Teaching Theory of Knowledge

Contemporary Epistemology

CONTRIBUTOR: Philip Peterson.

      Designed for graduate students in philosophy, and for advanced, philosophically experienced undergraduates (e.g., philosophy majors), this course begins with a brief review of traditional examples and theories of human knowledge and a look at typical contemporary skeptical arguments. Then it moves to critical assessments of the views that one knows that p only if one's belief that p can't be wrong, and if and only if one's belief that p is true and adequately justified. Out of these analyses (both pro and con) six theoretical approaches to explicating factual knowledge arise, and will be surveyed -- namely, foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, explanation theory, information theory, and naturalized epistemology. The course concludes with attention to current research on four problems of human knowledge -- namely, memory, perception, a priori knowledge, and rationality. Among the topics to be considered in the course discussions are fallibilism, externalism/internalism, realism, knowledge and belief "contents", and cognitive science.

Texts

Pappas, G. and Swain, M. (eds.). Essays on Knowledge and Justification. Cornell University Press, 1978. Hereafter cited as 'P&S'.

Phillips-Griffiths, A. (ed.). Knowledge and Belief. Oxford University Press, 1967. Hereafter cited as 'P-G'.

Goldman, A. I. Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press, 1986. Here after cited as 'E&C'.

Topics and Readings

Part I: Is There Knowledge?
Week 1: Is there knowledge?
Readings:

Yes:

Plato, Republic 506d-518d

Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1

Descartes, Meditations l; selections from 111

Hume, Inquiry VI, Xll

Kant, Prolegomena 4,5

Russell, Human Knowledge, XID

No:

A. I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, chapter 2

P. Unger, "A Defense of Skepticism" (P&S)

K. Lehrer, "Why Not Skepticism?" (P&S)

Part II: The "Traditional" Concept of Knowledge
Week 2: The "traditional concept of knowledge"
Readings:

N. Malcolm, "Knowledge and Belief" (P-G)

E. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" (P-G)

A. I. Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing" (P&S)

Lehrer and Paxson, "Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief" (P&S)

Part III: Six Theories of Factual Knowledge
Week 3: Introduction
Readings:

D. Armstrong, Belief, Truth, and Knowledge ( 137-8, 150-61)

E. Sosa, "The Raft and the Pyramid" (1980)

Week 4: Foundationalism
Readings:

W. Alston, "Two Types of Foundationalism" (1976)

W. Alston, "Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?" (1976)

Week 5: Coherentism
Readings:

K. Lehrer, "Systematic Justification" (P&S)

K. Lehrer, "Coherence Theory of Knowledge" (1986)

Week 6: Reliabilism
Readings: A. I. Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge" (P&S)

A. I. Goldman, E&C, chapters 3-5

W. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification" (1985)

Week 7: Explanationism and Information Theory
Readings:

G. Harman, "Selections from Thought" (P&S)

A. I. Goldman, "An Explanatory Analysis of Knowledge" (1984)

F. Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Inforrnation (selections)

Week 8: Naturalized Epistemology
Readings:

W. V. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized"

H. Kornblith, "Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory"

H. Putnam, "Why Reason Can't Be Naturalized?" (1982)

Part IV: Four Problems of Knowledge
Week 9: Memory
Readings:

Martin and Deutscher, "Remembering" (1966)

C. Ginet, Knowledge, Perception, and Memory (selections)

A. I. Goldman, E&C, chapter 10

Week 10: Perception
Readings:

R. Chisholm, Perceiving (selections)

Jackson, Perception (selections)

Goldrnan, E&C, chapter 9

Week 11: The A Priori
Readings:

W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism"

S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (selections)

N. Chomsky, selections in S. Stich, Innate Ideas

P. Kitcher, Nature of Mathematical Knowledge (selections)

Week 12: Rationality
Readings:

Cohen, "Can Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?" (1981)

Goldman, E&C, chapter 13

Harman. Change In View (selections)