Teaching Theory of Knowledge

Knowledge vs. Skepticism in Modern Philosophy

CONTRIBUTOR: Mylan Engel.

      This course gives students an opportunity to work intensively with a set of primary texts, with the goal of developing their own interpretations of what the philosophers meant. Other objectives include:

1. acquiring a firm understanding of the roots of important issues in contemporary epistemology;
2. exploring the historical connections between epistemology and psychology;
3. examining how various metaphysical assumptions, such as the theory of ideas, can lead to specific kinds of epistemological conclusions; and
4. considering the Rationalist/Empiricist debate, and how different epistemologies result from different starting points.

Texts

Descartes. Meditations.

Descartes. Discourse on Method.

Hume. Inquiry Into the Human Understanding.

Hume. Treatise (selections).

Reid. Inquiry and Essays. Beanblossom and Lehrer, (eds.).

Van Cleve, J. "Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle." Philosophical Review Jan. (19795.

Vernier, P. "Thomas Reid on the Foundation on Knowledge and His Answer to the Skeptics." In Barker and Beauchamp (eds.), Thomas Reid: Critical Interpretations

Section 1: Descartes

Descartes' Method of Doubt

Descartes' Dream Argument to set the stage for skeptical worries

Descartes' Foundationalism

Descartes' Theory of Ideas

Descartes' reliance on reason as opposed to the senses

Descartes' way out of skepticism.

Section 2: Hume

Hume's commitment to the theory of ideas

Hume's use of the theory of ideas to support skepticism with respect to the external world, the self, and induction;

Hume's role in driving Descartes' theory of ideas to its logical conclusion: skepticism.

Section 3: Reid

Reid's refutation of the theory of ideas

Reid's version of foundationalism

Reid's notion of "evidence" as a ground of belief

Reid's dependence on "First Principles"

Reid's Facultative approach (all our cognitive faculues are equally trustworthy, so the Rationalists' preference for reason is inconsistent)

Reid's meta-First Principle (the faculties by which we distinguish truth from error are not fallacious)

How Reid avoids the skeptical conclusion.