Teaching Theory of Knowledge

General Questions on Epistemology

Editor's Note: Judging from our curriculum meetings at the Institute Keith Lehrer's Knowledge remains an enormously popular choice as a text for Theory of Knowledge courses across the country. For that reason, we have decided to include a selection of questions written by Lehrer for a German edition of the text. A revised textbook edition of Knowledge is being prepared for publication by Westview Press for 1988. Until that edition appears, Lehrer, who is the copyright holder, hereby gives permission to anyone to reproduce portions of Knowledge as needed, for class use only.

Numbers in brackets refer to the relevant chapter in Knowledge.

1. Consider the following argument

   "In order to know something, we must be justified in believing it. To be justified we must have evidence. There is no justification without evidence. However, evidence must be something that we know to be true. Hence, to know that p, one must be justified in believing p on the basis of evidence q. But then one must know that q. To know that q, one must be justified in believing that q on the basis of r. But then one must know that r. And so forth. Thus, the assumption that we know anything leads to an infinite regress."

   How would you reply to such an argument? Is it necessary to assume that there are basic beliefs to avoid the regress? Why/why not? [1]

2. How would you respond to someone who said the following?

   "Either a theory of knowledge is a semantic theory concerning the meaning of the word 'know' or it is a learning theory about how people come to know what they do. There is nothing else concerning knowledge that justifies philosophical investigation. Thus, theory of knowledge reduces to either semantics or to learning theory, and in either case, is not a fruitful area for philosophical reflection." [1]

3. Consider the following claim:

   "Truth is nothing but coherence with a system. This is easy to see in the following way. If I claim to know something, for example, that a major thermonuclear war would produce nuclear winter, my justification for this claim is the coherence between what I claim to know and a system of convictions about the effects of nuclear explosions. Justification is, therefore, coherence, and truth is justification. There is no knowledge without justification, and therefore, no truth without coherence with a system of convictions. Truth just is justification."

   What errors occur in this argument? Is the connection between truth, justification, and coherence warranted? Is someone who holds a coherence theory of justification committed to a coherence theory of truth? Suppose everything said in the paragraph were correct. Would that imply that truth cannot be eliminated in the sense in which the author of Knowledge claims that it can be eliminated? [2]

4. Suppose someone offers the following argument:

   "It is often perfectly correct to say, "S/he does not believe that, s/he knows it." If it is correct to say that, then it is logically consistent to say it. Therefore, it is logically consistent to say that a person does not believe something that s/he knows. If, however, it is logically consistent to say that a person does not believe something that s/he knows, then the claim that a person knows something does not logically imply that s/he believes it."

   How would you argue against that person? If you agree with the argument, how would you rebut the argument you just created? [3]

5. Consider the argument

   "Some have alleged that a foundation theorist is committed to the thesis that the truth of basic beliefs is somehow guaranteed. But a foundation theorist need not maintain this position. The foundation for a building may be solid and dependable without any guarantee that it may never collapse. In an earthquake or other special circumstances, the foundation may collapse and the building with it. In ordinary circumstances, however, the foundation is adequate to support the building. By analogy, basic beliefs may be adequate to support the edifice of knowledge without guaranteeing truth. In unusual circumstances, such as skeptics have imagined, they may fail to protect us from error, but in ordinary circumstances they will lead us to truth. They are, therefore, an adequate foundation."

   Is this argument reasonable? How might one argue against it? [4]

6. Consider the following argument

   "When the skeptic argues that we do not know the things we all believe we know, that the bodies we see before us exist, for example, the skeptic has simply used the word 'know' in a different sense from the way the rest of us use the word. It is like when someone says that nothing is real and that everything is a dream. S/he has just used the words 'real' and 'dream' in a different sense than they are ordinarily used. There is, therefore, no factual disagreement The disagreement is merely verbal."

   How might one reply to this argument? How could one argue that the disagreement is not verbal? Is the argument correct? [5]

7. Consider the following argument

   "A foundation theorist can be fallibilist. S/he can admit that the justification we have for our basic as well as nonbasic beliefs does not guarantee truth. But s/he may affirm, nonetheless, that knowledge must have a foundation of basic beliefs. Such a theory leads to neither skepticism nor speculation."

   Evaluate this theory. You might attempt to develop it in some detail and then critically evaluate it. Is such a theory possible? [6]

8. Consider the following argument

   "It is proposed by some philosophers that a person is completely justified in a belief just in case that belief coheres with a system of belief. This proposal will, however, lead to paradox. If a person argues that a belief is justified in this way, then s/he must show that the belief is justified by appealing to beliefs belonging to the required system as premises, but the premises themselves must be justified or the justification is useless. Whatever premises of the system are used to justify these further beliefs must be justified by other premises of the system, and so forth. It is clear that this will lead either to an infinite regress of justification or to circular justification. A regress or a circle are unsatisfactory, and the only way to avoid them is to affirm that there are first premises, that is, self-justified beliefs."

   How might one reply to this argument? Is the reply satisfactory? [7]

9. Consider the following objection to the coherence theory:

   ''Justification is a matter of rationality. A belief is justified if and only if it is a rational belief. A belief is rational if and only if it is useful for the objectives of pursuing truth and avoiding error. The usefulness of a belief in thiS way is quite independent of any system of beliefs or coherence among beliefs, because whether a belief is true or erroneous is independent of the other things one believes. Truth and error are the determinants of rational as well as justified belief, and they are independent of coherence. Therefore, coherence is neither necessary nor sufficient for justified belief."

   How would a coherence theorist reply to this? What is the relevance of epistemic utility to this argument? [8]

10. Consider the following argument:

    "The coherence theory has two defects. In the first place, it is overly intellectual. It requires that we ascribe to people probabilities and beliefs that they have never entertained and might not understand. In the second place, it is insufficiently factual. What justifies our beliefs is the relation to the facts and the relation is causality. A belief that h is justified if and only if it is caused by the fact that h. It is, therefore, not the relation of a belief to other beliefs that makes them justified as the coherence theory contends. It is the causal relation to the facts."

    How would a coherence theorist reply? Is the reply satisfactory? [8]

11. Consider the following argument:

    "The coherence theory cannot give an adequate account of both perceptual and inferential belief, because it leads to a dilemma. Either coherence involves inference or it does not. If coherence is based on inference, then perceptual beliefs would turn out not to be justified, which is absurd, because they are not based on inference. If coherence is not based on inference, then no inferential beliefs would turn out to be justified, which is also absurd, because they are all based on inference. Either way, then, the coherence theory leads to absurdity."

    How would the coherence theorist reply to this argument? What does the coherence theorist claim with respect to perception and inference? [9]

12. Consider the following argument:

    "If there is some chance that a person might err in what s/he believes, then the person lacks knowledge. There is always some chance that a person might err in what s/he believes. Therefore, we lack knowledge."

    How can a coherence theorist reply to this argument? Which premise of the argument would s/he reject? Why? [10]

13. Consider the following argument:

    "Skeptics have argued that it is logically possible that perceptual beliefs might be in error. The mere logical possibility of error does not refute a claim to justification and knowledge, however. Moreover, there is no stronger premise the skeptic may appeal to in order to reach his/her conclusion. There is no more than a logical possibility that our perceptual beliefs are in error."

    How might a defender of skepticism reply to this argument? [10]