{1} James Cornman, Perception, Common Sense, and Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 392. Cornman's position on sensing is dialectically complex (convoluted?). However, my suspicion is that his final position has affinity to Davidson's 'anomalous monism' and may even be compatible with Sellars' thesis of the equivalence of sensa and sensing theories (see below chapter 9 on perception).
{2} C.A. Hooker, "Sellars' Argument for the Inevitability of Secondary Qualities," Philosophical Studies 32 (1977): 335-348.
{3} Frank Jackson, Perception (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
{4} Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), ch. 2 (discussion of his 'antipodeans'). See also the objections of Eddy Zemach, "The Possibility of a Materialistic Language," Ratio 25 (1983); and Kenneth Gallagher, "Rorty's Antipodeans: An Impossible Illustration?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1985): 449-455.
{5} Wilfrid Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in Science, Perception, and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1963), 40.
{6} Wilfrid Sellars, "Mind, Meaning, and Behavior," Philosophical Studies 3 (1952), #3.3322. I have added the "ir" to the text on the assumption that its omission must be a typographical error.
{7} This is expressed even more succinctly by the title of Jay Rosenberg's essay "The Place of Color in the Scheme of Things: A Roadmap to Sellars' Carus Lectures," The Monist 65 (1982).
{8} Wilfrid Sellars, "Sensa or Sensings: Reflections on the Ontology of Perception," Philosophical Studies 41 (1982).
{9} Peter Strawson, Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen, 1966).
{10} Wilfrid Sellars, "Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure Process: The Carus Lectures," The Monist 64 (1981), 49, #56.
{11} Thomas Vinci, "Sellars and the Adverbial Theory of Sensation," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1981), 217.
{12} Wilfrid Sellars, "Time and the World Order: A Metaphysical and Epistemological," in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), 594.
{14} Wilfrid Sellars, "Metaphysics and the Concept of a Person," in The Logical Way of Doing Things, edited by Karl Lambert, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 227.
{17} Eddy Zemach, "Four Ontologies," Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 235-236.
{18} Wilfrid Sellars, "Actions and Events," Noûs 7 (1973), 195.
{19} See below the chapter on behaviorism for a detailed explanation of dot-quotation.
{21} Wilfrid Sellars, "The Structure of Knowledge: (1): Perception, (2): Minds, (3): Epistemic Principles," in Action, Knowledge, and Reality: Essays in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars, edited by Hector-Neri Castañeda, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs- Merrill Company, Inc., 1975).
{22} C. D. Broad, Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, vol. 1 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1933), 128-170.
{30} Wilfrid Sellars, "Phenomenalism," in Science, Perception, and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 963).
{31} It seems to me that Sellars' early essays "Concepts as Involving Laws and Inconceivable Without Them," Philosophy of Science 15 (1948): 289-315, "The Logic of Complex Particulars," Mind 58 (1949): 306-38, and "Particulars," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 13 (1952): 184-199, are precisely such an attempt to convert predicate expressions to sort or kind expressions; so that "This is red" is transformed into "This is a red (kind)." This thesis is developed in the essay by Robert G. Turnbull, "Things, Natures, and Properties," in Action, Knowledge, and Reality: Essays in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1975).
{32} Wilfrid Sellars, "The Adverbial Theory of the Objects of Sensation," Metaphilosophy 6 (1975), 149.
{33} Wilfrid Sellars, "Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure Process: The Carus Lectures," The Monist (1981), 20, #84.