Teaching Theory of Knowledge

2. Skepticism

      Skepticism about the external world is traditionally a central concern of epistemology, and it is the subject of a great deal of current research. The problem of skepticism is that we seem to be committed to propositions that make up an inconsistent triad, i.e.,

1. Each of us does know various things about the external world;
2. In order to know these things, we have to know that we aren't always dreaming (or, that we aren't continually deceived by something like an evil demon); and
3. We don't know that we aren't dreaming (or being deceived).

      The classical source for skeptical arguments is Descartes' First Meditation -- more modern versions are found in Unger and Lehrer. Various forms of skepticism may follow from these arguments. These are distinguished and characterized in Klein, Goldman, and Pappas.

      Throughout this century, the resources of linguistic philosophy have been deployed in efforts to refute skepticism or to dissolve the problem it seems to pose. The writings of Moore, Wittgenstein, Austin, and Bouwsma have been extremely influential. (There is a useful survey of much of this material in the paper by the Blumenfelds). Currently, a great deal of attention has been focused on attempts to escape skepticism by rejecting (2) above (see here Dretske and Nozick). Also notable is Peter Klein's attack on (3). Other recent work has been concerned with the metaphilosophical implications of skepticism (as in Stroud and Cavell).

Cross Reference

For a brief account of the development of skepticism, see also "Skepticism" in the "Historical Sources" section.

Readings

Austin, J. L. "Other Minds." In his Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Blumenfeld, D. and J. B. "Can I Know That I Am Not Dreaming?" In Hooker, M. (ed.), Descartes: Critical and Interpretative Essays. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

Bouwsma, O. K. "Descartes' Evil Genius." Philosophical Review 58 (1949), 141-51.

Cavell, S. The Claim of Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1979. See especially Parts I and II.

Descartes, R. Meditations. Haldane and Ross. (tr.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Dretske, F. "Epistemic Operators." Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 1007-23.

Goldman, A. I. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986. See especially chapter 2.

Klein, P. Certainty: A Refutation of Skepticism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981

Lehrer, K. "Why Not Skepticism?" In Pappas and Swain.

Moore, G. E. "Certainty." In his Philosophical Papers. New York: Humanities Press, 1970.

Nozick, R. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Pappas, G. "Some Forms of Epistemological Skepticism." In Pappas and Swain.

Stroud, B. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford Universitv Press. 1984.

Unger, P. "A Defense of Skepticism." In Pappas and Swain (eds.), Essays on Knowledge and Justification. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978. Hereafter cited as 'Pappas and Swain'. See also his lgnorance, Oxford University Press, 1975.

Wittgenstein, L. On Certainty. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969.