Teaching Theory of Knowledge

12. Realism

      The question of realism arises in regard to both the analysis and the scope of knowledge. An almost invariant component of the analysis of "S knows that p" is that S's belief that p be true; a common component is that the belief be justified. This raises the question of the nature of truth and of its relation to justification. A realist notion of truth holds it to be independent from justification, and not relative to the beliefs, theories, or practices of believers or of their extended communities. An denies that such a notion can be used.

      In regard to the scope of knowledge, controversy often centers on presumed knowledge of unobservable entities and processes to which scientific theories appear to refer. Are the truth conditions for such theoretical judgments independent from their justification conditions? Do such entities and processes exist, and can we refer to them? Are our theories about them likely to be true in the realist, correspondence sense?

      In the suggested readings, Dummett defines the semantic notion of realism and questions its use. Devitt opposes this notion. The early Putnam, Boyd and Salmon present the case for scientific realism, while the later Putnam, van Fraassen, and Laudan argue against interpreting theories realistically.

Cross Reference

For a brief discussion of the earliest, concerted argument for realism, see also "Theory of Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy" in the "Historical Sources" section.

Readings

Bond, R. "The Current Status of Scientific Realism." In Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Hereafter cited as 'Leplin'.

Devitt, M. Realism and Truth. Princeton University Press, 1984. See especially Part II.

Dummett, M. Truth and Other Enigmas. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978. See especially the introduction and "Realism."

Goldman, A. I. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1986. See especially chapter 7.

Laudan, L. "A Confutation of Convergent Realism." In Leplin.

Putnam, H. Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. See Lecture 2.

Putnam, H. "Models and Reality." In his Realism and Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Salmon, W. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPreRs, 1984. See especially chapter 8.

Sklar, L. "Saving the Noumena." In Philosophy and Spacetime Physics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.

Van Fraassen, B. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. See especially chapter 2.