C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, 1930
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      (D) FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM. Sidgwick discusses this topic in Book 1, Chap. V of the Methods of Ethics. The general question can, I think, be stated as follows: "Granted that a certain man at a certain moment did in fact deliberately choose the alternative X and deliberately reject the alternative Y, could the very same man have instead chosen Y and rejected X even though everything in his own past history and present dispositions and everything in the past history and present dispositions of the rest of the universe had been precisely as it in fact was?" Ethics is interested mainly in a particular case of this general problem, viz., when the alternative X is wrong and the alternative Y is right. Granted that I did at a certain moment deliberately choose the wrong alternative and reject the right one, could I at that moment have instead chosen the right and rejected the wrong one, even though everything in my past history and present dispositions and in those of the rest of the universe had been precisely as it in fact was?

      Sidgwick confines himself to this special case of the more general problem. He mentions a number of empirical facts which seem to support determinism, but he deliberately refrains from going into the metaphysics of the question. In this, though rather reluctantly, I shall follow him. But this much I must say. Physical substances and events are so utterly different in kind from minds and mental events that, even if complete determinism were certainly true of the former, any argument by analogy to a like conclusion about the latter would be most unreliable. Again, the kind of causation which applies to mental events in general, and particularly to those mental events which are characteristic of the rational level, such as inference and deliberate choice, is so utterly unlike physical or even physiological causation, that it would be most dangerous to transfer any proposition which involves the latter to the former. No doubt apparent [194] exceptions to complete mental determinism can always be theoretically reconciled with it if we are ready to postulate ad hoc for each case enough non-introspectible mental processes and enough hitherto latent mental dispositions. But we must confess that we have no clear idea of what we are postulating when we do this. And the whole procedure is painfully reminiscent of Moliere's physicians and of the less reputable kind of company-promoter. The essential question is whether we can give any clear meaning to indeterminism, and whether with any meaning that we give to it it can be made consistent with certain fundamental principles of logic and metaphysics which seem to be self-evident. This leads at once into some of the hardest problems of philosophy; e.g. the meanings of "possibility", the analysis of the notions of cause and substance and the relations between the two, the notions of variable states and permanent dispositions, and so on. The devils who discussed the subject in Pandemonium soon discovered, as Milton tells us, that there is no end to what may plausibly be said on both sides of the question. They, it will be remembered, very wisely reverted to purely ethical problems and in this, if in no other respect, Sidgwick followed their example.

      Sidgwick is content to record his immediate conviction that, at the moment when he has to decide between two alternatives one of which he believes to be right and the other to be wrong, he can always choose the former. It should be noticed that what seems so certain to Sidgwick is not what has sometimes been called "freaks of unmotived volition". The choice is determined in the end by the actual motives in their actual strength. But one impulse, viz., the desire to do what is believed to be right, is held [195] to be in a peculiar position. It is held that this desire always could have been strong enough to overcome all opposing desires even though in fact it was so weak that opposing desires overcame it. The possibility which is contemplated by indeterminism is, not that a decision might have taken place without a complete cause, but that a certain one of the factors in this complete cause could have been of different strength though everything else in the universe up to the time of the decision had been exactly as it in fact was.

      Now, as regards this statement, all that I can say is this. It does seem to me to express some proposition or other which I believe and cannot help believing. And yet, whenever I try to give any definite meaning to "could" in it, it seems either no longer to express what I believe or to express something which conflicts with other principles which seem to me to be self-evident. And in this unsatisfactory state I must leave the matter.

      Indeterminism, in the sense described above, is, I think, quite compatible with the obvious fact that making frequent wrong decisions under certain circumstances in the past diminishes the likelihood of making right decisions in similar circumstances in the future. Even if it always remains possible for the desire to do what is believed to be right to exceed a certain assigned strength, it may still be the case that habitual indulgence of opposed desires makes this less and less probable. But this is not the whole of the matter. It is certain that the habitual indulgence of opposed desires makes their intensity greater. Now the decision in any case will be determined by the relative intensities of the desire to do what is believed to [196] be right and of these opposed desires. Consequently the desire to do what is believed to be right will have to be present in greater and greater strength if a right decision is to be made after repeated indulgence of opposed desires. Now, even if the desire to do what is believed to be right could reach the necessary degree of intensity, and even if the probability of its reaching an assigned degree be in no way affected by the habitual indulgence of opposed desires, it may still be the case that there is a certain average degree which it is most likely to reach. And it may be that the more the required degree exceeds this average the less likely it is to be reached.

      I agree with Sidgwick that a belief in determinism or a belief in indeterminism ought to make hardly any difference to our practice. On either view I have to act on probability. On neither can I be absolutely certain what I or any other man will do in given circumstances, and on both I can in the same cases make a fairly accurate guess. No means which it would be reasonable on one theory to choose for securing a given end would be unreasonable to choose on the other. On either view it is certain that a present resolve to act rightly in future, and the building up of certain habits in the meanwhile, increase the probability that I shall decide rightly in future. No doubt a dishonest determinist. who does not really want to give up a bad habit, will be tempted to say: "It is no use trying to give it up, for my character is such that I shall certainly fail." But a dishonest indeterminist in the same situation will be tempted to say: "There is no harm in indulging to-day; for I shall always be able to stop to-morrow."

      Would any end which it is right for a human being to desire on the one view cease to be right for him to desire on the other? So far as I can see, the statement that it is right to desire so-and-so as an end means that there is a [197] certain appropriateness between the nature of this object and the attitude of desire for it. But I think that this may over-simplify the situation. Perhaps we should rather say that there is a certain appropriateness between the nature of this object and the attitude of desire for it when felt by a being of such and such a nature. Now, so far as the appropriateness concerns only the object and the mental attitude, there seems no reason to think that the question of determinism or indeterminism would be relevant. Determinists and indeterminists ascribe precisely the same desires to human beings; they differ only in that indeterminists assert that a certain one of these desires always could have been strong enough to overcome the rest even when in fact it was overcome by the rest. Still, this difference may fairly be called a difference of opinion about the nature of the human mind; and it is conceivable that this difference of nature might be relevant at this point. It might be fitting for a mind of the nature which indeterminists ascribe to the human mind to feel desire for a certain object, whilst it would not be fitting for a mind of the nature which determinists ascribe to the human mind to feel desire for such an object. Whether there would in fact be this difference can be decided only by inspection m the case of each suggested end in turn.

      Sidgwick confines his attention to the two ends of Happiness and Perfection. It seems clear that if it be fitting to desire the maximum happiness either of oneself or of humanity in general as an end, it will be equally fitting to do so whether determinism or indeterminism be the truth about the nature of one's mind. The case is not so simple in regard to Perfection. In so far as the notion of Perfection contains factors which involve undetermined [198] free-will it cannot be a suitable object of desire if determinism be true. For it cannot be fitting for anyone to desire what is or involves a logical or metaphysical impossibility. But, even if the notion of Perfection does contain such factors, it is certain that it contains many others which do not involve undetermined free-will, e.g., intelligence, courage, kindness, etc. If it be fitting to desire these as ends at all, it will be fitting to do so even if determinism be the truth about the human mind.

      Are there then any points at which the difference between determinism and indeterminism becomes practically relevant in ethical matters? Sidgwick holds that the ordinary notion of Merit and Demerit is bound up with indeterminism, and that Remorse and Retributory Punishment are bound up with Merit and Demerit in this sense. Let us first consider what a determinist can consistently say and do in this connexion. (a) It is obvious that he can talk of "good" and "bad" men in a perfectly definite sense. A "good" man will be one whose character is such that, even in conditions under which many men would be determined to make wrong choices, he will be determined to make right ones. And a "bad" man could be defined in the same way mutatis mutandis. It may be objected that in this sense of "good" and "bad" they mean exactly what they would mean when we talk of a good watch or a bad motorbicycle, and that it is plain that we ascribe goodness and badness to men in some other sense beside this. This is no doubt true; but there are, even on the determinist view, profound differences between men and material systems, and between the causal determination of mental and of physical events. And it may be that these differences, rather than the difference between indeterminism and [199] determinism, account for the fact that we feel it unsatisfactory to equate a good man and a good motor. There are at least three points here which are, I think, important.

      (i) Common-sense draws a distinction between the good man who was born with a happy balance of innate tendencies, who enjoyed a sound education, and who has generally done right without any moral struggle, and the good man who has been less fortunate in his moral inheritance and training but has managed to make himself virtuous with considerable difficulty. It is inclined to ascribe "merit" to the second, and to say of the first that "it is no particular credit to him to be good". Now this distinction might, at first sight, seem to be bound up with indeterminism; but it is perfectly possible for a determinist to admit it, so far as it is tenable, and to account for it. The second type of good man has shown clearly that he possesses in a high degree the desire to do what is right; we have a measure of its strength in the obstacles which it has overcome. This is a guarantee that he will probably continue to act rightly. The first type of good man may have this desire in an equally high degree; but, since he has had little occasion to exercise it, we cannot possibly know that he has. It is therefore possible that, if circumstances were to change considerably, he would no longer habitually act rightly. It must be noted that common-sense keeps its admiration of the second type of good man within bounds, and that the bounds are such as would be reasonable on the determinist view. We should not particularly admire a man who had continually to struggle against impulses to commit murder, rape, and incest on the most trivial occasions, even though his struggles were always successful. There is something wrong with a man who has to be perpetually performing hair-raising feats [200] of moral acrobatics, though we may admire the strength and skill displayed in the performance.

      (ii) Complete determinism involves two different propositions which it is important to distinguish. The first is that a man's present choices are completely determined by his original character and the influences to which it has since been subjected. The second is that the man himself began to exist at a certain moment of time, and that his coming into existence at that moment with such and such an original character was completely determined by the nature, relations, and history of pre-existing substances. Either proposition can be held without 'the other. E.g., many indeterminists have held that human minds are created by God at the moment of conception; i.e., they hold the second proposition and reject the first. And some determinists, e.g., M'Taggart, hold that no human mind has ever come into existence. What is determined is simply that it shall begin to animate a certain body at a certain moment. Such determinists hold the first proposition and reject the second. We might call the two propositions respectively "determinism of mental events" and "determinism of mental substances". I think that Sidgwick always assumes that, if there be the first kind of determinism, there must also be the second.

      Now, in the first place, I want to point out that determinism of mental substances involves a perfectly unique kind of causation which we cannot pretend to understand even in the sense of finding it familiar. There is one and only one sense in which we can understand the origin of a "new substance". This is when the "substance" is a compound of pre-existing simpler substances. Its "originating" simply means that these simpler substances at a [201] certain moment came into more intimate mutual relations, that the whole thus formed is relatively stable, and that it has characteristic properties. Now, if minds come into existence, as distinct from merely beginning to manifest themselves through bodies, at allm they certainly cannot be conceived to do so in this way. I submit that we literally "do not know what we are talking about" when we speak of the coming into existence of a mind. If such substances do originate in the course of history, and if their origination be causally determined, the kind of causation involved must presumably be quite different from that with which we are familiar in the determination of events in pre-existing substances by each other. Now I think that it has been held that the notion of "merit", in the strict sense, vanishes on the determinist view because my original character is completely determined by substances and events which existed before I began to exist. My actions and decisions are completely determined in the end by my original character and subsequent circumstances, and I can take no credit for the goodness of my original character, if it be good, because it owes its being and nature to other things. Even if this be admitted, it does not follow that the notion of "merit" would vanish on all forms of determinist theory. A theory like M'Taggart's, which accepts determinism of mental events and denies that mental substances ever originated, would be untouched by this kind of objection.

      But, secondly, it seems to me that the above contention errs through a confusion between joint partial responsibility and remote total responsibility. If X and Y be two cause factors which together are sufficient and severally are necessary to produce the effect E, we can say that the responsibility for E is divided between them. The credit [202] or discredit of each is thus reduced. But suppose that D is the immediate total cause of E and that C is the immediate total cause of D. Then, although we can say that C is indirectly totally responsible for E, this does not in the least alter or diminish D's responsibility for E. If God deliberately makes a mind which will inevitably choose wrongly under the conditions in which it will be placed, this does not in the least alter the fact that this mind is bad and merits disapproval. The fact that God also merits disapproval for making such a mind is simply a supplementary fact, not a plea in mitigation.

      (iii) Watches and motor-cycles are called "good" or "bad" simply as means to the end for which they are constructed and used. It would be held by many people that these adjectives are applied to men as ends and not as means to anything else. But, whether this be so or not, it has nothing to do with the difference between determinism and indeterminism. An indeterminist might hold that a man can be called "good" or "bad" only as a means to producing good or bad results. And a determinist might hold that a character in which certain conative and emotional tendencies are present in certain proportions and in due relation to the desire to do what is right is an intrinsically admirable thing. The fact that a watch or a motor-car cannot be regarded as intrinsically good or bad does not depend on the fact that all its behaviour is determined, or even on the fact that it was constructed out of pre-existing materials by a pre-existing mind. It depends on the fact that it is a mere material mechanism. Now the human mind is not supposed to be of this nature by any determinist whose opinions are worth a moment's consideration.

      On the whole then I am inclined to think that much [203] more remains to the determinist of the notion of Merit and Demerit than Sidgwick will admit.

      (b) Let us turn next to the question of Remorse. A determinist can obviously regret that his character was such that he behaved badly on a past occasion, and can reasonably take such steps as experience has shown to be likely to amend it in the respect in which it has proved faulty. But, if remorse be a feeling of regret for a past bad action, which is bound up with the belief that my desire to do what is right could have been strong enough to conquer the other desires which led me astray, it is plainly not an emotion which a determinist can reasonably feel. It does not follow that he will not continue to feel it, as a person who disbelieves in ghosts might feel frightened in a house reputed to be haunted. Whether remorse does essentially involve the indeterminist view of oneself I am not quite sure. It seems to me that regret for past wrong doing amounts to remorse when two conditions are fulfilled, viz., when no reparation can be made by me owing, e.g., to the death of the injured party, and when I feel that I might so easily have done better. The first condition is obviously independent of determinism or indeterminism. As regards the second it must be remembered that there are a great many senses of "could", in which the statement that I could so easily have done better would be compatible with determinism. E.g., it may mean that nothing but a slightly stronger desire to do right was needed, and that a man who had used my opportunities better than I had done would have had this stronger desire.

      (c) We come now to Praise and Blame. And here we must distinguish between privately feeling and publicly expressing approbation and disapprobation. The determinist [204] has the same motive for the latter as the indeterminist, viz., the motive which makes us oil a bit of machinery. It is found that the public expression of approval of an action is a strong incentive to the agent to do similar actions in the future, and that the public expression of disapprobation is a strong incentive to him to avoid such actions. If the determinist can give a meaning to goodness and badness of character and conduct, and if it is appropriate to feel approval of good and disapproval of bad character and conduct in the determinist sense, a determinist is justified in privately praising or blaming men and their actions. I have already argued that both these conditions are fulfilled.

      (d) Lastly, we have to consider Reward and Punishment. The expression of praise and blame is really a particular case of this. Sidgwick's position is as follows. The determinist can justify punishment on reformatory and deterrent grounds; and in practice these are the only grounds that anyone can use in apportioning rewards and punishments. He cannot justify retributive punishment; but it is doubtful whether this is justifiable even on the indeterminist view. I agree with the positive parts of Sidgwick's statement, but am inclined to disagree with the negative part, viz., that, if retributive punishment can be defended at all, it can be defended only on the indeterminist view. The fundamental question in connexion with retributive punishment is whether a combination of two evils, viz., wrong-doing and pain, can be a more desirable state of affairs than one of these evils, viz., wrong-doing, without the other. The general answer is that there is no logical impossibility in this because the value of a whole depends largely on the relations between its constituents as well as on the natures of the constituents [205] themselves. And the contention of the believers in retributive punishment is that there is a certain appropriateness of pain to wrong-doing which, unless the pain be altogether excessive in duration and intensity, makes the whole state of affairs less bad than it would be if the wrongdoing were unpunished.

      This opinion seems to me to be true in spite of being old fashioned. And there is nothing in it which could not be accepted by a determinist. Determinists can admit that there are bad men and wrong actions; and they can admit the general principle that a whole composed of two evils suitably related may be less bad, owing the appropriateness of the one evil to the other, than one would be without the other. The question that remains is whether pain would be appropriate only to wrong-doing which is undetermined in the sense already defined. It is of course admitted that an action would not deserve punishment if it were involuntary, or contra-voluntary, or were done under an honest misapprehension of the circumstances. But this is irrelevant for the present purpose. The only question now at issue is this: "Suppose that at a certain moment I deliberately made a wrong choice simply because my desire to do what is right was not strong enough as compared with my other desires at the time. Should I not deserve punishment unless my desire to do right could at that moment have been strong enough to conquer my other desires even though everything in my past history and present circumstances had been exactly as it in fact was?" The reader must answer this question for himself, after inspecting as carefully as he can. It is certainly not obvious to me that I should not deserve punishment unless the condition mentioned above were fulfilled.


CLASSIFICATION OF THE METHODS OF ETHICS.