3. The "Nature" of a Term.
I shall conclude this chapter by stating and commenting
upon some remarks which McTaggart makes in various parts
of the Nature of Existence about what he calls the "nature" of
a term. In § 64 he defines the "nature" of any term as the
compound quality composed of all the qualities of the term;
i.e., the conjunction of all its qualities. In § 86 he points out
that, with this definition, the nature of a thing will change if
any of its relationships should change. For, according to him,
each different relationship in which A is a term generates a
different quality in A. Now he also holds that every two
particulars are related to each other at least by similarity or
dissimilarity. Suppose that A changes, and, to take the most
unfavourable case, suppose that B undergoes no changes in
respect of any of its relations to A. Still there will be a change
in B's qualities; for it will now stand in these unchanged relations to a thing with a changed nature, and this difference in
B's relationships will generate a change in B's qualities and therefore in B's nature. It follows that, if any particular
changes, the natures of all partioulars change. Again, on
pp. 87-8 we are told that, if there be change at all, the nature
of the past must change in certain respects. "In 1900 the
coronation of Queen Victoria was the last British coronation.
In 1903 it had ceased to be so -- a change of nature which
occurred more than sixty years after the event." In § 90 the
following point is made. Since the derivative qualities of a
term form an endless series, the nature of any term will be a
compound quality with an infinite number of components.
This is equally true whether the term in question be a particular or a characteristic. It does not of course follow, nor is it true, that every characteristic has an infinite number of components; for a characteristic is one term and its nature is
another characteristic. A characteristic x might itself be
simple or of finite complexity, even though the compound
characteristic nx, which is the conjunction of all x's qualities,
should be infinitely complex. (It may be of interest to remark
that many of the ostensibly vicious infinite regresses which
Bradley laboriously constructs in Appearance and Reality in
connexion with qualities and relations depend on the naive
assumption that, in the case of a quality, the quality and its
nature are identical. As soon as this elementary confusion is
cleared up, Bradley's argument collapses like a dollar security.)
Lastly, in § 91 McTaggart says that there is no means of
knowing whether the number of original qualities of a particular is finite or infinite. But, if the number of particulars is
infinite, as McTaggart holds on the ground that every particular is endlessly divisible, every particular will have an infinite number of original relationships.
The above are McTaggart's most important statements
about the "nature" of a term. I think that they are open to
several serious objections.
- I shall try to show in the next
chapter that the notion of a compound characteristic is
probably a figment;
- Whether this be so or not, it seems
certain that the notion of a compound quality composed of all
the qualities of a term is illegitimate. For such a compound
would have to contain itself as a component, which is nonsensical.
- Since I do not admit that relationships, like the
fact that A loves B, generate in A qualities like being a lover
of B, I could not in any case accept McTaggart's account of
the nature of a term without modification.
I should proceed
as follows. I should define the "Complete Original Fact"
about a term as the conjunctive fact whose conjuncts are all
the original atomic facts, whether qualitative or relational,
about the term. By "atomic" I mean for the present purpose
facts which are neither conjunctions nor disjunctions of other
facts. I should define the "Nature" of a term as the class of
all its original qualities. We then get three useful and unobjectionable notions, viz.,
- The nature of a term, i.e., all its
original qualities;
- the original relationships of a term, i.e.,
all the facts about its original relations to other terms; and
- the complete original fact about a term, i.e., the fact that it
is a term of such and such a nature and stands in such and
such original relationships.
With these definitions a term can
change in respect of its original relationships without thereby
suffering a change in its nature. And a change in the nature
or the original relationships of one term does not, as such,
entail a change in the nature of any other term. This seems to
me to have the double advantage of being in accordance with
usage, and avoiding the positive logical objections which confront McTaggart's account of the nature of a term.
Finally, it must be remarked that the "nature" of a continuant is often taken to consist of its permanent dispositional
properties, e.g., its melting point, its modes of reaction in
presence of certain other continuants, etc. Thus, it would be said to be a part of the nature of silver to dissolve in nitric acid, and part of the nature of gold not to dissolve in nitric acid but to dissolve in aqua regia. I deal with this subject in Section 3 of Chap. XIV of the present work.
Contents -- Chapter 6