Review
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cause motor behavior. A system could have consciousness without behavior and behaviour without consciousness' (p. 69).

This, of course, raises the other minds problem with a vengeance, and Searle proposes the following solution:

If you think for a moment about how we know that cats and dogs are conscious, and that computers and cars are not conscious (and by the way, there is no doubt that you and I know both of these things), you will see that the basis of our certainty is not ‘behavior’, but rather a certain causal conception of how the world works. One can see that cats and dogs are in certain important respects relevantly similar to us. Those are eyes, this is skin, these are ears, etc. The ‘behavior’ only makes sense as the expression or manifestation of an underlying mental reality, because we can see the causal basis of the mental and thereby see the behavior as a manifestation of the mental (p. 22).

There are good grounds for being dissatisfied with this. Consider the second possible outcome to Searle's silicon chip operation, where the patient is rendered completely unconscious but his behaviour remains unaffected. If there is even a bare conceptual possibility of this outcome, then I can hardly establish that others are conscious solely on the basis of how they look and behave, since looking and behaving as they do is quite compatible, according to Searle, with their being totally unconscious. They need not have gone through anything so dramatic as a silicon chip transplant: every other human being could simply have been born with a reticular formation which, unlike my own, does not allow consciousness to emerge because of some minute physical difference. If Searle is right in thinking that the second outcome is conceivable then I could have been surrounded by such people all my life; indeed, I have no grounds for thinking that such a state of affairs is not just as probable as the situation where I have always been surrounded by conscious agents. Searle's way of showing that consciousness and behaviour are ontologically quite distinct leads to a wholly private conception of the mental; this, in its turn, results in an insoluble—and quite unbelievable—sceptical impasse.

The second half of Searle's book is largely devoted to a cogent and thorough critique of cognitive science, and I have no doubt that much future debate will concentrate on these chapters. Generally, Searle's emphasis on biology and qualia rather than machines and programs is very welcome, and this stylish and professional book could well play a part in altering the whole focus of contemporary philosophy of mind.

M. W. Rowe

Essays on Religion and Education
By R. M. Hare
Oxford: Clarendon, 1992, viii+238 pp. £27.50

This book, which ought to be available in the library of every teacher training institution and pressingly recommended to all concerned, consists of a Pre-
face, thirteen essays, References and Bibliography, and an Index. Although all but three of the essays have been published previously, and mainly in journals or collections specifically concerned with either religion or education, there are sufficient cross connections to ensure that the result is a structure rather than a heap.

For instance: the first essay, which expounds a Braithwaitean development of or from traditional Christianity, presents widening appreciation of the essential autonomy of ethics as both one of the major threats to the former orthodoxy and a consequent opportunity to replace dogmatic moral teaching by the encouragement of rational moral thinking: 'This means that the God of the orthodox, who was never competent to provide us with the basis of our morality, can now be seen to be unnecessary for this purpose' (p. 30). The question of the competence in this matter of either 'the God of the orthodox' or other possible candidates is effectively explored in the previously unpublished 'Are there moral authorities?'; which goes on to point the difficulty if not the impossibility of identifying the norms actually authorized even if there were some extramundane Being competent to provide authorization.

Elsewhere Hare maintains that certain norms vehemently and persistently urged as supposedly endorsed by such an authority cannot survive critical moral thinking. Thus in 'Euthanasia: A Christian View' it is argued that an unqualified embargo upon the assisted suicide of voluntary euthanasia is flat incompatible with the Golden Rule. And in 'Satanism and Nihilism', another of the pieces previously unpublished, we read: 'The intuitionists and other "objectivists" tend to wrap up all our moral rules into a single package; they cannot give reasons for keeping any of them, so there is a great temptation to throw away the lot. The Roman Church has been the worst offender. It thinks it knows the truth about contraception. It is against God's laws to use contraceptives ... it would be hard to think of a better way of bringing the moral law into disrepute' (pp. 108–9).

The Satanist is defined as someone who deliberately does wrong just because it is wrong, and for the prescriptivist the problem is to explain how this is possible. The elegant solution is to argue that it is possible only and precisely in so far as moral judgments are mistakenly believed to be purely descriptive statements of fact. Thus in Paradise Lost the evil which Satan loves and does is defined as whatever is as a matter of fact forbidden by God.

Nihilists or, rather, moral Nihilists are seen as both sympathetic and more variously mistaken. Unlike the Amoralists, who reject moral rules because these interfere with the Amoralists' pursuit of their own interests, 'the nihilist sometimes puts on an appearance of almost saintly universal love' (p. 108). The mistakes of which these Nihilists are clients include descriptivist and heterological misunderstandings of the nature of morality and failure to distinguish necessary universality from not always necessary generality. When critical moral thinking is recommended as the sovereign preventative of Satanism, Nihilism and several other aberrations mentioned only in passing we must join with Hare in hoping 'that teachers... will make it clear that "criticize" is being used in the sense of "appraise" and not of "find fault with"' (p. 120). For in the educational as in the wider world a call for criticism or for a critical
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approach is often construed as being, and indeed is sometimes intended as, a demand that whatever is criticized should be condemned and rejected.

The last of the three papers not previously published is 'How did Morality Get a Bad Name?' Of all the thirteen this is perhaps the most widely and urgently needed. Hare begins by giving examples of stubborn 'refusals to make moral judgments' and of dismissions of those committing such political incorrectness as the irrelevant, irrational, uncaring 'morality brigade'. He asks: 'Why is it that morality has come to stink in this way?' His answer is 'that it is because many people have a quite misconceived idea of what morality is supposed to be' (p. 87).

After reminding us that an earlier generation of philosophers used the word 'judgment' for 'the act of thinking as opposed to the product or the content of thought, but comprehending all of these' (p. 89), Hare goes on to argue that 'The really important thing to get hold of is that it is possible to reason about what one ought to do. To show this is the prime task of moral philosophy. But people keep on urging moral philosophers to undertake another task, which is not important in the least . . . the task of showing that moral judgments are 'objective' (p. 94).

The most astonishing feature of the whole book, and the only one from which I myself strongly dissent, is the treatment of Rawls in the final essay, 'Opportunity for What? Some remarks on Current Disputes about equality in Education'. In his Critical Notice of A Theory of Justice, which was printed in two parts in The Philosophical Quarterly, Hare made much, and very rightly of the refusal anywhere to define the key word 'justice'. Rawls left it till the five hundred and seventy-ninth page of his enormous book even to remark and attempt to justify this neglect—by asserting his eagerness 'to leave questions of meaning and definition aside and to get on with the task of developing a substantive theory of justice'. But here Hare himself speaks of the 'principles of justice or fairness', indicating that his own view is that these principles can be chosen on a utilitarian basis, but without vouchsafing any definition of either key term. Do we have to remind Hare of the punch lines with which Plato scripted his Socrates to conclude Book I of The Republic?

Antony Flew