

3 Ukraine on the Eve of the Gorbachev Era

INTRODUCTION

The Brezhnev era ended late in Ukraine: its chief representative, Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, who had kept Ukraine in a tight grip for four Soviet leaders since his appointment as first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) in May 1972, managed to survive until September 1989 - four and a half years into the *perestroika* era.

Even his successors, Volodymyr Ivashko (September 1989-July 1990) and Stanislav Hurenko, who led the CPU until its banning on 30 August 1991 by the Supreme Council of Ukraine, failed to embrace fully the logic of national communism outlined in Chapter 1. Therefore in the early years of *perestroika* nationalist yearnings were not as marked in Ukraine as in other Soviet republics, although Ukraine caught up rapidly after 1990.

Shcherbytskyi's rule was characterised by repression, economic and spiritual stagnation, and a determined campaign for the Russification of Ukrainian language and culture. The media, cultural and educational circles were purged of nationally conscious elites, and national communist elements were removed from the CPU. In the words of one author:

Thanks to Shcherbytskyi and his associates, Moscow succeeded in cultivating a following of loyal 'Little Russians' in Ukraine, who were willing to subordinate the republic's interests to those of the centre. As the leader of this group, Shcherbytskyi may well go down in history as the *maloros par excellence*.¹

SHELEST AND SHCHERBYTSKYI

Analysis of the pre-Gorbachev era in Ukraine usually contrasts Shcherbytskyi's ultra-loyalist and pro-Moscow Brezhnevite orthodoxy as first secretary of the CPU from May 1972 until September 1989²

with the supposed national communism of his predecessor, Petro Shelest, who held office from June 1963 to May 1972.³ As will be argued below, this is enlightening, but a simplification.⁴

Some of the key changes within the CPU that supposedly encouraged the growth of national communism can be traced back to the Eighteenth Congress of the CPU in 1954, and the rule of Shelest's two predecessors, Oleksii Kyrychenko (June 1953-December 1957) and Mykola Pidhornyi (December 1957-June 1963). This period, inaugurated by the death of Stalin in March 1953, saw the renewed Ukrainianisation of the upper echelons of the CPU. Henceforth, the first secretary of the CPU would always be an ethnic Ukrainian (Kyrychenko was the first), as would a majority of leading figures in the party and the state apparatus. (The second secretary of the CPU, responsible for cadre appointments, was also an ethnic Ukrainian until 1976, though in many other republics this sensitive post was always reserved for Russians.) The percentage of Ukrainians in the CPU, only 23 per cent in 1922, rose and stabilised at levels first reached after the first wave of Ukrainianisation in the 1920s (although still less than the Ukrainian share of the population of the republic).

The Ukrainian party grew more rapidly than the CPSU as a whole, reflecting the same desire to increase its Ukrainian membership.

According to Krawchenko, therefore, 'The [1954] congress marked a turning point in the history of Ukraine. It saw the emergence of a new Ukrainian political elite.'⁸ Shelest did not appear from nowhere.

Table 3.1 Percentage of Ukrainians in the CPU⁵

1920	1922	1927	1933	1937	1940	1950	1960	1971	1980	1988	1990
23%	23%	52%	60%	57%	63%	59%	62%	65%	66%	67%	67%

Table 3.2 Growth of the CPU⁶

1918	1922	1933	1936	1940	1945	1954	1959
4 301	73 804	555 433	241 330	505 706	164 743	795 559	1 159 207
1966	1971	1976	1981	1986	1989	1990	1991
1961408	2 378 789	2 625 808	2 933 564	3 188 854	3 302 221	3 294 038	2 500 007

Rather, his regime's relatively tough defence of Ukrainian interests was the product of a long incubation period under his predecessors, during which the post-1917 modernisation of the Ukrainian social structure had resulted in the local state structures being captured for national communism from within.

On Motyl's alternative interpretation, however, the Shelest period was the product of the 1960s leadership transition in Moscow, and the consequent relative tolerance of troublesome republics. Brezhnev did not allow control of the periphery to atrophy in the same manner as Gorbachev, and was therefore able to recentralise in the early 1970s.

The analysis of the politics of Shelest and his circle, as they were actually conceived and implemented at the time, is however complicated by 20 years of mythologising since his dismissal on charges of aiding and abetting nationalism in 1972.⁹ The official explanation of his ouster was late, partial and based on a caricatured identification of Shelest with the 'national-separatist' straw men of communist propaganda.¹⁰ Similarly, Shelest has also been retrospectively claimed by nationalists as one of their own, without too much supporting evidence, other than the mere fact of his dismissal. Shelest himself, after his belated reappearance in 1988, sought to defend his period in power as a forerunner of the politics of *perestroika* and *glasnost'* rather than remembering them in the true context of the time.¹¹

In fact, Shelest was neither a separatist nor a precursor of the modern era. According to Pelenski, 'Shelest can best be compared to the Ukrainian Hetmen of the first third of the eighteenth century ... political leaders who attempted to maintain correct relations with the imperial centre, on the one hand, and who tried to defend the autonomy of the Ukrainian Hetmanate, its institutions and its special interests, on the other.'¹² However, another author believes that 'Shelest did aggressively assert a claim of national equality and reciprocity within a communist "internationalist" framework, and this claim did increasingly diverge from the integrative-russifying trend in official policy.'¹³

Shelest was never a separatist but he did lobby for Ukrainian cultural and economic rights, reflecting the preponderance of such elites in Ukrainian leadership circles at the time.¹⁴ In the manner of the dissident Ivan Dziuba (see below), he called for a return to supposed Leninist orthodoxy in nationalities policy, demanding equality of treatment for all Soviet nations, and respect for Ukrainian freedom of action within spheres of traditional republican autonomy. Additionally,

Shelest could be seen as a product of the periodic tendency described in Chapter I for Soviet federalism to generate advocates of local interests, whose authority-building strategies, patron-client networks or technocratic desire for full competence over their own sphere of expertise tended to create centrifugal forces when the centre relaxed its control of the periphery.

His agenda cannot be retrospectively identified with the *shestydesiatnyky* dissident movement however. They and the Shelest group represented two different issue and interest networks, which overlapped, but did not coincide.¹⁵

In the economic sphere, Shelest would often present himself as a spokesman for republican interests (in the 1970s he was condemned for *misnystvo*, or localism). He opposed attempts to shift investment priorities eastwards to Siberia and Central Asia, and called instead for investment in Ukraine's already dilapidated capital base and infrastructure, especially in Ukraine's traditional bedrock industries of mining and metallurgy.¹⁶ His argument that Ukraine's share of 'inward' investment should match its contribution to all-Union output paralleled those of 'national communist' economists such as Volubuev, who had developed the notion of Ukraine as an 'internal colony' in the 1920s (see Chapter 2).

Shelest's speeches, for example, to the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPU in 1971, and in Donetsk in July 1971, contained barely veiled attacks on all-Union authorities, and Gosplan in particular, for neglecting Ukrainian needs.¹⁷

In the cultural sphere, Shelest's rule coincided with increasing outspokenness amongst the Ukrainian intelligentsia, who had been largely silent since the last national revival was abruptly terminated in the early 1930s. Having tentatively found its feet under Khrushchev's partial liberalisation of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the intelligentsia began to take its campaign for cultural and linguistic renaissance into the Party-state apparatus. Although political constraints prevented Shelest making an open alliance with the cultural intelligentsia, nevertheless his remarks to the Ukrainian Writers' Congress in 1966, were unambiguous: 'We must treat our beautiful Ukrainian language with great care and respect. It is our treasure, our great heritage, which all of us, but in the first place you, our writers, must preserve and develop ... Your efforts in this direction always have been and always will be supported by the Communist Party.'¹⁸

Similar comments at the Twenty-Fourth CPU Congress in 1971 echoed demands first made by the Ukrainian intelligentsia at a conference on the state of the Ukrainian language in February 1963.¹⁹ In

response, Shelest's Minister of Education, Iurii Dadenkov, circulated a plan for the Ukrainianisation of higher education institutions in August 1965, although not surprisingly this was blocked by Moscow.

Despite the arrest wave of 1965-6, Shelest was at least more tolerant of the 1960s generation of dissidents and their cultural agenda than others in Moscow or the CPU desired. The most telling evidence for this is that the 1972-3 purge of the cultural intelligentsia coincided largely with his removal in May 1972, and that portion of the purge which preceded his downfall from January 1972 onwards can, in retrospect, be seen as a sign of the growing dominance of those who would eventually replace him.

None of this, however, meant that Shelest was a 'rebel', or that he did not operate within the rules of a system to which he was fundamentally loyal. His post-1988 interviews revealed a loyalty to Leninist principles that was by then somewhat outdated. Shelest's contradictions were also evident in his calls for more effort in atheistic propaganda, his criticisms of nationalist emigres and his demand for an 'intensification of the ideological struggle', especially between 1970 and 1972.²⁰ Indeed, his 1970 book *Ukraine - Our Soviet Land*, was nationalist only in the sense of being not in tune with 'the pro-Russian atmosphere of forced assimilation of the late 1960s and early 1970s', although it sought to rehabilitate certain specifically Ukrainian historical symbols.²¹

Shelest's desire to return to Leninism reflected the then prevalent mood within *samizdat* and independent literature (which coincided with the early Gorbachev view) that the faults of the Soviet system could be laid at the door of 'Stalinism' (and also 'Brezhnevism') - but not at that of the Communist Party or Lenin. This view was most famously expressed in Ivan Dziuba's study *Internationalism or Russification? A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem*, presented to the CPU and government in December 1965 and then circulated among regional leaders for comment.

Brezhnev (a Russian from the Dnipropetrovs'k region, which was also Shcherbytskyi's home base), the ideological secretary Suslov, and their supporters in the CPU, perhaps had a better understanding than Shelest of the centrifugal tendencies encouraged by his policies, and of how the logic of national communism rhetoric always tended to stimulate demands by local elites for progressively greater autonomy. Hence, centralist circles in Moscow, led by Suslov, but also those CPU elements dependent upon all-Union structures, began manoeuvring against Shelest as early as 1968, as the conservatives began to consolidate their position in Moscow.²²

An early sign was the campaign by the Dnipropetrovs'k-Donets'k CPU against the book *Sobor* (The Cathedral), published in 1968 and written by the chairman of the Writers' Union of Ukraine, Oles Honchar. As there was a simultaneous campaign against 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists' in the area,²³ the campaign was interpreted as Shcherbytskyi attacking Shelest by proxy.²⁴ After initially favourable reviews, the book was withdrawn from sale.²⁵

In July 1970, Shelest's client, V. F. Nikitchenko, was replaced as Ukrainian KGB chief by Vitalii Fedorchuk, widely perceived as a representative of the centre.²⁶ All of the regional heads of the KGB were also replaced in Ukraine at the same time. Fedorchuk moved immediately against the dissidents that Shelest had tolerated, and finally against Shelest himself in May 1972.²⁷

A press campaign was followed by mass arrests and purges, resubordination of academic institutions to strict Communist Party control and a campaign against Ukrainian national distinctiveness. 'The KGB completely slipped out from under the control of the CPU leadership', the *samizdat Ukrainian Herald* stated, after Shcherbytskyi successfully convinced Moscow 'that Shelest was a nationalistic deviationist'.²⁸

The Shcherbytskyi regime, by contrast, therefore, is normally seen as representing the triumph of the centre in the locality. The purge of the early 1970s indeed went far beyond the removal of Shelest himself, as it was designed to expunge completely the temptations of national communism. Between the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth CPU congresses in March 1971 and February 1976, six new replacements were appointed to the (11-man) Ukrainian Politburo, while 41 per cent of the Central Committee, 63 per cent of *Obkom* secretaries, and 8 or 9 of the 25 *oblast* and city first secretaries were changed.²⁹ (The figures include changes made at the Twenty-Fifth Congress, but still understate the total upheaval, as the purge arguably started in 1970-1.) Official figures, which are also almost certainly an underestimate, cite 37 000 expelled from the CPU in 1973-4, or 1.5 per cent of the total membership.³⁰ The purge fell particularly heavily on those involved in propaganda and culture work, on the universities of L'viv and Kyiv, on the editors and journalists of organs suspected of heresy, and, of course, on dissident circles as well (see below). It did not, however, appear to encompass economic elites.³¹ The new regime had a clear understanding, therefore, of the nature of Shelest's power base.

Accordingly, Shcherbytskyi's surprisingly slow consolidation of his power was based in a shift in the balance of governing forces towards those more directly concerned with purely 'political' work or adminis-

tration, and more politically reliable agricultural specialists, whereas the representation of the cultural intelligentsia, i.e. the group most prone to national communism, diminished.³² The higher elite also tended to be disproportionately recruited from the more Russified and again, therefore, politically 'safe' areas.³³ The Donets'k and Dnipropetrovs'k party machines, both traditionally highly integrated into all-Union economic and political structures, were particularly important in this respect, whereas Galicia and Kyiv provided few members of the new governing elite.

Politically, the Shcherbytskyi coterie therefore represented those portions of the CPU who were more prepared to do Moscow's bidding. Thus, under Shcherbytskyi, the CPU no longer raised objections to the centre's investment and resource allocation policies, and the rearguard action fought under Shelest to protect the Ukrainian language gave way to collaboration in the policies of intensified Russification adopted after the Twenty-Fourth CPSU Congress in March 1971. As a result, the number of Ukrainian schoolchildren educated in Ukrainian-language schools fell below 50 per cent in the second half of the 1970s (it did recover until the mid-1990s).³⁴ Fewer books were published in the Ukrainian language under Brezhnev than under Stalin.³⁵

Whereas Shelest had been willing to provide symbolic sustenance to Ukrainian national consciousness in the areas of language, culture and historiography, as with the book *Ukraine - Our Soviet Land*, largely ghost-written for him by Oles Honchar in 1970, the cultural and political discourse of the Shcherbytskyi regime placed it firmly within an all-Union context. Shcherbytskyi would even speak Russian on most public occasions. According to Pelenski, 'throughout Shelest's speeches and writings there are, of course, positive references to the Russian people. But, they do not include even an iota of that enthusiastic servility that is so familiar to readers of documents of both the Stalinist period and the period since 1972.'³⁶

The Shcherbytskyi regime maintained a rigid monopoly over public political activity until well into the Gorbachev era, despite premature predictions of his demise, or that he would be forced to trim his policies.³⁷

In 1979, for example, the downfall of the chief scourge of dissidents and 'national communists' since November 1972, the Propaganda Secretary Valentyn Malanchuk,³⁸ together with the dismissal of Education Minister Marynych and the appointment of a new editor, Perebyinis, for *Literaturna Ukraina* (the main organ of

the Ukrainian cultural elite) in March 1980, was interpreted as inaugurating a policy of partial reaccommodation with the cultural intelligentsia.³⁹

Similarly, on various occasions in the 1980s, the departure of key colleagues (such as Fedorchuk in January 1986, Prime Minister Oleksandr Liashko in 1987, and Second Secretary Aleksei Titarenko in December 1988), policy disagreements (over Chornobyl' for example, or Shcherbytskyi's reported criticism of Gorbachev's Geneva summit with Ronald Reagan in November 1985) and setpiece CPU/CPSU Congresses or plenums were all minutely examined for evidence of a Gorbachev-inspired move against Shcherbytskyi.⁴⁰

However, there was no real evidence of a centrally coordinated campaign against him.⁴¹ Nor did policy changes under Shcherbytskyi ever amount to more than his bending with the climate of the times to the degree necessary to ensure his survival.⁴²

The latter stages of Shcherbytskyi's rule, therefore, cannot be interpreted simply as an unwanted conservative hangover into the Gorbachev period, which the centre was anxious to remove. Rather, the CPU, although challenged by the gradual rise of opposition groups, loyally fulfilled the key instrumental role of control of the periphery for the centre until at least autumn 1990.

The Shcherbytskyi regime was founded on a 'younger brother' logic, the CPU elite receiving local predominance, and the possibility of all-Union promotion in return for resisting the national communist temptation⁴³ (a role comparable to that of the Scots in the establishment and policing of the British empire). The CPU, therefore, remained largely passive during the initial phases of *perestroika* because they only occupied intermediate and instrumental power positions.

As Gorbachev tried to recentralise in response to the 'penetration crisis' suffered by the centre (i.e. its increasing inability to direct and control republican bureaucracies), he gradually undermined the basis of the informal 'younger brother' contract, and the republican elections of March 1990 introduced a state- (and authority-) building logic that began to conflict with all-Union interests. However, predictions of anything more than cosmetic change under Shcherbytskyi before these structural changes took place were premature.⁴⁴

The consequences of Shcherbytskyi's longevity in office and the fact that, unlike in some other republics, Ukraine's momentum had been away from, rather than towards, national communism since 1972, were, in terms of the analysis presented in Chapter 1, threefold. First, it was comparatively difficult for the Ukrainian opposition to establish

itself as a legitimate public force until its take-off in autumn 1989 and breakthrough in mid-1990. Second, the possibility of securing political change through a split in the ruling elite and consequent alliance with opposition forces, as in the Baltic republics or Armenia, was ruled out until the rise of 'sovereign (i.e. national) communists', led by Leonid Kravchuk, between winter 1990 and spring 1991. Third, even when this possibility eventually emerged, it was on terms more favourable to the maintenance of communist power than in many other republics. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence on 24 August 1991 was arguably an attempt by the CPU to hold on to power in an independent state.⁴⁵

However, several complicating factors deserve to be mentioned. First, the 'Communist Party of Ukraine' (from 1918 to 1952 it was called the 'Communist Party [Bolshevik] of Ukraine') was never an autonomous organisation. It simply referred to those members of the CPSU who were resident in the Ukrainian SSR. The CPU did not even have its own programme until its Twenty-Eighth Congress in June 1990. Its leadership never had full 'horizontal' competence over Ukrainian affairs and it was often bypassed by alternative channels of power.⁴⁶ Therefore, the idea that the history of the CPU can be divided into clear eras defined by the political priorities of its first secretary (for example, the so-called 'Shcherbychchyna') is partly fictional.

As Hodnett argues, 'Neither Shelest nor Shcherbytskyi have come close to being the centre of an all-dominating patron-client network at the top leadership level in the Ukraine.'⁴⁷ Some elements within the CPU undoubtedly did owe their loyalty to the first secretary (for Shelest, the Kharkiv group, for Shcherbytskyi the Dnipropetrovsk organisation), but others owed it to past leaders, or saw their careers within an all-Union context. The CPU, therefore, was always a factionalised body, with arguably no true existence as a systematic whole. This, in turn, undermines the notion of a strict dichotomy between the Shelest and Shcherbytskyi eras, and helps to explain the otherwise unexpectedly sudden re-emergence of a sleeping national communist tendency in winter 1990-Spring 1991.

The long-term logic (socio-economic for Krawchenko, institutional for Motyl) towards the regular recurrence of national communism meant that the renewed rise of 'sovereign communists' in 1990-1 in Ukraine was to be expected, because the conditions that gave rise to it in the 1920s and 1960s remained 'part of the historical agenda'.⁴⁸

NATIONALITY POLICY UNDER BREZHNEV

Article 71 of the 1977 Soviet constitution guaranteed each republic 'the right to freely secede from the USSR'. But there would never be any need to exercise this 'right', as 'each nation is aware that its freedom and progress are reliably assured precisely within the Union'.⁴⁹ In reality the republics of the USSR had less autonomy than the states of the USA or the cantons of Switzerland.⁵⁰ For advocating the 'right' to secession many Ukrainian and other non-Russian dissidents were imprisoned in the Gulag prior to 1987.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Soviet nationality policy was based on the concepts of *rastsvet* (flourishing), *sblizhenie* (drawing together) and the eventual *sliianie* (merging) of nations. During his speech on the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR in 1972 (the year Shelest was removed from office), Brezhnev refined official doctrine with the introduction of the new concepts of *vsestoronnee sblizhenie* (all-round rapprochement), and *splochenie* (cohesion) leading to *edinstvo* (unity), which was already reflected in the 'new historical community of people', the 'Soviet people' whose formation Brezhnev had announced at the Twenty-Fourth CPSU congress in 1971.

The drawing in of the Ukrainian 'younger brothers' into a ruling partnership with the Russians was perceived by Moscow in the 1970s as the crucial component of this process, as rising Muslim birthrates threatened to reduce the Russians' share of the Soviet population below the psychologically important 50 per cent mark.⁵¹ Ukrainians were also the best targets for the plans to accelerate the adoption of Russian that were given extra emphasis in the 1970s.⁵²

Hence the common past of Ukrainians and Russians was repeatedly stressed. The 375th anniversary of the 'reunification' of Ukraine and Russia in 1979, the '1500th' anniversary of the city of Kyiv in 1982 and the millennium of the Christianisation of Kievan Rus' in 1988 were celebrated as the joint heritage of all three East Slavic nations.⁵³

The portrayal of the USSR as the logical successor to Kyivan Rus' was meant to deprive Ukrainians 'of a separate and distinct identity either in the past, present or future.'⁵⁴

During the Brezhnev period, the numerical and proportionate role of Russians in the republic dramatically increased. The Ukrainian share of the republic's population dropped steadily from 76.8 per cent in 1959 to 72.7 per cent in 1989, as the Russian share grew from 16.9 to 22.1 per cent. The rate of increase of the Russian population between 1970 and 1979 was 15 per cent, or 1.3 million, exceeding the numerical increase of Ukrainians.⁵⁵

As Krawchenko argues, 'These were not the immigrants that one found in most other countries in the world - newcomers moving into subordinate positions in the host society. Rather this immigration resembled the movement of population which occurs from an imperial core to a colonised periphery.'⁵⁶ It is difficult, however, to determine retrospectively how much this was an issue at the time, although similar complaints can be found in *samizdat* such as Dziuba's comment that the notion of 'a single socialist (Soviet) nation' was merely camouflage for an extensive policy of Russification.⁵⁷ The closeness of the Ukrainian language and culture to Russian and the association of Russian, with social advancement, made Ukrainians relatively easy targets for Russification.

If anything, therefore, national consciousness in Ukraine and Belarus during the 'era of stagnation' was on the decline. The high degree of integration of eastern Ukrainians at least into the Soviet system and their relative indifference to the national question were evident in polls after the March 1990 republican elections, when Ukrainians were found to be more conservative in their political attitudes than Russians, with trust in the centre to rectify problems and support for the Communist Party stronger than among Russians, while support for complete secession was still weak (at a time when the Ukrainian parliament was still not functioning and the democratic opposition was in the process of becoming a wide-based movement). Ukrainians valued 'order' over 'liberty' (Ukrainians were prized for their discipline in the Soviet armed forces), and were afraid of chaos and spontaneity in society.⁵⁸ Material rather than cultural or national issues were seen as more important.⁵⁹

DISSENT AND OPPOSITION

Dissent and opposition in Ukraine under Brezhnev however remained vociferous in relation to other republics, despite relatively harsh treatment.⁶⁰ Dissent was however a variegated phenomenon.

During the postwar OUN-UPA period, dissent in Ukraine took three forms: open agitation, clandestine work and lobbying within the national communist faction of the CPU. The clandestine tradition was linked to the nationalist movement of the 1940s, whereas the new civil rights movement of the 1960s was a product of the new cultural revival and post-Stalin thaw. Its characteristics were populism, humanism, high intellectual content and a deliberate desire to work in the open.

Some worked 'within the framework of the system' and espoused national communism, calling for a return to the Leninist nationalities

policy that had generated the Ukrainisation of the 1920s.⁶¹ The most prominent example was Ivan Dziuba, the mouthpiece of a section of the establishment from 1963 to 1972. Dziuba's argument in his book *Internationalism or Russification?* selectively quoted Lenin in an idealised manner, as a 'sort of unblemished, omniscient hero' to argue that Stalin and Khrushchev had perverted Leninist nationality policy.⁶²

Dziuba was eventually subjected to a campaign of vilification.⁶³ In March 1972 he was expelled from the Writers' Union of Ukraine, then arrested the following month and sentenced in March 1973 to five years' imprisonment,⁶⁴ although he later recanted, which spared him his sentence.⁶⁵ In early 1972 when Dziuba's house was searched by the KGB, the complete works of Lenin were confiscated, 'with notes in the margins and phrases underlined'.

The opposite side of the spectrum to Dziuba was represented by Valentyn Moroz,⁶⁶ whose writings echoed those of Dmytro Dontsov, 'the Ukrainian Nietzsche', who was the inspiration for the Bandera faction of the OUN. 'What connected Moroz with the Dontsovian-OUN tradition was his philosophical voluntarism, his insistence upon the maintaining of the pure national idea at all costs, his scornful rejection of any pragmatic accommodation to existing conditions, his cult of the strong, heroic, self-sacrificing individual, and, finally, his anti-intellect and advocacy of *oderzhymist'* which means approximately "frenzy" or "holy madness",' Ivan Rudnytsky commented.⁶⁷

But neither Moroz nor Dziuba became representative of the mainstream of Ukrainian dissent - either in the Brezhnev or the Gorbachev era. More typical were groups such as the Ukrainian Helsinki Group (UHG) in the Brezhnev period and the Ukrainian Popular Movement (*Rukh*) in the post-1985 era.⁶⁸ Ukrainian dissidents adopted the same legalistic approach as their Russian counterparts, trying to force the state to honour its commitments to the rule of law, and individual and national rights. In the 1970s and mid-1980s the balance between the latter two was about equal, but from 1989-90 onwards increasing emphasis was placed on the national question.

In a study of the national composition of dissidents in Ukraine in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ukrainians accounted for 77 per cent of the total number, while Russians made up only 0.5 per cent, the remainder being mainly Jews and Crimean Tatars. As a privileged group (in the state and socio-economic elites, and with no lack of publications in Russian) within Ukraine, Russians were less likely to

engage in dissent or publish *samizdat* in proportion to their numbers.⁶⁹ Their relative passivity in the face of a rising tide of Ukrainian nationalist collective action would be problematical by 1990-1, however.

Open anti-Soviet dissent was always most intense in the Soviet west, and this was always the case in western Ukraine as well.⁷⁰ The cities and towns of southern and eastern Ukraine had been heavily Russified and at the time of the Russian revolution were islands of Bolshevik support in Ukraine. Galicia, on the other hand, already a stronghold of nationalism, had, after the local Jews had been exterminated by the Nazis and the Poles deported by the Soviets to Siberia in 1939-41 or to Poland in 1944-7, become the most monoethnic region in Ukraine.⁷¹ In addition, 'the urban base of Party activity, which was so important in establishing Communist rule in east Ukraine, was largely lacking in the West.'⁷²

The nationalist guerrilla movement had fought on in Galicia until 1952-4,⁷³ and western Ukraine always played a disproportionate role in the dissident movements of the Brezhnev era and as the leading initial base for the national revival under Gorbachev. By the 1960s, however, central and eastern Ukrainian dissenters were becoming more numerous, as dissent became more of an urban phenomenon.⁷⁴ In Kyiv, the intelligentsia was much stronger than in Galicia, and consequently, the peasant-based populism of the OUN and its various would-be successor groups was followed by the civic values of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

The first post-Stalin dissident groups were organised in the late 1950s⁷⁵ after the end of the underground UPA war in the early 1950s, although arrests of members of the UPA and the OUN continued as late as the early 1960s.⁷⁶ Between the late 1950s and 1970s, the majority of nationalist underground groups were uncovered in western Ukraine, such as Levko Lukianenko's Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union, the Ukrainian National Committee, the United Party for the Liberation of Ukraine and the Ukrainian National Front.

The most radical and best organised was the Ukrainian National Front (UNF), which was established in Ivano-Frankivs'k in the early 1960s, although arrests were made as far away as Donetsk. The majority of members were villagers⁷⁷ and Uniate Catholic faithful, within the age group 20-30.⁷⁸ The UNF stood for state independence, a democratic form of government and agrarian reforms. It published the *samizdat* journals *Volia i Bat'kivshchyna* (Freedom and Fatherland), 16 issues of which appeared, *Zemlia i volia* (Land and Freedom) and *Mesnyk* (The Avenger), and circulated old OUN-UPA

literature. The UNF also circulated leaflets denouncing the occupation of Ukraine and calling for the punishment of those responsible for Stalinist crimes in Ukraine.⁷⁹ The majority of UNF members were arrested in the late 1960s, but in the early 1980s new reports were published in the *samizdat Chronicle of the Catholic Church* in Ukraine that the UNF was again active in the Ivano-Frankivsk region.

The Soviet authorities continued to persecute former members of the OUN and UPA, even in some cases executing them, and maintained a persistent anti-nationalist (and anti-emigre) media campaign,⁸⁰ attempting to link the contemporary national and democratic movement in Ukraine to the OUN and UPA and their alleged collaboration with the Nazis in World War II.⁸¹ The number and extent of such trials sharply increased in the late 1970s and first half of the 1980s, in some cases continuing until 1987-8.⁸² This domestic campaign coincided with a large-scale external campaign against emigre Ukrainians⁸³ accusing them of harbouring 'Nazi war criminals', which also ended at about the same time.⁸⁴

The dissident organisations uncovered in eastern Ukraine tended to have aims closer to those of Russian democratic movements at the time.⁸⁵ The generation of the 1960s (*shestydesiatnyky*) comprised poets, actors, writers, artists, publicists, historians and teachers - a 'patriotic opposition'. Their goals were to work within the system (rather than overthrow it) in pursuit of democracy, humanism, an end to Russification and in defence of Ukrainian language and culture. They used methods similar to those in Russia - individual and group letters, petitions, complaints, unofficial gatherings and *samizdat*.

In the summer of 1965 the first arrests of 100 intellectuals were made in several cities.⁸⁶ The authorities were however surprised by the degree of solidarity the accused received, producing appeals to party and state leaders, group petitions demanding full publicity and open trials, and unauthorised protest meetings.⁸⁷ One of the outcomes of this protest was a petition by Ivan Dziuba, to Petro Shelest, attached to which was the lengthy document 'Internationalism or Russification?' Dissident networks continued to spread, and by the late 1960s *samizdat* was widespread in Ukraine.

The clampdown on Ukrainian dissent in 1972 therefore concentrated on intellectuals in Kyiv, where 'the atmosphere resembled in many respects that of the Stalinist terror'.⁸⁸ By 1970-2, as in 1990-1, the central state's tolerance of limited dissent and a degree of greater republican autonomy had only led to more radical demands directed against the system and the Union. The dilemma on both occasions faced by the authorities was to either allow it to continue, or use

repression and recentralise. In both 1972 and 1991 the authorities chose repression, but by 1991 the degree of imperial disintegration meant that repression would have had to have been undertaken against thousands, rather than hundreds of people, as in 1972.

The clampdown destroyed the hopes of many dissidents to establish a dialogue with the Soviet Ukrainian authorities and work within the system, casting doubt upon the legalistic approach favoured since the 1960s. Dissent prior to 1972 in Ukraine had been shown to be a 'relatively weak and vulnerable phenomenon lacking a definite political programme, adequate organisation or a strong social base'.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the revived *shestydesiatnyky* would return in 1988-91 to provide intelligentsia leadership for the resurgent national movement.

Despite the clampdown, the USSR's largest Helsinki Group (Ukrainian Group for the Promotion of the Implementation of the Helsinki accords, or UHG) was established in Ukraine on 9 November 1976, encouraged by the rise in East-West detente to act as an open public association. By 1980 the UHG had issued a total of 30 declarations and appeals, as well as 18 memorandums and 10 bulletins.⁸⁹ Unlike the Moscow group, the UHG defended both civil and national rights, although religious and socio-economic rights were relatively neglected.⁹⁰ The UHG was 'a veritable microcosm of Ukrainian dissent and represented an attempt to create a unified structure in which ideological and tactical differences would be submerged'.⁹² The initiators of the UHG were nearly all members of the middle-ranking intelligentsia, and it was evenly divided between western and eastern Ukrainians.⁹³

An extra ingredient in Ukrainian dissent was the possibility of contagion from Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia into the sensitive western Ukraine whenever communist control of central Europe became less certain (1956, 1968 and during the early 1980s). Support for the Hungarian uprising existed in western Ukraine,⁹⁴ while the 'Prague Spring's' impact upon the Ukrainian minority in eastern Slovakia may have been an added incentive to send the Warsaw Pact forces to crush it.⁹⁵

Information flowed in the other direction. Events virtually unnoticed in the Soviet press were often published by Poland's Ukrainian-language press.⁹⁶ The rise of Solidarity in Poland and the continuation of an underground structure after the declaration of martial law on 13 December 1981 were also a cause for concern to both Kyiv and Moscow.⁹⁷ In the view of the ideological secretary of the Ivano-Frankiv'sk branch of the CPU, western Ukraine is 'literally in the forefront of ideological confrontation. A border *oblast* is always a special region where one constantly smells the fumes of anti-Soviet fire'.⁹⁸

The increased repression of dissent in the USSR during the late 1970s and early 1980s, drove opposition 'almost entirely underground' with dissidents dropping open tactics, and increasingly using pseudonyms in *samizdat* and statements." The authorities first tested new methods of persecution in Ukraine,¹⁰⁰ for example, charging dissidents with non-political crimes (e.g. homosexuality, theft, narcotics), re-sentencing political prisoners for additional terms¹⁰¹ and forcing dissidents to recant their views for domestic and foreign audiences.¹⁰²

The UHG, which eventually had 40 members, was effectively out of action by the early 1980s, although it never formally disbanded, as the Moscow Helsinki Group was forced to in September 1981. By then, 22 UHG members were in the Gulag (6 received 15 years each, 3 received 12 years each and 13 received 3-9 years' imprisonment), 2 were forced into internal exile, and 6 were forced to emigrate (they then established an external branch led by Mykola Rudenko), although 3 were released from imprisonment. In 1984-5 four UHG political prisoners - Vasyl Stus,¹⁰³ Oleksa Tykhyi, Valerii Marchenko and Iurii Lytvyn - died in the Gulag from conditions of confinement.¹⁰⁴ The popular music composer Volodymyr Ivasiuk was allegedly murdered by the KGB on 12 June 1978, while Mykhailo Melnyk committed suicide after a KGB raid on his home.¹⁰⁵ The deaths of the poet Oleksandr Hryhorenko and priest Vasyl Lutskiv were also ascribed to the KGB in UHG documents.

According to the Moscow Helsinki Group, Ukrainian dissidents by the early 1980s constituted the largest single group of political prisoners.¹⁰⁶ The former Jewish political prisoner, Yakiv Suslenskyi, noted that the harshest sentences were meted out in Ukraine, with Baits or Armenians receiving 3-4 years when a Ukrainian would have received 12 years' imprisonment and exile.¹⁰⁷ In the Gulag camps of Mordovia, Ukrainians reportedly accounted for between 60 and 70 per cent of political prisoners.¹⁰⁸

A former Ukrainian conscript, V. N. Holembovskyi, who served in the Ministry of Internal Troops (MVD) guard at the Mordovian political camps during 1970-2 recounted his story in December 1991.¹⁰⁹ The prisoners of the Mordovian camps where he served were always described as 'state criminals' and 'Banderites', and included many of the well-known Ukrainian dissidents of the 1960s, such as Levko Lukianenko and Viacheslav Chornovil. Upwards of 1200-1300 prisoners were held in the camp where he served, making furniture for high-ranking Communist Party officials.

In the words of Peter Reddaway, 'the biggest short-term risks of the current policy on dissent would seem to be the development of under-

ground groups that the KGB cannot easily monitor - as we have seen, this is already happening - and a sharp rise in acts of violence (hijackings, assassinations, bombings) which so far have been fairly rare.¹¹⁰ In going underground, the dissident movement in Ukraine (both in the Gulag and outside) during the late 1970s and early 1980s had become radicalised and moved from demanding democratisation within a Soviet context to calling for independence.¹¹¹ Moreover, the ties that were formed among the camp generation helped them serve as the avant-garde of the national movement, after most were released in 1987.

There is evidence that a small number of nationalists in western Ukraine turned to violence during this period, blowing up gas pipelines and railway lines.¹¹² In June 1982 Borys Terelia (who had spent 16 years in the Gulag) was killed in a shoot-out with KGB security forces in Transcarpathia,¹¹³ confirmed by the first secretary of the regional branch of the CPU, who accused him of being a 'common criminal'.¹¹⁴ Terelia 'offered resistance to the militiamen, seriously wounded one of them, refused to surrender to the authorities, and continued firing'.

Iosyf Terelia later claimed in the *samizdat Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine* that his brother had committed suicide rather than be captured on 10 June 1982 in the village of Poliana, and confirmed that his nationalist group had concluded that peaceful forms of protest in the current climate of repression in Ukraine would be unsuccessful.¹¹⁵ Six years after his death, an emigre newspaper reported that Borys Terelia had been head of the Security Service of the underground OUN in Galicia and Transcarpathia from 1975-82.¹¹⁶ A crash of a Soviet military plane carrying political-military officers from the Carpathian military district was also attributed to sabotage.¹¹⁷

Religion

Dissent in the USSR was always strongest where national and religious demands were combined, such as in western Ukraine and Lithuania. Ukraine on the eve of the Gorbachev era possessed two-thirds of Russian Orthodox parishes in the USSR, half of which were in western Ukraine.¹¹⁸ Both the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox (UAOC) and Greek Catholic (UCC) Churches had been destroyed in the 1930s and second half of the 1940s respectively, with most Church property being handed over to the loyal Russian Orthodox Church.¹¹⁹ Historically, both the Tsarist and Soviet regimes had favoured the Russian Orthodox Church as a 'state church', in particular in Ukraine and Belarus where it was an ally of the imperial authorities.¹²⁰

Religion had managed to maintain a strong influence in Ukraine, though, and Kyiv churches were attended by twice as many young people as in Moscow or even Tbilisi.¹²¹ The UCC survived its forced merger with the Russian Orthodox Church by becoming a 'catacomb' church,¹²² although the UAOC did not possess any underground structure in the pre-Gorbachev era in Ukraine, with the first lay pressure group not established in Kyiv until February 1988.¹²³

The extensive range of anti-Ukrainian Catholic propaganda testified to the latter's continued vitality.¹²⁴ The UCC received an infusion of energy with the election of Pope John Paul II, a Pole who was widely regarded as sympathetic to the plight of Ukrainian Catholics.¹²⁵ Consequently, at a time when Soviet repression of dissent in Ukraine was becoming harsher in the early 1980s, the UCC began to increase its activities in western Ukraine, helped by the energetic Iosyf Terelia. Pope John Paul II's support for Ukrainian Catholics and Solidarity made him highly unpopular with the Soviet authorities, and the subject of a widescale counter-propaganda campaign. In western Ukraine 587 commissions promoted Soviet festivals and rites, with atheistic propaganda conducted through more than 3000 lecturers and 7000 agitators. For adults there were 450 atheistic clubs while for children 1600 similar institutions existed. Between 1971 and 1981 over 800 publications in the USSR attacked Catholics.¹²⁶

In September 1982 Iosyf Terelia announced the establishment of the Initiative Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Believers of the Church which restricted itself to one goal: legalisation of the UCC. The Initiative Committee began to publish the *samizdat* information bulletin *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine* in 1984, modelled upon a Lithuanian equivalent of a similar name, after Terelia was released from a one-year prison sentence. *The Chronicle* received wide exposure in the West, and served to publicise the growth and continued vitality of Ukrainian Catholics in the early 1980s.¹²⁷ Although links existed between the Initiative Committee and the Ukrainian National Front (both of which were based in Galicia and Transcarpathia), there did not appear to be any links with the UHG or overlap in membership between these two organisations.¹²⁸ As already mentioned, the UHG's *samizdat* did not cover religious questions.

After Terelia's expulsion to the West in 1987, the work of the Initiative Committee was taken over by Ivan Hel, released from the Gulag during the amnesty of political prisoners in the same year.¹²⁹ Ivan Hel renamed the Initiative Committee the Committee in

Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and from August 1987 Ukrainian Catholics began to agitate openly in support of legalisation of their Church (see Chapters 4 and 5). The activation of the catacomb Uniate Church in 1982-7, during a period of continued Soviet harassment and repression, served to strengthen the Church for its full emergence in 1989-90 when the political climate was more opportune.

Workers' Groups

Specifically working-class agitation in the USSR arrived much later, the first traces in Ukraine appearing only in 1978. National and religious movements in western Ukraine had always included a large number of workers and peasants, whereas Kyiv-based groups such as the UHG were closer to Russian dissidents groups, in terms of their largely intelligentsia membership and in the subject matter of their *samizdat*.^m

Strikes and workers' protests occurred more frequently in the Soviet Union's periphery, and such strikes tended to be more violent. Often this was due to simple shortages.¹³¹ In 1962 the strikes and riots in Novocherkassk spread quickly throughout the region to include a large section of the working classes in neighbouring Ukraine.¹³²

The poor working conditions and exploitation in the coal mining region of the Donbas in eastern Ukraine were exposed by two Western correspondents who visited the area in December 1980. One of the reporters later described the degree of political control 'exercised right down to the level of each individual worker - deliberately fostering divisions, resentment and dissension bordering on hatred within the working class, sapping its unity and potential cohesion in the face of exploitation.'¹³³ The difficulty of organising a workers opposition movement in the Donbas was brought home to the reporter.

The bosses had absolute power to fire, reprimand, dock pay, deny vacation or mete out any combination of punishment they chose. In theory the workers enjoyed full rights to petition through their trade unions for redressing unfair treatment. In practice, workers usually agreed with their bosses. They were afraid to challenge them because they could only lose.¹³⁴

The political prisoner Mykola Pohyba wrote a lengthy open letter to Amnesty International in November 1980 claiming that 'the Soviet

Union is ripe for the founding of independent labour unions' and praising Poland's Solidarity. Official trade unions did not support the workers because they were 'an integral part of the party-state apparatus.'¹³⁵ Pohyba labelled the Soviet system 'totalitarian state capitalist.'

Whereas the UHG did not deal with socio-economic questions, the more radical Ukrainian Patriotic Movement called (prior to Solidarity's launch) for workers to establish their own independent trade unions, and advised workers that 'It is your sacred right to struggle against the merciless exploitation of your labour by the state.' Another document of the Ukrainian Patriotic Movement called for support for the miners.¹³⁶

The miners expressed sympathy for the Solidarity movement in Poland but felt helpless to act, worrying that if the USSR 'attacks Poland today, it would be us tomorrow.'¹³⁷ Strikes and labour disputes did, however, become more frequent and the authorities paid greater attention to trade unions and workers grievances in 1980—1.¹³⁸ In February 1978, the Free Trade Union Association of the Soviet Working People was established by two Donbas miners, Vladimir Klebanov and Aleksei Nikitin.¹³⁹ The union as Klebanov was ready to point out, had nothing in common with the dissidents, was not anti-communist and was against Ukrainian national rights.¹⁴⁰

Despite professing loyalty to communism and asking for support to work within the system (in the same manner as the *shestydesiatnyky*), both Klebanov and Nikitin were arrested and incarcerated in psychiatric hospitals in 1978. Nikitin died of stomach cancer shortly after being released in 1984.¹⁴¹ Klebanov was not released from compulsory psychiatric confinement until 1988.

Klebanov and Nikitin had been warned by the CPU *oblast* first secretary: 'If you stick your nose into our business, I'll mix coal with your blood and take your body and grind it into fertiliser.'¹⁴² Donbas miners' grievances eventually resulted in the strike explosion of summer 1989, however (see Chapter 5), and later in June 1993.

CONCLUSIONS

The pre-Gorbachev era had shown evidence of every strand of dissent and opposition in Ukraine: religious, nationalist, socio-economic and human rights. All had been severely repressed by the authorities. In terms of the argument of Chapter 1, therefore, although the state had to tolerate a greater degree of dissent than in Stalin's time, in the

Brezhnev and Andropov eras, and especially in Shcherbytskyi's Ukraine, no public space was permitted for different small groups, which were regionally and socially dispersed, to coalesce into a large unified movement capable of challenging the power and legitimacy of the Communist Party.¹⁴³

This would only occur in the second half of Gorbachev's rule, when the Ukrainian national and democratic movement took off and posed a serious threat to Moscow's and the CPU's control over the republic. But it would be the hundreds of politically experienced former Ukrainian political prisoners who would be the footsoldiers in the Gorbachev era. They had, after all, graduated from the 'universities' that the Gulag became, to become hardened activists ready to continue their struggle in the new conditions that existed after 1987 for the ideals that Gorbachev now professed - ideals which they had already held for at least two decades.

When Viacheslav Chornovil, a dissident and political prisoner in pre-Gorbachev days, was asked during the presidential elections held in Ukraine on 1 December 1991 what the difference was between himself and his main rival, Leonid Kravchuk, he replied: 'Nothing. Except that my programme is thirty years old, and Kravchuk's three weeks old.'¹⁴⁴

3 Ukraine on the Eve of the Gorbachev Era

1. Borys Lewytzkyj, *Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine, 1953-1980* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1984) p. 166.
2. On Shcherbytskyi, see Yaroslav Bilinsky, 'Shcherbytsky, Ukraine and Kremlin Politics', *Problems of Communism*, vol. XXXII, no. 4 (July/August 1983) pp. 1-26; Roman Solchanyk, 'Politics and the National Question in the Post-Shelest Period', in Bohdan Krawchenko (ed.), *Ukraine After Shelest* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983) pp. 1-29; Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Political Patronage and Perestroika: Changes in Communist Party Leadership in Ukraine Under Gorbachov and Shcherbytsky', in R. M. Bahry (ed.), *Echoes of Glasnost in Soviet Ukraine* (North York, Ontario: Captus Press, 1989) pp. 28-39.
3. On Shelest, see Grey Hodnett, 'Ukrainian Politics and the Purge of Shelest' (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Slavic Conference, Ann Arbor, 5-7 May 1977); which is partly summarised in the more widely available 'The Views of Petro Shelest', *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States*, vol. 14, nos 37-8 (1978-80) pp. 209-43; Jaroslaw Pelenski, 'Shelest and His Period in Soviet Ukraine (1963, 1972): A Revival of Controlled Ukrainian Autonomism', in Peter J. Potichnyj (ed.), *Ukraine in the 1970s* (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1975) pp. 283-305; Y. Bilinsky, 'Mykola Skrypnyk and Petro Shelest: an Essay on the Persistence and Limits of Ukrainian National Communism', in J. R. Azrael (ed.), *Soviet Nationality Politics and Practices* (New York: Praeger, 197) pp. 105-43; Lowell Tillett, 'Ukrainian Nationalism and the Fall of Shelest', *Slavic Review*, vol. XXXIV, no. 4 (Winter 1975) pp. 752-68 mainly considers Shelest's heretical book *Ukraino, nashaadianska* (Kyiv: Polityvydav Ukrainy, 1970).
4. Works covering both Shelest and Shcherbytskyi include Lewytzkyj, 1984; his 'The Ruling Party Organs of Ukraine', and Yaroslav Bilinsky, 'The Communist Party of Ukraine After 1966', both in Peter J. Potichnyj (ed.), *Ukraine in the 1970s* (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1975); Mark Beissinger, 'Ethnicity, the Personnel Weapon, and Neo-imperial Integration: Ukrainian and RSFSR Provincial Party Officials Compared', *Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol. XXI, no. 1 (Spring 1988) pp. 71-85; Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Political Mobility in Soviet Ukraine', *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. XXVI, nos 2-3 (June-September 1984) pp. 160-81.
5. *Storinky istorii Kompartii Ukrainy: Zapytannia i vidpovidi* (Kyiv: Lybid', 1990) pp. 484-5; and Bohdan Krawchenko, 'Changes in the National and Social Composition of the Communist Party of Ukraine From the

- Revolution to 1976', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984) pp. 33-54.
6. *Storinky ...*, pp. 482-3. As of 1 January each year, except for 1918 (July). The figures include both full and candidate members. Krawchenko, 1984, gives marginally different figures for 1918 (5000 in October; p. 36), 1922 (56 000; p. 36), and 1940 (680 000; p. 45). However, the 1940 figure and others are not necessarily from 1 January.
 7. *Vechirni Kyiv*, 17 June 1991 cited a decline in CPU membership to 2.5 million. See *Ukrainian Reporter*, vol. 1, no. 14 (August 1991).
 8. Krawchenko, 1984, p. 49.
 9. Despite official disinformation (and some Western analysis) at the time, that Shelest was removed for his hardline foreign policy views, no one would now dispute that Shelest's defence of Ukrainian autonomy, plus his association with the old Moscow circles around Khrushchev and Pidhornyi, were the real reasons for his dismissal. See the works cited in n. 3 above.
 10. *Komunist Ukra'iny*, no. 4 (April 1973) translated in *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, May 1973, pp. 1-6. All of the relevant documents are also published in *Za shcho usunuly Shelesta?* (Munich: Suchasnist', 1973). Compare Shcherbytskyi's *Radians'ka Ukraina* (Kyiv: Polityvydav Ukra'iny, 1978) to Shelest's book.
 11. There are clear similarities between Shelest's and Gorbachev's idealisation of Lenin and denunciations of Brezhnevism. See the former's interviews in *Sil's'ki vist*: 19 January 1989; *Argumenty i fakty*, no. 2, 1989, pp. 14-20; *Kyiv*, no. 10, 1989, pp. 90-110; and *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 29 March 1990. Some of these are discussed in Bohdan Nahaylo, 'Disgraced Ukrainian Party Leader Petro Shelest Reappears After Fifteen Years - a Slap in the Face for Shcherbytsky?', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 293/88 (29 July 1988); 'Shelest Confirms He Was Ousted For Nationalism', RL 40/89; Alexandr Rahr, 'Shelest Remembers', RL 41/89; *Report on the USSR* (27 January 1989) September 1989. See also P. E. Shelest, ... *Dane Sudymyi Budete. Dnevnikovyye Zapysy, Vosprominaniya Chlena Politburo TSKKPSS* (Moscow: Edition, 1995).
 12. Jaroslav Pelenski, 'Shelest and his Period ...', 1975, p. 299.
 13. Grey Hodnett, 'Ukrainian Politics', 1977, p. 34. (Underlining in original.)
 14. Mark Beissinger, 'Ethnicity ...', 1988, p. 79. See also Radio Liberty, *Arkhiv samizdata*, no. 1002.
 15. See the collections edited by I. Koshelivets', *Panorama nainovishoi literatury v URSR* (New York: Prolog, 1963 and Munich: Suchasnist', 1974); *Suchasna literatura v URSR* (New York: Prolog, 1964); as well as B. Kravtsov, *Shistdesiat' poetiv shistdesiatykh rokiv* (New York: Prolog, 1967). See also J. Pelenski, 'Recent Ukrainian Writing', *Survey*, vol. 59, no. 2 (April 1966) pp. 102-17; and George Luckyj, 'Turmoil in the Ukraine', *Problems of Communism*, vol. XVII (July-August 1968) pp. 14-20.
 16. Hodnett, 1977, p. 41. See also B. Krawchenko, 1985, p. 177.
 17. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-3. See also Krawchenko, p. 227; and A. Biscoe, *Internal Colonialism in the USSR: The Case of Soviet Ukraine*, M.A. thesis, University of Alberta, 1986.
 18. *Literaturna Ukraina* 17 November, 1966.

19. Pelenski, p. 286.
20. See Lewytkyj, p. 116.
21. Y. Bilinsky, 'The Communist Party of Ukraine After 1966' in Peter J. Potichnyj (ed.), *Ukraine in the Seventies* (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1975) p. 251.
22. Identified by Shelest as his main opponent in Moscow. See note 11 above.
23. See *Moloda Dnipropetrovs'ka v borot'bi proty rusyfikatsii* (Munich: Suchasnist', 1971).
24. R. Solchanyk, 'Controversial Ukrainian Novel to be Reissued - in Moscow', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 201/86 (21 May 1986). The novel was republished in Kyiv by Dnipro Publishers in 1989.
25. Originally published in *Vitchyzna*, no. 1, 1968 and then in Kyiv by Dnipro publishers 1968. See also Oles Honchar, *Sobor-Roman* (South Bound Brook, N.J.: Ukrainian Orthodox Memorial Church, USA, 1968) and *The Cathedral* (Washington: St Sophia Religious Association of Ukrainian Catholics, 1989).
26. Hodnett, 1977, p. 62.
27. Bilinsky, 1975, p. 249. See also W. Dushnyk (ed.), *Ukraine in a Changing World* (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1977). The central committee of the CPU first heard of Shelest's removal on *Radio Kyiv*. See Bilinsky, pp. 239-40.
28. Translated and edited by O. Saciuk and B. Yasen, *The Ukrainian Herald*, no. 7-8 (Baltimore, Md.: Smolokyp Publishers, 1976) pp. 126-7. The compiler of this issue was Stepan Khmara (pseudonym Maksym Sahaidak).
29. Ibid., pp. 61-71.
30. Krawchenko, 1984, p. 54.
31. Hodnett, 1977, pp. 67-8. See also Solchanyk in Krawchenko (ed.), 1983.
32. Ibid, pp. 71 and 77.
33. Beissinger, 1988, p. 82.
34. Dominique Arel, 'The State of Ukrainian-Language Schools in Ukraine', unpublished MS in the possession of the authors.
35. Y. Bilinsky, 'Shcherbytsky, Ukraine and Kremlin Politics', *Problems of Communism*, vol. XXXII, no. 4 (July-August 1983) p. 6.
36. Pelenski, p. 252.
37. See, for example, Roman Solchanyk, 'The Perils of Prognostication'; and 'Shcherbytsky: A Long Time Going', in *Soviet Analyst*, 5 March 1986 and 25 March 1987, respectively.
38. R. Solchanyk, 'Ukraine's Ideology Chief Purged', *Soviet Analyst*, 30 August 1979.
39. Solchanyk, in Krawchenko, 1984, pp. 10-19.
40. See David R. Marples, *The Social Impact of the Chornobyl' Disaster* (London: Macmillan/St Antony's, 1988).
41. Harasymiw, in Bahry (ed.), pp. 28-39.
42. Roman Solchanyk, 'Shcherbytsky Discusses "Style and Methods of Leadership"', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 311/84 (17 August 1984); 'Shcherbytsky Files a Report in Pravda', RL 378/86 (1 October 1986); 'Shcherbytsky Indulges in a Measure of Self-Criticism', RL 166/87 (4 May 1987).

43. Cf. Armstrong's more overtly sociological approach to the notion of 'younger brothers', discussed in Chapter 2.
44. Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukrainian Regional Bosses Virtually Untouched by Gorbachev Purge', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 52/86 (23 June 1986); 'Overview of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine', RL 85/86 (19 February 1986); Bohdan Nahaylo, 'Ukrainian Party Plenum: Stagnation Wins Out Over Talk of Restructuring', RL 481/88 (25 October 1988).
45. See T. Kuzio, 'Leonid Kravchuk: Patriot or Placeman?' *Soviet Analyst*, 19 June 1991; and 'An Independent Ukraine - But Still Communist?', *Soviet Analyst* 28 August 1991.
46. See Mary McAuley, 'Party Recruitment and the Nationalities of the USSR: A Study in Centre-Republican Relationships', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. II part (1981) pp. 461-87.
47. Grey Hodnett, *Ukrainian Politics ...*, 1977, p. 73.
48. Krawchenko, 1984, p. 250.
49. *Socialism: Theory and Practice*, March 1979, p. 129.
50. S. Bloembergen, 'The Union Republics: How Much Autonomy?', *Problems of Communism*, vol. XVI, no. 5 (September-October 1967) p. 35.
51. T. Rakowska-Harmstone, 'The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR', *Problems of Communism* vol. XXIV, no. 3 (May-June 1974) p. 14; and Armstrong, p. 32.
52. See R. Solchanyk, 'Russian Language and Soviet Politics', *Soviet Studies* vol. XXXIV, no. 1 (2 January 1982) pp. 23-42.
53. *Financial Times*, 5 October 1982; R. Solchanyk, 'Kiev's 1500th Anniversary and Soviet Nationality Policy', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 186/82 (5 May 1982) and O. Pritsak, 'Za kulisamy proholoshennia 1500-littia Kyieva, *Suchasnist'*, September 1981, pp. 46-54.
54. See R. Solchanyk, 'Moulding "The Soviet People": The Role of Ukrainians and Belorussians', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983) p. 13.
55. R. Solchanyk, 'The Ukraine and Ukrainians in the USSR: Nationality and Language Aspects of the Census of 1979', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 100/80 (11 March 1980). See also his 'Language Politics in the Ukraine', in I. T. Kreindler, *Sociolinguistic Perspectives on Soviet National Languages* (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1985) pp. 57-108; and 'Discrimination on the Basis of National and Cultural Identity', a brief submitted to participating states in the Cultural Forum, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 15 October-25 November 1985, Budapest (Toronto: World Congress of Free Ukrainians, 1985).
56. Krawchenko, 1985, p. 251. See also I. S. Koropecykyj, 1979, p. 150.
57. Dziuba's book *Internationalism or Russification?* was published by Suchasnist' (in 1968 in Ukrainian and in 1973 in Russian). The English editions were published by London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968 and 1970; and New York: Mosaic Press, 1974. See Dziuba, Mosaic Press, pp. 46-7.
58. A. H. Muller, W. M. Reisinger and V. L. Heslin, 'Public Support for New Political Institutions in Russia, the Ukraine and Lithuania', *Journal of Soviet Nationalities*, vol. 1, no. 4 (Winter 1990-1), p. 97. Faith

- in the centre progressively declined in 1990-1, and collapsed after the August coup. But the natural streak of Ukrainian conservatism could explain both the strong position of the CPU and longevity of Shcherbytskyi until 1989, as well as the overwhelming support for the 'centrist' presidential candidate, Leonid Kravchuk, in the elections on 1 December 1991. See the commentary by the editor of *Vechirnia Kyiv* (10 December 1991).
59. See the articles on 'The Lessons of the Elections', in *Filosofs'ka i sotsiologichna dumka*, no. 8 (1990) pp. 3-41.
 60. See L. Alexeyeva, *Soviet Dissent. Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1985) pp. 50 and 55.
 61. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'The Political Thought of Soviet Ukrainian Dissent', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 6, no. 2 (Winter 1981) p. 5.
 62. See B. Nahaylo, 'Dzyuba's Internationalism or Russification? Revisited: A Reappraisal of Dzyuba's Treatment of Leninist Nationality Policy', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Winter 1977) pp. 31-53.
 63. See B. Stenchuk, *What I. Dzyuba Stands for, and How He Does It (Once More about the Book 'Internationalism or Russification?)* (Kyiv: Society for Cultural Relations with Ukrainians Abroad, 1969 and 1970).
 64. R. Solchanyk, 'Literaturna Ukraina Marks Ivan Dzyuba's Fiftieth Birthday', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 304/81 (4 August 1981).
 65. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 9 November 1973; and *Visti z Ukrainy*, 22 May 1975.
 66. Valentyn Moroz was forced to emigrate from the USSR in 1979 and settled in Toronto, Canada, where he began to publish the journal *Anabasis*. Originally allied to the Bandera faction of OUN, he later split from them. See Y. Bihun (ed.), *Boomerang. The Works of Valentyn Moroz* (Baltimore, Md.: Smoloskyp Publishers, 1974).
 67. Rudnytsky, p. 6. In the view of Rudnytsky, the call by dissidents such as Pliushch and Badzo for 'democratic Marxism' was a 'symptom of intellectual confusion': Ukrainian dissent was less intellectually sophisticated and provincial, owing to a limited access to world literature and thought (in comparison to Russian dissidents in Moscow).
 68. Danylo Shumuk, for example, passed through both national communism and integral nationalism as a member of the Communist Party of West Ukraine and then OUN, going on to join the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. See D. Shumuk, *Perezhyte i peredumane* (Detroit: Ukrai'ns'ki visti, 1983) and *Life Sentence: Memoirs of a Ukrainian Political Prisoner* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1984). Leonid Pliushch also dropped his allegiance to Euro-Communism after being expelled to France in the 1970s and joined the external branch of the UHG. Iurii Badzo was also a Euro-Communist during the late 1970s, but was elected chairman of the Democratic Party of Ukraine in December 1990. See his 'Open Letter to the Soviet Leaders', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 9, no. 1 (1984) pp. 74-94; and vol. 9, no. 2 (Winter-Summer 1984) pp. 47-70.
 69. Krawchenko, 1983, pp. 250-1. During the Gorbachev era, the large Russian minority in Ukraine produced surprisingly few *samizdat* publications or political parties. Political groups in Russia also seemed to have been relatively unsuccessful in establishing branches in Ukraine,

- apart from in the Crimea. See Taras Kuzio, 'Independent (Samizdat) Press in Ukraine under Gorbachev', *Soviet Analyst*, 19 and 29 August, 13 September 1990.
70. See R. S. Clem (ed.), *The Soviet West: Interplay between Nationality and Social Organization* (New York: Praeger, 1975).
 71. See articles by P. Herlihy, S. L. Guthier, R. Szporluk and P. Woroby in I. L. Rudnytsky (ed.), *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1981) pp. 135-215.
 72. Armstrong, p. 106.
 73. R. Szporluk, 'West Ukraine and West Belorussia. Historical tradition, social communication and linguistic assimilation', *Soviet Studies*, vol. XXX, no. 1 (January 1979) pp. 76-98. See also Y. Bilinsky, 'The Incorporation of Western Ukraine and its Impact on Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine', in R. Szporluk (ed.), *The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR* (London: Collins & Harvill Press, 1979) pp. 180-228.
 74. L. Pliushch, *History's Carnival. A Dissident's Autobiography* (New York: 1977) pp. 177-8.
 75. See V. Boysenko, 'Ukrainian Opposition to the Soviet Regime, 1956-59', *Problems of the Peoples of the USSR*, 1960, pp. 24-30.
 76. *Ukrainian Review*, vol. VII, no. 1 (Spring 1960) p. 88; and vol. VII, no. 2 (Summer 1960) pp. 84-5. On members of the OUN-UPA in the Gulag see the memoirs of the Jewish dissident, M. Heifets, *Ukra'ins'ki syluety* (Munich: Suchasnist', 1984) pp. 175-204.
 77. Nationalist opposition in Western Ukraine was 'rooted heavily in traditional, rural Ukrainian values', which had been, on the whole, destroyed during the artificial famine of 1933 in eastern Ukraine. In eastern Ukraine dissent was more 'defensive, protective activism', calling for greater autonomy and sometimes linked to workers' protests. See J. Birch, 'The Nature and Sources of Dissidence in Ukraine' in Potichnyj, 1975, pp. 308-10. See also his *The Ukrainian Nationalist Movement in the USSR since 1956* (London: Ukrainian Information Service, 1971) p. 13.
 78. This rural and religious base was a handicap when the Ukrainian National Front attempted to expand beyond Galicia. Its contemporary counterpart is the political party known by its Ukrainian acronym DSU, Federation for State Independence of Ukrainian. Both the Ukrainian National Front and the DSU claimed to be following the tradition of the integral nationalists from the Bandera faction of the OUN.
 79. Nina Strokata, 'Ukrains'kyi natsionalnyi front, 1962-1975', *Suchasnist'*, June 1985, pp. 67-75.
 80. See John-Paul Himka, 'The Opposition in Ukraine', *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe*, vol. 5, no. 3-4 (Summer 1982) p. 36. *Literaturna Ukra'ina* (20 September 1978) linked Ukrainian dissidents to emigre nationalists, even accusing some of the dissidents of links to Western security services.
 81. See *Pravda*, 6 March 1971; *Pravda*, 12 July 1972; *Molod' Ukrainy*, 26 September 1984; *Radians'ka Ukra'ina*, 27 September 1984; *The Daily Telegraph*, 12 October 1984; *Sel'skaia zhizn'*, 17 January 1985; *Radians'ka Ukra'ina*, 7 July 1985; *Sil's'ki visti*, 13 August 1985; and *Radio Kyiv*, 23 August 1985.

82. *Ukrainian Weekly*, 30 October 1983. These continued into the early part of the Gorbachev era. See *Pravda Ukra'iny*, 13 January 1987; *Svoboda*, 22 October 1987; *TASS*, 9 February 1988; and *Radio Moscow*, 5 August 1988.
83. 'The Triumph of the Emigres in A. Motyl, *Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) pp. 132-45.
84. See articles in part II of Y. Boshyk, *Ukraine During World War II. History and Its Aftermath. A Symposium* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986) pp. 107-64. See also M. Warder, 'Collaborating with Communists to Prosecute Nazis', *Freedom at Issue*, May-June 1987, pp. 17-24; and E. Meyer, 'Efforts to Block Anti-Ukrainian Backlash ... Despite History of Mutual Mistrust', *The Jerusalem Post*, 20 March 1987.
85. Alexeyeva, pp. 29-30.
86. The trials are documented in Viacheslav Chornovil, *Lykha z rozumu (Portrety dvadtsiaty 'zlochyntsv)* (Paris: PIUF, 1968 and L'viv: Memorial, 1991). English translation as *The Chornovil Papers* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968). Chornovil was arrested in August 1967, and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. He later played a prominent role in the new national-democratic movement during the Gorbachev era. He was elected chairman of the L'viv *oblasf* council in March 1990 and came second in the presidential elections on 1 December 1991. On the arrests in Ukraine see also M. Browne (ed.), *Ferment in the Ukraine* (London: Macmillan, 1971); and R. Kupchyns'ki *Pohrom v Ukraini, 1972-1979* (n.p.: Suchasnist', 1980).
87. Glenny, pp. 85-7.
88. Alexeyeva, pp. 46 and 50. After 1974 secret instructions permitted locals only 25 per cent of places in universities in western Ukraine.
89. Nahaylo, in B. Krawchenko, 1983, p. 37. See also V. Swoboda, 'Cat and Mouse in the Ukraine', *Index on Censorship*, no. 1 (1973) pp. 81-9.
90. See Viktor Haynes, 'The Ukrainian Helsinki Group: A Postmortem', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2 (Winter 1983) pp. 102-13, which reviews all of the collections of UHG documents republished in the West.
91. Alexeyeva, pp. 51-2. The absence of support for worker's rights was criticised by Vasyli' Stus. See *Suchasnist'*, November 1983, pp. 89-90.
92. Nahaylo, in B. Krawchenko, 1983, p. 45.
93. Krawchenko, Winter 1983. See also Jaroslav Bilocerkowycz, *Soviet Ukrainian Dissent: a Case Study in Political Alienation* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988).
94. Railway lines used to transport Soviet troops to Hungary were reportedly blown up and thousands of Ukrainian servicemen deserted, some joining the Hungarian partisans. See *Observer*, 16 December 1956 and *Daily Express*, 17 December 1956.
95. See G. Hodnett and P. J. Potichnyj, *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis*, Occasional Paper no. 6 (Canberra: Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1970); and R. H. Anderson, 'Czech Ferment Spreads to the Ukraine', *New York Times*, 14 July 1968.
96. *Nasha kultura*, no. 3, 1963.

97. See three articles by R. Solchanyk, 'Poland's Impact Inside the USSR', *Soviet Analyst*, 9 September 1981; 'Nervous Neighbours: The Soviets and Solidarity', *Workers under Communism*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1982) pp. 16-16; and 'Poland and the Soviet West', in S. Enders Wimbush (ed.), *Soviet Nationalities in Strategic Perspective* (London: Croom Helm, 1985) pp. 158-80; and Taras Kuzio, 'Can Solidarity Spread to the USSR?', *Soviet Analyst*, 26 June 1985.
98. *Komunist*, no. 12, August 1984. See also *Soviet Nationality Survey*, vol. 1, nos 9-10 (September-October 1984) and the positive remarks about Solidarity by Vasyl' Stus written in the Gulag, *Suchasnist'* (November 1983) pp. 89-90. A *samizdat* text on Solidarity from the USSR was republished in the West as *Pol'skania revoliutsiia* (London: Overseas Publications Interchange, 1985).
99. See Stepan Hoverla [Ivan Hel], *The Facets of Culture* (London: Ukrainian Publishers, 1984 [Ukrainian-language edition] and London: Ukrainian Central Information Service, 1988 [English-language edition]). Ivan Hel became the chairman of the Committee in Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in 1987-90, and was elected deputy chairman of the L'viv *oblast'* council in March 1990.
100. Alexeyeva, pp. 53 and 55. See also R. Solchanyk, 'Trials of Human Rights Activists in the Ukraine', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 16/80 (8 January 1980).
101. 'More Helsinki Monitors Resentenced Prior to Their Scheduled Release', *News Release Communique, Human Rights Commission of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians*, 6 October 1982; and B. Nahaylo, 'Two More Ukrainian Human Rights Activists Face New Charges', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 435/84 (13 November 1984).
102. R. Solchanyk, 'Dissidents in Ukraine: The Pressure to Conform', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 61/78 (21 March 1978).
103. N. Svitlychna, 'The Death of Vasyl Stus', *Index on Censorship*, no. 2 (1986) pp. 34-6.
104. See 'Conditions in the USSR Perm Camp 36-1', *News Release Communique of the Human Rights Commission of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians*, 4 December 1986; and the full-page advertisement 'Will these men be on the summit agenda?', *New York Times*, 10 November 1985.
105. B. Nahaylo, 'The owls did it', *Index on Censorship*, no. 1 (1980) p. 64.
106. Nahaylo, in B. Krawchenko, 1983, p. 45.
107. Y. Suslensky, 'The Treatment of Activists of Russian and Non-Russian Nationality by the Soviet Regime: A Comparative Analysis'. *Nationalities Papers*, vol. XI, no. 2 (Summer 1983) p. 237. See also S. P. de Boer, E. J. Driessen and H. L. Verhaar, *Biographical Dictionary of Dissidents in the Soviet Union, 1956-1975* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), which lists 415 Ukrainian dissidents (excluding Jews, Tatars and Baptists from Ukraine, who are normally included in figures calculated in republican dissent). Another study compiled a list of 975 Ukrainian dissidents. See B. Krawchenko and J. Carter, 'A Statistical Profile of Dissidents in Ukraine before 1972', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2 (Winter 1983) pp. 85-8.
108. I. Korsun, 'The Political Opposition in Ukraine', *Meta*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1978) p. 6.

109. *Narodna hazeta*, no. 18 (December 1991).
110. Peter Reddaway, 'Dissent in the Soviet Union', *Problems of Communism*, vol. XXXII, no. 6 (November-December 1983) pp. 12 and 15.
111. See the texts by the Ukrainian National-Liberation Movement (1979) and Ukrainian Patriotic Movement (1980) reprinted in Taras Hunchak and R. Solchanyk (eds), *Ukrains'ka suspil'no-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti* (New York: Suchasnist', 1983) pp. 370-8. See also *Documents of the Ukrainian Patriotic Movement. Supplement to the Herald of Repression in the Ukraine* (External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, 1980). A document signed by 'Ukrai'ns'ki Patrioty' was reprinted in *Shliakh peremohy* 3 February 1985.
112. See Radio Liberty, 'Soviet Area and Audience Opinion Research', SBN 4-84, September 1984.
113. Radio Liberty, *Arkhiv samizdata*, no. 4771. See also *Toronto Sun*, 8 June 1984; *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 9 January 1983; and *Ukrains'ke slovo*, 4 November 1984.
114. *Sovetskaia kultura*, 8 September 1984.
115. Radio Liberty, *Arkhiv samizdata*, no. 5419.
116. *Shliakh peremohy*, 26 June 1988. Zenon Krasivskyi, a leading member of both the Ukrainian National Front and DSU was also reported after his death in September 1991 to have been the head of the underground OUN in Ukraine. See *Shliakh peremohy*, 6 October 1991.
117. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Foreign Report*, 23 May 1985.
118. The figure of 4000 functioning Russian Orthodox Churches in Ukraine is provided by *Radians'ka Ukrdina* (11 March 1988) out of a total of 6794 Russian Orthodox communities in the USSR in 1986 (*Nauka i religiiia*, no. 11, 1988). The single largest Russian Orthodox eparchy, with over 1000 Churches, was L'viv-Ternopil'. See *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia* (no. 4, 1987).
119. See Vasyl Markus, *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine after 1945* (Cambridge: Ukrainian Studies Fund, 1985); *Soviet Persecution of Religion in Ukraine* (Toronto: World Congress of Free Ukrainians, 1976); and the two volumes on the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox Churches: *Martyrolohiia Ukrainykykh tserkov, dokumenty, materialy, khrystyianskyi samvydav Ukrainy*, O. Zinkevych and O. Voronyn, (eds), vol. 1; and O. Zinkevych and Rev. T. R. Lonchyna (ed.), vol. 2 (Baltimore, Md.: Smoloskyp Publishers, 1987 and 1985). A first-hand account of Soviet actions against the Ukrainian Catholic Church is given in Rev. Dr. I. Hrynioch, 'The Destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Soviet Union', *Prologue Quarterly*, vol. IV, nos 1-2 (1960) pp. 5-51. For an account of the ties between the Russian Orthodox Church and Stalin in destroying the Ukrainian Catholic Church see I. Hvat, 'The Moscow Patriarchate and the Liquidation of the Eastern-rite Catholic Church in Ukraine', *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 13, no. 2 (Summer 1985) pp. 182-8.
120. Bohdan Bociurkiw, 'Soviet Religious Policy in Ukraine in Historical Perspective' in Michael Pap (ed.), *Russian Empire: Some Aspects of Tsarist and Soviet Colonial Practices* (Cleveland: Institute for Soviet and East European Studies, John Carroll University and Ukrainian Historical Association, 1985) pp. 95-112.

121. H. L. Biddulph, 'Religious Participation of Youth in the USSR', *Soviet Studies*, vol. XXXI, no. 3 (July 1979) p. 423.
122. See B. R. Bociurkow, 'The Catacomb Church: Ukrainian Greek Catholics in the USSR', *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1977) pp. 4-12.
123. Frank Sysyn, 'The Ukrainian Orthodox Question in the USSR', *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 11, no. 3 (Winter 1983) pp. 251-63.
124. R. P. Moroziuk, 'Antireligious Propaganda in Ukraine' in M. S. Pap (ed.), pp. 113-30.
125. See L. J. Wollemborg, 'John Paul II and Ukrainian Catholics', *Freedom at Issue* (May/June 1988) pp. 28-30.
126. I. Hvat, 'The Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Vatican and the Soviet Union during the Pontificate of Pope John Paul II', *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 11, no. 3 (Winter 1983) pp. 264-79.
127. J. Bilocerkowycz, 1988, pp. 93-8. See also Stephen Courtier, 'Ukrainian Catholics in the Catacombs', *Soviet Analyst*, 9 March 1983.
128. The close links already documented between the Ukrainian National Front (the ideological successor to the OUN in Ukraine) and the Ukrainian Catholic Church were openly admitted to in the eulogy on the 75th birthday of the deceased leader of the OUN-Bandera faction Iaroslav Stetsko, who was credited with having organised 'close joint activities' between the Ukrainian Catholic Church and 'the national-liberation underground'. See *Shliakhperemohy*, 25 January 1987.
129. Iosyf Terelia settled in Toronto, Canada, where he launched the journal *Khrest*.
130. See Bohdan Gidwitz, 'Labor Unrest in the Soviet Union', *Problems of Communism*, vol. XXXI, no. 6 (November-December 1982) pp. 25-42; and ch. 18, 'The Movement for Social and Economic Justice', in L. Alexeyeva, 1985, pp. 401-27.
131. M. Holubenko, 'The Soviet Working Class: Discontent and Opposition', *Critique*, no. 4 (1975) p. 8. See also T. Kuzio, 'Workers' Opposition in Ukraine', *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe*, vol. 5, nos 5-6 (1982-3) pp. 30-1.
132. *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. IX, no. 4 (Winter 1962) p. 85; and 'The Massacre of Workers at Novocherkas'k', *The Ukrainian Review*, vol. XXXII, no. 2 (Summer 1984) pp. 79-85.
133. Kelvin Klose, *Russia and the Russians. Inside the Closed Society* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984) p. 9. The two original articles were printed in the *Financial Times*, 9 January 1981, and the *Guardian*, 22 February 1981.
134. Klose, p. 43.
135. M. Pohyba, 'Capitalist Russia versus the workers', *Observer*, 16 August 1981.
136. Solchanyk, 'Ukrainian Dissidents Call for Free Trade Unions', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 338/80 (18 September 1980) and Radio Liberty, *Arkhiv samizdata*, no. 4071.
137. Klose, p. 45. One author found that, apart from the Soviet West (including Ukraine), Soviet workers were lukewarm and even hostile towards Solidarity. See E. Teague, *Solidarity and the Soviet Worker* (London: Croom Helm, 1988). The *Chronicle of the Ukrainian*

Catholic Church includes a letter to Lech Walesa from Iosyf Terelia expressing support for Solidarity. See Radio Liberty, *Arkhiv samizdata*, no. 5373.

138. R. Solchanyk, 'Labor Problems in the Ukraine', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 389/81 (29 September 1981).
139. V. Haynes and Olga Semyonova (eds), *Workers Against the Gulag. The New Opposition in the Soviet Union* (London: Pluto Press, 1979).
140. The Donbas miners had an all-Union perspective on issues well into the Gorbachev era, often looking to Moscow and their fellow Russian miners as closer allies in the 1989-90 strikes and organisation of an independent miners' union, than Ukrainian opposition groups or Kyiv. See Chapters 6-7.
141. B. Nahaylo, 'The Death of Soviet Workers' Rights Activist Alexei Nikitin', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 166/84 (25 April 1984).
142. Alexeyeva, p. 65. See also M. Corti, 'Repression of a Dissident Miner', *Workers under Communism*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1982) pp. 27-9.
143. On the immediate pre-Gorbachev era in Ukraine see two articles by B. Nahaylo, 'Ukraine: Moscow's Recalcitrant Republic', *Soviet Analyst*, 17 August 1983; and 'Moscow's Ukraine Predicament', *The Wall Street Journal*, 31 October 1984.
144. *Narodna hazeta*, no. 18 (December 1991).