Curt Ducasse, Philosophy as a Science, 1941

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE
INTRODUCTION

PART I
SOME RECENT HYPOTHESES AS TO THE NATURE AND METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY

  1. PHILOSOPHY AS MORE GENERAL THAN SCIENCE
    1. PHILOSOPHY AS A SYNTHETIC PICTURE OF THE WORLD AS A WHOLE
    2. SPENCER'S VIEW OF PHILOSOPHY AS KNOWLEDGE OF THE HIGHEST GENERALITY
    3. ORIGIN OF THE OPINION THAT PHILOSOPHY IS MORE GENERAL THAN SCIENCE
    4. PHILOSOPHY AS HARMONIZER OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE
    5. PHILOSOPHY AS POTENTIAL NATURAL SCIENCE

  2. PHILOSOPHY AS LOGICALLY ARTICULATED FAITH
    1. IS THERE A PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD DISTINCT FROM THE SCIENTIFIC
    2. HOERNLÉ'S VIEW OF THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY
    3. IS PHILOSOPHIZING ONLY WISHFUL THINKING?
    4. THE SEARCH FOR UNITY NO GUARANTEE THAT UNITY EXISTS
    5. METAPHYSICAL SYNTHESES WORTHLESS WHEN ONLY VERBAL
    6. HOERNLÉ ON PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD
    7. PHILOSOPHY AS THE ARTICULATION OF A FAITH
    8. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION
    9. URBAN'S CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY OPEN TO SIMILAR CRITICISMS URBAN ON PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

  3. PHILOSOPHY AS POETIC LITERATURE ABOUT THE COSMOS
    1. COLLINGWOOD'S VINDICATION OF TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHY
    2. DIFFERENTIATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS
    3. COLLINGWOOD'S PRECEPTS OF PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD
    4. DO THE CO-ORDINATE SPECIES OF A PHILOSOPHICAL GENUS OVERLAP?
    5. ANOTHER ALLEGED EXAMPLE OF OVERLAPPING SPECIES
    6. COLLINGWOOD'S BASIC CONTENTION EITHER CONTRADICTORY OR FALSE
    7. NONADDIBILITY OF "PHILOSOPHICAL" DEGREES NO EVIDENCE OF ESSENTIAL UNMEASURABILITY
    8. DIFFERENCES OF KIND, EVEN IN PHILOSOPHY, NOT IDENTICAL WITH DIFFERENCES OF DEGREE
    9. SPECIES OF A GENUS NEVER SPECIES OF IT IN VARIOUS DEGREES
    10. DISTINCTION AND OPPOSITION, EVEN IN PHILOSOPHY, NOT FUSED INTO A SINGLE RELATION
    11. THREE EASY CONFUSIONS ACCOUNTING FOR THE SURFACE PLAUSIBILITY OF COLLINGWOOD'S METHODOLOGICAL PRECEPTS

  4. PHILOSOPHY AS LIGHT ON SOCIAL PROBLEMS
    1. THE PRESENT NEED FOR A "PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE"
    2. THE INSTRUMENTALIST THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
    3. THE INSTRUMENTALIST CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY AND ITS METHODS
    4. DOES PHILOSOPHY CONSIST OF PROSPECTIVE THINKING IN GENERAL?
    5. DOES PHILOSOPHY CONSIST OF PROSPECTIVE THINKING SPECIFICALLY TO THE END OF SOCIAL IMPROVEMENT?
    6. KNOWING ORIGINALLY BUT NOT ESSENTIALLY A GUIDE TO ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR
    7. THE INSTRUMENTALIST CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM IN THINKING

  5. PHILOSOPHY AS IDENTICAL WITH LOGIC
    1. RUSSELL'S DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY
    2. PHILOSOPHY INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM LOGIC
    3. TRADITIONAL METAPHYSICS NOT KNOWLEDGE, BUT ONLY WISHFUL THINKING
    4. PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD ESSENTIALLY ANALYTICAL
    5. RUSSELL'S ACCOUNT OF THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY INCOMPATIBLE WITH HIS EXAMPLES
    6. RUSSELL'S ACCOUNT OF THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY UNSOUND
    7. DIFFERENTIATION OF PHILOSOPHY FROM LOGIC NO REFLECTION ON THE VALUE OF THE ANALYTICAL METHOD

  6. PHILOSOPHY AS SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF MEANING
    1. PHILOSOPHY AS COMPRISING ALL THE RATIONAL SCIENCES
    2. THE PLACE OF ANALYSIS AND CONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY
    3. PHILOSOPHY AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES
    4. DEFINITION AND SYSTEMATIZATION OF FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS A LATE STAGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATURAL SCIENCE
    5. INVESTIGATION OF THE MEANING OF CONCEPTS NOT THE DIFFERETIA OF THE RATIONAL SCIENCES
    6. BROAD'S FAILURE TO GIVE THE DIFFERENTIA OF CONCEPTS THAT PHILOSOPHY ALONE INVESTIGATES
    7. DIFFERENT NATURE OF THE PREMISES FOR THE ASSERTIONS OF THE RATIONAL SCIENCES VS. THOSE OF PHILOSOPHY

  7. PHILOSOPHY AS LOGICAL SYNTAX OF THE LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE
    1. WHAT CARNAP SAYS PHILOSOPHY IS NOT
    2. PHILOSOPHY AS LOGICAL ANALYSIS, I.E. SYNTAX OF THE LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE
    3. AMBIGUITY OF THE TERM SYNTAX AS USED BY CARNAP
    4. SYNTACTICAL SENTENCES AND THE FORMAL MODE OF SPEECH
    5. REAL-OBJECT SENTENCES
    6. PSEUDO-OBJECT SENTENCES AND THE MATERIAL MODE OF SPEECH
    7. "TRANSLATION" OF SENTENCES OF THE MATERIAL MODE OF SPEECH INTO THE FORMAL MODE
    8. "TRANSLATABILITY" FROM THE MATERIAL INTO THE FORMAL MODE NO PROOF THAT PHILOSOPHY IS SYNTAX
    9. WHAT CARNAP CALLS TRANSLATION INTO THE FORMAL MODE OF SPEECH NOT TRULY TRANSLATION
    10. "PSYCHOLOGISM" VS. "CHEMISTRY OF SYMBOLS"
    11. SYNTACTICAL TREATMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

    PART II
    THE SUBJECT MATTER AND METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY

  8. HOW IS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF ANY GIVEN SYSTEMATIC INQUIRY DEFINED?
    1. PHILOSOPHY AS SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE
    2. THE CLAIM OF PHILOSOPHY TO A SUBJECT MATTER DISTINCTIVELY ITS OWN
    3. PRIMITIVE AND DERIVATIVE FACTS
    4. DEFINITION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER DISTINCTIVE OF A GIVEN SCIENCE

  9. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NATURAL, THE FORMAL, AND THE MENTAL SCIENCES
    1. THE SUBJECT MATTER DISTINCTIVE OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES
    2. THE SUBJECT MATTER DISTINCTIVE OF THE FORMAL SCIENCES
    3. THE SUBJECT MATTER DISTINCTIVE OF THE MENTAL SCIENCES
    4. SOME QUESTIONS DEALT WITH BY "INTROSPECTIONISTS" NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE SCIENCE OF MIND
    5. ARTIFICIAL LIMITATIONS OF THE SCOPE OF THE SCIENCE OF MIND
    6. GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY

  10. THE SUBJECT MATTER DISTINCTIVE OF PHILOSOPHY
    1. THE PRIMITIVES OF PHILOSOPHY
    2. APPRAISAL AND DESCRIPTION
    3. APPRAISALS PRIMITIVE FOR PHILOSOPHY SPONTANEOUS, PARTICULAR, AND FORMULATED
    4. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIZING BORN OF THE DESIRE TO SETTLE DOUBTS OF OUR APPRAISALS RATIONALLY
    5. THE DERIVATIVE PART OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF PHILOSOPHY THE MORE PROMINENT AND TECHNICAL
    6. IS ALL PHILOSOPHY ULTIMATELY CONCERNED WITH APPRAISALS?
    7. PHILOSOPHY, THE BRANCES OF PHILOSOPHY, AND THE PHILOSOPHIES OF PARTICULAR SUBJECTS
    8. IS PHILOSOPHY MERE "RATIONALIZATION" OF OUR APPRAISALS?

  11. THE EMPIRICAL AND THE THEORETICAL TASKS OF ANY SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY
    1. EXPERIENCE AND REASON
    2. THEORY, CONJECTURE, AND LAW
    3. THEORY AS EXPLANATORY CONJECTURE
    4. NO CONJECTURE REALLY EXPLANATORY IF IT LACKS "PREDICTIVENESS"
    5. THEORY AS CONCEPTUALLY (VS. CAUSALLY) EXPLANATORY CONJECTURE
    6. STRUCTURE OF THE THEORIES EXPLANATORY OF LAWS
    7. GROUNDS FOR CHOICE BETWEEN RIVAL THEORIES
    8. THE FACTS WHICH A GIVEN THEORY SEEKS TO EXPLAIN OFTEN DERIVATIVE

  12. PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERIENCE AND PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY
    1. APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF THEORY THROUGH THE EXAMPLE OF ETHICS
    2. WHAT FACTS ARE PRIMITIVE FOR ETHICS?
    3. EMPIRICAL ETHICAL GENERALIZATIONS AND ETHICAL NORMS
    4. WHAT AN ETHICAL THEORY EXPLAINS AND PREDICTS
    5. THE TWO PARTS OF AN ETHICAL THEORY AND THE EMPIRICAL TESTS OF ITS VALIDITY
    6. GROUNDS FOR CHOICE BETWEEN RIVAL ETHICAL THEORIES
    7. CAN ETHICAL THEORY RESOLVE CONFLICTS BETWEEN ETHICAL JUDGMENTS?
    8. ONE ETHICAL THEORY, OR SEVERAL?
    9. ARE ETHICAL THEORIES PRESCRIPTIVE?
    10. ETHICAL THEORIES VS. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
    11. EXPERIENCE AND THEORY IN BRANCHES OF PHILOSOPHY OTHER THAN ETHICS

  13. PHILOSOPHY, WISDOM, AND THE APPLICATION OF WISDOM
    1. WISDOM AS KNOWLEDGE 0F NORMS
    2. NORMS DISTINGUISHED FROM AIMS AND DESIDERATA
    3. KNOWLEDGE OF NORMS USED TO DEFINE SPECIFIC AIMS FOR CENSORIAL ACTIVITY
    4. CENSORIAL ACTIVITY NOT PHILOSOPHY BUT PHILOSOPHICAL ENGINEERING
    5. CENSORABLES POSSIBLY QUALITIES, TELIC ACTIVITIES, OR INSTRUMENTS
    6. THE NATURE OF TELISM
    7. TELISM VS. AUTOMATIC MECHANICAL REGULATION
    8. CATEGORIES OF TELIC ACTIVITY
    9. RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAWS OF NATURE TO WISDOM
    10. WISDOM AND TECHNICAL PHILOSOPHY

  14. THE METHOD OF KNOWLEDGE IN PHILOSOPHY
    1. THE FACTS 0F OBSERVATION IN PHILOSOPHY
    2. THE EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY
    3. PRIMITIVE PHILOSOPHICAL FACTS, AND THEREFORE ALSO EMPIRICAL NORMS, ALWAYS "FUNCTIONS" OF SPECIFIC PERSONS
    4. THE TASK, THE NATURE, AND THE VALIDITY OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES
    5. TWO WAYS OF "KNOWING" THE MEANING OF A PHILOSOPHICAL PREDICATE
    6. TWO KINDS OF "MEANING" OF A TERM
    7. PRECEPTS OF THE METHOD OF KNOWLEDGE IN THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY
    8. ILLUSTRATIONS OF PROCEDURE
    9. PHILOSOPHY, NATURE, MIND AND LANGUAGE