theory construction is like that of introducing micro-physical items, molecules for example in the kinetic theory of gases. We are going beyond that which is as it were phenomenologically *detectable* and we are constructing a theory to explain something and we want to understand, you see, what there is to seeing *more* than thinking. What are the boundary conditions such a theory of the descriptive *core* of perceptual experience must satisfy?

If we are to work within the framework of the commonsense world, the manifest image, we must stipulate that the proper and common sensibles involved are to be construed in the their primary sense as qualities of physical objects. This however permits us to introduce now, new theoretical senses of perceptual predicates. In other words, once we take the stance of theory construction, we can introduce new predicates which are related to the basic predicates of physical things like color and shape as theoretical predicates are related to the kind of things that we can observe, for example, take the word “mass” in kinetic theory, this term is only analogous, it



functions analogously to the words like weight or words which pertain to the things that we can observe and handle and measure in our commonsense world. We are going to enrich our conceptual structure, we are not simply going to find things, we are going to develop a structure and we can use analogies then in our theory construction. So we now are permitted to introduce these theoretical predicates which are going to apply to items which are not strictly speaking physical.

In the second place, what we want are characteristics which actually characterize the descriptive core. In other words, we want to find out what is true of that feature of experience by virtue of which we are actually seeing or ostensibly seeing something as opposed to merely thinking of it. Therefore we must avoid metaphors which carry with them the implications of “being for thought” or “intentional being,” “thought of” existence, or “intentional inexistence.”

For if the pink and cubicle item involved in the hallucinating of a pink ice cube *itself* had merely thought of existence, then we would be no nearer a solution to our original problem.<sup>13</sup> We want something that has being other than merely “thought of” being. And that is the danger in the Scholastic term “being for sense” that it doesn’t clearly discriminate, it doesn’t satisfy the demand for an actual character of the descriptive core. It is too analogous to “being for thought.”


### Sensing and Sensa

Of course there is a familiar approach here: classical sense datum theory. Now classical sense datum theory was in large part a phenomenological theory, you know the sense data, you didn’t have to postulate them, you didn’t have to introduce them as elements in and explanatory theory, sense data were what you really got hold of and then of course we had all the problems about how do you know that there is anything but sense data. And you got into the puzzles of classical phenomenalism. But there is a form of classical sense datum theory which is available according to which sense data are *postulated* in order too understand this “something more” to perception than the simple thinking. And therefore we will *not*

<sup>13</sup> Epistemology I, track 12.

call them “sense data” because that word “datum” carries with it this notion of a phenomenological given, we will simply call them “sensa.”

According to *sensum theory*, when we perceive or ostensibly perceive an object, there are present to us in a way which is not a matter of knowledge but a matter of *sheer* sensing items which have characteristics analogous to the qualities of physical things. For example in the case of the pink ice cube, there would be the pink ice cube, here is a person and then there would be the causal impact of the pink ice cube and there would be an item which is not in physical space but in what was called “sensory space” which would be a pink item in a metaphorical or analogous sense of pink, it wouldn’t be literally pink because *pink* is a characteristic of material things to which we are related to



by the relation of sense, there would be a person sensing this and even when there wasn’t a pink ice cube, we were hallucinating, there would still be this item which was present to us, which we were sensing. This is an acceptable version for our present purposes of the so-called sense datum theory.

These sensa as I said would not be in physical space and yet they would have in their own way spatial characteristics and they would have, this would be pink, and this would be pink in a way which was a theoretical counterpart of pinkness as a feature of ice cubes and pink tea. This means that according to this theory even when we are hallucinating a pink ice cube, there is present to us an item which is a pink cube but it is not literally a physical thing and it is not in the same way pink that the physical thing is pink. The theory would go on, it is because of the occurrence of these sensa that our experiences are indiscriminable between the case in which we are actually seeing something and the case where we are seeming to see something or merely ostensibly seeing something. Again the important thing to note is that if we develop this theory, it might seem odd to say that the pink and the cubicity of this item here is a

mere theoretical character because we are inclined to say that when we experience an object, when we see it or ostensibly see it, the non-propositional feature is something that is not theoretical but it is somehow genuine and real.

I am going to be arguing that there is a genuine bite to this objection because it is going to turn out that when we finally come to terms with the scientific account of the world, we are going to have to hold that the primary mode of being of the sense qualities is in something like *sensa*.<sup>14</sup> But this is not the way we conceptualize the world, we have to distinguish with Aristotle between the order in which we come to conceive of things and the categories in terms of which we come to think of things and the categories in terms of which we come to understand things when we come to get an adequate understanding of them. Although these items which I am calling *sensa* are theoretical, nevertheless it may turn out that they are real because when I use the word “theoretical” it is a methodological notion, it’s an account of how we *arrive* at a concept and it’s no way impugning the concept to say that it is a theoretical concept, it may merely be by virtue of being a good theoretical concept be that which reveals reality as it is.

But now the next thing to see is that our options are not restricted something like classical sense datum theory where you have a sensing and a *sensum*. Because classical sense datum theory construes sensing as a relation between a person and these special items which are individuals. Notice that this is a pink cube which one is sensing or in the case of the book, a red rectangle and so on. One stands in a sensing relation to these individuals. And there is something very puzzling about this sensing relationship because it looks as though all the interesting features were in what is sensed and not in the sensing, the sensing were *indiscriminable*. Once we see that we are working with a theory, as opposed to phenomenological description, we see that the field is more open and we can consider other alternatives.

<sup>14</sup> Epistemology I, track 13 (#14).

### Process

Thus our options are not restricted to something like a classical sensum theory purged of its phenomenological character. Sensum theory construes sensing as a relation between a person and an item which is pink and a cubicle. But once we have realized that what is involved are theoretical counterparts of the perceptible characteristics of things, the proper and common sensibles, we see that the way is open to construe sensing not on the act-object model but on a quite different model which is *historically* very interesting. Thus instead of saying that the non-propositional presence of a pink cube in the ostensible seeing is a matter of a relation of sensing between a person and an individual which in the derivative sense indicated is a pink cube, we can take the quite different tact of construing the object of sensing a pink cube as a *manner* of sensing.

Thus sensing a pink cube in sensum theory will now be transformed in this new theory into sensing, and this is grammatically a howler but I am dealing with depth grammar after all, a-pink-cubely. Now that is *important* because you are all familiar with the kind of theory that I am going to be criticizing in a moment. This would be a cousin of what is known as the adverbial theory of sensing held by, for example, Roderick Chisholm and it goes back to be Stoics. It would differ, however, in two important respects. The usual adverbial theory would analyze our example in terms of sensing pinkly. Thus Chisholm speaks of *sensing bluely*. Pink as a feature of the non-propositional content of the ostensible seeing of a pink ice cube would be interpreted as a manner of sensing. But *remember* what was to be explained was the fact that an ostensible seeing presents us in some way not just with “pinkness” but with *a pink cube*! That is something pink and cubicle. Thus to do the job, the adverbial theory would have to construe not *pink* but *a pink item* as the relevant adverb or manner. But this is not all, taking the previous point fully into account, the adverb would have to be a-pink-cube.<sup>15</sup>

15 Epistemology I, track 13 (#14), end of Lecture I.

### Manners of Sensing

In the adverbial theory of sensing, sensing a pink cubely is sensing in any way which is normally brought about by the physical presence to the senses of a pink and a cubicle physical object but which can be brought about in abnormal circumstances by objects which are neither pink nor cubicle.<sup>16</sup> Again the example of the straight stick in water, the way of sensing that brings about is a way which is normally brought about by bent items but in the abnormal circumstances the way of sensing a *bent-cylinderly* is actually being brought about by a straight cylindrical object. And in the case of hallucination of course, where the way of sensing is brought about by the causes of hallucination.

The manners of sensing as I indicated are analogous theoretical concepts which are introduced by analogy with the characteristics of physical objects. They form families of resembling and differences like colors, the ways of sensing which are sensing *bluely*, to use Chisholm's kind of example, the ways of sensing here resemble one another in ways in which colors resemble one another, they form a family in the same way, and the same with shapes. Sensing a red *rectanglely* differs from sensing a red *circlely* in a way analogous to that in which a circle differs from a rectangle. In my next lecture, I shall explore the implications of the scientific explosion for the essentially Aristotelian picture of things and persons which I have been exploring this evening. And in particular I shall be concerned with what ultimately is to be made of the status of these manners of the sensing which in the Aristotelian picture of the world are unique ways in which the sensible properties of objects are present in perceivers.<sup>17</sup>

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### Question and Answers

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<sup>16</sup> Epistemology II, track 0.

<sup>17</sup> Lecture I, end: on Epistemology II, track 0.

### Conceptual Possibilities

I would<sup>18</sup> draw a very careful distinction between sketching a programmatic theory, sketching a schema of a theory, sketching the logical space of what is needed, from actually working out the details of such a theory which of course must be a scientific job. In other words, I regard, following Schlick, philosophy as the effort to understand the conceptually possible. There are certain places in our conception of the world where we are as it were constrained, and people who limit themselves to rehearsing the structure of what already is thought, are captured within a kind of net. I regard philosophy as one feature of that effort to expand a sense of conceptual possibility. Who does philosophy? Anybody can do philosophy, historians do the philosophy of history.<sup>19</sup> I mustn't be understood as meaning that the philosophy professional does a certain kind of job, I mean merely that often there is a place for a conceptual breakthrough where an enrichment of alternatives is needed. Now who does it? Often philosophers have permitted themselves, when they are working with certain problems, to be limited in unnecessary ways, this is particularly true in the philosophy of mind. The early revolution in science was in mechanics. The point I was making in *Science and Metaphysics* was that there are some places in the philosophy of mind where one should be willing to make a similar schematic breakthrough even though, ultimately the cash has to be scientific cash. It is not a matter of who does it, it is a matter of a certain job needing to be done. Ultimately, I am a Scientific Realist. The world is, as Pierce said, in the long run what science will say that it is.<sup>20</sup>

That was the spirit in which I wrote that passage. It didn't mean that philosophy as a professional enterprise has somehow a privileged access to postulation. It meant merely that philosophers must beware of being trapped in a limited conceptual framework and being too diffident about attempting to see possibilities for enrichment.

18 Selected answers (with few exceptions) dealing with perception. The questions were off-microphone, difficult to hear, and are omitted: apologies to the questioner.

19 Epistemology II, track 1(#2)

20 This marks the end of Epistemology II, track 1 (#2), 1:03.

### Explanation

My point is that it is quite clear that at certain places in the theory of perception, we come up against, what I call, problematical situations which are intrinsically problematical. This is generally true in the commonsense picture. There are certain places where, when you really reflect on it, it is clear that you have a framework which enables you to act and live and earn your living but it doesn't enable you to understand. We can have a general conception as to what sort of thing would provide an answer to these questions. Ultimately, what has to be provided is a concrete, determinate theory which has the characteristic features of a satisfactory explanatory theory. This doesn't mean that we can't see the general pattern of what is needed and that is what I was arguing in *Science and Metaphysics*.

### Extending Explanations

Any science has a feeling for what sort of thing will satisfy the demands for a solution. For example, in logic we lay down adequacy requirements for a solution of such and such a problem before we solve it. What would constitute a solution? We can have a sense of what would be a satisfactory solution before we have it. I am pointing out that historically philosophers have been tempted to stay within a framework which, however problematic it is, is the familiar one. I am indicating in particular in the problem of perception, we have a classic example of a situation where something is needed to resolve puzzles that actually exist.<sup>21</sup> I am warning that the philosopher should not simply say, "well, let's wait until psychologists do it." This presupposes that the job of the philosopher is simply to be the owl of Minerva and I want to suggest that philosophers should be concerned to call attention to problematic situations and to possibilities for resolving them wherever they exist and not simply be the owl of Minerva that takes flight after science has retired.

21 Epistemology II, track 2 (#3).

## Science and Philosophy

For me, philosophy is the crowning not only of science but of course, of ethics and all the dimensions of experience. Philosophy is, in its classical sense, the attempt... I attempted to state in so many words what I thought the aim of philosophy was, it is simply the attempt to know one's way around in the world in all of its dimensions. I regard the professional separation of philosophers from other areas as an unhappy fortuitous accident. It didn't used to be true and I am sure that some day, it will not be true. I think that right now the professional divisions lead to a falsification of the relationship. I think that the true historian is one like Collingwood, who writes the history of Britain and writes about what it is to write the history of Britain! One who thinks about what it is to have evidence for a historical argument. For me, philosophy is just the crowning of all intellectual enterprise! Philosophy is the perfection of all these enterprises and if that isn't a classical notion, I don't know what is.

## Basic Individuals

The fundamental difference here [as far as concerns basic and reducible individuals] is between pure mathematics and what is crudely called, applied mathematics or applied conceptual schemes. In the case of pure deductive systems, we can find alternative axiomatizations which have the same total force. Putting it crudely, the same body of "theorems" (including axioms) can be cut up in different ways. The interesting thing, however, about the physical or natural order is that here we have, in a way, a "brute fact element" which we attempt to capture by means of induction and theory construction. So that we don't have the same kind of freedom that we do, roughly, in the construction of pure mathematical systems. I would argue that the basic individuals of the physical order are the items which the laws of nature, in their simplest form (and here we get the problem of what is simplicity) require us to hold to be the basic individuals. Where this is not a matter of free construction but a matter of the methodological restrictions of induction and theory construction.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Epistemology II, track 3 (#4).



I am talking about the purpose of natural science (for theory construction) which is not in that same sense an alternative purpose which for example, we can look at a building from an architectural point of view, we can look at it from a demolition expert point of view and so on. But in the case of nature we look at it from the standpoint of the methodology of science. Again you see, you have to remember that in considering basic versus nonbasic in pure mathematics we have to consider not only the concepts involved but the propositions involved. Therefore it is dangerous to simply look at it in terms of the objects, as it were. What I tried to do was to indicate a distinction, an abstract distinction, between reducible and non-reducible individuals. But I would like to emphasize that what is going to count as a reducible individual has to be so not only in virtue of considerations of whole and part and so on, but in terms of the actual nomological structure of the system. Roughly, one of the criteria of an adequate conceptual scientific system is simplicity and even if we could reaxiomatize, suppose we had ideal physics, even if axiomatized in different ways taking different items as basic, there would be presumably, and here we get into some of the more touchy issues in philosophy of science, a way which would be the simplest way. What the concept of simplicity amounts to, I am not prepared to say anything about it.

In physics my conception would be that in principle there is distinguishable a picture of the world which is non-arbitrary and which can be singled out from its alternatives. This is, as I said, a moot point and I am aware that is a moot point.

### **The Philosophical Enterprise**

Philosophy is not a conjunctive enterprise. It is not a togetherness of seeings, it is a seeing of togetherness, bringing out the intentionality of the word. The historian who is a philosophical historian is one who reflected on the methodology of history and has a feeling for the way history ties in with sociology, anthropology and so on. But of course the philosophical historian is still limited in his horizons. Now ideally philosophy is the sort of thing which can be done only collectively. Pierce spoke of the scientific community, I think we should speak, I wish we could speak, of the philosophical

community.<sup>23</sup> There were times when a philosopher could be a philosophical community all to himself so to speak. But those days are gone forever and if there is going to be a philosophical community, it has to be a community of many and the fragmentation of philosophy, which has been so characteristic of recent decades, we are beginning to overcome, there is more communication now I detect than there was but philosophy can exist only in this collective enterprise not in any arbitrary, or artificial sense of collective, like collective writing used to be in the romantic days of early Soviet communism, but it has to be a genuinely group enterprise in which there is communication. To some extent philosophers suffer from a lack of discipline which is characteristic of science and chemistry. Anyone who does chemistry, knows the status of his problem, he knows the literature, anyone who does mathematics or logic knows the literature, and so on. In philosophy there is no such sense of responsibility, that is one reason why it tends to be so ephemeral. How long will it before, if ever, this is changed so that there is a genuine sense of communication, a sense of carrying on a dialogue in philosophy, I don't know. But it seems to me that this is the message.

### **The Object of Philosophy**

The philosopher obviously has to be looking at some specific intellectual enterprise in order to philosophize otherwise he is doodling. The philosopher might be studying being as being but if he doesn't study being as being in the context of studying being as extension, being as color, being as conscience and so on, he ain't studying being as being, he is studying noises.

### **Scientific Realism**

When I talk about "in principle science," I am not talking about any historical stages. What I am doing really is explicating our concept of reality, that is what Pierce was doing, when Pierce spoke about what the scientific community in the long run would agree upon, and I don't agree with all his formulations, but I am indicating the spirit of it, he was saying that this is what we mean by what

<sup>23</sup> Epistemology II, track 4 (#5).

is. So that he is not making a historical prediction, he is not saying some time, some where, *somewhen*, the scientific community will shake hands and say, “Brothers that’s it.” He was explicating what we meant by being real. And that is all we can do, and this makes no historical prediction whatever about the future. Scientists might always be an excited camp of people who are hurling invectives at one another, Copenhagen, anti-Copenhagen, and so on. There are of course many axiomatizations of Newtonian mechanics which are mathematically equivalent. The interesting problem comes when we attempt to correlate these abstract deductive systems with operational, experimental data. So again we must distinguish between the alternative axiomatize-ability of pure deductive systems from the problem at hand, namely, is it in principle the case that science has as its *telos* one picture of the world. My answer to that question is, “yes.” That does not involve prediction.<sup>24</sup> You have to distinguish between conceptual problems and historical problems. After all putting it in historical terms, the idea that reality is determinate is just another way of saying that science, in principle, would agree on a picture of it.

### Changing Frameworks

The warrant [for the philosophical approach] is having good reasons for the hypothesis one puts forward. If one has good reasons for them, then ipso facto, one has reasons to suppose that neurophysiology, for example, would bear them out. Obviously to have good reasons for a schematic hypothesis is, ipso facto, to have good reason for supposing that some detailed scientific account will be given of it. These are two ways of saying the same thing.

For the moment I can draw again on the perception issue and here I drew the analogy between my sketch of what would be adequacy criteria for a solution of the perception problem, and the case in mathematical logic or semantics for a theory of truth. Carnap, for example, in semantics laid down adequacy criteria for an account of truth. Now I have regarded this as in effect, laying down a schema for a theory, and then of course Carnap proceeds to give his version of a theory which will satisfy these adequacy criteria. As I said if I

<sup>24</sup> Epistemology II, track 5 (#6).

am right in thinking that the problems posed by the phenomenology of perception require a certain kind of solution. In other words, we spoke here of the *somehow* presence, of items which are *somehow* pink and red, cubicle to the perceiver. Now you see that is a schema, in other words as I see it, a theory has to fill in the “somehow”. What I attempted to do was to indicate how the “somehow” could be filled in but even then, I think that the most the philosopher can hope to do is to be more and more determinately schematic, but if he is on the right track at all, the ultimate cash has to be found in the kind of determinate theory which an adequate neurophysiology of perception would give. I am going to discuss that next time. I do have something to say about that specific issue.

I will also be discussing thinking, and the concept of the intentionality of thought. I want to make the same point there: that it is important not to keep rehearsing the structure of intentionality but we have to see if there are any ways we can understand it. And I would try to show that there are problematic features of intentionality which demand a transcendence of traditional accounts. Just as there are problematic features of perception which demand a transcendence of the phenomenological approach.<sup>25</sup>

## Lecture II

### Reply to Firth

I might follow through on one of the themes from my discussion on Monday evening by commenting on a paper by Prof. Firth called

<sup>25</sup> Epistemology II, end of tape, track 5 (#6), 4:58.

“Coherence, Certainty and Epistemic Priority.”<sup>26</sup> In a way it is attacking the type of view to which I am friendly although I don’t exactly recognize it in the formulation that he gives.

One of the useful ways of emphasizing some of the points that I was making the last time is to discuss an argument of Roderick Firth to show that it makes good sense to suppose that physical redness, the redness of physical objects, can be defined in terms of *looks red*.

It should be clear that on the analysis that I gave last time any such attempt is doomed to failure from the start if “looks” is taken in its ordinary sense. For as I was emphasizing, *looks* or *ostensibly sees* or *it appears to one that* and all of these locations apply to the experiences which contain the thought “such and such a physical object is red.” Thus it seems to Jones that there is a red object in front of him contains a reference to a thought on John’s part that there is a red object in front of him. And thus it would be a truism that in this basic sense of looks, the ordinary sense of looks, the concept of being red is logically prior to that of looks red.<sup>27</sup>

Thus if Firth’s attempt is to get off the ground, he must be saying that the *non-propositional* element, the non-conceptual element, the “non-thinking” element in perceptual experience for which the term “looks” is borrowed is itself red in a well-defined sense which is other than physical redness and which does not presuppose physical redness. But as I argued last time, the only well-defined sense of red other than physical redness which we found is that of a theoretical nature which is built on analogy with physical redness and hence would not be logically independent of it, it would presuppose it.

However given Firth’s supposedly well-defined or clear sense of looks red he must be arguing that “a certain object, O, looks red to me or red and triangular to me,” must have the sense of “object O is the cause of a red and triangular element in my perceptual experience” and he must be arguing that there looks to be a red and triangular object has the sense of there is a red and triangular element in

26 Epistemology III, track 0. Roderick Firth, *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXVI, No. 19 (October, 1964): pp. 545-557. The reply to Firth becomes a substantial part of the Appendix to the first “Structure of Knowledge” lecture.

27 In the lecture, “The Myth of Jones,” WS distinguishes 1st order “believing in” or “taking” (this-such) from the 2nd order seeming to see or feeling or looking f which is, in turn is distinguished from 3rd order endorsements (I see...).

my perceptual experience in a well-defined sense of red and triangular.

It should be clear that on the view that I am defending one is not in a position to perceive anything, one is not at the level of perceptual knowledge, one that is not in the position of being able to *see* that something is the case unless one has a whole system of concepts which form the, as I put it last time, the mentalese language of physical objects in space and time which have perceptible qualities.<sup>28</sup>

Firth, following C.I. Lewis, argues that whatever the empirical facts of language learning, there is available a domain of concepts pertaining to the sensible qualities which is logically independent of concepts pertaining to physical objects. And in the spirit of traditional empiricism he finds the source of these concepts to be, what I have called the *non-perceptual core* of the perceptual experience of physical objects. Thus he writes:

if a philosopher maintains that the Apple is red can be analyzed as meaning the Apple would look red under such and such physical conditions, he is assuming that *looks red* is logically prior to *is red*, i.e., that is at least logically possible to have the concept *looks red* before we acquire the concept *is red* but if<sup>29</sup> the appearance theory of meaning of concepts is correct and we cannot fully understand looks red unless we possess the contrasting concept *is red*, (notice he should have said 'is seen to be red' rather than 'is red' because "looks" is contrasted with "is seen to be,") then it would seem that it is not logically possible to have the concept looks red before we have the concept is red. This paradox might even lead us to wonder indeed whether the conceptual independence of looks and is, is enough to undermine Lewis' basic assumption that we can make expressive judgments, for example, I seem to see a door knob, it looks as if I am seeing something red, without at the same time asserting or at least implying (I would say) something about the nature of objective reality. It is these objective judgments according

28 WS accepts the non-inferential warrant increasing properties in the sense that he has frameworkly-warranted warrant principles but not the 24-karat modes of apprehension. The ultimately non-inferential warrant increasing properties derive from the non-inferential warrant increasing properties attributed to a judgment because it is likely to be true: a non-inductively warranted warrant principle. The principles arise as a result of what it is to be a person thrown into a world of "hunks of white," as "ivory", WS would say, that is ambiguous between stuff and color.

29 Epistemology III, track 1 (physical track 2).

to Lewis that enable us to escape the coherence theory of justification and if it should turn out that these judgments all make some covert reference to physical objects then depending of course on the kind of covert reference it might no longer be possible to make the epistemological distinction that Lewis requires.

Now I do in point of fact hold something like a coherence theory of justification. But I am just concerned now to pinpoint what I regard as a very bad argument which Firth goes on to give for his position. Firth following Lewis, note that Firth is confusing the proper sense of *looks* in which it contrasts with *is seen to be* with a contrived sense in which it merely means something like causes a red item in my experience. But although this is his key mistake, it is worth noting that the second step in his argument is a howler. Thus he writes and here I quote

it is a genetic fact but a fact with philosophical implications that when a child first begins to use the word 'red' with any consistency, he applies it to the things that look red to him whether these things are as we should say really red or whether they are merely made to appear red by abnormal conditions of observation. Thus the child calls white things red when he sees them through red glass. In fact at this stage, the child says 'red' in just those circumstances in which we as adults would truthfully say looks red to me now. So that it would not be unreasonable to assert that the child is using the word red to express a primitive form of the concept looks red."

The absurdity of this argument can be brought out by the following parallel: "In fact, just at this stage of his development the child says 'red' in those circumstances in which we as adults could truthfully say electromagnetic waves of wavelengths  $\lambda$  are striking his retina, so that it would not be unreasonable to assert that the child is using 'red' to express a primitive form of the concept electromagnetic waves of wavelength  $\lambda$  striking a retina."

## Persons: The Manifest Image

I want to turn to the main topic of the evening which is persons as involved in the structure of knowledge and I am going to be concerned with some basic features of persons in the manifest image.

In my first lecture I was exploring the nature of our philosophical knowledge of such elementary facts as that there is a pink ice cube in front of me or that there is a red book on the shelf. I emphasized that I was bracketing, that is suspending commitment to, the structure of concepts involved in micro-physical theory and considering perception as it might have been considered by an epistemologist who lived in the days when atomic theory was but a gleam in the Democritean eye. In short, the model with which I was working was essentially an Aristotelian one although I was not concerned with problems of historical exegesis.

I was emphasizing that in this model, material things are colored in a sense which is not to be explicated in terms of a hypothetical reference to sensations of color, I asked you to consider the case of the pink ice cube<sup>30</sup> and I pointed out how implausible it is to suggest that to see it to be pink is “to see it to have the power to cause normal observers in standard conditions to have sensations of pink or to sense pinkly.” Indeed I argued that the idea that when people see pink ice cubes, or seem to see pink ice cubes, or hallucinate pink ice cubes, they are having sensations of pink is a theoretical explanation of how people can have these experiences when no pink transparent material object is before their eyes. I concluded by suggesting that the most satisfactory form of this theoretical account is that sensing a pink ice cube is a state of the person which is normally brought about by the presence of a pink cubicle transparent material thing before their eyes in daylight but which can be brought about in abnormal circumstances by for example, a gray object illuminated by a pink light or by a pink rhomboidal object viewed through a distorting medium, or a hallucination by for example a probing of a certain region of the brain with an electrode, or by taking a hallucinogenic drug after much talk of pink ice cubes.

I distinguished between the propositional and the non-propositional content of the visual experience and I characterized the former as a thinking that something is the case where thinking was construed as the occurrence in the mind of sentences in mentalese or to use the traditional term, inner speech. I said relatively little about mentalese save to emphasize the positive analogy between it and overt verbal behavior. I concentrated on the non-propositional

30 Epistemology III, track 2 (physical track 3).



aspect of visual experience. And was concerned to show that unless supplemented by theory construction, the phenomenology of perception takes us no further than the idea that *somehow, something* which is in *some* sense pink and cubical is present to the perceiver other than by merely being thought of.

### Perceptual Response

This evening I want to explore what happens to the pink ice cube and our perception of it when we face up to the implications of the scientific revolution. But before picking up this theme, I want to explore the topic of the thinking as inner speech or mentalese and lay the groundwork for a discussion of the implications of the scientific revolution for the nature of thought.

Unless one takes a purely instrumental view of scientific objects both both sensing and thinking must be correctly located in a context of neurophysiological activity. The traditional mind-body problem has two dimensions which have often been run together, or at least not carefully distinguished. First what is the relation of sensations to physical states of the body and secondly what is the relation of conceptual states, *thinkings*, inner speech, to the physical states of the body.

It should not be assumed that these two dimensions of the mind-body problem admit of the same solution. I urged that we take seriously the idea that thoughts are mentalese sentence events and that mentalese has a strong positive analogy with overt linguistic behavior, for example saying things in English. Just how is this analogy to be understood?

To begin with we must simplify our model by abstracting from those features of language by virtue of which it is an instrument for influencing people. And for most people of course, this is the most important part of the language. As John Austin has emphasized, we can do things with words, we can inform or misinform, we can communicate our beliefs, we can make promises and so on. Illocutionary and perlocutionary acts to use Austin's term are actions. Like all actions they are sometimes deliberate, sometimes unintended, sometimes thoughtless. I am going to abstract from these features of linguistic behavior. I am not however going to abstract from linguistic actions altogether for in the model I shall propose, to think is

to use language and since, as I indicated last time, some thought processes are actions—they are the sort of thing that can be done deliberately—for example one can decide to do them like thinking about a problem, we must have a place in our model for *some* linguistic action but I want you now to view language not so much as a means of acting, of doing things, but as a means of thinking.<sup>31</sup>

Roughly, I am going to be excluding those linguistic actions which are *other* oriented and involve language as a means of communicating with, and making commitments to and influencing our fellow man. Now the simplified model that I propose to work with can be called “verbal behaviorism.” This is again a simplified model and I emphasized last time, that in the philosophy we construct simple models which we understand because we have constructed them and they are models applying to some area of discourse. The danger is to be fascinated by a nicely working model and to try regard it as everywhere applicable. The correct method in philosophy is to construct a model then look back at the area of discourse which you are modeling and notice that you haven’t captured some features of it, come back to your model and work with it again, reshape it, re-articulated and look back, it is a constant dialogue between the model and what you are attempting to model.

We must not be afraid to oversimplify, we must simply avoid being fascinated by the niceness of our oversimplifications. I am going to develop a view that I’ll call “verbal behaviorism” which is not an adequate view but which is the beginning of an adequate view and what more could one want.

## Perceptual Response

This view that I’m going to call “verbal behaviorism” is not intended as an adequate account of thinking, it is over simple. But I believe that it will prove a useful tool which will help us understand some of the features of thinking and of our own awareness of ourselves as thinking which have been a source of puzzlement since the very dawn philosophy. In other words, it will I think throw some light on the kind of puzzles that traditionally exist about thought

31 Epistemology III, track 2 (#3) end.

and our self-knowledge with respect to ourselves as thinking beings. Furthermore it is over simplified in a number of other ways because there are all kinds of thinking, there is the thinking which is logical thinking, there is a thinking which is empirical thinking about the objects around us, that kind of thinking which is writing poetry, there is that kind of thinking which is writing music.<sup>32</sup> and so on. So there are all kinds of thinking and I am going to be as it were concentrating on a very simple, restricted region of thought because my feeling is that if we can understand at least to some extent some restricted area, we have a means of getting a grip on the whole area provided we are willing, honestly and candidly to expand our model in terms of the problems posed by the areas of thought that we are dealing with. I have no illusions about the model I am proposing, it *is* an oversimplified model.

Now according to this model, thinking that-*p* where this means having the thought occur to one that-*p*—it suddenly occurred to me that he was an enemy, it suddenly occurred to me that the automobile is running out of gas—bear that notion in mind: “it suddenly occurring to one that” and this is a sense of thinking which I want to put at the center of the stage. According to verbal behaviorism this oversimplified model that I am proposing, having the thought occurred to one that-*p* has as its basic meaning, saying *p*, literally, yakking, talking, saying out loud, “I just missed the bus!” in other words having the thought occur to you, according to verbal behaviorism, is in this primary sense something like saying out loud “Gee, I just missed the bus!” You are not deciding to say it, you are not using it as a means or an instrument, it is as I like to say thinking out loud “Gee, I just missed the bus.” Now I want you to take that as the basic meaning of thinking, having the thought occur to one that something.<sup>33</sup> Take it at its face value, don’t start constructing a theory about it, simply recognize that somebody might just say out loud, “Gee, I missed the bus!” And this is just a candid, straightforward saying something.

32 The application to art and music is explored in Robert Kraut’s *Artworld Metaphysics* (Oxford, 2007).

33 The examples are explored at length in ME.

### **Thinking that-p**

According to verbal behaviorism, this is the primary sense of the expression “having the thought occur to one that I just missed the bus!”<sup>34</sup> The secondary sense is going to be the following, that in which it is a matter of a short term proximate disposition to say, “I just missed the bus.” In other words the full-blooded sense in which the thought occurs to one “I just missed the bus” is simply thinking out loud, “I just missed the bus” but of course we often think without saying anything. And this is where the problems begin to come in because what is it to think without saying anything, according to this approach? The concept that I introduced there is that of a short term proximate disposition to say out loud, or to say, “I just missed the bus” example. For example there is the bus, it is just pulling away, there you are. Now one time you might say, “I just missed the bus.” But the next time you might just stay there and with a perplexed look on your face and you don’t say anything. But the point is that somehow you may be short-circuiting saying, you may be restraining a saying. It is as though you were all ready to say “I missed the bus” but you cut it off, so to speak. And so you have a propensity to say it and that propensity, however, is counterbalanced by other propensities because we are very complicated beings and one propensity that we have may be overruled or overpowered by another.

I want you to think of there being an episode there which is a matter of your having on the tip of your tongue so to speak, “I just missed the bus” but you don’t actually say it. You are in such a frame of mind as we say, that if you were in a candid thinking out loud frame of mind, you would have said it. And that can be eventually clipped as an episode because you are caught up in life and your thinking goes on other tracks.

### **Disposition and Propensity**

This gives you a feeling for what I mean by a short term and a proximate disposition. It is a proximate disposition because it is as if it were on the tip of your tongue and all it requires is a kind of “letting-goish” kind of attitude for it to come out. Now according to

34 Epistemology III, end of Track 3 (#4), start of Track 4 (#5).

verbal behaviorist, most of the thinking episodes that we are involved in are of this kind. They are episodic, they are short term, and they are on the tip of the tongue so to speak but they don't get out. It is very important to realize in this context that dispositions and propensities can be vanishingly short in their duration. As a matter of fact, last time I considered a piece of soft iron in a helix through which an electric current is passed, there it is all wired up, press magnetized, unpressed, not magnetized, back and forth quick! quick! quick!, what you have there is however, if we leave micro-physical theory aside—a point to which I want to return—what we have is that first the soft iron has the propensity to attract iron filings, to have iron filings cling to it. So there it is and the iron filings cling and then you'd take your finger off the switch and they don't cling, they cling, and they don't cling and so on.

We can say of the iron that it first of all has the propensity to attract and then it lacks it, then it gains it, then it lacks it, you see this is why it is very important to distinguish between what I call an occurrent property and a mere occurrence, even a dispositional propensity can occur to something. And we can imagine some kind of stuff that might be soluble one moment and then you'd change the context and it is not soluble, then it becomes soluble, then not soluble. It is quite clear that iffy properties can be very short term. And according to verbal behaviorist, thinking if it isn't an *actual* thinking out loud, is a propensity to think out loud which can be as short termed as you wish. So that the verbal behaviorist says that we don't need to postulate any theoretical states of unobservable thoughts, all we need to recognize is that people can think out loud and they can have the propensity to think out loud and that these would account for all the rapid occurrences of thoughts which we would want to talk about.<sup>35</sup>

Notice that I am treating that-clauses as quoting expressions thus for example the thought that  $2+2 = 4$  occurred to Jones becomes, according to the verbal behaviorist, Jones said or had a short-term propensity to say, ' $2+2 = 4$ '.<sup>36</sup>

35 Epistemology III, end of track 4 (#5).

36 Epistemology III, track 5 (#6).

There are basic problems here pertaining to the fact that in a sense, the same thought can be formulated in different languages and this can indeed, this does indeed pose serious problems in the philosophy of mind. I am going however, to make the simplifying assumption that we can discuss the fundamental issues in philosophy of mind for our purposes by neglecting the fact of the multiplicity of different languages. Now I have discussed these issues pertaining to translation in many different places and it is a rich topic in its own right. But the kind of issue I want to discuss does not hinge on this because it turns out that the treatment of translation is perfectly compatible with the distinctions that I will be drawing.

I shall be using the thought occurred to Jones that  $2+2 = 4$  as equivalent to Jones *said* or had a short term proximate disposition to say ' $2+2=4$ '. Now picking up some of the themes from the above discussion of linguistic action, it is essential to note that just as thinking that-*p* in the sense of having the thought occur to one that-*p*, that this is not a mental performance, something that one does or could do voluntarily, so in the verbal behaviorist model, *saying-p* is not to be construed as an illocutionary act. It is not an action in the conduct sense. It is an act only in the Aristotelian sense of *actuality*. If a person says out loud, 'I just missed the bus', this is an actual occurrence but it is not an action in the sense that it is something he voluntarily chooses to do. It is something that is generated by his total frame of mind and by the circumstances in which he is but it is not something that he has decided to do. We can decide to say things but I am going to so to use the word "say" that *saying* is not the sort of thing that one decides to do any more than *thinking* is something that one decides to do except in that special sense in which thinking about relativity theory is something one can decide to do. In that sense of thinking, one can decide to do it. But there is a sense of thinking, the basic sense, in which is not something that one decides to do any more than one *decides* to see a chair. After all I can decide to look at a chair but if I'm looking in the appropriate way, I don't decide to think "there is a chair there." It is something that occurs without my deciding to do it.

According to the verbal behaviorist *saying-p* is not to be construed as, in Austin's sense, an illocutionary act. It is to be construed as I have elsewhere put it, as a *candidly thinking out loud that-p* and it is not to be confused with asserting to someone that-*p*,

telling someone that-p, or any of the other verbal performances so lovingly collected by Austin and his followers. Of course in any ordinary sense of the term, saying-p is a performance and therefore let me warn you that as I am using the phrase “saying-p,” it is a technical usage.

I could use other technical terms like ‘tokening’ or ‘uttering’ but I think ‘saying’ will be the most helpful and the one that carries with it the most suggestive overtones. I am using the expression “S says that-p” in a contrived sense in which these options are closed and the utterance specifically construed as a candid thinking out loud in the sense of it occurring to one out loud, as it were, that one has missed the bus.

Now we can imagine a child to learn a rudimentary language in terms of which he can perceive and draw inferences and act. In doing so the child begins by uttering noises which sound like words. He utters noises which sound like sentences and he ends by uttering noises which are words and by uttering noises which are sentences. We might use quoted expressions to describe what he is doing in both stages.<sup>37</sup> We might say, “he uttered ‘daddy’” or “he uttered ‘where is the dolly?’”. But in the earlier stages when we are dealing with a child who is just fumbling toward the use of language, we are classifying his utterances as sounds really and only by courtesy and hope often, and anticipation, are we classifying them as words and sentences. It is only when the child has got the hang of how the sounds function in language that he can be properly characterized as saying ‘this is a book’, or ‘it is not raining’, or ‘lightning so shortly thunder’, or ‘you’ve spanked me and so you don’t love me’.

### Functional Classification

What I am emphasizing here is to say what a person *says*, is to give a functional classification of his utterances. You are not concerned with them merely as noises or sounds. You are giving a functional classification when you use quotation marks. The verbal behaviorist model agrees with Wittgenstein: the meaning of the utterance is its use. The trouble is that for Wittgenstein, the notion of “use” blended together and blurred together the different kinds of

37 Epistemology III, end of track 5 (#6), beginning of track 6 (#7).

linguistic activity which I was discussing before. In other words, when Wittgenstein says that the meaning of an expression is its use, the kind of use that he has in mind includes such things as making promises, giving commands, communicating something to someone, telling someone something and so on. Whereas I have built a limited model in which that kind of use is going to be not of the communication and influencing kind but simply, as I put it, of the thinking out loud kind.

So let us consider the functional relationships which are involved in language having meaning in this very restricted model. Some of the functional relationship are purely *intralinguistic* or as they are often called, *syntactical*, they are connected with logical relationships, for example there are the functional relationships that are illustrated by syllogistic reasoning. For example: all men are mortal, Socrates is a man, so Socrates is mortal. Here we have a functional relationship between expressions which concerns the internal structure of language, it is a matter of the internal structure of language that this a consequential pattern of sentences. And of course, as we know, part of the very meaning of words like “all” and “some” and “not” and “and” and “or” is a matter of these functional relationships. These are called the syntactical or the “logical” functional relationships in language.

Other functional features of language concern language as a response to physical objects. Thus for example candidly saying or having the thought occur to one, “Lo! this table is red” or “Lo! this table is brown.” One of the functions of language is connected with its relationship to the world in perception as we have been discussing it. We can call this the function of language in which it functions *as a response* to objects in perception. Still others concern the connection of practical thinking with behavior, for example, in its simplest form we would have such connections as that between saying, ‘I shall raise my hand’ and raising ones hand. Suppose someone knows how to say, ‘I shall now raise my hand’, ‘I shall now raise my hand’, ‘I shall now raise my hand’. He often says, ‘I shall now raise my hand’ or ‘raise my leg’ but he never does anything. We would say somehow or other that kid has’nt quite caught on to the meaning of the phrase, he doesn’t understand how this sentence works. You can’t really mean “I shall now raise my hand” unless you have some propensity to raise your hand or unless you are ly-



ing, and lying is a very sophisticated thing. A child has to learn to tell the truth first. I don't know whether it is a blessing or not but at least it shows that there is a period, at least, in theory in which truth occurs. I would then say that in order for a child to have learned the meaning of such a sentence as 'I shall now raise my hand' other things being equal, there must be a propensity to raise his hand. So there are various kinds of functional relationships between *language and perception*, *language and action*, and *language and argument*. And those are the three dimensions that I want to particularly call your attention to.

All of these dimensions of functioning, can occur<sup>38</sup> not only at the level where one is thinking out loud about the world but also at the level where one is thinking about language itself, because one can not only use language to talk about things, one can use language to talk about language. All these distinctions, in principle, are reflected at the higher level where one is concerned with language. Now this is particularly important for the philosophy of mind. Thus when we characterize a person's utterance by using a quotation, we are implying that the utterance that the person makes is an instance of a certain specific way of functioning. Consider for example the following: it would be absurd to say, 'Tom said', as contrasted with merely uttered a noise, 'it is not raining'. But Tom has no propensity whatsoever to avoid saying that it is raining and not raining. You see that would be just as silly as to say, Tom just said 'I shall now raise my hand' but he has no propensity whatever to raise his hand.

In other words when we actually characterize what someone says by quoting, we are implying that the utterance in question is satisfactorily functioning in a certain way which we could describe. Thus to characterize a person's utterance by quoting sentences containing logical words is to imply that the corresponding sounds like "and," "or," "not," "all," "some," function properly in his language behavior. Again I am characterizing the verbal behaviorist position. And we are implying that the uniformities characteristic of these ways of functioning are present in his *sayings* and in his proximate propensities to say things.

38 Epistemology III, start of track 7 (#8).

The functioning which gives the utterances of one who has learned the language their meaning can exist merely at the level of uniformities. As in the fledglings speaker who is being trained by his parents. Those who train him think about these functionings, they are worried about his utterances, they are worried about whether they are going to function properly and they are using sticks and carrots to ensure that his utterances occur in the right kinds of patterns, and in the right kinds of contexts. So that the parents in teaching have not only to think about the world but they also have to think about language. The child does not start out by thinking about language, he starts out by trying it out and being encouraged or discouraged from doing what he does in the way of speaking. The trainer operates not only at the level of the trainee thinking thoughts about things but also at the higher level which is thinking thoughts about the functionings by virtue of which the first level language has the meaning that it does. In traditional terms, the trainer knows the rules which govern the correct functioning of language. The language learner begins by conforming to the rules without grasping them himself. Only subsequently does the language learner become a full-fledged member of the linguistic community who thinks thoughts, theoretical and practical, not only about nonlinguistic items such as tables, chairs and so on but also about linguistic items. That is, from the point of view of our simple verbal behaviorist model, about first level thoughts. He has then developed from being the object of training and criticism by others, to the stage at which he can train and criticize other language users and even himself. Indeed the language learner has now reached the point at which he can formulate *new and sophisticated standards in terms of which to reshape his own language and develop new modes of thought*.

According to verbal behaviorism, thinking is primarily *saying*, secondarily it is having proximate propensities to say and of course, thinking about thought is thinking about language with all these relevant distinctions being properly put into place. Notice that on the verbal behaviorist model, we can distinguish clearly between the functional role of utterances and the phonemes, the noises, the sounds, the sheer materials as it were of the language which embody these functions. Like the word 'or' embodies a certain function but the word 'or' as a certain sound, that noise must be

carefully distinguished from the word as functioning in a certain way, and it is meaningful not because<sup>39</sup> of the sound obviously but because of its function which I indicated a while ago in terms of the way in which the logical words function in patterns of argument.

Now notice that we are working with a very tough-minded account of thought. Thinking *is* using language, that is what it is. There is nothing more to it than using language. I want you to accept this as an initial model because as I have all ready indicated, it is very oversimplified but by working with this model, you will learn a lot about problems of meaning and mind.

It is the most significant fact that the classical conception of thought as inner speech or mentalese draws no such clear distinction between the conceptual functions of mentalese symbols and the materials which serve as the vehicle of these functions. In other words, it doesn't draw a distinction paralleling that between the sound "or" and the function of the word "or," between the sound "not" and the function of the word "not," between the sound "red" and the function of the word "red." On the other hand if the analogy between thinking, classically conceived, and overt linguistic behavior is to be a reasonably positive one, the idea that there must be inner linguistic vehicles or materials would seem to be a reasonable one. So we want to press this idea of the analogy between thought and language and we begin to feel a sort of gap in our ordinary classical notion of thinking. What is the material vehicle of the functioning which inner speech must have if it is to be analogous to overt speech where we clearly can draw a distinction between the sign vehicle, the phonemes and the function.

It is often thought that imagery is the vehicle of mentalese but there just doesn't seem to be enough imagery to go around and many people are very poor at imagery but very good at thinking. So it is quite clear that the idea of imageless thought is by no means incoherent. We are left with the question, 'what might be the vehicle of inner speech?'

To our verbal behaviorist model there are two familiar objections which must be given some attention. In the first place, 'surely' it will be said, 'thinking that-p isn't just saying that-p, even can-

39 Epistemology III, end of track 7 (#8), start of track 8 (#9).

didly saying that-p as you have characterized it, for candidly saying that-p involves knowing the meaning of what one says and surely this is no matter of producing sounds'. Knowing the meaning of what one says. Answer: there is all the difference in the world between parroting words and thinking out loud in terms of words. But the difference is not that the latter involves a non-linguistic "knowing the meaning" of what one utters, rather it is that the utterances one makes cohere with each other and with the context in which they occur in a way which is absent in mere parroting. Here is the parrot, "yak, yak, yak," the earth could be quaking, and the sky could be falling and so on and the parrot says, "Polly wants a cracker." There is no connection whatever between what the parrot utters and anything else, even what he has uttered before. Therefore the notion of parroting is the notion of merely uttering noises whereas the important thing about meaningful speech is its coherence with its context and with the actions one performs and with other things that one has said. Furthermore, the relevant sense of knowing the meaning of the words is a form of what Ryle has called "knowing how." For example, knowing how to ride a bicycle, knowing how to swim, knowing how to talk, knowing how to use language is like knowing how to ride a bicycle or knowing how to swim. And that must be carefully distinguished from knowing the meaning of words in the sense of being able to talk about them as a lexicographer might. For example by defining them. Mastery of the language involves the latter as well as the former. You only master a language when you are able<sup>40</sup> to talk about your skills as well as exercise them but the primary meaning of knowing the meaning of what one says is simply being able to function linguistically in a coherent way which is relevant to the context.

Indeed the art of the lexicographer is also a form of "know how" but at a different level, it is at the level of meta-language, language about language as opposed to the level of the object language. A second objection, 'surely' it will be objected, 'we are often thinking when we are not saying anything, our thoughts succeed one another with lightning rapidity, how can this be reconciled with the verbal behaviorist model?' But of course I have already laid the groundwork for an answer to this. It must be remembered, again,

40 Epistemology III, end of track 9 (#10), start of track 10 (#11).

that propensities can change and shift as rapidly as the sands. A third objection. Thinking does not seem to occur in words. We are often conscious that we are thinking, for example about a certain problem without any words going through our minds. Answer. Only a very naive person would think of the flammability of gasoline, it used to be called the inflammability when I was young, to be a hidden inner flame, as though, here is a match, it is not overtly in the flame but there is a hidden flame in it which becomes apparent when you scratch it. But of course only a very naive person would think of the flammability of gasoline or the flammability of a match as a matter of a hidden flame, an inner flame or would think of the propensity of an electron to jump from one orbit to another as a kind of hidden jumping as though a jumping were going on in the electron before it really jumped. Therefore, causal properties, propensities or dispositions should not be pictured as though they were latent in the sense of hidden (and that is what the word 'latent' means) actualities. Thus the verbal behaviorist could point out that the short-term propensity to say, "damn I missed the bus!" should not be construed as a hidden or inner saying "I missed the bus." Thus the verbal behaviorist believes himself in the position to account for the classical conception of thoughts as analogous to linguistic activity but it nevertheless involves no actual occurrences of words in the mind.

### Classical Theory

He sees the classical theory as an attempt to blend into one coherent picture, items belonging to radically different categories. The categories of *act*, like actually being inflamed, and the category of propensity, having the propensity to be in flame. Above all the verbal behaviorist model makes it clear how we know about thoughts. For in their primary mode of being thoughts are *publicly observable episodes* of people saying things. There is nothing puzzling about them, people say things. The primary mode of being of thought is something that we are all familiar with, this is one of the radical virtues of verbal behaviorism. There is nothing problematic about thoughts in their primary mode of being because they are people saying things candidly out loud. Of course in their secondary mode of being, according to the verbal behaviorist, thoughts are

propensities to say things out loud. And propensities can be known in the way in which for example, the propensity of salt to dissolve in water can be known. We can know that salt has the propensity to dissolve in water because it is a piece of salt and we know by induction that salt has this propensity. We have observed salt dissolve in water. So the primary mode of being of thought is thinking out loud. This is analogous to salt actually dissolving. Here is some salt actually dissolving, here is somebody actually thinking out loud. And the secondary mode of being of thought is as propensities to think out loud and we can know about them in the same way in which we know about salt as having the propensity to dissolve.<sup>41</sup> Thus we can know what we *think* in the primary sense by literally hearing ourselves think.

But it will be objected, we know the propensities of physical objects by induction. We know for example that acid turns litmus paper red by observing this happen in a number of cases and drawing a general conclusion from these observations. Thus we can be said to infer that an object is soluble from the fact that it is salt. But surely we have non-inferential knowledge of our own thoughts. To this the answer is that part of the process of learning to use a language is learning to make autobiographical statements and not just autobiographical statements in general but autobiographical statements about what one is thinking. Non-inferential knowledge on the verbal behaviorist model is a matter of reliably responding to, for example, physical objects, in standard conditions with the appropriate sentence. In other words to know non-inferentially that this table is rectangular is to respond in standard conditions with the sentence, and in the case of the verbal behaviorist model with the actual saying, 'this table is rectangular'. And by learning the language of perception, you learn to be caused to say, to think out loud "this table is rectangular," by the table itself.

### **Non-inferential Knowledge**

This is the model of non-inferential knowledge, this is the model of what it is to think something reliably without inferring it be the case from anything else. Seeing something to be the case is, as I illustrated, according to the verbal behaviorist, being led to

41 Epistemology III, end of track 9 (#10), start of track 10 (#11).

think out loud, “lo! Here is a rectangular table,” by the table itself. And you acquire that ability, how? By learning the language. That is why it is reliable, this is going to be a point I want to discuss later where I want to discuss knowledge as reliable belief. And now it turns out, you see that the verbal behaviorist can say that part of the training of a child in the use of a language is to learn to respond to its own propensities to say things out loud by such a thing as, ‘I was just about to say’, or ‘it was on the tip of my tongue to say it’. In other words, people can be trained to respond not only to tables but to themselves. Why not? And why can’t ones autobiographical statement, ‘it was on the tip of my tongue to say  $2+2=4$ ’, be a reliable response to the occurrence of that very propensity itself. How does the parent know that the child has that propensity? By watching him, by seeing the circumstances that he is in, and by usually, very reasonably inferring that’s what the child was about to say. We can look at people, and we can watch them and we can see the circumstances they are in and we can say, ‘by golly he is just about to say’ or ‘it is on the tip of his tongue to say something’ and if we can do that, then we can train them to do what? To respond to that situation that they are in when it is on the tip of their tongue to say something by saying, ‘Ah ha! You were just on the point of saying this weren’t you?’ And the child nods and a little more reinforcement of the successful kind has occurred.

We have a simple model of what thinking is which I am calling “verbal behaviorism.” Remember verbal behaviorism as I am describing it here is a theory about the *manifest image*, it is a theory in which people are Aristotelian substances or basic individuals, it has nothing to do with atomism or hard-core anything, it is simply a basic idea that the fundamental concepts that we have of things concern what is publicly accessible, what we can be taught about by people because they can see when we are confronted by it. I want you to remember that the verbal behaviorism as I am developing it here is a sophisticated philosophical theory which has very little to do with what is ordinarily called ‘behaviorism’. That is why I call it verbal behaviorism simply to emphasize that it is a matter of actually saying, candidly, “I just missed the bus!” This is behavior not

in the sense in which the behaviorists use the term, but in the sense in which we ordinarily<sup>42</sup> use it.

The important thing about the word ‘behavior’ as we ordinarily use it is that behavior is not just a matter of a frog flicking a piece of acid away from itself, it is a matter of a *person* acting and responding and doing things. So the original meaning of the word ‘behavior’ is a very rich one and I want to appeal to its original roots meaning and I am not appealing to its technical use by psychologists.

As already noted, according to the verbal behaviorist we hear ourselves say as for example, ‘I just missed the bus’, and when we hear ourselves say this we are literally hearing ourselves think. We would be thinking, for example, “the thought has just occurred to me that I missed my bus,” and I indicated how this thought that has just occurred to me could be a learned response to an actual propensity to say, ‘I just missed the bus’.

I have sketched this position on verbal behaviorism and I want you to notice that there are delicate issues which I have left to slumber. I introduced verbal behaviorism as a simple model and while I’ve been polishing and defending it, it has been with the aim of *transcending* it. I believe that it correctly represents a basic stratum in our conception of what thinking is but it is only a part of the larger picture to which I shall now turn.

### **The Larger Picture**

In the case of dispositions and propensities of material things, we distinguish between the propensities and dispositions themselves, which are definable in terms of test conditions and empirically ascertainable results. And the explanation of these propensities and dispositions which theoretical physics has made available. In other words, in the case of solubility, for example, we said that the notion of solubility is an “iffy” notion, it is the notion of a hypothetical, it is a notion of “if this were put in water, then it would dissolve.” Here we have a notion which is defined in terms of observable features of the object. You cannot observe solubility but you can define the notion of solubility in terms of what is observable, namely, *putting it in water* and *dissolving*. The same is

42 Epistemology III, end of track 10 (#11), start of track 11 (#12).



true with other dispositional characteristics like being magnetized and so on. Here we distinguish between the disposition and the theoretical explanation of it which is given and the case of magnetized soft iron is particularly helpful in this connection because here we correlate in physical theory the possession and the abandoning or the losing of the disposition with a steady stream of actual physical processes at the micro-physical level. So that there are constant actual processes going on which accompany the acquiring and losing of this propensity. As I said, in the physical explanation we distinguish between the propensities and the explanation in terms of theory as to the acquiring and losing of them. And we can similarly give an explanation in terms of micro-physics of what it is for a salt to be soluble, we can give an actual account of the processes involved in something being dissolved. And we can explain, in terms of theory, why salt does that in water rather than sitting stodgily in the water and folding its arms so to speak and not going about its business.

This means that the repeated occurrence and disappearance of the iffy property which is for example the property of being such that if iron filings are present, then they cling to it, is from a theoretical point of view of microphysics accompanied by actual physical processes which are induced by the current. And which are replaced by other of physical processes when the current is turned off.

### Models and Theories

I want to suggest now that we can regard classical theories of mental acts construed as *pure occurrents* or non-iffy events, as contrasted with the verbal behaviorist account of them as short term propensities, as *theories* in a sense which is analogous to micro-physiological theory.<sup>43</sup> In other words, I am suggesting now that just as we supplement our picture of iron being magnetized by a theory of pure occurrences which explain the existence of the propensities so we can regard the classical Cartesian-Aristotelian notion of thought as pure occurrents as a theoretical explanation of how it comes that these short-term propensities to say, to think out loud, appear and disappear, occur and follow one another with a ra-

43 Epistemology III, end of track 11 (#12), start of track 12 (#13).

pidity that they do. In other words I want to suggest that our commonsense conception of thought processes is a kind of commonsense theory which is designed to explain the propensities to think out loud and the way in which they occur, much as micro-physical theory is a system designed to explain the powers and propensities which we know things to have at the perceptual level.

Thus the theory of inner speech or mentalese would construe these postulated thought episodes or occurrences as items which have a strong positive analogy with the thinkings-out-loud to which the verbal behaviorist has called attention, and rightly so. Because just as we rightly call attention to solubility and then give a theoretical explanation of it, so in that case of thinking, the verbal behaviorist is right in calling attention to candid thinking out loud but we are also right in thinking that something must lie behind these propensities just as in the case of magnetizability and solubility, we feel that some substructure must underlie the existence of these propensities. I think this is the most fruitful way of looking at classical theories of mental activity.

By the way it is interesting to note that when we refer to the thoughts which are occurring in a person's mind, we find it quite natural to quote them even though they are not overt saying. On the other hand of course the negative analogy should not be neglected. Mental events, thoughts, are not thought of as waggings of an inner tongue. Nor, as we have seen, are mentalese events to be construed as verbal images. I am not going to elaborate the classical theory of thinking. Because this is done beautifully by classical philosophy. The point I am interested in is making a point *about* the theory, rather than *in* it. Because I am concerned with the *conceptual status* of all these ideas we have about ourselves as persons. I want to concern myself particularly with the principles of knowledge that are involved, and it is going to turn out that some of the principles that are postulated by other philosophers will fall naturally out of the framework that I have been developing.

Perhaps the *most important point* is that when the theory of thoughts, that what the theory of thoughts postulates in the way of new entities are processes and acts rather than individuals. Remember in my first lecture I focused attention on the notion of an individual, that which is referred to by a singular term and I talked about basic individuals, and I said that in the manifest image, material ob-

jects are some of them and *persons* are basic individuals or in the classical sense of the term *substances*. Now notice that the kind of theory that we are talking about here is postulating not new *things* but new *processes*. In this sense the theory we have been considering remains within the manifest image because it does not postulate new things. Persons remain the basic individuals of the system, we have simply enlarged our conception of what persons do as compared with the verbal behaviorist model with which we began. Obviously people do think out loud, people do have propensities to think out loud, all we have done is said that in addition there occur these processes which are actual occurrent processes and not dispositions and which explain the shifting propensities of people to say what they say.

In addition to sayings and short-term propensities to say we now conceive persons to be characterized by purely occurrent episodes of thinking in this analogically introduced sense. We might be tempted to refer to them as *inner episodes* but the spatial metaphor is misleading. They are primarily *in* the person as states of the person. To be sure they are not perceptible but neither is solubility and yet solubility is a state of a piece of salt. It is only when we come to think that some particular part of the body, for example the heart or the brain, is the locus of these activities that the term “inner” gains any richer meaning. This is what begins to happen when the scientific revolution makes its impact on our conception of the world.

I introduced the manifest image of man in the world as essentially an image which has been purged of all the scientific objects postulated by physical science. The basic individuals it countenances are certain material things, living things other than persons, about which I have had little to say, and persons. The attributes that the manifest image ascribes to material things involve in the first instance the proper and common sensibles, color, shape etc., etc.. But it also allows, in this universe of discourse, attributes which are definable in terms of them as I indicated solubility is definable in terms of perceptible qualities.<sup>44</sup>

44 Epistemology III, end of tape.

Dispositions<sup>45</sup> and propensities pertaining to the perceptible traits of individuals were taken into account. In particular, the shifting short-term propensities to say things which according to the verbal behaviorist are *thinkings* in a secondary sense of the term. But notice that this austere conception of the person has been enriched in two important ways without introducing new individuals. Thus in the first lecture, sensings were introduced as elements of a theory designed to explain, for example, how it could seem to a person that there was a pink ice cube in front of him when in point of fact there is none. In both the veridical perception and in the perceptual experience which would be veridical if there were such an object in front of one, the person senses a *pink cubely* or in more familiar terms, has a sensation of a pink cube.

Today we began our account of thinking with the verbal behaviorist model but proceeded to develop an account of mental acts which construes mentalese episodes which we were talking about as elements in a theory designed to explain the occurrence of these shifting propensities and dispositions. This enriched conception of man in the world which includes the sensings and mentalese thinkings but no new individuals other than common sense material things, living things other than persons and persons, is what I have called the manifest image in the essay call "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man." Now the next step in my argument is going to be to explore the impact of the scientific revolution and then to explore the epistemological principles that are involved in *perceptual knowledge* and *scientific knowledge* in terms of the framework that I have constructed.

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### Questions and Answers

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I think there is a primary role for the manifest image.<sup>46</sup> The very loving care with which I have been polishing the manifest image

<sup>45</sup> Epistemology IV, track 0.

<sup>46</sup> The questions are omitted since Sellars repeats what he takes to be key in each.

shows that I feel that it has a most important place in our understanding of the world and that I don't think that we are in a position to replace it yet. I think that science is still relatively in its infancy so I don't feel that we should scrap it. Feyerabend seems to me to be willing to...he is like a Russian peasant riding over the snows in a sleigh throwing the children off to the wolves, he is throwing the manifest image way bit by bit. I think that the manifest image is a coherent whole which we can begin to see *beyond* but which we cannot throw away, without throwing away something very precious, in the sense that we don't quite know what we would be losing if we threw it away. So I certainly differ radically in my attitude towards the manifest image from Feyerabend. I do think it is primary, my conception here is that it is primary in a *methodological* way, this is what we have to work with and until we have a coherent framework which will do better the same kind of job which it does, well we'd better understand it. I want to make it clear that I really do care about the manifest image. I think that one of the primary things that a good philosophy *must* do is to understand it. I am in full sympathy with people like Strawson and the ordinary language philosophers, the only places I disagree with them is where I think they are giving an incorrect account of the ordinary scene.<sup>47</sup>

What place is there for philosophy with respect to the scientific image? There is in the first place, philosophy as philosophy of science. In other words an understanding of what it is that makes a scientific argument a good argument, what different kinds of explanation there are, furthermore, one of the jobs of philosophy here is, clearly, to understand exactly the way in which scientific conceptions are anchored in observable situations which are part of the manifest image.

It is, assuredly, false [that the manifest image can be jettisoned]. I think that human beings are always going to think and know that they think. The problem is not that we are going to throw away thought, but that we may have a more detailed understanding of that material which does form the functions which is thinking. In other words, I understand thinking to be fundamentally a *functional*

47 Epistemology, track 1 (#2).

notion, governed by correctnesses and rules and validity, the most that the scientific image can do here is to give us some notion, in Aristotle sense, of the *material* cause of thinking but the *formal* cause of thinking is surely a *function* and this is a function which exists now and which we think of well now, we understand it well. I think that what science can add here is trivial. For me, to say that thought is neurophysiological is like saying English contains noises like “and,” “or,” “but,” and so on. The actual function of thinking is to be found in the rules that govern inferences and the rules that govern the conceptual structures of language in terms of which...which are often extremely complicated, which of course, I have been forced to oversimplify, in order to make some basic philosophical points. But we have an adequate notion of what thinking is in its *formal* cause, the most the science can do, if I can use this terminology, is to give us the material cause and as I said that is really quite unexciting as far as I’m concerned and that is why I think that as far as human living and the person is concerned, the manifest image contains the formal truth and that science is going to give us an account of the material substructure.

What I wanted to do was to purge the phrase ‘verbal behaviorism’ of certain pejorative overtones that it might have. We all have a model of behaviorist psychology in which that word ‘behavior’ is used roughly as equivalent to twitches and to sheer motion and what I wanted to do was to call attention to the fact that when a person as it were things out loud, “I just missed the bus,” this is verbal behavior but it is not to be thought of simply as motions, it is to be thought of as behavior in what I would call the ordinary sense of the word. Apart from that it is true indeed that I am introducing verbal behaviorism as a simplified model to throw light on “thought” in the classical sense and that was my purpose.

The model has explanatory power because what I want to emphasize is that thinking out loud, as I call it, is thinking. Even apart from any reference to classical thought episodes. We already understand what thinking is when we understand what it is for someone to meaningfully say, “I missed the bus.” So the classical conception of thought does have explanatory power, it is only if one thinks that thinking by its very nature must be the classical sort of thing that one thinks of verbal behavior as simply being an outer clothing, so to speak, of inner thought.

The most I have ever said [with respect to moving on from the manifest image] is that in its descriptive aspects the scientific image could in principle replace the contentual aspects of the manifest image. And this is the same point I was making, from the standpoint of the formal cause we are not going to replace the notion of thinking, all we are going to do is have a better understanding as to what specifically it is that is doing those functions.

At the level of sensations, as I indicated today, it is very important not to suppose that sensation and thought are going to be handled in the same way because I think that thinking is to be understood in terms of something like linguistic function whereas I think that sensation is quite a different sort of thing and it is, in a way, a *content* that is going to remain in the world picture regardless. I want specifically to discuss this because I want to argue that in the last analysis, as the scientific picture of the world begins to take shape, it will turn out that the locus of color and sound and so on, in the interesting sense of these terms, is not in the physical world, but in ourselves.

It is not just [that the scientific image is ] going to throw a light on it because I think it literally would involve a replaceability in the material aspects. I think that putting it in Kantian language that I like on occasion to use, the world of commonsense solid colored objects is a phenomenal world in Kant's sense of the term, it is an appearance of scientific reality.<sup>48</sup> Kant's *ding an sich* in my view become the scientific objects of theoretical science. Using that metaphor what we have is science as giving us insight into that which it is which appears to us in the conceptual framework which we learn as animals struggling our way up from the primordial ooze to use in acting and suffering and thinking. Let me emphasize that I have had relatively little, except by implication, to say about values, and standards and norms and obligations and that sort of thing because, putting it very crudely, I am talking here about the "is" of the world and my whole theory of ethics hasn't been touched on at all and of course ethics is not the same thing as science. When I talk about the in principle replaceability of the manifest image by the scientific image, I do so with respect to the *content* of the world, it's material

48 Epistemology IV, track 2, 3:07.

and not with respect to those forms which concern the normative, the obligatory, the correct, the incorrect, the valuable, the good, the evil and so on. I hope to say something about that but I do in *Science and Metaphysics*, I discussed this at length in the last chapter where it becomes clear that my fundamental ethical outlook is Kantian.<sup>49</sup> In other words, I think that Kant is essentially right, not only in many of the things that he said in a theory of knowledge but also in ethics.<sup>50</sup>

[With respect to cognition in animals] Leibnitz distinguished between reason and the consecutiveness which apes reason and of course the Cartesian drew a distinction in principle between rational beings which had minds and animals. Of course there are many interesting things that are involved in the Cartesian period in this respect but what the Cartesians also appreciated was that beings which didn't conceptualize could nevertheless be well ordered in their relation to their environment and this is true of all levels of animal life. It is quite clear that we are tempted to use the language of intentionality, the language of thinking with respect to animals and I think we are also tempted to use the language of *language* with respect to certain features of animal behavior but I think that these are analogical extensions of our basic notion because we tend to use human beings as models for our talk about non-human beings and we often forget that any such metaphor limps, uses a cane or a crutch, walks on three legs.

I myself would be very reluctant to say that animals, however articulated they are in their behavior and well adapted they are in their behavior, I would be very reluctant to say that they think thoughts in the sense in which human beings think thoughts. But again, I would want to say, take an example, when chimpanzees are brought up in a family with children, it is a well known fact that up to a certain period of time, they acquire the same skills and they do roughly the same kind of things, they get the same kinds of adjustments, they are remarkably subtle in their adaptation to their environment but after a certain point the chimpanzee just stays where he is and the child goes on to learn a language. For me it is a good illustration of the fundamental difference there is between thinking and

49 Epistemology IV, track 2, 3:07.

50 Epistemology IV, track 3 (#4).



“thinking” between recognizing and “recognizing.” For example you can train a white rat, if you have two doors and a platform and a triangle on one hand a circle on the other, and you can vary the figure and you can make them look more and more like each other and you can train animals to discriminate in the following sense, that they would jump at one door rather than another. For example, if they jumped at the triangle and you don’t want them to do that, you lock it and they bump their nose as they hit it, so the animal learns to discriminate between the triangle and the circle. One is tempted to say that the animal has the *concept* of triangle because it has this discriminative behavior, I think this is simply a mistake. One doesn’t have the concept of a triangle unless one is able to draw inferences about triangles and unless one has the kind of structure that is involved in language. All I’m doing here at the moment is being dogmatic, all I am attempting to do is to indicate that I am aware that there is a great deal that needs to be said about that and I have written to some extent about it but I don’t think I can do any more here than to indicate where I stand on the subject. So I would say that bees have a “language” not that they have a language.

You must remember [that I am not looking for evidence for verbal behaviorism ], the position that I adopted is not that of verbal behaviorism. What I did was simply give an account of the classical theory of thought which you are expounding which relates it to an observation base. Verbal behaviorism is bound up with methodological issues in philosophy but the point is that there is such a thing as candid speech, thinking out loud, there *are* such things as propensities, the problem is not are there such things because there clearly are, the question is, “is there anything more?” The “more” is not something that is given to us, the “more” is something that in the history of man, he has learned to conceive of in terms of a theory to explain the obvious fact that people *do* think out loud and they *do* have propensities to think out loud. So I would say that our ability to think of the classical theory of thought is something that has a long history in the human attempt to understand himself and this is a story which I told in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” of the myth of Jones, the theorist who works out the theory of thoughts and teaches it to his fellow man and teaches them to respond to their own thoughts and then disappears without a trace. And here we are, that is a myth a kind of philosophical parable which is designed to

explain how concepts pertaining to the unobservables could be grounded in concepts pertaining to the observables which is the general theme of both my talk on Monday and my talk tonight.

[As far as concerns the relation between the formal and material discussed earlier], I would have said that in the Aristotelian tradition, and here I speak diffidently, what were interchangeable were formal and final, not formal and material...All I was arguing was that what performs the material function in the manifest image might be performed by some other material in the scientific image. It wasn't a question of replacing formal by final or material by formal or formal by material, it was a question of a reinterpretation of the material content of the world. The formal components of the manifest image—that remains. The formal features of the manifest image which are the important features, features that concerned the normative, the evaluative, the matter of personal intention and so on, these are going to remain in the scientific image. What is going to change is the *contentual* aspect.<sup>51</sup>

### Lecture III

#### Principles

I wish I were discussing tonight the full scope of the concept of principles.<sup>52</sup> I have nibbled at it in a number of essays and I actually have some ideas, I think, on the subject but I am concerned tonight primarily with *principles* in so far as they relate to the topics that I have been discussing. Three lectures sometimes appears in advance as an endless period of time but as one proceeds, the time begins to evaporate and one knows that philosophy is long and lectures are brief. So if I can throw some light on principles as they concern knowledge of the types that I have been considering, I will have achieved my purpose.

<sup>51</sup> Epistemology IV, end of tape.

<sup>52</sup> Epistemology V, track 0 (#1), 1:30.

## Lecture III

### Practical Reasoning

I want to begin with a topic which is of course thoroughly familiar to all of you, the topic of knowledge as justified true belief. This is *thought* to be the classical conception of knowledge, there are other conceptions but there seems to be a general agreement these days sparked by Edmund Gettier's paper in which he attacked what he called the "classical theory of knowledge," that knowledge is justified true belief. Of course, the fundamental theme in this definition is that first of all, knowledge is a mode of belief. Austinians and Griceans grumble here, particularly Austinians because, after all, to say that something is something you believe is to imply that you don't know it. If you say I believe it is 10 miles to downtown South Bend, you imply that you don't know it so how can knowledge be a form of belief when to say of something that it is a belief is to deny that it is a case of knowledge. But of course, it is denied by *implication*, and the kind of implication involved is a peculiar one because, as G.E. Moore was one of the first to sense, the word "imply" is used in a number of different senses and is regimented only with the lopping off of the limbs by logicians. This means that once we take into account the variety of senses of implication here, that it remains well possible that knowledge is a form of belief.<sup>53</sup>

To know is to believe because this kind of implication can be dismissed as a *pragmatic implication* as it is often called. This would mean of course that in the framework that I have developed, that *knowledge* is a *form of thinking*, to know that something is the case is a form of thinking that something is the case. Of course a *form* of thinking that something is the case, a *species* of thinking that something is the case, the notion of form here is not used in its ordinary sense, it is used in its technical sense and we will see what comes of it. You might put it this way, that knowledge is thinking that something is the case where we have to add additional qualifications or characterizations. I shall assume that this is true although I shall be considering very shortly a position radically opposed to it.

Knowledge then is justified true thinking that something is the case. It is true because *you can't know what isn't so*, this is one of

53 Epistemology V, track 1 (#2).

the favorite and most useful slogans I know in philosophy, you can't know what isn't so and that brings out, of course, that knowledge, to call something knowledge implies that the thinking involved is true. If you claim to know something and discover that what you claim to know wasn't the case, you would withdraw—if you played according to the rules—the claim that you know it. Furthermore knowledge is *justified*, so we have these three themes, (1) knowledge is thinking that something is the case, (2) knowledge is true thinking that something is the case and, (3) knowledge is justified thinking that something is the case and this is called the *classical theory of knowledge*.

It is certainly true that we can be justified in believing something when we are not appropriately said to know it, so this won't do just as it stands, we often believe things that we are justified in believing and yet we would feel very uncomfortable if we were asked whether we *know* it. So I submit that there is a *tension* here between knowledge and merely justified true belief. What is it to be justified in thinking something? Well, it is to have good reasons for thinking it, good reasons for believing it as opposed to its contradictory. How good? Adequate? Conclusive? Adequate for what? Austin is well known for suggesting that, "I know that-p" is a performative as he called it. In the strict sense as it is often pointed out, an explicit performative is something like "I promise." If you say to somebody, "I promise to meet you downtown," you have committed yourself merely by uttering that formula, that very word itself, 'I promise'. You have committed yourself to doing the action in question.

So that merely by virtue of saying "I promise" you have by virtue of an institution so to speak, in the English language, promised. To say "I promise" is to promise given that institution. What we call the institution of The Promise. But, it isn't true that to say I know that-p is *ipso facto* to know that-p. Knowing would be too easy then. So if knowing is a performative, it must not be a performative in this primary sense. But Austinians, including Urmson, suggest that when you say I know, you are in the first place, presumably, saying that you think that something is the case with the qualifications that I introduced at the beginning and furthermore you are implying that you have adequate reasons *to give a guarantee, to give your word, to give your warrant, to stand behind it*, you commit

yourself. In other words when you say “you know” you are performing, you are making a performative statement, in the sense that you are saying something which is as it were, includes something like, *I guarantee, you have my word for it that it is so.*<sup>54</sup> If this were the case then, to know that something is the case, would be to think it was the case, to be correct in the thinking it is the case, and to be implying that you have grounds such that you could stand, you could put yourself, as it were, *on the line* with respect to the truth of it.

If this were the case, then we would have some idea as to what was meant by *good reasons*. Because it would be clear that good reasons would be a *context relative* notion, reasons that might good enough to tell somebody, “I knew it,” or “I know it” in one context might not when something else *was at stake*, so to speak, be good enough. In some circumstances, where small things are at stake, you might have good reasons and they might be adequate to justify saying ‘I know’, in other words, for you to as it were put yourself behind the statement. But if the circumstances were different, and more hinged on it these reasons might not be good enough. Because of this context dependence of this Austinian element which I think is indeed present in the notion of knowledge, I am going to basically drop the word ‘know’ because I think we have enough of a problem on our hands in attempting to understand what is meant by *good reasons*. And once we have seen that the adequacy or conclusiveness of reasons is relative to a context then, since we are not going to be discussing all the kinds of contexts in which this issue might arise, we might as well turn our attention merely to the notion of *what it is to be a good reason for a belief*.

Notice by the way, that we tend to, we don’t find the word “I know” occurring in, as it were, simple thinking out loud or in thinking to one’s self. Remember there is such a thing such as talking to oneself but when I have been talking about inner speech, I certainly haven’t had in mind talking to oneself as when one scolds oneself, “you shouldn’t have done that,” “you shouldn’t have said that,” “what a fool you were,” that kind of talking to oneself is not the sort of thing that I had in mind when I talked about inner speech and of

54 Epistemology V, track 2 (#3).

course that is not the sort of thing that Ockham had in mind when he talked about thinking in one's heart or saying in one's heart. We must distinguish very carefully between thinking proper and talking to oneself in the imagination. We can talk to other people in imagination, so I am not saying that the word 'I know' doesn't occur in inner dialogue in that way, but what I want to indicate is that the fact that it doesn't occur other than in these kind of dialogue-ish contexts is ground for again thinking that "I know" is a kind of *practical word, a performative oriented toward other people*, which I think is essentially true. In other words, I am suggesting that "knowing" isn't in the ordinary sense of the phrase, a kind of thinking. *It is believing which is contextually adequate to justify, "I guarantee,"* and which is furthermore specified as true. That would be roughly the account of knowledge that I would give.

### Reasonableness

Now we have to distinguish the reasonableness of believing a proposition from the reasonableness of acting on a proposition. Including such action as giving a guarantee for it. The concept of acting on a proposition is clear only in simple cases. Because there, acting on a proposition consists in using the proposition as a premise in one's practical reasoning, for example "I shall go downtown if it rains, it is raining! So I will go downtown." In other words there the proposition, the belief if you will, that it is raining, is occurring in the practical contexts where one is deciding what to do. Now that is a simple case in which one acts on a proposition. But all of the interesting cases that philosophers are worried about, are more complicated and difficult to analyze. For example we often act where there is no belief involved except for a practical one.<sup>55</sup> For example, suppose that I come to a fork in the road and one way goes to Indianapolis and the other way goes to Dayton Ohio and I am lost and I don't know where I am. Well I might very well go on one of the roads, and rationally go on one of the roads but I needn't in any sense believe that the road I am going on is the one that is going to take me to my destination.

I am going to be talking then about the *reasonableness of believing* a proposition and not the reasonableness of acting on a op-

<sup>55</sup> Epistemology V, track 3 (#4).

position. Although ultimately, the relation of belief to action is, I think, an essential part of the notion of belief. That would be an issue that would take me far beyond anything that I could hope to touch upon this evening. So I am going to concentrate on the concept of having good reasons for thinking or believing that something is case.

The general pattern of justifying belief in terms of good reasons is inferential, crudely, we have a premise P and the conclusion is going to be 'so I have good reasons all things considered for believing P'.

P

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*What goes in here?*

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So, I have good reasons (all things considered) for believing P.

In other words we have here, the abstract form of a certain pattern of argument, a certain premise and the conclusion is going to be, so I have good reason all things considered, for believing Q. We want to see what sort of thing might go in here, and what might be the principle of such an argument because every good argument has a premise, a conclusion and it has some kind of principle which takes you from one to the other.

Now reflection on classical theories of knowledge and therefore classical theories of having good reasons for believing something, lead to this kind of pattern, we can fill in the first part by something more complicated:

*I have good reason all things considered for believing P,*

*so, I have good reasons all things considered for believing Q.*

Well you look at that and say right away there must be something more to it than that, surely there must be a suppressed premise, what might it be? And of course one candidate that puts itself immediately forward is,

*P logically implies Q*

And now we have what looks like a good argument, I am not saying it is a fully explicit argument but it begins to grab us. In other words,

I have good reasons, all things considered for believing P, P logically implies Q, so I have good reasons all things considered for believing Q. If the nature of argument is made still more explicit, it is seen to involve the *principle* that:

logical implication transmits reasonableness.

And you can see what I mean by this, the premise says, we have good reasons for P, the conclusion says we have good reasons for believing Q and of course the premise that P logically implies Q, entitles us to say, well if you have good reasons for P, then you have good reasons for Q. If one thing entails another, if you have good reasons for the one, then you have good reasons for the other.

In this case we can say that we have derivative good reasons, all things considered, for believing Q. We say, traditionally, that the reasonableness for believing Q is inferential. Now notice that the above is an oversimplification because suppose I have independent reasons for believing that Q is false, in other words suppose I have reasons for believing not Q. Well I might start out here with, I have good reasons for believing P, all things considered, P logically implies Q and be sailing along saying, so I have good reasons for believing Q and suddenly it strikes me that I have good reasons for believing not Q.<sup>56</sup> So what we have to note then is that if P implies Q and it is also true that not Q implies not P so we have to take into account the fact that we might hurl ourselves along in this argument and run into the fact that we have good reasons for believing that Q is false and then we have to really re-estimate the whole situation and we might well decide that we don't have all good reasons, all things considered, for believing P because we might decide that all things considered, we have reasons for believing not Q and therefore decide that we have good reasons, all things considered, for believing not P.


Now this is something which is straightforward, I am however going to abstract from that type of consideration because it raises no points of central philosophical interest to us and I am going to suppose that we have no independent reasons with respect to Q. So that then if we have no independent reasons for believing that Q is false, then you see in this situation here if we do have good reasons

<sup>56</sup> Epistemology V, track 4 (#5).



all things considered for believing P and P logically implies Q, then we would have, it would seem, good reasons, all things considered, for believing Q.

I have been considering the case where one proposition P logically implies another Q. And said, with the above qualification, that logical implication transmits reasonableness. Now we can also take into account with trepidation, with fear and trembling to use Kierkegaard's phrase, probabilistic implication whatever that is. Thus we might have, it is reasonable all things considered or I have good reasons all things considered to believe that P, P probabilistically implies Q to a high degree, in other words if P is true than in all probability Q is true, so I have good reasons all things considered for believing Q.



Foundational Picture

Probabilistic justification of beliefs according to this latter pattern might presumably be exemplified by inductive arguments where we have good reasons for believing certain evidence to be the case, we have presumably some principles of induction which take us from the evidence to the conclusion, we have the conclusion that we have good reason all things considered for accepting a generalization, a law of nature or law-like statement. Or in another case of such probabilistic justification, might be that in which we justify theories, again we would have empirical generalizations which we have good reasons to believe, we presumably have some theories, we hope, some principles, in terms of which we can evaluate how theories stand with respect to the evidence we have for them and then as our conclusion, we would be able to say, therefore, we have good reason for accepting the theory, for believing the theory, for the believing that the theory is true.

But I am not concerned with these cases because obviously the kind of question I'm zeroing in on is the kind of question which I am

sure was discussed by professor Firth, namely what about going this way rather than going that way, it has been pointed out since time immemorial that it is most implausible to suppose that all epistemic justification is inferential. At least according to this pattern, *surely* it is said, there must be beliefs which we are justified in holding on grounds other than that they can be correctly inferred inductively or deductively from other beliefs which we are justified in holding. In traditional terms, if there is to be inferential knowledge surely there must be non-inferential knowledge, that is, in our terms, beliefs the “reasonableness” of which, the “authority” of which, the “rightness” of which is not established with reference to the reasonableness of beliefs which logically, or probabilistically imply them.

We are in the region of what has been called the *self-evident*, the *evident*, indeed the *self-certifying*, *intuitive knowledge*. It is part and parcel of what has come to be called the *foundational* picture of human knowledge.<sup>57</sup> You are all familiar, I am sure, with the foundational picture of human knowledge. It looks like this, obviously. Here is the foundation, now on the foundation are other beliefs which are justified in terms of principles relating them to the foundation and there could be many stories going up, for example according to do some versions of this foundational picture, the foundation, now by the way I am going to be concerned not with pure mathematics but with our empirical knowledge of matter of fact, according to one picture this foundation consists of let’s say sense data and our knowledge of what is going on in our own mind at the present moment.

In the Cartesian position for example, the self-evident as far as particular matters of fact, concerns what is going on in my mind at the present moment, my sensings, my feelings, my emotions, my thinking and so on, these would be the foundation but of course a person could hold the foundational picture here and put at the bottom, let’s say, physical objects and persons and put at the higher level theories about physical objects and persons and perhaps higher order theories and so on. I am not concerned this evening to belabor the points that I was making in the first lecture when I was

<sup>57</sup> Epistemology V, track 5 (#6).

attacking the *givenness* of the sensory, givenness of sensing, I am concerned now with the abstract pattern of justification that is involved here. I am going to be discussing this notion of the self-evident as being the *foundation* and of the others of course as being related to it by “epistemic principles,” or principles of justification. Naturally, the principles that would take us from the self-evident to other levels would be perhaps deductive principles or inductive principles or perhaps these other principles. And usually it is seen fairly quickly that other principles are involved. For a lucid discussion of some of the problems in this area, Roderick Chisholm’s book on theory of knowledge, the third chapter, called “the indirectly evident” is an attempt to present some principles which are needed in addition to inductive and deductive logic. But what I want to do this evening is to discuss, in the first place, the notion of the self-evident.

That which takes one, according to this foundational picture, from the level of self-evidence or intuitive knowledge to the higher levels would be the principles of logic deductive and inductive and perhaps certain additional principles which are *sui generis*. They would all have the character that they will transmit authoritative-ness or justification or reasonableness from lower levels higher level. Let us reflect now on the foundational level of knowledge in this picture. It is a level of beliefs which are reasonable in some sense, which have epistemic authority in some sense, which have epistemic *correctness* or goodness, downright goodness in some sense, but which are not reasonable or authoritative or correct or good by virtue of the fact that they are beliefs and propositions which are implied by other propositions which it is reasonable to believe. Let us label them, for the moment, *non-inferentially reasonable beliefs*. Because I am assuming for the moment that nothing can be called knowledge, which is something that we have, as it were, that we can believe as rational beings, unless it has some kind of claim on us, some kind of, as I said, authoritative-ness, some kind of correctness. How could there be such beliefs? when you think about it...and of course philosophers have puzzled about it.<sup>58</sup> As a matter of fact it is the central puzzle in the theory of knowledge.

58 Epistemology V, track 6 (#7).

How could there be such beliefs which somehow have authority to a rational being and yet are not inferentially authoritative? It is puzzling because the concept of a reason seems so clearly tied to that of an inference or an argument that the concept of non-inferential reasonableness seems to be almost a contradiction in terms. "Surely," we are inclined to say "for a belief to be reasonable one must have a reason for holding it, for a belief to appeal to us as a rational being, we must have a reason for holding it, or for a belief to have authority for us as a rational being, we must have a reason for holding it." And surely we are inclined to say that this reason must be something *other* than the belief. Something other than the belief which is its reason. This is one arrow that is driven into us in our philosophical torment.

How might a self-justifying, self-reasonable, self-certifying belief be construed? Can we make any sense of it? Let us try to make some sense of it. One possible suggestion modified from Chisholm's theory of knowledge is to the effect that the form of the justification of such beliefs is, the form of the reasonableness of such beliefs is,

what justifies me in claiming that my belief that-P is reasonable, has authority for me as a rational being, is simply the fact that-P.


Or to spell that out a bit,

what justifies me in claiming that my belief that *a* is F where *a* is an individual and F is a certain attribute," for example that I am unhappy, is simply "the fact that I am unhappy, that *a* is F.

That is Chisholm's formula.

Now this is puzzling. Because if we look at other cases of justifica-

tion, we find arguments, we find inferences, we find reasonings. Thus, this might seem to point to *reasonings* of the form "it is a fact that *a* is F, so, it is reasonable to believe that *a* is F." And then we might wonder what in the world principle would authorize that rea-



(a) Direct apprehension,  $F_1$  the fact that *a* is F.

soning? We seem to be back to inference again. This obviously can't be correct for in order for any such argument to do the job, the premise would have to have *authority*, that is it would have to be something which is reasonable to believe, and this would require us to modify it to become, "it is reasonable to believe that it is a fact that *a* is F, so, it is reasonable to believe that *a* is F." Of course, since it is a fact that *a* is F is a more complicated version, in an important sense however of "complicated," of *a* is F, this would simply tell us that it is reasonable to believe that *a* is F, so, it is reasonable to believe that *a* is F and that would be quite an illuminating.<sup>59</sup>

As I said this is an aside because now comes the heart of the matter, here is the move that is actually made at this stage. We would wipe this out. Again, this is just building up, tightening the screw a bit. Because what we find is that *most* philosophers who have taken the line expressed here are clearly committed to the position that there is a *level of cognition* more basic than believing, this more basic level would be a sub-conceptual level where "sub" of course, is far from being a pejorative preposition, there would be a sub-conceptual level of awareness of certain facts. In our terms this would be a level of cognition more basic than *thinkings* or sentence events in mentalese. More basic in fact than any symbolic activity. It would be a *real* knowing as opposed a symbolic knowing or believing. It would be a level of cognition unmediated by concepts, indeed the very *source* of concepts, in some such way as described by traditional *abstractionist* theories, we would abstract our concepts, indeed, from our knowledge of such facts, our non-conceptual knowledge of such facts. It would be, in traditional terms, a *direct apprehension* of facts, the *direct presence* of facts to the mind.

Now schematically this would give us the following (*see figure*): this is what we find in many philosophies, it is a fact which I apprehend directly or which is present to my mind directly that *a* is F so, it is reasonable to believe, where believing now is this different level of cognition, the symbolic level, it is reasonable to believe that *a* is F. What we would have here is a sub-conceptual, sub-belief


59 Epistemology V, track 7 (#8).

level, a sub-thinking level of knowledge and that would give us our *warrant* for the belief.

This is I think a recognized and familiar classical position which is as alive today as it ever was. I have called it in an essay with which some of you are familiar, the *myth of the given*. Because this apparatus raises two serious problem. One, *what sort of entities are facts?* Do they belong to the real order? Or do they belong to the conceptual order? That *fact* is roughly a synonym for truth, you can interchange them, it is a fact that-, it is a truth that-, and that ‘true’ seems clearly to be a predicate of conceptual items, judgments, statements, whether in overt speech or in mentalistic speech, should give us pause for thought. And of course I am implying here, that my own position is that *facts* belong to the conceptual order as *true thoughts*.

Secondly, more than this, how is direct apprehension to be understood? If the apprehending is distinguishable from the apprehended, might not apprehension occur without any fact being apprehended?<sup>60</sup>

If so, an apprehending that-p might not be an apprehending of the fact that-p. Now let me spell that out, of course, ‘apprehend’ like ‘see’ is in its ordinary sense an achievement word. But surely, as in the case of ‘see’ there is a place for ostensible apprehending. We talked about ostensible seeing why not ostensible apprehending that-p? That is, a seeming to apprehend? Where “seeming to apprehend” doesn’t imply an achievement but implies, that activity which if it *were* successful, would be an achievement and would be the apprehending of a fact. Hitting in baseball implies that something is hit. Swinging does not. Look at him swing. To hit is to swing successfully. To apprehend, surely, is to ostensibly appre-



$F_1$ , the fact that  $S_1$  is  $F$ . (a) the apprehending or seeing the fact and constituents.  $R_1$ , having, exemplification.

<sup>60</sup> Epistemology V, track 8 (#9).

hend but successfully. Many who use the metaphor of seeing, and everybody from Plato on down has used it, in epistemic contexts overlook the fact that “seeing” is a term for a successful conceptual activity which contrasts with “seeming to see” or looking or appearing as I put it in my first lecture. And that no simple metaphor like touching, which implies an object touched can do it justice. The distinction between seeing and merely seeming to see involves criteria. To rely on the vague metaphor of apprehending or the presence of the fact, is to obscure the relevance of criteria for distinguishing between knowing and seeming to know which ultimately define what it means to speak of knowledge as correct or well-founded as well as simply being a thinking that something is the case. What I want to suggest, then, is that if this is the case, to know that we have apprehended a fact, we would have to know that the criteria which distinguish apprehending from seeming to apprehend or ostensibly apprehending were satisfied. Otherwise as far as I can see, apprehending would be like sweating with conviction and as A.J. Ayer once pointed out, a person can sweat with conviction and be totally wrong.

In short, I suspect that the notion of a non-conceptual direct apprehension of a fact provides a merely *verbal* solution to our problem. The regress is stopped by an *ad hoc* regress stopper and it is not the first time in philosophy that this sort of thing has been done. What is the alternative? Now I am going to stick my own neck out. This is essentially the position that I developed in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” and which still recommends itself to me. I gave three lectures at the University of London, 13 years ago, on epistemology, I was invited to give them and I gave three lectures on epistemology and I called them “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind or the Myth of the Given.” And I read them over when I accepted the invitation to give these lectures and I was asking myself, do I still believe all that? And it is astonishing you know, I must be very inflexible, I perhaps don’t give well with the years but I still think that I was essentially right. What is the alternative?<sup>61</sup>

The key to our problem is provided by the verbal behaviorist model which I developed last time. I reminded you that it was a sim-

61 Epistemology V, track 9 (#10).

ple, radically oversimplified model but it provides us, I believe, with the outline of a strategy for getting out of the classical labyrinth. I am attacking the foundationalist picture in a sense because as I said in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," I do think that knowledge fits together in many different ways and there is such a thing as observation and it is related in a unique way to knowledge which is not observation but I want to say that they all require the other, it is a coherence, if you will, I know that professor Firth would be uncomfortable with this phrase, it is in a way a coherence theory of justification which I defend. This used to be a very dirty word but I don't think it is quite as dirty as it used to be.

Consider the verbal behaviorist account of visual perception. Remember that according to it the primary sense of "the thought occurred to Jones that snow is white" is "Jones said snow is white." Where the verb 'to say' you remember was used in a purified sense, it was stripped of some of its ordinary implications. It was construed as roughly equivalent to, "to utter words candidly as one who knows the language," as one who knows how to use the words in the sense of "know how." And in particular, purged of the illocutionary and perlocutionary forces which Austin and Grice find so central to their theory of meaning. I also characterized such sayings as *thinkings* out loud and I asked you to imagine somebody who without "to do" is simply thinking out loud as I am sure you often find yourself doing and as most of us who lecture are constantly aware of doing because when we lecture, I'm sure at least for most of us, we are often startled to find out what we said and in a way philosophers often find out what they think by hearing themselves think.

This is certainly in accordance with the verbal behaviorist pattern. Accordingly, the verbal behaviorist as I described him, introduced also, in order to account for those cases where one thinks quietly or silently, a secondary sense of "the thought occurred to Jones that snow is white," in which it refers to a short term proximate disposition to think out loud that snow is white.

I want to comment briefly on professor McMullin's expostulation that surely one can lie in bed having thoughts occur to one without having any propensities to say anything. I should have replied or replied more completely to him on Wednesday by pointing out that it is only if "propensity to say" is taken in the richer sense of propensity to say something to someone that this is clearly possi-



ble. The verbal behaviorist construes lying in bed silently thinking and knowing that one thinks as knowing what one would be saying, i.e., thinking out loud if one were in a thinking-out-loud frame of mind. And this is by no means an implausible view and of course it must be remembered that, knowing what one would be saying does not involve a kind of occurrence of verbal imagery because I was emphasizing that our thinking and our self-knowledge extends far beyond any matter of purely linguistic imagery. In any case what I want to do is to remind you of the verbal behaviorist's position which I said is a useful initial model for approaching problems in theory of knowledge.

In approaching the problem of non-inferential knowledge as it appears in the verbal behaviorist model, I am going to concentrate on the primary sense of having a thought occur to one that-p. In other words, I am going to concentrate on thinking out loud because according to the verbal behaviorist thinking primarily is thinking out loud.<sup>62</sup> For example consider, "Jones sees there to be a red apple in front of him." This would contain as its conceptual core, in this primary sense, Jones thinks out loud, "here is a red apple." Now to say that this visual thinking that something is the case is epistemically justified or reasonable or has authority is clearly not to say that Jones has inferred from certain premises, which he has good reason to believe, that there is a red apple in front of him. In the case of perception, remember, the key fact is that Jones, by virtue of learning the language at his mother's knee, has learned, has acquired the ability to respond to the world with appropriate sentences. 'Here is a red apple', 'here is a pencil', 'here is my dolly' and so on. This response aspect is the key. Perception is not inferring, it is *responding* but that responding has *authority* and I want to examine that authority.

### Warrant

The authority of the thinking out loud accrues to it in quite a different way from that of inference. It can be traced to the fact that Jones has learned how to use the relevant words in perceptual situations. And by learning how to use, I mean learn to respond in rele-

<sup>62</sup> Epistemology V, track 10 (#11).

vant ways, in ways which are parts of the linguistic...of the way of life as Wittgenstein puts it, of the language community. Thus, when a person candidly says in response to visual stimulation, "here is a red apple," it is likely to be true given the way in which he has learned to use those words that what...? It is likely to be true that there is a red apple in front of him. I said "likely to be true" because we all know of various ways in which things can go wrong. For example suppose he is in front of a mirror, suppose the apple is a piece of wax, the illumination is abnormal and the object is purple or there is nothing in front of him but he has taken LSD and people have been pounding his ears about red apples. Now if we were not to be there but were to overhear him, we know of him as somebody who knows how to use English, we know of him as a candid person who does not spend his time lying, if we overhear him and if we have reason to believe that none of these countervailing situations obtain, we would be justified in reasoning as follows, "Jones has thought out loud, "here is a red apple," no countervailing conditions obtain, so there is good reason to believe that there is a red apple in front of him. The sheer reflection on what it is to learn the language tells us this.

Note that although this is an inferential justification of the belief that there is a red apple in front of Jones, it is a special kind of inference, it has the form, *the thought that-p occurs to Jones in a certain context*, that is the perceptual context in which he is responding and in which circumstances are standard. *So, it is reasonable to believe that-p, now it is a special kind of inference.* I called it in my paper "Phenomenalism" *trans-level inference* for reasons which will emerge. Notice that the same proposition that-p, for example, that there is a red apple in front of Jones, is mentioned in both the premise and conclusion. Premise: Jones has thought out loud "here is a red apple," no countervailing conditions obtain so there is good reason to believe there is a red apple in front of him. The same propositional content occurs in the premise and in the conclusion. But the first mention concerns the fact of its occurrence at a particular moment, as a propositional event in a context to which basic features of language learning are relevant, from this

premise, the inference is drawn that the proposition in question is one which is reasonable to believe.<sup>63</sup>

We looked at the above example from the standpoint of an external observer. Let us now look at it from the standpoint of Jones himself. As we saw last time to be fully a master of his language, Jones must know these same facts about what is involved in learning to use perceptual sentences in perceptual contexts. Thus he too must know that other specifiable things being equal, the fact that a person says, responds remember, “here is a red apple” to a situation is good reason to believe that this is indeed the case. Now this is not to say that there are no cases in which we would not know what to say, for example, there is an *openendedness* to the kind of things that can upset the apple cart, for example we know about abnormal lighting conditions, we know about the way in which mirrors can function, we know about the way in which distorting glasses can function, we know about the way in which drugs can function, but we might not know that if you stick an electrode in a person’s brain, he might have an hallucination of a red apple in front of him. So when I say other specifiable things being equal, I want to leave a little openendedness in there to indicate that there are slips between the cup and lip in the case of knowledge—which is something that we all knew to begin with.

Thus Jones too can reason as follows: I just thought out loud “here is a red apple,” the conditions are okay, no countervailing conditions, so there is good reason to believe that there is a red apple in front of me. He might look, see the red apple and shut his eyes you see. Now he says, “I just thought out loud, here is a red apple, there are no countervailing conditions so there is good reason to believe that there is a red apple in front of.” Of course, the conclusion of this argument is not the thinking involved in his original experience. Like *all* justification arguments, it is a *higher order* thinking, we are thinking about thinking, we are evaluating thinking, we are looking at its criteria. Jones does not originally infer that there is a red apple there, it was *pulled out* of him by nature. It was, so to speak, pulled out of him by the red apple.

63 Epistemology V, track 11 (#12).

Now however he is inferring from the *character* and *context* of his experience that it is veridical and that there is good reason to believe that there is indeed a red apple in front of him. Notice that although the justification of the belief that there is a red apple in front of him is an inferential justification, it has the peculiar character that its essential premise asserts the occurrence of the very same belief in a specific context, as I said, as wrung from him. It is this fact which gives the appearance that such beliefs are *self* justifying and hence gives the justification the appearance of *being* non-inferential. It is, as I see it, precisely this *misinterpretation* of this unique pattern of justification in first person examples which leads Chisholm, for example, to formulate his principles of self-evidence. Thus if he were to agree with us that the perception of physical objects rather than the sensing of sense data is a primary form of non-inferential knowledge, his account of non-inferential reasonableness adapted to this example would be: the fact that there is a red apple in front of me is a good reason for believing that there is a red apple in front of me. The complex way in which the same proposition comes in twice, is here stripped down to a principle which, as I said although a classical one, is one which I can only regard as a purely verbal solution to the problem of knowledge.<sup>64</sup>

## Questions & Answers

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What<sup>65</sup> I was saying was that Jones' justification for his belief that there is a red apple in front of him is inferential, it is a special kind of inference which does not require that his original experience be an inference rather than a perception.<sup>66</sup> As I said his initial experience is, he is looking at the object and he is responding in the way in which he has learned to use language by the sentence, "here is a red apple." That is a response and by virtue of the way in which he learned the language, putting it crudely, that is a *reliable* re-

64 Epistemology V, end of tape. In the final paragraph of ME, Sellars provides a variant: "Consequently, I think that if one examines Chisholm's theory of truth, what we really get is "\_\_\_ is true if and only if \_\_\_ is true" which is true, but uninformative for much the same reason that I was developing earlier."

65 Epistemology VI, track 0 (#1), 4:45. The majority of the track is omitted. As before, questions will be edited out.

66 Epistemology VI, track 1 (#2).

sponse, that is a correct response, that is the way children are taught to respond. So that the thought, the belief that there is a red apple in front of him initially occurs at a basic level where it is a response, it is a response event, a particular tokening of the sentence, "here is a red apple." But now the question comes to him, as he shuts his eyes, am I justified in believing that there is a red apple in front of me? My point was that here he can reason, "I just said out loud, I just thought out loud, 'here is a red apple' in standard conditions, so in all probability given the facts about myself as a user of the English language, it is likely, it is probable, it is reasonable to believe, that there is a red apple in front of me." So I was distinguishing between two ways in which one and the same proposition can be involved in the experience. The original *perceptual way* and the other is the *justification way*, and that was the point of my argument. In other words, his original experience was not inferential, he didn't make an inference.

I am arguing, in effect, that all justification is inferential. In other words, the pattern of the argument as I gave it was, "I just thought out loud, 'here is a red apple', the conditions are standard and I am awake, I haven't taken hallucinogens, there are no electrodes probing my brain, there are no mirrors in front of me, so, there is good reason to believe that there is a red apple in front of me." You see that is an inference that involves the same proposition as the original one and, in my opinion, this is what gives rise to the *illusion* that these beliefs are *self-justifying*. Now notice, this is something that I take to be obvious but I want to rub it in, and that is that this justification has empirical premises. The important thing is that it is a different kind of inference than the standard "same level inference," now it is an inference that involves the fact that a certain event, a certain belief event has occurred in a certain context. But it is still has premises and it's principle rests on a principle about language learning and about the nature of language. So in effect I am agreeing with Dewey and Pierce, that justification always occurs within the context of beliefs about the world.

All I am emphasizing is that justification sometimes has that very special pattern which involves the occurrence of the thought in a special context, in this case—I could have also dealt with the case of memory, because we have ostensible memory, but I take the case of perception to be a paradigm case of non-inferential knowledge,

non-inferential justifiable belief. What I wanted to do was to bring out the specific character of the pattern of justification which as I concluded by pointing out, *involves the same proposition in two different ways which gives the appearance*, which generates the appearance that it is a matter of a belief *authenticating itself* and also which gives rise to the appearance that there is a justification which is not inferential because how can you simply infer the same thing from the same thing? That is the reason why the Chisholm principle in effect denies that any inference is involved and simply leaves it as an unexplained principle that the fact that there is a red apple in front of me is a good reason, without any inference or anything else, it just simply is a good reason itself for believing that there is a red Apple in front of me. I disentangled earlier one of the other strands in this type of theory which involves this notion of the sub-conceptual apprehension or direct presence of the fact.<sup>67</sup> What I am doing this evening is the rounding off of this general attack, that once again I have been making, on *givenness*.

At the conclusion, as I said, the view I am recommending is what I think is in the spirit of Pierce when Pierce was denying that there is any intuitive knowledge. But I am never quite clear on what Pierce means by this and so, although I like to invoke his name, if you were to ask me to find specific passages in which Pierce would spell it out in this particular way, I would be unable to do that. I think the same is true of Dewey, Dewey also emphasizes that any particular pattern of cognitive justification occurs in the context of other beliefs which are not themselves questioned at the time. I think this is true. What I wanted to emphasize simply was the different pattern of justification that comes in for the case of what we call perceptual or non-inferential knowledge.

[Take the case in which Jones is candidly thinking out loud, “here is a red apple.”] Jones is not making in autobiographical statements, he is saying, “here is a red apple,” so he is not making a statement about himself, he is making a statement about “in front of him” and to the fact that the “in front of him” contains a red apple. This statement, indeed, is a thinking *that* something is the case and if you are prepared to use the word ‘belief’ in the current sense as Chisholm puts it, then this is a believing out loud, it is a belief event,

<sup>67</sup> Epistemology VI, track 2 (#3).

a thinking out loud that there is a red apple in front of him. It is itself then, according to the verbal behaviorist model, a believing out loud.

In the beginning of my essay, I was discussing *not so much knowledge* because that involved the notion of *adequately* good reason and perhaps of *conclusively* good reasons and I was going to concentrate on the notion of *good reasons*. I also indicated that I was abstracting from the discussions of mathematical propositions and logical propositions. The implication that I was giving here was that at least in the case of perceptual knowledge, of perceptual beliefs, our good reasons are never matters of certainty, as I said it is likely that there is a red apple in front of Jones, I think however that if one were applying this model to cases of self-knowledge, there would be fewer slips. What I pointed out was that in the case of perception, we are able to indicate ways in which perception can go wrong. I gave you a list of ways in which perception can go wrong, there is a mirror here, or there is distorting glass, or the illumination is abnormal etc..

Consider the case, which I was discussing last time, of self-knowledge of what one is thinking. Well in this simple verbal behaviorist model, thinking in its primary sense *is* thinking out loud and one simply hears oneself think out loud but here, we can think of very few ways in which this can go wrong. I might actually have gone paralyzed and I might hear a recording of my voice, my voice might suddenly boom out “here is a red apple!, and it might be right over to [ the side ] and I might for the moment think that I was thinking out loud that there was a red apple.<sup>68</sup> Here is a case where something can go wrong so that in the case of self-knowledge at that level, there could be a seeming, and merely seeming to hear oneself think but then one would have to discuss the case of self-knowledge with respect to what I call the propensities, the short term propensities to think something. Here again I would be discussing the issue in terms of what is involved in learning the language game as it is transmitted from one generation to another. Now when it comes to *certainty* however, we get *closer and closer to certainty*, you might say, as we come to the case of self-knowledge. Perhaps we come

68 Epistemology VI, track 3 (#4).

closest to the case of certainty when we are dealing with mathematics. Because here, the kinds of mistakes that can occur are the kind of mistake where one is tempted to say, we mis-speak ourselves, where we make slips. So I have not been discussing *certainty* but I would indicate there a sort of *schema* for going on to discuss it.

This pattern of argument [the trans-level inference] is available and must be available in the first person case as well. But often, when it comes to justify our beliefs we do then go on to draw inferences from the actual content of our beliefs, like if there is a red Apple in front of me, then I'll feel it if I reach out. I wasn't concerned however with the inferential ways by which we justify our perceptual beliefs, I was saying that there was this basic way in which merely by virtue of learning how to think, in this case to think out loud, our reports are reliable because we learn them in accordance with the correct pattern of the use of the language. I am not saying that this is a complete account of how we justify any belief. I am merely calling attention to the fact that it is that dimension of a way of justifying our belief which has been *built*, in the classical theory, into the theory of self evidence, that is all.<sup>69</sup>

What I do want to do simply is to indicate that although our commonsense framework is a systematic system of concepts and therefore in a broad sense of the term a theory, I prefer to use the word "*theory*" not for a coherent system of concepts but methodologically for that kind of system of concepts which is explicitly constructed and coordinated with the kind of concepts that we ordinarily use in responding to objects. So I regard it as basic that there is a fundamental methodological distinction between observation statements and theoretical statements but I regard this as a methodological distinction and I think most of the terms that we use in observation statements go far beyond the kinds of thing that traditional empiricism stressed, namely, let us say, *red and rectangular items here-now*, that kind of thing. That is why I use the example of an Apple because obviously the notion of an apple is not in the ordinary sense of the term a theory-bound concept but it is certainly a concept that belongs to a whole system of classifications and involves a lot of principles.

<sup>69</sup> Epistemology VI, track 4 (#5).



The second point I would make is this: that often special training enables people to use as observation statements, statements which originally were clearly theoretical in the methodological sense. For example, a good clinical psychologist who has learned to work with patients and has absorbed a good theory, if there is one, of a certain mode of psychological disturbance, say, schizophrenia, may be able to look at a group of people who are brought into the clinic and spot, just by looking, who is a schizophrenic for example. Now here is a case where the language of a theory has been absorbed into one's response, so that one uses it not by inference but directly in perception as when one sees a red apple. Let me make it clear then that I think that statements which originally are part of a theory can become response statements, and this is part of what Paul Feyerabend has in mind by his pragmatic theory of observation. I think there is much in what he says there that I regard as extreme and carrying it too far but I think in the core of what he has in mind, I would agree with him. As I said, I disagree with his use of the word 'theory' because I think it blurs lots of things together.

The third point I would want to make, again, is that I wasn't speaking about all the ways in which an observation statements can be justified because many of the ways in which they are justified are straightforward patterns of inference, inductive, and from other facts. I was simply indicating that there is one important element in the justification of observation statements which is the one that has captured the imagination of the traditional philosophers and which they have reified into this notion of the *self-evidence* of a fact *independent* of any context and that is what I am criticizing. In other words, I am not sure that there is any issue here. I want to make clear that I was giving an account of only one dimension in the justification of observation statements but it is the one that has fascinated classical philosophers of perception.<sup>70</sup>

As I indicated, in the specific pattern of justification I was present-

<sup>70</sup> Epistemology VI, track 5 (#6).

ing what is involved is, if you will, a theory of how language gets its meaning and its use and is learned. For this reason I called it, using the term deliberately, because it is often used as a term of abuse, that is why I characterized my view as a coherence theory of justification. But the basic feature which differentiates my coherence theory of justification is that it *brings in* this trans-level dimension of justification where one goes from the occurrence of a belief to the justification of that same belief. The sense in which in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” I say *some authority accrues from tokens to types*, that is the point I was making in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in section 8 which is called “does empirical knowledge have a foundation?” I talk about the credibility of propositions and I speak about different modes of acquiring credibility and I said that there is a kind of credibility which flows from tokens to types, in other words from propositional occurrences to the credibility of the propositions. That is what is characteristic of this particular dimension of justification that I was analyzing this evening. As I say, I am convinced that it is this peculiar form of the *acquisition of credibility* by propositions which has been *reified* into the classical theory of self-evidence.

[How does one deal with Cartesian “cogito, ergo sum”?] I think that the Cartesian cogito is a many splendored thing, I think there are many themes that are involved here, some of which I have been talking about in my lectures but let me put it this way. There is one interesting feature of the cogito that has not always been appreciated and that is it requires an understanding of the meaning of the words ‘sum’, exist, I think that Kant was right when he said that “existence” is not a predicate but really Kant did not say that “existence” is not a predicate, he said that it is not a *real* predicate. In other words, he agreed that “existence” is a predicate, this is not always realized, Kant thinks, “of course existence is a predicate,” but it is a special kind of predicate, it is really a second level predicate, a predicate of concepts. To say that God exists is to say that the concept of God applies to something. Let us assume that that is true, I think it is true. Suppose that existence is in that sense a predicate and to say of something that it exists is to say that the relevant concept applies to something. What would the statement “I do not exist” be like? You ponder it and you will see. It would be “my concept of myself has no application, my concept of myself has no

application,” is that a coherent statement? It is not a coherent statement because it takes away with one hand what gives with the other. Whose concept of myself? My concept of myself! Descartes saw that there was a conceptual incoherence in the proposition “I do not exist.” What I would do is to put the finger right there, that it is incoherent because by analyzing out into, “my concept of me does not have application, it presupposes something that is denied.” So okay “cogito ergo sum” is a knowledge claim, it is a conceptual truth but it is a very special kind of conceptual truth because as Descartes said, in order to formulate the proposition, you have to refer to yourself and so that, in order to say “cogito ergo sum,” you have to say my concept of myself does not have application.

What I want to say is that the conceptual structure we use has different dimensions and in one dimension one can be prior and in another dimension another can be prior. Thus there is one sense in which, singular perceptual statements or observation statements are prior to generalizations, we support generalizations by appeal to singular observation statements. But on the other hand, there is a sense in which singular perceptual statements presuppose a knowledge of the very framework of perception and so this is what I argued, again in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” at the end of section 8:

If I reject the framework of traditional empiricism, it is not because I want to say that empirical knowledge has no foundation. For to put it this way is to suggest that it is really empirical knowledge so-called, and to put in a box with rumors and hoaxes. There is clearly *some* point to the picture of human knowledge as resting on a level of propositions—observation reports—which do not rest on other propositions in the same way as other propositions rests on them. On the other hand I do wish to insist that the metaphor of ‘foundation’ is misleading in that it keeps us from seeing that if there is a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest on observation reports, there is another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the former. (*EPM*, section 8.)

As I said, I think that this is essentially pragmatic and Piercean in its general line as contrasted with the empiricism of, let us say, Locke.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>71</sup> Epistemology VI, end of tape.



## What Really Exists 1969

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### Introduction

#### Flower in the Crannied Wall

Philosophy is nothing if not systematic and a system is the totality. I'm afraid therefore that I have to take the "flower in the crannied wall" approach here. By giving samples and strategies, I have been attempting to indicate the character of the systematic approach which I would take to philosophical issues as taking science seriously because, as I said, Philosophy of Science is essentially philosophy taking science seriously. Now last time I was discussing truth and I want to pick up themes that I introduced. You remember I distinguish between the *meaning of truth* and *truth conditions* and characterize the meaning of truth as *semantic assertability* and connected this to the *illustrating* use of quotes, the statement 'that snow is white is true' becomes on the analysis that I have been offering of 'that snow is white', here we have one of these singular terms 'that snow is white', that has been taken to name an abstract object, but this becomes,

The •snow is white• is semantically assertable

Here we have the dot-quoted expression. This means

•snow is white•s are semantically assertable.

And that in effect is an authorization to assert that snow is white. In other words to inscribe it, token it, which amounts to writing it without quotes or *dequoting* it and so as I said as a kind of slogan

you can say that the *truth move* is a *dequoting move* and the quotes in question are the functional, pure functional quotes, we have been talking about.

I pointed out that *truth conditions* as distinct from the *meaning of truth* are specified recursively, roughly we specify what the truth of basic sentences is, the truth conditions for basic sentences is, then you specify the truth of nonbasic sentences in terms of them. And I illustrated this by, let's say, given that P and Q are basic sentences, then "P or Q" would have as its truth condition

P or Q is semantically assertable if and only if P is semantically assertable or Q is semantically assertable.

Roughly what we have done is to specify the truth conditions for a molecular statement here in terms of the constituent statements that make it up, and we would go on and specify truth conditions for more logically complicated kinds of statements and in particular one would go on to specify truth conditions for quantified statements. But now I want to work today toward the topic of truth conditions for basic statements because this is where we come face-to-face again with the problem which has already been discussed earlier of *how do concrete, existential, honest to goodness factual relations get into the conceptual structure*. What kind of *factual relations* exist between a *conceptual structure* and *the world*. Because you remember I've been characterizing a whole family of pseudo-relations, saying, "stands-for" looks like a relation but isn't, and so on.

## Truth and Existence

But before I do that I want to discuss briefly exemplification and existence.<sup>1</sup> What we have, to take an illustration, to bring Socrates in on the final day,

That Socrates is wise is true

<sup>1</sup> What really exists, track 1 (#2).

becomes,

The •Socrates is wise• is semantically assertable

And that becomes

•Socrates is wise•s are semantically assertable

and then to assert it, is to conform with this permission, this authorization.

Truth is not a relation, truth as we have seen is not to be understood as a relation nor is it to be understood as an attribute, except in the sense in which the character of being semantically assertable is an attribute. And indeed it is perfectly legitimate to say that the character of being semantically assertable is an attribute so in that sense we can say it is an attribute but it is not an attribute not *of* a Platonic entity, it is an attribute *of* objects which are concreta. And of course it is almost an Irish bull of course to say that being semantically assertable is a character *of* concreta because of course this merely, as it were, authorizes one to write them, so it's a permission, it's a normative statement, if you will, the *subject matter* of which are linguistic concreta. The subject matter of this statement here is concreta to which this •Socrates is wise • would apply.

Now I want to discuss exemplification because, remember, according to the classical picture that we began with, for example, here is *triangularity* and this is an absolutely objective entity and if there is a triangular object in the world for example, *a*, [in figure 1], well that is triangular because it stands in a certain relation to triangularity.

So we get the classical picture that the relation of exemplification between the concretum, let's call this *a*, and our metaphysical picture here would be, here is the concretum *a*, here is the essence, here is the attribute of triangularity and there is the relationship or tie of exemplification which holds or ties them together. And so, this is the *relational* theory of exemplification. What I obviously




Figure 1. (a) triangularity, (b) instances.



am going to do and already did indicate earlier is to hold that this picture is false. It is a misleading picture at least. Because by treating exemplification as a *relation* between an objective entity and concreta, we are buying in on that whole picture which was fraught with pseudo-relations and the core one to get hold of the course being the pseudo-relational character of *means*.

Consider then

Socrates exemplifies (or ‘participates in’ or any of the other terms that we use here) wisdom

This looks like a relational statement (*figure 2*), in the picture we would have Socrates, wisdom and a tie of “exemplification” between them.




Figure 2. Socrates as R-related to wisdom.

On the analysis that I have offered, this becomes (first of all we turn around and take the converse)

The •wisdom• is exemplified by Socrates

and this becomes (since this is an abstract singular term)

The •wise• is true of Socrates.

This is a very special use of the words ‘Socrates’ as the context indicates. The fact that we have the predicate “true of,” you see what I’m doing is analyzing *exemplification* in terms of *truth* and to say that the •wise• is true of Socrates is to say that the sentence

Flower in the Crannied Wall**Existence**

forms by concatenating a •wise• and a •Socrates• in the formalism of *Principia Mathematica*, this would be

•wise (*Socrates*)•

abstracting from tense.

You know<sup>2</sup> *Principia Mathematica* doesn't give one a very adequate account of the syntax of interesting statements of any empirical kind but this would be the *Pmese* regimentation of "Socrates is wise" and what this comes down to is that

•wise (*Socrates*)•s are true

So that to say that *the wise* true of *Socrates* is to say that the sentence appropriately concatenated and actually involving the copula would involve an instance to which •wise• applies and to which •Socrates• applies. I underlined [italicized] them here to show that this is really a covertly quoted expression and we reduce exemplification to truth. To say that Socrates exemplifies wisdom is to say that the sentence that you get by putting together *Socrates* and a *wisdom* is true. So we get a *nonrelational* account of exemplification and furthermore instead of *exemplification* being *in the world*, it exists in discourse as the *semantic assertability* of a certain conceptual item.

## Existence

Now what about existence? Existence is, of course, a predicate. And it is a predicate because the word 'exists' is not captured by the existential quantifier. If I want to say there are cows, I could say,

( $\exists x$ )( $x$  is a cow)

<sup>2</sup> What Really Exists, track 2 (#3).

and that is perfectly all right, to say that there are cows is not to say, ‘cows exist’. I mean this is a barbarism to say that cows exist. The correct statement is there are cows and this is indeed captured by the existential quantifier. Now “exists” by contrast to the so-called existential quantifier—this should be called the “some” quantifier— “exists” is actually a predicate. We can say,

Socrates exists.

And this (“exists”) is a predicate, what is the subject? Well as you might suspect, according to the analysis I am going to offer, this is essentially a Kantian analysis. You see, Kant didn’t say that “existence” isn’t a predicate, he said that existence isn’t a *real* predicate. What he did say was that *existence* really is a predicate of *concepts*, a higher-order predicate. This is a Kantian view and I think it is essentially correct. When you say that Socrates exists, you are not talking about Socrates as when you say, “Socrates is wise,” when you say “Socrates is wise,” then you are using the word ‘Socrates’ in *first intention* and you are predicating *wisdom* of him so that *Socrates is wise* is a *first-order* statement whereas *Socrates exists* is a *second-order* statement where you’re using the word ‘Socrates’ in *second intention* and you say, roughly,

the •Socrates•...

Now what are you saying on it? You can’t simply put down the word ‘exists’ here as we have seen here: characteristically when you go from one of these basic semantical category words to its exposition in terms of the *illustrating quoting* device, you have to change the predicate. Thus, we are going to get a different predicate in this case, which is suited to the making explicit the *quoting* character of the word ‘Socrates’ as it is occurring in this context. And it’s going to turn out to be the following, now let me give you the analysis and then come back to it. The analysis is going to look like the following:

when I say that Socrates exists, I mean that something is true of Socrates. *To exist* is to have truths pertaining to the item: for the item to exist is for there to be truths pertaining to it.

Therefore, I am going to put down

*a* exists

and I'm going to put that as

For some attribute the attribute is true of  $a$ .<sup>3</sup>

And of course<sup>4</sup> that would be telling us that there is an attribute such that, and "PRECON" remember is a variable ranging over dot-quoted expressions, it is telling us there is a predicate which is true of  $a$  and that is telling us that a concatenation of that predicate with  $a$  is true.

There is a predicate such that that predicate concatenated with  $a$  is true.

The first thing to note is that the predicate in question has to be a genuine first-order predicate. It has to be a predicate that applies to *concreta*. Because when we say that  $a$  exists, we are talking about a certain *concretum*, we are saying of a certain *concretum* that it exists. And therefore if this is to be analyzed in terms of there being a predicate which is true of it, the predicate has to be appropriate to the *concretum*. It would be a matter-of-factual predicate. Like *tall* or *short* or *large* or *small* or any other empirical predicate. That means of course that you couldn't use predicates which are on a second order, like you couldn't use the word 'exists' as a predicate here, you might think that you get into paradoxes if you offer this analysis because it looks like as though you are saying if 'exists' is a predicate, then there would be a predicate such as *exists* which is true of it and therefore, we would then get *nonexistence* because obviously if *existence* is a predicate then *nonexistence* is the predicate, so *nonexistence* would be a predicate so that if  $a$  doesn't exist, then it doesn't exist. There are all kinds of apparent paradoxes that lurk in this area but the important thing to remember is that the only kind of predicate that we are talking about is that it is a first-order predicates. There is a first-order predicate which is true of  $a$ : examples of that would be as I said, spatio-temporal predicates, color predicates, size predicates and so on.

And if you wanted to, we could say that there is an  $a$  such that there is an  $x$  such that (a)  $x$  is true or,  $x$  concatenated with  $a$  is false.

3 WS could be using any number of symbolizations here.

4 What Really Exists, Track 3 (#4).

It is important to do that although it is not necessary because we have included that possibility in there because if there is a predicate that is true of it then there's also one that is false of, namely the negation of that predicate. The importance of this is that it brings out the fact that there is a *third* alternative because "some-statements" are neither true nor false so that when we say that an object exists, we are ruling out that no statements about it are either true or false.

Take for example Santa Claus. Santa Claus does not exist. The reason for this is that there is no attribute,

it is not the case that there is an attribute such that the attribute concatenated with *Santa Claus* is true or are concatenated with *Santa Claus* is false,  $\sim (a)$ .

Suppose you consider the sentence

Santa Claus lives at the North Pole

or,

Santa Claus it is jolly.

These are not literally true or false, they are true or false only under a certain rubric, what we call the "*fictional rubric*" in other words they are true in a *derivative* sense of true: i.e., that given the fictional rubric then these sentences are privileged as opposed to their contradictories. That is there's a certain story about Santa Claus in which these statements belong and their denial do not belong. Thus, statements to the effect that Santa Claus lives at the North Pole—these statements are true in the *Pickwickian sense*, they are not true a primary sense. This is the point. "Santa Claus lives in the north" is neither true nor false in the primary sense of true. In this respect "Santa Claus" differs from "Socrates."<sup>5</sup>

I have abstracted here from the tense difference between *exists*, *did exist*, and *will exist*. In philosophy you know we tend to say Socrates exists and we use that as an example, we tend to use the word 'exists' as short for a disjunction, either *existed* or is *existing* or *will exist* and that's the way it is to be construed here because otherwise we can give a more elaborate analysis in terms of which we

5 What Really Exists, track 4 (#5).

take account of the difference between existed, exists, and will exist. I'm abstracting from that and giving you what is the *heart* of the matter as far as this framework is concerned. Therefore, to say that an object exists is to say that some 1<sup>st</sup> level predicate is true of it.

You can see what I'm going to end up by saying if I get to it today, I'll say it now just in case I don't get to it. When we ask what *really* exists, then we want to say that what really exists is that of which predicates in an *ideal conceptual framework* would be true. We are going to define *reality* and *truth* and *existence* and so on, in terms of what *really* is true and what *really* exists—they are going to be understood in terms of an *ideal successor framework* to the framework that we actually now use. That's the sort of theme that I want to conclude with but I'm saying it now so that you understand the relevance of what I am doing here, why I am taking time out to discuss truth and existence and exemplification.

### Observation

I want to discuss observation and observation frameworks. First of all let me indicate my general agreement with Feyerabend, that a predicate is an observation predicate not because it labels an object of a certain kind but because it is a reliable response to concrete objects in situations. "Reliable response" this comes in with the way (a) we learn language to begin with and (b) the way we are continually learning new words as we progress through life. When a child learns its first vocabulary, it is learning to respond to objects in the world. It is acquiring responses to objects and when it is calling them red, characterizing them in terms of predicates and in terms of sentences involving predicates of that kind. And it is reliable in a very straightforward sense that if you brought up your child and trained it, and it is over in the corner, behind a screen or just going around the screen there and you hear it say "Mommy! here is the cat," or "Here is something white," or "something black," and if you have reason to believe that he is not pulling your leg etc. etc., there are always little contextually relevant considerations that have to be taken into account, but given all that, all these necessary qualifications that have to be added, the fact remains that you are entitled to infer from the *occurrence* of that utterance, that

there a is a cat there, that there is something red, there is something black there. In other words it's a basic feature of observation sentences that their occurrence *ceteris paribus*—and 'ceteris paribus' is one of the most important words philosophers can learn. Their occurrence is an indication of their truth.

The child starts by learning a certain vocabulary but then as we go on through life we acquire new response patterns in using words. As you know, for example, a clinical psychologist can use, in responding to people, very theory laden words like 'schizoid' and etc., the whole vocabulary of clinical psychology is one which a diagnostician can use in responding<sup>6</sup> reliably that is to say if these involved are good, which is in some cases, highly questionable, but certainly we would have here an example of a term that is functioning as an observation term in the vocabulary of a clinical psychologist, the diagnostician. And this of course is obviously connected with the familiar point that if we challenged the clinical psychologist with respect to the term that he is using as an observation term, then, you see he will retreat to a level of observation language which is less theory laden. He will now start talking about the symptoms that he sees, as a matter of fact, as you know there are many cases in which people can use terms as observation terms in which, when you challenge, they can't really formulate for you what the criteria are which in some sense they are applying: interesting problems are involved there. The point is that in the case of the clinical psychologist, he may retreat to observation predicates which are less theory laden and call our attention to how the person is looking, how they are behaving and so on. And indicated that in his theory those are sound grounds for ascribing to the person the theoretical predicate in question which he had previously been using as an observation predicate.

We can relativize the notion of observation framework and it is quite clear that there are sort of Chinese boxes here and the real issue here doesn't concern this sort of trivial fact which everybody acknowledges, the real issue is, "is there not only retreat from one framework to another but is there a framework which is the ultimate retreat?" Sense datum theorists hold that there is a kind of ultimate

6 What Really Exists, track 5 (#6)

framework to which one can retreat so that the clinical psychologist might first of all, might respond to the person with a theoretical term and then he might respond to the person and indicate he was doing so with words which are less theoretical and which concern the symptoms that he detects. Finally he might come down to words which are in a more obvious sense perceptual words, words in, Aristotelian terminology, which pertain to the proper and common sensible characteristics. It is normally thought that here in the Aristotelian framework of proper and common sensibles, we do have a basic framework to which retreat finally comes and where retreat stops and that is the notion of an *absolute observation framework*—something like the Aristotelian framework of proper and common sensible, and I think there's a lot to this.

Now before I go into that theme, however, let me remind you that the word "*theory*" is a tricky term. Just because a person uses the word "*theory*," it doesn't follow that he is the following some particular paradigm for using the term. In the philosophy of science over the past two and a half decades, the tendency has been to use the word theory in such a way that a paradigm case of the theory would be molecular theory or kinetic theory. Here a theory is not only an explanatory framework but it is an explanatory framework which has an external subject-matter as I called it in the *Irenic Instrumentalism* paper. For example it has an external subject matter, namely the gases, the kinetic theory of gases. It would have the external subject matter of gases as we perceive them and work with them operationally in laboratory situations and it would have an internal subject matter which would be molecules. So here we can draw a distinction between—a reasonable and pragmatic distinction—the external and the internal subject matter of a theory. We can say what the theory is *of*, it is a theory *of* gases and it is a theory which introduces molecules to explain gases. Molecules are the internal subject matter of the theory because the theory itself is formulated in terms of molecules. As I said, I think this is a reasonable and useful distinction.



In the case of some theories however, there is no external subject matter, and what do I mean by this?

7

The word 'theory' is often used in such a way that the theory is simply an explanatory framework and what I want to suggest is that the commonsense framework or the basic framework to the extent that we can speak of *the* basic framework, as a first approximation, is a framework which is an explanatory framework and has a conceptual coherence of a kind that makes possible explanations but what it explains are not something that is formulated externally to the framework. You might say that the commonsense framework is a framework in terms of which we explain the very things in terms of which the framework talks about, we explain cases of happenings and processes, the occurrence of processes of the kind which the framework itself formulates. So that in the case of a, you might say, something you would like to call an observation framework, we don't draw a distinction between the internal and external subject matter. Call it *subject matter external*, let's say gases, and *subject matter internal*, molecules. I think there is good methodological reason for Nagel's insistence on the distinction between the theory and the bridge laws or the correspondence rules and the observation framework. I want to comment on why I think that this is methodologically a sound thing to do but I also want to emphasize that this doesn't hold of every explanatory framework. It holds only of theories where new objects, new entities are being postulated in order to explain the behavior of an area with which we are already acquainted. You might say this is the antecedent framework and we are introducing new entities in a theory to explain the processes that we can already describe in an antecedent framework.

Whereas the basic framework, if there is one, or the relatively basic framework, is an explanatory framework but it has purely internal subject matter like physical objects. The common sense observational framework is a framework concerning physical objects and physical processes and so on and as I said then it is an explanatory framework which explains events and processes of the kind which it talks about as an external framework. So in this case

7 What Really Exists, track 6 (#7).

we have a distinction between an internal and external framework, a methodologically different kind of case from the kind of case in what we are tempted to call the basic observation framework. I think it is worth noting that the *concept of observation itself* belongs in an *explanatory framework*, putting it crudely, the concept of observation itself is a theoretical concept and over the history of science, we get changes in the concept of what observation is and this is one thing that is strongly influenced the philosophical theory because in effect, changes in interpretations of what observations are led from Aristotle's theory of perception to the kind of Humean theory or Berkeleyan theory of perception which ended in such a blind alley.

And I want to comment briefly on that because I think that some of the mistakes that are made there are made by the Instrumentalists.

I want to put my finger on what goes wrong in *Instrumentalism*.

### Sense Impressions

Sooner or later anybody who philosophizes about sense perception is going to introduce sense impressions or sensations or...other terms are used here. This is not to say that all philosophers do by any means but it certainly has been one very strong strand and I think it's a legitimate one. Sense impressions are correctly introduced into a theory of observation, of perceptual observation but sense impressions are misconstrued if they are construed as the primary objects of perception as was done by Berkeley, Hume and Locke, for that matter.<sup>8</sup>

They are not what we primarily know in perception as a matter of fact, I would argue that sense impressions are themselves theoretical, they a part of the *theoretical explanation* of what perception consist in, of what it involves. As a matter of fact, I would argue that far from sense impressions being the primary objects of knowledge, they are not even objects of knowledge except for the highly theoretical purpose of explaining the phenomena of perception,

8 What Really Exists, track 7 (#8).

perceptual error, and perceptual illusion. The second point I want to make is that not only are sense impressions not the primary objects of knowledge and perception but sense impressions are not cognitive themselves, they are not *knowings*, sense impressions are neither corrigible nor incorrigible, because they don't make any, as Kant pointed out, claims concerning what is the case. Sense impressions are not cognitive, they are not knowings, they are neither corrigible nor incorrigible, because they don't make any truth claim at all. It is important to realize then that perception involves *two modes of consciousness*, and the word "consciousness" is one of these words that has ambiguities in a way which can generate wonderful philosophical music.

Perception involves, first of all, something we can crudely call *conceptual consciousness* or *judgment*. Actually it is a misuse of the word "judgment" to speak of *perceptual judgments*, there are things that can be called *perceptual judgment* as when one *estimates* the height of a wall,<sup>9</sup> because there something called "judging" goes on but it is useful to use the word "judgment" because it carries with it this "truth claim aspect" so to speak and, of course, there is a truth claim aspect in perceptual consciousness. And this is the *conceptual element* in perception and if we were putting it in terms of our Cartesian account, we would say that perception involves a *believing*, a *taking* their something to be the case, a propositional truth claim. For example,

there is a red and triangular object over there

that would be the content of that truth claim. We could call it a believing but the word "believing" is, again, a word that is used very cavalierly by philosophers. Often *believings* are arrived at by answering questions and so on, we have to distinguish however between perception which can occur without any question being raised. One can just, as it were, see that there's a lectern on the table without having asked oneself any questions and that is why I think it is often useful to use the word *taking* and so that philosophers from H. H. Price on down have used the word *taking* instead of "believing" because the word "believing" tends to carry with it too in-

9 In the Aristotelian tradition, the cognitions of the aestimative sense.

tellectualized a view of what perception is like, so we can speak of a perceptual taking but the point is that the taking is a *propositional taking*, it is a taking that makes a truth claim.

But on the other hand perception is not simply making a truth claim. One can as it were with ones eyes shut, one could think there is a red and triangular object over there and it's quite clear that it would not be a perceptual taking. Now I am not going to attempt in this context here to analyze how these two elements that I am describing *fit together*, they do *blend together* in a very interesting way in the perceptual experience. But in addition to the *conceptual taking* which we can represent by means of the tokening of a mental sentence,

there is a red and triangular object over there, there will be the *non-conceptual item*, the sensory, the state which is analogous to feeling. We speak of this as the sense impression, we can speak of it as the visual sensation and so on and this would be for example a<sup>10</sup>

Sense impression of a red triangle.

It is itself not a conceptual state but it is essentially involved in experience because it is that *sentient* aspect of the experience which keeps it from being a purely judgmental, a purely conceptual, a purely *thinking* kind of state, perception isn't simply thinking that something is the case, it is thinking something is the case which is *brought about*, *provoked* and *accompanied by* and *blended* with a certain sentient state and it is that sentient state that we call "sense impression." Now the interesting thing about the sense impression and the taking—here we have the taking and here we have a sense impression—and the interesting thing is that in the example




Figure 3. this-red-triangular, the taking evoked by sensation or sense impression

<sup>10</sup> What Really Exists, track 8 (#9).

that I have given and other examples that we can easily construct, we use the same kind of technique for classifying. We classify it by means of a use of physical object talk, talk of perceptual qualities, 'red' and 'triangular' for example, so that we use the word 'red' and 'triangular', we use these words in *classifying* the conceptual state and we also use them in classifying the sensory state.

When we use them in classifying the conceptual state, of course, we are using them in *second intention*, we are using them in effect by dot-quoting them, •red• and •triangular•, because what we have here is a taking which is of the kind which would be expressed in language by a sentential utterance which involves a •red• and •triangular•. When we are using the words *red* and *triangular* in classifying the taking, we use them in the way I've been analyzing in terms of classifying them functionally as a linguistic item performing a certain function. When we use these words in classifying a *sense impression*, we are *not* doing the same thing, we are using them to classify the sense impression but we are not using them in *second intention*, we are using them in an *extended* or an *analogical* sense.

What do I mean by this? Well, I mean roughly a sense impression of a red triangle is a sense impression of the kind that is normally brought about by looking at red and triangular objects in standard conditions and furthermore which resembles and differs from other sense impressions in ways which correspond to the ways in which red and triangular objects resemble and differ from other colors and objects of other shapes. So that we are really introducing the phrase here "of a red triangle" to classify the sense impressions and in doing so we are actually forming then a classificatory expression which classifies the sense impression as of a certain kind.

Thus, in this context here we are really getting a theoretical... we are using physical object talk as a model for constructing a theory as to what goes on inside of people when they are seeing that there is a red and triangular object over there. So here is a classification and the import of the classification is that the state is of the kind which is normally brought about by red and triangular physical objects, and it is of a kind which differs systematically from other sense impressions in a way which corresponds to the way in

which colored objects, objects of different colors differ from one another and resemble one another and objects of different shapes resemble and differ from one another. We, as it were, construct, using a certain model, a theory space which has a logical structure analogous to the space of color and shape in the literal sense in which these words are used in physical object talk.

It's interesting to note then that in the perceptual experience, there are two items *each* of which is classified by making a very *special* use of physical object talk, talk about physical objects and their qualities. Obviously this introduces possibilities of philosophical confusion, in the first place you see, one notices that one uses<sup>11</sup> the words *red* and *triangular* in classifying both of them and might think that one does so in the same way, one either tends assimilate the

*taking* to the *sense impression* or the *sense impression* to the *taking* and this has been characteristically true of philosophies of perception, this kind of confusion is endemic in theories of perception.

And in the second place, since the "truth claim element" is an essential part, one may think of sense impressions as making a truth claim! If you run these two together, you will get ultimately what I refer to in "Scientific Realism and Irenic Instrumentalism" as a kind of bastard concept of something which is both pre-symbolic, pre-conceptual and yet makes the truth claim. You get the notion of sense impression as being a kind of basic genuine knowledge which is more basic than any symbolism or any language or any symbolic




Figure 4. (a) constituents: redness and triangularity. (b) apprehending the fact. (c) the directly seen.

11 What Really Exists, track 9 (#10).

system. And this is what I call the *Myth of the Given*, the idea that there is a certain *stratum* of experience which is somehow making a truth claim and which is somehow more basic than any acquired conceptual system.

Let me bring in another theme which I think is another mistake which is made, which is made and ultimately results in *Instrumentalism*. Suppose that we take the Platonic view seriously according to it when a person sees that an object is red and triangular, here's the object

What actually is involved of course is that the object which is red and triangular exemplifies or stands in the *exemplification* or the *partaking* or *instantiation* relation to redness and triangularity. So according to the Platonistic kind of model, when you are seeing that an object is red and triangular, you are apprehending, you are seeing, visually apprehending a *fact*, a fact which involves two constituents, a concretum—the object which is red and triangular—and two abstracta, namely redness and triangularity. Thus, when you see that something is red and triangular, you are standing in a direct relationship of visual apprehension of which different accounts can be given but the structure remains the same and that is the important thing, you are standing in an existential relation to two objects namely redness and triangularity which you are seeing.<sup>12</sup>

And the important point is that you are existentially related to them. When you are apprehending the facts, that involves apprehending these objects and they are visually apprehended you actually, visually apprehend redness and you visually at apprehend triangularity.

At this stage the Instrumentalist says to himself, you cannot visually apprehend theoretical attributes, you cannot perceive theoretical attributes, you can perceive redness and triangularity, the proper and commonsensible attributes and this means that theoretical attributes have a second-class status, vis-à-vis knowledge. The fascinating thing here is that the instrumentalist if he is sophisticated, accepts the linguistic function account of the sense in which theoretical predicates stand for attributes. In other words, I develop

12 See ME for a discussion of the history of facts.

an account according to which *standing for an attribute* is a matter of *performing a linguistic function*.<sup>13</sup>

The Instrumentalist is *happy* about that when it comes to theoretical predicates, “yes,” he would say, “to say that a certain theoretical predicate stands for a certain theoretical attribute is really not to talk about its relation to an entity but simply to classify its functioning.” To say that a certain theoretical word “means,” “stands for” molecule or stands for the attribute of being a molecule, for the instrumentalist means merely that the expression does the “molecule” kind of job. So that he would say, “OK ‘molekül’, in German, stands for the property of being a molecule,” he would say fine but all that means is that ‘molekül’ in German translates into “molecule” in our language and does the job in German which is done by our word “molecule.” If you look at a sophisticated Instrumentalist you will find he says the meaning of a theoretical term is its functioning in the deductive system.

In this way, to say of the theoretical term that it stands for an attribute, to say it stands for a certain attribute is simply classify it in terms of its function. I’m not saying that any Instrumentalist has actually come out and developed a nice neat tidy theory of linguistic functions and so on but if you talk with them and read what they say, it’s quite clear that to the extent that they are willing to talk about theoretical attributes at all, the account they would give of them is essentially the kind of account that I have been giving of what is to stand for an attribute.

To say that ‘molekül’ in German stands for the attribute of being a molecule, they would say that simply is to classify ‘molekül’ in German as a word that does the job that, in our language, is done by “molecule.” So that we have a kind “standing for” that is a classifying function, standing for, a functional classification standing for. And then what do they do? “Aha,” they say, when it comes to *redness* and *triangularity* there we have *real standing-for*. Because really to stand for attribute is to do what? It is to *label* it you see. In other words, the word ‘red’ stands for *redness* because it *labels* it, here is *redness* as an entity an objective entity and ‘red’ is its label.

13 What Really Exists, track 10 (#11).



We apprehend redness and we give it a label and the label stands for redness because it is the label of it and because we can apprehend what it is the label of. Now, on the other hand, when it comes to theoretical expressions, when you say that they stand for an attribute that really is just a way of classifying it. Of course on my view, to say what *any* predicates stands for is to classify it. This notion of certain predicates *labeling* objects, attributes as Platonic objects you see, that is the *core* of Instrumentalism. Because *that* is what they take as *first-class* and then everything else is second-class with respect to it.

The important thing about words like ‘red’ and ‘triangular’ is that in addition to inferential functionings, like we can infer from ‘x is red’ to ‘x is not green’, you know predicates come in kind of families, as Carnap pointed out. In addition to intra-linguistic functions which concern inference patterns in which predicates function, words like red and triangular and other observation words have a different kind of function which I referred to at the beginning of this discussion of observation, namely, the *response* function, the word-object kind of function.<sup>14</sup>

In the case of both *theoretical* and *observational* predicates, for those predicates to stand for an attribute is for it to function in a certain way. The point is that what we recognize as observation words do function as a response, as input. Now the classical view would be, as I’ve indicated, that theoretical words don’t do this kind of thing. Of course the answer is, “why can’t they?” And once you get away from the classical picture which draws an absolute distinction between observation predicates which are genuinely predicates and genuinely stand for attributes and predicates which merely stand for attributes in the sense of having a function, which the instrumentalist worked out but which other philosophers have also done in one way or another, without seeing that it is really the core of Instrumentalism. It occurs to us of course that there is no reason why one cannot acquire the ability to respond to environmental situations by means of expressions in a theory.

You see everybody grants that this happens because a person doesn’t look at Wilson cloud chamber and say, “aha! A path is

<sup>14</sup> What Really Exists, track 11 (#12).

forming here so such and such a kind of particle is probably going through,” no he just looks at it and responds to it right away with the appropriate physical description, the appropriate theoretical account of what’s going on there, just as, you remember, the clinical psychologist about whom I was talking earlier, responds to his patient directly with a with a clinical classification which is highly theoretical. So we *can* do it. And the point is then that if we mean by an observation predicate one that does reliably play the response role, by “reliably” meaning that it’s very occurrence is a symptom of its truth, then there’s no reason why theoretical statements can’t perform this kind of the job. But once we get away from this kind of a picture then, we realize that theoretical predicates could have first-class status.

In effect what Feyerabend does is to say not only that theoretical predicates can have this first-class status, but that it’s methodologically sound to give them this first-class status wholeheartedly and scrap old ones, you see. According to Feyerabend, the minute we have a theory that explains a certain domain, we should throw away our old account of that domain and then respond to it in terms of the new conceptual framework. But there are two separate questions here, one is, “Can theoretical predicates acquire a reporting role?” and the second is “Should we abandon old frameworks as soon as we get in a new one?”

In some cases where the theories are partial, there’s no harm in doing so. And what they are doing is replacing another theory, the closer we get, however to the commonsense framework, the more cautious we have to be because the way we perceive the world is a fascinatingly subtle mixture of ourselves and the world. Putting it crudely, the world as we can concretely perceive it with all its colors and sounds and tastes and so on is a fascinating mixture of ourselves and the world.

Now we have a pretty good theoretical structure for dealing with the physical aspects of objects and of physical aspects of persons but where science is still on the boundaries of investigation<sup>15</sup> is in *neurophysiology* and *perception*. I mean this is the next big

15 What Really Exists, track 12 (#13).

breakthrough, if this is to be broken through, this where all the action is now that molecular biology has been pretty well...big breakthroughs have been made there, now it has become standard science now, the big minds now are moving en masse into neurophysiology. Now as I said one of the \$64,000 questions in *neurophysiology* concerns the status of *sensation*, *sensory consciousness*, the relation of *sentiency* to *neurophysiological* processes. We hardly even have a glimmer yet at as to what kind of *categories* are appropriate for understanding this relationship.

Until we do, we should be very leery about dropping color talk and talk in terms of sensible qualities because if we referred to objects simply in terms of their primary qualities so to speak...in Lockean language...then we are *discarding* from our language the very basis in terms of which we talk about *sentiency* because we talk about sentiency how? In terms of the sensible qualities of physical objects. So as I said there is a kind of interesting mixture here at the commonsense level, part of which will be thrown out, you see, if you simply talk about object in terms of their physical<sub>2</sub> to characteristics, their characteristics which are talked about in microphysical theory. So this is one place where I would urge that it would be folly to drop the ordinary use of words for perceptible qualities in our observation language. I think therefore that this is the basic reason I give in the Scientific Realism paper for keeping a methodological distinction between the perceptual level of physical objects with their perceptible characteristics and the framework of theory.

I think it is useful, it is methodologically useful, to use this technique of, as it were, keeping an observation framework at arm's length, as it were, from our theory, the methodological reason is that this is a very rich framework and if you simply threw away at *adopted* this other one, you would be throwing away something that really formulated, that posed problems, because the problems pertaining to, as I said, *sentiency* ultimately arise from problems pertaining to the relation of perceivers to the physical objects that they look at, see, feel, taste and so on.

But my reason for accepting this methodologically, on the other hand, goes along with the *recognition* that in the last analysis, a theory is going to be correct and in principle, there will be a theory which does give an account of how sentiency is related to the

perceiver and to neurophysiological processes, we don't have it yet. But so until we have it, I think we should keep the domain of theory at arm's length. Of course this is a general philosophical point I'm making here because obviously there is no reason to keep people from using theoretically laden language in observation. I mean as I said there's no reason why clinicians shouldn't use their theory in responding perceptually to their patients or why physicists shouldn't look at bubble chambers or look at Wilson Chambers and so on and respond to them with the theoretical statements, the point is however that according to Feyerabend, they should not only do that but they should literally throw away the other. I want to suggest that for pragmatic reasons, you should use parts of the theory in observation by as a general methodological approach, do that only for practical reasons and keep a fairly tidy distinction, in terms of a theory of perception, keep a very fairly tidy distinction between the observation framework and the framework of theory. That was the argument, indeed, of the Scientific Realism paper.

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Finally. I was talking yesterday about the similarity of conceptual frameworks, one conceptual framework can contain items which function similarly to concepts in another conceptual framework. Furthermore, one conceptual framework can be a successor framework to another as for example Relativity mechanics is the successor framework to Newtonian mechanics.

Characteristic of the successor framework is that it explains why the preceding framework is incorrect, it explains why it leads to false observations, observations that are not confirmed. Furthermore, a good successor theory not only explains the flaws of its predecessor but it also explains why it works as well as it did. And that will be because, usually, it contains successor concepts, concepts which function interestingly like concepts in the older theory.

We can form the regulative ideal of a framework which is a successor framework to the framework that we have now but, for example, which does have a more adequate neurophysiology in it, which does solve problems posed by neurophysiological

observations and experiments. We can form the idea of a framework which stands to ours as one which explains why ours works as well as it does and which explains its shortcomings. Now this regulative ideal, I call the *Piercean Framework* from Charles Saunders Pierce, and after developing the idea of this regulative idea, I had compared our conceptual system,  $CS_{\text{ours}}$ , and this conceptual system,  $CS_p$ , and saw that this was Charles Sanders Peirce. And it was pure accident and I'm glad it worked out that way but we can imagine the conceptual system which stands to ours as a successor, and which explains why ours works as well it does, explains its shortcomings and of course a conceptual framework which, to say that it is a regulative ideal is to say that no questions arise which it can't cope with. Now of course this is always logically possible that more and more question should arise but we have the regulative ideal as one which so to speak arrives at a kind of stability so that there are no questions which can be generated, which it cannot resolve. I indicated, and this is going to be my concluding remark, that this regulative ideal defines what we mean by the phrase "*what really exists*" and defines what we mean by "*really true*." To say of a statement in our framework that it is really true is roughly to say that its successor in the ideal framework would be semantically assertable in accordance with the rules of that framework.

Well as I said four lectures is in one sense a long period of time and then in another it is a very short period of time. I've attempted to explain my strategies and fundamentally I've attempted to explain what I was up to in the two papers which you were asked to read: The "Theory of Categories" paper from "Experience an Theory" (edited by L. Foster and J. W. Swanson; Umass Press, 1970) and the "Scientific Realism or Irenic Instrumentalism" which is published in my book *Philosophical Perspectives*. I've tried in a way, particularly today, to clarify some of the rather terse things that are said in the Scientific Realism paper.

## Commemoration 1970

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### Lecture I

#### Physical Realism

This paper can be called “An Examination of the Double-Knowledge Approach to the Mind-Body Problem.” It seems only yesterday that I was writing an essay for another symposium on the living philosophy of Sellars. But yesterday can be a long time ago, when the living philosopher is Roy Wood Sellars and a glance at the printed page reminds me that it was, in fact, sixteen years ago that I wrote a essay on Physical Realism for the number of *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* devoted to his philosophy. Re-reading it the other day, I was struck by its flaws and ineptitudes as one always is with ideas which have escaped into the real world. I was almost moved to wish that I could do it over again. In a sense I have that opportunity. But although one can step into the same river twice, the river is never the same. When I wrote that essay, realism was almost as controversial a subject as it had been in the early years of the century, when the idealistic establishment was under attack by what must have seemed to be a revolutionary younger generation. Today the positivistic phenomenalism of the

1 Only the first of three lectures from The Commemoration is reproduced. The other two were not given by WS. As Sellars indicates, the lecture was later renamed and published. The lecture deviates in small but interesting ways from the published version.

period which bracketed WWII is almost as dead as the systems of Bradley, Bosanquet and their American counterparts, Creighton and Royce. Indeed, it is deader, for now that philosophy has gone “back to Kant” for the second time, can a Hegelian ‘trip’ be far behind?

The point I want to make is that Realism is very much the dominant epistemological standpoint today certainly as contrasted with Phenomenalism and Idealism. How ‘critical’ this realism is, is less clear. One might complain that it is unaware of its historical antecedents, and ask how philosophy can be truly critical if it lacks the perspective which, historians assure us, is essential if one is to avoid making old mistakes anew. There are, however, encouraging signs that the history of philosophy, even American philosophy, is beginning to re-assume its rightful place in the philosophical enterprise. However that may be, the primary reason for doubting that much contemporary realism is truly ‘critical’ is its largely noncontroversial status. It dominates by default. We are all realists largely because Phenomenalism and Idealism have come to seem absurd.

Now however interesting the task of unfolding the implicit, as a discussion of contemporary realism would be, it calls for a pattern of argument (citation, exegesis, and conjecture) which belongs in the library rather than in the conference room. I shall therefore leave contemporary realism to its dogmatic slumbers, and turn my attention to an issue which is as alive today as it was when my father began to wrestle with it in the early years of the century. And specifically to a position which is still enthusiastically affirmed by some and is vehemently denied by others as realism was first in the early decades of the century and then, again, under the guise of anti-phenomenalism, when I was writing my contribution to the previous symposium.

I am referring, of course, to the mind-body problem, and in particular to what might be called the consciousness-body problem. For, as my father has repeatedly emphasized, these are by no means the same, however intimately related they may be. One of the most striking features of the contemporary philosophical scene is the controversy over what is called the ‘identity theory’ of ‘the mental’ and ‘the physical,’ as well as the resurgence of the debate between Cartesians and anti-Cartesians, in between materialists and

anti-materialists. Metaphysics is indeed back with a vengeance—as well it might be after so many years of abuse.

Now my father ('RWS' I shall call him) has been both willing and not willing to classify himself as a materialist. For any such blanket term covers a spectrum of views ranging from the sophisticated to the absurd. Nor is the phrase 'identity theory' as perspicuous as one might wish. What is identical with what? Sometimes the claim seems to be that minds as enduring substantives are identical with certain enduring physical entities which are, for example, living human bodies; sometimes that mental happenings or events are identical with certain physical events of which the body is the subject. In either case puzzles abound.

In his 1938 paper "An Analytical Approach to the Mind Body Problem" which formulates the results of more than a quarter of a century of brooding on this topic, and is, in many respects, the best statement of his position, RWS points out that while his approach is "monistic," this term "does not get one very far. It does not really throw light upon the position taken to hunt around for some synonymous terms such as 'identity' or 'unity' . . ." "There is," he continues, "no substitute . . . for the analysis of the terms involved, and this . . . must rest upon deeper insights in science, and upon accompanying clarifications in epistemology and ontology."

Perhaps an Oxbridge-type analysis of common sense or ordinary language might yield the result that one and the same logical subject has both mental and physical attributes. But only in a contrived sense of the term could analysis, thus construed, countenance the statement that 'human minds' are identical with 'human bodies.' It's certainly absurd. It is worth noticing, therefore, that in characterizing his approach to the mind-body problem, my father explicitly rejects the simplistic formula: The human mind is identical with the human body.

He does however find it helpful to speak of the body as "minded," which suggests that we begin by thinking of minds as items which belong to the general category of physical objects, but have in addition the distinctive feature of being minded, i. e. having mental attributes. According to this picture, one and the same item would be both a physical object (qua having certain attributes) and a mind (qua certain other attributes). But although we can glimpse a Strawsonian structure in his initial description of "the



general character of [his] approach to the mind body problem," he soon makes it clear that his conception of 'analysis' includes a mobilizing of all relevant sources of knowledge, in this case all relevant sources of knowledge about bodies and minds. For RWS has always been an unabashed scientific realist. Indeed we find one of the early uses of this term in his first book *Critical Realism*, published in 1916. Thus he has no hesitation in identifying the physical object which, as having certain attributes, is a mind, with its counterpart in the conceptual framework of physical theory. To be sure, he nowhere agonizes over the sense in which common sense objects can be identified with systems of scientific objects. The situation, is rather, that once he had rejects Idealism, Phenomenalism, and Inspectional Realism, he sees no reason to reject the claim of science to give us evermore adequate accounts of what the physical world is like.

A mind, then, (and mind must not, of course, be equated with consciousness) is a physical system qua having certain attributes (abilities, capacities, propensities, etc.) which are appropriately characterized as 'mental.' But which are these? Before approaching this question, however, let us note that RWS picks out a certain sub-system within the physical system which is a human organism as conceived by theoretical science, namely the brain, and characterizes it—not implausibly—as the primary locus of mental attributes and events. To balance this, however, he repeatedly emphasizes that it is the organism as a whole which is the basic unit of purposive behavior. Yet, the brain plays a key role in organizing and controlling this behavior, and once this role is understood, and with all due respect to the organism as a whole, it is not misleading to construe this sub-system as the primary subject of mental attributes. Again this is no analysis, you might say, of the initial conceptual framework, this is, again, a sense of 'analysis' which is not to be identified with an explication of antecedently given bounded and tidy conceptual structures.

From this point of view, the mind is the brain (as conceived by theoretical science) qua, having attributes appropriately classified as 'mental,' but again we ask, which attributes are these? Here we must take a closer look at the conception of science which is built into this account. That the scientific picture in terms of which he resolves the mind-body problem is an idealized picture, a far ranging

extrapolation from the scientific results of his day is clear. What is more important is his contrast between the picture provided by those sciences which are 'externally' oriented, i.e. based upon perception (with or without the use of instruments)—and science which consists in the disciplined use of introspective techniques.

Thus it is time that we took into account his emphasis on the 'double knowledge' character of his solution. Actually, the phrase 'multiple knowledge' would be a more appropriate label, for he repeatedly distinguishes between different levels of knowledge both with respect to the physical world and with respect to self-knowledge. It is only by being clear about the nature, reach, and validity of these various levels of knowledge that, as he sees it, we can avoid the pitfalls which surround the mind-body problem; and he regards the key role played by his theory of knowledge in his resolution of traditional puzzles about the relation of the mental to the physical as a striking confirmation of its adequacy and truth.

I have already called attention to his distinction between the perceptual and the scientific levels of our knowledge of the external world, and to the manner in which his critical realism with respect to perceptual knowledge makes possible his wholehearted commitment to scientific realism. It is now important to note his distinction between three levels of knowledge concerning the mental:

first, the intuitive or inspectional knowledge of mental states and activities.

Second, the introspective knowledge of the dispositions, propensities, and traits of the enduring self, based upon this intuitive or inspectional knowledge.

And third, the knowledge of the mental states, activities, propensities, etc., which can be constructed by a behavioristic or physiological psychology methodologically oriented along the lines of animal psychology.

The first category includes our direct, non-inferential knowledge of our sensations, feelings, thoughts, and acts of will. The paradigm case seems to be that of feeling and sensation, which are

experienced as having qualitative character. The same he implies is true of conceptual activities "... feeling, knowing, willing are qualitatively given events," "Thinking as we experience it is qualitative." But while it is clear that our direct knowledge of our conceptual activities often involves an awareness of sensations and feelings, it is not clear that this is always the case, let alone that conceptual activity as such (as contrasted with its concomitants) is known as qualitative, certainly we might not speak of the conceptual activity as *experienced* unless elements of feeling and sensation were present. However this may be, the fundamental strategy does not require the qualitative givenness of conceptual activity as such. And indeed, his discussion concentrates on sensation and feeling.

Before starting to this argument, therefore, it should be noted that RWS distinguishes between feelings and sensations on the one hand, and our awareness of feelings and sensations, on the other; thus between a feeling of pain and the awareness of the feeling. The latter is an 'apperceptive' activity, presumably conceptual in character, which is distinguishable from, though intimately related to, the feeling of pain itself. This apperceptive awareness differs from external perception in that it is not mediated by an item other than the feeling itself. Whereas in vision, for example, the perception involves, in addition to the object perceived, a mediating item, i. e., the visual sensation. This distinction between the sensory state and apperceptive awareness of the state is clearly implied by the following passage in which a corresponding distinction is drawn between their physiological correlates:

A sense datum [by which he means a sensation, really, he is not committed to the view that sense data are particulars in the Moore-Russell sense] would have as its correlate a structured electro-chemical process in the visual center; the experience of being aware of the sense datum would have for its correlate the compresence of apperceptive processes with the visual correlate. (PPR, p. 441.)

But the distinction between "mental elements" and the apperception of "mental elements," and hence the possibility of unapperceived "mental elements," can also be found in Critical

Realism. Our apperceptive knowledge of our sensations and feelings, then, is not only direct in the sense in which perception is direct, but also unlike the latter, unmediated. On the other hand, our introspective knowledge of our abilities, propensities, attitudes, and traits of character is mediated by our direct experience of our sensations, feelings, and thoughts. Here, however, the mediation, unlike that involved in perception, seems to be, inferential although there need be no reflective activity such as is usually connoted by the term 'inference'. In such knowledge of enduring though short term traits of the self, the mediating states, known by inspection are, so to speak, samples of the very traits known. In knowing ourselves to be irascible, for example, the feelings of anger which might mediate this knowledge are—in a suitable sense—elements of the irascibility known. To use an expression which constantly recurs in RWS's writings: in such knowledge, we 'participate' in the object known. And if, as he argues, feelings and sensations are states of a physical system, in such knowledge, we participate in the very being of a physical system. You might say, a Cartesian could agree that in his sense we participate in the being of something, i.e., Cartesian minds. What he wants to emphasize, of course, is that in this case, since we are physical systems, since our sensations are states of a physical system, in this sense then, we participate in the very being of a physical system. It is this thesis which underlies the challenging statement "Careful introspection should disclose the mode of working of the brain." (PPR, 410)

To be contrasted with the introspective knowledge of mind which is based on the inspection of feelings, sensations, and thoughts, is the knowledge which can in principle be gained by "physiological psychology," i. e., by a psychology based on external perception. Thus, he writes,

... choice, preference, and reasoning must have analogues in the categories of physiology. Otherwise, dualism must needs appear. It is the naturalist's belief that an adequate empiricism will recognize the

validity of such categories to human behavior, and will seek to give them a physiological expression. . . . I take it that there must be a basic categorial parallelism between external knowledge of the organism and self-knowledge. (AA, p. 473.)

We thus find a distinction between two families of concepts pertaining to mind and behavior: (a) the family involved in introspective knowledge; (b) the family constructed by behavioristic or physiological psychology. The next move does not take us by surprise.

Why multiply entities, if the brain and the self have analogous abilities, and if epistemology indicates two kinds of knowledge having in all likelihood the same ultimate objectives” why not identify them? “Thus is it not possible that these two families of concepts give knowledge of the same attributes of the physical system which is the minded body with which we began?

If we are to answer ‘yes’ we must be careful to remember that the second family of concepts is, at least as far as the neurophysiology (or central state) theory of behavior patterns is concerned, scarcely more than a promissory note. If the fact that this promissory note conflicts with none of the rules and regulations of the banking system (i. e. with neither the methods nor the results of the epistemic enterprise as construed by Critical Realism), and is endorsed by a going concern which, according to all indications, will come up with the necessary cash, makes possible at least a partial explication of the identity thesis. I say ‘partial’ because it is a notoriously difficult problem to explain what it means to say that two systems of concepts of different origins can give knowledge of the same attributes. Yet I think that we have some intuitive understanding of what is meant, for the moment, at least, I shall rely on that.

But the above is not quite the move made by RWS. For his claim that in principle physiological psychology can give knowledge of the same attributes of the complex physical systems which are persons, as does disciplined introspection, is tempered by the claim, that science based on sense perception has a built-in limitation

which restricts its scope to *structural* attributes of physical systems. Thus, to fit his views, the above formulation must be modified to read as follows: The physical systems, which are the minded bodies of everyday life really are have two kinds of attributes: attributes pertaining to qualitative content, and attributes pertaining to structure. The concepts of introspective psychology give knowledge of both kinds of attributes, whereas the concepts of even an ideal physiological psychology would give knowledge only of the *latter* or structural kind.

. . . For the physiologist, the Cerebral patterns constitute the only mind he can deal with. (PPR, p. 431.)

The fact that this structural knowledge would be finer-grained, and, in a sense, more adequate than the structural knowledge given by the concepts of introspective psychology, would give it greater power as an instrument for explanation and prediction, but it would nevertheless be essentially *incomplete* in a way in which introspective psychology is not.

Thus we are repeatedly told that ‘external’ knowledge, knowledge based on sense perception, deciphers patterns and structure, but cannot reach to the qualitative content of physical systems. Particular, as we saw, physiology is limited to “cerebral patterns.” It must be “enlarged ” or “supplemented.” He agrees with Whitehead, in the *Philosophy of Physical Realism* (page 412) that existence cannot be “vacuous.” Or, as he elsewhere puts it, “. . . being must have content.” “And the external knowledge of perceptually based science cannot reach to the content.”

On the other hand, he rejects Whitehead’s equation of ‘qualitative content’ with ‘feeling.’ Feeling, sensations, and, it would seem, thoughts are just special cases of content, cases which are associated with the complex neurophysiological structures which are involved in the perceptual responses and purposive behavior of living organisms. It makes little sense to suppose that feeling exists at the level of isolated micro-physical particles. The latter must have

content, to be sure, but what explanatory purpose does it serve to postulate that this content has the specific character of feeling?

Thus only in awareness of feelings, sensations, and the like, do we encounter qualitative content. But this is not all, as we have seen, for not only is this the only place where we encounter it, it is the only source of determinate concepts of content. Thus, although we know (somehow) that every being must have a qualitative content of *some* determinate nature, we have no way of knowing what this determinate content might be save in the case of beings sufficiently like ourselves for there to be some point to reasoning by analogy.

Now if the term 'consciousness' is used as a collective term for such items as sensations, feelings, etc., we can say that in consciousness we find the qualitative dimension of the being of a physical system. Sometimes, however, the term 'consciousness' is used for this qualitative dimension itself, as when RWS writes,

Consciousness is a qualitative dimension of the existential content of a highly evolved physical system. (PPR, p. 424.)

To be sure, we also find pattern or structure in feelings and sensation. But whereas the pattern or structure can also exist in the objects of perception, so that we can say that our knowledge of pattern is, in a sense, participative (PPR, p. 431), our knowledge of content is participative in the extended sense only with respect to 'beings akin to ourselves.' And even here, he brings into account the problem of the inverted spectrum so that although we can know generically what the content might be, we don't know that we have exactly the same content in similar circumstances.

Furthermore, even with respect to ourselves our knowledge of content is not exhaustive.

We can participate in nature only where our organism is concerned, and here only to the extent that neural events are actually conscious events. (PPR, p. 413.)

Our feelings and sensations are irreducible states of a complex neurophysiological system, and do not consist (as Durant Drake

seems to have thought) of the qualitative content of the elements of the system. Here the concept of emergence shows its relevance. At the beginning of the *Analytical Approach to the Mind-Body Problem* RWS gives as the full title of this solution, the “double-knowledge and emergence solution of the mind-body problem.” Thus, according to evolutionary naturalism, physical systems of certain structures have properties which are not found in less complex systems, properties which do not require the postulation of controlling psychoids or entelechies.

Now, in part this means that certain complex systems exhibit uniformities as systems in their behavior, and in their interactions with other systems, which uniformities are ‘novel’ in the sense that they are not found at simpler levels of complexity. We can speak here of “levels of causality.” Examples would be the behaviors characteristic of RNA and DNA in suitable media.

Yet there is a deeper and more puzzling sense in which we can speak of emergence. For although the causal properties characteristic of RNA and DNA are associated with a complex biochemical structure, nevertheless it seems proper to say that the fundamental concepts in terms of which these systems are defined do not go beyond those necessary to define less complex biochemical structures. When, however, we come to sentient organisms, it seems that we must attribute to them properties (e. g., feeling pain, being ticklish) which are not definable in terms of the basic concepts of a biochemical theory necessary and sufficient to describe less complex structures.

Now here, of course, we must be careful to avoid certain terminological hang-ups. For if we count as a biochemical concept any concept necessary to the scientific description of some biochemical system or other—some system of biochemical objects—then we could perfectly well say, and indeed would be required to say that ‘feels pain’ is a ‘biochemical’ concept because it is attributable to a biochemical system. The fact would remain, nevertheless, that it would be a biochemical concept which was not definable in terms of those which are necessary and sufficient for the description of



less complex biochemical systems of which sentiency can reasonably be denied.

This gives us a new sense in which we can speak of an emergent property. ‘Feels pain’ would be an emergent in the sense that it not only does not characterize less complex systems (because this is true also of, say, the causal properties of RNA and DNA), but it is furthermore not definable in terms of properties which characterize less complex systems.

The same considerations which led us to say that ‘feels pain’ might be appropriately called a biochemical property, a property of biochemical systems, would count in favor of characterizing it as a physical property. For unless we so restrict the term ‘physical’ so that a property does not count as *physical* unless it can be defined in terms of the properties of inorganic physical systems, there is no reason why such a property of a physical system such as sentiency, for example, feeling pain, should not be called a physical property? It is this extended use of the term ‘physical’ which makes possible the idea that consciousness and, indeed, mental states generally, are physical. The identity thesis involves an enrichment of our concept of the physical—not, as is often thought, an impoverishment of the concept of the mental. It is the framework of evolutionary naturalism, then, which is mobilized by the claim that “consciousness is a qualitative dimension of the existential content of a highly evolved physical system.”

Now there are many difficulties to be overcome in fleshing out this interpretation of consciousness. I am, however, convinced that it is fundamentally correct. Yet I have some reservations about the compatibility of this ontological thesis with the limitations placed upon it by RWS upon external science in his specific form of the double-knowledge approach.

My uneasiness is related to the traditional challenge: is not materialism committed to epiphenomenalism?

But before pressing this issue, let me first raise some preliminary questions. It will be remembered that RWS speaks of his position as in “the family line of the double-aspect and identity tradition.” (AA, p. 463.) Thus the question arises: Is a sensation an

event ? Or is it an *aspect* of an event, but not itself an event? It is not immediately clear how these questions are to be answered. When he speaks of consciousness, he tends to say that “consciousness is not a physical event, but a feature of a physical event.” (PPR, p. 424) On the other hand, he does on occasion speak of sensations as events, and when he writes that

... the content of perception [is] a qualitative event intrinsic to [a brain event]. (PPR, p. 420.)

he suggests that sensations are events which are in some sense elements of brain events. He also writes :

Sensa [i.e., sensations] are qualitative events permeating and one with mind-brain events. (PPR, p. 432.)

In any case, it is clear that he rejects the view, characteristic of parallelism and interactionism, that brain events and sensations are events neither of which is a part of the other. I suspect that when it is denied that consciousness is an event, the term is being used not as a collective term for sensations, feelings, and the like, but as a generic term for the qualitative character of the various kinds of sensations and feelings.

Now if sensations are events, why should they not be causes? To be sure, as he points out, they are not causes in the sense in which ‘things’ or ‘substances’ are causes. But, then, even when a substance is a cause, it is so by virtue of participating in an event. The cow causes a wreck by getting on the track when the train is coming. But perhaps when RWS is tempted to deny that sensations are events and perhaps to say that they are features of physical events, he is telling us that our pre-scientific concept of a sensation is indeed that of an event but an event which we conceive of simply in terms of its having a certain sensible color for example and shape as a qualitative feature. If so, a sensation would be an event, but one which, if speculative neurophysiology is taken into account, is seen to be incompletely specified, i. e., specified in terms of only one of its aspects—the other aspect being that which concerns its electrochemical, say, properties. Now I take it that something like this is

the view he wishes to defend. According to it, then, a visual sensation is an event, and hence a possible cause. But to specify its causal role, one would have to bring into the picture its 'structural' aspect as an electro-chemical' event in the visual center.

In these terms, my uneasiness can be put as follows: What are we to make of the following passages?

It is my considered. opinion that physical science, that is, science which deciphers nature in terms of the revelatory capacity of sense data, must ignore consciousness altogether. (PPR, p. 421.)

or again,

... Does consciousness have a causal significance? That is the ultimate problem which, I think, people have in mind ... My answer has *always* been that [notice before he had said that it was his considered opinion but now he says 'has always been that'] it can have no causal significance for science, science is always dealing with the brain-mind and its states as physical events. Consciousness is not an independent event, but a feature of a physical event. (PPR, p. 424.)

He also says that consciousness is not a "fact" for animal psychology but this might be taken to mean, *today*, it is not a fact and that would leave open the possibility that it might some day be a fact. But these other passages are much more a matter of principle.

To take the second passage first. Consider the following parallel claim: The shape involved in a physical event can have no causal significance, for the shape is not a physical event, but a feature of a physical event.

Surely, however, the shape involved in a physical event can have causal significance (i. e., make a difference to the effect, it can be referred to in a characterization of the causality involved), even though the shape is not a physical event but a feature of a physical event. Why, then, could not consciousness have causal signifi-

cance? And if it does have causal significance (i. e., makes a difference to the behavior of a physical system), why could not this significance—and this is the point I want to make—be captured by a sufficiently subtle theory of neurophysiological structures? RWS might reply that neurophysiological theory can postulate structure, but not quality. But why not? Why could not concepts of sensible redness, etc., be introduced into a theory of the functioning of the visual cortex as concepts of certain qualitative content which perform specific roles in the economy of the visual system centers, and in the discriminative responses of the organism which they make possible?

Notice that after expressing his “considered opinion” that “physical science . . . must ignore consciousness altogether” he goes on to write, “. . . all it can say is that the content of being must be such as to have the structure and behavior deciphered.” (PPR, p. 421) But is this not to admit that the qualitative dimension of the brain state *can* be specifically characterized in terms of its explanatory role in the theory of the functioning of the sensory centers of the cortex? However can even structural ‘or relational’ attributes be characterized by physical theory? Of course, there is a place for skepticism regarding the practical achievability of a theory which finds a place for concepts which would be the counterparts of the color concepts of introspective psychology. But this practical skepticism must not be confused with the impossibility *in principle* of such a theory.

In his 1922 paper on “The Double-Knowledge Approach to the Mind-Body Problem,” This practical skepticism about the reach of external science find expression in the following passage:

My thesis is that mental operations are operations of the brain . . . I doubt that nervous anatomy and physiology can throw much light on these delicate operations. I would say that it was more a matter of biochemistry. And while I affirm a correspondence between the change of intervening cerebral patterns

and the mental operations, I doubt that our knowledge will ever be penetrative enough to trace it out.

That is, of course, the sort of practical skepticism. He continues, however, by expressing skepticism in principle with respect to external science.

Valid as scientific knowledge is, it can never be identical with participation . . . what I have called the “content of being” eludes physical science, for its knowledge is never an intuition.

Now one can agree that it’s knowledge is never an intuition but still grant the qualitative content of being doesn’t escape it because it may come in, in the theoretical dimension. Once again, however, the material for correcting this skepticism is provided. Thus in the concluding paragraph of the “Double Knowledge Approach to the Mind-Body problem,” (Aristotelian Society, 1922) he writes :

A psychical content is used by the apperceptive and controlling cerebral system as a warning and as a guiding sign. And this is possible because these quales can be brought within the purview of the active system ... in brief, the guidance which we are aware of in consciousness is, at the [very] same time, the guidance of the cerebral system of which consciousness is the qualitative dimension. Here and here alone we participate in the process of real causality.

He adds,

Because the cerebral background is hidden, this participation is but partial.

Yet, surely, if the qualitative dimension makes, as indicated, a difference to behavior, the difference can, in principle, *be captured* by a sufficiently sensitive scientific investigation, and the qualitative dimension conceived as one that makes just this difference. To conceive of the qualitative dimension in this way is not, of course, to conceive it adequately, if our criterion of adequacy for a concept

of a sensory quality is that it function in intuitive knowledge. But could not such theoretical concepts, as elements in a sophisticated theory, yield in their *own* way, the *way of theory*, knowledge of a qualitative dimension of which we also have intuitive knowledge by concepts formed at the introspective level of knowledge? In this case, the two modes of knowledge would have the same reach; and the idea that one must be supplemented in its reach by the other, abandoned. The difference between the theoretical and the intuitive modes of knowledge would, of course, remain.

## Perceiving and Perception 1973

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### Husserl's Framework

#### The Metaphysics of Perception

Idealism with respect to perceptual or physical objects maintains the thesis that their primary being is in being perceived or in terms of a classical phrase, their *esse est percipi* together with the fact that they would be perceived if certain conditions were realized and other kinds of additional qualifications. But the primary mode of being of physical objects—according to idealism—consists in their being perceived. Now what I'm concerned with is the question, "What might this mean?" and "Is there a good reason to accept it?", not necessarily a conclusive reason to accept it but is there a *good* reason to accept. Is it a position which is defensible and one which springs clearly and distinctly to the eyes once one sees what the issues are. In order to develop idealism with respect to physical objects and, to develop an approach to it, I want to present certain rather familiar framework categories in terms of which the problem can be discussed. This framework is going to be very familiar to some of you and less familiar to others. But I think that in order to make the points that I am primarily concerned to make, I need to lay

in front of you a common framework so that we can then carry on a discussion together.

The framework that I want to present is essentially that of Husserl but I'm not going to present it in the spirit of Husserl exegesis because after all the framework that Husserl developed was itself well rooted in the philosophical tradition and belonged to the perennial tradition in philosophy.

I want to start by discussing intentional acts. The intentional acts that I'm concerned with can be also called *thoughts*, thoughts in an *occurrent* sense, thoughts as episodes, thoughts—not as actions but as actualities. A thought would be an *energeia*, as opposed to a *dunamis*, in the Aristotelian tradition. It is an oc-




Figure 1 A pure act and a twinge

current and I want you to think of it then in the classical, almost Cartesian sense, of a mind and a mental act, *figure 1*. An act which is in some sense a *pure* act. I like to take as my example of a pure act, a feeling of pain, a twinge you see, there is nothing “iffy” about a twinge, a twinge doesn’t consist in it being the case that if something were to happen then something else would happen, a pain is there in all its startling, lightning-like brilliancy all at once, so to speak.<sup>1</sup> I want you to think of a mental act in these terms. I am going on in my second lecture to be examining criti-

1 A parallel discussion appears in ME, 110.



cally the framework of Husserl and in a way, transposing it into a somewhat different key, but for my purposes this evening I'm going to be more orthodox than the orthodox, you might say.

What we have here, then, is the notion of a thought *of* something and a thought can be of many kinds of things. It can be of a physical objects, a thought can of or about a mathematical object, about a person, about an action, an event and so on. And what we are reflecting on to start with is what it is for a thought to be about some object or other. We will develop a framework, a familiar framework, in terms of which an answer has been given to this kind of question.

Consider for example one model that we might use. Granting that there are thoughts, mental events which have "aboutness," we might use the relational model. In *figure 2*, for example is President Nixon and we might then think that a thought might be about President Nixon by virtue of some relationship between the act and the president.

We might think for example of the beautiful weather tonight, well here is beautiful weather tonight—looking at very abstractly— and here is somebody thinking about the beautiful weather tonight. There might be a relation between the thought, the act, and the beautiful weather. Of course as you know, since the time of Plato, there is the classical puzzle of how can we construe thinking on the relational model, how can we construe *aboutness* on our




Figure 2 A relation between (a) a mental act and the president.

relational model, in the case of nonexistent objects. Thus, for example to take the classic case, here's in *figure 3* is a thought about Pegasus and the thought reaches out there desperately like that Canadian Mounty but there is no Pegasus to be gotten you see, and it seems to be a basic principle about relations that a relation cannot exist unless the terms exist. It doesn't mean that they




Figure 3 The mind reaches out desperately.

have to be simultaneously, we have to take into account a broader sense of “exist” in terms of which something exists if it did exist, does exist, or will exist. So in the sense in which we are using the term, Socrates exists in the sense that he did exist, does exist or will exist. The simplest answer, then, that was hit upon to this problem was to provide a special object for those thoughts which cause trouble, we have a special kind of object and we have, for example, an object which is the Pegasus idea, *figure 4*.

We would have an object which is the Pegasus idea. The thought can be related to the Pegasus idea, it can have that as its object because a thought surely has to be about *something*. If there happens to be no Pegasus that




Figure 4 P<sub>1</sub> The Pegasus idea.

merely means that there's nothing which realizes that idea, nothing which corresponds to it in some special sense of "correspond," nothing which stands as its transcendental object. We might start introducing a term, we have the notion of an immanent object, an immanent object and a transcendent object and the idea would be that in the case of some thoughts there is both an immanent object and a transcendent object. Here, *figure 5*, would be Mr. Nixon as an immanent object by virtue of the fact that this mind is thinking of it and corresponding to that there would be the actual Nixon. In case Pegasus there would be the Pegasus idea, Pegasus having existence in some sense *in* the thought and a metaphor that was used here was as you know, that of *content*. And so we would have the Pegasus idea existing as the content of the thought and something corresponding to it in the case of, let's suppose somebody thinks that it is bad weather, they are thinking about the bad weather tonight but there is no such thing tonight as the bad weather tonight but there would still be that immanent object which was the bad-weather-tonight idea so to speak and the thought therefore could have an object. So a move was made to provide the hapless thoughts with objects.

Now this clearly is a very crude move because reflection tells us




Figure 5 A transcendent object, a person, and (a) an immanent object.

right away that two people can think about Pegasus. Two people can think about the bad weather tonight, and so we tend then to get a different picture coming in which is the one that I am going to be working with. There would be a domain which is public, it is objective in this sense of being intersubjective and this is the key notion the phenomenological tradition, the notion of *intersubjectivity*. We are not going to commit ourselves to the *ultimate* ontological status or reality of these object, we are simply going to call them “intentables.” Or




Figure 6 (a) intersubjective domain. (b) public domain. (c) thinking.

they can be called “thinkables” or “conceivables” but I’ll call them “intendables” because tonight I’m going to be concerned with a very special subclass of intendables and therefore do not need to discuss the structure of this realm of intendables, or as they might also be called “intentional objects.” But the important thing about them is that they are public as I said. Here for example would be the Pegasus *intention*, Pegasus *qua* intendable, *qua* intentional object, *figure 6 (a)*. Here would be (c) an act of thinking about Pegasus and then we could have a relation of *intending* or call the relation some

kind of *nexus* or *tie* or whatever. Something or other that binds this thinking to let's say, to the Pegasus idea, the Pegasus intention and so on. Here is somebody else. If this is Jones, this is Mr. Smith on the right here can also have an act of thought which intends that particular intention. And in the case of the good weather tonight, here is an act of thought which intends that and in this case here we have it realized in the world, we have the notion of that which realizes. So instead of a simple correspondence between an idea in the mind and reality, what really exists, we have a relationship of *realizing*. And, for example, if this is the Nixon idea, there would be that in the domain of "realizers" that which realizes this intentional object. So that we have a system which allows for intersubjectivity of intentional objects and then a kind of "objectivity" as opposed to *mere* subjectivity and yet withholds the question as to what their ultimate status is and furthermore, enables us to consider "intentions" in abstraction from whether or not they are realized. This turns out to be a crucial feature of the idealistic problem as seen, for example, by Husserl.

There are all kinds of intendables here and, as I said, I am going to be concerned in the course of these lectures with the general problem of the status of intentions and intendables, intentional objects or in general of intentionality.

This is the general framework that I am going to be operating with and I want to apply it specifically to the case of perception. But before I take up the specific case of perception. I want to put a little more commentary on this model here. I have spoken of a mental act and this act is, as I said, not an action for which one is responsible—one can be responsible for thoughts but all one is responsible for is thinking about a problem: that is something one can "set out" to do, an action is something that you can set out to do. Sometimes thoughts just occur to you and one of the important things about perceptual thoughts is that they occur to you willy-nilly even though you prepare yourself for them, when they come, they come

by virtue of the fact that you are there with your eyes open and your powers of vision.

A mental act will be of a certain kind. It will be a hoping, a wishing, a desiring...once can run through a whole list of kinds of mental acts; this is a traditional view that we have different kinds of mental acts which, in some sense, could have the same content. I am going to be exploring this idea later on as to whether you could have two mental acts which differed in kind but in some sense literally had the same content but I am going to assume that this is true. Now the second idea about a mental act is that it has a specific character. It might be, let's say, a wishing, and the specific character is going to be that feature of the act by virtue of which it picks out a certain intentional object. So that the mental act our pick out the intentional object "Nixon" by virtue of having a certain specific character, if it had a different character it would pick out some other *intendable*. As you vary the specific character of the act, you vary what the act




Figure 7 (a) The facing surface. (b) The book and the thought there is a book on the table.

intends.

What can we say about this character? Actually, there is not much we can say about it except to say that it is that character by virtue of which it has some certain intentional object. It is a kind of unilluminating way but that seems to be about all that we can say and I will explain why that is in my discussion of intentionality in general in the next lecture. But I want to mention this specific character to call attention to the fact, particularly, that if you are thinking, for example, of a triangle, there must be some character of the

act by virtue of which it intends a triangular and yet, obviously, that character is not going to be that of being triangular because, presumably, the last thing that a mental act could be is triangular or to have a shape or to be spatial.

So much for the general framework. I want to turn now to the general problem of perception and then to zero in on what I regard as certain key issues pertaining to the role of intentionality in perception.

As I pointed out before, we often use the word “thinking” to cover a whole range of items from problem-solving, questioning-answering, to simply thinking of something without thinking of anything particular about it, believing, it also covers taking for granted—the kind that cover the following: supposing for example that you were walking down the street and somebody ahead of you is about the height of your friend Jones, walks about the same way your friend Jones does, you might sit down on the sidewalk and ponder the evidence: this evidence points to its being Jones, that evidence counts against it...probably it is my friend Jones. I will go up to him and say “hello!” That is not, of course, what we do. What we do is we rush up, we *take for granted* that it is Jones, and we slap him on the back and of course it invariably turns out to be Smith. Now that is an example of thinking, mind you, the word “thinking” can stretched in such a way that we can say that in that particular context, in this framework, a certain mental act occurred which however was of a special kind if you will, a *taking* something to be the case, a thinking without question, as H.A. Prichard put it, that something is the case. Thus we can distinguish between, in the case vision, between *observing*, and seeing. Observing is an activity which is we performed carefully, carelessly and so on but “observing” is putting yourself in a position to see and, our problem is not with observing

but what it is to see, what is the role of intentionality in *seeing*?

For example, one might find in the case of a person who is confronted by a book (*figure 7*). Here's the book, and obviously his eyes are open and, he's tuned in, he's interested, alert, he is receptive. We might then think of this book as in some sense generating the judgment, the judgment that there is a book over there.

There would be a mental act that intends the intendable "there being a book over there." And it would have the character by virtue of which this intends that. And we might also say that this is accompanied by some sensory phenomena, sensations, visual sensations or sense impressions but we might think of the thinking involved in perception as essentially being of this form here, "there is a book over there," "there is a book on the table" and so on. This is, I think, a very dangerous and misleading model and I hope to show you what more effective models can be used to replace it.

## Sees

But now I want to concentrate on now are going to be thoughts of the kind, cases where a person, let's say Jones, *sees* a book. I'm not going to be concerned with *seeing that* a book is over there. I am going to be concerned with the notion of *seeing* a book and ask in what way is intentionality involved here.

First of all, as we ordinarily use the expression, "Jones sees a book," we do not commit ourselves to the idea that he sees it *as* a book. I mean it makes perfectly good sense to say that Jones saw the bush but took it to be a bear, he saw the bush but not *as* a bush, what I'm concerned with is seeing something *as* something because here is where we



begin to zero in on the specific role of intentionality. Let's concern ourselves with "Jones sees a book" where it is understood that he sees it *as* a book. Now seeing a book as a book is a notion that is highly endowed with overtones of success, after all, one could have a hallucination of the book as a book, a misperception of the book as a book, so I'm not emphasizing the *success* aspect here but what I'm emphasizing this visual experience of a book as a book, abstracting for the time being from the question as to whether or not there really is a book there or in what sense there is a book there.

Let's begin by retreating a bit. I called attention to the fact that I was rejecting this kind of intentionality, there being a book over there, and was going back to an intentionality which would be represented in language by a substantive expression such as "a book." I'm interested in the case, also of where we have a *demonstrative* element in other words, the characteristic feature we have in "there being a book over there," in logician's expression, a kind of existential operator here and so on. I want a good heart warming demonstrative. I want a case where if Jones were to verbalize he would say, "that is mine!" We want to have an intentionality which we represent as "that is mine!" I'm interested in the "that" and the "this" because I want a mental act which would be the sort that is the appropriately expressed by a demonstrative expression. And one might then say that what we had here in the case of seeing, leading aside for the moment the sensory element, and concentrating on the intentional aspect, that we would have the notion of an intending. An intending which simply picked out the intendable which we can represent by the word 'this'.

One interesting feature of the domain of intendables is that some of them are completely unproblematic in the

sense that they are the same for all circumstances, the same for all persons. Like one can intend mathematical truth that  $2+2=4$ , but there are other intendables like “I.” One can think about oneself, one can attend oneself, one can pick oneself out in thought. Here is an intending which is an intending of oneself. This is an interesting intendable because it really represents family of




Figure 8 (a) The subject which is intended in and taken for granted (b) The predicate we might go on to make.

intendables, as Hegel pointed out, demonstratives are, in a certain sense, universals. Hegel didn't quite know how to cope with it but he did point out this very interesting feature of this type of conceptual object, this object of thought. I just note then that I'm cognizant of this special kind of multiplicity that is involved, which is represented simply by a single dot here but you have to understand that it is context dependent. Obviously then what one is intending by a thought of “this” is going to be a function of the circumstances and what one is intending by the thought ‘I’ is obviously going to be a function of the fact that it is oneself that one is intending.

Now I am not concerned so much with the ‘I’ but with ‘this’. So here it is: ‘this’. It might be thought that in perception, one has a certain physiological state brought about by

physiological disturbances and so on, and with intermediate processes which we will look at, then there occurs an act of intending the intendable “this” in an appropriate context and then, the rest of the act goes on simply to judge something about it, to predicates something of it. So this would intend, this is mine, or this is a book, or this is the object that I lost yesterday and so on. There is temptation to look at the intention involved in the perceptual situation in terms of a demonstrative element that, as it were, picked out a certain object and the rest of the thought goes on to predicate something of the object.

It seems to me clear that what is seen in perception is not a bear *this* or *that* which is simply judged to be of a certain character. As I indicated before, what is seen is something that is grasped by means of a demonstrative phrase. For example *this-red-book*. Here, (in *figure 8*) would be the demonstrative, the mental act *qua* picking out this intendable, *this-red-book*, and then supposing there to be a red book there, we can fill out the diagram as follow, in point of fact in front of me we’ll suppose it is a red book and so then I am led to intend *this-red-book*. This intention is realized here, where schematically, we would have something which realizes that intention and then we might go on to predicate, in the thought, something of this red book, something which is also realized in, as it were, the domain of transcendant objects, of what really is. And not what is simply there as an object of thought.

Now I think this is the first step in the correct account of perception, the first step. Notice that this account gives flesh and blood to the idea that when we are perceiving this red book, imagine yourself in that position, or consider Jones too who is perceiving this red book. The idea is that it is perceived *as* a red book because the thought intends it *as* not just *this* but as *this-red-book*, so that we

have here the object being intended as a red book, this is in the *very content*, ((a) *figure 8*), of the intention. That is the basic framework that I have set up, this is the point of departure for the key points that I wish to make in the course of this lecture.

### Phenomenological Reduction

The next step is to genuflect in the direction of phenomenological reduction. Or, putting it differently, to work our way back to the common and proper sensibles and things of that kind. In other words, after all, when one sees a book, sees a red book, he sees the book. In this case, *figure 8*, the person is seeing the book, and he sees a book, not part of a book. Well let me put it this way, he doesn't *only* see part of the book, he sees a book. Now obviously he does not see all of this book, none of you are seeing all of this book, so that there is a lot of this book that you don't see. And yet you see a book and not *just* a part of the book. Now furthermore, notice that you see that the book is white. Not only do you see *that* the book is white but it is important to note that in a certain sense you *see* its *whiteness*.

And as I was emphasizing a moment ago, there is much of this book that you not see. You do see its whiteness or more accurately, you see the whiteness of the back cover. Now this is something that is up for analysis of course but there is a sense in which you see the whiteness of the back in which you don't see much of the book, as a matter of fact if you reflect on it you don't see the *bookness* of the book, and this is a point that Aristotle made and that you're all familiar and I'm just mobilizing it here, I am pulling agreement out of you so that we can get on with

the work of “supposing it to be so, what are you going to do with it?”

Now we brought the distinction, with Aristotle, between what we in some tough sense see of the book and what in some weaker sense we see of the book. We see that it is a book but we don’t see its bookness, because this bookness is a highly functional notion which isn’t the sort of thing when you come right down to it that can be seen. You are all familiar with the fact for example that you can see somebody strike out on a low curve. Well what of the strikeout do you see?

Do you see its “strikeout-icy”? There is a certain sense in which being a strikeout, the character of it, is a highly functional notion involving the rules of baseball etc., etc.. So I think we can have a plausible distinction here between what we see *of* the book and nevertheless grant that we do see the book and therefore that one can see the book as a red book without seeing many aspects of it. Certain features of it are perceptible in what I’m calling a hard sense.

At this point, I want to make use of a well-worn example, which I have found very useful and which will enable me to make, I think, some interesting points.

### **The pink cube**

I’m going to take my old example of a pink ice cube. An old friend. Now this pink ice cube which I have been preserving and have been carrying around here. Most objects are opaque. You can’t see through them. The important thing about this pink ice cube is that it is displaying itself, its whole inner being to you, there it is! Its hiding nothing from you and I would and I would claim that it is

literally hiding nothing from you. And that is very important. I want you to think now in terms of what I call the manifest image, namely the world as it is in terms of perception, in perceptual terms. I want you to think of color, not in terms of the category of substance and quality, I want you to think of color in *Presocratic* terms, back before all those mistakes were made, it is a very fashionable thing to go back to the pre-Socratics. Let's go back to the Presocratics for a moment and let's go *really* back to them,




Figure 9 The intentional object.

because they were already corrupted, you have to get back to the pre-presocratics, before you are quite ready to tune in on the conception of the world that we have here.

I want you to think of the objects around you as three-dimensional solid conglomerations of color, they are *made* of color, I want you think of color as the very *stuff* of which they. This is not the normal way of thinking about objects, we think of them in lots of funny ways but we don't think of them as made of color, of color as actually being a stuff. The nice thing about this pink ice cube is that if you take the example seriously you begin to think of pink as a stuff. It's a cubicle chunk, if you will, of pink. Of course, associated with this cubicle chunk of pink, are many causal properties. But I'm not interested in those causal properties right now because somehow or other the causal properties are not strictly speaking perceived. So that if we look now for our object of perception proper, it looks

as though a paradigm case is going to be a cubical chunk of pink, and let it be so.

Okay, work with that anyway. It is not a chunk of earth or air or fire or water, by golly it's a cubicle chunk of pink!

Now from this standpoint then, a basic perception would have, the act of intending, would have as its intentional object something that represents this-cube-of-pink. And you can see already that it would be misleading simply to call it "a pink cube" because as we ordinarily use the words 'pink book' it merely means pink at the surface. Therefore it is important to use cube-of-pink. If occasionally I lapse into calling it a pink cube, remember I really want to "say cube-of-pink." So then we have the act of intending this-cube-of-pink, and then we might go on to say this cube-of-pink is mine, we might have another word, we might think, the total thought might be this cube of pink is mine or this cube a pink is cold, or this cube of pink is made of ice and so on but what I'm focusing attention on now is this demonstrative intention here which is the intentional object of this basic perceptual act and I want you to take this then as a model for a basic perceptual act. It provides us with the subjects of perceptual judgment where the subjects of perceptual judgment are no mere thises but are already this-suches—to use the Aristotelian terminology. A cube-of-pink is a this-such in a way already and it is something which is intended *as* being of a certain sort, namely a cube of pink.

I've been focusing attention on what I've been calling the thought involved in the perceptual experience. What I want to do now is to go from a different direction and get a collision, sketch out a collision course and pose a problem.

Thus far I have been speaking of the perception as involving an intending which constitutes being aware, thinking of something as this-cube-of-pink, and therefore as a cube and as pink, as made of pink. And of course, pink cubes actually exist and there is in the physical world something which realizes that intention in that context. So here would be a case where one perceives something, one is intending something which in point of fact exists, I'm asking us to assume for the time being that there actually are such things as the pink cubes which our pre-presocratics think there are. So that there really is something that is pink in the aesthetically interesting sense, and cubical in the literal sense of sculptures.

There is another line of thought that comes in here according to which, it starts with a premise that after all, this cube of pink can look gray in abnormal circumstances. And it in certain abnormal circumstances it would look gray if we change the elimination so we have something out here which actually its pink and in normal circumstances it is experienced as pink but it can look to be of another color, a cube of gray, it can look to be other than cubicle, it can look to have a trapezoidal kind of shape. The argument now is a familiar one. It is the argument traditionally offered for sense data, it is the so-called sense datum inference. But now I'm assuming that we are not taken in by the act-object structure here, sense impression of a pink cube, and I am going to assume that what we can argue to is for the occurrence in a state of the perceiver in normal




Figure 10 (a) The evoking of the taking.  
(c) The taking, the intending. The sensation or sense impression.



conditions—this is a pink cube—in normal conditions will be a sense impression of a pink cube. We have the sense impression of a cube of pink, so that the sense impression of a cube of pink is a sort of state of a person which is brought about in standard conditions by a pink cube and in abnormal circumstances by, perhaps, a cube of ice on which a pink light is being played etc.. We have a sort of standard theory except that we are treating sense impressions in terms of an unanalyzed expression, sense impression of a cube of pink, we are explaining it as a kind of state of the perceiver which is brought about in different circumstances by different kinds of processes.

The first thing to note is, this is clear from the whole function of the sense datum inference, which is now a sense impression inference, that the point of a sense impression is to be something real... It is not to be something merely intending a state of affairs or an object, it is to be something that *actually exists* as a state of a person and it is in some sense a cube of pink. But it is not a physical cube of pink. It is almost a category mistake to say it, but *somehow* it is a state of a person that is somehow *really* pink and cubical. As I said that is a paradox and I'm going to leave it at that. What I want to do is discuss the way in which the sense impression and the intention might function together. I'm going along with the sense datum inference to the extent that I'm now bringing in a sense impression of a pink cube and I'm saying that the sense impression is brought in to be *something* that is *somehow genuinely* pink and cubical without explaining how it can be that and still be a state of a person. And indeed a state of the mind. Here in the *figure 10* is a state of the mind which is in some paradoxical sense genuinely—by 'genuinely' I mean in the sense that it belongs to the real order, it belongs not to the domain of intentions or objects that

might or might not exist, objects that exist as intended, but it belongs to the real order. So we have a contrast here between the intending of this cube a pink and the sense impression of a cube of pink. What theories can we hold here? How are they related? Well, the first theory says, “well, they’re obviously very intimately related and they are intimately related because of the following features. In the first place, the sense impression of the pink cube is what, giving your perceptual set, triggers off the thought, this cube of pink, this cube is mine, this cube of pink is made of ice, this cube of pink is cold and so on. So that given the perceptual set, the sense impression can be said to be the cause, in that circumstance, of the intending.” Here’s the intending, the mental act. We can speak of a causal relationship here. The first answer is, “well, that there is at least the causal relation, (a), between the sense impression and the intending of this cube of pink.”

Then there is a second relation and that is that we describe both the intending and the sense impression by using the phrase, *cube of pink*. We may be using them in a different ways but it is important to note that both the intending and the sense impression are described by the use of the phrase *cube of pink*. One is a thinking of a cube of pink and we describe its characteristics in virtue of what it intends, it is intending of this cube of pink and we describe the other, by calling it a sense impression of a cube of pink and we explain that by saying that it is a kind of non-intentional state that is brought about in standard conditions by cubes of pink. And then of course, the obvious feature that the two go along together, they co-occur, we have the causal relationship, there’s a kind of co-occurrence relationship and we have the notion of parallel descriptions.

Now here is an interesting answer which I want to throw up for your reflection. Something which is in some way really cubical and pink. And it is also going to be, to borrow a phrase from Durant Drake, the vehicle of intentionality, in the sense that this is going to be also that which intends the intentional object this-cube-of-pink. So that this item here is going to have two characters, one by virtue of which it functions as a real state of the individual and doesn't have intentionality and another by which it serves to intend, a kind of natural state which intends, by nature, *this cube of pink*. Some philosophers have emphasized the "intentionality aspect" and separated it from the "sense impression aspect." Other philosophers have stressed the sense impression aspect and lost sight of the intentionality. Now might it not be the case that this mental state here has *both* the character of *being a sense impression* of a cube of pink and also the character, whatever it is, *by virtue of which it intends* this cube the pink? It would be, in terms which I will be exploring later on, a kind of natural, unlearned way which matures and a reference, an intending occurs. Notice that the sense impression of a pink cube seems to be well-suited for being the bearer of intentionality. I mean what could be more appropriate to serve as the bearer of whatever character it is by virtue of which a mental act intends this cube of pink than the sense impression of a cube of pink. So the second answer is that in perception, the sense impression isn't merely something accompanies an intending, as it does according to theories according to which you have sense impressions and they are accompanied by judgments, perceptual thoughts and so on but rather the sense impression is, as I put it, the very vehicle of the intending. Nevertheless its character as intending this cube of pink is going to be different from its character as being a sense impression of a cube of pink. Now as you can see it's rather difficult avoid, as it were, collapsing those two aspects into one, and I think that it is one reason why philosophers have tended to collapse this interesting occurrence, collapsing it either into the intention or collapsing it into the sense impression. I want to urge that we regard the sense impression aspect of that event and the intending aspect of that event

as distinct. But as intimately related. more intimately related than they were according to the first position.

On the first alternative in which we had both the sense impression and a separate mental act which was the intending, then we could say that when a person has this team working there, then that is a situation in which it looks to that person as though there were a pink cube, a cube of pink in front of him. In other words, we only judge that something looks to be the case if a problem arises about it, we are being cautious. We can say, then, that whether or not there is a pink cube, or whether or not he is seeing it, we can at least say that if he has a sense impression and *intends* this cube of pink, then this is a situation which we can also described by saying, "it looks to this person as though there is a cube of pink in front of him." On the second view of course, it would be the occurrence of the one event with its two aspects which would be that by virtue of which it looks to a person as though there is a cube of pink in front of him.

Now that we have that situation set up, let's bring another aspect of the problem which is going to turn out to be, at least in Husserl's mind, crucial. Let's go back to our pre-PreSocratic moments. They are fleeting but let's go back to them.

If we take seriously the idea that in *rerum natura* there are cubes of pink in the literal sense, cubicle chunks of pink stuff, so to speak, in reality they are *non-perspectival*. In other words, if there are pink cubes in the world, just as there are cubes of ice in the world, as being in the world, they are *non-perspectival*. Let us write down here that if there is something which realizes this intention, then it is a non-perspectival object, an object located in physical space, we will suppose.

The interesting thing of course, is that these objects always *present* themselves to us *perspectivally*. An object is always, as it were...we see this pink cube over there and we can see that blue cube adjoining it, and we can see this pink cube *edgewise*, or we see it *cornerwise*. We always see it *somewise*. The cube *in itself* is *no-wise* or *anywise*, so to speak. The distinction doesn't really apply do it.

On the other hand, when it comes to the sense impression, we think of the sense impression as being *essentially* perspectival. This doesn't mean that we think of it as being two-dimensional. Many philosophers made the mistake of supposing that if it was

perspectival, you draw on perspective theory like in painting, and you think of the sense impression as being like a cross section of the stimulation coming from the object at a certain plane as the plane of picture and so on. But the point is that something can be perspectivally without being two-dimensional. This is a sense impression of a cube of pink but it is a sense impression of a cube of pink from a point of view. There is thus an essential *point-of-viewishness* about sense impressions and there isn't a *point-of-viewishness* about the physical objects.

Consider now the intention this-cube-of-pink. Now indeed, this cube of pink could be said to be edgewise or this cube of pink facing with a flat surface, in other words with a facing surface. The cube of pink is intended—I haven't attempted even to give a complete account of what might be intended by such a perceptual intention, but it is going to involve this notion of the object being presented edgewise or with the facing surface or cornerwise and so on. But nevertheless, although the intentional object is this cube of pink edgewise let's say, nevertheless it is the intention of a *cube* and that must be borne in mind. Now it is easy to think that the intention is perspectival because we construe the sense impression as perspectival because we want to account for the way things look, how they look differently in different perspectives. But I think there is an important sense in which what we intend in perception is not perspectival but is intended simply as either facing or edgewise or so on. But it is still a *cube* of pink which one is intending, and that mustn't be left out of the picture.

## Idealism

I want to come to the theme of idealism pertaining to these intentional objects. The first thing I want to explore is the limitation of what we might call our basic perceptual intentions. These intentions include, as I said, the intention that  $2 + 2 = 4$ , they include logical intentions, there's an intention "and", "not", "all", "some", and we can bring in forms of thought, Kant's forms of thoughts, we can look at intention in a more contemporary sense and what we want to ask is now is "Does a perceptual intention, an intending, in

this basic sense, pick out anything with logical content?" It is tied in very closely with a basic problems in the history of philosophy.

Parmenides, for example you remember, argued that there is no *notness* in the world. That *notness* is something that exists purely in the intentional order, there is nothing in the world which realizes "not" in a way which for example this object here is realizing this cube of pink, or realizing the intentional object Nixon *qua* representable. But I'm not concerned yet with that problem, what I'm concerned with is this: is there such a thing as an intending which is conjunctive? Consider for example, I'm looking at a pink cube, a cube of pink next to a cube of blue: here is a cube of pink next to a cube of blue. Now can we suppose that when I intend that situation, or have that the relevant intention, it might be for example, this cube of pink *and* that cube of blue. It would involve that there be a conjunctive element in the intention, *figure 11*. We could also raise parallel questions about the other logical connectives. One is confronted by a kind of dilemma here, apparently, if we deny that *and* functions here as an intendable at the basic perceptual level, then we seem to break up perceptual intentions into an atomistic group which somehow never merges together into a unity of apperception. Nevertheless I think we have to bite the bullet and say that "and" does not occur in basic perceptual intentions.

How can we do that? We can do it by drawing a distinction between logical relations and what we might call *real* relations, we can give a *real* relational structure there, but we can't get what seems to be to many people a kind of limiting case, namely the pure *and* connection we—that we can't get. We *can* get for example, this cube of pink *adjoining* that cube of blue. And this intention would be actually realized here, this intention would be realized in this cube of pink adjoining that cube the blue. So that this then would be the answer, that would be appropriate to the question. This means that we can have complex intentions and that these complex intentions can be realized.

The question of idealism is this: "According to you, basic perceptual intentions are of this character and one goes on to make predications of them, are these intentions ever realized?" Are there in point of fact in the real world, any such thing as cubes of pink? Let alone cubes pink adjoining of blue? The general problem of

idealism can be formulated by asking just how much of the sort of things that we intend here is to be found in the real order, in the order of actual first-class existence as opposed to the intentional existence which these items have as they are intendables or thinkables? The Parmenidean theme, which I referred to a moment ago, is that the real order contains no *logical* elements.

### The Parmenidean Problem

And that's a very serious, and really sweeping claim. Parmenides made it really work with "not" and so you saw some of the puzzles one gets into there but if you add to this all the other logical connectives, you do get into what seems to be an impossible, absurd position because this would mean that most of what we intend about the world isn't realized in the world. For example, if there is no notness in the world then presumably there is no if-then in the world, then what does it mean to say that a pink cube could have a causal property because a causal property is something that you cannot explicate except by using the logical notions like if-then, that's the *Parmenidean problem* and the Parmenidean problem is indeed a serious one. I'm not concerned with problems of that magnitude at the moment, I am concerned only with, "are there cubes of pink?"

What are the answers? One answer is, "yes!" "Yes of course, after all the world must have content. You cannot have structure without content and what is more content<sub>tee</sub> than pink because it's is by virtue of a contrast between pink and green for example that we get shape. Shape involves the contrast of color and if color basically exists as content, and we want content in the world, then surely color has a *prima facie* claim if anything does to being content or at least the important part of the content of the world as we perceive it, and other features being sound, and we can discuss those separately. So one answer is "yes" there are such things as cubes of pink because we need the world to have content. Then there is an other answer and the answer is "no!"

Husserl answered, "no" because he thought that color by its very nature was *perspectival* and that to suppose that the real world

is essentially *perspectival* is to make a real world that is something extremely puzzling. So his answer would be that there are no cubes of pink. Now I think that I have indicated why I think that his reason was a bad reason but that is certainly one of the reasons that led Husserl to suppose that there really are no such things as cubes of pink.

Then there is another answer which joins with the second one and the answer is, “no.” We can’t understand how color solids could play any causal role in the world, only the very crudest kind of theory could be developed which would we use the color of an object to explain how objects could interact with each other, we don’t seem to have to mention there color in order to explain what billiard balls do. Nor are they used to explain how we come to experience color when confronted by them, a theory of perception doesn’t seem to require that there really be color there. And one of the old maxims of philosophy is Occam’s razor and that is if it doesn’t do a job, then out with it. And the idea that there really is color there doesn’t seem to do a job. Because color looks epiphenomenal or causally irrelevant. The dialectic goes on.

First of all two more points and then a conclusion.

Suppose we are going to be scientific realists and say, “well after all, what really is there is not what’s doing the causal work, it is electrons, photons, positron, photons in particular. Those are the work horses of the world and then the scientific realists might say well, they’re merely *seems* to be a pink cube there. Or he might be generous and say, “let there be a pink cube there too.” But the important thing to see is that if you take seriously the idea that pink appears to us and stuff, it is a mistake to think of




Figure 11 (a) Intention. (b) A conjunctive element between cubes, A and B.




Figure 12 (R) A relation.



pink as quality and substance. It is a stuff. And so it would be a mistake for the scientific realist to say the pink is simply a quality of the structure of atomic particles. Because pink doesn't present itself to us in that guise at all. It is not that sort of thing. So the scientific realist will either say that there is no such thing as the pink cube in which case he is taking an idealistic stance with respect to pink cubes, or he is going to have to say, "well, in one and the same place there are two interestingly different objects. There is a complicated structure of scientific object and there is a *cube of pink*. And that somehow the particles "swim" through the pink so to speak, and are never perceived. So we have a system of imperceptible object there, and a kind of sea of pink in which they move and which they do not disturb.

If we reject perceptual realism and if we leave in abeyance the question of scientific realism, then what are we going to say about the status of perceived objects? We will have to say that they are a coherent system of actual and available intentional objects of the form, for example, this cube of pink adjoining that cube of blue. The position we are going to get is a form of idealism. It is going to hold that *esse* of cubes of pink is being as an object intention, but unrealized. After all this domain of the intentional object includes all logically possible combinations of cubes of pink etc., etc.. And so we are going to have to pick out some and say that they constitute the world and which are we going to pick out? Interestingly enough we are going to pick out that system which would constitute realized intentional objects if realism were true. We have already decided that it isn't. In other words, here is a privileged system of perceptual intentions and that privileged system of perceptual intentions is what there is in the way of the perceptual world as I said, abstracting from scientific realism. We define it as that subset of the logically possible perceptual intentions which would be realized if realism with respect to perceptual objects were true.

That's very much like Berkeley's position with the exception that Berkeley does not draw a clear distinction between the sense impression-aspect of basic perceptual experiences, and the perceptual intending-aspect of them. And so Berkeley tends then to think of the status of the physical world as being a system of sense impressions including all of them, including even the wild ones.

Where as according to the view that I've been developing here, the actual world doesn't exist *really*, it is transcendently *ideal* in Kant's sense but we can define it as that system of intentions which would be realized if realism were true. Which of course it can't be. Now that is something *like* Berkeley's position however because what did Berkeley hold? Berkeley held that physical objects consist of patterns of sense impressions. And who causes these sense impressions for Berkeley? Well Berkeley's God causes these sense impressions. Which sense impressions does Berkeley's God cause us to have? Well the answer is obviously, God causes us to have those sense impressions we would have if, *per impossible*, material objects, i.e. the Lockean-Cartesian kind of objects could exist and were transcendently real. Which of course they can't.

This is, then, at the present stage, the kind of alternative to which we are led. One alternative is to define the status of physical objects in terms of a subset of basic perceptual representings, those that would be true if realism were true or to take the Berkeleyan stance or to defend the thesis of realism and hold that cubes of pink are really out there. And here we have three alternatives. I want to explore, next time, the general status of intentions to see if they enable us to understand this problem better and to find some way out of this, as it were dilemma, and indeed the general dilemma which is posed by the Parmenidean challenge.

## Scientific Reason and Perception 1977

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### The Phenomenological Stance

#### Scientific Realism

I have a topic today which is in a certain sense open-ended. I am concerned with a family of topics which I am carrying on a dialogue with myself about because I am trying to clarify my own ideas. Living in isolation, I have discovered that reflection in isolation isn't really a dialogue. You need to be in the world in the form of other minds to come in and impinge upon what you say otherwise you find almost everything becoming plausible.

Unless you have a trustworthy group of colleagues who can help you whittle out what can be neglected for a time, unless you have such assistance, you find yourself overwhelmed by the sheer vastness of the literature or simply by the fact that after a time it all seems so plausible. Everybody is right it seems but you know that can't be true. As a matter of fact, in philosophy it's usually better to work with the fundamental principle that everybody is wrong with the exception of course of the person in question.

Now what I want to do is to review some themes which are reasonably straightforward and familiar from the theory of perception. And then I want to review, in the light of this schematic account of what is involved in perception, certain problems pertaining to Scientific Realism. Of course let me say right at the beginning that no philosophical term is self-explanatory. No matter how self-explanatory it may seem to you. When one speaks of "Scientific Realism"

what does this mean? Well? It means roughly that one excepts the ontological *first-classhood*, *first-classness* of scientific objects, photons, black holes, electromagnetic waves, whatever. You say they *really* exist in a non-Pickwickian sense.

But of course you always have to add...you know, they might turn out to be different in certain respects from what we conceive them to be: "of course there are photons but...of course there are electromagnetic waves but...of course there's Phlogiston but...". Scientific Realism, after all, has a long history. Phlogiston? Of course! There is Phlogiston! But of course, there isn't Phlogiston or is there? That's the interesting thing, when one is a Scientific Realist one doesn't commit oneself to scientific objects as objects in any neat sense of "object." I mean what is an object? Everything is an object I suppose. You see the interesting thing is, and I didn't discover this until I actually started, my curiosity was whetted, what in the world is Phlogiston? So I went back to some books on chemistry in the pre-Lavoisier period. And of course, "My what good sense a lot of it made!"

So the important thing is that there's a certain sense in which, if you think of the Cheshire cat and the smile, remember the smile continued after the cat had disappeared? That's quite a feat, of course, but in a certain sense Phlogiston is still there, it lived on in Lavoisier chemistry. Thus, a scientific realist can suppose that scientific objects really exist while yet while yet saying that the way in which they are going to continue to be conceived may involve quite revolutionary changes because some of the explanatory power that objects in one theory may have, may be carried out in the explanatory devices of a successor theory without any neat one-to-one mapping of objects. I want, therefore, to make it clear that when I say that I am a Scientific Realist, I am not somehow endorsing science as of 1977 as getting at the truth but it's getting there. I am a Scientific Realist in the sense that I think the scientific enterprise has at its final cause, to use a familiar term, the construction of a way of representing the world which is more adequate than what we have now. And we have the regulative final cause, and that's what final causes always were, no acorn ever *really* became an ideal exemplification, lived up to the ideal that is specified in the formal cause of the acorn which was its final cause.

So the Piercean notion of scientific method as having a certain ideal which defines what really exists, I think this is a sound one. And I think that in this sense, I am a Scientific Realist. But of course a Scientific Realist also recognizes that there are other dimensions of discourse than physics or the other sciences. There is normative discourse, fortunately. I will pay my respects to normative discourse today and then move on.

I have written about perceptual topics on a number of occasions. Usually in contexts in which I am exploring a great many issues, because I take a kind of holistic view of philosophy, not only a kind of dialogue or colloquium but also a curious kind of dialogue in the sense that everything is at stake somehow all at once, one of the big problems of philosophy is, “where to begin?”, philosophy is like a string on a ball of twine, you pull on it and it begins to unwind and soon every topic you can think of has made its appearance. So I usually discussed topics pertaining to perception in contexts in which I was talking about almost everything else and that, of course, as you know—perhaps some of you by experience, that is why my work is so *elusive*, because it is so holistic, so much a beginningless structure which, of course once we really get into it...It may be a curious form of mind washing, so to speak, but once you get into, you are at home, the problem is to get into it. Today I will probably do the same thing, at least I am going to take my point of departure from explicit discussions of themes from perception.

## Husserl

The first kind of consideration, and the primary kind of consideration I want to advance is *phenomenological*, I’m going to talk like a phenomenologist of a certain variety.

Of course it used to be the case that it was clear what phenomenology was, that is what Husserl did. I don’t know what phenomenology is today, it is many things, it’s all things to all men, so I can say that I’m going to take a *phenomenological stance* but I don’t mean that I’m going to take a directly sort of Husserlian kind of account. But those of you who are familiar with Husserl will probably find some little gaps in which you can insert a challenge or a question.

From the standpoint of *conceptual analysis* which is really just another term for *phenomenology*, from the standpoint of phenomenology, the primary datum to be approached in dealing with perception...and of course one deals with visual perception—I make no apologies for this because that is what philosophers have always done and then of course, in a little appendix or in the third chapter somewhere, you will find some paragraphs on touch, on taste, hearing and so on. But vision, vision has been the paradigm so I am going to talk about vision.

Let's consider the case when we are talking about a brick. This time I brought a brick but I have a pink ice cube lurking in there which I will bring out in a moment. But for the moment consider this stodgy, stolid clumsy, oafish red brick. The first point I want to make, phenomenologically speaking, is that we have to distinguish between the object seen, the brick, and at what we see *of* the object. Now of course there are many distinctions that have to be drawn but this is an obvious distinction. We don't see the bottom of the object, we don't see an inch inside the object, we see part of the surface of the brick. So we see the brick and *of* the brick we see a certain part. Now the word 'part' is a word that stretches across categories indeed. I'm not going to define, I'm not going to go into the kind of ontology today that concerns universals, particulars, attributes, substances, wholes and parts. Of course in some sense the surface of the brick is a part of the brick, it is a constituent, if you will, of the brick. And furthermore we see the surface of the brick from a certain point of view, visual perception is obviously *point-of-viewish*. The fact was recognized and acknowledged long before it was built into a theory of perspectives which concerned a technical problem for the painter and the architect.

Now I want you to think of the surface of the brick as a particular. In other words, the surface, although it doesn't classify itself obviously in any neat way from the standpoint of ontological classification, but it doesn't seem to be a universal, or an attribute. So I would just think of it as a particular. There is a certain sense in which I am going to bring in something to contrast with the surface of the brick. We see *of* the brick, its surface, not all of it but part of it, part of the facing surface from a point of view. It is customary to distinguish between seeing a physical object, for example, the brick, and seeing *that* the object is a brick. It is customary to distin-

guish between seeing objects and seeing *that* the object is such and so. In other words as it might be put, in terms of the nice tag, we see objects and we also see facts about the objects. We see certain visually accessible facts about the object. The word 'fact' suggesting truth in some sense, we see, we may be wrong so we have to use the word 'fact', we might use the word state of affairs, this is a term that seems to be up for grabs these days. So I'll just speak of *seeing-that*, and let you decide whether we are seeing *states of affairs* concerning the brick or whether we see *facts* or possible facts, and in any case there is the difference between seeing a brick and seeing that the object there is a brick.

We can see the facing surface of the brick, we can see that the object over there has a red facing surface.<sup>1</sup> Taking into account this distinction between what we see, for example, the brick and what we see *of* what we see, then we can add a distinction between seeing *of* a physical object it's facing surface, and seeing *that* the facing surface of the physical object is, for example, red and rectangular. Schematically, we have the familiar distinction between

*seeing an object*

and

*seeing that object is* ,

the object can be a brick or a surface of a brick and then we would have

*seeing that the object is red and rectangular*

or

*that it is a brick.*

These distinctions are reflected in traditional accounts of the mental activity involved in visual perception.

I shall limit my remarks to those accounts which speak of *perceptual takings*

1 Similar distinctions are treated ex professo in ME.

and make a few remarks about some interesting features of what it is to *visually take* something to be the case. I want to use the word *taking* in such a sense that it is a special case of “believing.” I mean usually this is put in very psychologistic terminology as follows for example, when some of our beliefs arise in a questioning frame of mind, we are wondering whether or what or why, so we are trying to answer questions. Some of our beliefs arise in the attempt to answer questions. It is sometimes said that the perceptual taking differs from *such* mental states because it arises in a non-questioning frame of mind, one simply—the classic example I always used whenever I am introducing this theme in courses on perception theory is, somebody like your friend Jones is walking down the street in front of you and about the same height, walks about the same way, dresses about the same style, has a “Jonesish” kind of a gestalt, and here you are, you sit down on the curbstone and say, “looks like my friend Jones, walks in the same way as my friend Jones. I wonder if it is my friend Jones? Probably is my friend Jones,” and you go up and slap them on the back and it turns out to be Smith.

The alternative of course is what actually happens, somebody up there, as we say, *presents* the Jonesian appearance, is slapped on the back without all this intellectual interrogatory, inductive machinery occurring. So sometimes the perceptual taking is described in terms of a kind of *unreflective* belief, or sometimes people speak of spontaneous belief, or a *thinking without question* that, to use Cook Wilson’s terminology. Well I’m going to give a different account and it is less psychologistic but involves a little philosophy of mind, before we really come to it.

I’m going to take for granted that there are such things as *occurrent* beliefs. There obviously




Figure 1 (a) a thinking without question: this brick. (b) the predicate.



are beliefs which exist as dispositional or in a potential way.<sup>2</sup> Jones is asleep there, does he believe that the earth is flat? Well we can go wake him up and ask him. But right now it is still true of him that he believes that the earth is flat. If we were to wake him up and ask him the question and do it in the way which didn't involve some screws and so on, we are permissive, we are happy, he says that the earth is flat, he is obviously speaking candidly and to the point.

This means of course that there is the *saying* 'the earth is flat' and I shall assume as part of our philosophy of mind that this *saying*, this candid utterance is the manifestation, causally, the manifestation of a process initiated by believing as a mental act. Here, *figure 1*, would be the believing as a mental act and of course a mental act is not a mental action, Gilbert Ryle had thought that he had refuted the notion that there are volitions because he said that if actions are caused by volitions, well...since volitions are an act and therefore caused by a volition, you have Gilbert's famous regress, his regress for the refutation that there are volitions. But of course as you all know, the word "act" here means *actuality*, it's to be contrasted with the notion of a power, propensity, disposition and that whole family of entities which are under careful philosophical scrutiny. Now supposing furthermore that a believing is in some sense a *basic* kind of mental *actuality*. It has logical form, various kinds of logical form and I'm going to be interested in the logical form that these *believings* can have...

When we come to ponder about *believings* as mental acts and contrast them with their verbal and other overt manifestations, when we think about them, we tend to construe believings on the model of language. Philosophers today would be at a loss what to say about a thought unless they started out first of all by giving you a structural, linguistic account of logical form, grammatical form, depth structure, surface structure, and then they might say that going on inside, of course, there are these mental acts which find expression in these grammatical structures. I'm not going to go into that I'm just going to point out that in one way or another, since the

2 The distinctions frequently appear in Broad, Pritchard, RWS and others of the period.

time of Kant, we have conceived of mental acts of the conceptual kind. Because, after all, the words “mental act” can also be used for such things as pain, they are actualities, pain can be even more brutal in its actuality, you might say, than a mere intellectual belief.

So the word ‘act’ here doesn’t connote acting. So here (*figure 1*) is a believing and it is expressed in language. I am saying that the perceptual takings are a *variety* of believing or they are an *aspect* the believing. I want you to think then of these occurrent *believings*, these mental acts which are believings as having something like grammatical form and it is very important that we understand that although we get our intellectual bearings with respect to mental acts of the conceptual kind by considering grammatical structures, subject-predicate structures, adverbial structures, and so on, nevertheless we should bear in mind after all that where we enter into our understanding of the subject may not be the place where we are going to end because we have to take into account that man is a language using animal but he is an animal *too* and that animals in some sense can do something like conceptualize.

Of course we don’t really have of good theory about animals yet. The initial movement in experimental psychology you know was the behavioristic movement and it was directed towards animal psychology. For a time they thought they had a lock on it but a good simple S-R reinforcement learning theory is no longer the lock on the psychology that it had. And it’s nice to know that there is a kind of free thinking in psychology just as there is beginning to develop a kind of free thinking in logic once again, after a period of, you might say, uniformity or orthodoxy. Unorthodoxies are everywhere and for the philosopher that is an encouraging sign because that means somebody is going to listen to them.

This occurrent believing, this is a mental act, and its appropriate expression is a tokening of a sentence. I’m going to be dealing with the subject-predicate sentences but I may throw in some relational sentences in a broad sense, we can treat them as subject-predicate sentences. What interests me most now are sentences that have a demonstrative in them like ‘*this*’.

What I want to suggest is that if somebody candidly, if Jones *candidly* says that is a brick or this is a brick or the surface of this brick is red, the demonstrative aspect, of his utterance reflects a kind of *demonstrative element* in the mental act. This may be a puz-

zling notion at first sight but I want you to take very seriously the idea that a belief can contain a demonstrative element a 'this', a "this element." Not the verbal symbol, these mental acts are non-verbal, they are not verbal images although they may be accompanied by the verbal imagery. *Taking* does not occur in words. It may be closely related to, close by and near to words but it's good to get away, as far as you can from the idea that there are words in this mental act, a demonstrative element and it somehow has to be something like the word 'this' occurring in the mental image. I want merely going to suggest that when the person candidly said 'this is ', that the believing that it candidly expresses has a demonstrative component.

## Complex Demonstratives

Philosophers of mind I think have much to say much, much to puzzle about it about this demonstrative component but I see no reason at the moment to rule it out of hand. So I suppose that corresponding to candid




Figure 2 (c) The complex demonstrative. (b) The believing. (a) The bringing about, provoking, evoking.

demonstrative utterances, there are thoughts which have a *demonstrative component*. Roughly, this (*figure 2*) would have as its text you might say 'this is ', it would be that kind of a thought, a *this-is- -thought* and it would be accompanied by this-is- -utterance.

Think of there being a demonstrative elements in certain thoughts or beliefs, occurrent beliefs, and of course it is an interesting and important fact that when we talk about perception, we are constantly using demonstratives, this is a book, that is the chair, this is etc.. The next thing I want to call attention to is that we use

complex demonstrative phrases like “this red brick is   ,” for example, “larger than that.” ‘This-red- brick’, is a complex demonstrative phrase.

Many philosophers who distinguish very carefully between the verbal expression of thoughts and the thoughts themselves, the mental acts, tend to think you know that after all, ‘this-red-book’ well that’s kind of linguistic shorthand for saying “this is a book and it is red and it is   .”

Thus, one would regard the structure underlying this nice simple sentence ‘the red brick is   ’ and one would find a more complicated structure. They tend to think of the thought as having all that explicitly in it. So in *mentalese*, putting it crudely, we would be thinking ‘this is a book, it is red and it is   ’. But I want you to take seriously the idea that beliefs can have complex demonstrative subjects just as much as a sentence in overt speech can have a complex demonstrative subject.

Let’s not buy into the idea that thought somehow has an analyzing machine so that the believings are always spelled out whereas language is a suitcase kind of phenomenon, with all kinds of things packed in. So then I want you to think of this believing expressed by ‘this-red-brick is   ’ as having a complex demonstrative component which is its logical subject so to speak, *this-red-brick*, and we would find some appropriate way of classifying, to have a species (so to speak) of this act, the believing, and I want you to think of this mental act as having as its subject a complex demonstrative component.

This-red-brick is heavy...is mine...is larger than that one, we distinguish between a complex demonstrative which gives the *subject* and what we go on to predicate of it: this-red-brick is *going to be used to rebuild the library* or something like that. Now what I want to emphasize then is that we shouldn’t think of *thisness* as something which occurs very often by itself. It usually goes along with the phrases like ‘red brick,’ ‘this red brick,’ people often tend to look at the word ‘this’, you know they study it, they look at it, they rehearse it, and they think of *thisness*. They ponder about the relation of *thisness* to form and matter and to the world and to space and time, thisness, thisness. Well what I want you to worry about rather is *this-red-bookness* so to speak because I think actually that in perception, with very few exceptions, we are having perceptual

thoughts which do have this kind of complex form as their subject. They have a complex demonstrative as their subject. Now the obvious point is that if we take this seriously, we can give an account that is not psychologistic in the way in which I gave before of perceptual taking, what we *take* in perception is, so to speak what is *in* the demonstrative phrase. When I, as it were, think while looking over there, this-red-brick and then go on to say something about it, what I am *taking* is a red-brick and the fact that I'm taking it, is a matter of being as it were, the very *form* of the perceptual thought. I haven't of course by any means exhausted the topic yet, but I want to suggest that we can distinguish between a *taking that* and one might say really, one *can* take it *that* something is the case, I'm not denying that, but what I want suggest is that the interesting sense of perceptual taking is that in which perception gives us, or presents us with subject matters to think about.

'This red brick,' well what about it? What we take is what is, as it were, packed into what is in the complex demonstrative phrase. That is a suggestion that I want to offer and I want to suggest that what we see something *as*, is a matter of the complex demonstrative phrase. In other words, to see something *as a brick* is to have a perceptual thought occurring to one and what the perceptual thought is, that is exactly what I'm concerned with, which vocalizes in its *very* subject, not only a demonstrative but some concepts such as the concept of being red, being a red brick. This is what is taken and to see something *as* involves, to see something *as a redbrick*, whatever else it involves—it does involve something else—it does involve this demonstrative complex. Now of course we can see something *as* something and yet be mistaken. To use Reichenbach's favorite example of there being a bush in front of the tent where one is camping. When we're nervous you know, one's perceptual set is a bit harried and one looks out of the tent and one sees the bush but takes it to be a bear, or sees it *as a bear*. In other words what occurs in the camper's mind is a demonstrative expression *this-black-bear is threatening me I better move* and so on. *This black bear*. Of course there is no black bear there but he has seen something *as a black bear* and I suggest that this notion of a complex demonstrative which is involved *in* the perceptual situation

clarifies in a not purely psychologistic sort of way, a certain element of what we call a *perceptual taking*.

Now I am going to say then that for our present purposes, visual takings simply *are* the complex demonstrative constituents of perceptual beliefs. I'm willing to work with this for a while and see where it leads and the explicitly predicative constituent of the belief is not part of what is taken but what is believed *about* what is taken. The model for taking then would be in a way something like presupposition in Strawson's sense. Strawson is talking about language.

The concept of the occurrent belief can be extended to cover this sense of taking by distinguishing between *believing that* and *believing in*. You see, I said that takings are a species of *believings* but we normally take as our model of believing, *believing that* something is such and so, believing that the Earth is round, a believing that-x will..., believing that, believing that! I want you to emphasize the *believing in* as it were, when I look at that table over there where that red brick is and I'm in the proper perceptual set, there occurs a believing *in* a red brick and I may believe *that* the red brick is useful, I might rush over and throw it at somebody if I were in a John Deweyan or a Heideggerian frame of mind. But I'm not of course, but anyway I believe in it, you see and I think we can say that perceptual takings are *believings in*, they are perceptual *believings in* things.

What we see something *as* is what we *believe in* when we are seeing it. The same thing is true of the surface. For example we can see something *as* the surface of a brick, this-is-the-surface-of-a-red-brick. So our demonstratives don't necessarily just hit nice solid substances but they demonstrate, as it were, visual perception which we might call, visually provoked given that I have a certain set-up...I'm into bricks (*figure 2*). I'm into bricks and I have a certain perceptual set and nothing else is interrupting me and I *believe in* a red brick and I'm thinking the thought this-red-brick, and then what about it?

Granted that there is a believing in, is there something more? Is this perceptual taking to be understood simply in terms of a *believing in* something which is causally *evoked* by visual stimulation—as Quine would say—my optical surfaces have been visually stimulated. So obviously the question is, “is seeing an object *as* a

red brick facing him edgewise” simply a matter of believing in a red brick facing him edgewise where this *believing in* a red brick is *visual* in the sense that his having this belief is, given his mental set, brought about by the action of that object on his “visual apparatus.”

Before tackling this question, we have to refine our distinction, between the *object seen* and what we see *of* the object. For what we see *of* the object includes not just such items as surfaces and certain other features I’m going to be introducing but it includes certain other items which belong to a different ontological category.

Consider for example now, I open my briefcase and there is the pink ice cube. There it is. Now it is pink, obviously it is pink. It is transparent, that is the important thing about it, you can see right *through* it. The brick is opaque and when you concentrate on its surface, you see *of* the brick its facing surface or part of its facing surface. In the case of the ice cube, it is transparent, you see in a certain sense right through it, you see *all* of it in a certain sense. All of it? Ah ha! It’s ice! Now what does its being made of ice consist in? You see I see it *as* a cube of pink ice. I would say that my thought would run, ‘this cube of pink ice is useful for cooling tea’ and so on. And why is it useful for cooling tea? Now that pertains to *iciness*. And what is it to be ice? It is to have certain causal powers, propensities, dispositions, in other words, a physical object-kind and substance-kind are to be understood in terms of the kind of property that would find its linguistic expression if it were unpacked...well first of all if it weren’t unpacked, in words ending in ‘-able’, for example, ‘soluble’ and if we *were* to unpack it we would use ‘*if-then*’, we would use hypothetical, subjunctive conditionals, contrary-to-fact conditionals, all of these are what constitutes the *ice*, it is because it has certain *causal* properties that it *is* ice. And when we see it *as* a cube of pink *ice* we are seeing it *as* something that has certain causal powers. Much of what we take, come to think about it, in visual perception, involves these causal properties.

Let me ask the obvious question, let’s go back to the brick, “do we see the brick?” “can we see the whole brick?” No. We don’t see the side of it, we don’t see the middle of it, we see the surface of it. Now let me ask a question, “do we see the pink ice cube?” Do we see its *pinkness*? Well of course we supposedly see pinkness until philosophers get us worried.



Do we see its iciness? Do we see its character *as* ice? We see its character as pink, for the moment, at least we suppose, but do we see its character *as* made of ice? And I want to suggest that to ask this question is to answer, in a sense, with Hume, 'no'. We may *conceive* of it as ice, we may *classify* it as ice, we may *interpret* it as ice, we may *construe* it as made of ice, as having the causal properties but do we see of the cube its iciness? Do we see the causal properties? Do we see *of* the cube the causal properties involved in being made of ice? Remember we do see it *as* made of ice, so I am asking a different question, I'm saying, granted that we see it *as* a cube of ice, do we see its iciness? It's *very* iciness and of course I want to suggest that the answer is "no." And in a certain sense this is a familiar answer.

It is the kind of answer that anyone brought up in the Kantian tradition would be prepared to use, say. Hume himself of course would have said it too, let's be more Kantian than Humean. Hume was a skeptic you might say and I'm not arguing in a skeptical frame of mind by any means here. I am picking up the theme from Kant. We conceptualize it in terms of certain causal properties though we don't see *of* the object those causal properties.

Now this then raises the next question. It looks as though in some sense, we see *of* the pink ice cube its very *pinkness*, you know there it is, the pink is smiling up at us. It is not hidden, you see in Heidegger's sense it is *open*, there is the pink. *There* is its *cubeicity*. Where is its causality? Well we know it has these causal properties but they don't smile up at us in quite the same way. Thus in some way which we haven't yet analyzed, the pinkness plays a different role in our perception, in our perceptual experience, than the *iciness* as I said. Putting it crudely—and one doesn't know how to put these things except crudely—we see *of* the ice cube its very pinkness but we don't see its very iciness.

Now what does this mean? This means, again, groping and using transcendental language because one has to, before one gets down to earth, it is *somehow* a cube of pink, *somehow*, *something* which is pink and cubicle is present in that experience other than as believed in. You might say the *ice* is believed in, it is *merely* believed in. But the pink, by *golly*! that is present in a way which is other than *merely* believed in. And this seems to be phenomenologically true. I don't know that anybody...perhaps we



would really go to the mat on that, but at least I'm proposing that the pinkness of that cube of ice is somehow present in experience other than as believed in. Although what is believed in as a whole is a cube of pink ice, there is a feature which is a cube of pink, we can sort of look at that as a *constituent* of what is believed in, somehow the cube of pink isn't merely believed in, whereas the ice is merely believed in, perhaps with good reason.

Now of course I say *somehow* the very pinkness is present in the experience other than as believed in and of course at this stage one might suspect that we just look at the pink very carefully and look for a little tag on it whereby it would explain how it is caught up in this scene, 'What are you doing here Pink?' 'How are you involved in the experience?'

## Phenomenology to proto-theory

Here I am over here and there is the pink over there and there is the ice over there, 'how is it that you are so intimate and the ice is so cool?' The pink doesn't declare its status and what I called the "myth of the given" is the idea that items sort of categorized themselves, *declare* their status. What we do have is a theory. Here's the point where theory *takes over* from *phenomenology*. In other words, as you know, one standard move, and the one I'm going to make is too introduce visual sensations. And to say that pink is present in the experience by virtue of the existence in the perceiver of a sensation of a pink cube (*figure 3*). And that is a theory, this is not something that simply transmits itself to us as a bit of ontological insight. And here it




Figure 3 (a) Evoking. (b) Taking. (c) demonstrative.

should be remembered that perception is, so to speak, given us not to clarify metaphysical issues, the mind-body problem. It was given us so that we can run away from foxes, so that we could maneuver. Just as pain, why do we feel pain? There are lots of interesting philosophical questions about pain but the fundamental thing to remember is that there is a hot stove there and if you put your hand on it you are going to get your hand off that stove very quickly so that the pain experience, obviously, it's tied up with getting hands off of hot stoves. You have to look at perception in its continuity with the fact that we have to get around, escape wolves, get between trees and get our hands off of hot stoves very quickly without asking any questions.

So what we have then is a theory which we can, and here we might you might even be willing to say, it is a kind of *proto-theory* which is almost built into the wiring diagram, if we want use that metaphor, of human beings and it is part of our animal heritage, so to speak. I was speaking earlier about our taking language as a model for conceptual acts but I said we must not forget that our conceptual acts have a long history which is not tied in such an obvious way to anything that can be called language and here we run into problems about which actually very little is known. It is simply a good warning to say, perhaps there's a kind of *proto-theory* which is understood by analogy with this nice apparatus that I've been putting up here. And which can occur at a much cruder level with simpler structures.

So I am going to suppose now without telling any longer story that here is a cube of ice, *figure 3*, and we'll suppose a veridical case of perception, and we are all familiar with the causal processes that occur in normal conditions, here's the eye, and somewhere in the sensory apparatus, this is part of the theory remember, in the visual center there occurs something we can call a sensation of a cube of pink.

And then we have the believing, the believing which is

This-cube-of-pink-ice

and so on. The believing can be very rich and it usually is but here we have something that we can merely describe in terms of the proper sensibles. We don't have a sensation of ice, you can have a sensation as of "ice falling down your back" you see. You can speak

of a sensation of pain or blue or sweet or sour but you don't speak of sensations of ice except in the sense of "caused by."

Here we are describing the *very* sensation itself and the phrase *of a cube of pink* is a classificatory phrase, a subjective genitive which is the genitive of classification. So roughly if we were making it explicit, we would say, of-a-cube-of-pink kind of sensation. Now the problem is, what is the relation between the *believing* which is *conceptual* and it involves *thisness* and *thatness* and *ice*, and what you can do with it, all kinds of propositional content and so on, and the *sensation*? Well of course, one possible answer is, and it is the one that I want to propose to you, that when we look at the phrase, 'this cube of pink ice', we see something which we understand to be as it were grammatically complex. But what is the *referent* of the word 'this' which is functioning there, can we develop a theory as to, so to speak, the *focus*, of the demonstrative element here?

What I want to suggest is that instead of thinking of the sensation as simply something that *causes* the belief, which is a view which is very tempting, in other words, of course seeing a pink ice cube isn't merely believing in a pink ice cube, I have a "sensory" *experience*, you have to have a sensation, but then you might think that the sensation somehow just *causes* the belief. I want to suggest instead that if we reflect on this situation, a *better* theory is that the *core* of the demonstrative element is the *demonstration*, so to speak, of the *sensation*.<sup>3</sup>

In other words, the *referent* of the demonstrative at its *core*, if we look at it, and recognize that after all it does have a complex structure, that it is roughly the sensation *itself* that we are *demonstrating*. Now of course this doesn't mean that we are *aware* that what we are demonstrating, so to speak, is something which is occurring in *ourselves* as a sensory process. The conceptualization is in terms of ice, and a cube of pink ice and so on but I want to suggest that instead out of the sensation being simply a *causal* factor in bringing about a belief of a certain kind, a belief in the cube of pink

3 As mentioned in the introduction, WS characterized the "unique togetherness" he is talking about as Kant's great insight that the mind, in taking up the manifold, involved the sensation in the "this" component.

ice that from its depth grammar, if I might put it that way, to speak out of a pure speculative grammar of thought, that the *this* component is really picking out the sensation.

As I said, that doesn't mean that we are aware of it *as* a sensations because things don't classify themselves in that way. As a matter of fact, if life were so designed that human beings and animals as it were, were constantly confronted with the fact that they were having sensations, you see, you know they would get so busy, raise so many questions, that they would never get started in escaping or in getting their tea cooled. In other words, the crucial point is that one can hold that the referent of the demonstrative, of the *core* demonstrative element in the belief, is the sensation but that it is not recognized, cognized, classified *as* such.

The idea that there are sensations, you remember, is a theory designed to explain something that we can get at phenomenologically, but it is a theory which can be held in cruder or in more sophisticated forms, but at least it is a theory.

What does this mean? If we take seriously the idea that what is believed in, is a cube of pink ice, we find that what is believed in, is something physical. The sensation is, in point of fact, and in a broad sense of this term, mental, but "mental" is a category and "physical" is a category and these are both elements in a very complicated theory about the world and ourselves and our place in it. A complicated theory which can be held in cruder or more sophisticated forms but a theory indeed. What is it for something to be physical? What is it to be in physical space? Is it to have certain causal powers, to interact with other objects? You can't *explain* what you mean by physical space without drawing upon notions pertaining to causal properties and interactions and so on. Mere geometry by itself, so to speak, considered as an uninterpreted system can have many interpretations. And this sensation of a cube of pink can have geometrical characteristics in a limited sense without being physical. Whether it's physical or not, there we get to the mind-body problem and I'm not going to start with that but I want to still say that sensations can be talked about in geometrical terms.

The point is that this *sensation of* is *mis-taken*; to use H. A. Pritchard's phrase, the sensation is *mistaken* for part of the surface of a physical thing. In other words, the taking, when we take this cube of pink, can be a *mis-taking*. Because it takes the "this," which

is in point of fact in the perceiver, to be something out there in physical space. Thus there can be *mis-takings*.

Of course, H. A. Prichard who put forward a theory of this kind that belongs in this general category was *scoffed* at because that was a time of Commonsense philosophy. You know when common sense could do no wrong! G. E. Moore refuted Bradley on the unreality of time by saying obviously I had my breakfast this morning therefore time exists. So the idea that perception could involve not only takings but *mis-taking* struck people as *really* absurd. Now I want to say it is true.

We take and the taking consists in the fact that the referent of the demonstrative is in point fact is a sensation, we take what in point of fact are sensory states of ourselves to be features of physical object. Now let's suppose that is true.

We have a complex theory of the world in which we think of the world as having sensible pinkness and as our theory gets more sophisticated, by the time of the 17th century, sensory pinkness had sort of left the ice and its *esse est percipi*, it exists only in sensory states. Now it is almost common sense to suppose that the pink that we experience is somehow in us. Although if you are really asked to give an account of how it is in us we don't know how to begin, physiologists wouldn't know how to begin either, physiologists worry about this now, as they well should. The point I want to make is then that if in point fact in visual perception, the demonstrative reference is to what is in point of fact sensory states of ourselves then that means that physical objects—and remember how little of the physical object even phenomenologically we saw—that leaves the place open for scientific objects.

In other words, if in a certain sense *right* from the beginning, what we are doing when we perceive so-called objects in space is using a *proto-theory* of physics so to speak, of what physical objects are and what physical space is, then we can understand how when we moved from this *proto-theory* which is almost part of our animal heritage to sophisticated theories about electro-electromagnetic vibrations or photons or Phlogiston, or whatever, then in a certain sense, there's a kind of continuity. And what I want to emphasize then is that in a certain sense we have been Scientific Realists for millennia. Because all of us, we have been responding

to our sensory states by conceptual acts, however crudely, which involve a theory of physical objects.

And that is why it is very important to remember what we see *of* the brick. Do we see all the brick? Do we see the other side?...that leaves a lot open if you see the facing surface and what you see is really a sensory state of the self, what we have really in our, using a Kantian phrase now, in our categorization, our categorial responses to our sensory states, what we have in point of fact is a sequence of *more* and *more* adequate theories beginning with a kind of proto-theory which is almost part of our *animal heritage*. So Scientific Realism is not a philosophical thesis which involves a radical break between so-called *real* experience and *theory*, you see there you are thinking of theory as something that is constructed by means of *developing* a theory. What I want to suggest is that the sophisticated “developing” of theories by means of reasoning and so on, is simply a continuation of something which is, to use Santayana’s phrase, a matter of *Animal Faith*.<sup>4</sup>

## Questions and answers

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*We don’t see physical objects?*

No. You have to speak in two tones of voice you know. Philosophers are distinguished by the fact that they are able to say, “of course there are tables,” “of course there are chairs,” “of course there are ice cubes,” “of course there are pink ice cubes,” and then

4 George Santayana, *Scepticism and Animal Faith* (1923), the plasticity of mind that WS’s evolutionary naturalism gives to Santayana’s comparatively static naturalism reflects WS’s view of the non-conceptual element in sensation. If we take animal faith as principles of interpretation (189), animal faith could be seen as a step in the direction of ur-concepts. Santayana’s continual assault in a masked ambush becomes WS’s evoking of response. However, Santayana does not take the proper sensibles, color, for example, to be primordial but finds the more primitive elements in experience of good and bad, near and far, coming and going, fast and slow, just now and very soon. In other words, what characterizes the ultimate “point-of-viewishness” of experience, a here and a there, a now and a then, myself in the midst of nature. Santayana did not have the analytical resources that allow us to get far in deciding what his non-conceptual core looks like but his remarks are suggestive—as WS appears to have thought.

speaking in a slightly different tone of voice they say, “there really are no pink ice cubes.” So the philosopher gives himself away when he talks in that new tone of voice. Now, of course we see bricks but... what we are going to do now is give an account according to which the sense in which we see the brick is not what we would have *expected* from the kind of simple theory of perception with which one starts out before one is corrupted by philosophy.

Prichard was asked that question, I remember. “You mean to say that we don’t *really* see chairs and tables and so on?” And Pritchard would say, “No! Of course we see them.” But the kind of theory we have about what goes on when we see them, is usually a very over-simplified theory which *mislocates* various items. After all as I said, we take our visual sensations to be features of physical things. It isn’t because the features that we experience have a little label on them saying “we belong in physical space.” No, we have to have some kind of theory. The point is that we can start out with a very naïve theory which is a *useful* theory. Remember the old story about the centipede who one day turns philosopher so to speak, and asks “How do I walk? How do I walk?” and then from then on it was downhill. Well you see it may be that what I’m calling a sort of proto-theory which has then evolved into more sophisticated forms under the heading of naïve realism, it may be a kind of proto-theory which is something which we naturally make use of but which would be an incorrect account of what is going on. Now the important thing to notice is that I speak here of a *mistaking* but notice that I have been very careful to say that the “mistaking aspect” simply concerns the, let’s say, the *red rectangle*. That actually is a red rectangular sensation. But the rest of it needn’t be mistaken at *all*. So there is the brick. All this sophisticated theory does is to say that there is one basic category mistake that is built into our perceptual responses to the world and apart from that there are bricks and chairs and tables and we see them and this is just a little philosophical development, the ‘Ah ha!’. But the theory we have about what goes on when we see things is not correct.

What I am saying is that it would be misleading to say we don’t see the brick. In other words, here we get into Gricean conversational implicature, if I say I don’t see the book, I don’t see the chair, I don’t see the table, well that implies Gee! you’re in a mess. But you see because as I pointed out, this complex demonstrative

phrase involves the notion of *ice*, this cube with pink *ice* and many of the concepts that are involved in that believing-in actually apply to what is there. There is just *one little* conceptual aspect that doesn't correctly apply to what is there, namely *the pink*. And that curiously enough you see according to this sophisticated theory, I call it sophisticated, because I believe it, there is a sensory state which in point of fact is being miscategorized as something out there in physical space as a feature of the ice, as a feature of the brick and so on. So you might say it is 99 and 44/100 percent pure in the case of honest-to-goodness visual situations but there is that .56% of useful error.

I mean error can be useful. Perhaps the pain is really in your c-fibers, some people think it is, some people have more sophisticated theories than that. I think there are some very interesting theories about pain that are being developed so that it is too naïve even from the standpoint of physiology to speak neatly of c-fibers being stimulated, and pain is simply the stimulation or certain state of the c-fibers but where do we instinctively, so to speak, believe that the pain is? Is there a pain in the tooth? You know the old legend about phantom pain, somebody had his leg cut off and is told it still continues to itch, he has a pain in his toe and yet he has no toe? So it may be that there are certain kinds of proto-beliefs which most of the time are very useful. But vision goes wrong lots of time because there are all kinds of strange phenomena that can occur: hallucinations, misperceptions of various kinds. But we can always pretty well except when smart psychologist gives us his apparatus, we can usually tell when certain circumstances are funny, we can't wipe out completely that instinctive belief. But as Kant saw, belief can exist as it were simultaneously at a kind of unreflective level, at a kind of spontaneous level, at, to use Santayana's term, a more animalistic level [proto-belief], and yet a contrary belief can exist as it were at the level of theorizing, questioning-answering, developing a complete picture of the world and so on. So that there is a certain sense in which even somebody who is *absolutely* convinced by identity theory that the pain he feels is in his c-fibers, he goes to the dentist and the dentist says, "Where does it hurt?"...That's my answer to the question.

What I am saying is, shall we say, *continuous* with what I said in "Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind" but *slightly* more complex. I



distinguished between our almost *animalistic proto-beliefs* and our theory constructed beliefs [which are characterized by the same phrase].

There can be a belief in the sophisticated theory framework like “this visual sensation”...I end “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” by discussing exactly this point. Namely, that when philosophers introduce sensations and develop ways of talking about them or introduce sense data or whatever, they are really introducing a theory and teaching themselves to use it in responding to the very thing which they normally respond to by physical object theory, proto- or not. Actually there is proto-physical object theory, we can think in subtle terms or we can think in terms of the proto-theory which helps us get around through the maze of existence. Why can’t there be *different levels of conceptualizing*? You see that is all consistent with what I argued in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.” My problem there was the problem of how we construe what I call inner episodes *at all*, what is our model for the conceptual *at all* and I said *our* introduction to the idea of conceptual episodes is fundamentally through considering language. But then you see I indicate that although that is our entering wedge into having a *theory* about conceptual episodes we shouldn’t suppose that all, that everything which deserves to be called something like a conceptual episode is the sort of thing that is expressed in a sophisticated syntactically complex language.

Now I don’t have anything more really helpful to say here because as I said, for a long time the theory of animal behavior was a matter of treating them as homunculi. You say roughly a rat is like a human being except it’s an awful lot dumber, my these animals are dumb! But the model basically was you start out by thinking of them as analogous to human beings then you start putting qualifications on, commentary on, but of course ... and so. When animal psychology began working with rats going through mazes, they developed idea of chained systems of stimulus-response and so on, it looked like everything was going fine. I gather that as I said the field is more open now and furthermore one of the crucial problems in psychology is exactly perception and the sort of thing that I am talking about here ultimately has to be cashed out in terms of some genuine psychological account of what pain is and how pain fits into causality. You see the temptation of physiologist has always

been to be epiphenomenalists ...“we’re not concerned you know, with images, sensations, tickles, itches, we are concerned with the old wiring diagram, the old hardware!” And you will find that a lot of physiologists are now getting to worry about what there is in, you might say, the software or softheadedness, because obviously in *some way*, the hardware involved in feeling pain has to include in *some way* a hook up with what we experience as pain. And this is the task, one of the basic jobs that philosophy has to do is to raise questions, to open up conceptual possibilities and that is certainly one of the themes that I stressed in both in “Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind” and *Science and Metaphysics*, that philosophers should not regard themselves as merely owls of Minerva who come back in the night after the day is done. They should also be heralds of the dawn. Perhaps the owls of Minerva were considered by classical Greeks as heralds of the dawn as well as owls of the night? But, anyway, they stayed out all night...historically that’s the way it works, conceptual possibilities were opened up with respect to space and time by philosophers, of course there used to be an intimate connection between philosophy and science, then they began to bicker and that fell apart, philosophers were over here and scientists were over there. Now I belong to that group that feels that this was a disaster.

## Perspectives 1986

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### Lecture I

#### Predication and Time

My aim this evening is to develop an account of the relation between language and thought and the world and I am going to be concerned primarily with what are often called basic sentences or atomic sentences and to develop something in the tradition of what used to be called the “picture theory” of language. But that is merely an historical aside because I aim to give you a general tuning in to what I am going to do.<sup>1</sup>

I am going to be concerned, however, with basic issues of ontology, the notion of an object, the notion of non-objects as items that can be referred to and in general an account of the meaning and truth of atomic sentences. Then I am going to apply this ontology to fundamental issues in the *ontology of time* and in particular to the *relational theory* of time which I hope to show is based on what Ryle has called a “category mistake.” But that is music of the future as far as this evening is concerned because I want to develop the framework in which I can make what I regard as telling *criticisms* of relational theories of time.

1 Parts of this essay appear in "Towards a Theory of Predication," in *How Things Are*, edited by James Bogen and James McGuire (Reidel, 1983): 218-318 and were presented at a conference on predication at Pitzer College in April, 1981.

I want to start by considering a classical problem with which you are all familiar and which touches on the issues that I have just been referring to in many places. I said that I am going to be concerned with the relation of atomic statements to the world and by “atomic” here I mean, nothing really in itself exciting, namely, unquantified sentences and thoughts and the expressions which make them up, predicate expressions and object expressions or naming expressions and I want to discuss a classical issue pertaining to exemplification because the classical theory of predication starts out by considering an atomic sentence such as ‘*fa*’ like saying, “the object is red” in PMese, the language of *Principia Mathematica*, and I want to bring out a schema here of some of the central presuppositions and features of this standard theory. For example we have here a sentence consisting of the predicate *f* and the name *a*, and the name *a* refers to an object in some fairly intuitive sense of this term although the term is often used as though it were, as if the scholastics had never written in terms of its distinctions between objects, categories, transcendentals, these are all grist to our mill here. The theory of time that I am going to develop next time is really a neo-Heraclitean, shades of Heraclitus, ontology and in order to formulate that we need a contrast background so I will be contrasting the Heraclitean Outlook with other outlooks.

What we have then is the name *a*, picking out an object which belongs to the class of *f-things*.<sup>2</sup> And then *f* is supposed to stand for *f-ness*, which is the property of *being-f*, the character of *being-f*, the attribute of *being-f*, however you prefer to put it. So that it would be *f-ness* and the statement *fa* is true just in case the object *a* exemplifies *f-ness*. So here we get a package which gives the structure of the standard or classical theory of predication. This is very stark but it can be held, as you know, in a wide variety of ways so the detail is everything and I will try to put in as much relevant detail as I can.

The classical theory tends to construe both *f* and *a* as names, *a* is the name of a particular belonging to the class of *f-things* and *f* plays a double role, on the one hand it plays the role of a predicate, the predicate of *a*, and it also stands for a certain object, an abstract object, as I said the property of *being-f*. So *f* faces two ways, it faces toward the domain of particulars and also faces toward the domain of

2 Perspectives I, track 1 (#2).

abstract objects supposing there are in some sense to be such, and in some sense of course there is. But it turns out according to the analysis that I am going to offer that it is quite an unusual object.

So in effect *fa* is equivalent to *f-ness(a)* because here (standing alone) we give it a predicative emphasis and here we look at it as a concatenation of two names, the name of a particular and the name of an abstract object. Now looking at it from the standpoint of its functioning as a name, we have the idea that we express that *a* exemplifies *f-ness*, we express a relation between *a* and *f-ness* by concatenating the two names. We concatenate *f-ness* and *a* and by so doing we *express* the relation of exemplification. This is the fundamental theme of the picture theory of meaning and language, namely that we *express* that items are related by relating the referring expressions that refer to these items. We say that *a* exemplifies *f-ness* by concatenating, i.e. relating, the names *a* and *f-ness*. This was a theme that entered into philosophy in the 1920s and has been with us in one way or another ever since and in one way or another it is the core, as you know, of Wittgenstein's initial work, the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*.

So that the relation of the particular to the universal it exemplifies, is expressed by a relation between tokens of the names of these entities, that an *f-ness* token is  $R_1$  to an *a* token expresses that *a* exemplifies *f-ness*. Now that is a very neat theory of how exemplification gets expressed. I have given an example of a thing with a particular character but I can also apply this to relational predication, for example suppose that **a** is next **b** and the predicate is 'next to' or 'is next to' and there are two names here, namely, 'a' and 'b', so that we would express that **a** and **b** jointly exemplify *next to* by<sup>3</sup> Concatenating **next to a, b**, we would have *next to(a,b)* as the counterpart of '*fa*'. In this case the tokens of the names of **a** and **b** are jointly concatenated with the token of *being joined to* or *being next to* expresses that **a** and **b** jointly exemplify *next-to-ness* where the relation in question is a mode of concatenation which of course is a fundamental and essential syntactical category and syntax is as you know, at the bottom of the foundation of semantics. And I will be assessing their relationship as we move on.

3 Perspectives I, track 2 (#3).

It is no news that a theory of predication is no sooner formulated than it generates puzzles but the puzzles which are initially generated simply concern the wide variety of predications which I will be looking at to some extent particularly in context of time and change. For example we have *adjectival* predication as in

**a** is red,

we have *sortal* predication as in

Leo is a lion,

we have *verb* predication as in

Socrates runs

and that is going to be our central focus next time and it becomes clear that although I am ostensibly dealing with a single topic, many of the central issues in metaphysics are lurking in the underbrush as they always do. After all the problem of predication is but one form of the many puzzles which originally fell under the heading of the One and Many. In the old days, seminars in metaphysics almost inevitably would begin with the topic the One and the Many. And this has a venerable tradition and there is a lot of good sense to it but it is only when you see how the one breaks up into many itself that you realize how indicative, how elusive the topic of the One and the Many is and it seems to have fallen out of use in contemporary metaphysics.

It would be useful for our purposes as a means of introducing some more terminology and what would we do without terminology? To consider a case of a *linguistic one* as contrasted with a *linguistic many*. Thus we are all familiar with Pierce and the distinction between words as *types*, for example, the word *and* and words as tokens which would be cases of the word *and* on this page for example. And it might seem that the relation between a type and a token is another example of a universal and its instances, we might speak of the word *and* type as a universal namely ‘and’-hood, ‘and’-ness, to indicate that we have a linguistic universal here and to speak of the many cases of *and* as being instances of ‘and’-ness.

So that the relation of type and token would appear to be just a special case of exemplification just as this blackboard is black, it exemplifies blackness so the instances of the word *and* would have

in common that they all exemplify the universal ‘and’-ness.<sup>4</sup> However, once we try to carry this through we run into problems. Thus we can say not only that a certain token *t* is an ‘and’, thus if I have the word ‘and’ written over the, call that token *t*, I can say *t* is an ‘and’. This would seem to be intellectually satisfying and true. Notice that I can also say that a token is a conjunction so I have written down there not only a token of the word *and* what I have written down the token of a conjunction, *and* is equivalent to *t* is a conjunction because ‘and’s in general are conjunctions in their standard use so I can say, “*t* is a conjunction” and properly so called ‘and’s are conjunctions. Now this gives us two intimately related readings of ‘and’ is a conjunction.

According to the first “‘and’” is interpreted along the lines, in our first discussion, as a name. “‘And’” is the name of a word, namely the word *and*, the word type. In this case the statement

‘and’ is a conjunction

becomes, to make it explicit,

‘and’-hood is a conjunction.

Just as I can say, for example, ‘red’ is a color word. And so when I say “‘and’-ness is a conjunction”, this predicates, ostensibly, being a conjunction of the object in question, namely, a linguistic universal ‘and’-ness. And by so doing entails that the items which exemplify it are conjunctions, when I said, “‘and’ is a conjunction”, I am saying something of the type word *and* that is a conjunction and therefore that its tokens are conjunctions.

Now according to the second line of thought, however, ‘and’ is interpreted not as the name of an object, ‘and’-ness or ‘and’-hood, in accordance with the schema

*a* is *f* entails *a* exemplifies *f*-ness

but rather as what I call a distributed singular term, now this is a key theme in the ontology I am going to be developing so it is important that we catch hold it in terms of the simple examples with which we begin. Now distributive singular terms are singular terms, that is,

4 Perspectives I, track 3 (#4).

there is a symptom is that they are followed by 'is' in the singular which makes a singular term, and it is distributive because it makes a general statement and the example that I have used from the beginning and have found no reason or grounds in the polemics which my writing immediately stimulated to reject it.

Consider the statement

the lion is tawny

when I say the lion is tawny, I am not making a statement about lionhood or lion-ness but I am making a general statement when I say, 'the lion is tawny' because this has the force of

standard or normal lions are tawny,

that is, lions that haven't been painted or subject to violence modification of their diet and so on. When I say, "the lion is tawny", I am making so to speak, a statement about the lion institution, Langford (in cooperation with C.I. Lewis in *Symbolic Logic*) called the institutional 'the' but I think that is not too helpful of a term. Anyway when I say, "the lion", I am committed to the idea that standard or normal lions are tawny, that is of a certain brownish, yellow color.<sup>5</sup> And so what is the subject of predication here? It is *the lion* and that is, indeed, an *ens rationalis*, but certainly not to be identified with, as I said, *lionhood* or *leoninity* or whatever you prefer as the name of the abstract sortal characteristic. In the case with which we are concerned, the relevant grammatical transformation is

standard 'and's are conjunctions entails the (an) 'and' is a conjunction.

So I say the

'and' is a conjunction = standard 'and's are conjunctions

let us look back at our standard theory of predication and see how some of this terminology can be applied.

The (what I call) standard theory of predication has a lot of truth in it. The platonic tradition has the essential structure of the truth but to use Emily Dickinson's invaluable metaphor, tells it "slant." The trouble with Platonism is that it tells the truth slant. And by so

<sup>5</sup> Perspectives 1, track 4 (#5).



doing carries with it possible error. Now what I want to show in part by constructing a philosophical lexicon, is that the natives of our 'jungle'—to use Quine's term—came far closer than is usually thought to an ontology which satisfies the adequacy conditions of a philosophical clarification. Let's look again at the theory.

According to it, the statement

*fa*

predicates, and I am at last using the term 'predication', *f*, for example, *being red*, by concatenating a token of the word *f* with a token of the word *a*. How does the statement '*fa*' bring *f-ness* to bear on *a*? Because, we are told, *f* stands for *f-ness*. This presents us with the following picture, predicative expressions, schematically, *f*, *being red* or *adjoins*, are correlated with singular terms. We have this general correlation between predicates and abstract singular terms, for example,

*f* with *f-ness*, being-*f*  
*R* with *R-hood*, being-*R*  
 etc.,

there are several ways in which we can formulate the abstract singular term which corresponds to a predicate. The simplest and most generally available one is simply to use the locution "being-*f*" so that instead of saying, "*f-ness*" we can say, "*being-f*," instead of "*R-hood*", we can say, "*being R*" where we are talking about a relation. Now notice that the theory commits itself to two types of semantical statements with respect to these expressions. On the one hand we are told that

'*f*' stands for *f-ness*

on the other that

'*f*' is the name of *f-ness*

and the key theme here is that of *name*. Because as we will see the metaphysical or ontological category of *object* is closely tied with the notion of naming.

To make things more interesting, the theory adds, that in the statement

*fa*

what we have really is a name of *f-ness* functioning as a predicate so that *f* is regarded as *f-ness* functioning as a predicate and that is why you get two expressions, *f* and *f-ness*. These are equivalent according to the standard theory but they express a dual functioning of '*f*' as I put it, one pointing up<sup>6</sup> towards the domain of abstract objects, universals, and the other pointing down to the class of *f-things*. So *f* faces two ways, it faces towards *f-ness* and it faces towards *f-things* and in some sense it is obviously true but whether it is philosophically illuminating or not that is the crucial issue.

How all this is to be understood is crucial to the evaluation of the theory. For while the concept of *the name* traditionally carries with it the idea that its *nominatum* is an object, it is by no means clear that the context

— stands for ...

requires that what it stood for be an object.

One is tempted to say that *anything* is an object, a temptation which is reinforced by the fact that 'things are objects' looks like a tautology. But the barest acquaintance with Scholastic thought should remind one that the *transcendental* 'anything' should not be confused with a compound expression 'any thing'. In other words the word 'thing' is not a proper part of the word 'anything' and it take it so is to be misled.

The perennial tradition contains the logical space for distinguishing among items which fall under the transcendental 'anything' between those *anythings* which are objects and those which are not. How such a distinction might be drawn will turn out to be the *heart* of our problem. It is not apparent to start with but it turns out that way.

Now the context

such and such stands for so-and-so

<sup>6</sup> Perspectives I, track 5 (#6).

belongs to the family of semantical contexts. To say what an expression *stands for* is a way of saying what it *means*. To fix our ideas, therefore, let us put aside the tidy accounts which contemporary semantical theorists, with their set-theoretical sophistication, give of semantical relations so-called and do some firsthand reflection on meaning. Otherwise we may find that we come to the problem of the ontology of predication with dirty hands.

After all, any statement has an equivalent in set theoretical terms. Thus, to take a trivial example,

there are two apples on this table

is necessarily equivalent to

the set of apples on this table has two members

but it is no more synonymous with the latter than

snow is white

is synonymous with

it is true that snow is white.

‘Snow is white’ and ‘it is true that snow is white’ are strongly indeed logically equivalent but they are not synonymous. Now I am obviously boldly striking out into the minefield which Quine has labeled but this can’t be avoided. I refrained from more exotic examples in which sentences are mapped into statements about possible worlds. The reader can find examples in any textbook on Montague grammar.

How the variety of ways in which ‘p’ can be necessarily equivalent to ‘q’ without being synonymous with it is to be botanized is a problem on which the perennial tradition is still working under watchful eyes. But then it has always been that Quines and the Hobbeses who keep the philosophical enterprise honest and force comfortable metaphors to assume criticizable form. With these sobering thoughts, back to our problem.

Consider the meaning statements, another old chestnut of mine,

‘Und’ (in German) means *and*.

Obviously true, what does it say? It doesn't say what it is ordinarily thought to say. Ostensibly, 'und' means *and*, has the form 'xRy' and asserts that two items, a German word and the item *and*—whatever that is—stand in a certain semantical relation<sup>7</sup> 'und' in German stands in a certain relation, the meaning relation to *and*. It is, however, received wisdom that this is a misconstruction of the statement, one which gives a false picture. So 10 people will tell us that meaning is not a relation and that although it appears that the sentence

'Und' (in German) means *and*

looks like a relational statement, it really isn't so and working through the argument there is useful for our purposes.

Now it might be thought that the best way to explain why meaning is *not* a relation is to tell us what meaning is. But this is not what is done. The subject is changed. We are told fascinating things about language as a system of tools, as a form of life, as a means of communication, as a medium in which speech acts are performed and a linguistic community is enabled to carry out its communal tasks. Much of what is said in this connection is both true and important, but it does not, at least directly, clarify classical problems of meaning and reference.

To do so we must take a longer look at the statement. To begin with, it is obvious that the word 'and' at the right in

'Und' in German means *and*

is not functioning in its normal way. It is not serving as a sentential connective which is the normal way of functioning of the word 'and'.

Now the most familiar way in which a word which is not in the ordinary sense ambiguous can play a radically different role is by being used in material imposition, as the scholastics put it—that is, in effect, by being placed in quotation marks. It might therefore be argued that our meaning statement, grammatically regimented, has the form

'Und' (in German) means 'and'

<sup>7</sup> Perspectives I, track 6 (#7).

where the quoted 'and' is the name of the English word.

But since it is obvious that the German word 'und' does not mean the English word 'and', this suggestion some becomes the idea that the original statement has the more complex course of

'Und' (in German) means the same as the English word 'and'.

But while of course this is true, it is by no means synonymous with the original.

Thus it becomes clear when we reflect that whereas the original statement tells us, and is designed to tell us what 'und' means, it informs us, it gives us the meaning, 'Und' (in German) means 'and', the new formulation requires additional formulations to do so.

Thus as I say that

'Und' (in German) means the same as 'et' (in French)

I gave you the meaning of the word 'und' only if, in effect, I add or it is presuppose that, 'et' in French means *and*, and this brings us back full circle.

To break out of this cycle, the first step is to ask the question, "how is the German word 'und' functioning in the original statement?" The answer should by now be obvious. Like the English word 'and' in the statement

'and' is a conjunction

it is functioning as a distributive singular term, and is equivalent to

(standard or normal) 'und's (in German) mean *and*.

And while this does not immediately clarify our problem, it does suggest that if the 'x' of our putative relational statement,

$xRy$

'und' means 'and'

is not to be a name, perhaps the same is true of the 'y'.

In other words we start loosening things out.

To make a long story short, I propose the following:

the ‘and’ of the original statement (‘Und’ (in German) means *and*) is to be construed as a meta-linguistic sortal like ‘ and ’ which I used in my introduction of dot-quotes where the dot-quotes are indeed quotation marks thus preserving the insight that it is being used in material imposition but with special criteria. ><>\plain \fs22  
\fs22 >

Any quoting device carries with it criteria for its applicability and relevance. We take into account the flexibility of quotation. Thus while the standard use of quotation marks tends to be tied to the sign designs of the quoted expressions, by ‘sign design’ I mean roughly the “look” or “shape” or the sound in case of auditory speech. Yet the quotation does not rigidly tie the force of the quotation to the sign designs for auditory tokens are included in the scope of ‘red’. So that *redd* in English is covered by the quoted expression ‘red’. Yet there is an intra-linguistic limitation, the limitation to one language for English *redds* but not German *rots* are included in the scope of ‘red’.

Thus in the case of ordinary quotes, the relevant patterns, the relevant designs are taken as functioning in a certain language. This makes it possible to distinguish between two dimensions of the criteria for being a ‘red’. The sign design dimension and the dimension in which it is considered as functioning in a specific manner in the English language. It is a familiar fact that in different functional systems, empirically different objects can play similar roles. Game events can in an important sense be tokens of the same game, even though they are embodied in different materials and motions. The example that I always used is that of chess and Texas chess or Tess where Texas chess is played with Rolls-Royces, Cadillacs, Volkswagens and with counties as their board whereas you are all familiar with the standard chess game and yet we can see that there can be a structural similarity between Tess and chess although the materials used are radically different. It is but a step up from these considerations to suggest that quotation can play an inter-linguistic role. Thus whereas ordinary quotation can transcend the specific sign designs included between them, but not the language to which they belong, we can conceive of a form of quotation, q-quotation, quotation in which

<sup>q</sup>red<sup>q</sup>

where the “q-quotes” are functioning like quotation marks, applies to tokens in any language which played a role in that language which is played by the design *red* in the language in which the quotation is made. The language with which we are concerned in dot-quoting (my q-quotation) is our background language, that is, standard English and it spells out how meaning always comes back to our own used background language.

At the beginning of the preceding paragraph I proposed that the ‘and’ of our original meaning statements that is

‘Und’ (in German) means ‘and’

be construed as a metalinguistic sortal, and indeed as occurring in a specific form of quotation which I represented by the use of dot-quotes. This gives us an analysis, if you will or a rational reconstruction to some degree, of the original statement

‘Und’ (in German) means *and*

‘Und’ (in German) means and

Where we are classifying

‘und’s in German

in terms of our background word *and*. But the reconstruction of one of the terms in a problematic context typically has repercussions for all the others.

Consider for example the familiar reconstruction of

some men are mortal

as

there are mortal men.

Which is the standard treatment of ‘some men are mortal’.<sup>8</sup> One might say that to do this is to reconstruct ‘some’ as ‘there are’. But clearly the entire sentence has been involved and has to be recast.

<sup>8</sup> Perspectives I, track 8 (#9).

In the present case the change of the ‘and’ of

‘Und’ (in German) means *and*

into *and* also requires corresponding changes in the rest of the sentence. What these changes might be is readily determined by reflecting that if *and* is a quoted expression, the basic form of sentences involving it is

[token] is a *and*

because it classifies tokens. Since we have already interpreted the “‘und’” as a distributed singular term which transforms into a reference to ‘und’s, we move smoothly from the original statement to

an ‘und’ (in German) is an *and*

we are classifying and we have than, fleshing it out,

(standard) ‘und’s (in German) are *and* s

that is they do the job in German which is done in our privileged, as it were, background language by the word *and*.

The result gives us a straightforward explanation of why meaning is not a relation. Now that is a nice bit of cash to get out of the credit for at bottom *means* is a specialized form of the copula, ‘is’, the copula is *not* a relation word. And that is a minor but very important point where our classification of expressions becomes philosophically important.

Of course it is the recalcitrant, and there are always the recalcitrant, the recalcitrant we have always with us, can argue that the copula ‘is’ stands for the relation of exemplification,

**a** is red

is then construed as

**a** exemplifies redness

and ‘is’ is interpreted as being rationally reconstructed by “exemplifies.” But underlying this is the idea that exemplification is a relation and I will be arguing very shortly that exemplification—and we are really getting into metaphysics—is *not* a relation.



So then, at least temporarily we have cash for the thesis, we have an explanation of the idea that meaning is not a relation because

‘und’ (in German) means *and*

we have, in the meaning statement, the ‘is’ of classification.

‘und’s (in German) are     *and*     .

‘und’s (in German) are the items that do the job done in our background language by ‘and’.

Clearly to say that meaning is not a relation, that is that the word ‘means’ does not stand for a relation, is not to say that meaning does not involve relations, even essentially.

Thus it should be obvious that ‘und’ in German would not mean what it does if

*p und q*

in German did not stand in the same consequence to

*nicht (nicht-p oder nicht-q)*

as do

*p and q*

to

*(not-p or not-q)*

in English.

Thus to say that meaning is not a relation is compatible with the idea that for an expression to have a specific meaning, it must stand in specific relations.

All I’m saying than is that I am giving you an account of why meaning is not a relation, I am not saying that meaning doesn’t involve relations.

Nor would ‘Sokrates’ in German mean Socrates unless the German word ‘Sokrates’ stood in certain sociological, psychological and historical relations to Plato’s snubnosed mentor.

Nor indeed would ‘rot’s in German be   red   s unless they belonged with ‘gelb’s, ‘blau’s, etc. in a family of competing predi-

cates and unless ‘das is rot’<sup>9</sup> were proper perceptual responses to red object in standard conditions.

It should also be clear that in this reconstruction ‘*sameness of meaning*’ is simply the *extremum of similarity* of meaning. If to say what an expression means is to classify it, the relevant philosophical point is that classification requires criteria, and that the criteria for classification under a sortal are typically flexible. In one classificatory context a spade may be a spade, in another a spade may be a shovel depending on the context and the purposes of classification.

Thus in a given context

this ‘nicht’ is a not

will be true or false depending on whether the criteria for being a not include or do not include the consequence relations involved in the principle of excluded middle.

At this stage the reader who has been struggling to remain in the dialogue is likely to say, “all this is interesting and perhaps important but what does it have to do with predication?” The answer is that what we had been doing is largely to explore features of our diagram and the propositions in terms of which the classical theory of predication was initially introduced. We have been gaining our bearings.

Indeed a review of the argument to date reminds us that the above discussion of meaning was initiated by an attempt to grasp the implications of the context “stands for.”

Does it, we ask, imply that what it stood for is an object? Is *standing for* a relation between one object and another? A word and a thing?

We began by pointing out that an item can be a *something* without being in any ordinary sense a thing or object. But this simply confronts us with the task of drawing an illuminating distinction between the *somethings* in terms of *anything* which are and somethings which are not objects. So far the only cash we have for this distinction is that objects have names whereas the terms which refer to non-objects may be singular terms which are not names.

And the sole alternative which it opens up would be for there to be reasons to suppose that the latter is a schema, not for names, but

<sup>9</sup> Perspectives I, track 9 (#10).

for distributive singular term. This would strike at the very heart of the theory, though the exact import of this fact would remain to be evaluated.

I come now to a crucial point which will dominate the remainder of the discussion. Although the proposition was not advanced in so many or the theory is committed, as you will all immediately see, to the idea that if

**a** is red

rather than

**a** is green

is true, there must be something in the world, in the extra linguistic domain which accounts for this fact. There is something about **a** which in some sense accounts for *a* being-red being-true and **a** being-green being-false.

What is this something? At this point, and I am sure that anybody who has gotten into an argument about universals will recognize this theme, what is this something in the world that accounts for the truth of “**a** is red” and the falsity of “**a** is green”? Well, the first move is usually to say, “it is redness.” The property of *being-red*, **a** has the property of *being-red* or *redness* and not the property of *being-green* or *greenness*. But of course the mere putting of redness into the extra linguistic domain doesn’t satisfy the argument. For the truth of

**b** is green

would put greenness there as well.

Thus the *something* turns out to be the *fact* that **a** exemplifies redness. And that’s what people will say, the fact that **a** exemplifies redness is that which makes a true that **a** is red and false that **a** is green. So the theory<sup>10</sup> presents us with two contexts in which the ostensible name ‘redness’ occurs. First of all

**a** exemplifies redness

and secondly

<sup>10</sup> Perspective I, track 10 (#10).

‘redness’ stands for redness.

These are both ostensibly *relational* contexts of the form ‘xRy’.

Now I may seem to have it in for relations but, believe me, there are relations, I am not saying there are no relations. I am saying that relations have proliferated in philosophy and *relational interpretations* have been given of items which shouldn’t have been given a relational interpretation and this is going to culminate in my argument that *temporal relations* are *not relations*. It is misleading, philosophically, to think of temporal relations as relations and that is what I am going to be discussing next time.

Now reference to exemplification reminds us of the fact to which attention was called earlier that the theory of predication is also a theory of the truth conditions of statements of the form ‘*fa*’. Does this suggest any additional intuitive principles which might help with our grappling with the diagram?

One raw candidate might connect ‘**a** exemplifies redness’ with

‘red’ is true of **a**.

This is the move that Quine makes, he takes *true of* to be a basic semantical notion and really takes it to be a basic one. So if a philosopher under Quine’s influence might well say

**a** exemplifies redness

has the same general force as

‘red’ is true of **a**.

What does this mean? Clearly the latter has the form

‘red’ (in English) is true of **a**

and must we now say that this is because ‘red’ in English stands for redness and **a** exemplifies redness that ‘red’ in English is true of **a**?

Might we not interpret these close connections between ‘red’ is true of **a**, the word red is true of **a** and a redness is true of **a** in terms of the idea that ‘redness’ is a distributed singular term

‘the ‘red’

so that

redness is true of **a**

would parse as

standard 'red's are true of **a**

and hence hopefully as sentences which consist of the predicate 'red' concatenated with an individual constant are true just in case the constant is '*a*'. In other words if the constant is '*a*' then the sentence consisting of the predicate red concatenated with it would be true.

But now to make a long story short why not take exactly the same tact with the exception that we interpret redness not as

the 'red'

but rather as

the red

mobilizing an old friend, after all redness can scarcely be identified with the English predicate 'red'—the property of *being-red* is scarcely parochial to our language community—it is conceptually possible to identify it with a roll which is play in English by 'red', in French by 'rouge' and in an interestingly different language by (whatever) '....' where 'red', 'rouge', '....' are all bearing in mind the flexibility of quotations based on similarity of role.

If we make this move however we confront the fact that

'red' in English stands for redness

and this now threatens to become

'red' in English stands for the red

and hence given our previous statements in respect to meaning contexts to

'red's in English are red s

and this would require that

'rot' in German means *red*

and

‘rot’ in German stands for redness  
 would have the same depth grammar, namely  
 rot’s in German are red s.

But is this absurd? Of these two semantical contexts, the former is that which is used to explain the meaning of a term.<sup>11</sup>

When I say to you  
 ‘und’ in German means *and*  
 I am explaining the meaning of the German word ‘und’. And this has the virtue, then, that in the statement  
 ‘und’ means *and*

the very word in English follows the word ‘means’ and is the very word we would rehearse in order to understand how ‘rot’ in German functions.

But meaning also relates to truth. In addition to the context  
 ‘Schnee is weiss’ (in German) mean *snow is white*  
 which is used to explain the meaning of ‘Schnee is weiss’ we have  
 ‘Scnee is weiss’ stands for *that snow is white*  
 which dovetails with the predication of truth  
*that snow is white* is true.

Consider also the pair

‘dreieckig’ (in German) means *triangular*  
 ‘dreieckig’ (in German) stands for *triangularity*  
 the latter involves a singular term ‘triangularity’, by virtue of which it dovetails with  
**a** exemplifies triangularity  
 and is equivalent

<sup>11</sup> Perspectives I, track 11 (#12).

triangularity is true of **a**.

Thus it would not be without reason that

‘dreieckig’s (in German) our triangular s

transforms into both

‘dreieckig’ (in German) means *triangular*

for its *explanation*, and

‘dreieckig’ (in German) stands for *triangularity*

giving a *truth condition*.

At this point the argument might seem to have established at most that whereas according to the standard theory the *something* in addition to **a** required by the truth of

red **a**

is a *nominatum*, and hence, in a straightforward sense, an object, a structurally similar thesis however, can be constructed in terms of which ‘*f-ness*’ is not a name but, as you can expect, a distributive singular term.

Now if we reduce the expression ‘distributive object’ in such a way that

*the K* is a distributive object

is a material mode of speech for

‘The K’ is a distributive singular term

we might put this by saying that the above suggestion has amounted to the claim that a form of “moderate realism” can be constructed which is structurally similar to the theory with which we began in which we have the term *fness* now construed not as a name of an abstract object but as a distributive singular term. Such a realism would be “moderate” in that the *res* in question, *fness*, would be a distributive object—this by the way is highly relevant to the problem of the nature of *mathematical objects*, they turn out to be distributive objects and not objects in the standard classical sense.

But of course the suggestion thus far constructed is much more radical, *fness* has been interpreted not as an extra-linguistic distributive object like *the lion*, where we have the equivalence

the lion is

lions normally are

or,

the triangle is

triangles normally are

but rather as a linguistic distributive object, for example

the red is

that is

red s normally are predicates

for example or,

the ‘und’ is

‘und’s normally are conjunctions

and this it might be said—pointing to the family resemblance between thought and language—would take us far from moderate realism to a conceptualism with all the puzzles that this entails. To bring matters to a head, if to be a

red

is to do something in some language or other done in our background language by ‘red’ then what is this job by virtue of what is it a *predicative* job?

At this point the standard theory can be expected to concede that I concepts introduced by its critics are useful... that’s very interesting, yes... and important but argue that what is called for is a far more careful distinction between the psychological<sup>12</sup> and the logical dimensions of predication. In doing so it would claim that the existence of the linguistic distributive object, the red , is

<sup>12</sup> Perspectives I, track 12 (#13).



compatible with the existence of the nonlinguistic object *redness*, and suggest that it is altogether premature to identify the property of *being-red* with the distributive linguistic object, the red which is the distributive singular term which implies to any expression in any language which does the job of our background word 'red'.

The idea that there is a linguistic "object" in the neighborhood of the predicate 'red' is suggestive but surely much honest toil would have to be done to establish that this "object" is a plausible candidate to be that in the world by virtue of a relation to which *a* is red.

This toil begins appropriately with Bertrand Russell. We must cope with his argument for platonic realism in his classic *The Problems of Philosophy* on which we all, I take it, cut our teeth.

His argument begins by pointing out that to make a basic statement, more is necessary and the names of particulars. It is obvious that a list of names such as,

Cassio, Desdemona and so on

simply raises the question "well what about them?"<sup>13</sup>

Russell draws the consequence that to make a statement, a sentence must include an item which is not the name of a particular, thus

Cassio *loves* Desdemona

or, in the nonrelational case

triangular *a*.

It is, of course, obvious that it would be a mistake to equate

item which is not the name of a particular

with

item which is the name of a non-particular

<sup>13</sup> WS knew that the Cratylus and the Sophist raise the issue because he discussed the issue of the sense in which Plato could be said to have contributed to the invention of the concept of a sentence (a combination) in the dialogues where he distinguishes mere lists from combinations of "words" consisting of "subjects" and "predicates." 431B and Sophist, 262B.

unfortunately, Russell makes exactly this mistake. Since language includes many items which ostensibly fall in the latter category, ostensibly names of non-particulars, and since they pair up nicely in accordance with the pattern of

<i>f</i>	being <i>f</i>
triangular	begin triangular (triangularity)
next to	next-to-ness, <i>being-next-to</i>

and so on, and the temptation to interpret the distinctive role in statements of non-names of particulars in terms of the distinctive character of being a name of a non-particular, an abstract singular term, becomes attractive. It is this line of thought which, if Russell is our guide, underlies to construal of

*fa*

as having the form

*f-ness a*

remember I devoted some discussion in the beginning to the two ways in which *f* is facing, one as standing for *fness* and another as denoting *f-things* and Russell is moved by his argument into reinforcing this feature of the classical theory of predication.

Next time I will begin with the specific discussion of predication as growing out of Russell's attempt to understand predication in *The Problems of Philosophy*.

I will continue with the search for basic ontology and the theory of time in the next lecture.<sup>14</sup>

## Lecture II

### Predication

<sup>14</sup> Perspectives I, track 12 (#13) at 4:11. Aside from a story about G.E. Moore giving a lecture at the University of Michigan, track 13, the final track, contains no discussion or lecture.

I have been introducing the topic of predication which has been hovering over the presentation. I believe in taking a running jump at a topic pounding it as firmly as possible and encasing it in considerations and then letting the superstructure follow. So I ended with a reference to Bertrand Russell on the topic of predication. Bertrand Russell, you remember, in his *Problems of Philosophy* argued that a statement is not simply a list of referring expressions, a point that is obvious to us now but which, when Russell was writing had not been clearly developed. As I put it, if we had a list of names, say

Tom, Dick, Harry, McTaggart, President Reagan

what we have is a list and our temptation is to ask, “what about them?” Russell argued that there must be at least an expression in the sentence which is not a name or a referring expression and, or as he put it, an expression which doesn’t refer to or name particulars. But he, at that time true a fatal conclusion and inferred that there must be an expression which is the name of a *non-particular*. We moved from

not the name of a particular

to

is the name of a non-particular.

And of course there are all kinds of abstract singular terms available and a virtual ritual for introducing abstract singular terms from predicates. So that we have

triangular    triangularity

red            redness

and we also have the ordinary language devices

*-ity, -hood, and -ness*

and

being

so that there was a whole galaxy of expressions available for keeping statements from being simply a list of names. So he looked at the sentence

Desdemona loves Cassio

and he said, “aha! You’ve got ‘loves’ there and that is not the name of a particular.” So he started construing it as referring to an abstract object namely,

loving.

So he developed in his book a theory of Platonic universals in a very classic formulation.

In the course of his development, Russell came to see that a sentence could consist of names and one could construe *loving* as a name of, to him, the universal

*loving-hood, or loving-ness*

and so he had in a sentence consisting of

loving<sup>15</sup>

and then,

loving Desdemona, Cassio.

And he said, “here we make a statement by using three names.” He told us that you must remember that these three words themselves are related here. So he gradually developed a thesis that we can express the relationship between three objects by placing the names of these objects or tokens of them in a relation, so it is by a relation of names that we express a relation of objects, in this case, exemplification. So that we would express that Desdemona and Cassio stand in this relation by simply a relation of names in this way, by concatenating the relation word with the pair of object expressions and so he introduced a theme which I want to highlight at the beginning of this period.

The idea that it is by relating the expressions of items that we express a relation between the items, that idea became the essential feature of the pictorial, as I put it, theory of language. And it came to its flower in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*.

Once you see that you can express a relation by relating the names, you notice fairly soon that the same move can be made down

<sup>15</sup> Perspectives II, track 1 (#2).

a level where you are not talking about the relation or supposed relation of exemplification, you can make use of simply ordinary relations. For example,

**a is next to b**

here I have the relational expression 'is next to' and I have the names of two objects but as Wittgenstein saw, we can also express it by simply writing 'a' and 'b' like this

ab

by as it were, just by relating the names 'a' and 'b'. This leads to the idea that since these are synonymous according to our conventions then what we have here is a relation between the names 'a' and 'b'. It is a contrived relation because it involves the expression 'is next to' but the expression is functioning in a unique kind of way, as I put it is an *auxiliary expression* and what it does is to bring about that the words 'a' and 'b' have a 'is next to' between them. So 'is next to here' is functioning as an instance of a sign design so that if we have a "sign design quote" an "asterisk" quote, we could then have

a case of \*is next to\* between 'a' and 'b'

so they stand in the dyadic relation of having an \*is next to\* between them. This enables us to see of these two sentences can have the same syntactical form, they are both conventional dyadic relations between 'a' and 'b'. In one case there is the dyadic relation of being catty-corner, to the left of, and here we have that in place of having a \*is next to\* between them. So these can have the same syntactical form in a deeper sense than what appears on the surface. Wittgenstein developed the theme that we express the dyadic fact by making a dyadic relation exist between the names of the elements. In order to see that these two have the same syntactical form, we have to look at it in those terms. This starts out as an idea but it soon begins to take over and it did take over although Wittgenstein never really appreciated what he was doing because Wittgenstein often talks as though they were abstract objects. But the fundamen-

tal insight that he had was following on Russell, you can express relations by relating the names.<sup>16</sup>

I have asked my readers to imagine a language called Jumblese which is the language which is spoken on the islands which Edward Lear pronounced this quote about namely “Far and few, far and few, Are the lands where the Jumblies live” and Jumblese is the language. Anyway, in Jumblese you don’t use any auxiliary expressions, you express a relational statement without the use of auxiliary expressions simply in relating the names, so here is an expression in Jumblese

Jumblese	$a_b$
English PMese	<i>next-to(a,b)</i>

in a subject-predicate language we have the use of auxiliary expressions like ‘is next to’. But as I said in the pure form of the theory ‘is next to’ performs the sole function of bringing it about that there is a dyadic relation between ‘*a*’ and ‘*b*’ when, ‘next to’ is simply a bringing it about that ‘*a*’ and ‘*b*’ have relation, an ‘is next to’ between them. According to the Jumblies philosophers, they thought that the role of predicates in a language with predicates is simply to be, as it were, instruments for making a relation possible. The semantical role of ‘is next to’ is that of providing material for defining the relation of ‘has and is next to’ between them. And then we get the radical thesis that predication is simply the use of auxiliary symbols and therefore in a way, predicative words, are not performing anything like the function of other words. ‘*a*’ refers to **a**, ‘*b*’ refers to **b** but the ‘is next to’ simply is the material for a relation between those names. So predicates, according to this approach to predication which I defend by the way, are merely auxiliary symbols and in no deeper sense do they have meaning.

This throws new light on the argument that I was offering last time. Consider for example, the word

red

and the German word

rot.

<sup>16</sup> Perspectives II, track 2 (#3).

I said that

‘rot’s in German are red s.

And that as we saw simply tells us that ‘rot’s in German do the job done in our language by the word ‘red’ and what is the job of the word ‘red’?—it is to be an auxiliary symbol. To say that it stands for redness, again, is simply to say that

‘rot’s in German do the job done in our language by the predicate red.

And that job is purely an auxiliary one but in this case where we don’t have a relation consider

*fa*

the syntactical form of this is not what you might think, on the classical theory the ‘*fa*’ is thought of as involving two expressions each of which has an independent semantical tie with realities. So that ‘*a*’ stands for a particular, it is the name of a particular, and ‘*f*’ stands for *fness* an abstract object and it would of course denote red things. So we get an additional way of coming to see that the classical theory had a false paradigm of ‘*f*’ and ‘*a*’ each having a different tie with reality. Of course according to Jumblese what ‘*f*’ does here is to give the token of *a*, the character of being preceded by an ‘*f*’. So here we have again

\*f\*a,

we have here<sup>17</sup> an \*f\* and ‘*a*’ is concatenated it. So the use of the predicate is simply that of an auxiliary symbol which gives *a* a certain character, the character of being preceded by an ‘*f*’, just as we have here, ‘*a*’ and ‘*b*’ having *a*, say, “catty-corner” between them,

*ab*

so here in the simpler statement form,

*fa*

we have ‘*a*’ as having the character of being preceded by an ‘*f*’.

<sup>17</sup> Track 3 (#4)

And in Jumblese, we wouldn't use an auxiliary symbol like '*f*', we can simply use a wavy *f* to say that *a* is *f*. We attribute characters to objects by bringing it about that the names of the objects have certain characters and this character is conventional so we could use a wavy *f* to say that *a* is red, or we can use a block **A**, we could use any device for giving '*a*' a distinctive character in order to say that *a* is red. So in a subject-predicate language like English we say, "*a* is red" and in Jumblese we simply say, *f*, a form either verbally or in writing an '*a*' with a distinctive character, either in writing using a *f*, or in speech I might say, '*A!*' and so on,<sup>18</sup>

I want you to take this view seriously because it an argument against Platonism you have a protean opponent, Plato is like Proteus and there is no such thing as a simple refutation of Plato to show that he is wrong, you do so by constructing another framework which is not platonic in which you can say everything you want to say and that Plato would say and that is what I am trying to do here.

That is the theory of predication and according to the theory of predication *fness* is an illusion, *fness* is simply the way of referring to a linguistic device whereby one brings it about that the names have a certain property. For example next-to-ness is a way of referring to a function that the expression 'next to' does in bringing it about that two names have an 'is next to' between them. And

*fa*

is a way to talk of *fness*, *fness* tells us that '*f*'s do the job of bringing it about that the name, for example, '*a*' has a certain character, the character of being preceded by an '*f*'.

Now you can see that this is a radical, should I say, demeaning of abstract singular terms. They are not names of objects, they are simply ways of expressing how the presence of the predicate is doing its job of characterizing a referring expression which occurs in an appropriate relation concatenated to it.

You remember that many philosophers today want to analyze the notion of events in terms of some kind of pairing of abstract entity and a particular which is called an *event*, so that the standard view of events today would be that events are objects and that, what

18 Towards a theory of Predication, section 164.



we have in predication of events involves the sort of classical theory of predication which I have been attempting to undercut.

### Time

Let me get into time. We are about ready to dive into it. Let's start out by looking at some event locutions. Consider the classical<sup>19</sup> example

Socrates runs

here we have a sentence of the form

Socrates + Verb

We have the tie between process statements and verbs which is essential to it and verbs are a form predication. So what we have then is the sentence

Socrates runs

and we also have the event sentence

a running by Socrates took place.

The latter is what I want to focus attention on because what you can say in a simple subject predicate sentence like 'Socrates runs', we can also say by means of the locution,

a running by Socrates took place.

Now 'taking place' here, it should be clear, is a cousin of *exemplifies*. The last time I was characterizing exemplification as equivalent to "true of", for example

a exemplifies triangularity

is a higher order semantical statement to the effect that a certain abstract entity namely, *triangularity*, is true of **a**. I called 'exemplifies' (or 'exemplification') an *alethic* expression, referring to the word 'true' and what I want to suggest now is that when we say that

a running by Socrates took place

<sup>19</sup> Perspectives II, track 4 (#5).

what we are really doing is saying

is  
that he runs      was              true of Socrates.  
will be

Thus ‘taking place’ is an alethic expression.

Other examples of alethic predicates pertaining to events are ‘perform’, and ‘participated in’ they look relational. But here are two more examples of items that *look* relational but are not. Thus

Socrates performed a running  
becomes  
that he runs was true of Socrates,

that is

$x$  runs was true  
if you put Socrates for  $x$ .

We have another example,  
Jones participated in a robbery

and that parses out, according to this framework, into

that he and others jointly robbed a third-party was true of  
Jones.

We can say

that Jones participated in a robbery  
involves the notion of truth. I will be summing up some views about  
truth next time.

I want to call attention to the equivalence between  
Socrates ran

and

a running by Socrates took place  
and arguing that  
a running by Socrates took place

is like an exemplification statement and hence the two statements are related as

**a** is triangular

and

**a** exemplifies triangularity.

They are logically equivalent but not synonymous. Just as

snow is white is true

is logically equivalent to

snow is white

but is not synonymous with it.

I want to turn immediately to the character of *time* and to make the basic point that I want to make this evening. With qualifications that are to be discussed later, *talk about events is a way of talking about things changing*. Thus there are *no events in addition* to changing things or persons. As I indicated, the closely related ontological point, there are *no temporal relations*. The key to this point is the fact that relation words are predicates and are completed into atomic sentences by singular terms, like ‘a is next to be’.<sup>20</sup>

Predicates can be construed, as you know, as open sentences but not every open sentence is a predicate, obviously examples are

if [...] or [...]

if [...] then [...]

so that logical connectives are not relation words but again the word relation is sometimes used in a, what we might call “superficial” grammatical sense and we need an ontological account of relations. Consider for example certain expressions which are always taken to stand for relations, namely,

before

during

<sup>20</sup> Perspectives II, track 5 (#6).

after

while

as in

Socrates ran before he dined.

Or to use the example which I originally used to make this point,

Nero fiddled while Rome burned.<sup>21</sup>

And the crucial point here, which stands out very clearly in this latter example, we have expressions which flank the 'while' which are *not singular terms* but sentences. And the characteristic feature of relational predicates is that they are flanked by singular terms, for example

a is next to b

'next to' is expressing a relation between the objects *a* and *b* which are referred to by singular terms whereas in the sentence

Nero fiddled while Rome burned

what flanks the "while" is two sentences and that as I said, it should be clear that sentences are not referring expressions. Now almost every statement that you can make is going to become controversial and there are died in the wool Fregeans who will insist that sentences are singular terms. But again I am going to be working with this view that relational sentences in addition to the relation expression involve referring expressions and that sentences are not referring expressions.

Now I am certainly very sympathetic with what Frege was doing and therefore that we can do certain things by classifying together names and sentences which you can't do otherwise but that doesn't mean that from an ontological standpoint he was right. Sentences are not names and I will simply assume that without arguing the point further.

21 Time and the World Order, p. 552. Also in the Carus Lectures, "Naturalism and Process," part II, section 21 ff where the discussion more closely parallels the present section because WS had already expanded his revised theory of events.

Consider the words

before

during

after

while

in “Time and The World Order” I characterize these words as *temporal connectives* to emphasize that like the logical connectives they are *not relation words*. I now think it better to construe them as *adverbs*, and await an adequate theory of adverbial modifiers for further illumination.<sup>22</sup> By adverb I mean an expression which when concatenated with the verb transforms it into another verb so that we might have

Jones ran quickly

you have the verb ‘ran’ modified by the adverb ‘quickly’ and the conjoint pair is a new verb, ‘ran quickly’, so ‘to run quickly’ is the verb built out of ‘run’ and the adverb ‘quickly’.

Now one of the most misleading features of certain properties is that they aid and abet the idea that these expressions that I am talking about, ‘before’, ‘during’, ‘after’ and so on...reinforce the illusion that they are relation words. For example, relations typically have such characteristics as transitivity, asymmetry, reflexiveness, and the like. And therefore some of these apply to our examples, and it might look as though this countenances the idea that these words are relation words. Consider

a is taller than b

b is taller than c

therefore, a is taller than c

here we would say that the relation of “being taller than” is transitive and this is true. But now consider

if p, then q

<sup>22</sup> WS takes up the discussion that appears in the Carus Lectures, “Naturalism and Process,” section III, paragraph 33.

if q, then r

therefore, if p then r<sup>23</sup>

that is transitive but it is not a relation so that the mere fact that something exhibit's transitivity doesn't guarantee that it is a relation. Or consider the following, which is closer to home,

S<sub>1</sub> V-ed before S<sub>2</sub> V-ed

(for example, S<sub>1</sub> sneezed before S<sub>2</sub> sneezed)

S<sub>2</sub> V-ed before S<sub>3</sub> V-ed

Therefore, S<sub>1</sub> V-ed before S<sub>3</sub> V-ed

we have here an example of transitivity but still 'before' is not a relation. I'm arguing, I'm building up the case.

All right, let's turn our attention from the sentence

Socrates ran once

to the event expression

the running by Socrates

If we seize upon the idiomatic

the running by Socrates was before the dining by Socrates

we might reason as follows:

This sentence has the surface form

[singular term] was before [singular term]

[referring expression] before [referring expression]

therefore it is *prima facie* proper to construe *before* in this context as a relation

because that would be different from

Socrates ran once before he dined

where we have a sentences flanking the expression in question.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Perspectives II, track 6 (#7).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. the footnote for part III, section 33 in the Carus Lectures. The present paragraph becomes section 39.

If the strategy I have been outlining so far is correct, the surface grammar is misleading. The idiomatic sentence above must be replaced by the more perspicuous

The running by Socrates *took place* before the dining by Socrates *took place*.

Now we have *before* flanked by what? Sentences. So that the flanking of 'before' by singular terms was an *illusion* based on a surface grammar which omitted the essential structure of the substructure. So, as I say, here we have

'before' flanked by sentences rather than the singular terms:

the running by Socrates

and

the dining by Socrates

These singular terms not only do not flank 'before', they are surface transforms of general terms. And I can illustrate this by means of the following sequence:

the running by Socrates was before the dining by Socrates

(that was the idiomatic or superficial formulation)

the running by Socrates took place before the dining Socrates took place

(and then according to our analysis)

that he runs was true of Socrates before that he dines was true of Socrates

that Socrates runs was true before that Socrates dines was true

'Socrates runs' was true before 'Socrates dines' was true

(and then, since those are distributed singular terms we unpack it as follows)

Socrates runs *s were* true before Socrates dines *s were* true

So in the concluding formulation, both sources of the original construal of ‘before’ as a relation word disappear, and its role as a temporal connective made manifest.

Thus even in the context of explicit event expressions, *before* remains a temporal connective and not a relation. From this perspective, the relational account, *relational theories of time*—taken seriously as such—involve a category mistake, *as does the ontology of events*—[which are] the ‘objects’ introduced [by the relational account] as you know, to serve as the terms of temporal ‘relations’. What we need is a *temporal connective* theory of time. A theory of time that is built on these facts and I have been presenting.

And now, let’s introduce some more material into the discussion. So far we have been dealing with event expressions formed from sentences about changing things. For example

Socrates runs

and then going to

the running by Socrates.

We have been construing expressions of the form

the V-ing of S

where ‘V’ just takes any verb:

the running of Socrates

we are construing these as<sup>25</sup> metalinguistic transforms of sentences of the form

S Vs

Socrates runs

then we transform that into a metalinguistic locution, namely,

the running by Socrates

and

that he runs was true of Socrates

<sup>25</sup> Perspectives II, track 7 (#8).



Now consider the occurrence in the manifest image framework of verbs which take dummy subjects. Consider

it rains

it thunders

it lightnings

In the case of rain it is not difficult to find an equivalent sentence which has as its subject an unproblematic referring expression, thus

rain rained

or,

drops of water fell

there we have 'drops of water' as our subject. Other cases are more difficult, we might try

thunder thundered

lightning lightninged

to get subjects for our sentence, for subject-verb, 'thunder' is the subject, 'thundered' is the verb. In 'lightning lightninged', 'lightning' is the subject, 'lightninged' is the verb. Obviously these are true sentences but they are not illuminating. Whereas we can ostensibly cash out rain in terms of drops of water, in these cases there seems to be no available referring expressions which have a sense independent of the verbs which are predicated of them. We might try

a sound thundered

or

a flash lightninged

but these seem to raise the same problem all over again, and here we are simply moving from the specific to the generic—from, for example, 'thunder' to 'sound'. We want to understand such noun expressions as

a sound

a flash

as well as sentences such as

there was lightning

there was a clap of thunder

there was a sound.

### Absolute Processes

Now instead of addressing this topic directly, I shall sidle into it by considering the account of the processes expressed by these verbs which was offered by a philosopher who has thrown as much light as anybody on problems pertaining to time, I refer of course, to C.D. Broad.

Broad introduces the concept of what he calls 'absolute processes'—which might be called subjectless or objectless events. These are processes the occurrence of which is in the first instance, expressed by sentences of the kind that we have just been looking at that is, which either do not have logical subjects at all or which have dummy logical subjects like 'It' with no antecedent.

In other words, the sentences which give them their primary expression do not have the form

Socrates runs,

i.e.,

S Vs

nor can plausible paraphrases be found which have genuine logical subjects. Notice, for example, that 'electrons jumped across the gap' is not to count, in the desired sense, as a paraphrase of 'there was lightning'. We must distinguish between the questions:

can all statements which are ostensibly about absolute processes be *paraphrased* in terms of changing things?

And,

granted that some are not, can the absolute processes to which they refer be *explained* in terms of changing things?

electrons for example.

To give a negative answer to the first question is to grant the existence in the manifest image of absolute processes. To give an affirmative answer to the second question would seem to commit one to the availability in principle of the scientific account of the world in which all processes are reduced, in the sense in which kinetic theory reduces heat to molecular motion, to processes with subjects, molecules for example.

Needless to say, to commit oneself to the latter idea is compatible with holding that in some sense or other of “reduce,” processes with subjects can be reduced to subjectless processes. Indeed, it might be argued that two theories might have the same factual content—whatever this means—and yet one can have the grammar of changing things, Socrates runs, the other that of absolute processes like,

it lightninged.

All of these questions—and more—are clearly buzzing around our heads when we begin to wonder about the relative merits of substance ontologies and process ontologies.

In “Time and the World Order,” before leaping forward,<sup>26</sup> I looked at two alternative ways of talking about temporal facts, the *substance way* and the *event way*. I now think that I was wrong.<sup>27</sup> I am going to as it were, apologize for being wrong because I was radically wrong. I really misinterpreted the status of event expressions.

First of all we have to get a better grip on this idea of absolute processes. Absolute processes you will remember, are processes, the expression of which does not involve a referring expression once again, in the classical way, as

Socrates is involved in Socrates runs.

<sup>26</sup> Perspectives II, track 8 (#9).

<sup>27</sup> WS also makes this point in “Metaphysics and the Concept of a Person,” p. 230, n. 6 which marks the first place that he acknowledges the evolution of his theory of events.

Let us consider, following Broad, sounds. Here it is essential to distinguish between the object which produces the sound and the sound produced.

To take a well-worn example, a bell when struck by its clapper, produces a familiar sound. When the bell tolls, it produces a sequence of sounds. The *tolling* of the bell belongs to the framework of events examined in the preceding section like

Socrates runs.

In other words we have the event of a bell tolling but we are now concerned with the logical grammar of the sounds produced.<sup>28</sup> Let's submit some analogies now.]

In the manifest image, the volume of pink, I want you to imagine a pink ice cube, my classical example, on top of that device over there. There is a pink ice cube on top. Now that pink ice cube is pink! I want you to think of it as interestingly pink, not just pink in the Lockean-Cartesian sense of normally producing experiences of pink but just PINK!

I want you to be naive realist there. Some people would say it is real hard-headed realism other people would regard it as naive but I want you to get into that frame of reference. So there is a pink ice cube and there is a volume of pink on top of that cabinet, I guess it's a cabinet. So there is a cubicle volume of pink on top of that cabinet and that cubicle volume of pink is connected with such causal property as ice for glasses, as chilling and solid and so on. Of course that pink ice cube is also pink in a dispositional sense.<sup>29</sup>

[BREAK]

### Lecture III

<sup>28</sup> A phrase occurs here that is difficult to hear, cf. Carus lecture II, section 59.

<sup>29</sup> The tape appears to end abruptly at this point, a point that corresponds to the Carus lecture II, paragraph 60 but it would appear that it would continue through to section VI, paragraph 110 which ends the discussion of absolute processes. When drawing upon these analogies, I remember asking Sellars if the buzz could be in a place the way the pink was when he was presenting this view in a seminar. He answered, "Well, sound can fill a room!"

## Time

I have been presenting views as they relate to standard issues in philosophy. First of all I want to briefly pay attention to time, what is time? The question “What is ...” as you know often turns out to be a matter of definitions... a definition in the sense of the genus and differentia. But any way a definition is essentially an explanation of the meaning of the word and I want to make a few explanatory remarks.<sup>30</sup>

Aristotle speaks of time as the measure of change in things. This is essentially true but it needs to be made a bit more precise and I want to suggest that time is the real number series, the series of real numbers as correlated with certain measuring procedures. So that time involves coordination of numbers, numbers in the days, years, minutes and seconds or whatever to the world. And the key notion here is the notion of a functor to take a very simple case which makes all the essential points, and this time is dealing with space, space is a three-dimensional array of real numbers as coordinated with measurements and consider for example the functor length-in-inches. We have, then, a functor length-in-inches ( $f$ ) followed by  $x$ , is for example, 10:

$$f(x)=10$$

So that by means of the functor, we get a correlation in the application, a correlation of the length of a certain object with 10.<sup>31</sup> So I want you to think of space and time, as essentially numbers and that is their ontological status. By itself, that is not illuminating until you know something about the ontological status of numbers but at least it is a helpful remark because it gives us something to think of as a referent for *time*, time is a domain of real numbers as correlated with a measuring device, a clock example.

Well what is the status of numbers? First of all I’m going to talk about classes. Consider this statement

Tom is a man

<sup>30</sup> Perspective III, track 0 (#1). Section II

<sup>31</sup> See Jeffrey Sicha’s *A Metaphysics of Elementary Mathematics* for the appropriate treatment of number.

Fido is a dog

Leo is a lion

these are basic subject predicate statements involving sortal predication for example ‘Tom is a man’ becomes

Tom    1 Man

(Let me call it ‘ 1’ because I am going to be contrasting it in a moment with ‘ 2’)

where ‘man’ is the sortal. Now correlated with ‘Tom is a man’, we have the statement

Tom    mankind

and this begins to strike us again as a relational context, ‘Tom is a member of mankind’. Now I am going to represent that as

Tom    2 mankind

and it looks as though ‘ 2’ stood for the relationship of “being a member of”. As you can intuitively see right now the move I am going to make that

Tom    2 mankind

stands to

Tom    1 man

as

**a** exemplifies *redness*

stands to

**a** is red

and that is the ultimate clarification of the so-called class membership relation, it is just a cousin of “exemplifies.” It is an *alethic predicate*.

We get the logical form here,

IND 1man is true of Tom

where you replace the metalinguistic sortal IND with Tom just as we have, you'll remember,

**a** exemplifies redness

has the form

red IND is true of **a**  $\leftrightarrow$  the ( red [INDCON]) is true of **a**  $\leftrightarrow$

Just as *exemplifies* is an *alethic* context, so is *class membership*.<sup>32</sup>

Now consider numbers. They all fall into place very neatly. For example, suppose I were to say that one piece of chalk is in this room we'll have a *logistice* interpretation, we would have

( $\exists x$ )  $x$  is a piece of chalk and  $\sim(\exists y)$  such that  $y$  is different from  $x$  and is also a piece of chalk.

So we have given an account of the statement attributing the character of *being-one* to a piece of chalk in this room. Roughly, the theme is

one K = for ( $\exists x$ )  $x \in$  KIND and  $\sim(\exists y) y \neq x$  and  $y \in$  KIND

and that is the number one. The *number one* becomes a *metalinguistic sortal* just as *f-ness* becomes a metalinguistic sortal.

And how about the *number two*? We make the exactly parallel move. The number two, what is it? It is a metalinguistic sortal. We say that there are, for example, two archbishops in England, we would say

( $\exists x$ )  $x =$  an archbishop and  $\sim(\exists y) y =$  is an archbishop in England and  $y \neq x$ <sup>33</sup>

so we could say that

two = the ( $\exists x$ ) ( $\exists y$ )  $x, y \in$  KIND

And that is true of archbishops from England. In other words, it is true if we substitute Archbishop in England for KIND, where

<sup>32</sup> Cf. See Naturalism and Ontology 4, paragraph 99.

<sup>33</sup> See Sicha's treatment of quantifiers, p.146 in the *Metaphysics of Mathematics*.

KIND is a non-illustrating metalinguistic sortal. So there we get an extension of this metalinguistic approach to the ontological status of items, we get the extension to classes and to numbers. Well, there is nothing very surprising in that except that mathematicians are worried about what kinds of things they are talking about, namely numbers. They think of them as *objects* in the classical sense of *objects*. And what I am showing is that numbers are, if you will, distributive objects. They are distributive conceptual objects, then, that nails their status down and should resolve some of the perplexities that people get into when they try to think of numbers as objects.

### Truth

The next topic that I want to discuss is that of truth. I have been talking about the meaning of predicates and the importance of the concept of truth and I want now to talk about truth. In talking about truth, we obviously have to pay our respects to Tarski. Then obviously he is doing something. The question is, "what exactly is Tarski doing?" And nobody that I know of has seen exactly what Tarski is doing and therefore I am going to try to spell out what I see as Tarski's accomplishments.

I was checking out of my hotel and took one bag down, it was heavy and I just wanted to take it down but by the time I got back to my room, industrious people had already been turning it inside out and had taken all my papers—which had been carefully ordered—then, in effect, thrown them in the waste paper basket. So I had to spend half an hour with reordering and I haven't completely done that yet so if I hesitate here it is because I am still operating with a handicap.<sup>34</sup>

What is Tarski doing? What is the formalist approach doing? I have given a theory of meaning according to which meaning is not a relation. There is another way of doing this but not doing the same thing exactly. For example, consider the following formalist account of what it is to be a predicate.

In German first of all, given individual constants,<sup>35</sup> consider the following formula

<sup>34</sup> Perspectives III, track 2 (#3).

<sup>35</sup> Compare "Toward a Theory of Predication," sections 107ff..



$x$  den (in German)  $y$      $x = \text{'Sokrates'}$      $y = \textit{Socrates}$ .

$x$  den (in German)  $y$      $x = \text{'Griechenland'}$      $y = \textit{Greece}$ .

$x$  den (in German)  $y$      $x = \text{'der Mond'}$      $y = \textit{the moon}$ .

This would be a standard example of a listing specification of singular terms and their meaning in German. What you do is give a listing of the expressions and then a listing of what the expressions denote. We can call this a “listing definition.” Now the listing definition is obviously true but notice that if interpreted as a definition, it defines “denotes in German” in terms of conjunction, disjunction, identity and the correct list of wedded pairs. But it has little of substance to say about the wedding ceremony, it simply gives a list of words and a list of things. We can make a parallel move in the case of *satisfaction* which is a key notion in formal semantics thus after defining “predicate” in German by a listing of predicates and listings INDCON in the way that I illustrated, we can go on and explain satisfaction.<sup>36</sup>

We get for example

$x$  satisfies (in German)  $y =_{\text{df}} x = a \ \& \ y = \text{'rot'} \ \& \ \text{red}(a)$

or

$x =_{\text{df}} b \ \& \ y =_{\text{df}} \text{'blau'} \ \& \ \text{blue}(b)$

or

and obviously we can keep on going until we have covered all the circumstances in the language and we get a *listing* account of satisfaction.

Again, it doesn't illuminate what satisfaction is but it gives us an extensional equivalence of the definition. These definitions by listing put us in a position to introduce the technical expression, “true in German” taking also as an expression. Then we can define it as follows

a sentence

<sup>36</sup> The definitions of INDCON and “predicate” alluded to are not actually given here but they appear in TTP, sections 110 ff.

PR[INDCON] is true-in-German    INDCON den-in-German  
 $a$  and  $a$  satisfies 'rot'

or

INDCON den-in-German  
 $b$  and  $b$  satisfies 'blau'

or etc., etc., etc..

We get, then, an account of truth in German which gives us simply a listing of true sentences in German in accordance with previous listings of referring expressions and predicates.

Now given these listing stipulations, the *T-sentences* come out, for example, it is a consequence of those listing definitions that

'rot  $a$ ' is true-in-German    red( $a$ )

But all this provides little or no illumination as to how the German sentence 'rot( $a$ )' must be connected with the world in order to be assessed as *true* which, after all, despite all the logic that is floating around, is an evaluation, truth is an evaluative notion, of course.

Thus given listing definitions of 'denotes in E' and 'satisfies in E' and the corresponding definition of 'true in E,' it becomes a logical truth that

' $fa$ ' is true-in-English     $fa$ .

Unless we are going to permit ourselves to be hypnotized by all this rigor, it is essential to remind ourselves that even if

P    Q

is logically true, it need not be the case that 'p' explains 'q'. Explaining and logical equivalence are not the same thing, of course. Consider, after all,

$$2 + 2 = 4 \quad 3 + 3 = 6$$

neither of these explains the other.

What we know however, coming to the problem of truth is clearly the fact that  $a$  is red combined with some additional premises provides an explanation of the fact that

' $a$  is red' is true (in English).

Well, what is "the rest"?

If one is hasty and careless in going through the “Tarski motions,” one can easily be deceived into thinking that the explanation in question is readily forthcoming. After all, using the appropriate definitions of ‘denotes in English’, ‘satisfied in English’, and ‘true in English’ we understand why, given that *a* is red, it *must* be true, it must be the case that ‘*a* is red’ is true in English.

But an explanation of *how we know* that

‘*a* is red’ is true (in English)

need not be an *explanation* of why, in English, the sentence ‘*a* is red’ is true.

Clearly the issue hinges on the correct interpretation of the fact that a true statement is necessarily a true statement in a given language. It would be granted on all sides that to abstract from the fact that a statement belongs to a certain language is to cut off any possibility of determining its truth, let alone its meaning. But to specify the language to which the statement belongs is not the same thing as to give a recursive, formalist, listing of the expressions of the language. Nor a recursive listing of “what denotes what in L,” nor, for that matter, what “satisfies-in-L” certain predicates in L.

Thus it makes perfectly good sense to say that a certain expressions belongs to a certain language—or for that matter a certain dialect or even an idiolect, even though one is not in a position without an investigation to provide such lists. Compare attributing a certain law to a certain legal corpus. Thus even though one lacks a satisfactory formalist or listing account of what it is for ‘*a* ist rot’ to be a German sentence, one can nevertheless be in a position to explain the truth of the statement (made in German) ‘*a* ist rot’ and that is certainly something I want to do today. But before doing that I want to make some other points that are directly relevant to this topic.

I was explaining predication last time and pointing out that predicates are dispensable symbols. You can say everything you want to say without using predicates. Thus once we appreciate the fact that there are two equivalent ways of expressing a relation between objects using a non-name which stands for the relation for example, *next to*, or using a relation between tokens of the names to express the fact that the objects are related. In our Jumbles sentence

A<sub>b</sub>

There we would have a sentence involving an auxiliary expression.

I discuss in great detail a misunderstanding of this point in my book *Naturalism and Ontology*. It might be thought that there is something in the

A<sub>b</sub>

which corresponds to 'next to' but there isn't.<sup>37</sup> There is a function that is being performed by means of which 'next to' is used in

*a* is next to *b*

but there is no analogy between the two functions as I want to bring out.

So what do the English sentence,

*a* is next to *b*

and the Jumblese sentence

A<sub>b</sub>

what do they have in common? In each case tokens of the names '*a*' and '*b*' are placed in a conventional dyadic relation. In the case of

A<sub>b</sub>

The Jumblese formulation there is no use of an auxiliary symbol. They are simply placed in the relation of catty-corner, say to the left of, *a...b*. In the case of *PMese* English, we have '*a*' and '*b*' having an 'is next to' between them where the 'is next to' is *simply* functioning as an inscription. It is not functioning semantically in any other way than to bring it about that the names '*a*' and '*b*' have a certain design between them. That is a radically different status that predicates have and this is the key to the problem of predication. It *dissolves* the problem of predication. *Predicates are auxiliary symbols*. You see the classical theory of predication thinks that when we have a subject-predicate statement

<sup>37</sup> In Chapter 3, paragraph 34, for example.

*fa*

or any other representative, we have two expressions, each of which has an independent semantical *tie* with the world or with reality. And this is the fundamental mistake it makes and all the other mistakes follow from it. So this is a *radical attack* on classical theories of predication which gives a definite answer to the question, “what do predicates do?” And it will enable us to give an account of truth.

I am telling you now dogmatically what I have told you and I indicated that it is a radical thesis with respect to good classical issues.

Let me bring in another point: again a classical point. Plato, in the *Phaedo*, draws a distinction between

tallness

the tall in us

and

tall things (tall in the thing),

this developed into the Scholastic theory of accidents. The point, then, is that if we look at a fire truck, here is an item which exemplifies,

*fire-truck-hood*



and the fire truck is red. Now there is a certain shade of red, say, red<sub>49</sub>, and we would have

*red<sub>49</sub>-ness*

which would be that shade of red, and according to the theory that I am working with here, there is an item which is

*a red<sub>49</sub>*

that is *a red<sub>49</sub>* in the truck, so to speak. Other objects, then, can be red<sub>49</sub>, so here would be

*a red<sub>49</sub>,*

and here is another fire truck with same color,



*a* red<sub>49</sub>

and there would be *a* red<sub>49</sub>, an instance of red<sub>49</sub> which was the accident, as it were, of this (last) truck.<sup>38</sup> And this truck has *a* red<sub>49</sub> or, to use Aristotle's example, *a* white, this all comes from Aristotle's *Categories*. Here we would have a truck having *its* red<sub>49</sub> and here is another truck having *its* red<sub>49</sub> so we can count red<sub>49</sub>s.

What is their principle of individuation? Clearly, it is there being accidents of a certain substance rather than another. In other words, we individuate these *dependent particulars*, as they are often called, in terms of their subjects.

Here is a standard theory of what it is to say of a fire truck that is red<sub>49</sub>. It is to say that *inhering* in the fire truck is *a* red<sub>49</sub>, an expanse red<sub>49</sub>. And the other one is red<sub>49</sub> for the same reason, there is a numerically different expanse of red<sub>49</sub> which inheres in it.

Of course, the first move that comes here is to ask what in the world is 'inherence'? And to develop a theory according to which substances are patterns or collections of the features.

I am going to call items like *a* red<sub>49</sub>, I am going to call those 'features' and if you ask a philosopher in this tradition what is it that *has* the features, well, one answer that comes out is sort of a *ur* Goodmanian answer, namely, that the substance is a *whole* of which the features are parts. So that the one red<sub>49</sub> would be a part of this truck, a "part" in the mereological sense, and that the other red<sub>49</sub> would be an element or a part of the other truck. So we get to view that things are pattern of features. This is a very reputable view in the history of thought.

Another view simply brings in a relation of *inhering* according to which there is a substance and inhering in it, is *a* red<sub>49</sub>, a certain shape and other features. So we might have what you might call the *collection* view of substances and then we have the *Orthodox* view that substances are items which *have* these dependent particulars as accidents. Let's see what we can do here.

38 Perspectives, track 5 (#6).

The first move is to note that according to this view there is the substance sortal, *truck-hood*, and this would be said to be an instance of *truck-hood*. According to the collection view, to be a truck is simply to be a *whole* consisting of features like *a red*<sub>49</sub>, *a shape*<sub>47</sub> and so on. I take it that you are all familiar with the classical account of accidents so I will move on to use this, put it to philosophical use.

Let's look at Logical Atomism once again. According to it the world consists of atoms, not the physical kind but *simples*, the world consists of *simple objects*. There are the simple objects and then there are the wholes which consist of them. So that everything is either a simple or a whole consisting of simples, that would be a standard form of Logical Atomism. Thus, for example, a *phenomenalist* would say that the basic simples are color patches, noises, and things of that kind and wholes consisting of them such as chairs, tables, lecterns and so on. That lectern would be a whole consisting of a rectangular brown patch and the other patches—presumably the ones that concerned its insides and so on. So Logical Atomism was the view that the simples were called *sensibilia*, color expenses and so on.

And what was it<sup>39</sup> for a whole to consist of those parts? That was analyzed, metalinguistically, as follows:

that you can say everything that you want to say, for example, about a checkerboard by making statements about the squares and how they are related and what properties *they* have. So all statements could be reduced to statements about the atoms.

That was the standard view when *I* appeared on the philosophical scene.

Let us suppose for the moment that it is true. That is the correct account, that talk about a complex is in principle explicable in terms of talk about the parts. You can say everything you want to say, as I illustrated, about a checkerboard by talking about its parts and their properties. If you are at the level where you know what the atoms are then you can make every statement about the world in terms of the *atoms* involved. This was the standard view and I am using it now as I did last time as a point of departure.

39 Perspectives III, track 6 (#7).

What would it mean for a phenomenalist to say, for example, physical objects consist of sensations—that was the early form of the phenomenalist's position, Berkeley's form. What is it to say that a chair is a pattern of sensations? Or as Berkeley would've put it, perceptions. And the answer would be, again, that you can say everything about a chair that is true by means of talking about sensations. The atoms are the ultimate subjects of discourse and ultimately meaningful discourse can be reduced to statements about these elements.

This gives us our first understanding of what it might be to hold a metaphysics of *pure process*. It would be to say that every statement about any object can be unpacked in principle into a set of statements about pure processes. For example talking about the cabinet over there, a metaphysician of the pure process kind would say that you can say everything you wanted to about that by talking about pure processes. And he would start out by saying, for example, that side of the lectern or the cabinet, that side is a rectangular, *brown-ing*. As I pointed out, strictly speaking, the adjective 'rectangular', according to the Heraclitean, is going to be transformed grammatically into an adverb. I would say that it *rectangularly-browns-over-there* and and it does many other things too and the togetherness of those many *doings over there* would be the cabinet. So we just take the move made by the Logical Atomists and cash it out in terms of pure processes. Again, the claim that the cabinet consists of pure processes, would be the claim simply that you can unpack statements about the cabinet in terms of a *compresence*, if you will, a togetherness of many pure processes. This would be the view corresponding to phenomenism in simple Logical Atomism.

We have, then, what the Heraclitean doctrine would amount to. It would amount to the thesis that you can talk about the world adequately and completely simply by using expressions such as "it C#s over there." But, as I obviously have in mind, such a locution as '*over-there-ness*' has to be spelled out to and so what we have to do is, as it were, be *wholehearted* Heracliteans with respect to such things as the wall and the corner. So these statements are going to be very complex but use as your model, as I said, phenomenism according to which the world consists of sensibilia. Because if you understand what is meant by saying that the world consists of



sensibilia, and some people claim to, then you<sup>40</sup> know what's going on here when we're talk about the world as being a *logical construction out of pure processes*.

### The Problem of Truth

Let me turn to the problem of truth. I began my series of lectures by talking about the *picture theory of language* and what I am now doing is giving the cash of that because, ostensibly, I have been preparing the way for an account of *world stories* and I have argued in a number of places that world stories are an essential element in understanding the semantics of ordinary language which construes them as *world-sized, if schematic, maps*.<sup>41</sup> By a "world story" I want you to think of basic sentences which would describe the history of the world. It tell us in radical detail the story of the world.

That is a story for another occasion which I have given in *Naturalism and Ontology*, I have given an account of world stories. I am going to be discussing a much simpler account. I'm going to offer an account which construes maps in the ordinary sense as limited or fragmentary parts of a world story. For in order to understand what ordinary maps do, clearly, is to grasp the role of world stories in their representation of the functions of language.

The first step is to construe a map in the ordinary sense as a system of logically elementary sentences, a map is a *system of sentences*. We can suppose these elementary sentences to translate into English, say, according to a straightforward translation manual. Thus a certain design patch in a certain place is the maps name for Chicago, think of crosshatching, Chicago! As it thoughtfully indicates by placing the word 'Chicago' beside it. Not all the maps names, of course, need to be provided with translational cues.

I won't bore you with the obvious details of what translates into what. The crucial thing to get right is

- (a) that the map is a system of sentences

and

- (b) that there is a preferred direction of translation.

<sup>40</sup> Perspectives III, track 7 (#8).

<sup>41</sup> This section appeared as Chapter 5 of *Naturalism and Ontology*, paragraph 69.

Just as there is a preferred direction translation of a code. A code is a parasite and so is a map. The difference is significant for whereas the items in a code translate into whole sentences, items in the map translate into both names *and* sentences. And here is where the theory of predication becomes relevant.

Consider for example,

here is Lake Michigan, here is Chicago, here is Champaign-Urbana

Chicago



Urbana



Here is a road connecting Champaign-Urbana with Chicago, Chicago and Champaign-Urbana also have the words but these are simply translation clues. If we look at the crosshatching (in the picture) here, we can say that this is the sentence ‘Chicago is large’ or ‘it has many districts’ and so on. Whereas on the other hand, Champaign-Urbana is small. Here we have the sentence ‘Champaign-Urbana is connected by route 79 to Chicago’.<sup>42</sup> We have blue here, let’s say, and we have, ‘Michigan is a lake’ and so on.

Look at the map and see it as a system of sentences and the crucial thing is that it *is* a system of sentences. I don’t mean that it is a thing *like* sentences, it *is* a system of sentences. But sentences in what? Jumblese. You want some examples of the philosophical use of Jumblese? Look at a map! A map is a Jumblese system of sentences or a system of Jumblese sentences. Just as in Jumblese we say that *a* is red by, let’s say, using a wavy *A* and if we want to say that it is green, we use a boldfaced **A** and so on. We inscribe an ‘a’ in a certain manner, so we say that Chicago is large or whatever by just, as it were, drawing the Jumblese dialect for ‘Chicago is large’ —a big swatch there.

A map is a matrix from which can be carved particular sentences, for example, ‘Chicago is a metropolis,’ ‘Urbana is a city,’ ‘Chicago is northeast of Urbana,’ and so on, these are all sentences

<sup>42</sup> Perspectives III, track 8 (#9).

in ordinary English which could be carved out of their Jumblese equivalents in the map. What I want to say again is that a map is not *like* a system of sentences, it *is* a system of sentences and it is a system of Jumblese sentences, i.e., that does not involve predicates.

So this is one theme which is tying together my lecture and I'm trying to show you the importance of this notion of Jumblese. Now the vocabulary of a map is limited, it does not include logical connectives, quantifiers, modalities. And in particular, it does not include descriptions. On the other hand it generates description by virtue of connections between the symbols in the map and the full-blooded language of which it is a functioning part. This map here is a part of English. It is also a part of German.

What we have then is the connection of the map with a language using a logical vocabulary. So the map is poorer as I said it is a Jumblese dialect and it is a poorer dialect. On the other hand, then the map generates descriptions by virtue of connections between the symbols on the map and the full-blooded language of which is a functioning part, these connections enable the map symbols to participate *vicariously* in logical operations. Thus although 'the highway which runs 80 miles south of Chicago in an east-west direction,' is not the translation of any symbol on the map to one who understands the map, it trips readily off the tongue.

A map is no mere list of names although in a sense it *consists* of names just as Jumblese, in a sense, consists of names. For example when I say

**a<sub>b</sub>**

then I am using two names. When I say

*a* is next to *b*

by using Jumblese, I say

**a<sub>b</sub>**

what I have simply, is an *arrangement* of names. The notion of arrangement is obviously essential to that of a map. Even in the limiting case where every symbol on the map is a name, it is also *more* than a name, the map belongs to a Jumblese dialect.

Although in a certain respect a map can be compared to a code, one significant difference is that in a certain respects the symbols on the map resemble that terrain which the map represents. It is important to see therefore that the map does not represent the terrain by virtue of the sheer existence of these similarities. They must play semantical roles which center around the fact that they translate into geographical sentences. The question as to which kind of similarity are useful in that they enable he who runs to read a map belongs to a different dimension of the theory of maps.

I pointed out a moment ago that the vocabulary of a map is extremely limited, lacking for example logical connectives.<sup>43</sup> It is equally important to note that it lacks words for actions. Thus although a map is for use in traveling, there are no words for 'to go forward,' 'to turn right,' or actions, there is no action vocabulary in the map, although it can be annotated. Thus even if the map tells us that Chicago is north of Urbana, it is only in the language to which we translate the map that we get,

going northeast from Urbana is going to Chicago, going toward Chicago

or

if I am in Urbana and I want to get Chicago, I should first go north on Route 89.

It is this fact which tells us what maps *are*. One doesn't have to actually use them in order to go to the places that they represent in order for them to be maps. The *point* of being a map is to translate into sentences which dovetail in with *practical* discourse in the richer language within which it is embedded.

Thus,

I am here, here is Urbana,

Chicago is northeast from Urbana on Route 89,

this is route 89,

I will get Chicago and satisfy certain other conditions if and only if I go north on 89,

43 Perspectives III, track 9 (#10).

I will go north on 89.

To which might be added

Chicago is a large city,

being in Chicago is being in a large city,

given where I am, I will be in a large city tonight if and only  
if I am in Chicago,

*would* that I *were* in a large city tonight,

*would* that I *were* in Chicago.

That is how maps tie in ordinary with factual discourse. They don't contain it, but they tie in with it. And to see how they tie in with it, is to know how to use them.

There is of course from the point of view of practice, a connection between the symbol for Chicago and Chicago. And between symbols for large cities and large cities. And there is a connection between the fact that large cities have suburbs and the fact that the map maker would draw in a symbol for a suburb near the symbol for large cities. Even if he had no direct information that there was such a suburb.

What I want to suggest is then, that the Tarski's account of truth has to be *supplemented* by an account of the truth of basic sentences and basic sentences are to be construed as elements in a Jumblese map. So to understand truth, we have to understand first as you know, the truth of atomic sentences, basic sentences and the truth<sup>44</sup> of molecular sentences. And as I said all we get from Tarski is the listing of the definitions and what I am doing is suggesting that what we have is a relationship between items in this world story, between atomic sentences in the world story and a conventional tie between them and the world. It is just as conventional as this sentence here 'Chicago is large'.

What we have, then, is an account of the truth of atomic sentences which regards them as parts of the conventions of a map that can make true statements, this makes a true statement 'Chicago is

<sup>44</sup> Perspectives IV, track 0 (#1).

large'—if I were to draw Champaign-Urbana in this way here, I would be making a false sentence in the basic sense of 'false.' And this is the correct version of the correspondence theory of truth. The correspondence theory of truth is not given by what are called "truth sentences," such as

'snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white

that looks like a correspondence and in the broad sense it is but is *not the correspondence* between language and the world. The correspondence between language and the world comes in with this particular connection which is illustrated by maps. So this is as I see it, the *fundamental truth* of the picture theory of language which was never really understood and has been *thrown away* onto the discard heap and yet is a pearl, the chief who threw away the pearl, was like the philosophers who threw away the picture theory of language.

Obviously, as I said, maps can use different symbols and we have to talk about that, when we have an adequate theory of maps, about the selection principles for the elements of the map. But I am making now just a general philosophical point that a map is a system of sentences in Jumblese.

## One final point

In my diagram of a theory of predication, you remember, I had '*f-ness*' and I had the statement '*fa*'. I said that the predicate *f* expresses *f-ness*, *a* names a certain object and in the case that I'm thinking,

*a* is red,

*a* is *f*.

Thus, here would be

*f*-things

and by "things" here, I mean features, in other words I don't mean substances, I mean *f-particulars*. And this [putting the above into a picture] tells us that

*a* is a member of the class of *f-things*

or

*a* is an *f-thing*.

Now according to the classical theory, we can go on to say that

‘*f*’ stands for *f-ness*,

‘*a*’ stands for *a*

and

*a* exemplifies *f-ness*.

I have given you an account of all of these terms which removes certain philosophical presuppositions from them but what I want you to note is that, last time, I talked about *linguistic representatives*. I pointed out that meaning statements are not relational but the statement that something is a linguistic representative of something is a relational statement. For example, I can say,

Sokrates (in German) means Socrates

but I can also say,

‘Sokrates’ (in German) is the linguistic representative<sup>45</sup> of a certain Greek Philosopher.

There is a psycho-sociological-historical connection between the use of the word ‘Sokrates’ and a snubnosed Greek philosopher. It is a matter-of-factual connection which is to be, some day we hope, formulated in an adequate causal theory of reference. But in any event, we have to distinguish between

Sokrates (in German) means Socrates, or refers to Socrates

and

the word ‘Sokrates’ is the German linguistic representative of a certain philosopher.

<sup>45</sup> Perspectives III, track 2 (#2). The discussion picks up themes from the end of TTP.

What we have there is the distinction between the theory of meaning on the one and a theory of linguistic representation which is hardly in existence even yet, it is music of the future almost entirely—although some interesting things have been said about a causal theory of reference but it has never been worked out with a clear awareness of what its *task* was.

At one stage in my argument, I asked rather rhetorically, ‘isn’t there something in the *world* by virtue of which ‘*a* is *f*’ is true as opposed to ‘*a* is *g*’? For example, that *a* is red as opposed to *a* is green. Isn’t there something in the world? This is often been construed as, “what is there in the world which ‘*f*’ stands for?” And then as I said, it is *f-ness*, and *f-ness* is, in some sense, in the world, using the word ‘world’ in a broad sense in which it involves Plato’s names. Now what is there in the world corresponding to the predicate *f*? Well, I can tell you that the answer is very simple because, instead of saying ‘*fa*’, I could have said

*A*

By using the notion of linguistic representation, I can say that individual constants which are concatenated with an ‘*f*’ are linguistic representatives of red things. So that here we have

\**f*\*IND

is an ‘*a*’ concatenated to the left with the design \**f*\*, remember the ‘\*’-quote was simply a way of quoting the design without any intention of anything else.

So, in Jumblese, for example,

*A*

would be the linguistic representative of *f-things*. In English, *PMese*,

‘*f*’INDS

are linguistic representatives of *f-things*. What there is in the world corresponding to predicates is, in this case, *f-things*. And there are *f-things* but *f-ness* is not an object. *F-ness* looks like an object but what there is in the world is actually *red-things*.

And so to the expostulation, somebody might say, “Syntactics, schmintactics! Our problem is a problem in semantics, and you



have not yet answered the question raised in the earlier paragraph, namely

what is there in the world by virtue of which *fa* is true?

And what there is in the world is *f-things* but that is not an object and what we have is then the word

‘*a*’ is a linguistic representative of *a*

and

‘f’INDS are the linguistic representatives of red things

and this tells us, again, that *a* is a *red thing*. So that gives us the ontology of truth. Let me say again, we just follow the Tarski pattern, only we give bread instead of stones when it comes to definitions. [End of Lecture]

## Questions and Answers

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...Picking up<sup>46</sup> sortals as part of a classificatory system and here is where the notion of standard and so on. If I say, for example, to use my illustration from the other day

man is mortal

I am using a distributed singular term ‘man’ but I don’t mean by that necessarily standard man although in some theological contexts, I might distinguish between standard man and non-standard man.

The point is that the *fons et origo* of distributed singular terms is in a system of classification and definition—that is the way it developed. And the systems of classification normally carry with them this idea of standard or normal. There is nothing exciting here in other words it is just that when we were worried about the relation between

lions are tawny

<sup>46</sup> Perspectives IV, track 3 (#3).

and

the lion is tawny

we don't worry about the green lions that are run in by jokesters. Any system of classification will grant that there are borderline cases or nonstandard cases and so on. The point about distributed singular terms is that they are introduced to cover a certain interesting cases of classifying and that when we say, 'the lion is tawny,' we are not including... for example, suppose I say, cats are quadrupeds and somebody brings in a cat that has been operated on and has had its legs removed after an accident. Somebody brought in to one of Plato's classes a featherless chicken with a placard around its neck saying 'Plato's man,' featherless biped. Anyway the point is, that I say, 'the lion is tawny' and somebody brings in a green lion, I was really just talking about standard or normal lions.

...Think of Jumblese, the point is that the whole background of this was that the parts of the map are Jumblese sentences and if I say that *a* is next to *b* I've said something that is directly related to the world, if I say,

**a<sub>b</sub>,**

I've done the same thing in Jumblese. It is not just an illustration, I was able to defend the correspondence theory of truth and I assure you that's a task. I'm saying the correspondence in any interesting sense exists only at the level of basic sentences and that what people often think of as correspondence in connection with truth are what Tarski calls T-sentences like

'snow is white' if and only if snow is white,

it looks like that is formulating a correspondence relation but it is not.

...I am not clear why you don't want knowledge that *a* is next to *b* involves a conventional element.<sup>47</sup>

...I gave a relational theory of time built on events. *Time is a system of real numbers* and therefore all I had to do was to add in an ontology for real numbers, I didn't add it for real numbers, I just gave it for numbers. That is all I wanted to say about it. It is what Ar-

<sup>47</sup> Perspectives III, track 4 (#4).

istotle said and I am content to go along with the master...time is real numbers *as* correlated metrically with and so on by means of instruments, clocks, yardsticks. So the crucial notion there is that of a *functor*, length-in-inches is a functor,

$$\text{length-in-inches}(x) = n$$

and then I say that this equals  $n$ . 'n' is the length in inches so that there is how the numbers get correlated with the metrical procedure of using the yardstick for example. It is not correct to say that time is simply numbers, it is numbers *as* functioning in a certain way. What I mean is that ontologically, the interesting issue is, "what are numbers?" And then the second interesting question is, "what is measurement?" And that is a nice question too. The Aristotelian approach to time leads to those questions and Aristotle knew that.

...Jumblese is not a theory of predication, it's a language which doesn't involve any predicates.<sup>48</sup>

...Michael Loux and I had a controversy about this [providing Jumblese].<sup>49</sup> There are all kinds of problems that arise [in providing Jumblese] because after all my dot-quoted expression applied to any object in any language which does a certain job which is done by the expression in the quotes and so we get the problem of explaining the boundaries of items which are red s, for example, and then making statements like 'jealousy is the vice most detested by W. V. Quine,' for example and then you want to understand how 'jealousy' is functioning there and that presents interesting problems which Loux and I have gone back and forth on...in "Naming and Saying", I have an appendix which is part of the correspondence with him.<sup>50</sup> It is not finished so there are problems.

...[Is everything a system of sentences?] Good heavens, no! That chair is not a system of sentences! I want you to do is to go out and buy a Rand McNally map and look at it, your hand is a rather, attenuated, fluctuating, ephemeral example and I can't pin it down. Just take my map, I drew a good enough map. What is your problem about Chicago? A map is used as a matrix for generating sentences. ...A map is a group of sentences but it also generates them because

48 Perspectives III, track 5 (#5).

49 The correspondence with Loux is reprinted in NAO.

50 Sellars meant to say NAO.

it generates them in English. So the map generates English sentences like

Chicago is a metropolis

or

Chicago is way away from Champaign-Urbana,

putting it crudely, the map translates into many sentences in English.

...[A map which didn't depend upon convention an, aerial map, for example...] the resemblance is useful in maps but the crucial thing is the way in which the symbol with the word *Chicago* after it represents Chicago and that is to be done by a theory of maps which I indicated requires a theory of the use of maps. The connection between, roughly, the word *Chicago* and the map or the symbol for Chicago and the map and Chicago is by deriving practical sentences from the map, we can then get to Chicago.<sup>51</sup>

...Remember the world story says, for example, that Cesare knocked Cassio down, there is an element in the history of the world but it is not mapped in the sense that there would be a map of it, what I am doing is showing the interpenetration of the notion of sentence and map item but I am not saying that the world story is going to be a map in the *literal* sense. It is going to consist, if you will, of Jumblese sentences which are adequate to say everything that is going on. I was answering a question in the informal period, before this interrogation began, and wasn't able to make the point that once you get the notion of a Jumblese sentence, you can see that *a* is next to *b* is a Jumblese sentence in a derived sense because *a<sub>b</sub>* in Jumblese has the same syntactical form as *a* is next to *b*. So that the important thing to see is that the same syntactical form consists in the fact that both consist of 'a's and 'b's dyadically related. In one case *without* the use of an auxiliary symbol and in the other case *with* the use of an auxiliary symbol. So if you appreciate the sense in which non-Jumblese sentences can have the same syntactical form as Jumblese sentences, you can understand how sentences in ordinary English can map the world.

51 Perspectives III, track 6 (#6).

...Jumblese is not always convenient. For example I am sure that the printers union would go on strike if we adopted Jumblese because printing would be fantastically difficult because for every new relation, you would have to have a different way of relating the words for the terms. So the printers would hate Jumblese. Jumblese is anti-Gutenbergian in its ideology.

...I am assuming that my world story is written in atomic sentences—that's a big assumption. Once you do that you run into the general problem, how do you parse out, or how do you spell out higher level sentences in terms of lower levels sentences and that is a difficult problem but it is not philosophically germane.

...My view here is what I regard as what Wittgenstein wanted to say, he didn't say it, he wanted to say it...I'm assuming something that we don't have, that we have a list of objects, I haven't the foggiest idea what Wittgenstein would *really* list as objects. But I know that in his ambience, the Cambridge ambience, people were thinking of red patches as objects. The point is that if a cow<sup>52</sup> is a logical construction out of colors and sounds and so on, then we still have to find a way of understanding that the cow can be milked and that is the problem of translating, as it were, into logical atomism, 'Jones milked Fossey.' It is a difficult problem and nobody ever came up with an answer...[What is in place of Wittgenstein's objects?...]Objects. Until I go on to develop a more accurate account of the Heraclitean ontology, I would just go back to logical atomism. Because basically at heart, I'm a logical atomist but I'm not going to give you a list of objects.

...[We have to bring in the 'over-there' part.] That's exactly what I said and that is difficult, that is a theory of measurement. Putting it crudely, you have to give a Heraclitean account of yardsticks and clocks. First of all put it in neutral monism, I can see that that brown patch is related to the brown patch on the surface of that railing and that is a perceptual fact. So we need a theory of perception and apply it because a theory of perception requires a theory of language...In the case of perception and its relation to knowledge, we start out with statements like that brown railing is pointing toward the cabinet and this can be ascertained by perception. And

52 Perspectives III, track 7 (#7).

then we have memory, we just go through the whole theory of knowledge kaboodle.

...There may not be relations but there are quasi-relations, for example,

Nero fiddled while Rome burned

looks like a relational statement, it has many of the properties of a relational statement, it is just that from the standpoint of ontological purism that you say that it is not a relational statement because, roughly,

relations hold between objects and sentences are not names of objects.

And that is the basic point there.

...[C#ings] They are not objects, we don't get any objects with absolute processes. If I say it C#s over there, 'it' is functioning as a dummy name and therefore we would have to go to the grammarians to find out exactly how dummy names differ from names but we can philosophize in our arm chairs about them. The point is that relational statements involve

referring expression, predicate, referring expression

and 'Nero fiddles' is not a referring expression. But that takes us to the whole semantical theory because Frege would say, 'Good God! sentences *are* referring expressions, they refer to truth values, hah.' So there we have a long semester seminar in Frege's theory of sentences and I am not going to give that right now.[End of Tape]



## Materialism Conference: Two Images

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*Roundtable discussion: Wilfrid Sellars, Robert Trumbull, William Lycan, George Pappas, Pedro Amaral. The Ohio State University, 1977.*

*Pappas*

The manifest and the scientific image are introduced as a certain heuristic device. And it would seem that neither the Manifest nor the Scientific image is a conceptual framework.

*Sellars*

That's right.

*Pappas*

They, in some sense, contain a conceptual framework.

*Sellars*

Well, the scientific image is a described conceptual framework but it is described in terms of its status in scientific development. So that it is described in terms of certain regulative ideals as to what an explanatory framework should be... which are not made explicit be-



cause it is put very coherently in terms of ...let's suppose that science has succeeded in developing an adequate explanatory framework without spelling out exactly what that would be. What makes an explanatory framework adequate? The manifest image is what shall I say...as you put it...it is a heuristic device designed to ...I mean the original model was the difference between entities which, in some sense, we experience: see, hear, taste and so on... and objects which are postulated. You see, the manifest image does introduce or contain explanatory theoretical states like *sense impressions* but they are not objects...they are states of a person. So I drew the distinction, basically, between perceptual objects and imperceptibles...that was the basic model, and certainly I was using it to explore the contrast between the atomistic traditions which were, you know, a promissory note until 18th and 19th century, and the kind of perceptual model of objects which takes ...how shall I put it...takes color seriously.

*Pappas*

Let me try and do something on the board. [erases the board]

*Sellars*

I take it you must have an ulterior motive for erasing...no one gratuitously erases.

*Pappas*

As you know in the "Eddington's Two Tables" paper, Cornman tries to argue for a doctrine which he calls "Compatibilism." And that, in this case, he is talking about sensible qualities of external physical objects. He wants to say that this kind of pink ice cube pinkness is, in fact, identical to a certain configuration of micro-particles. He wants to say that *Compatibilism* is the claim that they are. Now suppose we look at how you will invoke the manifest/scientific distinction. Cornman will reply, "my identity claim there cuts across that distinction." Now what can that mean? It can mean, "I, Cornman, am not going to buy these distinctions because there is something wrong with them," or it can mean, "I am identifying an entity which, as a matter of fact, belongs in that framework [*point-*

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*ing to the Manifest Image cube*] with something that, as a matter of fact, belongs in that image [*pointing to the Scientific Image cube*].” That latter doesn’t sound reasonable to me but , I don’t know. Now suppose you were to try to work the same reasoning in the materialism case. Take some kind of identify theory there [*pointing to the Scientific Image*] of the Smart line. You would invoke your distinction between images. But suppose someone took the Cornmanian line and said, “ I don’t accept the destination,” and identifies the two?

*Sellars*

Well, my first reaction whenever people talk about sensations as brain processes...I always ask, “well, which brain?” [*as construed in the MI or the SI*]...Because that brings us back, in a way to this [*the relocation of perceptual states of a person in the MI in the SI*] because , I think that it is perfectly legitimate to speak of sensations as brain processes but the trouble is...which “brain”? The brain conceived in which state of science? I would say that in my scientific image , it is perfectly correct to say that sensations are brain processes. But the point is that they are brain processes which involve these sensory processes like the *pink-cubing* so the notion of a “brain process” is *not* unambiguous and therefore I regard it as a red herring that obscures the real issues because I am prepared, holding my view, to say that sensations *are* brain processes!

*Pappas*

Yes, I know. But...

*Sellars*

And then the identity becomes simply a matter of successor concepts...

*Pappas*

...But suppose someone were trying to maintain the sort of identity that Cornman claims that he has with respect to properties and microstructure where he is not talking about a “successor relation”

or a “counterpart relation” [*between paired properties in the two images*] but he is talking about an identity relation in some other sense.

*Sellars*

Well, again...let me express my uneasiness here because there are...is clear what the Cartesians would call the fine-structure of the surfaces of physical objects which leads them to behave differently with respect to light and we have the whole...and it can become more sophisticated each time we go around...the surface texture of an object by virtue of which it deflects and absorbs electro-magnetic radiation. Now whether one is going to can do that with “pinkness” or not is another matter. It [the state of the scientific object] is obviously, to put it in the weakest way, *correlated* with pinkness...but the question is, what kind of identity statement is he making? Is he saying that I know that there are sensings of pink...I mean there are *sensing pink-lys* and this obviously is a state of a person. You see, that is the only thing that one could really hold to be there so that if there is to be anything in physical space which is to be called ‘pink’...it can’t be pink *sensings* because *sensings* can’t be in physical space. And so, you more or less are committed to the claim of a kind of Lockean theory. You see, for Locke, secondary qualities were powers of objects. Now, Locke distinguished between the power of an object to cause sensings of pink and the microstructure which explains that power...What Cornman is doing is saying that as far as the physical world is concerned, the only candidate for *pinkness* would be either the *power* to cause sensings of pink or the microstructure which explains the *power* of physical objects to cause sensings of pink. But you see this [the MI] hinges on the idea that the *esse* of pink is obviously *percipi*.

*Pappas*

No. That is what Cornman denies.

*Sellars*

Excuse me?...I mean...he wants to hold that there are sensings?

*Pappas*

He wants to hold that physical objects really are colored. He wants to say that this *very* quality is identical with the microstructure of the surface.

*Sellars*

At the moment [*laughing*] I cannot even make sense of that. We will have to chew around it.

*Pappas*

I would rather not talk about Cornman...Let's talk about the counterparts of that... [*the counterpart characteristics in the SI*]

Sellars:

You see the position that I am adumbrating? Someone might say that it is obvious that sensible pinkness...its *esse* is *percipi*...it exists as a mode of sensing and if there is going to be any meaning for "pink" it must be the power or microstructure—that I can understand—but for somebody to say both that there is *sensible* pinkness in physical space and that it is *identical* with the microstructure...this I find baffling.

*Pappas*

Now, a similar thing you ought to find baffling in the mind body case. Let me put it this way...someone might hold...

*Sellars*

Let me go back to my diagram...remember I had my "Smartian business"...here is a physical cortex and then we have a physical<sub>2</sub> property—which is a complicated structural property of the state of the visual cortex—and then I said there is also the character *C*...which may involve other elements of the brain as well...sensing a pink cube. I regard the state here [*in the successor framework*] as physical<sub>2</sub> state of the system then, "sensing a pink cube" would be a sensory predicate of the system and somebody might want to say, 'well, sensing a pink cube is honest to God the sort of thing that a Berkeleyan would think it is...it is really a state of sensing...it is

not...somebody might say that it is, genuinely involves, the sensible quality *pink* and yet is identical to this [brain state]—then you would be making what I regard as a puzzling statement that parallels the previous one.

*Pappas*

You see the reason that I think there is something wrong with the parallel is that it looks as if when he makes the one about the external world physical object, he is crossing the lines between the manifest and scientific image, that he is straddling them in some way and trying to say that they aren't incommensurable in any way at all...that entities are seemingly pink or are really identical with each other...but that doesn't seem to come up here [when looking at it as two frameworks].

*Amaral*

Sure it does, because “person” [*in the SI successor framework*] is construed as a system of physical<sub>2</sub> particles and not as a person.

*Sellars*

Here would be the sensing a pink-cubely and you are saying, roughly, that this is identical with this physical state...and I regard each of them as absurd...the difference would be that I can understand here [*in the conflation of a MI person with a system of physical<sub>2</sub> particles*] a kind of successor relation...but what is there that physical objects have with respect to [*manifest*] color? Well...in some sense...scientific physical objects are the successors to manifest physical objects and what corresponds to the scientific would be the microstructure....and I can see that this would be the successor concept that is exemplified by scientific objects, it would be the microstructure. So there I can make sense of it...Now what would be the same parallel here [in the case of sensible pink]?

This is sensing a pink-cubely [in the MI]. Here, in the SI, what is the successor to that? Well, in this type of view...the reductive materialist would be saying that the physical<sub>2</sub> state of the brain is the successor of sensing-a-pink-cubely and he would be

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making a cross-identification. He would say that what Sellars refers to as a successor is really an identity.

*Pappas*

Suppose someone were to say that. What would be so Bad about it?

*Sellars*

*Pappas*

What is the real payoff of making the distinctions that you make? Aside from a heuristic one?

*Sellars*

Well, again...let me put it this way. It might mean, he might mean that the objects involved are identical but that the qualities aren't. You see, as I put it in the "Identity" paper...the identity thesis is only interesting if you are talking about the identity of brain-state universals and raw-feel universals or sense impression universals. Now...the materialist of the non-reductive kind says that, roughly, the mind is identical with the brain as an object but the brain, as an object could have different types of predicates including these emergent ones. So, when Cornman is identifying, is he identifying attributes or objects.

*Pappas*

I don't know. Suppose it were attributes.

*Sellars*

Well, first I would like to know what it is to identify attributes except to show that two attributes have the same system of implications—that the attributes have the same logical powers. In the first place that claim would be absurd because microstructure has *certain* logical powers and *pinkness* has *certain* logical powers and I'll be *damned* if I can see that in any sense those are the same logical powers! So he can't *really* be identifying attributes, therefore, he

must be “identifying” in that sense which I take to be a misnomer for *successorship* when I talk about correspondence rules as candidates for definitions.

*Pappas*

Well, I cannot speak for Cornman.

*Sellars*

I haven’t read through the book so I don’t know...as I said, I can make a kind of Lockean sense in which physical pinkness must be microstructure because sensible pinkness is clearly a state of a person...it is a mode of sensing and therefore anything out here must be simply a Lockean secondary quality. But if he is going to say that the attribute of pink is *identical* with the microstructure then I simply balk you see...because it doesn’t even make sense...

*Pappas*

My suspicion is that he will use the instance/property distinction. What I was trying to do was to raise the following issue: suppose someone were to say, “look, in going through all the different materialist theories that we have on hand, we get a strange stance or picture of Sellars looking down on all of them from the standpoint of a distinction between the Manifest Image and Scientific Image and having comments about all of them. Now someone who wants to hold one of those views might well say, “in order to believe you, you have to show us that the distinction between the Manifest and Scientific image is justified.”

*Sellars*

OK. Let us go back and review the point of the distinction. In a certain sense, you see, I could just develop what I regard as the Scientific Image. Now why didn’t I do that? Well, for reasons which I said in the paper on the “Irenic Instrumentalism,” I pointed out there, you see, that the Scientific Image is still something that we have to get at. Now, therefore, I argue, we have to know *what we were* and *where we are*...you see physics has had great advances and although the basic categories in physics are still up for grabs be-

cause of the puzzling character of many of the objects that they are now encountering. You might say that some of the categorial features are pretty well I straightened out. Now, on the other hand, when it comes to neurophysiology, you see, we can go a long way with the notions of objects such as neurons or dendrites and so on, synapses, electrochemical processes and so on, but as any neurophysiologist will tell you, we are really still at the threshold at what neurophysiology will be and we can expect exciting developments.

And so the crucial problem that I see with respect to the Scientific Image concerns exactly the relationship of the mental to the physical and therefore, since that is not as it were, *there* scientifically, means that we have to be very clear about what the domain is that we expect to have a better grip on and that is why I develop the Manifest Image idea in order that we can, sort of, understand that dialectic that has forced scientist and philosophers alike into certain moods ultimately concerning the mind-body problem...my ultimate concern was always the mind-body problem but I wanted to get clear in my own mind about the status of colors and to take an example, a sense impressions, and so that this was merely a way of indicating the domain that we have some kind of grip on and on which we hope to get a better grip. Now, as I said, the first big event was in the understanding of the physical. And I wanted to indicate that we are tempted to push color out of the physical and into the person and then as I saw that the scientific image tended to take over the person and tends exactly to reach toward Reductive Materialism. And I wanted to be clear in my own mind about what it was that was getting constantly pushed out, pushed out, pushed out and where it would end up. And that was the reason...that was *really* the reason.

You might put it this way, if we *had* the scientific image then we would philosophize about its conceptual relation to earlier stages of human thought but we *don't* have it and therefore we have to be clear about where the puzzles are. I just felt that if you look at the history of philosophy from 1600 on, one of the key puzzles has been primary and secondary qualities and I don't know that...many philosophers are very cavalier about this and talk about sense impression in ways which turn them into objects but I wanted to bring them in, not as objects, but through the adverbial theory and yet I



wanted to indicate why it was so easy for philosophers to treat them as objects. The reason was of course, that they are modeled on the Manifest Image, they are modeled on pink ice cubes and the visible surfaces of physical objects. So I wanted to say that sense impressions had objects as their model and that therefore, they tended to be *treated* as objects. So that you get the *sense datum* analysis you see—the act–object analysis—and I wanted, therefore, to clear the way for realizing just what it would be to have an adequate Scientific Image. You might say that the physics part of it, people don't worry about. Quine is prepared to say that basically it is going to be a little more of the same but when it comes to that overlap between physics and persons, I think that we come to a place where science still has new frontiers and therefore we can't really talk about it *in propria persona* because it doesn't exist yet. We have got to look at it...the only thing we can do is to get a perspective on it. That is the way I see it, so that is the heuristic value of the distinction.

And then the second point is that when you take the Manifest Image as I describe it, you can see it approximated to in various ways by standard philosophies, you see. You can understand why Berkeley says what he says, you can understand why G.E. Moore says what he says, you can understand why Austin says what he says. It provides a way of summing up those philosophies which don't take science seriously. What I am doing in the Scientific Image, in one way, is to throw science away except insofar as it requires inductive generalizations and...with the exception of bringing in explanatory states of the person but with respect to objects, throw away all objects except those which we see, hear, taste and smell because if we do that, then we get in a pure form, what many anti-scientific philosophers think the world is like.

The world is like what we see and hear and taste and then of course they will bring in causal properties—that is legitimate—and I wanted to develop all this in a pure form so that then I could get the deviations. I developed the Manifest Image and then I can place Moore and Berkeley and Kant and I can explicate their problems in terms of it. So that, as I say, is an ideal type. There is not a philosopher who actually holds all the views which are embodied in the Manifest Image but there are a whole lot of philosophers who sort of cluster around it and then you can explain their deviance in terms of either good arguments or bad arguments'

*Pappas*

I just have one more question. Suppose that from the standpoint of the completed scientific image, it is going to be strictly speaking, false, that there is *literal pink* had by anything except the sense impression. It is going to be strictly speaking false that people feel pain and so on. How is it that this remark is not taken to imply that those sensations sentences now made are false?

*Sellars*

Well, in the first place I would say that “true” or “false” is all relative to a conceptual framework. So, it is really “true in a framework”...this is a point similar to “true in language L.” What I try to say in Science and Metaphysics was that given the resources of the Manifest Image, certain statements are true in the framework and are true because they picture in their way although in a gross large scale kind of way, the objects that they are of.

I am talking here about basic empirical truths and not logical or mathematical truths. They...but again, they can also be, even in the Manifest Image, false, because even without going to the Scientific Image...you see, I give an analysis of perception according to which, in perception we must distinguish between the *perceptual taking* and the sensing. The perceptual taking I regard as what is packed into the demonstrative...you see this case there...at the unreduced level it is “this briefcase...this black brief case...belongs to me...worn out.” So that what I *take* is packed into the subject because pure demonstrative are absurd so now, at the critical level, where one is talking in terms of phenomenology, concentrating on what one see *of* the object as opposed to what the object as a whole.

One, of course, does not see the whole object, one sees the facing side. Well, what is one really responding to? I argue that what one is really responding to is actually the sensing but one responds to it in a way which *miscategorizes* it. In other words, supposing I have a sensum...of a *red rectangle*...what I do is respond to this red rectangle in physical space...this physical red rectangle...or this physical red rectangle or physical cube of pink. So, I think that there is a falsity involved in our very perceptual experi-

ence but I think it is a useful falsity because if we distinguish between our sensings and wondered what their causes were, we would never run away from danger.

I mean, after all, the point of perception is not to illuminate the structure of the world, it is to get us around—like the point of pain is to get our hands off of stoves. Well now, so that, as I would put it, when one is having a minimal perceptual experience but which is not of the “looks” kind—a minimal perceptual taking, a commitment concerning what is there is physical space...one is responding to a sensing with ‘this red rectangular object’ or ‘this red rectangular surface of an object.’ So that in a curious way, what we are responding to or denoting is the *sensing* but we categorize it as something in physical space.

So that I do think that our common sense experience involves a radial error which can be exposed philosophically without even going to the Scientific Image but then, as I said, this can be explained in terms of the practical function of external perception. But apart from that, of course, although it is false, it nevertheless does give us a grip on the truth because corresponding to this experience there will be the case of the veridical perception of an object which is roughly rectangular and behaves in a way which might well be involved in a more specific classification of the object. It might be involved in a veridical perceptual taking, for example, it is not a completely...it might be this red rectangular surface of a book. Well, then there is in the content of that reference, truth as well as error.

*Pappas*

So the answer to my question is that the notion of truth and falsity has to be relativised to a conceptual framework and that when you say that, strictly speaking, a sentence about pain is false, it is that the sentence, in the Scientific Image, is false.

*Sellars*

Well, you see I wouldn’t...I want to say that in the Scientific Image the counterpart statement is true. I would say that with respect to the Manifest Image it is true and with respect to the perceptual framework it is true because its successor is true. That is the

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way I would put it. But I wanted to indicate that even in the manifest image, our perceptions do involve, what Pritchard calls, a mistake.

*Lycan*

Feyerabend would say that an avowal like “ I am in pain” is false but you want to say that strictly speaking, relative to the Scientific Framework, it is false but relative to the common sense framework it is not. Now suppose we are all sophisticated philosophical types and someone says that he is in pain. What framework are we all speaking in? Is it true or is it false? How can we tell what we are talking about?

*Sellars*

Well, putting it roughly, that statement is made as a common sense statement in the Manifest image and with the criteria of common sense statements, it is true. We can also put the philosophical commentary on it...that what is really true is a much more complicated statement which we are not in a position to make yet.

*Lycan*

That makes good sense. How is it that we tell which framework one is in?

*Sellars*

Well, first let's take the color case because I don't think the case of pain is very problematic. I mean it is either extremely problematic because the logic of pain talk is still not clearly understood but if I can work with the case of color ...how can I tell if someone really thinks that the pink ice cube is pink. Well, I would have to carry on a dialogue with him, a philosophical dialogue: do you mean that it reflects light at 760? “No, I mean...well, dammit! You can see right through it and it is pink all over...it is like this! And further more I don't merely mean that it has the power to put me in a certain state! I'm not talking about my states! I'm talking...” I would carry on a little dialogue you see, because someone might say that, after all, I was using the word “pink” merely to mean that something has the power to cause me to have certain experiences. But there is no

way of telling apart from going up and actually carrying on a certain kind of dialogue.

*Lycan*

You could start the same thing with pain. The trouble is in the case of pain, people are going to resist that kind of questioning. They will say, "I don't know..." What sort of questions do you ask them?

*Sellars*

Well, I think philosophers outside their study aren't difficult to question. My general view would be that the conceptual framework of naive realism with respect to color is so built into our language and the way we learn the language that even the scientist is really operating in that framework except when he is explicitly taking his theoretical structure into account. Feyerabend talks as if people could discard conceptual frameworks like clothing like but I don't think it is true.

[Here follows a series of questions which are inaudible on the tapes.]

*Sellars*

I think Locke might well have said the same thing, that is, I doubt if Locke knew, as it were, that colors aren't out there but I think that if you asked him, "don't you experience the world as if colors were out there?" He would answer, "yes."

*Pappas*

The thing that I think I was driving at, what I was thinking of and maybe what Bill was thinking of was, if you think of this as broken into small stages [i.e., the passages of theories] then the question of truth or falsity at any given stage...you don't want to say that

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it is sort of true or partially true, you don't want any degree of truth...

*Sellars*

Yes, but what it means is that to a certain degree, you have to regiment. Let me illustrate. Even when philosophers are convinced that colors are out there, in their unreflective moments, they would be inclined also to think that there are physical particles out there. And then you get that mixing together which I was trying to analyze and which poses difficulties in the two-tables problem. So that, I think that from the standpoint of any, say, stage of development, the rules are such that it is correct to respond to this both as a cube of pink and to respond to it as a cubical bunch of particles so that those would both be true with respect to that stage of intellectual development but with respect to the critical standpoint, you see, they would stand on different pedestals.

In other words, from the critical standpoint, just as you would tend to pull out the pink cube and leave the particles at that stage, even if people spontaneously do put the color there, like Descartes, they would say, "I spontaneously think of the color as being there but that is false." And, now when it comes to pain, well you get an interesting point here, of course, when we classify a pain as a pain *in the arm* or *in the finger*, from the standpoint of sophisticated philosophy, this really isn't to classify the pain. It is an in-the-finger kind of pain. That doesn't mean that this implies that the pain is physically in the finger although something is typically in the finger when you have that kind of pain because, as you know, you can have your arm cut off so that there is no finger there and yet you can have a pain in-the-finger kind of pain. So, in a sense, even from the standpoint of sophisticated common sense, there are false beliefs about pains in the finger because, like Descartes believing that color is in the physical world, so people would believe that pain is physically located there in the finger. And as I said this could be subjected to criticism.

*Lycan*

Would this be a fair Sellarsian test for being in the Manifest Image, as long as we regard pain, whatever it is, as a state of a person, that is, we question that status of the pain more than we question the status of the subject, we are by and large in the Manifest Image. The real move toward scientificness would be to question the “person” as the logical subject as much as we question the pain.

*Sellars*

In other words, what is it that has the pain? Well, what are you? “Well, I am a person.” Now, if you press, “Well don’t you consist of complex physical systems?” If the person is prepared to argue that, then at least at the critical level he is moving towards the dimension of alternatives which we were discussing this morning. But as long as discussion doesn’t lead him almost immediately to say that he is a system of particles that is feeling the pain but just that “I am feeling the pain” or “a person is feeling the pain,” I would say that he is still pretty much operating in the manifest image.

*Pappas*

At this stage of course we would all be ready to say, “yes, yes, I am a system of particles” except that this would be a case of having the concept but we are in no position at all to give up the routine: self reference.

*Sellars*

Most people would keep the person with the pain and add on this structure. I think that is the kind of “double image” that we have here. In the case of a person, I think we started out by thinking in Strawsonian terms, you see that is one of the aims of my Manifest Image, to get back to Strawson. So that, in a way, we think of a person as a logical subject and not as a system of logical subjects but then of course we could also add to this a kind of penumbra just like we did here (the emergentist)...

*Lycan*

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Giving up the idea of ourselves as logical subjects is going to be one of the hardest things to do.

*Sellars*

And certainly that is when people begin to get awfully uneasy because if one is, in some sense, a system of logical subjects, one tends to feel like we feel about Hume's philosophy, "what is holding me together?" People get very anxious about Hume's conception of the self as a bundle of impressions and ideas and many people get the same feeling about viewing a person as a bundle of processes, *positroning* and a *pink-cubing* and so on. And I try to show them that as long as they functionally hold together in certain ways, that is being a unity, that is being an identity.

*Trumbull*

This sort of halfway house, you were talking about. Nothing prevents us from being in two images.

*Sellars*

As a matter of fact, I am absolutely certain that a physicist in some contexts, when he is playing with his children, "here is a nice red ball," that is, "look at that beautiful color!" I can perfectly well believe that the same physicist, in another context, might say "this is red" and really mean by it that it has certain physical properties.

*Trumbull*

In another context, different moves would be mobilized.

*Sellars*

The manifest image is not just common sense because common sense contains a variety of different strata, contains a lot of old science and so on. So the manifest image was not intended to be only what we think at the common sense level. It was intended to be an ideal type of what philosophers think properly belongs to the com-



mon sense level as opposed to what can be added to it instrumentally. You see, Strawson, I think he is very close to the Manifest Image. He wants to capture problems appropriate to the manifest image and its objects which have perceptible qualities.

*Lycan*

Almost all of Strawson's assumptions rest on verificationist principles.

*Sellars*

When I was writing, introducing the phrase, I was thinking of G.E. Moore as one person whose work was illuminated by this concept of the Manifest Image and of Strawson as another. Strawson is probably the best example because Moore brings in all kinds of objects like sense data. Whereas, Strawson, I am never quite clear as to what his ontology is but...he brings in *sensa* as objects...he has his dependent individuals so that he is not a perfect example of what I had in mind so that is why I made my manifest image an ideal type and then I put Strawson out here and Moore out here and Locke out here... So that the manifest image is not common sense. It is a way of representing a philosophical view which is discounting theoretical science and taking the world as we experience it.

*Pappas*

It is interesting that Berkeley, who claims to be defending common sense, that he was doing what you claim to be doing, giving a philosophical account of what common sense amounts to.

*Sellars*

Well, the way I put this is to draw a distinction between physical objects and material objects and Berkeley does not deny that there are chairs and table and trees, he denies that they are material objects because "material object" has a certain theory built into it. So that, Berkeley himself does offer a theory but he doesn't think that common sense has a theory.

*Lycan*

It is only because of God that they exist...would he still claim that his view was common sense if he said they didn't?

*Pappas*

My own view is that he couldn't.

*Sellars*

Well what Berkeley was concerned to deny was that common sense has the Lockean theory—that he would die in the last ditch for. He doesn't want to say that common sense has his theory.

*Trumbull*

In that article you make it a great part to talk about model theoretic explanation. I think you left out the fact the common sense takes a very positivistic stance toward science.

*Sellars*

Well nominalism gets in only at the stage...well, you see you have to have the sense impressions as explanatory states of the person in the manifest image because the phenomenalist requires that for his boot strap, so that he can pick himself up....My point would be that the concept of a sensation is an explanatory concept that is modeled on physical objects and the positivist, because of his notion of givenness, thought that there was, in point of fact, an explanatory state or something which was just smiling up and categorizing it self for you. So that merely by sensing, you were sensing something *as* something and you were sensing it correctly and knew what it was and then, that was short circuited by the positivist who regarded the sense impressions as reporting what they are without any process of explanation and then of course...you see the primary mode of explanation within the manifest image is a matter of generalization and correlation so that the positivist declines to work with this notion of sense impression.

*Trumbull*

Is there any further defense of the postulation of the raw feels universals in the Scientific Image?

*Sellars*

Well, in my view this turns out to be unexciting. Because, they are not sensed so that there is not a problem with their being unobservable...but then sensing isn't a cognitive act anyway. And the core of what is, epistemologically, observation is direct reliable response. You know, it happens that what we directly, reliably respond to at the common sense level, in the way we are brought up, is to our sensory states but one can perfectly well imagine that in the Scientific Image people are brought up to respond in theoretical terms, as a matter of fact, my sensings would be highly theoretical entities anyway, you see, they are all in the same boat, it is just that some of them are sensory and some of them are not.

*Trumbull*

In the millennium there is the possibility that one might respond to entities first classified as purely model theoretical. But of course, your own physical realism is closely associated with the idea that the model theoretical approach is or can be defended as the thing that will be then.

*Sellars*

You see, if you associated direct knowledge too closely with the perceptual model, then you are going to get into the kind of puzzle about theoretical entities versus non-theoretical entities which many philosophers get into. Now, at this level here, all entities are theoretical [in the scientific Image]...you see...and what one is responding to is really complexes of items which are, let's say, pink-cubings and also electronings and a very complicated system, I mean that is what one is responding to and one is conceptually responding in that way. So that what starts out, you might say, as a highly theoretical structure in the sense of being postulated model theoretical, ends up by being the language of direct knowledge. This is of course a view which I have held...that what starts out as a

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model theoretical structure might end up being a reporting language.

*Pappas*

Let me pursue a different line. To say that there is a red thing is, strictly speaking from the Scientific Image, false but a counterpart is true. You can say also that there are external physical objects where “physical” has the Manifest Image sense is strictly speaking, false, but a counterpart is true. But there are going to be a lot of statements that are going to be, I would think, false strictly speaking, but won’t have counterparts in the Scientific Image, for example, “There is a table.”

*Sellars*

Now why would you think that it is not going to have a counterpart? Well, because from the discussion this morning, it seemed that the kind of counterpart you are going to have will be determined by constraints on successor concepts that you have got to have as you move from a framework to a new framework. That is going to be determined, in turn, by the thing that I called the logic of successor concepts which has to do with those features constitutive of the replacement framework being somehow mirrored with successor concepts. But what about those things that aren’t constitutive, like being a table isn’t constitutive of the Manifest Image whereas being naively, realistically pink is. So that there would be lots and lots of sentence which, were they tokened in the Manifest Image would be true but are strictly speaking in the Scientific Image are not nor are their counterparts.

*Sellars*

Well, I am unhappy about that for the reason that it is going to be irrelevant. Namely, “table” is going to be a functional notion, a *table* is something one puts dishes on and so on, that is the real, you might say, “concept” of table already allowed for radically different kinds of things fulfilling the function of table so that I would be...

*Pappas*

...where the unpacking of the function would have to bring in a certain notion that is constitutive of the Manifest Image?

*Sellars*

Well, no...that we would have, roughly, the distinction between the function and what is performing the function and in the manifest image what is performing the function is roughly a colored solid with certain properties...causal properties and then in the scientific image, what is performing that function is a systems of microparticles.

*Pappas*

Yes, but that presupposes that the function in Manifest Image is constitutive of the image.

*Trumbull*

So what if it is?

*Sellars*

Well, I think we have to look very carefully at what you are packing into the word “constitutive” now because I would have said that many of our—this is sort of a Heideggarian-Deweyian kind of point—many of concepts pertaining to objects are of this kind of functional sort. So I would want to distinguish between function and content and what you are calling “constitutive” is more limited to what I would call the content.

*Pappas*

Well, I was trying to use it in a neutral way, that is, let us right down a set of sentences which we think are true in the Manifest Image and strike out the ones or leave in the ones which, were they not true, we wouldn't have the Manifest Image but not so for the others. Let all the features described by the remaining sentences be the features that are constitutive of the manifest image. Now, grant, I don't know how to construct the list and I grant that as a crude model...

*Sellars*

well, take a sampling set of statements that are representative.

*Pappas*

Surely, the statement that persons are single logical subjects.

*Sellars*

As a matter of fact, that objects are, a pink ice cube as a solid hunk of pink which has certain causal properties and ice-cubes cool tea...Now that isn't already a functional notion but it is getting pretty close to it because. We don't think of an ice cube as simply a cubical piece of ice, we think of it as something we can go to the refrigerator and get to cool drinks. So that "ice-cube" as we actually use it, is a richer notion than simply the notion of a piece of ice. And so it is like a table, and I would want to say that, in the manifest image, it is true that this is a table, it is true that it is brown and it is true that this will stay on it and so on and now the question is "Do these statements have successor statements?" I haven't given an example yet which I think doesn't have a successor statement. What would be an example of one which didn't have a successor?

*Pappas*

Well, are you assuming that all functional statements or concepts have successors?

*Sellars*

I see nothing to stand in the way.

*Pappas*

I don't see anything to motivate it though.

*Sellars*

Well, I don't see why, once we draw a distinction between functional concepts and content concepts, why the Scientific Image couldn't contain functional words.

*Pappas*

Oh, of course, I grant that it can.

*Sellars*

Why couldn't it contain the word "table?"

*Pappas*

Certainly it can, I was going on the assumption that the only successor concepts that we must have, that we know that we are going to have to have, are going to be those which are the successors to those concepts which are somehow essential to the manifest image and it didn't seem to me that table was essential.

*Sellars*

I agree with that. So that what you are asking is, "What are the essential features of the manifest image?" Well, that objects have perceptible qualities, and that of color and shape and that they have causal properties and...I am, at the moment, not clear that we...as to where we would be likely to find one that couldn't have a successor concept in the Scientific Image.

*Pappas*

Do you think that, "is a table," the concept of being a table has a successor because being a table implies the set of characteristics, among others, that you gave and they are essential to the manifest image?

*Lycan*

Which is a broadening of the constraints on successor concepts, I think.

*Sellars*

No, I am not. As a matter of fact, I was agreeing with you, I was ruling them out then...I don't want to rule out all functional concepts because I think that the concepts pertaining to persons are ul-

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timately going to be bound up with the whole neighborhood of functional concepts. But any particular one, like table, is dispensable. To what extent, I mean, I would deny that all functional concepts are dispensable...but I agree. that "table" is.

*Pappas*

It is interesting because then the question of truth or falsity across frameworks, which we thought we settled by saying "true in manifest image...strictly speaking false when seen from the manifest Scientific Image but has a counterpart true in the Scientific Image, that holds across the board...now I do not have any idea if that would have any ripples into what we were talking about.

*Sellars*

No, I don't think it would you see, because in the Manifest Image, it is color in the aesthetically interesting sense which is located in physical space, outside one's body, but in the scientific image, of course, that is not true, but what is true, is, of course, that the physical objects of the scientific framework have certain causal properties which generate sensations.

*Pappas*

The manifest image, has a dizzying headache, has a stabbing pain and all those ones that we are going to utter, all of them are going to have counterparts?

*Sellars*

Well, if I can take those as paradigms, simply feelings, sensations, emotions and so on. They are going to have very complicated counterparts but they are going to have counterparts. I think.

*Pappas*

It follows from that fact that they have counterpart in successor concepts that those things are central to the manifest image.

*Sellars*



Yes. But, again, it is not essential to the Manifest Image that there be A's

*Pappas*

No, but the kind of category to which they belong. Is there any way which you could say, quickly, what makes up the assurance that you have that that will hold true across the millennium for the mental?

*Sellars*

Well, again, let me put my caveat out again about the word "mental." I draw a distinction between the sensory and the conceptual.

*Pappas*

OK, let it be the sensory.

*Sellars*

Then, I would say that it holds across the board about the sensory and I would just repeat what I said this morning about colors.

*Pappas*

It is so plausible in the case of color....

*Sellars*

Well, the topic of pain, I have a lot of books on it but I have never really written them up...I have a very complicated theory of the logic of pain which uses the model theoretical explanation as an account but is far more complicated than the color case. The color case is simple. I think the pain case and the bodily feeling cases are, start out, you know, with an analogy between, with visual perception, you might say, as fundamentally, the basis of the analogy and then, as it were, I find a two-tiered kind of use of the model-theoretical items to end up with having a pain in ones hand. It seems to me that this requires a much more complicated model in order to account for the logic of such statements as "I feel a pain in my hand."

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But that is a big story but I don't want to attempt here what I have tried to formulate and that someday I hope I will formulate. I just to know that the pain case is much more complicated.

*Trumbull [unintelligible]*

*Sellars*

Well, unlike Berkeley, I would prefer to say not that bright color shades into pain but that *seeing* bright colors is *painful*. I would say that there is a legitimate sense in which an extremely bright color, that seeing an extremely bright color is a pain, but I would find it...that means that it is *painful*. So I would distinguish between the adverbial character of the seeing-the-color and the clearest way in which we get another adverb coming in here complicating the structure, you have seeing color is painful. So that seeing a bright...hearing a loud noise is painful. Now here we have an adjective "painful" but we can have a verb here, "it hurts to hear a loud noise" so we can put it in a verbal form. I wouldn't want to say that color shades into pain but that the experience of seeing a color can be, in most cases, neutral but in certain cases can be painful.

*Pappas*

Well, if we are convinced that the sensory is going to have counterparts, then we can give the same for all of them. Notice that we brought all this up without ever taking about reducibility.

*Lycan*

Now it is up to the job of the philosophers of science to tell us what the counterparts are. We can, in effect, take "counterpart" as primitive just as "reducible" was taken as primitive.

*Pappas*

Well, I certainly wouldn't have said that the successor concept and the logic of successor concepts was something that was to be given to the philosophers of science to be worked out.

*Sellars*

Well, it is easy to give examples but it certainly needs to be worked out but...like it is easy to give examples of likeness of meaning but then to embed this in a theory of meaning is a difficult job. You can give examples and say, “yes, I can see that there is a likeness of meaning between the exclusive sense of ‘or’ and the inclusive ‘or’, i.e., they are alike in these respects and unlike in these respects.” We can give examples and say, “Here are two meanings that are very similar but different and then we can take other examples like “scarlet” and “crimson” and describe the similarities and the differences here but a general theory of the similarity and difference of meaning doesn’t exist. I think my own account of meaning provides the framework in which it can be given because meaning statements are essentially functional classifications and those are, any system of classifications commits us to relaxation and tightness of the criteria so that you might say “sameness” of meaning is often just the ideal case of performing them in exactly the same function but that is very rarely done except in very regimented discourse, in mathematics and so on.

*Pappas*

There is no place then that we can go and look at what you have said about successor relations except in those chapters in *Science and Metaphysics*?

*Sellars*

Well, there is the chapter on conceptual change. [End]

## The Dot-quote Primer

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Sellars offers a reconstruction of the “means rubric” that has since found an expression in “Inferentialism”—a term which is appropriate given that the reconstruction attempts to undermine traditional “Relationalism.” The Introduction contains a brief discussion of the historical importance of reconstructing the *means rubric* via the “dot-quote” analysis (without which it makes little sense): pictures must be accompanied by commentary. The earlier discussion looks at the dot-quote analysis “from the inside,” so to speak and it is now time to look at it “from the outside.”

WS disagrees with the view that meaning statements of the form

S (in L) means *p*

that is, the means rubric, are relational statements that assert a relation between linguistic and nonlinguistic items. On WS’s view, both terms in the meaning relation must have meaning and therefore must both belong to linguistic order. Meaning statements are specialized theoretical devices that function to say that one linguistic entity is a counterpart of another or, as he frequently puts it, that two words, sentences, or linguistic items have the same use or role.

However this should not leave us with the impression that there is a similarity between

‘Rot’ (in German) means *red*

and

‘rot’ and ‘red’ have the same use.

The first one mentions the word 'red', the latter does not. The differences Sellars focuses upon rest in his view that the former presupposes that the speaker knows how to use the word '*red*'. But if "'red'" is being used in the former then it is being used in a very special way. What is the special use of "'red'"? What is the difference between using '*red*' in the special way, using '*red*' in the ordinary way and simply mentioning "'red'"?

To explore this difference, Sellars introduces his notion of dot-quotes to represent a special form of quotation and argues that meaning statements embody this special form of quotation, a form which is analogous to ordinary quotation but an extension of it. Using dot-quotes to represent the special form of quotation, Sellars says that while the expression formed by normal quotation applies to all instances of the quoted word, dot-quoted expressions apply to all words, no matter what their language, which can play the same role as that played by that quoted word in the "home" language. That is to say that while ordinary quotes form expressions that have an intra-linguistic use, dot-quoted expressions have an inter-linguistic use. Dot-quoted expressions are more general than ordinary quoted expressions because they pick out similarities of role, and ignore the empirical differences between the expressions which play the role in different languages.

Thus,

'Rot' (in German) means *red*

is analyzed as a phrase which actually involves a specialized form of quotation,

'Rot' (in German) means *red* .

Sellars takes the second to be a way of saying

'Rot's (in German) *are red* s

so he takes the "means rubric" to be a specialized form of a copula, "the surface features of which (a) indicate that the subject matter is linguistic ... (b) make possible such contrasts as those between 'stands for,' 'connotes,' 'denotes,' 'refers to,' and 'names' ..."

Given the analysis of the means rubric, both terms of the "meaning relation" must belong to the linguistic order: meaning statements function as a recipe for allowing us to translate expres-

Given the analysis of the means rubric, both terms of the “meaning  
sions into our own language. Thus, WS’s theory marks the begin-  
ning of the trend toward viewing meaning as translation.

The difference between

‘Rot’ (in German) means *red*

and

‘Rot’ and ‘red’ have the same use

is located in the fact that ‘red’ properly applies to any words  
which are governed by the same rules that govern ‘red’ in the  
speaker’s language. If ‘red’ is used correctly, the speaker must  
know how to use ‘red’ correctly. Thus, ‘red’ is being used in a spe-  
cial way in the means rubric

‘Rot’ (in German) means *red*

because it is being used to illustrate its normal use. The special use  
that words have acquired in meaning statements, in the means ru-  
bric, is that of standing for their ordinary sense. So while the means  
rubric uses ‘red’ in a special way, it does require that the speaker  
know how to use ‘red’ in the ordinary way.

In the means rubric that we are considering, our language pro-  
vides the given context and it is the language of the whole state-  
ment, not the language of the dot-quoted expression. So, it is  
because

‘Rot’s are red’s

is in English that the dot-quoted expression is too.

Sellars uses his contrived form of quotation, the dot-quotes, to  
illuminate the “meaning” of the means rubric. He also uses  
dot-quotes in the “rational reconstruction” of philosophical dis-  
course. For example, it is invoked in his analysis of abstract singu-  
lar terms such as

‘that snow is white.’

To use the nominalizing (quoting) device ‘that’ on

Snow is white

forms the propositional phrase

that snow is white

and turns it into a distributive singular term

the snow is white.

The result is a term that is applicable to linguistic expressions in any language which play the same role as that played by the expression between the quotes in our language. ‘Snow is white’ is used to illustrate the linguistic role it normally plays.

The sense of ‘the’ used in forming a distributed singular term ‘the Snow is white’ is called the “institutional sense”. Thus, for example, consider the use of ‘the’ in the statement

The Ford is an American car.

Such statements do not refer to any specific Ford, they are statements about Fords in general. Similarly, the sense seems to be the same as

Ford’s are American cars.

Statements about *the Ford* when treated as a distributed singular term, mean the same as the corresponding statements about Fords. Thus, according to Sellars, we should treat this in accordance with the following equivalence schema for DSTs:

The K is f = All Ks are f.

## Universals

For Sellars, ontological categories are to be construed as the highest kinds of conceptual items and not of entities in the world—conceptual items are not in the world in the narrow sense but in the world in the broad sense. The technique of dot-quoting allows him a reasonably formalizable means for handling the traditional “problem of universals” without the dense formal methods found reminiscent of the earlier works in his *logistice* phase but still found, occasionally in the treatment of belief. Since it is a technique that facilitates formal methods, one must not be surprised to find that the terminology remains flexible. It was adapted to different problems and often changed to fit the topics.

Returning now to the general theme, statements which make use of

Returning now to the general theme, statements which make use of categorical sortals such as

Redness is a quality,

are construed as statements in the material mode for the explicitly metalinguistic syntactical statements:

... is a quality.

This would find as its explicit replacement

... is a monadic predicate.

The metalinguistic expression 'redness' as in 'redness is a quality' would be replaced by

The red is a monadic predicate

which reduces to

red s are monadic predicates.

And, similarly, the propositional expression

that snow is white

is to be analyzed as

the Snow is white .

In general, the formal mode for

... is a proposition

is roughly

... is a sentence.

So,

that snow is white is a proposition

is taken as

the Snow is white is a sentence

which reduces to

snow is white s are sentences.



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In short, the context

... is a proposition

is an unobscured representation of the context

the ... is a sentence.

### **Objects**

In a statement such as

Socrates is an object

the analysis would say that is

The Socrates is a singular term

which it reduces to

Socrates s are singular terms.

In this way

... is an object

is, in an unobscured language, a way of representing

The ... is a singular term.

In the case of 'triangularity', the context

Triangularity is object

would be read as

The the triangular is a singular term

because

the triangular s are distributed singular terms

Words like 'triangularity' are ambiguous because they may mean either

The triangular

or

the the triangular

depending upon whether the context pertains to universals or formal universals. Sellars points out that in traditional philosophical contexts, it is possible that both of the following are true:

Triangularity is a quality, not an object.

And,

Triangularity is an object, not a quality.

In the first instance, it is a universal, in the second it is taken as a formal universal.

The former is to be analyzed as

The triangular is a monadic predicate, not a ST

And the latter is to be taken as

The triangular is a ST, not a monadic predicate.

It is worth pointing out that the scholastics frequently operated at the level of formal universals—the natural level of the philosophical discourse in which they examined the function of the concepts themselves. They seldom advertized their move “up the semantic ladder” as WS would put it and this makes for some baffling reading until one catches onto their technique.

### **Objects: Events**

If events are not basic objects in the world in the *narrow* sense, what are they? WS makes room for the claim that in talking about events, we are committed to one of two possibilities: events are objects but not propositions or events are propositions but not objects. Nothing could seem more odd than the idea that events are propositions—a point WS often acknowledges accompanied by an admonition that, when rungs of the semantic ladder matter, one must not forget where one stands when doing philosophy.

In general, the formal mode for the ontologically grounded

... is a proposition

is roughly

... is a sentence.

So,

that S Vs is a proposition

is taken as the quoting context; introducing 'E<sub>i</sub>-sentence' as the "event sentence" species of sentence, we have,

the S Vs is an E<sub>i</sub>-sentence

which reduces to

S Vs s are E<sub>i</sub>-sentence.

In short, the context

... is an event proposition

is an unobtrusive representation of the context

the ... is a E<sub>i</sub>-sentence.

Thus, to speak of events as *objects* is to treat them as formal universals (talking about, talk about objects). So,

Socrates' running is an object, not an event

Becomes, in the formal mode

The the Socrates runs is a ST, not an E<sub>i</sub>-sentence

Whereas,

Socrates' running is an event, not an object

Becomes

The Socrates runs is an E<sub>i</sub>-sentence, not a ST.

WS, like the scholastics, notes that often nothing in the language singalizes moves up and down the semantic heirarchy—one is left at the mercy of philosophers who are famously careless or confused about such things. The nominalization, 'Socrates running' is ambiguous because it can be taken as an event or an object. For WS, philosophical discourse typically confuses the two contexts:

(The) Lion is a kind

The •lion• is a common noun.

What about

The lion is a kind

which treats “the lion” as a whole? ‘Kind’ in this case is the same as ‘Distributive individual’. So, it is the counterpart of the formal mode, DST.

The •the lion• is a DST

which reduces to

•The lions• are DST’s (AE 252).

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