Teaching Theory of Knowledge

Exam Questions

1. Sketch the main lines of Lehrer's attack on foundationalist theories of justification. You should consider Lehrer's reply to the foundationalists' regress argument as well as the general responses to the types of foundationalist theories outlined in chapters 4-6. You will obviously have to omit much detail, so be careful to include what you consider to be the basic strategy employed against foundationalism. (GJM)

2. What are the main points of contrast between explanatory coherence theory and the subjective coherence theory? Why does Lehrer (as a disinterested seeker of the truth) take his own theory to be superior? Could the stective coherence theory be subjected to similar criticisms? (GJM)

3. In chapter 6, Lehrer claims that the foundationalist cannot base his/her program on probabilities, yet he thinks they can be employed in the subjective coherence theory. What features of the two kinds of theories account for this disparity? (GJM)

4. How does Lehrer attempt to use the concept of the verific alternative to solve cases of justified hue belief without knowledge? Does the use of the verific alternative capture the condition laid down on p. 21? Show how it solves the Tom Grabit example, and indicate whether you think this is a good solution. (GJM)

5. Clifford, Huxley and others have taken a rather extreme view that it is immoral to believe on insufficient evidence, and the skeptics have been too quick to point out that we never have sufficient evidence to stop all doubt. But Charles Saunders Peirce asks, "Do you call it doubting to write down on a piece of paper that you doubt?", and his words prompt a critical question: aren't the skeptics setting up conditions for belief that are impossible to meet? What is the connection between belief and doubt? If I doubt something, am I saying a belief here would be unfounded? wrong? false?, etc. And if I do not doubt something, am I saying my belief is true? Write an essay in which you discuss these and related issues. (MAC)

6. "In a nutshell, the doctrine about knowledge, "empirical" knowledge, is that it has foundations. It is a structure the upper tiers of which are reached by inferences, and the foundations are the data on which these inferences are based . . . the way to identify the upper tiers of the structure of knowledge is to ask whether one might be mistaken, whether there is something that one can doubt: if the answer is Yes, then one is not at the basement. And conversely, it will be characteristic of the data that in their case no doubt is possible, no mistake can be made. So to find the data, the foundations, look for the incorrigible." (J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia)

   First, "unpack" this description of foundationalism, by explaining the various assumptions it makes about knowledge, certainty, and truth. Then, where possible, trace each of those assumptions to one (or more) of the philosophers we studied this semester. Be as specific and as detailed as possible; use (short) appropriate quotes from that philosopher to show why you believe he contributed to the assumption you have attributed to him. (MAC)

7. As is clear from considering its history, foundationalism developed as an answer to problems suggested by a particular definition of knowledge. First, explain what that definition of knowledge is, then discuss the specific problems it entails, and finally, explain how foundationalism seeks to resolve those problems. Next, criticize foundationalism from the perspective of Montaigne, Hume and (the later) Wittgenstein. Do you see the beginning of an "anti-foundationalist" view in those philosophers? Discuss as specifically as you can what assumptions these three philosophers share that might be called "anti-foundationalist." (MAC)

8. How does Reid's Foundationalism differ from Descartes? What exactly are Reid's Foundations? How does Reid's Foundationalism avoid the skeptical objections to which Descartes' view seems vulnerable? (ME)

9. Explain Reid's argument for all our cognitive faculties being on a par with one another and being equally trustworthy. Do you think that Reid's contention, that to be consistent either we must trust all our faculties or we must trust none of them, is legitimate? Defend your view. (ME)

10. Is there any practical difference between saying something is evident and saying that we are so certain of its truth that we don't see how anybody could doubt it? If not, can knowledge be equated with certainty after all? Discuss, being careful to offer definitions, justifications, arguments and counter-arguments where needed. (MAC)

11. Use Clifford's shipowner case to construct an adequate evidence condition (i.e., what counts as adequate evidence). He thinks the origin of one's belief is relevant to whether one has the right to be sure or not. Which sorts of origins are acceptable and which are not? Why/why not? Are beliefs actions? Why/why not? Clifford holds that to believe when one does not have the right to believe is not just to fail to have knowledge but also to act immorally. Why? Supposedly, William James would agree that Clifford's shipowner does not have the right to believe. Exactly how, on James' view, does the shipowner case differ from cases in which one has the right to believe on no evidence (i.e. from a genuine option, on his view)? What good does it do to worry about exactly how knowledge should be defined? (MAC)

12. What is an adequate reason for doubting? Is it enough to say that because not-p is logically possible, I can't be sure that p is true? What is the difference between 1) reasonable doubt, 2) unreasonable doubt and 3) logically possible doubt? Give examples of each and discuss. (MAC)