Teaching Theory of Knowledge

4. Foundationalism

      Foundationalism in the theory of knowledge comes in many forms. In general, Foundations theories are characterized by the thesis that there exists a class of beliefs which have some degree of justification that does not derive from relations to other beliefs. These beliefs, often called basic beliefs, typically are held to have some status ranging from incorrigible to prima facie justified. The basic beliefs serve as the foundation, i.e., all justified non-basic beliefs are justified in virtue of relations they bear to the basic ones.

      Chisholm (1977) and Pollock (1974) have provided the most systematic exposition and defense of Foundationalism. Discussion of the types of status basic beliefs might be said to have can be found in Alston (1971) and Pollock (1979). Many critics of Foundationalism attack the notion of a basic belief, e.g., Sellars (1979), Lehrer (1974), BonJour (1978). For a defense of basic beliefs, see Alston (1976), Van Cleve (1979, 1985), and Sosa (1980). General discussions of Foundations theories as they contrast with Coherence theories can be found in Lehrer (1974), Pollock (1979) and Sosa (1980).

Readings

Alston, W. "Varieties of Privileged Access." American Philosophical Quarterly 8, (1971), 221-41.

Alston, W. "Two Types of Foundationalism." Journal of Philosophy 73, (1976), 1965-85. Reprinted in Moser (ed.), EmpiricalKnowledge. Rowman and Littlefield, 1986. Hereafter cited as 'Moser'.

BonJour, Laurence. "Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?" American Philosophical Quarterly 15, (1978), 113. Reprinted in Moser.

Chisholm, R. Theory of Knowledge (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

Chisholm, R. "A Version of Foundationalism." Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 5. University of Minnesota, 1980. In Moser, P. and vander Nat, A. (eds.), Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Hereafter cited as 'Moser and vander Nat'.

Lehrer, K. Knowledge. Oxford, 1974. See especially chapters 4-6.

Pollock, J. Knowledge and Justification, Princeton, 1974.

Pollock, J. "A Plethora of Epistemological Theorles." In Pappas G. (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Reidel, 1979, 93-113.

Sellars, W. "More on Givenness and Explanatory Coherence." In Pappas op. cit., 1979.

Sosa, E. "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in Theory of Knowledge." In French et. al., (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1980, 3-27. Also reprinted in Moser, and in Moser and vander Nat.

Van Cleve, J. "Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles and the Cartesian Circle." Philosophical Review 88, (1979), 55-91.

Van Cleve, J. "Epistemic Supervenience and the Circle of Belief." Monist 68, (1985), 90-104.