Teaching Theory of Knowledge

Skepticism

CONTRIBUTOR: William Morrris.

      This course is a one-quarter upper-level introductory course in epistemology. "Problems of Philosophy," a three-quarter introductory sequence, is formally a prerequisite. Frequently, however, students enroll who have not had "Problems," so "Skepticism" presupposes no substantial philosophical backgound.

Texts

Descartes, R. The Philosophical Works of Descartes. Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch, (tr.). Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Stroud, B. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford University Press, 1984.

Peirce, C. S. Selected Writings of Peirce. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Moore, G. E. Philosophical Papers. Allen and Unwin.

Assorted readings to be distributed in class.

Topics and Readings

Weeks 1 and 2: Descartes.
Reading:

Meditation I.

We begin with an extended examination of Meditation I. I stress the motivation for the method of doubt, Descartes' conception of experience, and the structure of the skeptical arguments in context. At this point, my concern is not with evaluating the arguments, but with carefully determining what they are. I emphasize that, despite Descartes' lucidity, this is no easy matter. I introduce some prominent readings of these arguments. We critically evaluate these as we develop our own account of the structure of Meditation I.

Weeks 3 and 4: Criticisms of Descartes.
Readings:

Bouwsma, O. K. "Descartes' Evil Genius." From his Philosophical Essays, University of Nebraska Press.

Peirce, C. S. "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man." From Selected Writings of Peirce.

Peirce, C. S. "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities." In Selected Writings of Peirce.

Haack, S. "Descartes, Peirce and the Cognitive Community." The Monist (1981).

At this point, the students are anxious to criticize Descartes' arguments. Examining classic articles which express some of their critical points is a useful way of encouraging them to express their criticisms. Not incidentally, a critical approach to these pieces also encourages reflective self-criticism. I use Bouwsma's "Descartes' Evil Genius" to introduce analytic criticisms of Cartesian skepticism. We look closely at some of the analytic tools Bouwsma's critique involves, especially the paradigm-case argument and the argument from excluded opposites.

Peirce's objections to Descartes effectively express the natural reaction that Cartesian doubt is unreal or artificial. Susan Haack's paper, "Descartes, Peirce and the Cognitive Community," is also useful in setting out the issues involved.

Week 5: The Philosophical Significance of Skepticism.
Reading:

Stroud, B. "The Problem of the External World." In The Philosophical Significance of Scepticism. Oxford University Press.

Criticisms of these arguments against Descartes leave things in flux. Students remain unconvinced by the skeptical arguments of Meditation I, but realize that refuting them is more difficult than they first thought. This is a good point to begin Barry Stroud's The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Stroud's initial chapters go over some of the same ground, and reinforce the moral that there is no easy refutation of skepticism.

Week 6: G. E. Moore.
Readings:

Moore, G. E. "Four Forms of Scepticism." From his Philosophical Papers. Allen and Unwin.

Moore, G. E. "Certainty." Also in Philosophical Papers.

Stroud's discussion leads naturally to Moore's classic papers, "Certainty" and "Four Forms of Scepticism." We look at these pieces in some detail. Stroud's chapter on Moore is helpful in looking at these arguments sympathetically but critically.

Week 7: Analytic Responses to Skepticism.
Readings:

Malcolm, N. "Knowledge and Belief." From his collection of papers, Knowledge and Certainty. Cornell University Press

Cavell, S. Selections from The Claim of Reason. Oxford University Press.

Next we move to two analytic responses to skepticism influenced by Austin and Wittgenstein: Norman Malcolm's paper "Knowledge and Belief" and selections from Stanley Cavell's The Claim of Reason. Considering what is right and what is wrong with their arguments is excellent preparation for appreciating On Certainty.

Weeks 8 and 9: Rorty's challenge to epistemology.
Readings:

Rorty, R. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press. (selections).

Hacking, I. "Is the End in Sight for Epistemology?" Journal of Philosophy (1978).

Wilson, M. "Skepticism Without Indubitability." Journal of Philosophy (1984).

Stroud, B. "Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge." Journal of Philosophy (198 ).

Though his views are not directly concerned with skepticism, I include selections from Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Rorty's challenge to the entire epistemological enterprise can be seen as a way of eliminating the problem along with the attempt to find an indubitable basis for knowledge. The papers by Hacking, Wilson and (especially) Stroud provide a good critical perspective on Rorty's claims.

Week 10: Wittgenstein.
Readings:

Wittgenstein, L. On Certainty. Blackwell. (selections).

Cook, J. "Wittgenstein's Refutation of Skepticism." Philosophical Investigations (1985).

The final part of the course is devoted to Wittgenstein's On Certainty. I don't try to cover everything in that difficult work. Instead, I concentrate on one of Wittgenstein's central lines of argument, his characterization of skeptical doubt and his argument that skeptical doubt, so characterized, is incoherent. I stress the resemblances, as well as the differences, between forms of argument Wittgenstein uses, and the analytic responses to skepticism we have looked at during the course. Discussion of these arguments effectively summarizes much of the course's content and structure, and allows us to assess, at least tentatively, the progress we have made in understanding the various facets of the problem of skepticism.