What is Value?

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well be criticized for attaching no importance to feelings of conviction, expectation, surprise, etc. But Mr. Hare is equally behaviouristic in attaching (quite rightly, in my opinion) no importance to feelings, whether of "obligation" or of "approval", in his discussion of moral principles. If we ignore feelings of all sorts an analysis of "I believe p" into 'I am acting in such a way that my actions are appropriate to p's being true' has an obvious resemblance to an analysis of "I subscribe to q" into 'I am acting in such a way as to play my part in making q true'. There are, of course, obvious differences: in the case of belief, the truth of p is, as it were, the Pole Star to which I orient my behaviour; in the case of moral subscription, the truth of q is more like the Rainbow's End whose orientation depends, in part, upon my behaviour. But both Pole Star and Rainbow's End can guide my footsteps. Now that Professor Stevenson and Mr. Hare have done such distinguished service in clarifying our understanding of how we use our ethical language, the way seems open for a frontal attack upon the problem of the relation between the manner in which our moral judgements are bound up with our actions and the manner in which our "plain judgements of fact" are bound up with our actions; and this is what I take to be the crucial problem, at the present moment, before those of us who are concerned to propound and to defend a theory of "ethics without propositions".

R. B. Braithwaite.


It is as welcome as it is rare to find an ethical writer who, while adopting unreservedly the standpoint of those who call themselves objectivists, is prepared to defend this standpoint by the method of linguistic analysis. Professor Hall's book is a running commentary upon the progress of his soul from the crude 'material-mode' question 'What is Value?' to the subtler and more fruitful questions 'What is the proper syntax of value-sentences?' and 'What is the significance of linguistic analysis for value-theory?'. Both the progress and the commentary on it are tortuous and hesitating—'I have found it necessary', he writes, 'to use the ideas and expressions of others as approximations, needing qualification to indicate the sort of view that I am trying to formulate clearly to myself and communicate understandably to others'. The 'ideas and expressions of others' suffer some mangling in the process (thus he attributes to Professor Ayer on page 68, to myself on page 142, to Strawson on page 228 confusions of which our original text are innocent); but it would be unkind to
demand either directness of argument or accuracy of exegesis from a writer who is obviously more than fully occupied in wrestling with the inherent difficulties of the subject.

He starts from the presupposition that 'there is value and it is unique.' He calls this 'the assumption of the objectivity of values' (pp. 1, 2 n.). He therefore thinks it necessary to give such an account of the nature of values as will leave them 'in the world' and yet keep them distinct from (though 'co-ordinate with') another sort of thing that is to be found in the world, 'facts'. 'Our problem', he says on page 113, 'is to have value in the world, not merely in our language, but to have it there in some other role than that of a property, whether a property of particulars or of facts. Value is to be somehow co-ordinate with fact, and thus to have a status similar to fact.'

He thinks that he can show that value is 'in the world' if he can show by logical analysis that value-sentences are not reducible to any other sort of sentences, and in particular not to factual sentences. He seeks the source of this irreducibility (rightly as I think) in that feature of value-sentences—whatever we are to call it—which they share with imperatives. He is thus led to devote much space to a very interesting discussion of the logic of these latter. He has little difficulty in disposing of those theories (such as Bohnert's) which would reduce imperatives to indicatives. But in his main argument he goes further than this. He thinks that in order to show that imperatives are not reducible to indicatives (and thus, according to his programme, that value is different from fact) he has to show that the 'syntax' of imperatives is completely different from that of indicatives. This involves showing that 'not' and all the common logical connectives have a different behaviour in imperatives from that which they have in indicatives. Any theory which, while agreeing that imperatives are not reducible to indicatives, nevertheless holds that, so far as the logical connectives go, their logic is the same, is dismissed by Professor Hall as a 'trivialisation' of imperative logic (p. 141). It is not clear why he thinks this pejorative term appropriate; imperative logic is not trivialised by showing it to be similar to indicative logic, unless indicative logic also is held to be trivial; but what would it be like to hold this?

The most fundamental difference between the logics of imperatives and indicatives which he claims to observe (pp. 125 ff.) is that there are two ways of negating an imperative sentence, one of which has no counterpart in the case of indicatives. Thus the command 'Donald, wear your rubbers!'¹ may be negated in the ordinary

¹ He follows the queer practice, which has become quite common, of putting an exclamation mark after those imperatives which he is mentioning, while omitting it (correctly) after imperatives which he is using. Although I agree with Fowler's judgment (Modern English Usage, s.v. 'Stops : Exclamation') I will in this review err with Professor Hall.
way by saying ‘Donald, do not wear your rubbers!’; but it may also be ‘cancelled’ by saying ‘Donald, you don’t have to wear yours rubbers!’ Thus instead of a pair of sentences, analogous to the indicative pair ‘Donald is wearing his rubbers’ and ‘Donald is not wearing his rubbers’, we have a quartet, which he writes as follows, altering the original two commands in a way which is not above suspicion:

Donald, you have to wear your rubbers!
Donald, you don’t have to wear your rubbers!
Donald, you have to refrain from wearing your rubbers!
Donald, you don’t have to refrain from wearing your rubbers!

This difference in regard to negation gives rise, as he thinks, to differences in the behaviour of other logical words.

So far he has not laid great emphasis on the difference between imperatives proper and ‘normatives’ (as examples of ‘normatives’ he gives ‘I ought to go’, ‘It would be a good thing if Iowa lost this game’ and ‘The right thing to do is to keep your promise’). He now turns to the relation between these two sorts of sentence. He thinks that normatives cannot, as has sometimes been suggested, be reduced to imperatives (because, he says, normatives can be in the past tense and in all persons, but imperatives can only be in the future tense, and their apparent occurrences in other persons than the second can all be reduced to second-person imperatives). But he makes the suggestion that ordinary imperatives can be reduced to normatives. Thus ‘Give me that book!’ can, he says, be replaced by ‘You ought to give me that book’ (p. 158). And so he thinks that what he has said about the peculiar logic of imperatives can be applied without alteration to normatives. He then seeks to complete his analysis of value-sentences by showing that they can all be reduced to normatives, and specifically to ‘ought’-sentences. This leads him into an interesting, though involved, discussion of the rival views on this question of Moore and Prichard and their supporters.

He concludes this part of his book with an attempt to draw an analogy between ‘legitimate’ as predicated of normative sentences and ‘true’ as predicated of descriptive sentences (pp. 187 ff.). In accord with his view about the two ways in which normative sentences can be negated, he thinks that they can have three ‘legitimacy-values’. These are arrived at as follows. He writes the normative form of the imperative quartet given above thus:

Donald ought to wear his rubbers.
There is no ought about Donald’s wearing his rubbers.
Donald ought to refrain from wearing his rubbers.
There is no ought about Donald’s refraining from wearing his rubbers.

1 He sometimes puts the indicative which corresponds to an imperative into the present, sometimes into the future tense (pp. 125, 148). The future is surely correct.
He then says that the second and fourth of these can be combined into a 'single, simple, normative' (but why 'simple'—for the two are by no means equivalent?). If this latter holds, then 'Donald ought to wear his rubbers' fails to have legitimacy in one way; but if the third of the four sentences holds, it fails in another. Thus, whereas indicative sentences can normally have only two values (true and false), imperatives and normatives can have three.

I hope that the above summary of Professor Hall's views is not utterly unjust. Are they correct? Many would agree with him that value-judgments are radically different from statements of fact. But it is not clear to me how, in any usual sense of the word, such a view is consistent with 'objectivism'. It is true that the word is so ambiguous that there are very few ethical theories which cannot claim to be in some sense 'objectivist'. But would any of the commoner sorts of objectivist be satisfied with any ethical theory which did not hold that value-judgments were statements of fact?

Nor is the argument beyond reproach whereby he seeks to prove that imperatives are not reducible to indicatives. He thinks that he can fulfil a necessary and sufficient condition of such a proof if he can show that 'not' and the common logical connectives behave differently in the two moods. I shall try to make clear (1) that this is not a necessary condition; (2) that it is not a sufficient condition; (3) that Professor Hall does not fulfil it.

(1) He is clearly right in holding that, for example, the pair of commands 'Wear your rubbers!' and 'Do not wear your rubbers!' is not reducible to the pair of statements 'You are going to wear your rubbers' and 'You are not going to wear your rubbers' (or for that matter to any other pair of statements). But if we are asked to prove this, we can do it by showing that those features of the first pair of sentences which make us call them imperatives are not found in the second pair, and vice versa. It is not necessary to show that no feature occurs in the first pair which occurs in the second and vice versa. In particular, it is not necessary to show that 'not' behaves differently, any more than it is necessary to show that 'rubbers' behaves differently. And therefore, in order to show that imperatives are not reducible to indicatives, it is not necessary to prove what Professor Hall seeks to prove.

(2) But it is not sufficient either. For even if there were a class of sentences in which 'not' and the logical connectives behaved differently from similar words in the commonest kind of indicative sentences, this would not prove that this class of sentences is not indicative—it might be a class of indicatives of a peculiar sort, distinguished from the ordinary sort by this very feature. Let us suppose (without committing ourselves either to the truth of the doctrine or to the utility of this way of expounding it) that there is a class of sentences in ordinary language (or could be in an artificial language) whose logic is 'multi-valued', and in which,
therefore, the word ‘not’, and any connectives which are related to it, have a different use or meaning from that which they have in a two-valued logic. This in itself would not show that these sentences were not indicatives; and therefore to show that imperatives have these features would not be to show that they are not indicatives.

But we may go further than this. It is possible, using methods analogous to Professor Hall’s, to construct quartets of indicative sentences which have the same feature as his quartet of imperative sentences; and this shows fairly conclusively that he has not hit upon a distinguishing feature of imperatives. His quartet is generated from the pair ‘Donald, wear your rubbers!’ and ‘Donald, do not wear your rubbers!’ by ‘cancelling’ each of them. The first, when ‘cancelled’, he writes ‘Donald, you don’t have to wear your rubbers!’; and the second, when ‘cancelled’, he writes ‘Donald, you don’t have to refrain from wearing your rubbers!’ He then rewrites the original two sentences in a way which looks more homogeneous with these latter two; he writes them ‘Donald, you have to wear your rubbers!’ and ‘Donald, you have to refrain from wearing your rubbers!’ But the quartet which is thus produced can be written more idiomatically as follows:

Donald, you must wear your rubbers.
Donald, you may refrain from wearing your rubbers.
Donald, you must not wear your rubbers (must refrain from wearing your rubbers).
Donald, you may wear your rubbers.

In fact, they might all be described as modal sentences of an imperative sort, and none of them—either in Professor Hall’s version or in mine—is an ordinary imperative.

But if we are allowed to pass from non-modal sentences to modal ones, much the same thing can be done in the indicative mood by using another sense of ‘may’ and ‘must’. Instead of the pair ‘Donald, you are going to wear your rubbers’ and ‘Donald, you are not going to wear your rubbers’, we have the quartet:

Donald, you must be going to wear your rubbers.
Donald, you may be going to refrain from wearing your rubbers.
Donald, you must be going to refrain from wearing your rubbers.
Donald, you may be going to wear your rubbers.

‘May’ in one sense can be used to ‘cancel’ an indicative, just as in another it can be used to ‘cancel’ an imperative. And ‘must’ in both senses ‘cancels’ the ‘cancellation’, thereby restoring something stronger than the original statement or command. Once we stray from plain non-modal sentences into any of the many kinds of modal sentences, this sort of thing happens to negation; but it happens in both moods alike.

(3) There is not space to deal with all the examples whereby Professor Hall and those on whom he draws have sought to show
that 'not', etc. behave differently in the two moods. I shall take those examples which seem the most plausible. Note, that I am not here claiming positively that the two moods are alike, but only negatively that it has not been shown that there is a difference. This I shall do by constructing, in the indicative, cases to parallel his imperative examples. I shall deal only with 'not', 'and' and 'or'.

'Not' has already been partly covered. I have shown that indicative sentences too can be 'cancelled' as well as negated. It only remains to point out that provided that we confine ourselves to negation (which is the proper function of plain 'not' in both moods, 'cancellation' being a more indirect proceeding which requires much other logical apparatus besides) singular imperatives are as 'two-valued' as singular indicatives. This is seen by comparing the following two questions, both of which are perfectly legitimate:

Tell me, am I to wear my rubbers? Yea or No?
Tell me, am I going to wear my rubbers? Yea or No?

They would not be legitimate in either case, if a third answer were possible besides 'Yes' and 'No'. But it is not. In both cases, if we answer 'Neither' (which a 'three-valued' logic would allow) we say something incomprehensible—for we cannot in the first case tell Donald neither to wear his rubbers nor not to wear them, any more than in the second case we can say that he is going neither to wear them nor not to wear them. The only thing that 'Neither' might conceivably mean is 'I'm not giving either answer'; but this is not to answer the question, but to refuse to answer it; and this can be done to both questions.

In the case of 'and', Professor Hall says that from 'The prisoner was first handcuffed and then given a private audience with the judge', we can infer 'The prisoner was given a private audience with the judge'. But we do not, he says, want to have 'and' used in imperative logic in such a way that from 'Let the prisoner first be handcuffed and let the prisoner then be given a private audience with the judge!' there follows 'Let the prisoner he given a private audience with the judge!'. The source of his disinclination to allow this inference is perhaps as follows: he envisages a policeman, on being given the first order, making the inference and then carrying out the second order by giving the prisoner an audience without handcuffs. In the case of 'or' a very similar example is given. Professor Hall says that 'The defendant was sentenced to death or was set free' follows from 'The defendant was sentenced to death'; but that we cannot allow an inference from 'Hang the defendant!' to 'Hang the defendant or set him free!'.

Has he forgotten that, in all inferences where the entailment is not mutual, the premises say more than (are more definite than, exclude more possibilities than) the conclusion? Thus in the
Inference from 'Socrates is a male animal' to 'Socrates is an animal', something which is said in the premiss is left unsaid in the conclusion, namely, that Socrates is male; but this does not make the inference invalid. What is left out may in certain cases be something of the last importance. Professor Hall has given examples of such omissions in imperative inferences; but they can occur in indicative inferences too. I ask a policeman in court 'What happened while I was having lunch?' He replies 'The prisoner was first handcuffed and then given a private audience with the judge'. It happens that the judge's wife, who is hard of hearing, has come in with me; she asks 'What happened?'. I reply 'The prisoner was given a private audience with the judge'. The inference is valid, though the conclusion might alarm. In the imperative example, likewise, the policeman who, having been ordered 'First handcuff the prisoner and then give him an audience!', passes on to a subordinate the order 'Give the prisoner an audience!' is guilty, not of an invalid inference, but of omitting an important part of his instructions. And similarly in the disjunctive case: I ask a policeman outside the gaol near which I live 'What has been done with the defendant?' [whom we may assume to be a brutal murderer]. He tells me 'The defendant was sentenced to death'. But although the inference that therefore the defendant was either sentenced to death or was set free is perfectly valid, I do not go home and bolt all my doors and windows because of the possibility that the defendant is at large. This possibility was excluded by the premise which I know to be true; the fact that it is not excluded by the conclusion which I have rightly inferred does not make the inference invalid. So also in the imperative. If a hangman is told 'Hang the defendant!' there is nothing in logic to prevent him inferring that he is to hang the defendant or set him free. But if he then sets him free, he is guilty, not of a logical error, but of acting on the less definite order when what he was given was the more definite.

Thus Professor Hall is unsuccessful in establishing a difference between the logics of singular imperatives and singular indicatives. He has perhaps been misled by his assimilation of ordinary imperatives to 'ought'-sentences. These latter have, indeed, a logic which is radically different from that of singular sentences, indicative or imperative; it is much more like that of universal or of modal sentences. And this makes his reduction of 'Give me that book!' to 'You ought to give me that book' quite impossible. But I will not repeat here what I have written elsewhere about the differences between singular imperatives and 'ought'-sentences.

Professor Hall's analogy between 'legitimate' and 'true' is of value up to a point, but dangerous thereafter. I do not know whether he himself oversteps the limit of discretion. The danger is that the analogy may lead us to think of legitimacy as a kind of

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The last chapter of the book is a most interesting discussion in retrospect of the problems of method which the rest of the book has encountered. In it Professor Hall gets nearer than at any other point to an understanding of what he is about. Indeed, we may conjecture that the book was written, in the order in which it is printed, during a period in which the author's thought was rapidly developing. This is the only explanation that can be given of how an author who in his last chapter can write with penetration and even lucidity about the relations of language to the 'non-linguistic world' and of ideal languages to ordinary language, can in his earlier chapters make such heavy weather of these same problems. The book, we may feel, records Professor Hall's progress as he has gallantly fought his way out of the jungle; many readers will regret that he has brought out so much of the jungle with him.

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