

7 1990: Ukrainian Elections and the Rise of a Multi-Party System

The all-Union elections of March 1989 were followed by elections for a new Ukrainian parliament, or Supreme Council, in March 1990. 1990 was therefore characterised by:

- further partial mobilisation of the population during the election campaign;
- the authorities successfully delaying the formation of a multi-party system, and the first signs of an independent civil society in Ukraine until after the elections; and
- (despite this) the formation of an opposition in the Supreme Council after the elections, and the beginnings of significant parliamentary politics.

REPUBLICAN ELECTIONS

In August 1989 the draft election law was published.¹ It envisaged quotas for public organisations as in the recent all-Union elections, although the *Komsomol* refused to take the twenty seats allocated to it.² The Supreme Council was to have one chamber, and its number of seats was to be reduced from 650 to 450. Most controversially, however, candidate nomination was to be controlled by district election commissions, created by local *oblast* (i.e. CPU-controlled) executive committees. Groups of 200 electors had first to nominate candidates, but any such nomination could be vetoed by the local district election commission.

The reaction from the new independent groups was very critical, in particular from the newly established Club of People's Deputies, the Ukrainian branch of the reformist Inter-Regional Group in the all-Union Supreme Soviet. (Of the 262 Ukrainian deputies to the all-

Union body, nearly 70 were reputed to be supporters and sympathisers of *Rukh*.)³

In August 1989 an open letter signed by 38 ail-Union deputies⁴ threatened: 'In the event that respective organs of power will not take into account alternative projects - to call for a boycott of the elections, including also strikes', and proposed an alternative law entitled 'On Elections to the Organs of Popular Rule'.⁵

The alternative election law attacked the allocation of 25 per cent of seats to communist organisations, proposed that only 'one person, one vote' should be the basis for the elections, demanded more candidates than seats, direct proportional elections to the Supreme Council and to the presidency, and argued against the electoral commission's influence on the registration of candidates. After the publication of the alternative election law, one newspaper claimed to have received 60 000 proposals and comments 'which repudiated the act of the group of USSR People's Deputies aimed at replacing broad dialogue and constructive discussion ... by the fuelling of tension and psychological pressure'.⁶ But the Deputies countered by saying they had 'felt strong support from below'.⁷

At the inaugural congress of *Rukh*, the Deputies Club issued an open letter to Gorbachev demanding that Shcherbytskyi should go. They agreed that tension was rising in Ukraine, but blamed this upon the republican Party apparatus, 'which is leading not to a consolidation of all healthy forces, but to confrontation'. The removal of Shcherbytskyi, they argued, would restore faith in socialism and *perestroika* because public confidence in the top leadership of the CPU had plummeted.⁸

At a meeting in Kyiv on 18 November, the Democratic Bloc was formed as a coalition of 40 independent groups to fight the elections on a common platform.⁹ Two-thirds of the programme was a negative appraisal of the situation in Ukraine, which stated that after nearly five years of Gorbachev's rule *perestroika* had failed. The elections would decide if Ukraine would be free and sovereign or 'politically, economically, culturally, a province of the central authorities'. The Democratic Bloc called for 'real political and economic sovereignty for Ukraine', economic and political pluralism, a new constitution, national rebirth, freedom of conscience and an end to nuclear power, and legal and political guarantees 'to prevent a return to the Stalinism and neo-Stalinism of the Brezhnev-Suslov eras'.

The programme appealed for a negative vote against the CPU and the ruination it had brought upon Ukraine. There was little in terms of

a concrete counter-programme. Other leading independent activists also issued their own individual programmes. Oles Shevchenko, Levko Lukianenko and Viacheslav Chornovil of the UHU still stressed sovereignty - and not independence - in their programmes, with Chornovil proposing the radical reorganisation of Ukraine along federal lines.¹⁰ The leading radical Stepan Khmara, also from the UHU, was one of the few candidates who at this stage argued for complete independence.¹¹ *Tovarystvo Leva* supported Ihor Hryniv, second secretary of the *Komsomol* in L'viv and head of the regional branch of Memorial, in a programme based upon the Democratic Bloc's call for complete republican sovereignty. All of the issues raised and proposed by the Democratic Bloc ultimately made their way into the Declaration of Sovereignty in July 1990.

The election campaign began in earnest during January and February 1990, after the highly successful human chain from L'viv to Kyiv organised by *Rukh* on 21 January. Numerous rallies were organised throughout Ukraine, even in the de-nationalised Donbas where an openly anti-communist mood was increasingly dominant, as in many similar urban areas in the RSFSR.

After a round-table at the newspaper *Vechirnyy Kyiv* on 15 February 1990 a rally was called in Kyiv entitled 'Time for Unity - not Discord!'¹² The Democratic Bloc and UHU issued a number of appeals condemning anti-Semitism and attempts by unspecified sources to incite inter-ethnic strife.¹³ In L'viv the Democratic Bloc was allegedly overshadowed by more radical groups, such as the strike committee. Pickets held aloft portraits of the leader of the wartime OUN, Stepan Bandera; there were calls for punishment of those who had ordered the use of OMON militia on 1 October 1989 against demonstrators and for 'occupation troops' to go home.¹⁴ Oleh Vitovych, later a leader of the radical Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth was quoted as saying, 'every Communist was, is and will be the hated enemy of all Ukrainians'.

The Democratic Bloc had many popular candidates, including well-known writers, intellectuals and former prisoners of conscience.¹⁵ But the refusal of the authorities to register *Rukh* until February, after the deadline for registering candidates had passed (which broke the promise made by Kravchuk at the inaugural congress of *Rukh*), together with the refusal on a local level in many areas to recognise candidates from Green World Association and the Ukrainian Language Society, meant that the elections were not wholly free.¹⁶ Of Ukraine's 33 000 polling stations, 20 000 lacked supervisors. The

state's monopoly over the mass circulation media confined publicity for the opposition programme to small, independent publications. According to *Vechnii Kyiv*, 75 per cent of the ballot in the elections were tainted in the above fashion.¹⁷ Often the Party-controlled electoral committees refused to investigate violations of the electoral law, even though M. O. Lytvyn, secretary of the Central Electoral Commission, eventually received 800 complaints.¹⁸

Eighty-five per cent of the candidates were members of the CPSU (although this included many leaders *oiRukh*). Many CPU candidates stood in rural areas, where the electorate was conservative and more easily manipulated, or utilised conscripts to bump up their vote (such as Ivashko in Kyiv *oblast*).

In the first round on 4 March, 84.69 per cent voted, whilst 78.80 per cent participated in the run-off elections.¹⁹ The results, despite the evidence of manipulation,²⁰ were in some respects a disappointment for the Democratic Bloc (DB), even though they managed to obtain between 25 and 30 per cent of the seats.²¹ In the three *oblasts* of Galicia (L'viv, Ivano-Frankivs'k and Ternopil') the DB obtained 43 out of the 47 seats, in Volyn and Rivne 11 of the 19, but in Chernivtsi and Transcarpathia (where independents won 11 of the 19 seats) fared badly. In central Ukraine the DB obtained 50 per cent of the seats, including 16 of the 22 in Kyiv. In eastern and southern Ukraine, with the exception of the cities of Donets'k and Kharkiv, the DB fared poorly.

However, a closer look at eastern Ukraine and Kharkiv showed that 28 out of the 40 DB candidates were successful, but only 2 out of 16 in southern Ukraine, indicating that in the east the DB's problems may have been more those of obstruction than of a lack of support.²² The relatively high number of uncommitted deputies from eastern Ukraine - 32 out of 122 - showed that the population was prepared to vote against the CPU establishment, if not ready to accept the cultural programme of the Ukrainian national democrats. Eight Democratic Bloc deputies came from Donets'k, and 'it is upon this unity (of national democrats and workers) that rests the further fate (of Ukraine)', argued *Tovarystva Leva*.²³ Southern Ukraine was still 'an oasis of stagnation in Ukraine'.

Of the 442 deputies elected in March 1990, 373 were Communist Party members. The CPU obtained between 25 and 30 per cent of its seats from rural constituencies. Seats in the big towns, however, were split roughly equally - 50 going to the CPU, 36 to the uncommitted and 66 to the DB.²⁴

The social composition of the new parliament was 95 from the CPU apparatus (CPU first secretaries and the like), 60 from the state apparatus (ministers, bureaucrats), 67 from the industrial apparatus (managers, experts), 44 from the agricultural apparatus (collective farm chairmen, directors of the agro-industrial complex), 14 from the armed forces, 19 from the official trade unions and allied institutions, 27 were working class, 16 unknown and 102 from the intelligentsia.

Sixty-five per cent of DB deputies were from the intelligentsia and 85 per cent of the eventual hard-line CPU group were from the command-administrative apparatus - a clear and obvious divide. A surprisingly high proportion of the managerial and economic elite (24 out of 67) were uncommitted, however. Of the deputies, 331 were Ukrainian (73 per cent) and 99 were Russian (22 per cent), with 20 from other nationalities. This almost exactly mirrored the composition of the population as a whole in Ukraine. Only 13 women were elected.

Local elections were held at the same time. These resulted in the DB breaking the CPU's local monopoly on power. The DB gained absolute control in the three Galician *oblast* councils and in many urban areas. Chornovil became the high-profile leader of L'viv *oblast* council, and was later the main initiator behind the formation of the Association of Democratic Councils and Democratic Blocs in Dniprodzerzhyns'k on 28-29 July 1990. Thus, for the first time, the opposition had a foothold in the state, and some control over the institutional resources at its command.

The elections signalled the end of the CPU monopoly over political life in Ukraine, and therefore represented a watershed in the development of the opposition. Ievhen Proniuk, a leading UHU member who failed to be elected in Kyiv due to alleged malpractice, believed that the campaign had awoken the 'political and national consciousness' of key sections of the public. Public opinion had clearly been radicalised, and anti-Communist sympathies had risen, while many CPU members began to distance themselves from the conservative leadership of their party.

The DB, however, could not yet command a natural majority in Ukraine, which still rested with the CPU because of its strength in small towns, rural areas (outside Galicia) and southern and eastern Ukraine, but the opposition had nevertheless set the agenda for the elections, and its programme ultimately became the basis for the Declaration of Sovereignty. The opposition would force the pace of change in the new Supreme Council.

The retreat to the countryside and the loss of most big cities was a crucial psychological and political blow for the CPU: psychological

because the CPU claimed legitimacy for its 'leading role' in society in virtue of its function in the vanguard of urban progressive forces, and political because urban centres were now the crucial arena of political struggle, but were now dominated by the DB or by the 'uncommitted' - candidates from the technocratic and managerial elite, who were later to become an important swing group in the Supreme Council.

LOCAL COUNCILS

A statement released by the first session of the L'viv *oblast* council, which elected Chornovil as head, described the *oblast* as an 'island of freedom' which intends to 'end the totalitarian system' and 'the usurpation of power by the Communist Party'. The *oblast* saw itself on the right path 'for the fulfilment of the eternal vision of our nation for an independent, democratic Ukrainian state'. According to one report, 'Everything is in turmoil ... L'viv today is seething with political passions, the clash of ambitions, the struggle of ideas and characters, stripped of parliamentary niceties'.²⁵

The first decrees of the Galician councils sought to replace Soviet with Ukrainian national symbols, increase the size of peasant plots and close down communist cells in factories and institutions. Later resolutions adopted by the L'viv *oblast* council included depoliticising the militia, legalising the Ukrainian Catholic Church (Ivan Hel, chairman of the Committee in Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, was elected as Chornovil's deputy) and returning its property, (all officials, such as Mayor Kotyk, were now sworn in by taking an oath on the Bible), taking local manufacturing out from under the control of central ministries, registering informal groups and attempting to take over official CPU newspapers, such as *Vil'na Ukraina*.

The early sessions were broadcast live to crowds outside, and when a huge bill was deliberately presented to the council to attempt to cut these live proceedings, an appeal for donations from the public brought in millions of roubles within days.

On 17 April 1990 the Central Committee of the CPU, Council of Ministers and Supreme Council of Ukraine issued a threatening statement denouncing the 'destructive elements' which had taken control of councils in western Ukraine.²⁶ In quoting the statement, *Izvestiia* claimed that 'a wide-scale campaign to discredit the Communist Party has been devised, and psychological pressure on Communists is increasing: they are threatened with dismissal from work and are

being forced to leave the CPSU. Practical steps are being taken for the removal from enterprises, institutions and educational institutions of party and *Komsomol* organisations'.²⁷

Stanislav Hurenko would later compare the fate of communists in western Ukraine to those in the Baltic republics, where the 'democrats' were 'violating the Constitution and Soviet laws with impudence and impunity. Their actions are ostentatious, defiant and provocative. They are clearly provoking a sharp retaliatory action'.²⁸ Coming just less than a month after the military repression in Lithuania and Latvia, this was clearly a warning by Hurenko that the same action could be undertaken in western Ukraine.

A further warning came in mid-April 1990 when the first secretary of the L'viv *oblast* CPU, Pohrebniak, was replaced by the more hardline V. Sekretariuk. *Pravda* claimed that under Pohrebniak, the Democratic Bloc had operated, 'under conditions of the *oblast* Party committee's 'ideological neutrality' ... This is why Party members found themselves without a rudder and sails, as it were, in a raging sea of public passions'.²⁹ This merely served to strengthen nationalism and led to election defeat.

In such circumstances Chornovil, despite the initial euphoria of his election, found it difficult to undertake wholesale change, particularly given a partial economic blockade against western Ukraine. In other words, he faced the classic dilemma of holding office without power.³⁰ The opposition was still hamstrung whilst the central state (both in Kyiv and in Moscow) remained strong and under conservative control. Chornovil found his local popularity slipping by mid-1991.

Similarly in Kyiv after weeks of inconclusive wrangling and two dozen unsuccessful attempts in which no candidate achieved a majority, the Kyiv City Council finally elected A. Nazarchuk, from the Democratic Centre Group (allied to *Rukh*) as mayor. In his acceptance speech Nazarchuk stated that his goal was, 'to see Ukraine independent both politically and economically'. O. Mosiiuk, a senior *Rukh* member, was elected as his deputy. The council was unable to achieve much more than symbolic change, however. In a centralised state, power has always been concentrated at the top, but increasingly that would mean Kyiv rather than Moscow, particularly as the new Ukrainian parliament began to assert itself.

PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS

During the first session of the new Supreme Council from May to August 1990 factions began to be established. However, it should be

borne in mind that, because Ukrainian political culture was still in an embryonic stage of development, and because non-communist political parties were formed only after the elections, the Ukrainian Supreme Council did not yet have a classic parliamentary system, with a mature system of party discipline. Factions lacked unity, their memberships overlapped (deputies could belong to up to two factions) and, although they may well have met as a caucus, the decisions of such caucuses tended to be recommendatory rather than binding. Even the CPU group, initially monolithic, had become fractious and undisciplined by 1991.

In June, the radical wing of the opposition formed the *Nezalezhnist'* group of 22 deputies, dominated by the UHU.³¹ The formation of a People's Council was also announced in *Literaturna Ukraïna* in June, based on the Democratic Bloc. By the summer, after the addition of some independents and the Democratic Platform of the CPU, it claimed 115-33 members.³² The head of the People's Council was Ihor Iukhnovskyy, a *Rukh* supporter and member of the CPSU until December 1990. His deputies were Levko Lukianenko, Oleksandr Iemets and Dmytro Pavlychko, with Les Taniuk as secretary.

The People's Council was soon opposed by the hardline CPU group 'For the Soviet Sovereignty of Ukraine', created on 1 June and led by Oleksandr Moroz (but more commonly known as the 'Group of 239' after the size of the conservative majority).

The People's Council's apparent minority position was bolstered by four main factors, however. First, the People's Council's deputies were more committed and regular attenders at the Supreme Council than the Communists. This gave the former disproportionate influence on the key (legislative drafting) committees of the chamber, and on the 27-man Presidium, composed of the chairman of the Supreme Council and the heads of the above committees, which issues decrees on behalf of the Supreme Council when the latter is not sitting. Many CPU deputies, on the other hand, tended to be occupied with their other jobs in the *apparat*, and were probably guilty of underestimating the newfound importance of the legislature, accustomed as they were to a political system where real power lay elsewhere. A total of 63 CPU deputies were absent at the Twenty-Eighth CPSU Congress in Moscow during the crucial sittings of the Supreme Council leading up to the Declaration of Sovereignty.

The decision to allow the opposition the chairmanship of certain key committees was in fact taken under Ivashko in May. These included the Human Rights committee under Oleksandr Iemets (of the Democratic Platform), the Culture and Spiritual Revival

Committee under Les Taniuk, Foreign Affairs under Dymytro Pavlychko (*Rukh*, and later the Democratic Party), Chornobyl' under Volodymyr Iavorivskyy (also Democratic Party), Education and Science under Iukhnovskyy, and Economic Reform under Volodymyr Pylypchuk. In addition, the deputy chairman of the Council, an ex-officio member of the Presidium, Vladimir Grinev, belonged to the Democratic Platform.

Hence, the opposition carried disproportionate weight on the influential Presidium, where it was later to form crucial links with more moderate members of the CPU.

Second, the CPU was put on the defensive by the 'Ivashko affair'. It will be recalled from Chapter 6 that, having only just been appointed chairman of the Supreme Council on 4 June 1990 (a vote boycotted by the People's Council because he maintained his position as first secretary of the CPU), Ivashko suddenly cut his ties to Ukraine, and accepted a job in Moscow as number two to Gorbachev in the CPSU on 11 July.³³ (He was replaced by a diumvirate consisting of Stanislav Hurenko as first secretary of the CPU and Leonid Kravchuk as chairman of the Supreme Council.)

Third, the People's Council had by now succeeded in establishing a sphere of acceptable opposition activity in civil society, as the CPU's ability and/or willingness to apply coercion declined, and for the first time had a foothold in the state system. Unable to take power itself, it pursued a two-pronged strategy of pressuring the reform-minded elements on the CPU, and the 'uncommitted', to take state-building measures on its behalf, while at the same time supporting a rising tide of public protest, which gradually undermined the confidence of CPU elites and undermined their will to resist. The first big public demonstrations of 1989 continued through the 21 January 'human chain', and were to culminate in the 'October Events' of 1990.

Fourth, external events, particularly the election of Yeltsin and the RSFSR's Declaration of Sovereignty on 11 June 1990, and the surprisingly hostile reaction by the Ukrainian public to the Ryzhkov government's price reform of 24 May, helped to slowly edge the CPU, under Ivashko's rather uncertain interregnum, towards the positions previously espoused by *Rukh*.

Under pressure from the Democratic Bloc, the CPU had already incorporated sovereignty for Ukraine within a 'renewed Soviet federation' into its platform for the March elections.³⁴ This position was endorsed by the plenum of the central committee of the CPU in April 1990.³⁵ But, as with so much during the last few years in the USSR and Ukraine, the understanding by the CPU of sovereignty and that by the

opposition was quite different. The CPU believed declaring sovereignty was a step towards adopting a new Union treaty, and instructed its deputies to 'actively participate' in preparing one. The opposition, on the other hand, looked at the issue of sovereignty as a means in itself, or as a step on the path to independence. Serhii Koniev, deputy head of *Rukh*, said, 'It's the beginning of independence'; whereas, Ivan Pliushch, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, was reported as saying on 16 July, 'Today is a celebration - a day of the declaration of sovereignty of Ukraine within the confines of a renewed Soviet federation'.³⁶

The major achievement of the first session of the Supreme Council was the Declaration of Sovereignty, adopted by 355 votes to 4 on 16 July as an amalgam of the five different alternatives that had been circulated by the factions.³⁷ The Declaration was more radical than observers had expected, although it was more a statement of intent, rather than a legally binding document, and the majority of those who spoke at the session stressed that the concept of sovereignty should not be directed towards secession from the USSR.³⁸ The Declaration claimed the 'exclusive right of the Supreme Council of Ukraine' to 'speak on behalf of the Ukrainian people', and the 'supremacy of its constitution and laws on its territory'. Ukraine was economically sovereign, could create a separate currency and banking system, its borders were inviolable, and it had the right to create separate armed forces. Military service should only be on the territory of Ukraine.

However, many radical demands were not met. The Declaration referred throughout to the 'Ukrainian SSR' rather than 'Ukraine'; the notion of dual citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR had been opposed by many on the People's Council; the Ukrainian SSR only had 'the right to' form its own armed forces (a compromise reached between the People's Council and Communists); and the final clause stated that 'the principles of the Declaration on the Sovereignty of Ukraine are to be used in the preparation of a new Union treaty'.³⁹

The session also passed several laws of similar intent, such as the 'Law on the Economic Independence of the Ukrainian SSR' on its last day - 3 August - and measures to limit military service to Ukrainian territory.⁴⁰

THE REPUBLICANS: UKRAINE'S FIRST OPPOSITION PARTY

After the elections, the process of forming fully fledged political parties began in earnest, once the February 1990 CPSU plenum had

opened the way for the abolition of Article 6 from the USSR and Ukrainian SSR constitutions, which had formerly given the Communist Party's monopoly of power legal status.

The inaugural congress of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU) had originally been scheduled for November 1989. The UHU's earlier 'popular front' function had now clearly passed to *Rukh*, and the UHU's leaders felt it could now fulfil its vanguard function more effectively as a political party - a party whose clear commitment to independence would help to push *Rukh* in the same direction. The repeated postponement of the congress, primarily because the organisation placed all its efforts into helping to launch *Rukh* and to push its candidates in the election campaign (eleven of whom became Deputies), was criticised by the more radical members of the UHU. They argued that 'The Declaration of Principles had already long ago lost its radical edge' and the UHU 'had stopped being in the avant-garde of the socio-political processes in Ukraine', and was losing members to more radical parties such as the Ukrainian Christian Democrats Party.⁴¹

The UHU finally held its inaugural congress on 29-30 April 1990, attended by 381 delegates representing 2300 members, 190 centres of activity, and 28 branches (including 2 outside Ukraine in the USSR); 351 delegates were Ukrainian: 157 were workers, 99 intelligentsia, and 26 were students, pensioners or the unemployed.⁴² At this stage in the development of the Ukrainian opposition, the UHU was effectively the only party with an all-republican structure, although half its members still came from Galicia. (The membership figures given at the party's second congress on 1-2 June 1991 were 55 per cent from Galicia, 6.2 per cent Volhynia 5.6 per cent Transcarpathia and Chernivtsi, 22 per cent Central Ukraine (15.9 per cent Left Bank, 6.1 per cent Right), 7.3 per cent from the East, 3.6 per cent from the South - were probably similar to those of 1990.)⁴³ The UHU could capitalise on its well-known leaders, who had the moral authority of long prison terms behind them, and enjoyed by far the largest number of independent publications.

The UHU was renamed the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP) at the congress, Levko Lukianenko was re-elected Chairman, and Stepan Khmara and Hryhorii Hrebenuk (from Donetsk) the two vice-chairmen.

The Republican Party adopted a radical programme which stood finally for complete independence, and claimed that 'Russian imperialism and chauvinism were and remain the biggest danger to the existence of the Ukrainian nation'.⁴⁴ The Republican Party stood for the

adoption of a new constitution, a parliamentary republic, depoliticisation of the judiciary, military and security services, nationalisation of CPSU property, priority of ecological over economic concerns, a Ukrainian state bank and private banks, and a Ukrainian currency. It argued that the 'Union treaty (of 1922) is invalid because it was signed by an illegal government'.

There was, however, some criticism at the congress of the party's preoccupation with the national issue, and its lack of discussion of socio-economic problems, especially by the 1970s dissident Leonid Pliushch, now an exile member of the UHU in Paris.⁴⁵

Chornovil, who issued a declaration of dissent signed by 11 other delegates, also attacked Lukianenko's conception of the party as a vanguard nationalist group with tight internal discipline, modelled on the democratic centralism of their CP opponents (as the party still had to operate semi-underground), which he saw as a betrayal of the UHU's original federalist structure and human rights priorities.⁴⁶ 'We are creating a highly centralised organisation of the Bolshevik-Fascist type,' he claimed at the congress.⁴⁷ Consequently, he kept his distance from the new party.

Arguments over the Republican Party's attitude to the Supreme Council also soon came out into the open, echoing the basic issue in wider opposition circles about whether to seek alliances with national communists. Lukianenko believed in participating in parliament's structures, and had put himself forward, symbolically, as a successor to Ivashko in July, but in August the more radical Khmara called the Supreme Council 'not a parliament, but a proto-parliament', to be regarded as a tribunal to publicise the views of the opposition and influence legislation. Khmara believed 'real power at the moment lies in the hands of the CPSU apparatus. This will remain the case until there is a change of forces in the Supreme Council'.⁴⁸ He was soon calling for the Republican Party, and the People's Council as a whole, to withdraw.

The Republican Party's radical faction had been strengthened in the wake of the congress, partly because Lukianenko, in attempting to balance West and East Ukraine by the appointment of Khmara and Hrebeniuk as his deputies, had actually chosen two ultra-radicals, around whom a nationalist faction began to coalesce. Their ally Roman Koval, a member of the Republican Party secretariat, argued that the Republican Party lacked a 'clear-cut programme of action', and should pursue a more aggressive strategy of blocking the activities of the communist majority in the Supreme Council and seeking to remove communists from local councils. The younger members of the

Republican Party were becoming increasingly impatient with their older leaders, many of whom were deputies and more ready to cooperate with the CPU. Serhii Zhyzhko characteristically believed that the Republican Party should stop just 'talking about the struggle and begin to struggle'.⁴⁹

Koval believed that by the winter of 1990 the season of meetings had ended, hence the need to search for new methods and means for struggle. The Republican Party 'sees as positive the path of destabilisation' which awakens the 'yearning for struggle in new layers of the population'.⁵⁰ The Republican Party should push for the KGB to be abolished, but should seek to expand its influence in the militia by 'enlightenment work, based in the first place upon a reawakening of national self-awareness, making clear to them the criminal activities of the CPSU/CPU whom they unfortunately defend'.

In November 1990 Koval argued that the People's Council, Association of Democratic Councils and leaders of main opposition groups should 'work out a joint strategy and form the necessary structure, a shadow Council of Ministers, which can at any moment be ready to take over the reins of power in Ukraine'. In other words, frustration at the slow pace of reform and the inability of the opposition to gain a majority were attracting radical elements within the Republican Party to the Trotskyist strategy of 'dual power' first proposed by radical groups in the summer of 1990 (see below). Instead of seeking alliances with reformist-minded elements in the state, they were prepared to promote alternative structures of power to challenge the authority of the state.⁵¹

MULTI-PARTY POLITICS: THE EMERGENCE OF A RIGHT WING

The radicalisation of the Republican Party was partly due to the emergence of other competitor right-wing parties in 1990. They also arose because of disillusion with *perestroika* and the continued conservatism of the CPU. Many were also financed by radical emigre parties, particularly the Banderite OUNr, which was anxious to construct a right wing nationalist movement in its own image.⁵² Such parties were soon displaying all the classic symptoms of a 'vicious circle of sectarianism', as a large number of small parties, barely different to one another, but nevertheless strenuously competitive, began to appear.⁵³

Such parties tended to lack a material base in terms of members and resources (although some received support from the diaspora), and hence were forced to escalate their aggressiveness and exaggerate the uniqueness of the party's profile in order to sharpen its image, and maintain members' loyalty by providing them with a strong sense of purpose and identity. This, in turn, alienates other organisations, further cutting the party off from resource-building activities, leading to a further escalation in its aggressiveness ... and so on.

Hence, right-wing parties soon began to make a lot of noise, and were usually prominent in street demonstrations, but the importance of these was declining, as the centre of activity moved into Parliament, and the moderate nationalists sought to find and ally with reformers in the CPU. The extreme nationalists' politics, therefore, were largely self-limiting, particularly as they adopted the kind of radicalism that only had a tradition of support in Galicia. Beyond Galicia the activities of the radicals were eagerly seized on by the CPU to discredit the opposition as a whole.

One such was the Ukrainian Democratic Peasants' Party formed in March 1990 to mobilise the Ukrainian peasantry. An appeal signed by 21 people 'To the peasants, workers and intelligentsia of Ukraine' was partly worded as follows:

The peasants and those whose fate is tied with the village have remained the most socially unprotected stratum of society. For their hard work they receive the lowest remuneration. Their standard of living is the least regulated, and children of peasants form the lowest percentage of students at institutes of higher education. The peasant has the lowest level of medical care and the least possibility of spiritual and cultural development.

Peasants! Who is defending your interests?

To a certain extent - nobody. For this reason it is time to form an organisation which knows the life of the peasant and of the village intelligentsia, their problems and their questions and is prepared to defend without compromise their interests.

The Ukrainian Democratic Peasants Party can become such an organisation, which will put general human values above class values and which will work towards the renewal of national agriculture and various forms of economic systems and ownership.⁵³

Its priorities were the revival of the Ukrainian village and its national traditions, arresting the demographic decline of the Ukrainian nation,

and ending the colonial exploitation of Ukraine and its agricultural sector in particular. Although its first congress in Kyiv on 9 June 1990 was addressed by moderates such as the head of the People's Council, Iukhnovskyyi, Ivan Zaiets, and others, by the time of its second congress in February 1991 it was more firmly under the control of its radical leader, the well-known writer Serhii Plachynda.⁵⁵

The UDPP found *it* difficult to expand its influence beyond Western Ukraine, but its popularity there was sufficient for the CPU to organise a rival 'Ukrainian Peasant Union', as an attempt at forming a 'Peasant Inter-Front'.⁵⁶

Another Galician-based conservative party, the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Front (UCDF) mentioned in Chapter 5, attempted to consolidate its position after what amounted to the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the winter of 1989 and spring of 1990, and the clean sweep for the opposition in Galicia in the March 1990 elections. The UCDF had displayed its radicalism by defying the law to urge a boycott of the elections in a statement issued in February 1990. 'No genuine elections can take place as long as Ukraine is an occupied territory'. The UCDF refused to nominate candidates to the 'occupational parliament', because: 'To participate in these elections ... would be tantamount to betraying the interests of the Ukrainian nation'.⁵⁷

The second congress of the UCDF was held on 21-22 April 1990 in L'viv, attended by 200 delegates, each representing on average 10 members, with another 206 guests (the first congress had far fewer delegates). Two Ukrainian Catholic priests, the Rev. Iaroslav Lesiv and the Rev. Petro Zeleniuk, began the congress with a prayer service. The congress was greeted by the chairman of the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party and a statement was read out from the Christian Democratic International. Other Ukrainian political parties, Ukrainian deputies and guests from Donetsk, Odesa, Georgia, Leningrad and Moscow also gave their greetings. The congress heard a report by the head of the UCDF, Vasyl Sichko, and adopted a new programme and statute for the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party, as the UCDF decided to rename itself.⁵⁸

'It is also important to note that the majority of both delegates and guests were young people, which is witness to the popularity of the movement among the youth,' one report stressed.⁵⁹ Vasyl Sichko was re-elected chairman of the UCDF.

A day after the congress ended on April 23, the Co-ordinating Council of Christian Democratic Organisations of (Soviet) Captive

Nations held a conference in L'viv. The resolutions criticised the introduction of a presidential form of leadership in the USSR, stated that they would 'search out dialogue and co-operation with those Christian organisations in Russia which recognise the right of each nation to self-determination', thanked the Christian Democratic International for supporting Lithuania and called for 'brotherly relations with our neighbours in Central Europe'. The statement was signed by the UCDP, Georgian National Democratic Party, Georgian Christian Democratic Association, Lithuanian Christian Democratic Union, National Union of Lithuanian Youth and Estonian Christian Union.

The second congress of the UCDF and formation of the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party coincided with the launch of the newspaper of the UCDP - *Voskresinnia* (Resurrection). The first issue contained an appeal to the Ukrainian nation, extracts from the statute and programme, a report of the first Central European Christian Democratic conference in Budapest in March 1990 and extracts from the Bible for children.

Despite the UCDP's early promise, and Galicia being a natural base for a Christian Democratic movement, the party was soon paralysed by the sectarianism that plagued other right-wing parties, and in 1991 effectively split.⁶⁰ Having helped to radicalise public opinion and speed up the retreat of the state from high totalitarianism, the UCDP like many other parties found it more difficult to put down long-term roots as an independent civil society struggled to establish itself in Ukraine.

INTEGRAL NATIONALISTS

A further group of right wing parties more consciously sought to echo the interwar Ukrainian nationalism of Dmytro Dontsov and the OUN, until now taboo.⁶¹ These were the parties closest to the OUNr, although the latter tended to shift its support from one to another, as none would serve as a simple puppet.

The Ukrainian National Party was established as the first non-communist political party in Ukraine as early as October 1989 by Hryhorii Prykhodko, a former prisoner of conscience and critic of the UHU. The UNP adopted as its programme a 'maximalist' position, refusing to participate in any official structures as 'those of the occupying power', copying the rejectionist tactics previously employed by the radical Citizens Committees in Estonia and the campaign for a 'National Congress' in Georgia. The UNP's programme demanded

the withdrawal of occupation troops from Ukraine, independence, Ukrainian armed forces (the UNP was one of the first groups to propose this), the establishment of a provisional government in Ukraine after the convocation of a Congress of Citizens owing their allegiance to the Ukrainian People's Republic of 1917, the abrogation of the 1922 Union treaty that formed the USSR and recognition by the West of the colonial status of Ukraine.⁶² It also supported 'the right to bear arms' as the best guarantee of liberty.⁶³

The UNP claimed 'principled differences' with the Republican Party, because the latter was supposedly prepared to compromise with the 'colonial government'. The small size of the UNP was not a drawback, Prykhodko, claimed, 'in today's situation the important question is not numbers, but the purity of an idea, its elite aims. Only the CPSU can brag about numbers today'.⁶⁴ The UNP then became the main initiator of the Inter-Party Assembly (IPA) which was launched in the Summer of 1990 by radical groups who refused to take part in the Supreme Council of Ukraine and criticised *Rukh* for being 'collaborationist' and too moderate.

The main purpose of the IPA was to register citizens of the Ukrainian People's Republic. When 50 per cent of the population were registered, the IPA would call a Citizens' Congress to elect a government which would declare independence. By the end of 1990, 1 million had been registered within a period of six months. The IPA also supported widespread strike action and the Kyiv strike committee was based in the Assembly's offices.

Although the list of groups participating in the Assembly was long, only two - the UNP and Ukrainian People's Democratic Party - were sizeable political parties.⁶⁵ It soon fell victim to the fissiparous tendencies described above. At the third session of the IPA in December 1990, the UNP and Prykhodko walked out (and the UPDP soon followed) after disagreements with the majority of participants who criticised their undemocratic behaviour. It is noticeable that not only the UCDP, but also the Federation for Ukrainian State Independence (the successor to the Ukrainian National Front of the 1960s and 1970s, with some of the strongest links with the OUNr) - despite all their similar ideological positions (their differences being more of a personal nature coupled with competition for domination of the integral nationalist wing of the political spectrum in Ukraine) - refused to cooperate with the IPA.

The IPA eventually came under the control of its best organised element, the Ukrainian National Union. Although ultra-radical, it

remained the most active and most visible political force to the right of the Republican Party, particularly after the 5000 strong paramilitary 'Ukrainian Self-Defence Forces' were set up under its auspices in the Autumn of 1991. Its leaders, such as Viktor Melnyk, openly compare their party's situation with that of the Nazis in Weimar Germany, hoping that his party's fortunes could be similarly transformed by economic decline.

The Federation for Ukrainian State Independence was established in April 1990 in L'viv and was led by another former prisoner of conscience Ivan Kandyba, who had been imprisoned with Lukianenko as a member of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union of 1958-61. Although calling for only peaceful methods to achieve independence, the Federation was based upon the structure of the OUN of the 1940s, as was the National Front during the 1960s and 1970s in which leading members of FUSI had been involved. Kandyba refused to have any dealings with the UNP, despite being asked on numerous occasions.⁶⁶ The Federation's programme explicitly called for 'the building of an Ukrainian state within its ethnographic borders'.⁶⁷

YOUTH GROUPS

Numerous independent youth groups were also established during this period, and tended to share the same problems of sectarianism and fissiparity as the right-wing parties.

These included student and youth organisations - the Ukrainian Students' Union in eastern Ukraine and the Student Brotherhood in western Ukraine. The Ukrainian Students' Union was established between 8 and 10 December 1989 at a congress in Kyiv University, attended by delegates from throughout Central and Eastern Ukraine. The programme of the Ukrainian Students' Union included making military education voluntary, the removal of Marxist-Leninist courses from higher education, the introduction of Ukrainian history courses, religious freedom of conscience and demands for the political and economic sovereignty of Ukraine.⁶⁸

The Student Brotherhood was launched at an inaugural congress in L'viv on 25 May 1989, although it traced its origins back to November 1988.⁶⁹ (The major impetus for the launch of Student Brotherhood had been the repressive actions undertaken by the authorities in L'viv, in particular in March 1989.)⁷¹ The programme of Student Brotherhood aimed to protect the social needs of students and help form a 'demo-

cratic national intelligentsia'. The Student Brotherhood 'was against all violations of social, political, national and religious rights of students and youth. It supported the raising of national and political consciousness and development of a democratic way of thinking'.⁷¹

On 20 and 21 February 1990 student groups organised strikes to press their demands, which included a minimum grant, guaranteed living quarters, and an end to Marxist-Leninist instruction, the political repression of students and military education.⁷² The strikes also aimed to draw the attention of the Ministry of Higher Education, USSR and Ukrainian people's deputies and to attempt to awaken students out of their passivity.⁷³ Besides the above demands, the strikers demanded the abolition of *Komsomol* committees in Higher Education and the repeal of article 6 of the Ukrainian SSR constitution on the 'leading role' of the CPU.

The strikes were followed by the congress held between 23 and 25 February 1990 in L'viv that launched the Confederation of Student Organisations of Ukraine, an umbrella group uniting the Ukraine Students' Union and Student Brotherhood. Its programme reflected the radicalisation of the student movement in Ukraine, demanding the introduction of religious holidays, national symbols, the raising of national consciousness among students and young people, the closure of nuclear power stations and punishment for those responsible for the Chornobyl' disaster.⁷⁴ The Confederation also called for Ukrainian independence and claimed that 'student problems, as well as those relating to all young people, are the result of the subjugated status of Ukraine and the totalitarian socialist system of economics. We believe that the political, economic, social and legal problems can only be resolved through democratic methods and the parliamentary way.' The Confederation also stood for the closure of Communist Party and *Komsomol* cells in enterprises, offices, education and the media.

A year later, on 30 and 31 March 1991, the Student Brotherhood and Ukrainian Students' Union formally amalgamated into one organisation, the Union of Ukrainian Students.⁷⁵ The authorities' response, even at this late stage, was to attempt the old method of forming a group with a similar name entitled the Socialist Union of Ukrainian Students.⁷⁶ Not all members of the Ukraine Students' Union agreed with the merger into the Union of Ukrainian Students, though, and a section led by Oles Donii, a leading organiser of the October 1990 student hunger strikes maintained a separate organisation.⁷⁷

The Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM) was initially organised by the Ukrainian Helsinki Union as its youth wing,

but it soon evolved into a completely separate formation.⁷⁸ SNUM held its inaugural congress in Ivano-Frankiv'sk on 26 and 27 May 1990, attended by 205 delegates representing an estimated 2000 members.⁷⁹ The congress was marred by disputes between radicals and moderates, the former eventually splitting off only six months later to form at first 'SNUM-nationalists' and then the Ukrainian Nationalist Union (UNU). SNUM-n and UNU joined the Ukrainian Inter-Party Assembly, and later came to dominate it by default as other groups left.

The programme of SNUM stated that 'it is a political civic youth organisation with co-operates with the progressive democratic forces in Ukraine and strives for political, economic and social sovereignty as a step towards complete state independence'.⁸⁰ It counterposed itself to the *Komsomol*, which educated 'youth as a reserve for the Communist Party of Ukraine and aspires to implant in them only communist ideas'. This had led to 'the persistent education of youth in the spirit of so-called atheism, national nihilism, slavish submissiveness and careerism' which, in turn, had, 'resulted in spiritual degeneration and apathy'.⁸¹

However, it soon developed into a mirror image of its rival. A former member of SNUM, Iryna Tymochko, wrote that 'Upon leaving the Association I achieved liberty ... there is a need for more goods, less hostility, less careerism, which, unfortunately, exists among members of the Association. And in the first place there is a need to love one's country, and not oneself, she wrote.⁸² Bohdan Horyn, the head of the L'viv *oblast* Republican Party, stated in an interview that because SNUM had refused to be 'guided' by the older generation it had declined over the years since its foundation.⁸³ Its ultra-radicalism certainly soon led to falling membership and the alienation of mainstream public opinion.

For some, however, even SNUM was too moderate; for example, the Association of Ukrainian Youth, established in Kharkiv and then Kyiv and Donets'k, from the outset declared its allegiance to integral nationalism, in competition with the 'democratic' SNUM.⁸⁴ The Organisation of Democratic Ukrainian Youth was the youth branch of the emigre Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic party, which began to establish branches in eastern Ukraine.⁸⁵

Other youth groups established included *Plast* scouts, which had existed in pre-war Western Ukraine as an organisation to which the Galician Ukrainian intelligentsia and middle class had sent their children both in Poland and in the diaspora. It held its inaugural congress in L'viv on 16 December 1989.⁸⁶ At its second congress Oleh Pokalchuk, the well-known young folk singer, was elected head.⁸⁷

As mentioned in Chapter 6, the L'viv *Komsomol* in 1990 broke its ties with the CPU, and renamed itself the Democratic Union of L'viv Youth. Unlike the other groups, it remained in possession of significant institutional resources, with a membership of maybe 22 000 (although this was far less than in its *Komsomol* days). The L'viv *Komsomol* newspaper *Lenins Tea molod* also defected to the L'viv Union and renamed itself in early 1990 *Moloda Halychyna*. The L'viv Union was allied to and influential within *Tovarystvo Leva* (publisher of *Postup* and later *Post-Postup*) and the Ukrainian Youth Fund (attached to the *oblast* council).⁸⁸

OTHER INFORMAL GROUPS

The pre-war Union of Ukrainian Women was relaunched in Galicia,⁸⁹ and three human rights groups were also established during this period - Helsinki-90, the Union of Former Political Prisoners and the All-Ukrainian Society of the Repressed.⁹⁰ In September the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers of Ukraine was formed under Liudmyla Trukhmanova, in order to campaign against the draft, and in favour of military service on Ukrainian territory only.

UKRAINIAN POPULAR MOVEMENT (*RUKH*)

When the second 'All-Ukrainian Assembly' of *Rukh* gathered in Kyiv between 25 and 28 October 1990, a majority of delegates considered its programme outdated, as its major points had already been achieved in the Declaration of Sovereignty and *de facto* growth of a multi-party system in Ukraine.

Data on the social composition of *Rukh's* Second Congress showed that its membership closely resembled that of Solidarity in Poland. Both were 'crisis-generated anti-partocratic movements' possessing charismatic leaders. The average age of both *Rukh* and Solidarity was 35, and each focused on 'abstract values and principles of justice, dignity, democracy, equality and freedom', with national symbols playing an important role in the movement's life.⁹¹

However, while Poland is relatively homogeneous ethnically, Ukraine is not, and *Rukh's* monoethnic nature (95 per cent of delegates were Ukrainian) and disproportionate base in western Ukraine (48 per cent of delegates) and in the cultural intelligentsia was to

prove problematical in 1990-1. *Rukh's* increasing radicalisation meant that, despite considerable growth (it now had 632 828 members)⁹² it could not mobilise the population to the same degree as the Baltic popular fronts (*Rukh's* membership at its first congress represented 0.5 per cent of the population, compared with 3 per cent in the Estonian popular front at the same stage).⁹³ It attracted as many negative opinions as positive,⁹⁴ and it began to alienate centrist and non-Ukrainian elements as it moved from a generally democratic to a more specifically national programme.

The opening speech of Ivan Drach, the head of *Rukh*, for example, sounded a radical note.⁹⁵ Although *Rukh* rejected any 'seizure of power', and would continue to seek alliances with reformist elements in the CPU, any return by the *apparat* to the methods of the past would, he declared, be met by 'extra-parliamentary means', which included, 'strikes, meetings, demonstrations, pickets, petitions, the refusal to pay taxes, the refusal to deliver agricultural and industrial produce which is unlawfully expropriated by the party-state ... and non-payment for communal services'.

Rukh's new programme demanded 'the state independence of Ukraine' and 'the creation through non-violent means of a democratic republic', and rejected any Union treaty or confederation as simply 'a new noQse ... for the oppressed nations', which would merely safeguard the monopoly of the CPSU.⁹⁶ As one *Rukh* activist put it, 'we have understood that the only way out of the crisis is also out of the Soviet Union', because the 'way to integration is through disintegration'.⁹⁷ *Rukh* had to move forward, as many of the planks in its original programme had been endorsed by the CPU. *Radio Moscow* commented that '*Rukh* has now become generally speaking, an association of anti-Party forces', 'the nucleus of the official opposition in the Supreme Council of Ukraine'.⁹⁸

The congress ratified a decision taken earlier by the *Rukh* Grand Council, to drop the words '*forperestroika*' from the title of the organisation. In the words of Volodymyr Muliava, '*Rukh* has risen to a new rung in its evolution, namely from the popular movement for *perestroika* to the popular movement of Ukraine for independence'.⁹⁹ Membership in *Rukh* was denied to those who belonged to a political party whose principal base lay outside Ukraine - a clear reference to the CPSU/CPU.

Rukh's position on the national question was now more radical. Its original February 1989 programme had envisaged national-cultural autonomy and local administration for national minorities, but now

Rukh only promised the former.¹⁰⁰ A Council of Nationalities was established, but it rarely met.

That said, *Rukh* leaders, mindful of the mistakes made by Baltic nationalists vis-a-vis their Russian minorities, alienated by seemingly threatening language and citizenship laws, to become a susceptible audience for populist 'Interfronts', always tried to concentrate on territorial, as opposed to ethnic, conceptions of nationalism. This helped to minimise ethnic tensions in Ukraine.

A discordant note was again set by the speech of Chornovil, who condemned ill-prepared strikes that relied too heavily upon workers in Western Ukraine (to strike in Western Ukraine when the councils are in democratic hands was 'counter-revolutionary'). *Rukh*, he believed, should act as the cradle for the emergence of political parties, whereas the Association of Democratic Councils and Blocs should be the kernel for the development of democratic state structures.¹⁰¹

MULTI-PARTY POLITICS: THE EMERGENCE OF CENTRE-LEFT PARTIES

During the second half of 1990, the political spectrum was further expanded by the establishment of five new centrist or centre-left political parties. This was in response to the radicalisation of *Rukh* and the Republican Party, and, from the Autumn of 1990, the CPU. Such parties sought to occupy what they saw as a vanishing centre ground, and maintain the old strategy of seeking alliances with CPU reformers. They also saw *Rukh*, the Republican Party and the rightist parties as too narrowly based in Galician extremism, and sought instead to act as bridges between east and west Ukraine.

Their numerical strength, particularly in the Supreme Council, soon began to outweigh that of the marginalised ultra-radicals, and, once elements in the CPU also returned to the centre ground after spring 1991, the national communist-opposition alliance could finally begin to take shape.

Social Democrats

Social democracy has a well-established tradition in Ukraine, going back to the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party/Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party of Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura, active in Greater Ukraine from 1900 to 1920, and the West Ukrainian Social Democratic Party of 1899-1939.¹⁰²

Therefore, towards the end of 1988 social democratic groups with an all-Union perspective had been formed in a number of Ukrainian cities. In L'viv one such group, led by a Russian, Ievgenii Patrakeev, began to publish a *samizdat* bulletin entitled *Na polnyi golos* and its members were active in local initiative committees to establish Popular Fronts in the city.¹⁰³ On 4 and 5 February 1989 in Leningrad the second all-Union conference of social democratic groups took place with 39 delegates from 14 cities. At this conference 10 groups united to form the Social Democratic Confederation, including the Social Democratic Federation of Ukraine (Kyiv) and the Association of Social Democrats (L'viv).

Ukrainian social democratic groups, primarily in L'viv and Kyiv, did not establish an independent profile until late 1989 when a programme was released in Russian.¹⁰⁴ Ukrainian social democrats tended to stress the retention of the welfare aspects of the Soviet system, mindful of a potential working-class constituency in central and eastern Ukraine. Consequently, the programme devoted little space to the national question, a criticism levelled against it by Ukrainian national activists.

However, in May 1990 the inaugural congress of Ukrainian social democrats led to a 'left' and 'right' split. The larger, rightist group felt itself closer to western European social democracy on socio-economic questions, but was relatively willing to place more emphasis on the national question. Its programme declared that 'Although historically, Social Democracy is linked to the teachings of Marx, we resolutely abandon the ideological doctrine of Marxism as a philosophy tainted with utopianism and violence ... and do not support the traditional socialist idea of restructuring society.'¹⁰⁵ It took the name the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, while the 'left' faction, which was less willing to cut its ties with the traditional ideas of the Second International, became the United Ukrainian Social Democratic Party.¹⁰⁶

The former moved quickly rightwards on economic questions, as it came to feel the urgency of radical market reform, but at its conference on 24 and 25 November 1990 condemned the 'national ultra-radicalism' gaining ground in *Rukh*.¹⁰⁷

Green Party

The draft programme of the Green Party was published in April, and a manifesto in May 1990, but these were not ratified until the inaugural congress of the Greens on 28 September 1990.¹⁰⁸ The Green

Party was established on the basis of the Green World Association, and would strive for the all-round renewal of Ukrainian society. The party dropped the former's 'eco-socialism', and based itself on a general humanism instead, totally rejecting all 'anti-humanistic theories and the practice of bolshevism, national socialism and totalitarianism'.¹⁰⁹ The Greens were, however, increasingly radicalised, as they came to believe that root-and-branch overhaul of the economic system was the only way to deal with its disastrous ecological side-effects.

The guiding principles of the Greens were 'pacifism, active community activity, non-violence and direct democracy'. The Greens were for independence and against a new Union treaty, and announced their disillusion with the prospects for reform within the CPSU. 'We are certain that the solution of ecological problems in Ukraine is impossible in the event of the maintenance of the totalitarian-bureaucratic regime and colonial status of our native land. That is why the Green Party stands against tying Ukraine to a central-imperial Union treaty', the congress appeal stated. The Greens would struggle to unify people, 'in the struggle for an independent, democratic, ecologically free, non-nuclear Ukraine'.¹¹⁰ Iurii Shcherbak, head of the Green World Association, said that he saw the Greens 'as an integral component of a strong left-centre bloc of democratic forces'.¹¹¹

The party lacked any representation in the Supreme Council, as its candidates had been prevented from standing in the 1990 elections, but its long history of activism, and the public reaction to Chornobyl' and other environmental disasters usually placed them at, or near, the top of public opinion polls.¹¹² In 1991 Shcherbak became environment minister.

The Party of Democratic Revival

The small liberal wing of the CPU, part of the all-Union Democratic Platform, announced its intention to break away from the party on 27 July 1990, after the disappointments of the Twenty-Eighth Congress of the CPSU and CPU, taking 28 deputies of the Supreme Council of Ukraine with it.¹¹³ The party, under the provisional name of the 'Party of Democratic Accord' also began to attract non-party centrists, and those disillusioned with *Rukh's* growing radicalism, such as the original head of *Rukh* in Kyiv, and *Rukh's* spokesman in the televised debates of 1989, the philosopher Myroslav Popovych.

The party contained many parliamentary 'grandees' who maintained their links with CPU circles, such as second deputy chairman Vladimir

Grinev and Oleksandr Iemets, head of the Commission on Human Rights, while its sympathisers included Iukhnovskiy and Pylypchuk. By the time of the party's second congress on 15 and 16 June 1991, it claimed a 36-strong faction in the Supreme Council (20 members and 16 supporters).¹¹⁴ Hence it is often compared to Shevardnadze's and Yakovlev's 'Movement for Democratic Reform' in Russia.

The party's strongholds were among the reformist *apparat* and technical intelligentsia of East and Central (mainly Left-Bank), Ukraine. The party's largest organisations were in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kyiv and Kharkiv, with pockets of support in Lviv. Eight of its deputies were from Donetsk, and seven from Kharkiv. It contained a rough balance of Ukrainian and Russian speakers, with the latter feeling increasingly alienated by *Rukh's* national radicalism. Therefore, the party was to play a crucial role, after it joined the People's Council in summer 1990, as a bridge between *Rukh* and the Russian-speaking radicals of eastern Ukraine, and can be credited with playing a key part in persuading potentially separatist Russian elites in Ukraine to throw in their lot with the independence movement. Because of its Russian element, the party stressed the importance of maintaining practical links with Russia, and it was the driving force behind the creation of the inter-republican 'Democratic Congress' on 26 and 27 January 1991 (see Chapter 8).

At its inaugural congress on 1 and 2 December 1990, the party was renamed the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine (PDRU), and announced it had 2340 members in 23 *oblasts'* (except Transcarpathia and Zhytomyr). Twenty-five per cent of the members were still in the CPSU, but any members of the CPSU could only attend as 'guests'.¹¹⁵ The party's social profile was confirmed by the fact that 208 delegates (or 64.2 per cent) were '*sluzhbovtsi*' (i.e. white-collar) and 55 (17 per cent) were scientific workers; 268 (82.7 per cent) had higher education and 77 (23.7 per cent) were deputies at one level or another.¹¹⁶

The congress highlighted two tendencies within the party - liberal and social democratic, reflecting the difference between libertarians such as Popovych, and east Ukrainians, such as Volodymyr Filenko, who had only recently cut their ties with the CPU, and were aware of the importance of socio-economic issues in the east.

The congress therefore stressed economic and practical issues in a clear attempt to target the urban population of eastern Ukraine.¹¹⁷ The congress, however, was also critical of the CPU's recent atavistic lapse into authoritarianism (see Chapter 8),¹¹⁸ and instead of the proposed new Union treaty suggested a 'Commonwealth of Republics'.¹¹⁹

The party also pursued a strategy of using its former links with the CPU 'to deepen ... the divergences between sovereign and imperial communist [that is, between national communists and pro-centre hardliners], and show Communist Party members the path towards integration in the civil, political, cultural and economic life of an independent, democratic Ukraine'.¹²⁰ It was described as having 'a strong potential to become one of the primary forces in a possible wide-encompassing centre coalition: social democrats, liberals, PDRU, Greens and the Democratic Party of Ukraine. In the transition period from totalitarianism to democracy the formation of such an influential centre would be very important'.¹²¹ After the August 1991 attempted coup, the PDRU was to initiate the formation of just such a centrist grouping, *Nova Ukraina* (New Ukraine).

The Democratic Party

On 15 and 16 December 1990, the Democratic Party of Ukraine was launched by those leading members of *Rukh* and former members of the CPSU, such as Ivan Drach and Dmytro Pavlychko, who had been the original driving force behind the alliance between the Writers' Union of Ukraine and dissidents formed in the winter of 1988-9. Iurii Badzo, a former prisoner of conscience, was elected the leader of the new party, with Pavlychko deputy chairman and parliamentary leader.

The party's roots lay in the attempt by Drach and Pavlychko to turn *Rukh* into a full-scale political party, announced in early March 1990 in *Literaturna Ukraina* but then rejected by the Grand Council of *Rukh* at Khust later in the same month. The rationale for this move, and the subsequent decision to form the Democratic Party, was to distance *Rukh* from the increasingly radical tactics of the Republican Party, and continue the strategy of seeking alliances with the CPU, while at the same time attempting to transfer *Rukh's* popularity to a new political party.

The original draft programme written by Badzo as long ago as April 1989 had envisaged a 'Ukrainian Party of Democratic Socialism and State Independence', reflecting Badzo's Eurocommunist roots, and the fact that the party's origins lay with the CPU elite in the Writers' Union of Ukraine. The larger manifesto and draft programme published in May and November 1990 stated that the party 'continues the traditions of Ukrainian Social Democracy ... and will strive to ensure that Ukrainian society, on its path to economic and political freedom, does not repeat the experience of primary capitalist accumulation

with its acute social antagonisms and unchecked egoistic private ownership'.¹²²

The party was therefore more centrist than the Republican Party on socio-economic questions, and viewed the Republican Party's neo-Bolshevik discipline and largely working class membership with distaste (and was therefore closer to the PDRU or Ukrainian Social Democrat's in its social base or methods of working). But, as the party of the Ukrainian-speaking cultural intelligentsia, it shared the Republican Party's views on the national question.

The much delayed December congress was attended by 523 delegates representing 2763 members and, reflecting the general radicalisation through 1990 of the cultural intelligentsia that was the party's bedrock, ratified a programme calling for independence and a market economy. Sixty-six delegates were workers, and 370 members of the cultural intelligentsia, teachers, scientists and the like.¹²³

The party claimed as its central idea the notion of balance between left and right, between the rights of individuals and the rights of the nation or state, between east and west Ukraine. When the party was registered in June 1991, its membership figures were more evenly spread than the Republican Party (concentrated in Galicia and Kyiv), or the PDRU (concentrated in central and eastern Ukraine), but, reflecting its nature as the party of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, were still biased towards the west and the Right Bank (33.6 per cent were in Galicia, 4.8 per cent Volhynia-Polissia, 6.3 per cent Transcarpathia and Chernivtsi, 35.6 per cent central Ukraine (19.1 per cent Left Bank, 16.5 per cent Right), 12.4 per cent in eastern Ukraine, and 6.9 per cent in the south).¹²⁴

The party claimed a faction of 22-26 in the Supreme Council, although eight of these were from L'viv alone.¹²⁵ At the congress Dymtro Pavlychko attacked both the 'dictatorship of one-party Bolshevism ... and Nietzschean nationalism',¹²⁶ while Badzo stressed the party's sympathy with *Rukh* 'not simply as a bloc of oppositional, but of *democratic* oppositional forces'.¹²⁷ Badzo also argued that, because the CPU 'was far from being an organisation of the like-minded, but was created artificially ... not like a party, more like a social class',¹²⁸ it was important 'not to drive Kravchuk and his supporters towards Hurenko [by then Kravchuk represented 'national communism' and Hurenko conservatism and the centre] but to seek the division between them and widen it'.¹²⁹

The year 1991, however, saw a growing rapprochement between the Democrats and the Republicans, because of their common radical

stand on the national question. If the Republicans represented mainly ex-dissidents, and the Democrats the cultural intelligentsia, the prospects for a cooperative division of labour between them were good once the Republicans had shed its ultra-radical element.

CONCLUSIONS

The period after the March 1990 republican elections saw the development of an embryonic multi-party system, both inside and outside parliament with four basic groupings.

First, the CPU and United Social Democratic Party on the left; second, the Democratic Party, PDRU, Liberal Democratic Party, Greens and People's Party in the centre and centre left; third, a centre right consisted of the Republicans, Peasant Democrats and Christian Democrats, and People's Democratic Party and finally, the far right comprised the Ukrainian National Party, the Federation for Ukrainian State Independence, and the Inter-Party Assembly (after August 1991 the Ukrainian National Assembly).¹³⁰

However, despite the consolidation of a wide spectrum of political opinion, the Ukrainian party system of 1991 remained in many crucial respects underdeveloped. Although the Republican Party had 8879 members at its Second Congress in June 1991, most other parties struggled to attract the 3000 members necessary for official registration (reduced to 300 in September 1991). The total membership of all non-communist political parties in 1991 was only 35 000-40 000, out of a population of nearly 52 million (the CPU, by contrast, claimed 2.9 million members at its December 1990 congress).¹³¹

Nearly all political parties still lacked organisational or social roots, and only had a regional base, although this was to be expected during the period when civil or public society was still in the early phase of reconstruction. Programmes tended to be simply declaratory and repetitive, and exhibited a considerable overlap in philosophy. Party discipline in the Supreme Council and local councils was weak or non-existent. Most parties were in fact little more than personality-based factions, as parties were still in the stage of defining themselves by their anti-communism, rather than developing a more positive self-image.¹³² Many parties had created overly diffuse and decentralised organisations in the idealistic initial enthusiasm, but soon had to create more streamlined and efficient structures, as the former's ineffectiveness became apparent.

The PDRU reduced its number of joint heads from seven to three, and established a ruling presidium at its second conference on 29-30 June 1991.¹³³ The Social Democrats' second congress on 26 and 27 October 1991 established the new post of party leader and more clearly delineated the spheres of competence of the party's leading organs.¹³⁴ The Greens, originally only a federation of political clubs, introduced a governing political council and secretariat in December 1991. Even the Democratic Party felt compelled to devolve power from its larger national council of 83 to a smaller working council and Presidium.¹³⁵

Although the parties helped to fill the developing ideological vacuum with the nationalist agenda, organisationally they were still no match for the resource of the state. Unable to take power on their own, they were still awaiting the emergence of the national communists.

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1. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 6 August 1989.
2. Kathleen Mihalisko, 'Reaching for Political Democracy in Belorussia and Ukraine', *Report on the USSR*, RL 555/89, (15 November 1989).
3. The Deputies Club later formed the organising committee of the DPU of Ukraine.
4. This was republished in *Pravda Ukrainy* and *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 8 September 1989.
5. *Lenin'ska Molod'*, 15 August 1989. See also Kathleen Mihalisko, 'Dispute in Ukraine over Draft Law on Elections to Republican Parliament', *Report on the USSR*, RL 430/89 (15 September 1989). The UHU also released an alternative election law drawn up by S. Khmara. See *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 22 September 1989.
6. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 8 September 1989.
7. *Moscow News*, no. 45, 1989.

8. Kathleen Mihalisko, 'Shcherbytsky Must Go: An Open Letter to Gorbachev', *Report on the USSR*, RL 441/89 (13 September 1989).
9. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 22 November 1989; *Slovo*, no. 3, November-December 1989; and *Vilne slovo*, no. 8, 1990.
10. Viacheslav Chronovil: *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 22 September 1989; Oles Shevchenko: *Ukrainian Press Agency*, Warsaw, no. 19, 1989; Leuko Lukianenko: *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 8 December 1989. Copies of Stepan Khmara's and *Tovarystvo Leva's* programmes are in the authors' files.
11. Serhii Naboka, a leading UHU member, refused to be a candidate because the Supreme Soviet was not a genuine parliament and participation in the elections was therefore 'immoral'. See *Ukrains'ke slovo*, 8 April 1990.
12. *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 21 February 1990.
13. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 22 February and 26 February 1990; *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 31 January 1990.
14. *Krasnaia zvezda*, 18 February 1990.
15. Kathleen Mihalisko, 'Can Rukh Win the March 4 Elections in Ukraine?', *Report on the USSR*, RL 91/90 (23 February 1990); and Taras Kuzio, 'Elections and National Discontent in Ukraine', *Soviet Analyst*, 21 March 1990.
16. *Literatuma Ukra'ina*, 22 February 1990; *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 5 February 1990; and David Marples, 'The Ukrainian Election Campaign: The Opposition', *Report on the USSR*, RL 115/90 (9 March 1990).
17. *Washington Times*, 18 October 1990.
18. *Pravda Ukra'iny*, 21 January 1989.
19. *Literatuma Ukra'ina*, 12 April 1990.
20. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 4 March 1990.
21. See Peter J. Potichnyj, 'Elections in Ukraine', *Berichte des Bundesinstituts fur ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale studien*, 1990, no. 36; and Dominique Arel, 'The Parliamentary Blocs in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: Who and What Do they Represent?', *Journal of Soviet Nationalities*, vol. 1, no. 4 (Winter 1990-1) pp. 108-54.
22. Arel, table 1, p. 112.
23. *Postup*, no. 7 (24), March 1990; and *Dosvitni vohni*, no. 3, April 1990.
24. Arel, table 8, p. 128.
25. *Moscow News*, no. 17, 1990.
26. *Radians'ka Ukra'ina*, 18 April 1990.
27. *Izvestiia*, 19 April 1990.
28. *Pravda*, 4 February 1991.
29. *Pravda*, 20 April 1990.
30. Valentyn Moroz, 'The L'viv Oblast Soviet Attempts to Introduce a Market Economy', *Report on the USSR*, RL 475/90, 16 November 1990.
31. *Temystyi shliakh*, 6 June 1990, p. 2.
32. *Literatuma Ukra'ina*, 14 and 28 June 1990; 'Ukraine Democrats Join Forces', *The Times*, 12 June 1990.
33. Kathleen Mihalisko, 'Volodymyr Ivashko and Ukraine', *Report on the USSR*, RL 315/90, 20 July 1990.

34. The CPU election platform is published in *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 3 December 1989.
35. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 3 April 1990.
36. Susan Viets, 'Ukraine to Vote on Sweeping Changes', *Independent*, 16 July 1990.
37. See Kathleen Mihalisko, 'Ukraine's Declaration of Sovereignty', *Report on the USSR*, RL 329/90 (27 July 1990); Peter Shutak, 'Ukraine's Declaration of Sovereignty', *Soviet Analyst*, 1 August 1990; J. Rettle, 'Ukraine Soviet Republic Proclaims Sovereignty', *Guardian*, 17 July 1990; F. Clines, 'Ukrainians Declare Republican Sovereignty Inside Soviet System', *New York Times*, 17 July 1990; Marta Dejevsky, 'Ukrainian Parliament Declares Its Sovereignty', *The Times*, 17 July 1990; P. Symon, 'Ukraine Votes to Break Away', *Daily Telegraph*, YI July 1990; and Adrian Karatnycky, 'Now It's the Ukraine's Turn', *Wall Street Journal*, 18 July 1990.
38. TASS, 16 July 1990.
39. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, Warsaw, 16 July 1990; and *News from Ukraine*, 1990, no. 31.
40. David Marples, 'The First Session of the Ukrainian Parliament', *Report on the USSR*, RL 403/90 (28 September 1990).
41. Article by Volodymyr Iavorskyi in authors' files.
42. *Ustanovchyi z'izd Ukrains'ko'i respublikans'koi parti'i* (Kyiv: RUKH-inform, 1990) p. 52.
43. Report of the mandate commission, 2nd URP congress; in authors' possession.
44. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 14 May 1990; *Halychyna*, 2 June 1990; and *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 17 July 1990. See also 'Rights Group Form First Free Ukrainian Party in 70 Years', *The Times*, 1 May 1990.
45. *L'vivs'ki novyny*, no. 22, 1990. See *Ustanovchyi z'izd ...*, 1990, pp. 92-93.
46. Iurii Kyrychuk, 'Narys istorii UHS-URP', *Respublikanets*, no. 2. (November-December 1991) p. 95.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
48. Copy in authors' files.
49. *Prapor antykomunizmu*, no. 5, 1990.
50. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 12 March 1990; *Literaturna Ukraina*, 8 March 1990; and *Moloda Halychyna*, 7 April 1990.
51. See Chapter 1.
52. Angelo Pannebianco, *Political Parties, Organisation and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) p. 194.
53. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 18 June 1990; and *Russkaia mysl'*, 22 June 1990.
54. *Agro*, 9 June 1990; *Zemlia i volia*, no. 1, August 1990; and *Moloda Halychyna*, 26 September 1990.
55. *Visnyk Rukhu*, no. 6, 1990; and *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 12 December 1990. See also *Literaturna Ukraina*, 8 November 1990 for Serhiy Plachynda's views.
56. 'Appeal of the UCDF to the Ukrainian People', *Ukrainian Review*, vol. XXXVIII, no. 1 (Spring 1990) pp. 82-3.
57. *Moloda Halychyna*, 24 April 1990.
58. *Chervona dolyna*, 5 May 1990.

59. Ievhen Boltarovych, 'L'vivshchyna: politychni slyly i potitychnyi spektr', *Respublikanets*, no. 2 (November-December 1991) p. 30.
60. See Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929* (Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs, 1980) ch. 6; and M. Sosnows'kyi, *Dmytro Dontsov: Politychnyj portret: Z istorii rozvytku ideolohii ukrains'koho natsionalizmu* (New York/Toronto: Trident International, 1974).
61. *Visnyk UNR*, no. 1, June 1990.
62. Haran', 1991, p. 30.
63. *Visnyk Rukhu*, no. 6, 1990; *News from Ukraine*, no. 43, 1990; *Ukrainian Weekly*, 21 October 1990; and *Ratusha*, 18 October 1990.
64. The L'viv branch of the Ukrainian Peasants' DPU also participated initially.
65. The Bandera faction of the OUN was called the 'external branches' of the OUN in the 1950s, and during the 1960s renamed itself the OUN revolutionaries (OUNr).
66. *Visnyk UNR*, no. 1, June 1990.
67. The programme is published in the special edition of the Federation's organ *Poklyk voli*. See also *Moloda Halychyna*, 10 April 1990; and interview with a veteran of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and member of the Federation in *Halychyna*, 22 July 1990.
68. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 13 December 1989; *Ky'ivs'kyi politekhnik*, 22 December 1990.
69. *Kameniar*, 22 and 29 May 1989.
70. On the Student Brotherhood, see *Komsomol's'ki prapor*, 27 January 1990; *Moloda Halychyna*, 20 December 1990; *Prosvita*, vol. 3, no. 23, 1991; and *L'vivs'kyipolitekhnik*, 1 March 1991.
71. SB programme in authors' files.
72. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 21 and 22 February 1990; *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 14 February 1990; *Molod' Ukrainy*, 17 February 1990; and *Vechirni Kyiv*, 2 March 1990.
73. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 16 February 1990.
74. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 26 March 1990.
75. *Radio Kyiv*, 11 February 1991; *Molod' Ukrainy*, 10 April 1991; *Moloda hvardiia*, 12 April 1991; *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 25 April 1991; *Slovo*, no. 10, May 1991; and *Osvita*, 11 June 1991.
76. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 27 April 1991.
77. On Donii, see *Holos Ukrainy*, 2 February 1991; while on the Ukraine Students Union see *News from Ukraine*, nos 42 and 46, 1991.
78. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 1 June, 21 August and 26 October 1990; *Radians'ke slovo*, 27 February 1990; *Halychyna*, 1 June 1990; *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 1 July 1990; *Moloda Halychyna*, 28 August 1990; and *Ratusha*, 13 October 1990.
79. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 1 June 1990; *Halychyna*, 1 June 1990; and *USSR News Brief*, nos 5-6, 1989.
80. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 26 October 1989.
81. See the article 'SNUM: Alternatyva Komsomolu?', *Osvita*, 15 February 1991.

82. *Postup*, no. 1, October 1990.
83. *Molodyi respublikanets'*, no. 1, 1991.
84. See *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 21 August 1990. See also the interview with the people's deputy and chairman of SNUM, Ihor Derkach, in *Perturbatsii*, no. 1 (Autumn 1989) pp. 29-37.
85. *Moloda hvardiia*, 6 July 1991.
86. *Nashe slovo*, 4 November 1990; *Bratstvo*, no. 4, 1990; *Moloda Halychyna*, 10 April, 1 May, 22 May, 14 August and 23 August 1990; *Halychyna*, 28 August 1990; and *Svoboda*, 9 June 1990.
87. *Molod' Ukrainy*, 18 April 1991.
88. *Ukrainian Weekly*, 15 December 1991.
89. *Moloda Halychyna*, 8 March 1990; and *Halychyna* 19 May, 10 June and 17 July 1990.
90. (All-Ukrainian Society of the Repressed); *Ukrains'ke slovo*, 16 September 1990; and *Zona*, no. 1, 1990; (Union of Former Political Prisoners): *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 14 November and 7 December 1990; (Helsinki-90): *Informatsiinyi biuleten ukrainskoho komitetu 'Helsinki-90'*, no. 1, August 1990.
91. The sociological breakdown of *Rukh* is given in *Ukrainian Reporter*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1991); and David Marples, 'A Sociological Survey of *Rukh*', *Report on the USSR*, RL 21/90 (12 January 1990). For a comparison with Solidarity see Janusz Pakulski, 'Leaders of the Solidarity Movement: A Sociological Portrait', *Sociology*, vol. 20, no. 1 (1986) pp. 64-81; and *Social Movements. The Politics of Moral Protest* (Melbourne: Longman, 1991).
92. All figures from *Suchasni politychni partii ta rukhy na Ukraini* (Kyiv: Institute for Political Research', 1991) p. 230.
93. Figures supplied by Oleksyi Haran'.
94. For example, in an autumn 1991 poll of 2056 Ukrainians for Radio Liberty, 35.8 per cent evaluated *Rukh* positively, and 36.4 per cent negatively. *Vechirni Kyiv*, 3 December 1991.
95. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 7 November 1990.
96. *Druhi vseukrains'ki zbory narodnoho Rukhu Ukrainy: Dokumenty* (Kyiv: *Rukh* Secretariat, 1990) pp. 4 & 44.
97. M. Dobbs, 'Group Calls for Ukrainian Independence', *The Washington Post*, 29 October 1990.
98. *Radio Moscow*, 25 October 1990.
99. *Radio Kyiv*, 3 November 1990; and *Kul'tura i zhyttia*, 4 November 1990.
100. *Druhi vseukrains'ki...*, p. 16.
101. The Association was established in July 1990. See *Moloda Halychyna*, 2 August 1990; *Zakhidnyi kurier*, 3 August 1990; and *Ratusha*, 20 November 1990.
102. See Volodymyr Lytvyn, 'Suchasni sotsial-demokratychni partii Ukrainy, *Polityka i chas*, 8 June 1991, pp. 44-9.
103. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, press release nos 14 and 15, 1989.
104. Copy in authors' files.
105. *Ukraina bahatopartiina: Prohramni dokumenty novykh partii* (Kyiv: Pam'iatky Ukrainy, 1991) p. 74.

106. See *Visnyk Rukhu*, no. 2, 1990; *Postup*, no. 1 (18) 1990; *Moloda Halychyna*, 19 May 1990; *Halychyna*, 8 July 1990; *Moloda Halychyna*, *YI* July 1990; and *Ratusha*, 4 October 1990.
107. Copy in authors' files.
108. See *Zelenyi sviť*, no. 1, April 1990; and no. 2, May 1990.
109. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 30 September 1990; *Visti z Ukrainy*, no. 42, 1990; and *Kul'tura izhyttia*, no. 14, 1990.
110. *Zelenyi sviť*, no. 12, October 1990.
111. *Zelenyi sviť*, no. 11, September 1990.
112. For example, 10.28 per cent, second only to the then CPU in August 1991; *Zelenyi sviť*, no. 16, October 1991.
113. *Ukrainian Press Agency*, 26 September 1990; *Moloda Halychyna*, 7 April 1990; and *Literaturna Ukraina*, 19 April and 23 August, 1990.
114. *Demokratychnyi vybir*, no. 11, 1991.
115. *Ukrains'ke slovo*, 23 December 1990. The programme was published in *Suchasnist'*, January 1991, pp. 191-6.
116. *Partiia demokraticheskogo vrozhdennia Ukrainy: Materialy uchreditel'nogo s'ezda* (Kyiv: Ukrniinti, 1990) p. i. See also Volodymyr Lytvyn on the UPDR in *Polityka i chas*, no. 1, January 1991, pp. 84-6.
117. *Holos*, no. 21, 1990.
118. *Ratusha*, 4 December 1990.
119. *Partiia demokraticheskogo ...*, 1990, p. 39. See also *Vechirni Kyiv*, 11 December 1990.
120. O. Iemets to the party's second congress in June 1990. Quoted by Volodymyr Lytvyn, 'Novi orientyry novykh partii', *Polityka i chas*, 12 (August 1991) p. 52.
121. *Zelenyi sviť*, no. 14, December 1990.
122. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 31 May 1990.
123. Volodymyr Lytvyn, 'Demokratychna partii Ukra'iny', *Polityka i chas*, 2 (January 1991) p. 56.
124. Membership figures presented to the Ministry of Justice for registration, 24 June 1991. Authors' files.
125. *Ikva* (DPU organ) no. 1, 22 June 1991.
126. *Ideini zasady demokratychnoi partii Ukrainy: z materialiv ustanovchoho z'izdu* (Kyiv: Prosvita, 1990) p. 15.
127. *Ibid.*, p. 24. Emphasis in original.
128. *Trybuna*, no. 4, 1991, p. 35.
129. *Zakarpats'ka pravda*, 30 April 1991.
130. See the article by Taras Kuzio in *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 4 June 1991; and *Slovo*, no. 11, 1991.
131. Rostyslav Khotyn, 'Bahatopartiinist': diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi (Politychna kar ta Ukra'iny), *Nezalezhnyi ohliadach*, August-September 1991, pp. 12-20.
132. See also A. M. Sliusarenko and V. Tomenko, *Novi politychni partii Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Znannia, Serii Chas i suspil'stvo, no. 12, 1990).
133. Volodymyr Lytvyn, 'Novi orientyry novykh partii', *Polityka i chas*, 12 August 1991, pp. 47-55.
134. *Kyivs'kyi sotsial-demokrat*, no. 2 (December 1991).

135. *Postanova natsional'noi radi DPU*, no. NR-2-2-1, 18 May 1991. Authors' files.