

5 Consolidation (1988-9)

THE VIEW FROM THE CENTRE

By 1988-9 the nationality question had become increasingly acute in the Soviet Union, but Gorbachev still refused to consider a new union treaty or the transformation of the USSR into a confederation of sovereign states (a demand raised earlier by the non-Russians, but not backed by Gorbachev until after the August 1991 attempted putsch). This period saw the growth of new Popular Fronts throughout the non-Russian republics, criticism of bilingualism, demands for a return to 'Leninist nationality policy', complaints about the role of the Russian 'elder brother' and condemnation of the non-voluntary nature of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev therefore belatedly conceded: 'we must get down to some very substantive work on nationalities policy. Among all avenues, both in theory and practice.'¹ In the traditional way of Soviet leaders, Gorbachev blamed current problems on his predecessors, specifically the 'era of stagnation'. But he was still short of new ideas. Indeed, Gorbachev's insensitivity to the nationality question could be seen in the fact that the number of Russians within the central organs of Soviet power increased during the latter part of his term in office.²

Although Gorbachev claimed that, whereas there had been notable achievements in Soviet nationalities policies there were also 'obvious shortfalls, omissions and difficult connections with the unresolved nature of specific socio-economic issues'. But, he sincerely believed that the introduction of the rule of law, economic sovereignty and the creation of the Congress of Peoples Deputies would defuse the nationality question.

At the 19th Conference of the CPSU the resolution on nationality questions outlined the following facts and policy recommendations:³

- the existence of a new community of the Soviet people;
- the correctness of 'Leninist nationality policies', as well as certain 'violations in legality';
- support for 'full-blooded and dynamic unity within national diversity';

- a proposal to create a new body for nationalities within the Supreme Soviet;
- the CPSU as the 'cementing force behind nationalities';
- the armed forces were a 'genuine school of internationalism'.

THE VIEW FROM UKRAINE

The period in Ukraine from the end of 1988 until the autumn of 1989 was characterised by the following features:

- alliance building: official cultural organisations helped launch a popular front initiative with dissidents, as middle-ranking elements in the *apparatus* sought to build bridges with the 'informals';
- the opposition was broadened by the rise of an unofficial workers' movement;
- a myriad of informal groups attempted to mobilise society in the ail-Union election campaign of March 1989;
- campaigns were conducted to legalise the Uniate Church and the Ukraine Autocephalous Orthodox Church;
- the CPU was confronted with an increasing challenge to its monopoly over public life.

POPULAR FRONT

After 10 000 had attended the Kyiv demonstration on 13 November 1988 organised by *Hromada*, the Green World Association and various writers, the Kyiv branch of the Writers' Union of Ukraine (WUU) and the Taras Shevchenko Institute of Literature joined forces to form an initiative committee for the launch of a Ukrainian popular front. Whereas in western Ukraine the dissident UHU was playing an important role in the organisation of similar groups and demonstrations, in Kyiv and eastern Ukraine (where the UHU was weaker) official bodies, such as the Writers' Union, played a larger role.

Pavlo Movchan and Viktor Teren originally proposed the idea on 1 November at a meeting of the Party organisation of the Kyiv branch of the Writers' Union.⁴ A joint plenum of cultural unions in mid-November resolved to draft a programme. The working group consisted of 20 writers, headed by Ivan Drach. The WUU was immediately accused, however, of trying to form an alternative to the CPU,

and threatening to make those who did not speak Ukrainian 'second-class citizens'.⁵

At a plenum of the WUU in December 1988 it was resolved to instruct the initiative group to 'draw up a draft of programme for a Ukrainian Popular Movement in Support of Restructuring'.⁶ Leading *literati* would now take the lead, with dissident groups such as the UHU helping in the background with organisational matters. A meeting of supporters of a popular front on 4 December was attended by informal groups (such as the UHU, Ukrainian Language Society, Green World Association and Memorial) and writers.

On 31 January 1989 the initiative group presented the draft programme to the plenum of the WUU. The CPU-dominated press demanded that they insert a clause supporting the 'leading role' of the CPSU. Leonid Kravchuk, then ideological secretary of the CPU, claimed a popular front was unnecessary, as the Communist Party itself was undertaking *perestroika*, and attacked the programme in the media as 'anti-constitutional'. CPU members meanwhile were advised not to join the front.⁷

The CPU attempted in every conceivable manner to prevent the publication of the draft programme of the Popular Movement (*Rukh*). Ivan Drach even threatened to publish it in *samizdat* if it was not published in an official newspaper. On 13 February, leading writers went to Moscow to appeal to Mikhail Gorbachev, who was forced to make an unscheduled visit to Ukraine on 19 February. The draft programme was eventually published on 16 February in *Literaturna Ukraina*, the weekly organ of the WUU, the only newspaper which dared to print it.

Although it is not clear if Gorbachev gave the go-ahead to publish the draft programme, his remarks during his visit to Kyiv attacking Ukrainian nationalism meant that the CPU felt its stance vindicated and proceeded to launch an all-out media campaign against *Rukh*. Many unofficial activists were arrested for the duration of Gorbachev's visit.⁸ Gorbachev may have been heartened after seeing the draft *Rukh* programme, which supported the continued leading role of the CPU/CPSU in society, but nevertheless his concern at developments in Ukraine made him maintain Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi in power until September, four years into his programme of democratisation, *glasnost'* and *perestroika*.

The launch of *Rukh* was welcomed by the main unofficial group, the UHU. In an appeal it stated: 'It is only in Ukraine that the Party has preserved in full with complete inviolability the Stalinist terrorist

method of propaganda'. After the media campaign against the UHU and the Culturological Club, the Popular Movement was next in line. The UHU claimed that 'the democratic initiative of the Ukrainian patriotic intelligentsia' had been answered by 'the old Stalinist method of demoralising society and reducing to nothing the constitutional right to freedom of thought, speech and independent action'.⁹

The draft programme of *Rukh* called for a front of independent groups and the reformist wing of the CPU opposed to the leadership of the party. *Rukh* was a

demonstration of support for revolutionary restructuring set into motion in our country by the Party. It represents a new coalition of Communists and non-Party members united in a new struggle for a fundamental social renewal in all spheres of public, governmental and economic life in the Ukrainian SSR.

The programme emphasised a continuing commitment to left-liberal ideas, such as 'humanity, peace and progress'. *Rukh* 'recognised the leading role of the Party in a socialist society. The Movement is a unifying link between the programme of restructuring proposed by the Party and the initiative of the broad masses of the people'.¹⁰

Rukh would assist the CPSU in broadening democratisation. In reality, however, *Rukh* dominated the public debate, keeping the CPU on the defensive, forcing it to move somewhat in the direction of accommodating public opinion. *Rukh* promised to expose all attempts at slowing down democratisation, to improve the environment, to raise living standards, to ensure the establishment of a law-based society and to campaign for republican sovereignty. The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine should control Ukrainian resources 'along the lines of the principles formulated by Lenin on the national question'. The draft programme included sections dealing with sovereignty, human and national rights, social justice, the economy, environment, national question and language policy.

The leadership structure of the CPU (as described in Chapter 3), however, remained impervious to such appeals so long as Shcherbytskyi was at the helm, and hopes for significant co-operation between the opposition and reform-reminded communists had to be repeatedly postponed until at least the spring of 1990. Hence, a growing number of *Rukh* members became increasingly hostile to the CPU, although many CPU members ignored Leonid Kravchuk's original advice against the CPU joining *Rukh*, and links did begin to develop.

COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN AGAINST *RUKH*

After the publication of the draft programme there followed a media campaign orchestrated by the CPU to discredit it. The editor of *Vechimii Kyiv*, for example, which at that time had a daily circulation in Russian nearly three times higher than that in Ukrainian, stated that two-thirds of the thousands of letters his newspaper had received by the summer were positively inclined towards the draft programme.¹¹ One of the 3000 letters that *Literaturna Ukraina* - the newspaper which had published the draft programme - claimed to have received by early March 1989 complained that while all the other newspapers had refused to publish the draft programme they nevertheless began a vicious campaign against it. 'How can one link this to democracy and *glasnost*?' the author asked.¹²

The newspapers *Radians'ka Ukraina*, *Pravda Ukra'iny* and *Robotnycha hazeta* were the most virulent in their attacks upon *Rukh*.¹³ Borys Oliinyk, head of the Ukrainian Cultural Fund, joined in the attack on the draft programme.¹⁴ *Radians'ka Ukraina* threatened that 'political realities must not be disregarded. We are making history and any haste is inopportune.'¹⁵ The draft programme contained 'too much detail' and 'was worked out without the participation of specialists'. It included a 'great deal of spontaneity and dilettantism'. There was a lack of input from workers, whereas the author's goal was to create a structure 'based on confrontational positions'. 'The question that arises is this: is the movement to be a socialist and internationalist structure or not?'

High-ranking members of the Academy of Sciences wrote in *Pravda Ukra'iny* that, as in the Baltic republics, 'their organisation cannot boast of a real contribution to practical achievements in restructuring. But the division along national lines, mutual suspicions and distrust, on the other hand, run quite deep'.¹⁶ There was nothing new, the authors alleged, compared with the documents already drawn up by the CPSU. 'The entire experience of restructuring has clearly shown that in its role as a generator of restructuring ideas and guarantor of their implementation, the party is irreplaceable,' they claimed. The draft programme of *Rukh* restricted the CPSU to being merely a 'generator of ideas'. 'How do the draft's authors conceive of co-operating with the CPSU while bypassing the republic's party organisation?' The call to Ukrainise the education system conflicted with the interests of the '20 million Russian-language speakers' living in Ukraine.

Pravda Ukra'iny criticised the leaders of *Rukh* for remaining in the CPU as a violation of party discipline: 'they have to remember that

ideology and organisational unity are an inviolable law in our Party's life, that any manifestation of factionalism and grouping is incompatible with adherence to the Marxist-Leninist Party'.¹⁷ Kravchuk asked how leaders of *Rukh* could remain members of the CPU when they regularly criticised it.¹⁸

The writers were apparently surprised and caught off guard by the fury of the media campaign, which accused them of fomenting civil war, nationalism and separatism and trying to establish an opposition political party.¹⁹ Despite the continuing Ukrainian belief that Moscow and Gorbachev were more progressive and sympathetic to *Rukh* than was the conservative CPU, *Pravda* joined the chorus of attacks by claiming *Rukh* was 'standing above the organs of Soviet power and basically in opposition to the CPSU'.²⁰ A meeting in April of the Kyiv branch of the WUU passed a message to the central committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine from Dmytro Pavlychko, 'that our tasks are the same: to accelerate *perestroika*'.ⁿ But at that stage the Communist Party remained interested only in initiatives put forward by itself from above, and not others from below.

The CPU continually claimed that informal groups were busy influencing *Rukh* in a negative manner, especially in western Ukraine where the UHU was said to be especially influential in *Rukh*. *Rukh* was allegedly a vehicle for groups such as the UHU with 'no mass following' to expand their adherents.²²

In July the Kyiv *oblast* branch of *Rukh* held its conference, and elected the philosopher Myroslav Popovych as its leader. Ivan Drach claimed that *Rukh* already had 200 local groups with 200 000 members in the *oblast*, despite the fact that 'the respective ideological workers have launched an offensive against it'. The media was accusing *Rukh* of being 'extremists', at which Petro Osadchuk quoted the dictionary definition of 'extremists' as a term usually applied 'by reactionaries and reformers to revolutionaries'.²³

OPPOSITION LEAGUES AND FRONTS

At this stage of development, many oppositional forces in Ukraine were still prepared to act within an all-Union context. Ukrainian representatives attended the founding conference in Moscow of the Democratic Union opposition party in May 1988. One of the demands raised at this conference was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the areas occupied after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, including western

Ukraine. Iurii Skubko, a Ukrainian member of the Moscow-based *samizdat* journal *Tochka zrennia* and a leading Democratic Union activist, then reported that branches had been established in Kyiv, L'viv and Sumy in Ukraine.²⁴ Ukrainian representatives also attended the second Democratic Union congress in Riga between 26 and 29 January 1989.²⁵

The Ukrainian Democratic Union (UDU) planned to hold its first founding congress on the weekend of 22/23 January 1989 in Kyiv, the anniversary of the declaration of Ukrainian independence in 1918, but the authorities prevented the congress from taking place.²⁶ In December 1988 a leading member of the UDU, Leonid Miliavskiy, claimed that UDU groups already existed in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Kharkiv and Rivne with a total of 100 members. They had decided quite early to establish a separate organisation, and not be merely a regional branch of the Russian Democratic Union. In Miliavskiy's view, the most preferable option for Ukraine would be outright state independence. When asked about the difference between it and the UDU, Miliavskiy replied:

Firstly, we formed our group before the Helsinki Union. So there is no competition. Secondly, we are purely political - an opposition political organisation. It is a federation of human rights groups to which members of the Communist Party and members of the UDU can belong. They have a wider programme, like the Estonian popular front or the Latvian one. It is really an unofficial popular-front because an official one cannot, as yet, be recognised.

We have a purely political programme which is ideologically motivated. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union does not address itself to the Marxist Leninist question, nor to the questions of socialism or capitalism.²⁷

The UDU was composed of three factions - liberal democratic, Christian democratic and social democratic - in the same manner as the Russian Democratic Union.²⁸ In February 1989 the UDU changed its name to the Ukrainian People's Democratic League (UPDL) in order to break completely with the Russian Democratic Union. The programmes of both the UDU and UPDL were similar, although the UPDL adopted a new policy of not allowing separate factions. The UPDL programme, adopted by the Kyiv regional branch of the organisation on 12 February 1989, declared that it was a 'political organisation that united people of different views and beliefs, who stand for

the general principles of democracy, humanism and freedom and aims to promote the political, economic and spiritual revival of Ukraine'.²⁹

Therefore, the UPDL represented yet another political club, seeking to provide a common shelter for the various informal groups, although it had already moved on to more radical demands. The UPDL planned to develop and propagate alternative programmes, participate in election campaigns, form new branches, publish UPDL newspapers, journals and leaflets, conduct meetings and discussions, hold referenda and opinion polls, strikes and pickets. At the large 22 May 1989 meeting to honour Taras Shevchenko's 175th anniversary in Kyiv members of the UPDL were seen holding placards reading 'Long Live a United, Independent Ukraine!'

The first issue of the UPDL's *Bulletin I (Documents)* in July 1989 included the programme of the League, ratified at the inaugural congress held in June in Riga, an 'Appeal to the Citizens of Ukraine' and 'Resolutions of the fiftieth anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact', as well as condemning attempts by the authorities to incite inter-ethnic hatred in Ukraine. In late July 1989, the UPDL issued leaflets in support of the striking miners and organised a hunger strike in front of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine in protest at their refusal to introduce legislation on Ukrainian national symbols.³⁰

The Ukrainian Christian Democratic Front (UCDF) was formed in November 1988 in Ivano-Frankivs'k *oblast*, western Ukraine.³¹ The UCDF was led by two former political prisoners, Vasyl and Petro Sichko. Petro Sichko had served a long sentence for his membership of the Ukrainian nationalist underground during the 1940s, and his entire family had been deported to Siberia. Vasyl Sichko studied journalism at Kyiv University, but was expelled for publishing a *samizdat* journal in the early 1970s. After organising a requiem service on the grave of the young composer Volodymyr Ivasiuk, allegedly murdered by the KGB in 1979, he was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

The UCDF hoped to capitalise upon the greater degree of national consciousness, stronger bonds with western Europe and greater proportion of believers to launch a Ukrainian Christian Democratic movement in the Catholic *oblasts* of Galicia (L'viv, Ivano-Frankivs'k, Transcarpathia and Ternopil'), that would be comparable to the Christian Social Union (CSU) in Bavaria. Despite indications of isolated pockets of UCDF support beyond western Ukraine in cities such as Odesa, most UCDF sympathisers were Ukrainian Catholics.³²

The first inaugural meeting of the UCDF was held in L'viv in a private residence on 13 January 1989, where a programme and statute

were ratified.³³ The room was decorated with a large trident and the inscription:

God hear our pleas. Misfortune is destroying our land. The strength of the nation lies in unity, God grant us unity! God remove the shackles from us, do not let us die in captivity. Send Ukraine her freedom, grant her happiness and good fortune.

The L'viv branch of the UCDF was the most active, organising concerts of formerly banned patriotic songs and poetry, which were attended by several thousand people. Repression against this radical informal group began almost immediately after the UCDF was launched. The inaugural meeting was interrupted for one hour by the militia and KGB, who conducted a search and took the names and addresses of delegates, preventing a prayer service from taking place. However, a central council was elected, consisting of Vasył Sichko (chairman), Lidiia Chekalska (secretary) and 11 others.

The UCDF's emphasis on raising the national consciousness of the young led them to relaunch *Plast*, the pre-war Ukrainian scout organisation, with Taras Kartyn as its head. The meeting resolved to renew the *Prosvita* (Enlightenment) Society, which had fostered literacy and national consciousness prior to the Soviet occupation of western Ukraine, and Iaroslav Kormeliuk was elected its head. Funds had already been launched to help remaining Ukrainian prisoners of conscience and victims of the Armenian earthquake. Other resolutions adopted included calls for the erection of a monument to the late Ukrainian Catholic Metropolitan Andrii Sheptytskyi and for official commemoration of 22 January (the date of the 1918 declaration of independence) as an annual national holiday. A petition to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine demanding official registration of the UCDF was given to the KGB and central committee of the CPU for scrutiny. The registration document was even sent to Moscow and then returned to Ivano-Frankivs'k *oblast*. Despite the fact the UCDF did not contravene Soviet law and worked openly, its registration was refused.

The UCDF's draft programme believed that the Communist Party was incapable of solving Ukraine's and society's problems, which only the full recognition and adoption of religious values would allow. It called for a halt to the persecution of all Christian denominations in Ukraine, an end to the study of atheism in schools, conscientious objection on religious grounds and a multi-party system and mixed economy. Other areas which the UCDF programme dealt with were

national symbols, rehabilitation of repressed individuals in culture, ecology and nuclear power. The programme was wider and more radical than the other main informal groups active at that time, including the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU). Although both Vasyl and Petro Sichko were originally also members of the UHU, they resigned in the spring of 1989, after disagreeing with the more moderate policies propagated by the UHU.³⁴

By the summer of 1989 the UCDF claimed to have 1000 members in western Ukraine, the majority belonging to the younger, more radical, generation. The UCDF developed a more politicised and confrontational attitude towards the authorities than the Committee in Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, believing, unlike the latter, that the Church should be used as a vehicle for politicising believers.

In the autumn of 1989 the UCDF launched the Ukrainian Christian Youth Association, a body aimed primarily at young people between the ages of 16 and 30, headed by Ivan Loi from L'viv.³⁵ (The *Plast* scout organisation would now be concerned mainly with educational matters with children below the age of 16.) The Association's first statement appealed 'to all patriotic organisations to take an active role in an alternative to totalitarian methods of educating the youth and the rebirth of youth *Plast* traditions and camps, where youngsters could learn their native history, culture and religion, and undergo a beneficial, ethical educational course'.

In a programmatical document entitled 'What to do next?' (an obvious reply to Lukianenko's programme of a similar name), dated May 1989 and presented to the sixth conference of non-Russian national democratic movements in Estonia, Vasyl Sichko proposed a new alliance between the Ukrainian Catholic Church and national-democratic groups, like the UCDF, which had proved successful in the earlier part of this century in Galicia, and gave his reasons for criticism of the less radical UHU. In his view, Gorbachev's reforms and his so-called policies of 'democratisation' were a lie, which the West had foolishly been hoodwinked into believing; the USSR was nothing more than a 'Russian empire', an empire which was 'despotic', 'ill', 'based on falsehoods' and in 'economic ruins'. The reforms introduced by Gorbachev would merely turn the USSR into a law-based, but still despotic, state.³⁶

In Sichko's view, the UCDF was the first organisation to stand for the right to full state independence for Ukraine (this was incorrect as the UPDL also stood for secession). The UCDF was therefore

attacked not only by the Party, but also by the 'loyal opposition' - members of the UHU who were 'collaborationists' and 'confederalists'.

In an open letter to the Christian Democratic International in October 1989, the UCDF complained of official repression ever since the launch of the organisation. The authorities, refusing to register the UCDF, demanded that it disband of its own accord. The open letter then went on to give numerous examples of repression by the KGB and militia conducted against the UCDF, which might be taken as typical of the authorities' actions in general; disrupting meetings, press attacks on them as 'extremists' and 'terrorists', refusal to allow demonstrations, repeated rearrest on 10- and 15-day terms, beatings by unknown assailants, tapping of telephone lines and censorship of mail, dismissal from work and physical deportation to prevent attendance at meetings.³⁷

RELIGION

The revival of religion in Ukraine during 1989 gathered momentum outside Galicia. In January 1989 a lecturer at Kyiv State University's Department of the History and Theory of Atheism, Vladimir Tencher, said, 'As seen by much of our youth, atheism has simply become old-fashioned. It is the view of grandfathers and grandmothers.'³⁸ In February 1989, the Initiative Committee in Support of a Revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was launched in Kyiv, with support from unofficial groups.³⁹ (The Ukrainian Autocephalous [or Independent] Orthodox Church had been relaunched after the Bolshevik revolution, but was liquidated in 1930.)⁴⁰

The revival of the UAOC, backed by informal groups such as *Rukh*, UPDL and UHU, in some ways posed more of a threat to the Russian Orthodox Church than the Uniate Church, because of the intimate connection between the unity of the Russian Orthodox Church and the unity of the Soviet state. In 1988 of the 6893 functioning ROC churches in the USSR, 4000 were located in Ukraine, half of them in the western region of the republic (the RSFSR boasted only 2000 churches). Two-thirds of new churches opened under Gorbachev were in Ukraine, while three-quarters of all vocations to the priesthood were from Ukraine.

Therefore, a church schism in Ukraine was a 'mortal danger' to the ROC, and it remained hostile towards both the UAOC and UCC.⁴¹ In May, Metropolitan Filaret, then a high-ranking figure in the ROC and

head of the ROC exarchate in Ukraine, said that the UAOC was the 'work of politicians, not church people, who want to exploit it with the aim of taking Ukrainian believers out of the Russian Orthodox Church. But our church, as one knows from history, does everything to unite peoples. That is why she is against autocephaly.'⁴²

The Committee for the revival of the UAOC exerted great pressure upon the Russian Orthodox Church to accommodate Ukrainian aspirations in part at least. Consequently, the ROC introduced some cosmetic changes. Priests were allowed to hold services in Ukrainian and no longer in old Church Slavonic (which is closer to Russian). The print-run of *Pravoslavnyi visnyk*, the organ of the Ukrainian exarchate, was increased, and the Odesa seminary was allowed to give instruction in the Ukrainian language.

The Russian Orthodox Church had never restricted itself solely to Russian believers and had acted as an imperial arm of both the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. Even some Russian Orthodox believers in Ukraine and the RSFSR had begun to move towards the emigre ROC because of the subservience of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Communist Party.⁴³

The UAOC Committee initially received strong encouragement from the UHU and the Culturological Club. The UHU press service published the appeal of the UAOC Initiative Committee to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, All-Union Supreme Soviet and International Christian Community as release number 68. Many Culturological Club activists, such as Serhii Naboka, Oles Shevchenko and Ievhen Sverstiuk, were active supporters of the UAOC and had dared to hold unofficial celebrations of the millenium of East Slavic Christianity in Kyiv in the summer of 1988, when the official celebrations were held in Moscow.

The appeal claimed that the UAOC's historical roots lay in the Ukrainian Orthodoxy usurped by the ROC in 1685. It also eulogised the Church's revival in the 1920s, when 5000 parishes and 4000 priests had been registered in Ukraine. 'But the Russian Orthodox Church does not recognise the very fact of the existence of the UAOC and is incapable of satisfying the religious needs of Ukrainian believers.' The UAOC Committee would therefore petition legislative bodies in the attempt to have UAOC religious communities registered.

Initial contacts between the UAOC and the Ukrainian Catholic Church were friendly, as evidenced by the joint service by Orthodox and Catholics in L'viv on the 175th anniversary of Shevchenko's birth on 26 February 1989. The wholesale collapse of the ROC in western

Ukraine towards the end of 1989, though, faced many priests with a stark choice - either to go over to the Ukrainian Catholic Church, or, if they wish to uphold 'Orthodoxy', to move into the UAOC. Therefore in Galicia, which had no UAOC tradition, a sizeable number of former ROC priests, particularly in the countryside, joined the UAOC; this would later lead to friction over the allocation of buildings (although technically all Church property in the USSR belonged to the state). Eastern and southern Ukraine, which was more Russian-speaking and contained a proportionately smaller number of believers, remained broadly loyal to the ROC, whereas Central Ukraine was a mixture of all Churches: Orthodox, Uniate and even Protestant. Here, the UAOC's strength was concentrated in the urban areas, where the radical intelligentsia were to be found.

Consequently, the revival of the UAOC throughout 1989 took place primarily in western Ukraine. A young leading UAOC priest, Iurii Boiko, admitted, 'You know it's quite a complicated task to restore the UAOC in eastern Ukraine. Particularly here in Kyiv we have much scarcer grounds to revive the UAOC than in western Ukraine'.⁴⁴ The security services and CPU were only too happy to help the UAOC establish itself in western Ukraine - while, at the same time, hindering its revival in eastern Ukraine. Father Boiko commented, 'The Russian Orthodox Church considers the UAOC non-existent canonically, therefore any dialogue with us is out of the question.' He quoted a reformist, former ROC prisoner of conscience, Father Iakurin, who had told him that he objected to Ukrainian autocephaly because it would result in the ROC being virtually extinguished in Ukraine.

In August 1989, the parish and priest of the Church of SS Peter and Paul in L'viv seceded from the ROC and became the first UAOC parish (and Metropolitan see) in Ukraine. They called upon the Ukrainian people to support the revival of an Orthodox Church in Ukraine independent of Moscow. They proposed that new religious communities should attempt to gain registration as UAOC, that parishes adopt resolutions stating their refusal to obey the hierarchy of the ROC and to mention Patriarch Demetrius I of Constantinople - not Patriarch Pimen - in their sermons. In statements to the Council for Religious Affairs they called the ROC in Ukraine 'none other than an organ of the spiritual enslavement of the Godfearing Ukrainian nation'.⁴⁵ UANTI quickly voiced its support for the emerging UAOC and Mykhailo Osadchyi offered to work on a UAOC information service, calling for the establishment of a Ukrainian patriarchate.

In May 1989 the campaign for the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church gathered momentum when three bishops and three priests travelled to Moscow to meet Supreme Soviet officials. In protest at their refusal to meet them, all six began a hunger strike, their ranks being later swelled by the arrival of new priests and lay activists from Ukraine. Boris Yeltsin, Oles Honchar and Rostyslav Bratun were persuaded to try to raise the question of the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Congress of People's Deputies.⁴⁶ Roman Fedoriv, editor of the L'viv-based journal *Zhovten'* (since 1990 *Dzvin*) called for the legalisation of both the Ukrainian Catholic and Autocephalous Orthodox Churches at the Congress. On 18 June over 150 000 Ukrainian Catholics throughout western Ukraine held prayer services in response to Cardinal Myroslav Liubachivskyi's call for a worldwide vigil for Ukrainian religious freedom.⁴⁷

ALL-UNION ELECTIONS

During the second stage of the evolution of the opposition in Ukraine the elections to the all-Union Congress of People's Deputies in March 1989 made an important contribution to the mobilisation of public opinion and informal groups. These were, after all, the first semi-free elections in the USSR since the Bolshevik revolution, although the election law compiled and controlled by a state machinery still in the hands of the CPSU reserved one-third of the seats for CPSU organisations, and the nomination of candidates was strictly controlled.

Consequently, on 18 December 1988 the Co-ordinating Committee of the UHU, one of the few informal groups active at that stage, called for a boycott of the elections: 'The Ukrainian Helsinki Union, which if democratic elections were held even today would have realistic chances of victory in a string of electoral districts, is deprived of such a possibility by the new undemocratic laws.'

The UHU believed that their participation would benefit 'only the reactionary forces of society, helping them to create an illusion of legality'. They therefore recommended that the UHU not put forward candidates and not participate in them, that election cards be cancelled and for UHU members to explain their position to the electorate. (Eventually, the UHU supported certain candidates such as Rostyslav Bratun, who endorsed its key policies, for all-Union laws to apply only after ratification by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, for

Ukrainian to be the state language, for republican self-financing and sovereignty, and for the closure of nuclear power stations.)⁴⁸

The L'viv *oblast* branch of the UHU attacked the 'naive hope that the election to the so-called Congress of People's Deputies of several more liberal deputies can in some way influence the composition of the Supreme Soviet, the composition and policies of the future government'. Participation would merely 'help the CPU receive a mandate to govern'. They therefore recommended that voters write 'BOYCOTT' across the ballot card, write a statement to this effect to the district election authorities or give the ballot card to the UHU.⁴⁹

Popular candidates, such as Bratun and Ivan Drach in L'viv and Alia Iaroshynska in Zhytomyr, were subjected to a dirty tricks campaign by the CPU to prevent their nomination. Despite Bratun receiving 13 000 signatures on a petition, the backing of work collectives and support of all informal groups (including national minority societies), he was accused by the media and CPU of various sins, including membership of the OUN in his youth. (At the time in question Bratun was only 14.)⁵⁰

Bratun's programme supported sovereignty, political pluralism, an end to nuclear power, Ukrainian as the state language, freedom of conscience, the abolition of all-Union ministries, the depoliticisation of the judiciary and direct elections to the Supreme Soviet. 'There should be a union agreement in which the economic and political rights of republics are clearly outlined in conditions of a genuine democratic federation,' Bratun stated in a leaflet disseminated by *Tovarystvo Leva*, which ended with the words, 'Bratun is struggling for democracy, restructuring and *glasnost!* Bratun is struggling for the realisation of the resolutions of the nineteenth party conference!' (Of course, informal groups and the CPU interpreted such resolutions in a different manner.)

In Zhytomyr, Alia Iaroshynska was one of five candidates standing, although the only one who was a non-Party member. Her journalistic exposure of housing corruption in the city by the CPU had earned her the wrath of the authorities. Nevertheless, this reputation as a crusading journalist made her highly popular and she won 90 per cent of the vote.⁵¹

The vast majority of candidates were CPSU members, although Iurii Shemshuchenko, director of the Institute of State and Law, Academy of Sciences in Kyiv, believed that 'there is no contradiction. Of course, every deputy who is a member of the CPSU ... should follow the Party line in a corresponding representative body. At the same time, he should define the interests of his electorate where the majority are non-Party people.'

But the CPU was shocked at the election results many of its candidates received, in particular those running unopposed (a third of all CPSU candidates ran unopposed). In L'viv 36 000 ballot cards were either defaced or were left blank, primarily in protest at candidates running unopposed. In Drohobych, near L'viv, the supposedly moderate first secretary Iaroslav Pohrebniak ran unopposed, after the local UHU had rejected overtures to support him.⁵² Pohrebniak claimed, 'The national problem does not exist. The language problem does not exist', and he defined democracy as a system in which 'If one has a certain position and prestige, then the other candidate may withdraw out of a certain respect.' The electorate thought differently and he received less than 12 per cent of the vote.⁵³

Shcherbytskyi stood in his home constituency of Dnipropetrovs'k, also unopposed. The official Soviet news agency described 'the main point in his election programme as the Party's all-round concern for the happiness and well-being of the people', and continued: 'the attempts of individuals and groups to use democracy and *glasnost* to the detriment of the people's friendship and consequently, to the detriment of *perestroika* are therefore totally unacceptable.'⁵⁴

The election results were a shock to the CPU, but instead of addressing the crisis of its own legitimacy, the CPU blamed its setback on the opposition, particularly the UHU, and on excessive press freedom. 'We are still learning the art of democratic judgement and ability to hold a discussion,' Chornovil stated.⁵⁵

Any hint of poor election results was not publicised in the Soviet Ukrainian press. At a plenum of the CPU in May, Shcherbytskyi complained of even army officers, Afghanistan veterans and certain members of the CPSU (supporters of the Democratic Platform and *Rukh*) distancing themselves from the CPU. He called upon the organs of power to 'deal a timely, convincing, open and most decisive rebuff to demagogues and extremists'.⁵⁶

MEMORIAL

In March 1989 the Ukrainian branch of the historical-educational society Memorial was formed, with support from various informal groups and the Cinematographers', Theatre Workers' and Architects' Unions, as well as the Ukrainian Cultural Fund.⁵⁷ The initiative group to establish Memorial in Ukraine had been working for six months prior to its inaugural congress on 4 March, in the midst of the election

campaign and on the anniversary of Stalin's death, 'but efforts to form a Ukrainian arm of Memorial had long run into stable but potent opposition on high'.⁵⁸

Memorial sought to publicise 'Ukraine's Katyn', a mass grave reputed to contain over 200 000 bodies at Bykivnia near Kyiv, which the authorities had for years tried to blame upon the Nazis.⁵⁹ 'Memorial is already a focus for nationalist-orientated groups in the republic', one report stated, with many informal groups in attendance at the congress.⁶⁰ In L'viv the UHU was the main organising force behind Memorial.

The congress attracted 500 delegates from 40 cities, together with 300 guests, including such well-known former prisoners of conscience as Stepan Khmara, Bohdan and Mykhailo Horyn, Iaroslav Lesiv and Ivan Hel.⁶¹ The resolution commission at the congress included M. Horyn and Ievhen Proniuk. Memorial, during the congress, 'expressed [its] willingness to cooperate with various movements, ecological, groups, religious and informal organisations; irrespective of what the functionaries think about them'.⁶²

Having stressed that although 'Stalin is dead, his followers are still among us', the congress demanded the restoration of traditional place names in Ukraine, free access to KGB and MVD archives, abrogation of the law on rallies and the investigation and punishment of officials involved in repression under Brezhnev, and supported the embryonic *Rukh*. At the rally the following day additional demands were made, such as the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and rehabilitation and compensation for former prisoners of conscience.⁶³

THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE SOCIETY

The second stage of development of the opposition movement in Ukraine witnessed the establishment of the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, the successor to the *Ridna Mova* Society.⁶⁴ As the first large-scale popular movement to escape CPU control, and to pursue specifically national ends, it acted as a *de facto* precursor of *Rukh*, uniting in its ranks many of the future leading lights of the opposition.

The *Ridna Mova* Society had originated in western Ukraine and by the congress already claimed 10 000 members in Galicia.⁶⁵ The inaugural congress of the ULS took place in Kyiv between 11 and 12 February 1989, supported by the Writers' Union of Ukraine, the

Institute of Philology and the Academy of Sciences Institute of Literature.⁶⁶

The inaugural congress was attended by 700 participants, including 500 delegates. Informal groups, government officials and members of the creative unions all attended. The opening speech was given by Oles Honchar, later followed by Ivan Dziuba. During the congress Iurii Ielchenko, of the ideology department of the central committee of the CPU, attempted to drive a wedge between the Ukrainian Language Society (which was praised), and *Rukh* (which was condemned). The Ukrainian Language Society resolved, however, to support *Rukh* and become a collective member of it.

The congress recommended that the Ukrainian Language Society publish a newspaper and an information bulletin, prepare a draft programme for Ukrainian as the state language, prepare sociological research on the functioning of the Ukrainian language and publish a Ukrainian edition of the *UNESCO Courier*, a new *Pravopys* (Orthography), an ecological supplement in Ukrainian, Russian and English to *Pravda Ukrainy*, and that Ukrainian television broadcast a programme on the functioning and development of the Ukrainian language.

The delegates criticised the damage inflicted upon the Ukrainian language in recent years, as a 'withdrawal from Leninist nationalist policy'. Shcherbytskyi was heavily criticised, the CPU was condemned for its media campaign against *Rukh* and there were calls for the rehabilitation of those repressed under Brezhnev, such as Vasyl Stus. Ielchenko walked out after his calls not to support *Rukh* were rejected. A minute's silence was held for all those who died under Stalin and Brezhnev. Ivan Kandyba read a greeting from UANTI, while Vasyl Barladianu and Levko Lukianenko spoke from the UHU, and Bohdan Horyn from the UHU was elected to the executive.⁶⁷

The Ukrainian Language Society, in keeping with the climate of the times, argued that '*perestroika* creates the best possible conditions for the people's spiritual resurgence, for granting the Ukrainian language full rights'. It called upon all nationalities in Ukraine to support constitutional protection for the Ukrainian language, its elevation to a state language and prioritisation in everyday functions. Russian should be the means of communication between the nationalities of the USSR, while Ukrainian should be the means of communication within Ukraine. The Ukrainian Language Society promised to become active within election campaigns and support *perestroika*. The Ukrainian Language Society would 'establish the Society's primary

organs in localities - at industrial enterprises, schools, newspapers, institutes of higher learning, research and cultural establishments and institutes ...'⁶⁸

The statute of the Ukrainian Language Society described itself as a 'voluntary community organisation which organises its activities in accordance with the constitutions of the Soviet Union and Ukrainian SSR, Soviet laws and its statute'. The Ukrainian Language Society 'supports *perestroika* as initiated by the CPSU and will base its work on principled internationalism, democracy, social pluralism, self-government and *glasnost*'... ' The Ukrainian Language Society would undertake lectures, festivals, conferences, translation work, publishing, give advice and organise branches to raise awareness and national consciousness.'⁶⁹

A pensioner described how during the last three decades use of Ukrainian had fallen, while Russian had increased in cities such as Kyiv: 'People were just ashamed of speaking Ukrainian, using it in practical jokes and anecdotes. I wouldn't like a language to come into or out of fashion. If most people want Ukrainian to be the state language our government should take a relevant decision and make a law.'⁷⁰

By the middle of 1989 Dmytro Pavlychko, elected head of the Ukrainian Language Society, claimed 70 000 members for the Society, which by then had been officially registered. The Ukrainian Language Society avoided confrontation with national minorities, although: 'We emphasise - and people should understand - that if one lives in Ukraine, then one should know the Ukrainian language.' Pavlychko claimed that Gorbachev had supported the Ukrainian Language Society, as had the top levels of the CPU with whom they were 'working harmoniously' and able to 'count upon their support'. It was only on a lower level that the Ukrainian Language Society had problems from 'those who are not behind *perestroika*' he claimed.⁷¹

Clearly, a pattern was now developing whereby the Kyiv cultural intelligentsia was always foremost in the development of unofficial organisations. As stated in Chapter 2, the growth in the twentieth century of the Ukrainian intelligentsia had been impressive, particularly given the situation in 1917, when most of the leading elements in Kyiv were not identified with the Ukrainian cause. As Krawchenko argues, this gave new possibilities to the processes of indigenous culture formation and reproduction, and to leadership of the national movement.

In this respect, the Ukrainian movement had much in common with the nineteenth-century national revivals described by Hroch.⁷² First,

isolated, often scholarly, individuals nurture the national idea. However, the second phase, 'the formation period of national consciousness' requires a broad social base, so that elite leadership of the national movement appears as a result of regularised social relations, and not simply through individual choice.⁷³ Finally, the creation of an organisational base for the national movement allows the elites to take their message to the masses (Krawchenko's argument, and Drobizheva's paradigm of intelligentsia leadership of national movements under *perestroika* described in Chapter 2, are clearly similar to Hroch's).

The fact that the initiators of *Rukh*, Memorial and the Ukrainian Language Society were largely the elite of the Writers' Union of Ukraine, and their foot-soldiers the broader intelligentsia (teachers, those with higher education) fits the paradigm quite well. The cultural intelligentsia obviously had a career interest in resisting the pressure of Russification. The WUU provided a ready-made organisation, and at this stage, Ukrainian cultural elites were allowed a certain autonomy, although Kravchuk had warned writers not to join *Rukh* at the Kyiv Writers' Union of Ukraine plenum on 31 January 1989, and the intelligentsia still found it difficult to contest the state's near-monopoly control of the public sphere.⁷⁴

Hence the mass organisation stage still faced a difficult birth.

5 Consolidation (1988-9)

1. *Soviet Nationality Survey*, vol. 5, no. 2 (February 1988).
2. Only Shcherbitskyi was a non-Russian voting member of the 13-member Politburo. All seven non-voting Politburo members were Russians and, of the 12 secretaries, only one was a non-Russian. See 'Union of Unequals: the Nationality Question in the USSR', *Soviet Nationality Survey*, vol. 5, no. 3 (March 1988); and Dawn Mann, 'Gorbachev's Personnel Policy: The Non-Russian Republics', *Report on the USSR*, vol. 1, no. 48 (1 December 1989).
3. *Soviet Nationality Survey*, vol. 5, no. 7 (July 1988).
4. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 7 November 1988.
5. *VechirniyKyiv*, 1 December 1988.
6. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 15 December 1988.
7. David Marples, 'Current Events in the Ukraine (III)', *Soviet Analyst*, 28 June 1989.
8. See Taras Lekhyj, 'On the Current Situation in Ukraine', *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe*, vol. 12, no. 2, (1989) pp. 17-2; and Chrystia Freedland, 'Popular Movement Shakes Up the Ukraine', *Across Frontiers* (Summer 1989), pp. 9 and 50.
9. *Ukrainian Central Information Service*, no. 22, 1989.
10. An English translation of the draft *Rukh* programme can be found in *Soviet Ukrainian Affairs*, vol. 2, no. 4 (Winter 1988), pp. 20-3.
11. David Marples, 'Interview with Editor of Vechirniy Kyiv. The Voice of Perestroika in Ukraine', *Report on the USSR*, RL 353/89 (16 July 1989).
12. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 9 March 1989. The same issue carried letters both for and against the draft *Rukh* programme.
13. The media campaign, orchestrated by the then Ideological Secretary of the CPU, Leonid Kravchuk, continued relentlessly throughout the period, but especially during February-May 1989. See B. Nahaylo,

- 'Confrontation over Creation of Ukrainian Popular Front.' *Report on the USSR* RL 101/89 (15 February 1989), and 'Draft Program of Ukraine Baltic-Style Popular Movement under Strong Attack', *Report on the USSR* RL 106/89 (1 March 1989). Some of the attacks are contained in *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 11 February, 3 March, 17 March, 25 March, 20 April 1989; *Pravda Ukrainy*, 1 March, 1989; *Robitnycha hazeta*, 21 February, 23 February, 26 February, 3 March, 27 March 1989; *Molod Ukrainy*, 2 March and *Sil'ski visti*, 22 March 1989.
14. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 8 March 1989.
 15. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 1 February 1989.
 16. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 18 February 1989.
 17. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 19 March 1989.
 18. *Sovetskaia kul'tura*, 28 September 1989.
 19. See Roman Solchanyk, 'Party and Writers at Loggerheads Over Popular Front', *Report on the USSR*, RL 237/89 (22 May 1989).
 20. *Pravda*, 21 May 1989.
 21. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 27 April 1989.
 22. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 5 July 1989.
 23. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 13 July 1989. See also Roman Solchanyk, 'Constituent Conference of Kievian Regional Popular Front', *Report on the USSR*, RL 365/89 (27 July 1989).
 24. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 101, 1988.
 25. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 18, 1989.
 26. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 9, 1989.
 27. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 187, 1988.
 28. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 10 & 11, 1989.
 29. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 56, 1989.
 30. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release, 26 & 31 July, 1989.
 31. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 25, 1989 and see Taras Kuzio, 'The Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party', *Christian Democracy, Bulletin of the Christian Democratic International on Eastern Europe* no. 8 (July-August 1990) pp. 8-11.
 32. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, Warsaw, no. 26, 6 February 1990 and *Ukra'ins'ki novyny*, no. 5, 3 September 1990.
 33. *Ukrainian Central Information Service*, no. 77, 1989.
 34. Op. cit., ref. 9.
 35. *Ukrainian Central Information Service*, no. 109, 1989, and *Moloda Halychyna 8 My 1990*.
 36. Copy in the possession of the authors.
 37. *Shliakh peremohy*, 3 December 1989.
 38. *The Washington Post*, 22 January 1989.
 39. *Keston News Service*, 2 March 1989; *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release no. 27, 1989 and Bohdan Nahaylo, 'Initiative Group for Restoration of Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church Founded', *Report on the USSR*, RL 105/89, 26 February 1989.
 40. See Frank Sysyn, 'The Ukrainian Orthodox Question in the USSR,' *Religion in Communist Lands*, (Winter 1993) no. 3, pp. 251-63 and Bohdor Bociurkiw, 'The Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, 1920-1930: a Case Study in Religious Modernisation', in D. J. Dunn (ed.), *Religion*

and Modernisation in the Soviet Union Boulder (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1977) pp. 310-47.

41. J. B. Dunlop, 'The Russian Orthodox Church and Nationalism After 1988', *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 18, no. 4 (Winter 1990) pp. 292-306.
42. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 9 May 1989.
43. *News from Ukraine*, no. 49, 1990.
44. *News from Ukraine*, no. 22, 1989.
45. *Ukrainian Central Information Service*, no. 94, 1989.
46. *Ukrainian Press Bureau*, 26 June 1989 and *Literaturna Ukraina*, 29 June 1989.
47. *Ukrainian Press Bureau*, 22 June 1989 and *Keston News Service*, 6 July 1989.
48. *Ukrainian Weekly*, 8 January 1989.
49. *Ukrainian Central Information Service*, no. 15, 1989.
50. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 19 February 1989.
51. Q. Peel, 'Too-good-to-be-true milkmaids flight for the Ukrainian vote', *The Financial Times*, 3 March 1989; S. Cornwell, 'Crusading journalist beats Communist bosses in Ukrainian elections', *The Independent*, 28 March 1989, and Kathleen Mihalisko, 'Alia Yaroshyns'ka: Crusading Journalist from Zhitomir Becomes Peoples Deputy', *Report on the USSR*, RL 247/89 (24 May 1989).
52. Bohdan Horyn', pp. 8-9.
53. Ibid.
54. TASS, 3 May 1989.
55. *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia*, 27 March 1989.
56. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 16 May 1989.
57. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 5 March 1989.
58. Rupert Cornwell, 'Anti-Stalinist congress in Kiev underlines anger at present leadership', *The Independent*, 6 March 1989. See also Iu. Lukanov, 'Dobro bez kulakiv', *Pam'iatky Ukraïny* 1989, no. 2, pp. 63-4. See also L. Y. Luciuk and A. Chyczij (comps.), *Memorial* (n.p.: Kashtan Press, 1989).
59. See Taras Kuzio, 'Bykovnia - Ukraine's Kuropaty', *Soviet Analyst*, 22 February 1989; B. Keller, 'Behind Stalin's Green Fence: Who Filled the Mass Graves?', *The New York Times*, 6 March 1989; X. Smiley, 'Hidden Horrors of Kiev's Katyn', *The Daily Telegraph*, 6 March 1989, and R. Cornwell, 'Long Crusade for Justice in Silent Forest of Death', *The Independent*, 10 March 1989.
60. See note 54.
61. *Ukraïns'ke slovo*, 26 March 1989. See the attack upon the UHU for its influence in Memorial in Lviv, *Pravda Ukrainy*, 11 June 1989.
62. *News from Ukraine* no. 11, 1989.
63. *Associated Press*, 5 March 1989.
64. See B. Nahaylo, 'Inaugural Congress of Ukrainian Language Society Turns Into Major Political Demonstration,' *Report on the USSR*, RL 103/89 (13 February 1989).
65. *Radio Kyiv* 11 February 1989. See *Lenins'ka molod'*, 31 December 1988 for an early conference of the *Ridna Mova* Society in L'viv.

66. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 12 February 1989.
67. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 8 February 1989.
68. *Literaturan Ukraina*, 2 March 1989 and *News from Ukraine*, 1989, no. 11.
69. *Literaturan Ukraina*, 2 March 1989.
70. *News from Ukraine*, 1989, no. 9.
71. David Marples, 'The Shevchenko Ukrainian language Society: An Interview with Dmytro Pavlychko', *Report on the USSR*, RL 340/89 (29 June 1989).
72. Myroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
73. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
74. See B. Nahaylo, 'Confrontation over Creation of Ukrainian Popular Front', *Report on the USSR*, RL 101/89 (3 March 1989).