Teaching Theory of Knowledge

7. Explanationism

      An alternative approach to the analyses of both knowledge and justification appeals to the concept of inference to the best explanation. The explanationist analysis of knowledge holds that S knows that p when p enters into the best explanation for S's having the belief that p. Similarly S is said to be justified in believing p when that belief is inferred as part of the best explanation for evidence that S has, or when it is part of a system of beliefs that maximizes explanatory coherence.

      In the suggested readings Alan Goldman presents the explanationist analysis of knowing and suggests an account of foundational beliefs as self-explanatory. J. W. Cornman appeals to explanatory coherence as the source of justification beyond (more traditionally construed) foundations. Gilbert Harman uses intuitions regarding knowledge to construct a theory of inference and justification based on inference to the best explanation. Roderick Chisholm opposes the equation of justification with explanatory coherence. Keith Lehrer offers an account of self-explanation and explanatory coherence, but holds the latter insufficient for justification.

Cross Reference

For a brief discussion of the origins of this account of knowledge, see "Theory of Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy" in the "Historical Sources" section.

Readings

Chisholm, R. The Foundations of Knowing. Minneapolis, 1980. See especially pages 31-32.

Cornman, J. Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation. Dordrecht. 1980. See especially chapter 7.

Goldman, A. H. "An Explanatory Analysis of Knowledge." American Phlosophical Quarterly 21 (1984), 101-8.

Harman, G. Change in View. Cambridge, Mass.: 1986. See especially chapter 7.

Harman, G. Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973. See especially chapters 7 and 8.

Lehrer, K. Knowledge. Oxford, 1974. See especially chapter 7.