

6 The Birth of Mass Politics (1989-90)

Are you really not able to understand that soon you will be dealing with a mass social movement?

(Valentyn Moroz, Report from the Beria Reserve, 1967)

THE VIEW FROM THE CENTRE

The nationality question became increasingly acute after 1989 with massacres of Meshketians in Central Asia, pogroms and ethnic conflict within Azerbaidzhan as well as the centre's clumsy repression of Georgian nationalists. In addition, the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies radicalised demands within the republics, strengthening the activities of the Popular Fronts. In some republics there was already effectively shared power between all-union institutions and the Popular Fronts. In December of that year the Lithuanian branch of the CPSU seceded, causing the first serious fracture in the once monolithic Communist Party. Throughout the non-Russian republics the legitimacy of Communist Party rule was undermined, especially as *glasnost'* revealed previously taboo 'blank spots' in history with Stalin-era mass graves of victims opened up to public scrutiny and condemnation (Bykivnia in Ukraine, Kuropaty in Belarus).

It was only in September 1989 that the central committee of the CPSU devoted a plenum to the subject of the nationality question. Gorbachev admitted that 'unresolved issues have surfaced one after another, errors and deformations that were accumulated over decades have now made themselves felt, and ethnic conflicts have erupted after smouldering for years'.¹ The new Gorbachev line had become a rejection of the fusion² concept of the Brezhnev era in favour of a strong centre and strong republics. This would be accomplished through a 'renewed union' where each republic would have wide opportunities for the development of its economy and culture through devolution. The question of how the division of powers would be accomplished between the republics and centre now entered the debate.

Gorbachev, however, steadfastly refused to accept the division of the CPSU into national branches or any dropping of the leading role of the CPSU. Nationalism was declared to be incompatible with membership of the CPSU. Gorbachev was therefore initially opposed to the creation of a separate Russian Communist Party but did not oppose the establishment of Russian symbols of statehood (cultural, scientific, economic and academic) which had not existed previously. The Russian language was also made the new 'state language' of the USSR. Nevertheless, Gorbachev finally accepted the need to replace the 1922 Union Treaty in order to overcome arguments made in the non-Russian republics that the USSR was a non-voluntary creation.³

CPSU plenums proved to be disappointing as they failed to elaborate a new set of policies, thereby opening up the field to the Popular Fronts and national communists to agitate for their own proposals. Gorbachev accepted that the republics needed to be given greater decision-making powers, rejected border changes and called for action against violent separatists. But what was an offer was 'either too little and too late to meet heightened demands or, in the case of republican state languages and republican economic autonomy, for example, merely a belated and not necessarily wholehearted endorsement of initiatives taken in the republics'.⁴

The plenum was followed in July 1989 by Gorbachev's first broadcast to the Soviet people on the nationalities question. While rejecting separatism Gorbachev accepted the need for a 'profound transformation in the Soviet federation' and promoted the benefits of the Union.⁵ Gorbachev's calls for actions against separatists led to the adoption of amendments to the article in the Soviet legal code 'On Criminal Liability for State Crimes' - amendments which were more repressive than article 70 which had been used to imprison dissidents in the pre-Gorbachev era.

The CPSU's new draft platform on the nationalities question called for a radical overhaul of centre-periphery relations, with each republic retaining its independence (*samostoyatel'nost*). The draft platform outlined the following priorities:⁶

- the transformation of the federation;
- greater rights for the republics;
- equal rights for all ethnic groups;
- the establishment of conditions for the free development of national cultures and languages;
- greater guarantees against ethnic discrimination;

- greater attention to ideological work on the nationalities question;
- rejection of the federalisation of the armed forces and the CPSU;
- the centre would define all-union principles and policies, maintain control over security policy and co-ordinate the economic, scientific and cultural spheres;

Clearly therefore, the draft platform fell far short of converting the USSR into a genuine confederation of sovereign states, a demand that the republics had been demanding since 1988-9. Many of them would soon drop this demand in favour of independence after failing to obtain any support for confederation from Gorbachev prior to 1990.

THE VIEW FROM UKRAINE

The period between the autumn of 1989 and autumn of the following year, marked the crucial period of transition in Ukraine, during which small, isolated groups were transformed into larger alliances, and a powerful opposition was formed.

The non-Russians had not been in a position to rebel in the pre-Gorbachev era, because 'As long as the public sphere is occupied and more importantly, as long as the KGB remains intact, the deprivatisation of anti-state attitudes will be problematical, anti-state collectives and elites will be unlikely to mobilise, alliances between workers and intellectuals will not materialise and rebellions, revolts and insurrections will be well-nigh impossible'.⁷

All these obstacles began to dissolve in 1989-90, although in Ukraine, unlike the Baltic republics, the state retained sufficient powers to delay the formation of a true multi-party system and embryonic civil society until after the republican elections of March 1990. Hence the CPU was initially dominant in the new parliament as well.

The most significant features of the pre-election period were:

- the end of the 'Brezhnev era' in Ukraine with Shcherbytskyi's resignation;
- the failure of the CPU to crush *Rukh* in its infancy;
- the beginnings of a working-class movement in Ukraine after the strikes of July 1989; and
- the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

The key point in this stage was September 1989 when three important events occurred: the resignation of Shcherbytskyi, mass meetings of Ukrainian Catholics and the inaugural congress *oiRukh*.

SHCHERBYTSKYI REPLACED BY 'REFORMER'

In September 1989 Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi was replaced as first secretary of the CPU by Volodymyr Ivashko. Although born in Poltava, Ivashko had been the first secretary of the Dnipropetrovs'k *oblast* CPU, the same region from where Shcherbytskyi (and Brezhnev) had originated. In January 1988 he had become a member of the politburo of the central committee of the CPU, and in March 1989 was elected as a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet.⁸

Although there was little evidence to back the claim, the Western press, which had speculated for many years over Shcherbytskyi's demise, now wrote that Ivashko was 'a protege of Gorbachev' and 'considered a relative moderate in the Communist Party'.⁹ His election to the post of first secretary of the CPU was a 'victory for *perestroika*'.^w Yet Ivashko was a former political adviser to the Soviet-backed communist regime in Afghanistan.¹¹

In the view of the CPU, 'democratisation' of Soviet society was to be undertaken by transferring communist control from the Communist Party to the state structure. Hence in Ukraine, Ivashko was eager to combine the two posts of first secretary of the CPU and chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, which he achieved by 4 June 1990, replacing Valentyna Shevchenko as chairman of the Supreme Council. However, little more than a month later, Ivashko gladly dropped his two Ukrainian positions to accept Gorbachev's offer of a position in Moscow as deputy general secretary of the CPSU.

Gorbachev probably judged that he was just conservative enough to satisfy the more moderate conservatives in the Party, while appearing just reformist enough not to frighten the more moderate reformists, one report claimed.¹² In other words, Ivashko was a committed communist, but also a realist, balancing between conservatism and reform - like Gorbachev.

Ivashko's resignation from the post of chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine showed that he did not regard it as an important position, and also reflected Gorbachev's continued lack of tact and understanding of the nationality question. Ironically, Ivashko turned out to have made a poor career move, as Mykhailo Horyn (head of

the *Rukh* secretariat) prophesied: 'only a man who does not think about his future can abandon the post of president [sic] of a 52 million-strong nation to become deputy chairman of a party which is dying on its feet'.¹³

Ivashko, for example, stated on Soviet television¹⁴ after his defection to Moscow that he was 'a staunch supporter of *perestroika*' and warned, 'we must in no way allow a split in the party' or 'push our republic and country over the cliff with non-constructive criticism and confrontation in society'.¹⁵

Only a month after taking up the position of deputy general secretary of the CPSU, Ivashko, with Oleg Shenin, central committee secretary responsible for cadres, began circulating instructions, later leaked, to central committee departments actively to support the beleaguered communists in Lithuania.¹⁶ He proposed that a military unit under KGB command be established to protect the pro-Moscow CPSU and demanded that communists employed in the KGB, MVD and Prosecutor's Office organise 'legal proceedings against the leaders of various nationalist and anti-Soviet formations'. In August 1991, Ivashko also neglected to condemn the attempted coup.

However, despite his personal views, the long-term logic towards the creation of 'national communism' outlined in Chapter 1 had already forced Ivashko to make crucial concessions to the opposition in the Supreme Council.

NATIONAL SYMBOLS

As the embryonic *Rukh* began to develop its organisational capacity, it increasingly sought to challenge official interpretations of Ukrainian history, and to replace them with more specifically national myths and symbols, which would help to solidify national consciousness and assist in the organisation of collective action.

Rukh, the UHU and other 'informals', for example, opposed the official celebrations of the 280th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava on 6-9 July 1989. Official Soviet historiography had always interpreted Poltava, when Peter I's armies defeated Charles XI's Swedes and the Ukrainian Cossacks under Hetman Ivan Mazepa, as marking the final stage in the mutually beneficial 'reunification' of Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians, but *Rukh* wished to reclaim it as a specifically nationalist uprising, nobly defeated. In particular, the desire of various all-Union groups, such as *Rossia molodaia* (Young Russia - affiliated to *Pamiat*) to come to Ukraine for the celebrations was widely condemned.

At the inaugural congress of the Kyiv branch of *Rukh* on 1 July 1989, the leading writer Ivan Drach stated:

The relations between the closest and most kindred peoples (Ukrainians and Russians) have never been idyllic, although our home-grown scribblers tried hard to present things in this way in their quasi-ethnography ... It is well known that Peter I and Menshikov annihilated thousands of Ukrainians for the so-called treachery of Mazepa ... What would happen if we, in order to boost Ukrainian patriotism, organised a trip along the route traced by Hetman Petro Sahydachnyi who, jointly with the Poles, captured Moscow in 1616? I am sure they would break our legs in the first *oblast* of the RSFSR we had to cross, and they would be absolutely right to do so.¹⁷

Although the 'informals' were not yet strong enough to prevent the official ceremonies taking place, a counter-demonstration was organised, and the overt siding of the authorities with Russian chauvinists helped to push disillusioned semi-official groups towards the ranks of the ex-dissidents.

On 6 May 1989 the central committee of the CPU published a Resolution regarding the 'reunification' of western Ukraine with Soviet Ukraine 50 years earlier, which was published in all the major Soviet Ukrainian newspapers and journals, and announced a programme of celebrations including a special joint meeting of the central committee of the CPU and Supreme Council of Ukraine, and meetings with, 'those who took part in the revolutionary-liberationary struggle for socialist construction', veterans of World War II and western Ukrainian CPU and cultural activists.¹⁸ A documentary film would be released, there would be 'Days of Culture, Art, Exhibitions' with wide-ranging exhibitions in museums, clubs and galleries. A republican academic conference would be organised, a new 'Historical Outline of the Communist Party of West Ukraine' (the Communist Party of inter-war Galicia and Volhynia) would be published, together with the collected works of well-known activists of the Communist Party of West Ukraine (CPWU).¹⁹

The Resolution was notable for its lack of reference to Stalin, or of the repression against the local population that occurred after the 'liberation'. Only the last, short paragraph added that a commission attached to the Politburo of the central committee of the CPU would

be looking into the question of rehabilitating members of the CPWU who had died during the Stalin era.

The problems surrounding Soviet legitimacy in all the areas occupied as a consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were ignored. In the words of Professor Norman Davies, a historian of Poland:

If the Baltic states can now reclaim their independence on the grounds that they were victims of Soviet aggression, so too can all the other lands affected by the protocols of the Pact - eastern Finland (Karelia), eastern Poland (Belarus and Ukraine) and eastern Romania (Moldavia). So too, indeed, can all the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union, every single one of which was incorporated by force either in 1918-21, in 1939-40 or in 1944-5.²⁰

On the other hand, *samizdat* writings noted that 'liberation' brought with it mass repression, deportation and executions of political prisoners.²¹ According to Viacheslav Chornovil,

Exactly how did Ukrainian history benefit by turning away from a mild Polish occupation, under which western Ukraine at least had some -possibilities of democratic decision-making and cultural development, to the terrible occupation by Stalin? And can we forget that the Ukrainian lands were gathered together not for the good of the people, but in order to widen, under the pretext of reunification, the Russian empire?²²

The UHU was also concerned to stress that the nationalist alternative to the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (which itself was disbanded on the orders of Stalin by the Comintern in 1938), the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), had played a positive role in protecting Ukrainians from 'Polish national and social oppression', and in its later struggle against both German and Soviet occupation.

As early as winter 1987, the *samizdat* journal *Ukrainian Herald* had published the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.²³ The accompanying editorial had argued that the secret protocols could not form the basis for the 'reunification' of Ukrainian lands.

The Ukrainian People's Democratic League, a more radical group than the UHU, issued a statement about the 'reunification' of western Ukraine at its inaugural congress in Riga, between 24 and 25 June 1989. In their view, 'With the occupation of the regions of western

Ukraine this was the final act in the occupation of Ukraine begun in 1918'. They proceeded to demand that a commission be established by the Congress of People's Deputies to examine the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in order that all the documents be published, that it hold 'public hearings' which would discuss and 'denounce this deceitful Pact'.²⁴

In early June, Viacheslav Chornovil discussed the reasoning behind the opposition's decision to celebrate the anniversaries on 23 August and 17 September as acts of occupation - not 'liberation' or 'reunification'. He believed that the real anniversary to be celebrated each year was 22 January 1919, when the Ukrainian People's Republic had united with the West Ukrainian People's Republic briefly to form a united Ukrainian independent state.²⁵

On 23 August in Kyiv's Central Stadium a 2000-strong meeting organised by the Ukrainian People's Democratic League (UPDL) and the UHU to condemn the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was violently broken up by the authorities, when the demonstrators refused to agree to a demand from the authorities that they take down their Ukrainian national flags. In L'viv 4000 people attended a rally against the pact, where Bohdan Horyn (head of the L'viv *oblast* UHU) and Volodymyr Iavorskyi spoke. In Kharkiv riot police occupied the city centre to prevent a demonstration.

Oles Shevchenko, head of the Kyiv branch of the UHU, said in his speech: 'There cannot be an independent Ukraine, without an independent Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.' Another member of the UHU, Serhii Naboka, editor of the UHU newsletter *Holos vidrodzhenia* (Voice of Rebirth) warned against inciting inter-ethnic conflicts. Ivan Hel, the head of the Committee in Defence of Ukraine Catholic Church, meanwhile announced that on 17 September that there would be a march and special mass in L'viv to deliberately coincide with the Communist Party-sponsored 'reunification' anniversary.²⁶

On 21 January 1990, *Rukh's* organisational ability reached a high-point when 750 000 formed a human chain from Kyiv to L'viv and Ivano-Frankivs'k to celebrate the 1919 anniversary.²⁷ This was to have a major impact on the election campaign, and, as the evidence of popular support for the opposition accumulated, helped put the CPU on the defensive.

Only a minority was receptive to this new nationalist historiography, however. The working class in particular remained largely immune. The revisionist intelligentsia could not reach a mass audience until the resources of the state, the mass media especially, begun to sing the same tune in early 1991.

INDEPENDENT TRADE UNIONS²⁸

Towards the end of 1989 the opposition was broadened by the first stirrings of a working-class movement, although links with intelligentsia-led organisations, such as the embryonic *Rukh*, were initially very poor. Signs of working-class discontent had long been apparent. In 1988, *Robitnycha hazeta* had carried workers' complaints that they had not noticed any *perestwika* at their enterprises. Readers of the newspaper demanded 'action at all levels. Not to wait for new instructions'.²⁹ In Kharkiv a bi-weekly newspaper *Kharkivs'ki profspilky* (Kharkiv Trade Unions) had been initiated by Vitaliy Korotych, an all-Union deputy and editor of *Ogonek* in September 1989 to promote democratisation, and trade union reform.³⁰

But the problems of organising an all-Ukrainian independent workers movement modelled upon Solidarity were due primarily to the uneven level of national consciousness in Ukraine. Iurii Zhyzhko, then a UHU activist, wrote in 1990: 'It is not surprising that beyond the large academic centres in Ukraine, a wide section of society is thoroughly indifferent to and distrustful of political demands - even partly towards the national revival.'³¹ Zhyzhko continued:

As events have shown, workers have exhibited solidarity in protests against the Party apparatus, but not yet all workers connect their employment and societal poverty to the social system and Communist ideology, because not all have been convinced of the idea of Ukrainian state independence. The simple citizen is directed by a salami psychology, he resembles a hypnotised rabbit not ready to undertake independent steps and always glancing at the almighty state.³²

Vladimir Klebanov, who in 1977 had organised the Free Trade Union Association of the Soviet Working People (which suffered repression from the authorities and was subsequently broken up), remained committed to an all-Union agenda, as opposed to a specifically Ukrainian one. Speaking during December 1989, Klebanov voiced his personal opposition to Ukrainian independence, stated his preference for Russian as the state language of Ukraine and said he believed most workers in the Donbas were negatively disposed towards *Rukh*.³³ Workers had been 'fooled by Communist propaganda' and 'the majority of workers are afraid of politics'.³⁴ A miner at the *Rukh* congress in September lamented: 'We drank before, they pushed bottles in front of us. Enough! We need to learn. Organise us

lectures. Only not "schools of young Communists" - we need legal, economic and political knowledge.³⁵

From 18 to 24 July 1989, the Donbas miners were on strike, as part of the first (publicised) mass all-Union industrial action since the 1920s.³⁶ At its height, 141 out of 273 pits were on strike.³⁷ The strikes quickly spread to the more nationally minded miners of western Ukraine, who introduced more political demands, such as democratic elections and the removal of the local CPU leadership, and called for the creation of independent trade unions along the lines of Solidarity.

In the main, however, demands remained strictly economic. The miners sought a pay rise, longer holidays, the recognition of certain diseases specific to miners, improved housing, increased soap quotas, priority food supplies, a profit-sharing scheme, a minimum wage and many other things.³⁸ On the other hand, they also demanded the 'prohibition of the establishment of co-operatives and the disbandment of existing medical and food co-operatives'.³⁹

Opinion polls showed that 62 per cent of miners rejected specifically political demands, although the long-term potential for radicalisation was shown by the fact that 72 per cent would consider broadening their struggle to include political aims, if their original demands were not met.⁴⁰

Petro Pohrezhnyi, deputy head of the Donbas Strike Committee, told the *Rukh* congress in September 1989 that they lacked any information about *Rukh*, because the Communist Party-controlled press was attempting to divide workers and the intelligentsia. 'Well, it is not our fault that we do not know our symbols and the history of the Ukrainian people,' he said. Answering claims that the summer 1989 miners' strikes were purely economic, he said: 'Comrades! Do not think that our strike is purely economic. It is also political. We are undertaking restructuring from below.'⁴¹

The miners were very distrustful of officials, the media and 'outsiders', including the emissaries of opposition groups from Kyiv or Galicia. When an official told the striking miners, 'Go to work and everything will be done. I give you my honest word as a Communist,' they jeered him.⁴²

A strike leader told the Tass news agency (17 July 1989) that 'At the outset, when we elected a strike committee, a man arrived from L'viv. He introduced himself as a member of the UHU and gave us leaflets, of an apparently instigatory and provocative character.' Another leaflet was prepared by the Ukrainian People's Democratic League, and ended with the words:

Put forward not only social and economic demands, but also political demands! Change your strike into a struggle against the exploiters - the party bureaucracy. Demand economic and political sovereignty for the Ukrainian republic ... Without political freedom there cannot be economic freedom!⁴³

Such overtures were largely rebuffed.

The miners did not directly criticise Gorbachev at this stage, choosing to blame the local Communist Party instead for the problems, and claiming to support the more rapid development of *perestroika*.⁴⁴ Gorbachev himself was ambivalent, both riding the tiger of unrest and attacking the strikes as organised by 'people hostile to the socialist system'.⁴⁵

In the period after the strikes, a large number of new trade unions and strike committees began to be formed. However, the lack of any sense of working-class solidarity in Ukraine was soon reflected in the growth of a large number of overlapping and/or rival organisations, often doomed to only an ephemeral existence.

In August, at a meeting in Horlivka in the Donbas, the miners formed the Regional Union of Donbas Strike Committees, representatives of which later attended the *Rukh* congress. Plans for a second wave of strikes commencing on 1 October were only cancelled after Gorbachev's direct appeal on television the day before.

During the summer an Association of Illegally Dismissed Workers was established in Kharkiv, with 200 members. Up to 10 000 in the *oblast* had allegedly been dismissed from work.⁴⁶

On 26 November in Donetsk a constituent assembly of the *Vilni profspilky Ukraïny* (Free Trade Unions of Ukraine) was held, and Volodymyr Stemasova, head of the miners' strike committee, became its head. *Rukh* and the UHU attended the founding congress as guests.⁴⁷

In October the Independent Workers Union was established in Kharkiv. The main supporter of this move was Valerii Semyvolos, the head of the Kharkiv *oblast* branch of the UHU. The ultimate aim of the Independent Workers Union was to launch a Council of Independent Trade Unions of Ukraine.

The Independent Workers Union promised to 'defend political, economic and social rights of workers from the authoritarian rule of administrative, enterprise, state and Party bureaucracy'. The Independent Workers Union stood for workers' democracy, profit-sharing, the right to strike for both economic and political demands,

private initiative in industry, alternative and direct elections. The Independent Workers Union agreed to 'co-operate with any public organisation, but will not recognise the leading role of any public political organisation' (a clear reference to the CPSU).⁴⁸

Between 10 and 11 February 1990 in Kharkiv a congress of strike committees and independent workers' groups decided to launch the first all-Ukrainian free trade union *Iednist'* (Unity). Unity sought to counteract the already worrying centrifugal tendencies in the working-class movement, although, for example, the independent but all-Union *Sotsprof* with a base in the Donbas refused to take part.

The congress was sponsored by both *Rukh* and the UHU, who worked together closely in Kharkiv, and this could be seen in the combination of both political and socio-economic demands in Unity's programme.⁴⁹ The participants laid flowers at Shevchenko's monument and attended an *oblast Rukh* meeting. A co-ordinating committee of 35 was elected, 7 of whom were to act as the executive, including Khmara and Semyvolos, the head.

The congress ratified a workers' statute and passed a list of resolutions, which called for an end to repression and the release of all prisoners of conscience. Unity appealed for recognition to the International Labour Organisation. Unity's long-term aim was to struggle for a law-based state in a politically and economically independent Ukrainian republic. It would help to foster a civil society, democratic structures and the political and cultural rights of workers.⁵⁰

In an appeal to the working classes of Ukraine, Unity stated that in the struggle against informal groups, 'the party bureaucracy has moved to propagate inter-ethnic, inter-religious and inter-class conflicts. The ancient principle - divide and rule - works for them even today'. Unity called for the unification of the working classes against the CPSU and for Ukrainian sovereignty, 'regardless of one's position in the national, religious or social structure'.

In March 1990 the *Solidami profspilky Ukrainy* (Solidarity Trade Unions of Ukraine) was launched in Kyiv, its main organiser being Aleksander Sheikin. The Solidarity Trade Unions of Ukraine was an outgrowth of the Workers' Society formed in November 1989 by 40 enterprises in Kyiv. Solidarity Trade Unions of Ukraine united 26 unions from the Donbas, Cherkasy, Mariupol' and elsewhere. Unlike the official unions, the Solidarity Trade Unions of Ukraine would defend workers' interests and allow its branches complete autonomy. It applied to join the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and in August 1990 began to establish a newspaper entitled *Volia*.⁵¹

A member of the Solidarity Trade Unions of Ukraine, Nadiia Iatsenko, described how only independent trade unions and citizens' committees (see Chapter 7) as 'organs of self-government' could promote Ukrainian aspirations. Workers had to ditch the 'concentration camp complex' and 'not wait for the blessing of Muscovite benefactors' to undertake something on their behalf. Polish Solidarity, she reminded her readers, which by then was the Polish government and introducing economic reform, also began from humble beginnings similar to those of Solidarity Trade Unions of Ukraine.⁵²

In L'viv the unprovoked attacks against peaceful demonstrators on 1 October 1989 led to the formation of a radical strike committee by the UHU.⁵³ As Mayor of L'viv, Kotyk admitted, 'the UHU are at the helm of the strike committee.'⁵⁴ Appeals and letters to the authorities after similar violent actions by the infamous 'Black Berets', the Special Purpose Militia Detachments called ZMOP in Ukrainian (in Russian OMON) in August 1988 and March 1989 had fallen on deaf ears. As Chornovil commented, 'they wanted to provoke the imposition of martial law, but provoked the formation of a strike committee.'⁵⁵

Whereas *Rukh* was hesitant about supporting radical workers' action in L'viv, unofficial groups such as the UHU had no qualms. The strike committee's bulletin *L'vivs'kyi visnyk* was helped technically by the UHU. Levko Lukianenko believed that 'the Communist stronghold is the old factory managers, who have unlimited control over the workers. If we privatise the economy and free it from Communist control, we shall free the working class from Communist control too'.⁵⁶ Consequently, the UHU, and its successor the Ukrainian Republican Party, consciously began to copy the traditional communist tactics of organising both territorial and workplace cells, in order to counteract CPU domination of the workplace.

Three days later, L'viv experienced a two-hour strike and meeting attended by 30 000 people in protest at the OMON action. Strike committees were founded in each enterprise and institution to utilise the political strike (economic strikes were illegal). The L'viv strike committee was led by a Russian, Valerii Furmanov, and his deputy was Stepan Khmara. A general strike organised on 27 October was not backed by *Rukh*, which demanded that the strike committee consult with it before launching such actions. Furmanov replied 'Some misunderstandings or disorganisation during the strike is altogether unsurprising; well, we don't have any experience of this kind of work. The political consciousness of the masses is only awakening - it needs time.'⁵⁷

In early December, L'viv hosted a meeting of strike committees, unofficial workers' groups and other organisations with the aim of

forming an all-republican strike committee that would also enable the co-ordination of actions during the forthcoming election campaign. The Kharkiv-based Independent Workers' Union, Poltava-based Independent Workers' Union and miners' strike committees from Chervonohrad and Horlivka attended.⁵⁸

The L'viv strike committee organised demonstrations in L'viv against the deployment of Ukrainian conscripts in the Caucasus in January and in support of Lithuanian independence in March 1990.⁵⁹

The radicalisation of public opinion in Ukraine was reflected in the miners' more political demands, when a second wave of strikes and mass demonstrations rocked the Donbas in June and July 1990.⁶⁰ The miners now demanded the resignation of the Ukrainian government, liquidation of CPU cells and the nationalisation of CPU property, reflecting their complete lack of faith in Gorbachev and the Communist Party after the latter's failure to fulfil the promises of 1989.

As the Donbas strike committee stated, 'The only thing the party and the people who run the mines are interested in is filling production quotas and their own stomachs. Last year we shook the government and we have reminded them again how we feel. The miners will not accept this for much longer. I think there could be bad trouble in the mines.'⁶¹

The miners, now grouped together in the Union of Strike Committees of the Donbas, however, still seemed better able to express what they did not want - as opposed to what they wanted to replace it with. They rarely referred to the Supreme Council and talked more of vague notions of 'workers' control', although the radicalisation of the public and greater contact between the miners and intelligentsia was gradually having an impact.⁶² One independent union leader for the miners said, 'Ukraine is very rich. It has enormous potential. The Donbas workers will support sovereignty and independence for Ukraine if it makes economic sense.'⁶³ The parliamentary Peoples' Council issued an appeal in support of the striking miners which stated: 'The way out of the crisis situation is possible only on the basis of a real peoples' government and state sovereignty for Ukraine. The People's Council calls upon miners to support our parliamentary struggle for the adoption by the Supreme Council of complete sovereignty and a decree on the government.'⁶⁴ The working-class movement was therefore beginning to have an indirect effect. Their actions helped to pressure Communist deputies, for example into voting for the Declaration of Sovereignty (see Chapter 7).⁶⁵

At this stage of its development, however, the labour movement in Ukraine was still highly fragmented, reflecting working-class distrust

of any form of political organisation, and the fact that 70 years of working-class atomisation and organisational passivity under communism made mobilisation very difficult. In contrast to Poland in the Solidarity era, the formation of links between the working class and intelligentsia remained problematical.

POPULAR MOVEMENT OF UKRAINE (*RUKH*)

The inaugural congress of *Rukh* took place on 8-10 September in Kyiv, attended by 1100 delegates,⁶⁶ 85 per cent of whom were ethnic Ukrainian. Seventy-two per cent had higher education, but only 10 per cent were workers and a mere 2.5 per cent collective farmers. Only 228 were members of the CPSU. Approximately half the delegates were from western Ukraine, 35 per cent came from the eight central *oblasts* and only 15 per cent from eastern and southern Ukraine. Ninety per cent of deputies were male, and 58 per cent between the ages of 25 and 45.

A poll of delegates' priorities showed most support for political and cultural, rather than simply economic aims (seeking 'to promote democratisation and the expansion of *glasnost*' was supported by 75 per cent, 'the development of Ukrainian culture and language' by 73 per cent, but 'the solving of pressing economic problems' by only 46 per cent).⁶⁷ *Rukh* members approached economics as something to be solved through tackling political issues, which reflected *Rukh's* nature as a movement of the intelligentsia of western and central Ukraine, without Solidarity-style working-class participation. Hence a potential gulf already existed between *Rukh* and the population at large, whose priorities remained conservative and practical.

The congress included nearly 100 national minority representatives, including Russians, Jews and Poles, who rejected the notion of a Baltic-style Inter-Front. The miners' movement was represented at the congress by Petro Pobrezhnyi, who argued for the removal of Shcherbytskyi, for an alliance with *Rukh* and for republican sovereignty, but expressed reservations about the use of Ukrainian national symbols.

Guests from Solidarity, such as Adam Michnik, gave loudly applauded speeches calling for Ukrainian-Polish solidarity, but only called for a 'democratic' and 'free Ukraine', falling short of calling for an 'independent Ukraine' - which might have been too provocative to Moscow.⁶⁸

The radical wing of *Rukh*, however, represented by the UHU, with much influence in western Ukraine, used the occasion to promote

calls for Ukrainian secession from the USSR. Lukianenko's speech, which called upon *Rukh* members 'to abolish this empire as the greatest evil of present-day life', was the only one from the congress not published in *Literaturna Ukraina*.⁶⁹ The 'extremist wing of the movement has long been formally established' in L'viv, one newspaper claimed; while these delegates 'set the tone in the discussion', which included numerous speeches against socialism, the CPSU and Lenin and openly calling for *Rukh* to take power.⁷⁰

Chornovil argued that the essential theses of the UHU Declaration of Principles were now included in the new *Rukh* programme. Criticising the attempts by the CPU to drive a wedge between the UHU and *Rukh*, Chornovil said:

The fact that a Lukianenko or a Chornovil see Ukraine as an independent democratic country in the future, while Drach and Iavorivskiyi aspire to broaden sovereignty within a recognised Union structure, or that the former support political pluralism, while the latter see merely the liberalisation of the Party to which they belong, does not yet constitute sufficient grounds for disunity. The mission of the Popular Movement of Ukraine is precisely to unify all the people who care about the fate of Ukraine.⁷¹

The congress approved a new programme for *Rukh* which supported the calls for the 'radical renewal of society' proclaimed at the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the CPSU, the Nineteenth All-Union CPSU conference and the Congress of People's Deputies. More than eighteen months before Gorbachev agreed to contemplate the idea, the *Rukh* programme called for 'the creation of a sovereign Ukrainian state which will build its relations with the other republics of the USSR on the basis of a new Union treaty'. A 'radical transformation in the Soviet federation' would ensure Ukrainian sovereignty, it stated.⁷²

Rukh still saw itself as a vehicle to implement *perestroika* in Ukraine, with its main goals being 'democratisation and a humane society'. *Rukh* would co-operate with the CPU, the government and other organisations, but also put forward candidates in elections, propose new legislation, use public pressure and influence, conferences, publications, pickets, demonstrations and open letters to the press. It would promote the rebirth of Ukrainian national customs, and monitor compliance with human rights agreements.

The congress adopted many resolutions on subjects such as economic sovereignty, the ecological situation, elections, support for the Crimean Tatars, the legalisation of Ukrainian churches, national symbols, the Ukrainian diaspora, and publishing.⁷³ A powerful resolution condemned anti-Semitism.⁷⁴ Another asked Russians living in Ukraine for support.⁷⁵ Myroslav Popovych condemned the slogan 'Ukraine for Ukrainians!' touted by some marginal nationalist groups, because 'Ukraine is a common home to everybody living there.'⁷⁶

When Kravchuk claimed that although, 'They are our opponents, we hope to win them over by arguments', in fact it was elements within the CPU that were won over gradually by *Rukh* (with Kravchuk himself eventually adopting the bulk of the *Rukh* programme in the 1 December 1991 presidential campaign).⁷⁷ Much of *Rukh's* programme would be included in Ukraine's Declaration of Sovereignty, adopted only ten months later.

The poet Ivan Drach (a member of the CPSU) was elected head of *Rukh*, with Serhii Koniev from Dniprodzerzhynsk as his deputy. Mykhailo Horyn, a former prisoner of conscience and high-ranking member of UHU, was elected to head the secretariat.

In his speech to the congress Kravchuk claimed that the CPU would like to see in *Rukh* an ally in restructuring. But, he warned, 'All those who have once embarked upon their political path in search of an answer to "Who's to blame?" have lost their political direction. I would like *Rukh* to take this under consideration.' Kravchuk opposed the 'dismemberment of the USSR', but stood for sovereignty and improving the 'Soviet socialist federation'.⁷⁸ However, he also promised that *Rukh* would be allowed to publish its own paper and would be registered in time for its candidates to stand in the republican elections due in March 1990 (although this did not in the end happen until 14 February, too late for *Rukh* to participate).

COMMUNIST CRITICISM

There was still little sign of the CPU seeking to build bridges with *Rukh*. The official media remained implacably hostile after the *Rukh* congress, arguing that the congress did not represent the social composition of Ukraine, when, for example, only 125 of the 1100 delegates were workers and peasants.⁷⁹ The lack of live television coverage was blamed by state television and radio upon *Rukh's* refusal to grant them

accreditation, which 'was not in the style of *glasnost*' and pluralism, not in the spirit of *perestroika*'.⁸⁰ The congress was portrayed as dominated by the 'activities of various informal associations of reactionaries and of an extremist persuasion who use *perestroika* slogans as a blind resort to gross violation of public order and flouting of the law'.⁸¹

The CPU, meanwhile, attempted to organise *anti-Rukh* meetings in Kyiv and L'viv, where 'military school students dressed up in civilian clothes are brought to the stadium to speak against *Rukh* as civilians'.⁸²

The central committee of the *Komsomol* criticised it for being increasingly influenced by 'anti-socialist groups', who were making *Rukh* more anti-communist. The *Komsomol* resolved to only 'support healthy forces in *Rukh*' and to struggle against 'anti-socialist elements, expansion of anti-Soviet and nationalist ideas'. Serhii Vovchenko, secretary of the central committee of the *Komsomol*, argued that they 'must work within *Rukh*, help its orientation towards positive activity, further strengthening within it healthy forces'.⁸³ The central committee of the *Komsomol*, however, was to change course in April 1990, with its L'viv branch defecting wholesale to the opposition as the renamed Democratic Union of L'viv Youth.⁸⁴ (Although as late as January 1991 a plenum of the Poltava *oblast Komsomol* adopted a resolution denying members the right to join *Rukh*.)⁸⁵

Further cracks in CPU unity appeared when the UHU, which was the focus of numerous attacks in the official press ever since it was launched in March 1988, was invited to 'round-table constructive talks' with the local CPU committee in L'viv, the most nationally conscious region of Ukraine, with the greatest number of unofficial groups and demonstrations.⁸⁶

Bohdan Volkov, the first secretary of the L'viv city CPU, met leading figures from the UHU, Chornovil (editor of the *samizdat* journal *Ukrainian Herald*), Mykhailo and Bohdan Horyn (head of the L'viv *oblast* UHU). The aim of the discussion was simply to make contact with members of the group with a view to understanding their positions. The talks were not intended to follow a specific theme.

According to *Robitnycha hazeta*, the three leading members of the UHU (who did not attend in an official capacity) put forward fairly radical demands: 'The [republic's] budget should be set not from above - but should originate from below and work its way upwards; there should be a fair medium of exchange between different regions; profits for republican enterprises should be reinvested within the same republic and there should be a move away from central power to local authorities.' The article reported that Chornovil put forward the idea

that Ukraine's regional diversity should be recognised in a devolution of economic and administrative power to regions such as Volhynia and Galicia, as in the USA.⁸⁷

The article claimed (untruthfully) that during the discussions, the UHU representatives emphasised that, in contrast to Sajudis (the Lithuanian popular front), the UHU had not put forward the question of Ukraine's secession from the USSR.⁸⁸

Robitnycha hazeta also claimed that the UHU stood for 'the reconstruction of the Union from an authoritarian state to a federal one'. Volkov spoke at great length about the preparations to the forthcoming republican elections and asked the participants for their opinions. Mykhailo Horyn replied by saying that existing political structures ought to be preserved. However, such bodies ought to be filled with 'true statesmen, who would completely dedicate themselves to the service of the people and would take part in parliamentary work on a professional level'. Horyn added that there would be UHU representatives among future candidates to the Congress of Peoples' Deputies.

Robitnycha hazeta quoted Horyn as speaking out sharply against rumours circulating in L'viv, allegedly from the UHU, that it was anti-Russian and was preparing a pogrom against them and other minorities. 'The security services should catch every person, who wanted to provoke conflicts on the basis of nationality. This is a very dangerous game. We cannot and have no right to allow a situation to develop similar to that in Karabakh and Fergana,' said Horyn.⁸⁹

The article admitted that the attitude of the security forces towards the UHU was often not conducive towards calming down the political tension in L'viv. The article also reported the feelings expressed by the UHU representatives towards the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. Whilst the unification of all Ukrainian lands was welcome, Stalin brought with it mass terror, which at first was allegedly directed against Communists, they believed.

The L'viv city CPU had, under pressure of public opinion in western Ukraine, initiated discussions with individuals of the UHU, but this had neither the blessing of Kyiv, Moscow nor even the Executive Committee of the UHU; the head of which, at the time, was on a visit to Western Europe. As argued in Chapter 1, the CPU would eventually have to seek common political ground with the opposition, in order to rebuild its authority, but this would only begin to happen on a mass scale in 1991.

Rukh's nature as a broad church often meant arguments, splits and defections for the authorities to publicise. Tensions with east Ukraine

were highlighted in late September in Kharkiv, when 15 members of *Rukh* resigned because of the alleged 'anti-democratic nature of several of the principles in its programme and charter', and announced their intention to establish a rival Popular Front.⁹⁰ According to Vladimir Grinev (later to become deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine and a presidential candidate in December 1991), after the inaugural congress of *Rukh*, '*Rukh's* self-appointed leaders showed their separatist intent, lack of a clear-cut stance in the relations with the Party, as well as authoritarian views and a wish to suppress dissident views within the movement... Instead of arguing over national colours, we call for real action.'⁹¹ Delegates from the Voroshylovohrad (Luhans'k) strike committee also resigned, but were ready to return provided *Rukh* distanced itself from 'everything nationalist and extremist'.⁹²

UKRAINIAN LANGUAGES LAW

On 28 October 1989 the Supreme Council of Ukraine adopted a Languages Law after much deliberation and debate, and in response to similar measures adopted in other republics. The Law proposed the gradual increased use of Ukrainian over a number of years in all spheres of life, including the state, government, media and education. Ukrainian was now the state language, but the free use of all languages was guaranteed, and 'the languages of international co-operation in the Ukrainian SSR are Ukrainian, Russian and other languages. The Ukrainian SSR guarantees the free use of the Russian language as the language of international co-operation of the peoples of the USSR'. Therefore, Russian was to be the language of 'interrelations between republican and local state, party and public bodies, enterprises, establishments and organisations and ail-Union bodies'. In addition, in areas of compact settlement of national minorities their language could be used alongside Ukrainian. 'Public humiliation or contempt, deliberate distortion of the state or other languages' was proscribed by law.⁹³

The Supreme Council resolved to introduce the Languages Law over a period of ten years, and therefore charged the Council of Ministers with working out and adopting by 1 July 1990 a 'state programme for the development of the Ukrainian language and other national languages in the Ukrainian SSR in the period up to the year 2000'.⁹⁴

The Languages Law was introduced prior to the first semi-free republican elections in March 1990, and therefore at a time when the

Ukrainian parliament was still dominated completely by appointees from the Shcherbytskyi era. It is therefore ironic indeed that the Languages Law was described as necessary because of 'deviation from the Leninist principles of nationalities policy', precisely the same argument as used by Ivan Dziuba in the 1960s (see Chapter 3).⁹⁵ Those that now lamented the limitations imposed upon the Ukrainian language were, after all, the very same people who had threatened Dziuba with imprisonment and subjected Ukrainian to a severe policy of Russification during Ukraine's 'era of stagnation' (1972-89).

The Languages Law was therefore criticised by nationalists because of the weakness of its provisions concerning the revival of Ukrainian, and because of the role of Russian as an intermediary between nationalities in Ukraine, arguing that Ukrainian should have this role. (Some deputies, particularly from southern and eastern Ukraine, had in fact called for both Russian and Ukrainian to become the state languages of the republic.)⁹⁶ On the other hand, the mildness of the law, particularly in comparison with those adopted in the Baltic republics, was one factor in limiting the emergence of ethnic tensions in Ukraine.⁹⁷

RELIGION

September 1989 marked the launch of a mass Ukrainian Catholic movement for legislation prior to the planned Vatican meeting between Pope John Paul II and Gorbachev. On 17 September in L'viv, in a demonstration deliberately organised to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, an estimated 150 000 people demanded the relegalisation of the Church. In the evening L'viv residents turned out their lights and placed candles in their windows in commemoration of those repressed after the Soviet occupation of western Ukraine in 1939-41. The rally broke the 1931 record when 120 000 had gathered in L'viv⁹⁸ and coincided with an important ground-breaking article in the Moscow-based reformist magazine *Ogonek* supporting the Galicians' demands.⁹⁹

The rally, organised by the Committee in Defence of the Ukrainian Catholics Church, was addressed by its head, Ivan Hel, and independent activists such as Viacheslav Chornovil. Chornovil said in his speech that 'a decisive step has been taken toward the rebirth of the Ukrainian Church ... After today I am certain we will be successful when the Pope meets Mr Gorbachev in Rome.'¹⁰⁰ Cardinal Liubachivskyi stated that the rally 'sends a message to the Soviet government: legalise our Church ... Our people in Ukraine proved this

through their demonstration on 17 September and we in the West will continue to give them our support.'¹⁰¹

Meanwhile, the UAOC Initiative Committee began to publish a *samizdat* newspaper in September 1989 entitled *Pravoslav'ia, nasha vira*, the editors of which were Mykola Budnyk, Mykhailo Orfeniuk and Oleksandr Tkachuk. The first issue included material on Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivskyi, who established the UAOC after the 1917 revolution; the February 1989 appeal of the Initiative Committee; and an interview with the poet and *Rukh* supporter, Pavlo Movchan.

A major breakthrough for the UAOC was the emergence from retirement of Bishop Ioan of Zhytomyr, who had previously served in the Russian Orthodox Church to become *de facto* head of the UAOC in Ukraine. At a press conference after a meeting of the Holy Synod of an alarmed ROC hierarchy in November, Ioan was 'excommunicated' for 'his schismatic activities' and because he 'had subjected the souls of believers to temptation'.¹⁰²

The UAOC, however, continued to expand. A petition of 10 000 was collected in Volhynia by November, calling for the UAOC to be given the Cathedral in Luts'k. Volhynia, according to one appeal, was always a 'bastion' of the UAOC and Orthodox Brotherhood and it called upon believers to support Bishop Ioan and 'return to the bosom of their native UAOC'.¹⁰³ In early December 1989, a meeting of UAOC parishes in Kyiv resolved to establish a UAOC Brotherhood (a tradition which had existed in Ukraine in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) to act as a lay group support mechanism for the UAOC and help to foster the spread of religious culture. The UAOC organisation 'Sisters of St Princess Olha' was also established.

Conflict between the UAOC and the Ukrainian Catholic Church in western Ukraine continued meanwhile, with the UAOC caught between the hostility of both the Ukraine Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church. In Galicia the UAOC was often supported by the Communist Party, to prevent the spread of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, whereas the communists continued to support the ROC in eastern Ukraine. For many in the Ukraine Catholic Church, the UAOC in Galicia was an 'intermediate stage' between the ROC and Ukraine Catholic Church, and in future the UAOC and Ukrainian Catholic Church would merge.¹⁰⁴

Chornovil, head of the UHU press service, attempted to reconcile the two sides. The UAOC should, in his view, accept priests into their ranks only if they fulfilled a number of conditions, including condemning the 1685-6 subordination of the Kyiv metropolitanate to Moscow

and the destruction of the UAOC during the Great Terror, and supporting the separation of Church and state and the rehabilitation of Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivskyi. New UAOC priests should sign their names under these points, Chornovil stated.¹⁰⁵

During the latter part of 1989 and early 1990 the Soviet press was full of accusations and complaints from the Russian Orthodox Church alleging violence and hostility by Ukrainian Catholics in western Ukraine.¹⁰⁶ The ROC attacked *Rukh* and other informal groups for supporting the actions of Ukrainian Catholics. An open letter was drafted to the Pope from the 'Committee in Defence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church'.¹⁰⁷ People were agreeing to become Ukrainian Catholics only after 'threats of physical violence', the ROC claimed. The ROC clamoured for the imposition of a 'state of emergency' in western Ukraine and the return of Church property to the ROC. A monk from the Pochai'v monastery in Ternopil *oblast* was reported as saying that the Orthodox Church in western Ukraine 'is faced with a dilemma, either to go underground or to use force against the Uniates'.¹⁰⁸ The local authorities, afraid of the forthcoming elections, were accused of turning a blind eye to the occupation of churches.

By December 1989, 600 Ukrainian Catholic parishes had applied for registration, with over 200 ROC priests defecting to the Ukrainian Catholic Church.¹⁰⁹ An investigation by a Vatican delegation found no evidence of the use of violence in the seizure of churches, despite claims to the contrary by the ROC in the central Soviet press.

The meeting of Pope John Paul and Gorbachev in Rome on 1 December 1989 was used to announce the registration of Ukrainian Catholic parishes in western Ukraine, and the first synod of the Ukrainian Catholic Church since 1945 was held in January 1990, which proceeded to denounce and condemn the 'so-called L'viv synod of 1946' which 'reunified' the Ukrainian Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church.

The 1 December statement envisaged 'the assignment of ... buildings to religious communities ... in accordance with established procedures'. As these were not trusted by the Ukrainian Catholic Church, according to Ivan Hel, the settlement 'does not provide a real legal basis for the Church'.¹¹⁰ A tripartite commission was therefore set up to negotiate between the ROC, the Vatican and the Ukrainian Catholic Church, but broke down after the Ukrainian Catholic Church walked out, primarily because the ROC refused to accept the illegality of the 1946 Synod or to accept the legality of the Ukrainian Catholic Church as a Church with a hierarchy, and not as parish communities.¹¹¹

In September, when the tripartite talks resumed, the ROC walked out owing to the continuing dispute over the St George's Cathedral complex in L'viv.¹¹²

In a statement released in March 1990 the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Catholic Church put forward a number of conditions to be met before dialogue could be resumed: the 1946 illegal dissolution (the so-called 'L'viv Sobor') should be regarded as 'uncanonical'; all Church property should be returned and all the clergy of the Ukrainian Catholic Church who were repressed should be rehabilitated; the Ukrainian Catholic Church should have full rights as a church and be allowed to remain in contact with the Vatican; Cardinal Liubachivskyi should be allowed to visit L'viv (an event eventually scheduled for late March 1991); the Metropolitanate of Halych should be raised to the status of a Patriarchate; and printing activities should be freed of restraint.¹¹³

Once most local councils in Galicia passed into opposition control after the March 1990 elections, the Ukrainian Catholic Church obtained most of what it had been demanding.

By the early part of 1990 the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) had seven archbishops and over 200 priests. The Russian Orthodox Church remained on the defensive and, at a synod in February, the formation of 'autonomous' Ukrainian and Belorussian Orthodox Churches was announced.¹¹⁴ But despite numerous cosmetic changes to the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, little fundamentally changed. An open letter from first- and second-year seminarians in Kyiv in late June complained of an 'atmosphere of terror' against sympathisers of the UAOC and the Ukrainian Catholic Church.¹¹⁵ Despite Ukrainian being proclaimed the state language and the existence of an autonomous Ukrainian exarchate, all seminary disciplines were still conducted in Russian. The seminarians resigned and left to join the UAOC and the Ukrainian Catholic Church, 'where we are convinced that better human and Christian conduct will be forthcoming and be more democratic towards us'.

In early June in Kyiv the UAOC held its first *Sobor* (ecumenical council) for five decades.¹¹⁶ Metropolitan Mstyslav, head of the UAOC in the USA, was refused a visa to attend, but 547 delegates, after a religious service in St Sophia Cathedral and the laying of flowers at Shevchenko's monument, held their *Sobor* without him. The excommunication of Bishop Ioan was condemned and Metropolitan Mstyslav was elevated to the rank of Patriarch. In October Patriarch Mstyslav was finally allowed to travel to Ukraine, where he visited numerous regions and attended the second *Rukh* congress, after the UAOC was formally registered on 1 October.

On the last day of the second *Rukh* congress, on 28 October 1990, Patriarch Aleksii of the ROC visited Kyiv, which resulted in mass protests at what was seen as a provocative visit.¹¹⁷ When he attempted to address believers in Volhynia in Ukrainian, 'it was a praiseworthy but unsuccessful act'. Patriarch Aleksii was driven around Ukraine in the old official car formerly used by Shcherbytskyi. The incident surrounding the visit prompted leading academics in the USA and Canada to join with leaders of *Rukh* in demanding the return of St Sophia Cathedral to the UAOC.¹¹⁸

The situation of the ROC in Ukraine was critical, but it continued to refuse to discuss anything with the UAOC, maintaining an 'irreconcilable attitude to the very idea of autocephaly'.¹¹⁹ Metropolitan Filaret, who had compromised himself in the eyes of Ukrainian believers, remained the key obstacle to change.

CONCLUSIONS

The first signs of emergent civil society were now visible in Ukraine. The steady growth in support for informal organisations left many opposition leaders confident that they would progress inexorably to command a natural majority. The Ukrainian elections of 1990, however, showed that this was not the case, and that the opposition would need the additional strength of national communist defectors from the established order if it was to achieve its agenda.

6 The Birth of Mass Politics (1989-90)

1. Motyl, 1987, p. 170.
2. See Marco Bojczun, 'Interview with Volodymyr Ivashko', *Ukraine Today*, vol. 1, no. 2 (August 1990) pp. 19-23.
3. *The Globe and Mail*, 5 June 1990.
4. *The Independent*, 12 July 1990.
5. *The Times*, 5 June 1990.
6. *The Times*, 13 July 1990.
7. Ibid.
8. *Sovlef Television*, 11 July 1990.
9. *Sovetskaia kul'tura*, 12 October 1989.
10. *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 29 January 1991.
11. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 13 July 1989.
12. *Visti z Ukrainy*, no. 20, 1989; and *Pravda Ukrainy*, 6 May 1989.
13. On the CPWU see J. Radziejowski, *The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919-1929* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983); R. Solchanyk, 'The Foundation of the Communist Movement in Eastern Galicia, 1919-1921', *Slavic Review*, vol. 30, no. 4 (Winter 1971) pp. 774-94; and 'The Comintern and the Communist Party of Western Ukraine', *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Summer 1981) pp. 181-97.
14. Letter to *Daily Telegraph*, 9 August 1989. See also T. Sherlock, 'New Thinking on the Nazi-Soviet Pact', *Report on the USSR*, RL 333/89, 13 July 1989.
15. See *Zlochyny komunistychno'i Moskvyy v Ukraini v liti 1941* (New York: Prolog, 1960) (serialised in the L'viv oblast Memorial newspaper *Poklyk sumlinnia*); M. Rudnyts'ka, *Zakhidnia Ukraina pid bol'shevykamy* (New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society in the USA, 1958); and J. T. Gross, *Revolution From Abroad. The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
16. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 26 July 1989.

17. *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, Vypusk 9-10, October-November 1987 (n.p.: External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, 1988) pp. 269-75.
18. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 1 August 1989. See also the views of the Russian Democratic Union in *Rusaskaia mysl'* 18 August 1989.
19. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 26 July 1989.
20. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 5 September 1989.
21. *Daily Telegraph*, *The Times*, *Independent*, 22 January 1990; *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 25, January 1990; B. Nahaylo, 'Human-Chain Demonstration: A Triumph for Rukh', *Report on the USSR*, RL 57/90 (2 February 1990).
22. See Elisabeth Teague, 'Perestroika and the Soviet Worker', *Government and Opposition*, vol. 25, no. 1 (Spring 1990) pp. 191-211.
23. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 17 April 1988.
24. *Radio Kyiv*, 23 September 1989.
25. *Nasha meta*, no. 20 (76), June 1990.
26. *Respublikanets'*, no. 1, June 1990.
27. *Financial Times*, 15 March 1988. See also V. Haynes and O. Semyonova (eds), *Workers Against the Gulag. The New Opposition in the Soviet Union* (London, Pluto Press, 1979); and Taras Kuzio, 'Workers' Opposition in Ukraine', *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe*, vol. 5, nos 5-6 (Winter 1982-3) pp. 30-1; and J. Cunningham, *Klebanov and Nikitin. The Story of two Ukrainian miners' fight against the Soviet bureaucracy* (Oxford: no publisher or date).
28. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, Warsaw, no. 12, 1989.
29. *Hqlos*, no. 5, 1989.
30. 'Perestroika from Below: The Soviet Miners' Strike and its Aftermath', *New Left Review*, May-June 1990, pp. 5-32; and D. Marples, *Ukraine Under Perestroika. Ecology, Economics and the Workers' Revolt* (London: Macmillan, 1991) ch. 6, 'The Donbas Miners and the 1989 Coal Strike', pp. 175-217.
31. O. V. Volovodova, 'Shakhtars'kyi rukh: vid stykhiinoho vystupu do demokratychnoi systemy samoorhanizatsii', *FilosofsTca i sotsiolohichna dumka*, no. 7 (1991) pp. 45-52; fig. p. 51.
32. See also David Marples, 'Why the Donbas Miners Went on Strike', *Report on the USSR*, RL 416/89 (8 September 1989).
33. *Guardian*, 24 July 1989.
34. Volovodova, 1991, pp. 47 and 49.
35. *Dosvitni vohni*, no. 3, November 1989. See also *Obizhnyk UHS*, Donetsk, August 1989.
36. *Independent*, 24 July 1989.
37. Copy in authors' files.
38. *The Times*, 27 July 1989.
39. *Independent*, 20 July 1989.
40. *Ukra'ins'ke slovo*, 2 July 1989; and *Rusaskaia mysl'*, 23 July 1989.
41. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, no. 2, 1989.
42. *Na spolkh*, No. 6, 1989.
43. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 1 March 1990.
44. *Holos vidrodzhennia*, no. 3, 1990.

45. See *Volia*, no. 1, August 1990, where the statute of the Solidarity Free Trade Unions of Ukraine is published.
46. *Rankovyi Kyiv*, 2 July 1990.
47. See D. Kowalewski, 'The Lviv Strike Committee - The Role of Workers in the Ukrainian National Movement', *International Viewpoint*, 26 March 1990, pp. 21-2; and *Viche*, no. 14, 1990.
48. *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 15 October 1989.
49. *L'vivs'kyi visnyk*, 7 October 1989.
50. Y. Trofimov, 'Ukraine's Mandela tipped as president', *Daily Telegraph*, 22 October 1990.
51. See *Vil'na Ukraina*, 13 October 1990, for a critical account of the strike.
52. *USSR News Brief*, nos 23-4, 1989; and *Informator UHU*, no. 55, 21 December 1989.
53. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 23 March 1990.
54. *Rusaskaia mysl'*, 9 March 1990; *Sotsialisticheskii Donbass*, 9 February 1990; *Sunday Telegraph*, 14 February 1990; *Soviet Labour Review*, April 1990; *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 26 February 1990; and *Sunday Correspondent*, 4 March 1990.
55. *The Times*, 13 July 1990. See also *Independent* and *The Times*, 12 July 1990, on the strikes.
56. David Marples, 'Turmoil in the Donbas: The Political Situation', *Report on the USSR*, RL 423/90 (12 October 1990).
57. *Wall Street Journal*, 18 July 1990.
58. *Moloda Halychyna*, 12 July 1990.
59. David Marples, 'The Background of the Coal Strike on July 11', *Report on the USSR*, RL 325/90 (27 July 1990).
60. See Taras Kuzio, 'The Ukraine Stirs', *Soviet Analyst*, 27 September 1989; T. Fishlock, 'Kremlin faces challenge from Ukraine Front', *Daily Telegraph*, 9 September 1989; Rupert Cornwell, 'Ukrainians create popular front to push for reform', *Independent*, 11 September 1989; M. Dobbs, 'Moscow Eyes Ukraine Warily', *International Herald Tribune*, 12 September 1989.
61. See Vladimir Paniotto, 'The Ukrainian Movement for Perestroika-Rukh: A Sociological Survey', *Soviet Studies*, vol. 43, no. 1 (January 1991) pp. 177-81.
62. C. Freedland, 'Solidarity gives tips on how to wake Ukraine' *Independent*, 14 September 1989; *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 11, 12 and 14 September 1989; and B. Bakula, 'Dokiad zmierza Ukrainski Ruch?' *Kontakt*, 1990, no. 3, pp. 76-84.
63. Lukianenko's speech is reproduced in the special issues of *Suchasnist'*, December 1989, pp. 96-9 and translated in *Soviet Ukrainian Affairs*, vol. 3, nos 3-4 (Autumn-Winter 1989) pp. 35-6 dealing with the congress.
64. *Pravda*, 15 September 1989.
65. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 30 November 1989.
66. *Soviet Ukrainian Affairs*, vol. 2, nos 3-4 (Autumn-Winter 1989) pp. 43-52.
67. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 21 September and 12 October 1989; *Holos*, no. 5 (1989).

68. *Literaturna Ukra'ina*, 5 October 1989; and *Soviet Ukrainian Affairs*, vol. 2, nos 3-4 (Autumn-Winter 1989) p. 55.
69. *Literaturna Ukra'ina*, 5 October 1989.
70. *Radio Kyiv*, 10 September 1989.
71. J. Steele, 'Police keep wary eye on Ukraine fronts launch', *Guardian*, 11 September 1989.
72. *Literaturna Ukra'ina*, 21 September 1989.
73. *Radians'ka Ukra'ina*, 16 September 1989.
74. *Radians'ka Ukra'ina*, 15 September 1989.
75. *Izvestiia*, 9 September 1989.
76. *Radio Vilnius*, 14 September 1989.
77. *Molod' Ukrainy*, 4 October 1989.
78. *Ukrainian Weekly*, 15 December 1991.
79. *Moloda Halychyna*, 31 January 1991.
80. See Taras Kuzio, 'Nationalist Ferment in Western Ukraine', *Soviet Analyst*, 3 August 1989.
81. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 5 August 1989.
82. Both Bohdan Horyn and Mykola Horbal in their interviews in *Gazeta Wyborcza* (10 July and 28 August 1989 respectively) called for Ukrainian independence. Chornovil also called for independence at the Kyiv *oblast* Rukh congress. See *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 6 July 1989.
83. *Radians'ka Ukra'ina*, 5 August 1989; and *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 1 August 1989.
84. *USSR News Brief*, nos 17/18 (1989).
85. *News from Ukraine*, no. 44 (1989).
86. *Radians'ka Ukra'ina*, 14 September 1989.
87. *Materialy pro rozvytok mov v Ukra'ins'kii RSR* (Kyiv: ULS 'Prosvita', 1991), pp. 3-12.
88. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-16.
89. *Izvestiia*, 7 September 1989.
90. TASS news agency, 27 October 1989.
91. A. S. Pigolkin and M. S. Studenikina, 'Republican Language Laws in the USSR: A Comparative Analysis', *Journal of Soviet Nationalities*, vol. 11, no. 1 (Spring 1991) pp. 38-76.
92. *Keston News Service*, no. 334, 1989. See also *Lenins'ka molod'*, 19 September 1989; and *Vil'na Ukra'ina*, 20 September 1989; 150 000 Ukrainian Catholics also demonstrated on 18 June 1989 after Cardinal Myroslav Liubachivskyi designated the date as an international day of prayer for the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. See *Ukrainian Press Bureau*, 22 June 1989.
93. *Ogonek*, no. 38 (September 1989).
94. *Keston News Service*, no. 334, 1989.
95. *Ukrainian Press Bureau*, 19 September 1989. See also *Sunday Telegraph*, 17 September; *International Herald Tribune*, *Guardian Globe and Mail*, 18 September; *Guardian*, 21 September; *Catholic Herald*, *Independent*, 22 September 1989.
96. *Radio Kyiv*, 15 November 1989.
97. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 1 and 14 December 1989.

98. *Zakhidnyi kurier*, 3 November 1990.
99. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 21 November 1989.
100. *Radio Moscow*, 20 December 1989; *Soviet Television*, 21 January 1990; Rupert Cornwell, 'A Different Holy War Rages in Soviet Union', *Independent*, 22 December 1989; J. Steele, 'Ukrainian Catholics Accused of Seizing Churches', *Guardian*, 28 December 1989; and M. Binyon, 'Church Battle Sours new Soviet Religious Freedom', *The Times*, 14 April 1990.
101. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 13 May 1990.
102. *Radio Moscow*, 29 December 1989.
103. *Keston News Service*, 11 January 1990.
104. Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukrainian Catholics in the USSR: Towards Legalisation', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 559/89, 15 December 1989.
105. *Moscow News*, no. 31, 1989; *Keston News Service*, 17 January 1990; and *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 4 February 1990.
106. *Ukrainian Press Bureau*, 18 September 1990.
107. *Lenins'ka molod'*, 22 March 1990.
108. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 9 February 1990; and *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 15 February 1990.
109. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 27 June 1990.
110. *Keston News Service*, 7 June 1990.
111. D. Marples and O. Skrypnyk, 'Patriarch Mstyslav and the Revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church', *Report on the USSR*, RL 25/91, 4 January 1991; S. Viets, 'Rukh MPs challenge "Russian" Church', *Independent*, 29 October 1990; and A. Krushelnycky, 'Ukraine Nightmare for Gorbachev', *The European*, 2-4 November 1990.
112. *Nasha vira*, no. 7, October 1990.
113. *News from Ukraine*, no. 37 (199).