2 Strengths and Weaknesses of the National Movement

INTRODUCTION

In nearly all respects modern Ukrainian society is characterised by diversity. The lack of a single consolidating centre such as the Roman Catholic Church in Lithuania or Poland has made the organisation of a national movement relatively difficult. Ukraine's vast, sprawling territory, the size of France, has always contained many different regions and traditions. Moreover, throughout the modern period, Ukrainians have not possessed a Ukrainian nation-state, and it is normally the state that is the most powerful instrument in overcoming such diversity.

Ukraine's last true periods of independence were in the seventeenth century (the last vestiges of which, Cossack autonomy within imperial Russia, were abolished by 1781) and under the always fragile governments which sought to revive the national idea in the unfavourable circumstances of 1917-20.

Consequently, in the modern era Ukrainian ethno-linguistic territory has rarely been governed as a unit, but has been continually subdivided in shifting patterns among several states (although its core, the lands on either side of the Dnipro, was ruled by Tsarist Russia and then the USSR for two centuries) until most, but not all, Ukrainian lands were incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR) in 1945. However, these lands have always been administered as regions in a broader system of empire. This is not to make a value judgement, but is simply a recognition that Ukraine has not possessed its own autonomous political institutions.

The analysis here follows Eisenstadt's definition of an empire as a supranational or supra-ethnic political system, which exists by virtue of its possession of sufficient 'free-floating resources' to give it political autonomy. An empire is then defined by its very ability to act freely, and therefore does not necessarily involve any specific set of

social or economic relations, exploitative or otherwise. (This is not the same thing as saying that an empire is immune from all outside influences.)[1]

The struggle to escape from empire and invest the institutions of the Ukrainian SSR with real political content will be the theme of later chapters. The present chapter seeks to analyse the effect that such a lack of autonomy has had on Ukrainian politics and society, and the consequent key strengths and weaknesses of Ukrainian nationalism today, in terms of territory and demography, regionalism, culture, society and economy, and then relate this to the arguments presented in Chapter 1.

TERRITORY AND DEMOGRAPHY

Map 2.1 shows the post-1945 boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR within the Soviet Union (the Crimea was added to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954, and declared itself an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in January 1991). The 25 administrative sub-units of the Ukrainian SSR, known as *oblasts,* are also shown, together with the city administrations of Kyiv and Sevastopol. It should also be noted because of shifting historical patterns of political rule and migration, significant groups of ethnic Ukrainians live in adjoining territories. On the other hand, many border regions within the Ukrainian SSR also contain potentially worrisome minorities.

Ukrainians living outside of the Ukrainian SSR can be divided into four main groups. The first two live within the Soviet Union, in adjoining areas of Moldova, Belarus and the Russian Federation (RSFSR), part of the Ukrainian ethno-linguistic territory in the past; the second two further afield. Map 2.2 shows Ukrainians in neighbouring territories. The 1989 Soviet census recorded a total of 44.2 million Ukrainians, of whom 37.4 million lived inside the Ukrainian SSR and 6.8 million in other republics.[2] The largest numbers of the latter lived in the RSFSR (3.7 million), Kazakhstan (0.898 million); Moldova (0.561 million) and Belarus (0.231 million). Smaller concentrations of ethnic Ukrainians, such as those in the Baltic states, tend to be among the most highly denationalised.

Ukrainians in Moldova are concentrated on the left bank of the Dnister centred around the town of Tyraspol', where a large proportion of Moldova's heavy industry is concentrated. The area, also known as 'Prydnistrov'ia', was part of the Ukrainian SSR until 1940,



Map 2.1 Post-1945 boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR within the Soviet Union

Map 2.2 Ukrainians in neighbouring territories

when it was added to other lands gained by the USSR from Romania to form the Moldavian SSR.[3] The mainly Russian and Ukrainian (60 per cent) population of the region showed markedly separatist tendencies when the Moldovan Popular Front came to power in 1990.

Ukrainians in Belarus live predominantly in the south-western region of north-eastern Polissia, south of the River Prypiat' and around the town of Brest (this area is now the Brest and Homel *oblasts).*

In the RSFSR, ethnic Ukrainians are mainly concentrated in southern Kursk and Voronezh *oblasts,* in the Taganrog and Shakhty regions at the mouth of the River Don which were part of the Ukrainian SSR until 1924, and in the Kuban' and Caucasus.[4] (The Kuban' was settled by Zaporozhian Cossacks in the eighteenth century after Catherine II destroyed their military stronghold, the 'Sich'.)

Tsarist and Soviet internal borders have been frequently redrawn, always with the interests of the centre in mind, and hence have tended to lack more than symbolic legitimacy. Those Ukrainians who have found themselves on the wrong side of such borders now tend to be heavily denationalised. The future Ukrainian state, therefore, is likely to become increasingly vocal about their interests,[5] and for those of the second group of Ukrainians, dispersed more widely throughout the USSR, either in large cities (in 1989, 247 000 Ukrainians lived in Moscow, for example; 94 000 in Kishinev; 51 000 in Minsk; 44 000 in Riga), or as migrant labour further afield.[6] Under Soviet rule, Ukrainians outside the Ukrainian SSR have never enjoyed the same levels of educational and cultural facilities as Russians outside the RSFSR.[7]

A third group are the Ukrainians living beyond Ukraine's western borders: approximately 300 000 in Poland, 50 000-150 000 in the former Czechoslovakia, 50 000-70 000 in Romania, and isolated communities of around 30 000 in the Vojvodina autonomous region of Serbia, and in Bosnia-Herzogovina.[8]

The Ukrainian border with Poland and the status of the minorities on either side have posed a particularly thorny problem in the region. The border established after the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1919 left millions of mainly Galician Ukrainians under Polish rule, and neither of the more westwardly borders established in 1939 and 1945 coincided with the ethnic boundary. The Ukrainians from the Chelm region and the 'Lemko' Ukrainians from the areas around the town of Przemy'sl in the south-east of Poland (see Map 2.2) were largely dispersed from their traditional homelands during Operations 'Vistula' in 1947.[9] Only 30 000 remained, but Polish Ukrainians have been trickling back to the area since the end of communist rule in Warsaw in 1989.

Ukrainians, or Lemko-Ukrainians, in Slovakia are concentrated in the Presov region of northeastern Slovakia. The former Czechoslovakia also governed what is now Ukrainian Transcarpathia from 1919 to 1938.

The Ukrainians left in Romania after the mainly Ukrainian region of North Bukovyna was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR in 1940 live in the most northerly areas of the counties of Maramures, around the town of Baia Mare, Dobrudja, around the town of Constanta, and Suceava, and suffered from severe pressure to Romanianise under the CeauQescu regime from 1964 to 1989.

Finally, the fourth group (not shown in Map 2.2) are the Ukrainians of the wider diaspora. It is difficult to give a precise figure for this group, as emigrants, particularly to the New World, are not usually required to be precise about their origins, and many left Ukraine around the turn of the century, at a time when Ukrainian national consciousness was at a low ebb. However, the diaspora may number some 2-3 million, with the largest groups in the USA (1.5 million), Canada (750 000),[10] Argentina (100 000), Brazil (50 000-100 000), the UK (30 000) and Australia (20 000).[11] (Additionally, a disproportionate number of the 400 000 Soviet Jews settled in Israel by end-1991 have come from Ukraine, as the former heartland of Soviet Jewish settlement.)

There have been two great waves of westward Ukrainian emigration. The first, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was because of economic hardship and the relative openness of Austro-Hungarian Ukrainian lands to the west. The second was due to the dislocations of the Second World War. Hence, Ukrainian emigres in the West have tended to be from Western Ukraine, and therefore to be more nationally conscious and politically radical (on Western Ukraine, see below), whereas Ukrainians under Russian or Soviet rule have tended to migrate eastwards within Russia/the Soviet Union itself.

Western emigre groups have considerable political influence, particularly the Canadian Ukrainians, who make up 3 per cent of the total population of Canada.[12] Well-financed and politically prestigious, they have had a strong impact on domestic Ukrainian politics since 1988.

On the other hand, as Map 2.3 shows, Ukraine has substantial minorities of its own and therefore faces the possibility of territorial claims or political interference from its neighbours.

As stated above, there were 37.4 million Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR in 1989. The rest of the population of 51.5 million was officially made up of 11.4 million Russians, 490 000 Jews, 444 000

Map 2.3 Minorities and separatism in Ukraine

Belarusians, 325 000 Moldovans, 234 000 Bulgarians, 219 000 Poles, 160 000 Hungarians, 135 000 Romanians and 596 000 others; in all 14 million, or 27 per cent of the total population.[13]

The Russians are, of course, the largest and most significant minority. Russian peasants have lived on Ukrainian territory for centuries, especially in what are now the Kharkiv, Sumy and Luhans'k *oblasts,* and as settlers of the southern coastal region, conquered by Catherine II in 1768-83. Greater numbers arrived in successive waves of industrialisation starting in the 1870s, and continuing under Soviet rule in the 1930s and 1950s to 1970s. There were 2.5 million Russians in Ukraine in 1897, 7.1 million in 1959 and 11.4 million by 1989.[14] The Russian population therefore is still heavily concentrated in the industrial regions of eastern Ukraine, and the port regions of the south.

In addition, under Tsarist rule, the imperial elite (military garrisons; administrative, business and cultural elites) tended to be Russians, or Russified Ukrainians. The Soviet empire has not been staffed so exclusively by ethnic Russians, and consequently the institutions of the centre's rule in the periphery have become more Ukrainian. Since the 1950s, the composition of the Communist Party in Ukraine, and therefore of the ruling elites in Ukraine, has become broadly proportional to the relative size of the Ukrainian and Russian populations in Ukraine.[15] However, the potential for conflict between Ukrainian and Russian elites remains.

The figure of 11.4 million Russians, however, is derived from Soviet census questions which rely on self-identification of nationality. One school of thought holds that this is a considerable underestimate, because many nominal Ukrainians are in fact acculturated to a Russian identity and/or are Russian-speaking. Thus, Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians accounted for only 64.7 per cent of the Ukrainian SSR population in 1989, and were in a minority in southern (40 per cent) and eastern Ukraine (44 per cent).[16] Together with Russian-speakers from other minorities (see below), and because of the cultural and religious closeness of Russians and Ukrainians, on this argument the 'Russian' minority in Ukraine is close to 40 per cent of the population.[17]

The counter-argument would hold that assimilation processes are of course reversible (although this is more difficult in the case of language), especially as many self-declared 'Russians' may in fact be Russified Ukrainians, and that local Russians can be mobilised to the Ukrainian national cause by a mixture of territorial and economic nationalism.[18]

The social composition of the Russian population, and the consequent patterns of Ukrainian-Russian interaction, is substantially different from that in the Baltic states and Central Asia, however.[19] In the Baltic states, Latvia and Estonia especially, the Russian presence is mainly a result of the postwar factory construction and relatively high standard of living that drew large numbers of Russian immigrants into the domestic working class. Few have learned the local language. Hence in the late 1980s they were susceptible to the politics of economic populism and opposition to indigenous attempts at cultural revival.

In Central Asia, by contrast, Russian immigrants tended to occupy privileged positions, both economically and politically, owing to the lower education levels and limited labour mobility of the indigenous group. Additionally, many Central Asian republics fit quite closely the 'internal colony' paradigm of Michael Hechter.[20] That is, the locals are largely confined to the bottom of a relatively undeveloped and undifferentiated social structure, employed in agriculture or a commodity monoculture, or as an unskilled working class with Russian supervisors. Hence the Russians have often behaved like the settlers of European overseas empires.

Ukraine's Russians, on the other hand, have a much longer tradition of living on Ukrainian soil, are more evenly spread throughout the social structure, and as fellow east Slavs, feel less threatened by the Ukrainian language and culture. (Although they can also be dismissive of it - only 4.9 per cent know Ukrainian.) They are more likely to make common cause with their Ukrainian cousins than would Russian colonists with the indigenous nationality in Central Asia, but, on the other hand, Russians feel a cultural affinity with the Russian Federation, or with the former USSR. They are not likely to be attracted by the myths and symbols of either the Ukrainian People's Republic of 1917-20 (which had no practical jurisdiction over eastern and southern Ukraine), or by the wartime struggles of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (which were again largely confined to Galicia and Volhynia, and often fought against eastern Ukrainians).[21]

Other minorities in Ukraine can be divided into three camps: (1) those subject to Russification, such as Jews, Germans, Belarusians and Greeks; (2) a smaller group that has gravitated towards the Ukrainian language and culture, mainly Poles and to a more controversial extent Rusyns; and (3) those who have retained a distinct identity, such as Hungarians, Moldovans-Romanians, Bulgarians and Crimean Tatars.[22] Overall, postwar Ukraine, although still a multi-ethnic state,

has become slightly more homogeneous, as minorities have declined and assimilated, most, but not all, Ukrainian ethnic territories are now in the same state, and modernisation has Ukrainianised the cities.

Poles, Jews and Germans are three minorities whose importance has declined sharply in twentieth-century Ukraine. Until the partitions of Poland in 1772-95, a large swathe of Ukrainian territory west of the River Dnipro (the 'Right Bank' - see below), was under Polish rule, and a landowning Polish ruling class predominated in the area until 1917. In Habsburg Galicia (see below) Poles and Ukrainians vied for supremacy, a rivalry that continued under Polish rule of Galicia from 1919 to 1939. War, revolution and population transfer have, however, reduced their numbers from 2.194 million in 1926, to 219 000 in 1989, according to the official census.[23] The largest remaining Polish communities are in L'viv and Zhytomyr *oblasts.* (Polish exile sources, however, have claimed that 500 000 Poles remain on Ukrainian territory, their numbers underestimated because of high levels of Polish linguistic assimilation.)[24]

Jews have lived on Ukrainian territory since the Middle Ages. The Tsarist 'Pale of Settlement' until 1917 confined Jewish settlement to the area of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (which included most Ukrainian lands from 1385 to 1648), and out of Russia proper. Therefore, there were over 2 million Jews in Ukraine in 1897.[25] Their social position as middlemen between Ukrainian peasants and their Russian or Polish overlords caused much resentment. War, pogroms, the Holocaust and emigration (including to Israel from 1971 onwards) have reduced the Ukrainian Jewish community to a shadow of its former self (840 000 in 1959, and around 300 000 in 1991).

Unfortunately, as postwar Poland has shown, the near-disappearance of Jews does not necessarily mean the disappearance of tensions between Jewish and indigenous communities. In Ukraine, memories of the murder of Jews in 1648 during the Cossack-Polish War and in 1768 during the Koli'vshchyna uprising, the pogroms of the 1880s and early 1900s, and the massacres of 1919-20 by troops of the Ukrainian People's Republic and Volunteer (White) armies and during the Second World War, will make reconciliation difficult.[26]

In 1926, 394 000 ethnic Germans lived in Soviet Ukraine, and 610 000 overall within what became the postwar boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR.[27] In 1928-9 they even enjoyed the status of six specifically German *raions.* War, deportation by Stalin and resettlement, however, virtually eliminated the German community, with only 39 000 remaining in 1989.[28]

In Transcarpathia there is much dispute as to whether the majority population (some 75 per cent of the *oblasfs* 1.1 million) is Ukrainian or an ethnically distinct group known as Rusyns or Ruthenians.[29] The area also has a substantial Hungarian minority and a small number of ethnic Romanians in the Tiachiv region.

The Hungarians are highly compact territorially and predominant in the Berehove and Vynohradiv *raions* (which border Hungary), though their cultural centres are in Mukachiv and Uzhhorod. They remain overwhelmingly attached to their mother tongue (97 per cent continuing to use it as their first language in 1979), and are basically a rural community (75 per cent in 1989).[30] Problems in the past between Ukrainians and Hungarians are the result of a legacy of forced 'Magyarisation' during the period of Hungarian rule of Transcarpathia from 1867 to 1918, the Hungarian destruction of the short-lived Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic of September 1938-March 1939 (formed as the result of the break-up of the Czechoslovakian state, of which Transcarpathia had been a part since 1919), and the Hungarians making common cause with the Ruthenians against the Ukrainians.

As regards the majority, Paul Robert Magocsi has argued that, as late as 1945, the inhabitants of Transcarpathia did not have 'a clear-cut understanding of their own national identity. The Russian, Ukrainian and Rusyn orientations each had enough adherents to prevent any one of them from becoming dominant... this balance was broken after 1945 by the Soviet regime, which gave exclusive support to one orientation, the Ukrainian.'[31] Since 1989, the Rusyn identity, fuelled by linguistic peculiarities, a sense of a separate past and of relative closeness to central Europe, has revived, although even Magocsi had thought it to be in terminal decline.

Ivan Rudnytsky, on the other hand, states that the

> Russophile and Rusynophile orientations were moribund by the 1930s and the victory of the Ukrainian national movement resulted from the dynamics of the internal development of Transcarpathian society, and not from the intervention of outside *deus ex machina.* The Soviet regime did not impose, after 1945, a Ukrainian identity on the people of the Transcarpathian *oblast;* it only ratified the outcome of a preceding spontaneous local development.[32]

The struggle between the two conceptions in Transcarpathia itself after 1989 is described in Chapter 9.

Ukraine's Romanians and Moldovans (some differences between the two groups do exist, but they were exaggerated in order to justify the division of the Moldavian SSR from Romania in 1940) live mainly in the Hlyboka region of Chernivtsi *oblast* and in southern Bessarabia (the territory west of the River Dnister that since 1954 has been part of the Odesa *oblast).* These areas, long disputed between Tsarist Russia and Romania, were seized as a result of the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939, and its general unravelling prompted both Moldovan and Romanian revanchist claims by June 1991.[33] Romania has also supported Gagauz and Bulgarian separatism in southern Bessarabia, but has opposed similar attempts by Ukrainians, Russians and Gagauz to dismember Moldova.

The Crimean Tatars were the original inhabitants of the Crimean peninsula, their Khanate having been absorbed into the Tsarist state in 1783 after the Russo-Turkish wars of the eighteenth century. Migration had reduced the Tatars' share of the population from 78.7 per cent to 19.4 per cent by the time of the mass deportation of the remaining 200 000 or so in 1944, for alleged collaboration with the Germans.[34] A long campaign for rehabilitation resulted in the partial restoration of civil rights in 1967, but the Tatars have only been able to return after a USSR Supreme Soviet investigation in 1989. Some 130 000 had already returned by mid-1991 rising to 260 000 by 1993.[35] However, fear of their return among the (mainly Russian) settlers who have taken their place has helped fuel separatist sentiment in the Crimea.[36]

Other minorities include the Belarusians. According to the 1989 census, 33.5 per cent of Ukraine's 440 000 Belarusians gave Russian as their first language, and only 18.6 per cent gave Ukrainian.[37] Hence, they and other highly Russified minorities are often regarded as effectively an addition to the Russian minority in Ukraine.

As a result of late eighteen-century immigration, 240 000 Bulgarians remain in Ukraine, 170 000 of whom live in southern Bessarabia as a compact and largely rural community around the town of Bolhrad. The 1989 census reported 62 per cent as maintaining Bulgarian as their mother tongue.[38] On the Azov coast, 37 000 live in Zaporizhzhia *oblast,* having been resettled there after the Russo-Moldovan conflict in 1861-2.

Ukraine's 99 000 Greeks, on the other hand, despite a history of settlement on Ukraine's Black Sea coast since c.lOOO BC are now heavily Russified; only 8 per cent gave Greek as their mother tongue in 1979,[39]

Table 2.1 gives an ethnic breakdown of the Ukrainian SSR in 1989, by *oblast.*

Table 2.1 National composition of the Ukrainian population in 1989 (per cent)*

Oblast	*Ukrainian*	*Russian*	*Other*
Galicia			
L'viv	90.4	7.9	2.7
Ternopil'	96.8	2.3	0.9
Ivano-Frankivs'k	95.0	4.0	1.0
Volhynia			
Rivne	93.3	4.6	2.1
Vofyn'	94.6	4.7	0.7
Other West			
Transcarpathia	78.4*	4.0	17.6*
Chernivtsi	70.8	6.7	22.5*
Left Bank			
Kyiv (city)	72.5	20.9	6.65
Kyiv *(oblast)*	89.4	8.7	1.9
Kharkiv	62.8	33.2	4.0
Poltava	87.9	10.2	1.9
Sumy	85.5	13.3	1.2
Chernihiv	91.5	6.8	1.7
Right Bank			
Kirovohrad	85.3	11.7	3.0
Cherkasy	90.5	8.0	1.5
Vinnytsia	91.5	5.9	3.6
Zhytomyr	84.9	7.9	7.2
Khmel'nyts'kyi	90.4	5.8	3.8
East			
Donets'k	50.7	43.6	5.7
Luhans'k	51.9	44.8	3.3
Zaporizhzhia	63.1	32.0	4.9
Dnipropetrovs'k	71.6	24.2	4.2
South			
Mykolai'v	75.6	19.4	5.0
Kherson	75.7	20.2	4.1
Odesa	54.6	27.4	18.4[11]
Crimea	25.8	67.0	7.2**
Total	73	21	6

Source: *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR, po dannykh vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991).

* Ukrainians and/or Ruthenians.

* Including 12.5 per cent Hungarians.

* Including 10.7 per cent Romanians and 8.9 per cent Moldovans.

§ Including 3.9 per cent Jews.

1 Including 6.3 per cent Bulgarians and 5.5 per cent Moldovans.

** Before the large-scale return of the Crimean Tatars.

REGIONALISM

Because of their different populations and divergent historical experiences, Ukraine can be divided into the following six regions, and their specific features examined as follows.

Galicia

The three western *oblasts* of L'viv, Ternopil' and Ivano-Frankivs'k first came under Soviet rule in 1939. Their previous experience of Austrian (1772-1918) and Polish rule (1387-1772, despite the Ukrainian revolt in 1648 and 1919-39) had been relatively mild, and a strong revival of national life had taken place in the late nineteenth century. Galicia had been a part of the kingdom of Kievan Rus', and had enjoyed its own period of independence as the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia' until the fourteenth century. Its latterday revival was, however, based on the local Uniate, or Ukrainian Catholic Church, established in 1596, and the Habsburg desire to bolster Ukrainian nationalism as a counterweight to the Poles. Already strong by 1917, Ukrainian national consciousness in Galicia was further strengthened by the armed struggles of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic of 1918-19, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) from 1929, and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) from 1942 against Polish, German and Soviet rule. (The latter fought on against Soviet rule in Galicia until 1954.) The Galician population has remained over 90 per cent Ukrainian despite Soviet rule, and since 1945 has become even more ethnically homogeneous after the death or resettlement of most of the pre-war population of Poles and Jews.[40]

Galicia has seen itself as the 'Piedmont' of Ukrainian nationalism since the late nineteenth century, but the tension between Galicia's sense of mission and those regions of Ukraine which are Russian-populated, Russified or simply more ambivalent about links with Russia (the south, east and Left Bank), has also been a key *leitmotiv* throughout modern Ukrainian history.

Volhynia

The two modern *oblasts* of Volyn' and Rivne have a level of national consciousness that rivals that of Galicia. Most of the area was not under Soviet rule in the inter-war period, but was under Tsarist rule after the Polish Partitions of 1793 and 1795 and hence has had strong

Polish Catholic and Russian Orthodox influences which justify the region's separate treatment.

Transcarpathia and Bukovyna (Chernivtsi *oblast)*

These two *oblasts* are geographically in the West, but have been much more loosely and ambiguously linked to Ukraine as a whole. Transcarpathia has been discussed above. The treaties of Saint-Germain (1919) and Trianon (1920) gave the region to Czechoslovakia, although far-reaching promises of local autonomy were never implemented. Hitler's dismemberment of Czechoslovakia led to the short-lived Carpatho-Ukrainian 'autonomous republic' of 1938-9 under the Uniate priest Avhustyn Voloshyn, destroyed by Hungarian invasion. Since the war, the Soviet state has pursued a policy of Ukrainisation. The dominant religion in Transcarpathia is also Uniate, but there is some resentment at Galician domination of the Church.

Although Czechoslovak rule in Transcarpathia may be remembered with some nostalgia, Romanian rule of Bukovyna in the inter-war period abolished the autonomy the area had enjoyed under the Habsburgs, and meant forced Romanianisaion after 1924, despite (or perhaps because of) the declaration by a North Bukovynan assembly of November 1918 to seek union with Ukraine. The legacy of this period, a strong Orthodox tradition and the fact that the local population is now 70.8 per cent Ukrainian, have probably tied the region more closely to Ukraine than is the case with Transcarpathia.

The phrase 'Greater Ukraine' is used to refer to the rest of the Ukrainian SSR, i.e. those Ukrainian lands under Soviet rule in the inter-war period (not counting ethnically Ukrainian territory in other Soviet republics, but including the Crimea added in 1954). It has three sub-regions.

Central Ukraine

The heart of historical Ukraine. Its ten *oblasts* can be divided into the Left Bank and Right Bank-Podolia regions (east and west of the River Dnipro respectively). The former - Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv - have been under Russian rule since 1654. The latter - Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr and Khmel'nyts'kyi - were under Polish rule until 1793, and are mainly agricultural, especially in the west. (The division between 'Left' and 'Right' Bank is

here fairly arbitrary because of shifting administrative boundaries, but is important in terms of the longer history of the Russian connection on the Left Bank.)

Eastern Ukraine

The four *oblasts* of Luhans'k (formerly Voroshylovh-rad) and Donets'k (the Donbas), and Dnipropetrvs'k and Zaporizhzhia are highly industrialised and Russified.[41] Although important Ukrainian historical and cultural centres, their character was changed utterly by successive waves of industrialisation from the late nineteenth century, which developed the area's water, coal and iron ore resources. The Donbas working class was a bastion of Bolshevik (or, on occasion, Makhnovite) support in 1917, and are equally radical today. Immigration has produced a Russian population of 43.6 per cent in Donets'k, and 44.8 per cent in Luhans'k, and a lesser 32 per cent in Zaporizhzhia, and 24.2 per cent in Dnipropetrovs'k.[42] The high numbers of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in these *oblasts* (34.3 per cent of Ukrainians in Donets'k and Luhans'k gave Russian as their first language in the 1979 census) also need to be added to such figures, however.[43] Much of the area's traditional industry is now highly uneconomic, environmentally hazardous, and therefore facing closure.[44]

Southern Ukraine

The three coastal *oblasts* of Odesa, Kherson and Mykolai'v and the Crimean peninsula have the weakest historical links to Ukraine. The south was not part of Kievan Rus or the Hetmanate and was added to Tsarist Russia by Catherine IPs wars with the Turks in the late eighteenth century. Its ethnically mixed population of Ukrainians, Russians, Greeks, Jews, Bulgarians, Moldovans and Gagauz is the result of subsequent in-migration. Under the Tsars, the area was known as 'Novorossiia' (New Russia). Ukrainians are in a minority in many areas, and national consciousness is low, particularly in the Crimea, where the Ukrainians account for only 25.8 per cent of the population. Crimea was only added to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954 as a gift from Khrushchev to mark the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereiaslav (which led to the 'reunion' of the Left Bank with Russia). The original inhabitants of Crimea, the Crimean Tatars, were deported in 1944.

Eastern and southern Ukraine (Crimea included) were never in any practical sense under the jurisdiction of the various Ukrainian governments of 1917-20, nor did the Ukrainian independentist forces have much impact on these areas in the 1940s.

It is, of course, also important to consider the relative population in each area. The three *oblasts* of radical Galicia, for example, contain just 10.4 per cent of Ukraine's population.[45] Volhynia contains 4.3 per cent; Transcarpathia and Bukovyna together 4.1 per cent; central Ukraine 39.8 per cent (divided between 23.8 per cent on the Left Bank, and 16.0 per cent on the Right); the highly industrialised eastern Ukraine has 27.2 per cent (with 16 per cent in the Donbas alone); and finally southern Ukraine, including Crimea, has 14.3 per cent. Therefore, the national movement's areas of greatest strength, Galicia and Kyiv, do not represent a large section of the republic's population.

Hence, Ukraine is characterised by an unusually high level of regional diversity. Its borders historically have not been those of a nation-state. Some of Ukraine's marginal lands', which have always been a problem for the process of state-building, now lie outside its borders, such as the Kuban' or the Brest region; others, such as Transcarpathia and Bukovyna, lie inside, but the fullness of their incorporation is an open question.

CULTURE AND RELIGION

In this sphere, modern Ukraine faces three main problems. First, a degree of cultural pluralism (partly related to regional divisions), which has made the organisation of a united national movement highly problematical. Second, while western Ukraine is closer linguistically and culturally to Poland and Belarus, and historically has closer ties to Central Europe, the existence of large minorities in Ukraine and the pressures of Russification have resulted in perhaps 40 per cent of the population, especially on the Left Bank and in the eastern and southern regions, feeling closer to Russia. Thirdly, although general Ukrainian culture has maintained a surprising level of vigour, the lack of recent statehood means that Ukrainian political culture is chronically underdeveloped. With the major exception of Galicia, which developed some of the elements of civil society under Habsburg and Polish rule, Ukraine lacks strong political traditions to draw on as it tries to build a post-communist society.

In Galicia, the myths and symbols of national moral patrimony were well established by the early part of this century.[46] In retrospect, the postwar Soviet regime seems only to have enforced the privatisation of such sentiments and modes of social communication, while proving incapable of transcending or eradicating them. If anything, the addition of a new myth of the wartime struggles of the OUN and UPA helped to further underpin nationalist sentiment.[47]

In addition, the Soviet federal system has helped to bolster Kyiv, since it regained capital city status in 1934, as a 'centre of national culture and consciousness'.[48] The Ukrainian population of Kyiv increased from 60.1 per cent in 1959 to 72.4 per cent in 1989.[49] This recreation of a L'viv-Kyiv axis, for the first time since the Middle Ages, has been vital in cementing a sense of nationhood in the leading urban areas where the national movement was so weak in 1917, and in the modern period, the original strongholds of the anti-Soviet and national opposition were Galicia in 1987-8 and Kyiv by the late 1980s (see Chapters 6-8).

The cultural symbolism of Galician-Kyivan nationalism, however, cannot but have a highly differentiated appeal in the other regions of the Ukraine. The OUN-UPA myth, for example, is not easy to disseminate, because its military struggles were confined to western Ukraine, and because the population of Greater Ukraine have been long accustomed to an interpretation of the Second World War which glorified traditional Soviet myths and symbols.

Additionally, the non-Galician population of Ukraine remains more deeply attached to the welfare and egalitarian values of the Soviet era. In those territories with a much stronger tradition of links with Russia, the Ukrainian national movement has stressed the importance of linguistic distinctiveness, precisely because Greater Ukrainians and Russians are similar in some other respects, particularly the shared Orthodox tradition. Again, however, the attempt to reassert Ukrainian linguistic rights will risk alienating the Russian and Russified sectors of the population, outside western and Right Bank Ukraine. Hence, the Ukrainian national movement in the past has often divided between a messianic element, which seeks to raise the level of national consciousness in all areas to that of Galicia or Kyiv (by force if necessary), and those who have been prepared to play down the cultural card and make a pragmatic and basically economic appeal to the east and south in order to attempt to transcend regional and cultural differences.[50]

Certainly, the OUN and UPA quickly found that they had to adapt their programme towards greater consideration of bread-and-butter issues when they tried to expand their appeal beyond Galicia during 1941-4, and the ideology of authoritarian 'integral nationalism' was dropped after the third extraordinary Congress of the OUN in summer 1943.[51] (The organisation had already split into 'moderate' [Melnyk] and 'integral' [Banderite] factions in 1940.)

Although a dire economic situation may help to unite all Ukrainians in a kind of short-term territorial patriotism, the long-term unity of an independent Ukraine is more likely to depend on the development of the kind of symbolic cultural unity, which Chapter 1 sought to argue was a more effective form of social cement than purely civic bonds, or ties of material interest. Such a 'single psychological focus' would have to transcend the particularistic cultural loyalties of different groups and regions. The attempt to rely exclusively on the Kyiv-L'viv tradition, narrowly conceived, for the cultural resources of the new state would simply create centrifugal forces.

Religious diversity is another longstanding problem in Ukraine. Ukraine has been Orthodox since the adoption of Byzantine Christianity by Volodymyr, Prince of Kyivan Rus' in 988 AD, but since the thirteenth century the faithful have divided their loyalties between Moscow and Kyiv. In keeping with Orthodox traditions of religious support for secular power, the separate Ukrainian Church was first dissolved and subordinated to the Moscow hierarchy in 1686, and then reborn after the formation of the Ukrainian People's Republic in 1917-20 as the Ukrainian Autocephalous (Independent) Orthodox Church in 1921. The Autocephalous movement's attempt to create a National Church independent of Moscow made considerable headway in the 1920s, until it was suppressed in 1930.[52] Despite the constitution of a new hierarchy in German-occupied territory during World War II, the Church was again repressed in 1945, although it continued to exist abroad.

In Galicia, the Uniate (or Ukrainian Greek Catholic) Church was established during the period of Polish rule at the Union of Brest in 1596 in the attempt to proselytise Catholicism in the East. Although under the authority of the Pope, the Church has an Eastern rite. The vigorous strength of the Church in Galicia, and to a lesser extent, Transcarpathia (it was effectively suppressed by the Tsars in the rest of Ukrainian territory in the early nineteenth century), has helped to maintain a Westward orientation among its flock, and its married clergy historically have been a leading elite in the Galician national

movement. Its hold on the population was clearly not destroyed by its forced incorporation into the Russian Orthodox Church in 1946.[53]

The strength of religious traditions in Ukraine, and the way in which the Uniate and Autocephalous Churches have reinforced national sentiment (whereas the Russian Orthodox Church has been an unabashed vehicle of Russification), have been major strengths of the national movement, but the division between the three has also been a major source of weakness. (In Lithuania or Armenia, by contrast, the National Church and national movement have tended to be strongly mutually reinforcing.)

SOCIETY[54]

Changes in the social structure of Ukraine in the twentieth century have already been momentous. A backward, socially undifferentiated and largely illiterate peasant society has become urbanised and educated. Ukraine is now a more 'modernised' society, but one that still bears the birthmarks of its passage into modernity. By 1966, a majority of the Ukrainian SSR's citizens were urbanised, and a majority of its Ukrainians by 1979.[55] Ukraine's population of 51.9 million in 1991 was 68 per cent urban (35.1 million).[56]

The total workforce in 1990 was 23.301 million, including 3.481 million collective farmers (15 per cent of the total), 13.674 million workers (59 per cent) and 6.146 million 'sluzhbovtsi' or 'employees' (26 per cent).[57] An alternative to the notion of 'employees', as a measure of the Ukrainian white-collar population, are specialists with secondary or higher education, who numbered 6.969 million in 1990 (30 per cent of the workforce).[38]

However, although the decline of the countryside and corresponding urbanisation and the creation of a Ukrainian working class and intelligentsia have been the most profound social changes of the Soviet period, most social groups in Soviet-type societies tend to be amorphous. Deprived of the capacity for self-organisation, groups such as the peasantry or working class exist more as labels than as concrete social entities.

The growth of a specifically Ukrainian intelligentsia ought to be an important strength of the national movement, one that first manifested itself after the Ukrainisation of the 1920s. Although this trend was cut short by the purges of the 1930s, it resurfaced again in the 1960s. (A united intelligentsia of nearly 7 million would clearly

provide the Ukrainian national movement with the leadership it lacked in 1917-20.)

Even the intelligentsia is far from homogeneous, however, and its different segments will clearly be differentially receptive to nationalism. L. M. Drobizheva's paradigm of the development of the Estonian national movement under *perestroika* can usefully be compared with Ukraine.

Nationalist discourse was initiated by the academic intelligentsia, and then given a wider hearing through the artists and writers of the creative intelligentsia. A wider audience was reached through the mass media intelligentsia (editors and journalists), before a mass movement was finally created through the agency of teachers and other intelligentsia 'working in the sphere of production'. They in turn connected 'the elite groups of the intelligentsia with the wider masses of the population'.[59]

In Ukraine, the occupational and emotional interests of the artistic and cultural intelligentsia as a whole can be expected to make them strongly supportive of a national movement which stresses the importance and unique value of the national language and culture. Other sections of the intelligentsia, however, are predominantly Russian-speaking, because Russian was the language of their work-place and their means of access to their peer groups in the world at large. Scientific and technical institutes, for example, and the employment opportunities for those they produce, have long been heavily concentrated on the Left Bank and in highly Russified eastern Ukraine.

The working class, on the other hand, is much larger than in Western economies at a similar level of economic development, a structural legacy of the excess demand for manual labour in all Soviet-type economies.[60]

As in all of the Soviet Union's western republics, extremely rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, founded on labour-intensive economic growth, plus highly concentrated urban housing developments, has created mass *laagers* of relatively undifferentiated working-class culture, which are difficult for intelligentsias to penetrate. This impenetrability is likely to have been further compounded by the crisis in upward social mobility following the economic stagnation of the 1970s onwards. Again, this working-class sub-culture is heavily concentrated in industrialised Left Bank and eastern Ukraine, often in the more Russified areas.

The working class, deprived of independent organisation and lacking even the limited channels of political expression available to the intelligentsia, has primarily been oriented towards basic economic and welfare issues, an attitude often crudely characterised as the so-called 'kovbasa' (sausage) mentality. This insensitivity to the national question was demonstrated during the Second World War, when *pokhidni hrupy* (nationalist agitators from Western Ukraine) found little enthusiasm for their idealistic message.[61] Nor were the *shestydesiatnyky* (the new generation of cultural activists in the 1960s) able to establish Solidarity-style links with the working class.

Ukraine has collective farmers rather than a peasantry. Although under the Tsars Ukraine had a strong tradition of individual rather than collective farming (as the land was more fertile than in Russia proper), a peasantry in the sense of an independent class of smallholders has long since ceased to exist. Collectivisation and the Great Famine in 1932-3 destroyed the Ukrainian peasantry as a political force.[62] The present-day rural population is disproportionately elderly and female, as younger elements have been drawn into the cities, and economically dependent on the collective farm. However, much of the urban population is first-generation, and links with the countryside are maintained by family ties and by the absence of a sharp dividing-line between urban and rural spheres of employment, particularly in small towns. Hence, there is a steady, two-way cultural diffusion between town and country, so that the latter is not as isolated as it would at first seem.

ECONOMY

The economy is important in so far as it has shaped the pattern of interests in Ukrainian society. Much recent economic dispute, not least in Ukraine itself, has centred on the question of whether the Ukrainian SSR can be characterised as an 'internal colony' of the USSR.[63] An 'internal colony' lacks the political or economic institutions with which to shape its own destiny, and therefore is subject to the imposition of economic priorities decided elsewhere. That is to say, its economy is instrumental to that of the core area. The effects of this instrumentality will vary, but may include imbalanced development (regionally and sectorally), national income transfers and resource exploitation. This could logically happen to any region, or

even within a region; therefore the significance of 'internal colonialism', according to Michael Hechter, who coined the term, comes when this economic pattern overlays an ethnic boundary, thereby creating a highly politicised 'cultural [i.e. ethnic] division of labour' (see Chapter I).[54] It also places Ukrainian economic elites in a paradoxical situation - economically dependent on the centre, but simultaneously resentful of this fact.

Apart from the partial decentralisation of the *sovnarkhozy* period of 1957-65 and the NEP period of 1921-9, over 90 per cent of economic activity in Ukraine has always been controlled by the central all-Union ministries, thus satisfying the first condition above. Ukraine's economy also shows abundant evidence of the predicted consequences. It suffers from uneven regional development, despite the Soviet system's initial emphasis on equalisation between regions through industrialisation.[65] The economy is also sectorally imbalanced, because Soviet planners have concentrated on maintaining Ukraine's role as a supplier of foodstuffs, coal and iron, and metallurgical and chemical products (rather than light or consumer industries). Like all Soviet republics, it also has its share of localised all-Union monopolies (its share of USSR military-industrial production, such as the Iuzhnyi rocket-producing complex in Dnipropetrovs'k, is possibly as high as 40 per cent),[66] but its self-sufficiency in many key areas, energy especially, is doubtful.[67]

Most observers, from Mykhailo Volobuiev, the Ukrainian national communist economist of the 1920s, onwards have calculated that Ukraine has suffered from a net outflow of its national income and wealth, both under the Soviet Union and under the Tsars.[68] The centre has rarely invested in Ukraine in proportion to the taxation revenue extracted from the republic. In addition, Ukraine has suffered from more indirect forms of income transfer, owing to relatively low fixed Soviet prices for its agricultural and raw material exports, and relatively high prices for the finished goods it has to import.[69]

The ecological situation in Ukraine is nothing short of disastrous, and this can be attributed primarily to the unaccountable operations of Moscow ministries.[70] The effects of the Chornobyl' disaster are well known, but Ukraine also has endemic problems with industrial and water pollution, and public health in general. These are common to the whole of Ukraine, although they are particularly acute among the rust-belt industries of the Donbas.[71]

However, even if it is possible to argue that Ukraine has been an 'internal colony', it is not so easy to identify the corresponding exploiting metropolis. It is not another national group (i.e. the Russians),

because there is no evidence that the RSFSR has received net benefits in exact counterpart to Ukraine's net costs, and the Soviet political system cannot be simply characterised as an ethnic hegemony.[72] Rather, all the Union republics have been subordinated to the Great Power interests of the leading elements in the Union system itself, their economies subordinated to 'the geopolitical demands of the state as perceived and acted upon by the state leadership'.[73] Ukraine has, of course, derived some benefits from the ail-Union command economy, such as some economies of scale and guaranteed access to cheap energy supply, but never as a result of its own republican decision-making processes.

The pattern of economic relations described above has several political effects. Ukrainian elites have usually been deprived of the economic resources that would otherwise have empowered any political challenge to the centre. On the contrary, those who have controlled Ukraine's economy have tended to act as representatives of the centre. The bureaucrats of the command economy function as the 'representatives of the centre in the periphery' that Galtung has argued are a key aspect of any system of imperial rule.[74] However, there has also undoubtedly been a structural tendency for republican level sub-elites (the term 'sub-elites' is used to stress that indigenous economic elites are still normally subordinate to all-Union bureaucrats, even on their own territory) to seek to expand their power, whenever the system of vertical integration above them has broken down, as in the 1920s, 1960s and, most importantly, in the economic chaos of the early 1990s. An alliance between 'national communists' in republican political institutions, and republican economic sub-elites can be a potent nationalist force, as seen in the rise of the 'sovereign' or 'national' communist group under Leonid Kravchuk in 1990-1.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, although the same forces leading to an upsurge in nationalism in the late 1980s may have operated throughout the USSR, as argued in Chapter 1, Ukraine's ability to support a national movement lay somewhere in between that of the Baltic states and Russia. Ukraine's diversity, sheer size and lack of any recent tradition of statehood made collective action harder to organise than in the Baltics, but, on the other hand, Ukraine did not have the identity

problems produced in Russia by the confusion between Russia and the Empire.

In Ukraine, the process of forming a unified nation would have to take place as much *after* the nationalist takeover of the state as beforehand.

Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983).

47. Motyl, 1990, chs 5 and 6. Cf. Steven L. Burg, 'Nationality Elites and Political Change in the Soviet Union', in Hajda and Beissinger, 1990, pp. 24-42.
48. For general overviews of the Soviet Union's nationalities problems, see Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda's largely historical *Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990); or Gregory Gleason's straightforward introduction *Federalism And Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1990).
49. See Motyl, 1990, especially chs 5 and 6; Burg in Hajda and Beissinger, 1990, or Gleason, 1990, especially ch. 5.
50. See, for example, Steven L. Burg again, 1990; or Mark Beissinger's excellent study of UkSSR and RSFSR elites in 'Ethnicity, the Personnel Weapon, and Neo-Imperial Integration: Ukrainian and RSFSR Provincial Party Officials Compared', *Studies in Comparative Communism,* vol. xxi, no. 1 (Spring 1988) pp. 71-85. John A. Armstrong's classic work, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite. Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus* (New York: Praeger, 1959) describes the local oligarchy in the Ukrainian SSR. On the concepts of 'penetration', 'participation', 'distribution' and 'legitimacy' crises see Leonard Binder (ed.), *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
51. Motyl, in Mandelbaum (ed.), 1991, p. 47.
52. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).
53. See Olson's own analysis, 'The Logic of Collective Action in Soviet-type Societies', *Journal of Soviet Nationalities,* vol. 1, no. 2 (Summer 1990) pp. 8-27.
54. Mayar N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (eds), *The Dynamics of Social Movements: Resource Mobilisation, Social Control and Tactics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1979) p. 14.
55. For some public choice approaches to the phenomenon of nationalism, see Susan Olzak, 'Contemporary Ethnic Mobilisation', *Annual Review of Sociology,* vol. 9 (1983) pp. 355-74; Ronald Rogowski, 'Causes and Varieties of Nationalism: a Rationalist Account', in Edward Tiryakan and Ronald Rogowski (eds), *New Nationalisms of the Developed West* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985) pp. 87-108; Hudson Meadwell, 'Ethnic Mobilisation and Collective Choice Theory', *Comparative Political Studies,* vol. 22, no. 2 (July 1989) pp. 139-54; and J. Craig Jenkins, 'Resource Mobilisation Theory and the Study of Social Movements', *Annual Review of Sociology,* no. 9 (1983), pp. 527-53 for the general importance of culture.
56. J. Craig Jenkins, 1983, p. 538.
57. Rachel Walker, *Language and the Politics of Identity in the USSR.* Paper presented to the 75th Anniversary Conference of the School of Slavonic

and East European Studies, London, December 1990, pp. 2-3. See also her 'The Relevance of Ideology', ch. 6 in Ronald J. Hill and Jan Zielowka (eds), *Restructuring Eastern Europe: Towards a New European Order* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1990).

58. George Schopflin, 'National Identity in the Soviet Union and East Central Europe', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Special issue on 'National Identity in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union', vol. 14, no. 1 (January 1991) p. 11.
59. See Timothy Garton Ash, 'Reform or Revolution?' in *The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe* (Cambridge: Granta/Penguin, 1989) pp. 218-30; and Vaclav Havel, 'The Power of the Powerless', *Living in Truth* (London: Faber & Faber, 1987) pp. 36-122 on the pursuit of post-communist civil society.
60. Tilly, 1973, p. 438; and 1978, ch. 7, on 'multiple sovereignty'; and Motyl, 1990, pp. 103-4.
61. Grzegorz Ekiert, 'Democratic Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration', *British Journal of Political Science* vol. 21, pt 3 (July 1991), especially pp. 229 and 301. Although focusing on east central Europe, the arguments also apply to the Soviet Union.
62. C. M. Drobizheva, 'The Role of the Intelligentsia in Developing National Consciousness among the Peoples of the USSR under Perestroika', *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* vol. 14, no. 1 (January 1991) pp. 87-99.
63. Johan Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', *Journal of Peace Research,* vol. 7, no. 2 (1971) p. 81.
64. Kenneth C. Farmer, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myths, Symbols and Ideology in Soviet Nationality Policy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980); and 'Politics and Culture in the Ukraine in the Post-Stalin Era', *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US,* vol. XIV, nos 37-8 (1978-80) pp. 180-208.
65. On the difference between the two sorts of national development, see Anthony D. Smith, 1991; or H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1967).
66. Anthony D. Smith, 1991, p. viii and p. 163.
67. Chew Sock Fan, 'On the Incompatibility of Ethnic and National Loyalties: Reframing the Issue', *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism,* vol. XIII, no. 1 (Spring 1986) pp. 1-11.

2 Strengths and Weaknesses of the National Movement

1. S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York: The Free Press, 1963). See also M. W. Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986). A suitable biography of literature on imperialism can be found in Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981).
2. The sources used here are *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR, po dannykh vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 g.* (Moscow: Finansy I statistika, 1991); V. I. Naulko, *Razvitie mezhetnicheskikh sviazei na*

Ukraine (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1975); *Ukrains'ka RSR u tsyfrakh:* 1990 (Derzhavnyi komitet Ukrai'ns'koi' RSR po statystytsi) (Kyiv: 'Tekhnika', 1991); and *Natsional'ni vidnosyny na Ukraini: Zapytannia i vidpovidi* (Kyiv: Ukraina, 1991).

3. The name change is a result of the Moldovan desire to re-Latinise their alphabet after 1989.
4. The Starodub region north of Chernihiv was also part of Ukraine under the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918. The Treaty also gave to Ukraine the old Tsarist *gubernias* (provinces) of Chelm and Podlachia, now in Poland and Belarus. On the Kuban', see V. Ivanys, *Borot'ba Kubani za nezalezhnist'* (Munich: Ukrainian Technical-Economic Institute, 1958).
5. President Kravchuk, in his inauguration speech on 5 December 1991, promised to defend the interest of 'Ukrainians abroad'. See *Ukrainian Reporter,* no. 22, December 1991. A Congress of Ukrainians of the former USSR was held in Kyiv on 22-23 January 1992.
6. Mikhail Guboglo, 'Demography and Language in the Capitals of the Union'', *Journal of Soviet Nationalities,* vol. 1, no. 4 (Winter 1990-1) pp. 8, 21,13 and 18.
7. See Bohdan Nahaylo, 'Concern Voiced About Six Million Ukrainians Condemned to "Denationalization"', *Radio Liberty Research,* RL 92/88, 9 March 1988; and Ivan Dziuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968) p. 109 and throughout.
8. Different estimates can be found in Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: a History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) and in *Natsional'ni vidnosyny,* p. 7. The problem in giving precise estimates derives from the manner in which the various populations' calculations of the costs and benefits associated with a declaration of a given national status has changed.
9. On Polish-Ukrainian relations in general, see Peter J. Potichnyj (ed.), *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980). On Operation 'Vistula', see T. A. Olszanski, 'All About "Operation Wisla"', *The Ukrainian Quarterly,* vol. XLVII, no. 3 (Fall 1991) pp. 249-62.
10. See Orest Subtelny, *Ukrainians in North America* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).
11. *Natsional'ni vidnosyny ...,* 1991, p. 7. See also Subtelny, 1988, chs. 27 and 28; and Armstrong, 1990, ch. 13, which also contain brief accounts of emigre history and politics.
12. W. R. Petryshyn (ed.), *Changing Realities: Social Trends Among Ukrainian Canadians* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980). See also Myron B. Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884-1954* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991). On the politics of the diaspora, see Taras Kuzio, 'Panorama politychnykh partii ta orhanizatsii ukrai'ns'koi' emihratsii', *Za vil'nu Ukrainu,* 3 October 1991.
13. *Natsional'nyi sostav,* 1991, p. 78 (figures rounded off to the nearest 10 000). Also, 269 000 Crimean Tatars, expelled by Stalin in 1944 for alleged collaboration with the Germans, are now returning in increasing numbers.

14. Krawchenko, 1982, p. 103; and 1985. See also the essays by Szporluk and Woroby on post-war urbanisation in Ukraine in Ivan L. Rudnytsky (ed.), *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1981).
15. Krawchenko, 1984(b).
16. 'The Demography of Ukraine', *Politics of Soviet Economic Reform,* vol. 1, no. 5, 1 November 1991, p. 4. Anderson and B. Silver, 'Some Factors in the Linguistic and Ethnic Russification of Soviet Nationalities: Is Everyone Becoming Russian? in Hajda and Beissinger, 1990, pp. 95-130 consider that the rate of assimilation of Ukrainians is surprisingly low, although they only cover the period from 1959-70.
17. All information on Russians in Ukraine is derived from Dmitrii Vydrin, formerly of the Kyiv Institute of Social Sciences and Political Management.
18. Iaroslav Dashkevych, a radical L'viv historian, claims that the 1989 census was tainted by a variety of administrative and social pressures towards Russification, and out of the alleged 11 million 'Russians' recorded in Ukraine, a minimum of 3.5 million are Ukrainians whilst another 1.5 million are other minorities who classified themselves as 'Russians'. See his article on national minorities in Ukraine in *Derzhavnist,* no. 3,1991, pp. 24-7.
19. On the Russians in contemporary Ukraine, see Krawchenko, especially 1983,1984(a) and (b) and 1985; and Isajiw, 1980. Also useful is Roman Szporluk, 'Russians in Ukraine and Problems of Ukrainian Identity in the USSR', in Peter J. Potichnyj (ed.), *Ukraine in the 1970s* (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1975) pp. 195-218.
20. See Chapter 1.
21. See Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukraine and Russia: Before and After the Coup', *Report on the USSR,* RL 346/91, 27 September 1991.
22. In 1989, only 23.2 per cent of Germans, 48.5 per cent of Belarusians and 18.5 per cent of Greeks in Ukraine knew their native language as their first or second language; 84.4 per cent of Poles knew Ukrainian, and 66.5 per cent Russian, whereas the Rusyns were not classed as an ethnic group. In the third category, 95.6 per cent of Hungarians, 84.4 per cent of Moldovans, 62.3 per cent of Romanians, 69.5 per cent of Bulgarians and 93.5 per cent of Crimean Tatars knew their mother tongue. T. M. Rudnyts'ka, 'Natsionalni hrupy i movni protsesy v Ukra'ini', *Filosofs'ka i sotsiolochichna dumka,* 1991 no. 5, pp. 145-55.
23. V. I. Naulko, 1975, Table 4, p. 64. The 1926 figure is the author's own estimate for the number of Poles then residing within what became the post-1945 boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR, using the Polish census of 1931.
24. Kristopher Gasior, 'Poles in the Soviet Union', *Report on the USSR,* RL 521/90, 28 December 1990, p. 12. See also P. J. Potichnyi (ed.), *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980).
25. Volodymyr Kubijovyc (ed.) *Encyclopedia of Ukraine,* vol. II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) pp. 385-93, which cites the figure of 2.245 million Jews on Tsarist territories in 1897, and 2.68 million overall on the territories of what was the Ukrainian SSR. Krawchenko's calcu-

lation for Jews in Tsarist Ukraine in 1897 is 1.908 million (8.1 per cent of the population), Krawchenko, 1985, Table 5.1, p. 173. On the Jews in Ukraine, see Zvi Gitelman, 'The Social and Political Role of the Jews in Ukraine', in Potichnyj (ed.), *Ukraine in the 1970s,* pp. 167-86; Potichnyj and Aster, 1988 (n. 34, ch. 1); the same authors' *Jewish-Ukrainian Relations: Two Solitudes* (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1983); *Ukraine and Jews. A Symposium* (New York: The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1966); and Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukrainian-Jewish Relations: An Interview with Oleksandr Buratovs'kyi', *Report on the USSR,* RL 34/91,18 January, 1991.

26. See Taras Hunczak, *Symon Petliura and the Jews: A Reappraisal* (Toronto: Ukrainian Historical Association, 1985); and Soloman I. Goldeman, *Jewish National Autonomy in Ukraine, 1917-20* (Chicago: Ukrainian Research and Information Institute, 1968).
27. Kubijovyc, vol. II, 1988, pp. 43-7.
28. *Natsional'ni vidnosyny* ..., 1991, p. 25.
29. See Paul Robert Magosci, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus'* 1848-1948 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1978); and *The Rusyn'-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia: A Historical Survey* (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumuller, 1983).
30. Ibid., pp. 36-7; and Kubijovyc, vol. II, 1988, pp. 274-5.
31. P. R. Magocsi, 1978, p. 272.
32. I. L. Rudnytsky, 'Carpatho-Ukraine: A People in Search of their History', *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987) p. 368.
33. On these territories, see I. M. Nowosiwsky, *Bukovinian Ukrainians: A Historical Background. Their Self-Determination in 1918* (New York: The Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1970); and Vladimir Socor, 'Moldovian Lands Between Romania and Ukraine: the Historical and Political Geography', *Report On the USSR,* RL 473/90, 16 November 1990. On the Romanian declaration of 24 June 1991 see V. Socor, 'Annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina Condemned by Romania', RL 256/91,19 July 1991. The Moldovan parliament made a similar condemnation on 23 June 1990.
34. *Natsional'ni vidnosyny na Ukra'ini,* 1991, pp. 32-5.
35. *TASS,* 19 June 1991.
36. For Crimean politics in 1990 and early 1991, see Kathleen Mihalisko, 'The Other Side of Separatism: Crimea Votes for Autonomy', *Report on the USSR,* RL 60/91, 1 February 1991; and R. Solchanyk, 'Centrifugal Movements in Ukraine on the Eve of Independence', RL 408/91, 29 November 1991.
37. *Natsional'ni vidnosyny na Ukra'ini,* 1991, p. 15.
38. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
39. Kubijovyc, 1988, vol. II, pp. 95-7.
40. *Natsional'nyi sostav,* 1991. See Jan T. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
41. Kharkiv, or Slobids'ka Ukraine, could either be included in the Left Bank, because of its traditional position as a key meeting point of

Ukrainian and Russian culture, or in Eastern Ukraine, because of its similar level of industrialisation.

42. *Natsional'nyi sostav,* 1991.
43. Krawchenko, 1983, for a breakdown of ethnicity and language by region. Cf. Roman Szporluk, 'Urbanisation in Ukraine since the Second World War', in I. L. Rudnytsky (ed.), *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1981). pp. 180-202.
44. David Marples, *Ukraine Under Perestroika: Ecology, Economics and the Workers' Revolt* (London: Macmillan, 1991).
45. *Chislennosf i sostav naseleniia SSSR (Po dannykh vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1979 g.)* (Moscow: Finansy I statistika, 1984) p. 12. The figures refer to 1979, and are rounded to the nearest percentage point.
46. See Paul Robert Magocsi, *Galicia:A Historical Survey and Bibliographical Guide* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983) on Galician historiography.
47. The classic work on war-time nationalism is John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism,* 3rd edn (Englewood, Col.: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990) (first edition published by Columbia University Press, 1963), although the author, writing originally in the 1950s, did not have the opportunity to research post-war beliefs and sentiments.
48. Szporluk in Rudnytsky, 1981, p. 198.
49. Guboglo, 1990-1, table 3, p. 7.
50. On the difference between 'ethnic' and 'territorial' nationalism, see Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (London: Holmes and Meier, 1983) ch. 9.
51. Armstrong, 1990, chs IX-XII. See also L. Shankovs'kyi, *Pokhidni hrupy OUN* (Munich: Ukrains'kyi Samostiinyk, 1958). The competition between integral and democratic nationalism led to a second split in the exile OUN in 1954, with only Stepan Bandera remaining faithful to Dontsov's ideas. See also n. 12 above.
52. On Autocephalous Orthodoxy in the Ukraine, see Frank E. Sysyn, 'The Ukrainian Orthodox Question in the USSR', *Religion in Communist Lands,* vol. 11, no. 3 (Winter 1983) pp. 251-63. Vasyl Markus, 'Religion and Nationalism in Ukraine', in Pedro Ramet (ed.), *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1984) pp. 59-81 looks at religion in general.
53. Bodhan R. Bociurkiw, 'The Ukrainian Catholic Church in the USSR Under Gorbachev', *Problems of Communism,* vol. XXXIX, nos. 11-12 (November-December, 1990) pp. 1-19 is a useful survey, concentrating mainly on the postwar period.
54. With regard to social change in twentieth-century Ukraine, the works of Krawchenko cited in Chapter 1 provide excellent background information. See also Motyl, 1987, ch. 4; Isajiw, 1980; Szporluk in Potichnyj (ed.), 1975; and in Rudnytsky (ed.), 1981.
55. Krawchenko, 1985, p. 181.
56. *Ukrains'ka RSR u tsyfrakh,* 1991, p. 22.
57. Ibid., p. 33.
58. Ibid., p. 36.

59. L. M. Drobizheva, 'The Role of the Intelligentsia in Developing National Consciousness Among the Peoples of the USSR under Perestroika', *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* vol. 14, no. 1 (January 1991) p. 92.
60. See E. and J. Winiecki, *The Structural Legacy of the Soviet-Type Economy* (London: The Centre for Research into Communist Economies, 1992).
61. J. A. Armstrong, 1990; see note 40 above. See also Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera (eds), *Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground, 1943-1951* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986).
62. Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (London: Hutchinson, 1986).
63. On the concept of 'internal colonialism' see Chapter 1. On its application to Ukraine, see the following works by Ivan S. Koropeckyj (ed.), *The Ukraine within the USSR: An Economic Balance Sheet* (London: Praeger, 1977); 'A Century of Moscow-Ukraine Economic Relations: An Interpretation', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* vol. V, no. 4 (December 1981) pp. 467-96; *Development in the Shadow: Studies in Ukrainian Economics* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1990); and (ed.) *Ukrainian Economic History: Interpretative Essays* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).

    See also Anna Briscoe. *Internal Colonialism in the USSR: The Case of the Soviet Ukraine,* thesis submitted to the faculty of Graduate Studies, Edmonton, University of Alberta Fall 1986. Marples, 1991, and Gennady Ozornoy, 'The Ukrainian Economy in the 1970s', in Bohdan Krawchenko (ed.), *Ukraine After Shelest* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukranian Studies Press, 1983) pp. 73-100, are also useful in this context.
64. The notion of an 'internal colony' arguably in fact makes more sense within the political allocation of resources of a command economy, rather than in Hechter's original hunting-ground of Western Europe. The command-administrative system's monopoly on political and economic power is clearly reserved to itself and denied to regions, but in a market capitalist economy no 'region' is deprived of autonomous powers, as the allocative mechanism is impersonal in the first place.
65. M. Dolishnii, 'Rehional'ni problemi ekonomichnoho i sotsial'noho rozvytku Ukrainy', *Ekonomika Radians'koi Ukra'iny,* 1991, no. 5, pp. 12-22.
66. *Radio Kyiv,* 27 June 1991.
67. Marples, 1991, ch. 1. See also his 'Ukraine's Economic Prospects', *Report on the USSR,* RL 357/91, 4 October 1991; 'The Prospects for an Independent Ukraine', RL 173/90, 13 April 1990; and 'The Economic Outlook for Ukraine in 1990', RL 80/90, 16 February 1990. Similar points are made by John Tedstrom, 'The Economic Costs and Benefits of Independence for Ukraine', RL 500/90, 7 December 1990.
68. Mykhailo Volobuiev, 'Do problemy Ukrai'ns'koi ekonomiky', *Dokumenty Ukrains'koho komunizmu* (New York: Prolog, 1962) pp. 132-230.
69. Koropeckyj, 1981, pp. 469-74.
70. David Marples, *Ukraine under Perestroika,* 1991, especially ch. 4.
71. David Marples, *The Social Impact of the Chornobyl' Disaster* (London: Macmillan, 1988).

Motyl, 1987, ch. 3.
Koropeckyj, 1981, p. 487.
Johan Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', *Journal of Peace Research,* vol. 7, no. 2 (1971) pp. 81-117.