R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (1952)
PREFACE

I have set out in this book to write a clear, brief, and readable introduction to ethics which shall bring the beginner as directly as possible to grips with the fundamental problems of the subject. I have therefore, in reducing the material which I had prepared to about half its original length, left out most of those qualifications, answers to minor objections, and other defences with which the security-minded philosopher is apt to hedge himself round. Though I think that the approach to ethics which is sketched in these pages is in general a fruitful one, I shall be less disturbed if my readers disagree with me than if they fail to understand me. Almost every paragraph in this book, as in other works of philosophy, requires some qualification; but to supply it on every occasion would be to make my main contentions difficult to grasp. I have therefore tried to adopt throughout as definite a standpoint as possible, in the belief that it is more important that there should be discussion of the points herein raised, than that I should survive it unscathed.

Ethics, as I conceive it, is the logical study of the language lof morals. It is in general easier to understand the very complex logic of moral terms if one has some acquaintance with the simpler kinds of logic; but since many students of philosophy are for some reason made to study ethics without such acquaintance, I have tried not to take it for granted. If anyone approaches this book without any previous philosophical reading, he will, I hope, find it intelligible if he follows this simple rule: to omit any passages which he finds difficult, go on reading, and return to them later. I have included, for the benefit of those who may be interested in them, certain very cursory references to some of the familiar 'types of ethical theory', and also to the works of some of the best-known writers on ethics; but these references may be ignored without missing any essential of my argument. I have put the section on 'The Imperative Mood' first, because it seems to me the most fundamental; but since it is also perhaps the most difficult, I have, in Part II, not taken for granted the argument of Part I; any reader, therefore, who wishes to take these two parts in the reverse order is at liberty to do so.

I have deliberately avoided references to the problems of moral psychology. In particular, the problem known as 'The Freedom of the Will', which has a place in most introductions to ethics, is not mentioned, and the problem usually referred to by Aristotle's title Akrasia, which should be discussed more often than it is, is mentioned only in passing. This is not because I consider these problems unimportant, nor because I have nothing to say about them, but because they are rather problems of the language of the psychology of morals, than of the language of morals itself.

My thanks are due, in the first place, to the Master and Scholars of Balliol College, for their generosity in giving me, during the year 1950-1, the relief from my teaching duties without which the task could never have been completed. Secondly, I have to thank the examiners of the T. H. Green Moral Philosophy Prize, Professors H. J. Paton and G. Ryle, and Mr. P. H. Nowell-Smith, for their many helpful comments on my dissertation for the prize, of which Part I of this book is an abridgement. Thirdly, I owe acknowledgement to those many at Oxford and elsewhere, in the course of discussion with whom I have learnt most of what is here set out; my debt to Mr. J. O. Urmson, for example, will be obvious. I have especial reason to be grateful to Mr. D. Mitchell and Professorsr H. L. A. Hart, A. J. Ayer and A. E. Duncan-Jones, who have read part or all of my typescript and saved me from serious errors -- for those which may remain I ask forgiveness. The latter's paper to the Aristotelian Society on 'Truth and Commands' appeared too late to allow any comment in the text; and the same is true of Professor Everett Hall's book What is Value?, in which the subject of the present book is examined on a more ambitious scale. For a discussion of Professor Hall's views I must refer the reader to a forthcoming review in Mind. I have also to thank Mr. B. F. McGuinness for help in compiling the Index. Lastly, in case brevity should seem to have led to dogmatism in dealing with the writings of philosophers both living and dead, and to injustice towards their doctrines, I must confess that I have learnt as much from those writers with whom I may appear to disagree, as from those whom I applaud.

I dedicate this study of moral language to those good men and women without whose lives the moralist would be wasting his breath, and especially to my wife.

R. M. H.

BALLIOL COLLEGE 1952

In the second impression I have made some minor corrections which did not involve radical disturbance of the text. Were I rewriting the book, I should write it differently, since now I have the advantage of knowing what has been misunderstood, and what has misled. Though my views have changed in some particulars, they have not changed in any respect which seems to me fundamental. I am most grateful to those who have helped to clarify these issues by commenting on my arguments. For my present views, I must refer the reader to a new book, a continuation of this, which I hope to publish shortly.

R. M. H.

BALLIOL COLLEGE 1960