Andrew Chrucky, Critique of Wilfrid Sellars' Materialism, 1990

PREFACE

      In writing this dissertation, I have worked with the following assumptions. The theses of philosophy seem to exist in the ambience between hypotheses, prescriptions, and descriptions. The ideal would be to have a synoptic view combining these in some acceptable proportions. A good proportion is suggested by Alfred North Whitehead when he writes that metaphysical views should meet an empirical and a logical test. The empirical test is that philosophical theses should apply to experience and should apply adequately; while the logical test is that they should be consistent and coherent with each other. Now although this is a prima facie plausible suggestion, what does it mean? Specifically, what is to be understood by 'experience'? By 'coherence'? By 'adequacy'? And in view of alternative approaches to logic, what is to be understood by 'consistency'? It would seem that if alternative interpretations of these terms are possible, Whitehead's criteria may be met in different ways.

      In view of the fact that there are alternative views concerning the task of philosophy, and even alternative views about how to meet agreed on tasks, I see no better way to approach the myriad of philosophical views except through an extensive disjunctive syllogism. By this I mean that the best approach to choosing a philosophical position is to consider all the contending views and eliminate, if possible, all except one. Thus, the situation can be represented formally as: either A or B or C or . . . or Z. It is not the case that A or B or C or . . . ; therefore Z. It would also be incumbent on the defender of Z to rebut any arguments for the rejection of Z. And likewise a defense of A or B or C or . . . should be rebutted.

      By adopting this method, one engages dialectically with all philosophers -- dead and living. This is the approach which is taken by, among others, Wilfrid Sellars, and perhaps more so by C. D. Broad, especially in his Mind and Its Place in Nature, but most self-consciously and systematically by James Cornman in all his writings. Since I consider this method of the extended disjunctive syllogism to be the proper way to do philosophy, it may explain my emphasis on locating the views of Sellars in some rubric or other. Although my ideal would be to emulate the writings of Cornman in which there is meticulous care given to meeting the challenge of every alternative position, I have avoided such widespread confrontations. For example, I have avoided facing Broad's basic alternatives to the place of mind in nature, which he gives as Monism and Dualism; and within Monisms he lists the positions of Mentalism, Materialism, and Neutral Monism. I have opted to limit my inquiry to the question of which variety of Materialism is most viable. In short, I have stayed as close as possible to the alternatives which are close to Sellars' position. And I have elaborated on those aspects of Sellars' philosophy which I have found to be significant, revolutionary, or wrong. The result is that my dialectical examination of Sellars' position is geared to what may be viewed as the correction of his ideas.