Teaching Theory of Knowledge

9. Perception

      Although it is clear that perceiving is epistemologically central, there is considerable disagreement -- stemming from disagreement over the character of perception -- about why this is so. Traditional theories regard perceiving as essentially sensational: to perceive is to be in some conscious sensory state (see, e.g., A. H. Goldman). Such sensory states stand in certain relations, on the one hand to objects and events "in the world," and, on the other hand, to nonsensory cognitive states of perceivers. Causal theorists suppose that sensory states are caused by external goings-on, and that it is in virtue of this that epistemic connections between perceptual beliefs and external states of affairs are possible (see, e.g., Dretske, Jackson). Phenomenalists envisage a more intimate connection: sensory states comprise ordinary objects (see, e.g., Price). Adverbial theorists, in contrast, take sensory episodes to be nonrelational: to perceive a cat, for instance, is inter alia, to have a certain sort of sensory experience, to sense catty (see Chisholm, Tye). The idea is to avoid, if possible, the positing of specialized sensible entities.

      Less traditional theorists disdain any bifurcation of sensory and epistemic states. They contend that perceiving consists essentially in being caused -- by objects perceived -- to be in certain cognitive belief-like states (Armstrong, Heil). The occurrence of sensory episodes is, on such a view, a contingent feature of perceiving. Perceivers undergoing identical sensory experiences may nevertheless perceive differently.

      The move to naturalize epistemology has resulted in philosophers coming to take more seriously empirical work in psychology and the physiology of perception (see Anderson, chapter 3, for background information on recent work in psychology; and A. I. Goldman, chapter 9, for an application of such work to matters of epistemological concern).

Cross Reference

For additional readings on the role of perception in epistemology, see the sample courses in the "Bridge Courses: Epistemology and Psychology" section.

Readings

Anderson, J. R. Cognitive Psychology (2nd ad.). New York: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1985. See especially chapter 3.

Armstrong, D. M. Perception and the Physical World. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.

Chisholm, R. M. Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1961.

Dretske, F. I. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/Bradford Books, 1981.

Dretske, F. I. Seeing and Knowing. London: Routledge tic Kegan Paul, 1969.

Goldman, A. H. "Appearing as Irreducible in Perception." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (1976), 147-64.

Goldman; A. I. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.1986. See especially chapter 9.

Heil, J. Perception and Cognition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. See especially chapter 3.

Jackson, F. Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Pollock, J. L. Knowledge and Justification. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. See especially chapter 3.

Price,H. H. Perception. London: Methuen, 1932.

Tye, M. "The Adverbial Approach to Visual Experience." Philosopical Review. 93 (1984), 195-225.

Wright, E. "Recent Work in Perception." American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984), 17-30.