

8 Stalemate and the Rise of National Communism (1990-1)

THE VIEW FROM THE CENTRE

By 1990 Gorbachev understood that maintaining the Soviet nationality policies of his predecessors with only minor alterations was no longer acceptable to the ruling elites of the Soviet republics. The three Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, together with Armenia and Georgia, had already declared independence. The March 1990 elections had empowered new and more democratic parliaments within the 15 republics as well as given access to state resources and the media to anti-communist and democratic groups. A 'war of laws' began between the newly elected republican parliaments and the centre, followed by declarations of sovereignty in the summer and autumn.

1990 also witnessed the emergence of Boris Yeltsin in the centre. Yeltsin was to form his own power base within the Russian Supreme Soviet from which he progressively challenged Gorbachev and the Soviet centre. Yeltsin championed the right of Russia also to possess its own attributes of statehood and sought allies among the other republican leaders against Gorbachev. The rise of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation that year ensured that Yeltsin was able to cut his ties to it ahead of Kravchuk in neighbouring Ukraine. The Russian Communist Party remained a conservative, anti-reformist institution in total opposition to Gorbachev's *perestroika* (as well as Yeltsin's post-Soviet reforms). Yeltsin's opposition to Gorbachev came from the opposite end of the political spectrum, accusing Gorbachev of not being reformist enough.

Russia became an important ally of the non-Russian republics who pressed for the USSR to be transformed into a confederation, in contrast to what Gorbachev offered ('renewed federation'). Russia signed bilateral agreements with the other republics, including with Ukraine in November 1990, which recognised existing borders. Any new Union

Treaty should be built on these bilateral treaties, the republican leaders argued. Gorbachev, who had rejected a new Union Treaty in September 1989, realised six months later that the USSR would not survive without one. In June 1990 a working group was therefore established to draw up a new Union Treaty, the first draft of which was presented in November of that same year.

The draft Union Treaty quickly ran into problems. A multi-tiered federation, with some republics backing confederal and others federal ties, would be a recipe for chaos. If Gorbachev had not opposed a new Union Treaty between 1988 and 1989 the majority of the republics would have settled for this minimalist position. As it was, Gorbachev's refusal to consider restructuring centre-periphery relations led inevitably to the radicalisation of demands by both Popular Fronts and national communists after 1990. The majority of the republics would no longer accept a cosmetic re-working of the USSR; to them the 1922 Union Treaty had never been voluntary and the state had never been a genuine federation. From the late 1920s Soviet republics had far less power than American states or Swiss cantons. By mid-1990, therefore, what Gorbachev was offering was too little, too late. The bulk of the Soviet republics, particularly the two key ones - Russia and Ukraine - would only accept a renewed USSR in the form of a confederation of sovereign states built from the bottom up on the basis of bilateral treaties.¹

In April 1990 the Supreme Soviet adopted a new law 'On the Procedure for Dealing With Matters Connected With the Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR'. The process would take up to six years. Autonomous republics could decide to remain within the USSR and therefore the seceding republic could lose territory. Secession had to be backed by a referendum where two thirds had to approve the decision. If it failed another referendum could not be held for five years. If the vote was less than two thirds a second referendum could not be held until after ten years.² The law was therefore immediately dubbed a law 'Against Secession', geared primarily to holding back the Baltic and Trans-Caucasian republics from pushing for independence.

THE VIEW FROM UKRAINE

From the autumn of 1990, it became increasingly clear that the CPU was losing its previous unity, and that the long-desired alliance between the opposition and reform-minded elements in the CPU was

at last taking shape, as the logic of 'national communism' outlined in Chapter 1 finally began to unfold. However, from the summer of 1990 until August 1991, this tendency would be interwoven with a counter-attack against the opposition by conservative elements within the CPU, co-ordinated with similar moves by Moscow hardliners (and to a certain extent orchestrated by them).

As the opposition was not strong enough to take power on its own and was increasingly weakened by growing radicalisation and differentiation within its ranks, an uncertain period of stalemate, both between the two wings of the CPU and between the CPU and the opposition, lasted until August 1991. Then the CPU hardliners discredited themselves by their support for the coup and left the path clear for an alliance between the national communists and the nationalists.

Hence, although the predicted rise of national communism within the CPU was initially obscured by an uncertain transition period of 'dual power' - of competition between the two wings of the CPU, and between the institutions of Party and state - it is important to bear in mind that the national communist wing of the CPU had already been promoting state building measures in alliance with the People's Council throughout the third session of the Supreme Council from February to July. The failed coup only accelerated this process, rather than beginning it.

STUDENT HUNGER STRIKES AND REACTION

The first session of the new Supreme Council from May to August 1990 had been marked by partial victories for the opposition People's Council, and had seen the CPU on the defensive since its Twenty-Eighth Congress in June 1990.³ The diumvirate elected to replace Ivashko, Leonid Kravchuk as chairman of the Supreme Council and Stanislav Hurenko as first secretary of the CPU, seems originally therefore to have been intended to lay the foundations for a counter-attack against *Rukh* and the People's Council. Kravchuk's initial election as Chairman of the Supreme Council on 23 July 1990 was boycotted by the People's Council, which at the time only remembered him for his leadership of the media assault on *Rukh* as CPU ideology secretary in 1988-9. Consequently, they issued a public statement relinquishing 'responsibility for the activities of the newly elected chairman of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR'.⁴

There was certainly little doubt that Hurenko at least was a dour traditionalist. In his view, 'What is particularly worrying is the

continuing underestimation of the danger of anti-communism and the absence of even the slightest attempt at countering its increasing onslaught'. Having 'sustained a furious onslaught from anti-communist propaganda in a state of ideological demobilisation', the CPU should now reassert itself again, he argued.⁵

Hence, after a lull in the summer, the second session of the Supreme Council from October to December 1990 was marked by growing tension and confrontation. A 200 000-strong mass demonstration in Kyiv on 30 September was timed to coincide with the session's opening, and was followed by a general strike (albeit patchily supported) on 1 October.

When things appeared to be calming down, up to 150 students, organised by L'viv's Student Brotherhood and Kyiv's Ukrainian Students' Union, began hunger strikes in Kyiv that were to last from 2 to 16 October.⁶ The students demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Masol, new parliamentary elections on a multi-party basis, military service to be on Ukrainian territory only and the nationalisation of CPU and *Komsomol* property, and adamantly opposed the signing of any Union treaty (seeking to bind the authorities to a statement already made by the Presidium of the Supreme Council on 30 September that Ukraine would not sign any Union treaty until it had revised its own constitution).⁷ Unlike the spring student strikes, the hunger strikes attracted widespread popular support and appeared to catch the authorities (and the People's Council, apart from the radical wing of the Republican Party) unawares.

Divisions within the *apparatus* were obvious once the hunger strikers were not dispersed in the traditional fashion, and after several days of rising tension, and increasingly large public demonstrations, the authorities conceded an agreement on 17 October that met most of the students' demands. Although a section within the *apparatus* was prepared to implement the accord, and Prime Minister Masol was replaced by Vitold Fokin on 23 October, others viewed it merely as a device to end the strikes, and the period from November onwards was marked by a series of measures designed to restore CPU control.⁸ Clearly the time was not ripe for the national communists to come to the fore, as too many within the CPU had their eye on the trend in the opposite direction in Moscow. Moreover, in retrospect the People's Council, despite issuing a call for Polish-style round-table talks, was not sufficiently organised to take advantage of the opportunity to enforce wholesale change.⁹

When the Supreme Council reconvened on 13 November, the CPU forced through limitations on the right of public demonstration during

workdays, and reduced the necessary quorum for Supreme Council business from two-thirds of the deputies to a half, thereby depriving the 120 or so People's Council deputies of their power to stop proceedings by simply leaving the chamber.

Ukraine was also, of course, subject to the more hardline measures coming from Moscow during this period, such as extra powers for the KGB and militia patrols on the streets, and conservatives forces were clearly in the ascendent during the second phase of the Twenty-Eighth Congress of the CPU in Kyiv on 13 and 14 December.¹⁰ The conservatives were also disturbed by the campaign spreading from Galicia to Kyiv for the rehabilitation of the nationalist movements of the 1940s, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). In an opinion poll conducted in the summer of 1991 in L'viv *oblast*, 95.8 per cent viewed the UPA and OUN as a historically positive phenomenon.¹¹

In April 1991 an All-Ukrainian Brotherhood of Veterans of the UPA and OUN was launched in L'viv to propagate Ukrainian military traditions and halt criminal actions against Ukrainian defectors from the Soviet armed forces.¹² The Veterans organisation also sought to rehabilitate the UPA and OUN, and erect memorials, called for the release of political prisoners, and, not surprisingly, opposed the Union treaty.

Although Ukraine did not suffer from the use of military force in the winter of 1990-1 in the same way as the Baltic states did, there were several disturbing incidents that led to an escalation of tension. In December 1990 and June 1991 three nationalist monuments to Stepan Bandera and Ievhen Konovalts (leaders of the OUN), and to the SS Galicia Division (a Ukrainian force trained by the Germans in World War II) were blown up. According to Ihor Derkach, member of the parliamentary commission on military and security affairs, this was the work of the same KGB 'Alpha' anti-terrorist unit based in Moscow used in the assault on the TV tower in Vilnius in January 1991. The day after the Lenin monument was removed in Ivano-Frankivsk on 10 October 1990, a hand grenade was thrown inside the city council building. At the scene a note was left which said it was 'Revenge for Lenin' and signed by '*Pamiat*'.¹³

The destruction of the monuments was apparently organised by Moscow. A copy of a letter dated 13 December 1990 from the Soviet Ministry of Defence to military officers in L'viv *oblast* called upon them to 'increase the combat readiness of troops' in response to 'the provocations' of 'destructive and nationalist elements' in western Ukraine.¹⁴

The letter told officers to 'earnestly counter' the erection of monuments to 'fascists', which were to be 'liquidated' wherever possible. On 7 December 1990 the Kyiv military garrison received orders of General Varennikov 'to place under military defence Soviet monuments where this is called for', and to destroy 'fascist monuments'. In the same month a Communist Party of Ukraine plenum called for the prevention of the erection of monuments to nationalist heroes.

THE KHMARA AFFAIR AND THE NEW RIGHT

The most celebrated instance of reaction came on 7 November, when the radical deputy and joint deputy leader of the Republican Party, Stepan Khmara, who had presented a draft law calling for the nationalisation of CPU property in October, was set up on charges of assault. The 239 (plus one) hardline CPU deputies then voted to strip him of his parliamentary immunity on 17 November, leading to his subsequent arrest in the parliament building itself.

By targeting Khmara, the CPU hoped to split the opposition, not all of whom were prepared to join in the campaign for his release, and associate themselves with his radical politics. Hence the affair was dragged out until the aftermath of the August attempted coup, with Khmara spending two long terms in prison, leaving moderates in the Republican Party from speaking out against him and his policies while he remained something of a popular hero.

The conservative counter-attack served to promote its mirror image - a more militant and oppositional right-wing nationalism. However, the rise of such groups soon led to tensions with those People's Council moderates seeking to encourage the emergence of a national communist group with whom alliance-building would be possible.

The theoretical conference of the Republican Party held on 23-24 February 1991 in Kyiv demonstrated the growth of such radical nationalism among the party's young members, who tended to support Khmara, and were calling for the party to adopt a mythologised version of the OUN's ideology, or of Dontsov's elitist nationalism.¹⁵ The party's radicals had close links with the Inter-Party Assembly and other radical groups,¹⁶ who were becoming increasingly noisy, if not necessarily increasingly influential, through the early part of 1991.¹⁷ The emigre OUNr had been supporting such groups financially, and

by supplying the works of authors such as Dontsov and Bandera in order to promote their own radical brand of nationalism.¹⁸

The Republican Party's leadership shared the desire of the rest of the opposition to co-operate with the national communists, especially in times of rising reaction, whereas for the young radicals this represented weakness and compromise. Ukraine was simply a colony that required liberation, and those who, by participating in its structures 'help to perpetuate the colonial status of Ukraine, are an enemy of the Republican Party, and an enemy of Ukraine'.¹⁹ Such views led to a series of bitter disputes between Koval and the Republican Party's parliamentary moderates, represented by Oles Shevchenko, and rampant factionalism on the Republican Party's secretariat.²⁰

In the run-up to the party's second congress on 1-2 June, the radicals - Koval, Hrebenuk, Zhyzhko, lavorskyi and others - were all purged. The party also forbade joint membership of the Republican Party and Inter-Party Assembly.²¹ However, although support at the congress for Khmara's brand of radicalism was confined to 15 per cent of the delegates, the leadership felt compelled to retain him as Lukianenko's deputy, given his continued persecution and consequent popularity.²² As a result, the Republican Party would continue to be sidetracked by the Hydra-like return of its radical element, despite the growing desire of Lukianenko and the Horyn brothers to co-operate with the national communists.²³

PARTY ALLIANCES

The Republican Party was not alone in its problems. The CPU's attempts to divide and rule the opposition had some success, as the climatic October had failed to result in outright defeat for the CPU, the euphoria of the mass meetings of 1990 had dissipated, and the opposition's ability to organise collective action had declined. *Rukh's* second congress had failed to deal with the threat that the newly created political parties posed to its umbrella function, and increasingly the parties tended to pursue their own line, as *Rukh* faded into the background.

Rukh had tried to devise a system of collective membership for political parties to counter this threat, but none of the major parties had taken up the offer. The Republican Party wished to preserve its distinctive profile, while at the same time using 'entryist' tactics to promote its

interests within *Rukh*. The PDRU and Social Democrats saw themselves as centrists and distrusted *Rukh's* growing nationalism, and the Democratic Party did not join because of similar fears expressed by delegates from eastern Ukraine at its founding conference.²⁴

Attempts at merger or coalition between the parties floundered, despite the fairly minimal ideological distance separating them. Co-operation at a local level encouraged the Democratic Party, PDRU and Social Democrats to talk of merger, but such overtures were eventually rebuffed by the Democratic Party because of the others' supposed indifference to the national question.²⁵ The Democratic Party's own attempt to unite all nationally minded parties in a coalition entitled 'Independent Democratic Ukraine' collapsed on 10 June 1991, as Drach saw it as a rival to *Rukh*, and Lukianenko again wished to preserve the Republican Party's distinctive face.²⁶

In November 1990, a Committee of Public Accord was formed in L'viv by nearly all parties, to support Chornovil's council in the face of the CPU's counterattack. In effect, it usurped many of the functions of *Rukh*, but the example was not copied elsewhere in Ukraine.²⁷

Hence, all attempts to transcend the problems created by weak and fissiparous political parties failed. Parties were more successful, however, in forging foreign links.

The PDRU was the main Ukrainian initiator of the 'Democratic Congress' of 46 opposition groups from 10 republics (mainly also centre-left groups, such as the United Democratic Party of Belorussia [Belarus], and the Russian Republican Party and Social Democrats), formed in Kharkiv on 26-27 January 1991.²⁸ The congress promoted the idea of a commonwealth of sovereign states, which the PDRU and its Russian allies then placed before their respective parliaments. The PDRU, therefore, claims the credit for first promoting the notion of a 'CIS' that was eventually adopted for the dismantling of the USSR in December 1991. The congress was also designed to promote good Ukrainian-Russian relations, as the Ukrainian centrists had long advocated.²⁹

More radical groups had begun meeting as early as January 1988, as the 'Co-ordinating Committee of the Patriotic Movements of the Peoples of the USSR'.³⁰ Ukrainian delegates were mainly from the UHU, and helped to establish the Co-ordinating Committee as an international lobby for individual and national rights, and to promote mutual understanding among the republics and a common front against the centre.

The Ukrainian Greens also established links with their counterparts in other republics at meetings in Kyiv on 4 July, and in Tbilisi on 9 September 1991.³¹

DIVISIONS IN THE CPU

However, despite the apparent supremacy of the conservatives within the CPU, the bifurcation of the CPU leadership was beginning to have its effect. Divisions between the hardline and pro-Moscow approach represented by Hurenko and the embryonic national communism of Kravchuk began to surface in the aftermath of the January 1991 events in Lithuania and Latvia. The Presidium of the Supreme Council issued a statement condemning the events, stating that it 'supports legally elected state executive organs of the Republics ... [and] ... considers inadmissible the use of military force on the territory of any Republic for the solving of internal and inter-ethnic conflicts without the approval of the legitimate authorities of the Republic'. Whereas the CPU central committee adopted a resolution condemning the 'provocative campaign, conducted by national-separatists and extremist forces' in Lithuania.³² Hurenko on 4 February called for solidarity with 'our party comrades who are being persecuted in this region [the Baltics] in a most flagrant, uncivilised and dangerous way ... [We should] offer them political and moral support'.³³

Kravchuk, meanwhile, had since its first meeting on 1 November 1990, headed a 59-man committee of experts established after the 17 October accord with the students to draw up a project of constitutional reform. Divisions over its deliberations surfaced at the CPU plenum in February 1991.³⁴ According to Hurenko, 'We and Kravchuk have different points of view concerning the realisation of sovereignty. Leonid Markarovych's speech shocked many at the last plenum of the central committee of the CPU.'³⁵ Kravchuk, on the other hand, defending Parliament from the Party, said 'Many [Communists] have not parted with the illusion that it is not a [Supreme Council] session in which they are participating, but a Party plenum'.³⁶

When the committee's plans were presented to the Supreme Council on 14 May, it became clear that Kravchuk intended to proceed with state-building measures, that is to give genuine content to the July 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty, which at the time had been little more than a statement of intent. This would also allow Ukraine to stall on signing Gorbachev's Union treaty, claiming that

determining its own constitutional status had to be logically prior to deciding its constitutional relations with other republics.

THE MARCH 1991 REFERENDUM, THE UNION TREATY AND THE RISE OF KRAVCHUK

The first results of the developing centrist alliance between 'national communists' and the majority in the People's Council came in the run-up to the 17 March 1991 referendum called by Gorbachev on the future of the Union. The old 'Group of 239' was only able to muster 135 votes for the presentation of Gorbachev's question ('Do you consider it necessary to preserve the USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which human rights and the freedoms of all nationalities will be fully guaranteed?') on its own. Radical proposals in the Supreme Council of Ukraine for a boycott or a ballot on outright independence also failed to gain a majority.

On 27 February Kravchuk secured a 277-32 vote to present Gorbachev's question simultaneously with a second, specifically Ukrainian, question. ('Do you agree that Ukraine should be part of a Union of Soviet Sovereign States on the basis of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine?')³⁷ The opposition-controlled Councils in the three Galician *oblasts* later added a third question. ('Do you want Ukraine to become an independent state which independently decides its domestic and foreign policies, and which guarantees equal rights to all of its citizens, regardless of their national or religious allegiance?')

The 70.5 per cent support for Gorbachev's question was not unexpected, but the Ukrainian question received an even higher 80.2 per cent, and 88.4 per cent voted for independence in Galicia. As all the questions were basically contradictory, it was possible for all political forces in Ukraine to interpret the results as they saw fit. The interpretation that mattered, however, was Kravchuk's. He ignored the first and third ballots, and used the second (plus the October 1990 student agreement) to support his line of negotiating a commonwealth of sovereign states, but only once Ukrainian sovereignty had been achieved. Ukraine had first to constitute itself as a legal subject capable of signing such a treaty.

The February-July Supreme Council session would indeed discuss much constitutional reform, but at a pace which gave Ukraine the power to procrastinate on the Union treaty as it deemed necessary.

The referendum in fact largely confirmed the balance of political forces in Ukraine first revealed in the March 1990 elections. The conservative and pro-Union forces were stronger in the south and east, and in small-town Ukraine and the countryside, whereas radical nationalism dominated in Galicia (spilling over into Volhynia), Kyiv and some other urban centres. (See Table 8.1.)

Public opinion in Ukraine remained more conservative than in many other republics (the Baitis, Georgians, Armenians and Moldovans boycotted the vote altogether), while the opposition had found it difficult to improve on its 1990 results without access to the mass media, which remained largely under CPU control.

After Gorbachev used the March referendum to begin the Union treaty process at the Novo-Ogariovo meeting on 23 April, Kravchuk had to perform a difficult balancing act (Ihor Iukhnovskyy had voiced the suspicion in March that Kravchuk was saying one thing in Moscow and another at home in Kyiv).³⁶ The domestic pressures on him were considerable. The Republican Party was demanding outright independence, and even the relatively moderate PDRU was insisting on a '9 and 0' formula, rather than a '9 and 1'; that is nine republics could form a union as equal partners, but there must be no centre.³⁹ Significantly, Kravchuk had organised a meeting in Kyiv on 18 April between the leaders of Ukraine, the RSFSR, Belarus, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to organise a common front in defence of this position, and avoid being bounced by Gorbachev.⁴⁰

Kravchuk, if not duplicitous, was certainly seeking a middle course, but a middle course that split the difference between Gorbachev's demand for a renewed federation with 'a strong centre and strong republics' and strong domestic pressures. These left him insisting that

if we wish to preserve the Union it can only be as a union of sovereign states. ... We are adopting a clearly radical position. Our aim is not to destroy the Soviet Union, but we don't want to see it once again become a formal union of 'sovereign states' where powerless governments and powerless parliaments would once again be required to rubber-stamp dictates from the centre.⁴¹

In the face of a call by the Republican Party for a general strike, and student threats to renew hunger strikes if any Union treaty was signed, 345 deputies voted on 27 June to delay any consideration of the Treaty until 15 September, when the Supreme Council of Ukraine was due to reassemble.⁴² This represented a victory for the line

Table 8.1 Results of the 17 March 1991 referendum in Ukraine (per cent)

<i>Oblast</i>	<i>Union question</i>	<i>Republican question</i>	<i>Galician question</i>
<i>Galicia</i>			
L'viv	16.4	30.1	90
Ivano-Frankivs'k	18.2	52.1	90
Ternopil'	9.3	35.2	85.3
<i>Volhynia</i>			
Rivne	54.2	79.6	
Volyn'	53.7	78	
<i>Other West</i>			
Transcarpathia	60.1	69.5	
Chernivtsi	80.8	83.2	
<i>Left Bank</i>			
Kyiv (city)	44.6	77.8	
Kyiv (<i>oblast</i>)	66.9	84.6	
Kharkiv	75.8	83.8	
Poltava	78.8	88.7	
Sumy	78.8	87.1	
Chernihiv	83.3	90.3	
<i>Right Bank</i>			
Kirovohrad	82.4	89.5	
Cherkasy	77.3	88.8	
Vinnytsia	81.2	89.2	
Zhytomyr	81.7	88.4	
Khmel'nyts'kyi	87.8	87.9	
<i>East</i>			
Donets'k	84.8	88.2	
Luhans'k	86.3	88.9	
Zaporizhzhia	79.8	86.8	
Dnipropetrovs'k	77.5	85.1	
<i>South</i>			
Mykola'iv	85.2	87.7	
Kherson	81.4	87.4	
Odesa	82.15	84.5	
Crimea	87.6	84.7	
Total	70.5	80.18	88.43

83 per cent of those eligible to vote took part.

Source: Electoral Commission, official results.

pursued by Kravchuk and the deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, Ivan Pliushch, over Hurenko's desire to lock Ukraine into the treaty at an early stage.

Kravchuk was able to take this line because the previously monolithic unity of the hardline CPU 'Group of 239' in the Supreme Council began to disintegrate in Spring 1991, and a centrist alliance started to replace it as the dominant force. (Of the 450 deputies elected in 1990, 373 had been members of the CPSU/CPU, but this numerical dominance was much reduced by later defections and the *de facto* existence of a large bloc of independents. The term 'Group of 239' had therefore referred to the hardcore CPU majority revealed in controversial votes such as the 17 November 1990 decision to wave Stepan Khmara's parliamentary immunity.)⁴³ By June 1991, Kravchuk could claim that 'in practical terms ... this group [the '239'] no longer exists. In essence, it has liquidated itself.'⁴⁴

The increasing bifurcation of the CPU was also apparent beyond the Supreme Council. On 15 June an open letter from CPU dissidents styling themselves 'Initiative Group-91' appeared in *TemopiV Vechimii*. It attacked the party as 'the main obstacle to democracy and social progress ... [and] to the independence of Ukraine' and called 'for the split of the Communist Party of Ukraine from the CPSU, for its complete independence, and for its transformation into a Social Democratic parliamentary party'.⁴⁵ The growing climate of disillusion with the party had reportedly reduced its ranks from 3.5 to 2.5 million, with many more not paying their dues.⁴⁶ On the other hand, Hurenko was still defending 'the socialist choice' and attacking the opposition for 'always nudging Kravchuk' away from Communist orthodoxy.⁴⁷

NATIONAL COMMUNISM

There were several reasons for this development. Before 1990, power had clearly been concentrated in the hands of the CPU central committee-ministerial nexus. (In so far as any real power had been devolved to Ukraine - see Chapter 1.) A formal separation of powers had existed, but the legislature and courts had a purely decorative role. The old system was not replaced overnight in March 1990, but slowly gave way to an institutional pluralism, in which party, ministerial, legislative and eventually presidential structures competed for influence, without any of them being hegemonic. (This inevitably also meant a highly chaotic and inefficient system of government.)

A crucial fault-line then developed within the CPU majority, between those who belonged primarily to the party *apparatus* and those who belonged to state or economic institutions, with the latter group, as argued in Chapter 1, being more susceptible to 'national communism'.

According to Mark Beissinger, the behaviour of republican elites in the former Soviet Union can be analysed in terms of three alternative rational-technical, patronage and authority-building models.⁴⁸ All three, under given conditions, would predict growing tendencies towards national communism, particularly among state officials. Rational-technical theory would argue that the system of *nomenklatura* - the selection of leadership cadres according to ideological loyalties - had to be increasingly supplemented by the co-optation of specialist elites for efficiency reasons. The system is then progressively subject to the priority of technical over political objectives, and even the importation of nationalist ideologies, in so far as rational-technical elites will reflect the culture of the society from which they are drawn. Such technocrats will then seek to gain personal control over their own activities, given that they will tend to assume that such areas should be regulated by their own professional competence, rather than by political interference from above.

Given the absence of professional organisations or true pressure groups in the former USSR, the only way to make such an assertion of professional independence was through Union-republican structures, rather than at the lower level of individual enterprises and institutions. Additionally, as the Soviet economy and ministry system descended into utter chaos in 1990-1, it became rational for rational-technical elites to seek to escape from the ail-Union system as part of an elementary exercise in crisis management. Some may have sought to evade past traditions of vertical control altogether. Some may have hoped to re-establish subsidies, and the inter-enterprise exchanges without which the Soviet economy could not function at a republican level. Some thought that a sovereign Ukrainian government would be easier to influence and control.

As the Soviet economy began to slow, and eventually to shrink in 1990-1, it also became rational for local elites to seek an expanded role for local political institutions, in order to compete more effectively in a zero-sum struggle over diminishing resources.⁴⁹ Such Ukrainian elites were represented in the Supreme Council of Ukraine by the 67 members of the 'industrial *apparatus*', i.e. mainly enterprise managers; the 44 members of the 'agricultural *apparatus*', or mainly

collective farm chairmen; and the 16 members of the institutions *apparaf*, that is representatives of scientific or cultural institutions.⁵⁰ Increasingly through spring 1991, this group supported aggressive state-building measures, which it perceived as likely to serve its own interest. Key figures in this group were VasyP Ievtukhov, head of the so-called 'industrial faction', Leonid Kuchma, head of the Pivdenmash rocket factory, and Volodymyr Slednev, director of a metallurgy complex in Donets'k.⁵¹ Thus, for example, the vote to establish a national Ukrainian bank in April 1991, on a platform of establishing a Ukrainian currency, and the June declaration of control over all Soviet enterprises on Ukrainian territory were measures first and foremost promoted by the 'industrial faction'.

Patronage, or patron-client networks, could logically strengthen either integrative or centrifugal forces, depending on whether the most important circles of patronage existed at a republican or an all-Union level. Traditionally, Ukrainians' status as 'younger brothers' meant that considerable channels of opportunity were open to them at an all-Union level. This was often a deliberate tactic to ensure the loyalty of Ukrainians to the imperial system, and also to remove many of the more active and ambitious elements from Ukrainian territory.⁵² Ivashko's departure to Moscow in July 1990 exemplifies this trend.

Although the upper reaches of the CPSU became increasingly Russified under Gorbachev, it largely remained true that a majority of CPU party officials continued to see their career progression in an all-Union context.⁵³ Few in the CPU central committee sought to cut ties with Moscow in the manner of the Lithuanian CP. The 1990 CPU programme stated that, 'while assigning importance to the widening of the independence of the Communist Party of Ukraine, we at the same time consider that it must be dialectically unified with the strengthened international, principled and organisational unity of the CPSU'.⁵⁴

However, the all-Union logic that continued to dominate in party structures was of decreasing importance in state or economic structures. As argued in Chapter 1, the logic of 'national communism' was primarily one of the incubation of nationally-minded elites in *state* structures, who then sought to gain power over their own societies whenever the imperial centre contracted. The elections of 1990, and the declining authority of central ministries (and their simple inability to deliver resources), further encouraged this increasing separation of

party and state. State institutions sought to invest themselves with the power they had lacked in the past - and enterprises increasingly came to rely on horizontal supply links between themselves, rather than on traditional vertical lines of authority.

As Kravchuk became an increasingly aggressive spokesman for Ukrainian interests, others hitched themselves to his bandwagon, such as his deputy as Supreme Council chairman, Leonid Pliushch, and other powerful figures on the Presidium, including Mykola Khomenko, head of the parliamentary secretariat, Anatolii Chypurnyi, of the agriculture committee, Vasyl Riabokon of the deputies' ethics committee, and (at a later stage) Anatolii Matvienko of the youth committee. Such allies, along with the People's Council representatives, gave Kravchuk a majority on the Presidium, while Khomenko and Pliushch were especially useful in helping Kravchuk manipulate what was after all a very inexperienced parliament.

Most importantly, however, authority-building strategies led to national communism. Competitive republican elections in conditions where alternative focal points for organisation, such as class, were not available (see Chapter 1), meant that authority-seeking republican elites had to ground their appeals in the myths and symbols of populist nationalism. Thus, by mid-1991, it was Kravchuk, as much as the opposition, who was reviving the cultural discourse of national moral patrimony, in preparation for his presidential bid in the autumn.

In July 1991, for example, Kravchuk referred in a speech at the Palace of Culture to the present day as Ukraine's *third* attempt to establish national independence in the modern era (after Khmelnytskyi in 1648, and the hitherto officially reviled Ukrainian People's Republic of 1917-21.)⁵⁵ On 18 June *Radio Kyiv* announced that 16 July would be celebrated as a public holiday and Ukraine's Day of *Independence* (not just sovereignty), replacing 'USSR Constitution Day'.

The logic of national communism was thus playing itself out. The failure of the centre to recentralise while this was perhaps still possible, in 1990 or early 1991, meant that centrifugal forces were close to attaining critical mass. Moreover, the failure to overthrow the governments of the Baltic republics in January, and the second big wave of Ukrainian miners' strikes in March 1991, and the apparent rapprochement of the national movement and the working class that followed, had reduced the CPU's options and made a conservative programme less feasible.

STATE-BUILDING MEASURES

Meanwhile, the Supreme Council, although not yet prepared to fully overhaul the constitution, took the initial decision on 21 May to establish a presidential form of government for the republic, whose name, state symbols, and exact form of administration were to be decided by referendum, as was the question of whether the future state would maintain its 'socialist choice' (the referendum plans were subsequently overtaken by the August events.)⁵⁶ Clearly, an executive presidency would be used to strengthen the position of Kravchuk, but the People's Council also supported such moves in so far as Kravchuk was beginning to adopt their policies, and because they saw a more powerful presidency as the best means of circumventing the hardliners in the CPU (previously the president had only chaired the Presidium, real power lying elsewhere with the first secretary of the CPU).

A federal form of government within Ukraine was rejected, and local councils were to be transformed by having their elected chairmen function simultaneously as presidential plenipotentiaries. The Law on the Presidency eventually adopted on 5 July gave the President the power to issue decrees and to reorganise the government (Article 7), although not to dissolve the Supreme Council of Ukraine, or veto its laws (Article 5). The President could not 'be a people's deputy, or occupy any [other] position in state organs or social organisations' [i.e. political parties] (Article 2).⁵⁷ The first such Executive President would be chosen in direct elections on 1 December.

The new President would be able to take a more active role in pushing for additional state-building measures to those already adopted. By July, more than thirty⁵⁸ laws had already been passed to give substance to the Declaration of Sovereignty, including the May streamlining of the Ukrainian government, the nationalisation of the metallurgy and coal-mining industries in June, the election of Volodymyr Matviienko as chairman of a newly created Ukrainian National Bank in June on a platform of introducing a Ukrainian currency, and the June declarations asserting control over all Soviet enterprises on Ukrainian territory and claiming for the Ukrainian government the sole right to levy taxes on its territory.

At this stage, however, such declarations often had only symbolic affect, as shown by the fact that similar, but more effective, measures were passed in the wake of the failed August coup.

Ukraine also sought to expand its sovereignty by a series of bilateral agreements with other Soviet republics (most importantly, with the

RSFSR on 19 November 1990)⁵⁹ and neighbouring states, including Hungary in September and Poland in October 1990.⁶⁰

Ukrainian economic policy had also become increasingly nationalist and protectionist since the adoption of the 'Pylypchuk-Fokin programme' on 1 October 1990. This introduced a system of coupons (paid with salaries) that had to be used in parallel to roubles for the purchase of most goods and services. This was designed to prevent Ukrainian products leaving Ukraine, as was the introduction of a licence system on 10 April 1991 for the 'export' of all consumer goods. In the summer, the government introduced measures to prevent the sale of grain to other republics and introduced patrols on the republic's borders to enforce the measures (although never in sufficient numbers.)⁶¹

MOVES TOWARDS A CENTRIST COALITION

The other side to the equation concerning the possibility of a centrist alliance was the People's Council. The March 1990 elections had given the opposition a foothold in power for the first time, and in retrospect created the first real opportunity for co-operation with reform-minded elements in the CPU. (Such a combination was less feasible when the opposition was confined to the streets.) Practical co-operation within the unicameral Supreme Council of Ukraine, where deputies are seated alphabetically and by region, also had its effect.

At the same time, the best strategy for the People's Council itself seemed to be the pursuit of an alliance with 'national communists' in the CPU. The People's Council itself was by 1991 divided into four main groups, consisting of the 36 members and supporters of the Party of Democratic Revival (PDRU), the 26 claimed by the Democratic Party,⁶² the radical *Nezalezhnist'* group dominated by the Republican Party's 11 deputies, and the rest as nominal independents.⁶³ The radicals, however, were often marginalised, or in disarray. The Khm^ra affair had forced the Republican Party into an isolated position in his defence. The Inter-Party Assembly had begun to splinter, with many of its founder members leaving, and the radical nationalist movement in general developing extreme fissiparous tendencies. On the other hand, the defection of the PDRU from the CPU in mid-1990 had both strengthened the position of the centrists on the People's Council, and provided it with valuable leadership and a crucial bridge to the national communists with whom the PDRU had been closely associated.

Moreover, the results of the 1990 republican elections, largely confirmed by the March 1991 referendum (see above), indicated that opposition forces did not yet enjoy a natural electoral majority, even if a trend in their favour was detectable. The People's Council, therefore, pursued a strategy of pushing Kravchuk to take state-building measures on its behalf. In this respect, the continued campaign of public demonstrations, resumed again on a large scale in spring 1991 (people remained more passive in winter in Ukraine), helped to maintain the psychological pressure on the CPU, as did the strike wave in March.⁶⁴ No one demonstration was ever crucial in itself, but their cumulative effect was to indicate to potential 'national communists' that the key to any future authority-building strategy would be the co-optation of national myths and symbols.

'INTERFRONTS' AND MINERS' STRIKES

Conservative communists in the Baltic republics had based their survival strategies on creating 'interfronts' to drive a wedge between indigenous intelligentsias with programmes of national cultural and linguistic revival, and a largely Russian working class of recent immigration, susceptible to populist appeals concerning the threat of nativisation and factory closure. The social structure of Ukraine, however, as indicated in Chapter 2, was not fertile ground for such a policy (74 per cent of the working class was Ukrainian as early as 1970, and Russians and Ukrainians were much closer linguistically and culturally than Russians and Baits).⁶⁵ Ukraine's Russians, even when in-migrants, were joining a Russian community with deep historical roots in Ukraine rather than being settlers in a hostile community, as in the Baltics and Moldova (the Crimea is an exception here, hence later problems).

Attempts were nevertheless repeatedly made to establish a Ukrainian interfront, and to play up minority or Russian discontents, particularly in Crimea, and Transcarpathia.⁶⁶ *Anil-Rukh* rallies were organised in Kyiv on 12 and 20 November.⁶⁷ However, such efforts had limited success. The 1989 Ukrainian Languages Law was as yet a paper tiger, and fears of 'Ukrainisation' difficult to stimulate. Most importantly, the Baltic interfronts were established to oppose governments already dominated by nationalists, whereas in Ukraine the national communists seemed likely to keep power themselves. It was therefore illogical for all but hardline communists to support such

populist movements. Interfronts only began to take off after the autumn of 1991 and the Ukrainian Declaration of Independence and banning of the CPU, when they seemed the only way for many *local* elites to ensure their survival.

The miners' strikes of March 1991 had in fact revealed a level of political radicalisation wholly absent in 1989. If anything, their demands were over-politicised and unrealistic: the resignation of Gorbachev, the dissolution of the ail-Union Congress of People's Deputies and the granting of constitutional status to Ukraine's Declaration of Sovereignty over and above their economic demands.⁶⁸ Such radicalisation indicated that the most organised sections of the working class were not yet promising material for a populist appeal.

The strikes themselves, however, were a relative failure, revealing a lack of organisation and co-ordination with the broader opposition movement.⁶⁹ As in 1989-90, working class living conditions were sufficiently appalling to persistently create outbreaks of unrest, but a lack of social cohesion always meant that the organisations thrown up by the unrest soon went into decline, or began to splinter. Ukraine is not mono-ethnic, and lacked the Catholic Church that had underpinned Solidarity in Poland.

The strikes' disorganisation, however, led to a post-mortem round table of union and opposition leaders at Pavlohrad in May⁷⁰ and the subsequent inaugural congress of the 'All-Ukrainian Union of Workers' Solidarity' (VOST) in Kyiv on 21-23 June.⁷¹ Three hundred and thirteen delegates claiming to represent 1-3 million Ukrainian workers,⁷² adopted a highly radical platform, and elected the Donetsk miner Oleksandr Ivashchenko as leader.⁷³ VOST self-consciously styled itself on Poland's Solidarity movement, and formed a 'Consultative Council' of political advisers, dominated by radicals such as Stepan Khmara and Larysa Skoryk, in the hope that the long period when the intelligentsia-led national movement and the unions developed largely in isolation was coming to an end.

However, the moderates on the People's Council maintained their distance from the workers' movement, as they courted the CPU's 'national communists', while council leaders such as Chornovil continued to condemn strikes as a 'stab in the back to democracy'.⁷⁴ VOST's alliance with radicals (from the Republican Party, and even Inter-Party Assembly) was therefore something of a blind alley, and an obstacle to the organisation's further growth. VOST was as much a street-based protest movement as a workplace trades union. Tensions

also remained in the Donbas with the all-Union 'Independent Miners Union', denounced by Skoryk as 'clearly a new imperial connivance'.⁷⁵ The official trades unions, although discredited, also proved difficult to displace, given their control over many welfare benefits, sanatoria and so on.

CONCLUSION

Hence on the eve of the August coup attempt, the national communists were clearly gathering strength. The possibilities for a conservative counterattack had been weakened by the half hearted assault on the Baltic republics in January, the continuing decline of the imperial centre, and the apparent *rapprochement* between the opposition and the working class. In retrospect it is clear that the coup attempt came too late. The slippage of power to the republics, and their leaderships' reorientation towards their own national electorates had gone too far.

8 Stalemate and the Rise of National Communism (1990-1)

1. David Marples, 'The Communist Party of Ukraine: A Fading Force?', *Report on the USSR*, RL 253/90 (8 June 1990).
2. *Vechirniy Kyiv*, 24 July 1990.
3. *Soviet Television*, 4 July 1990.
4. See Taras Karpalo, 'The Ukrainian Student Movement: A Brief Account', London: *Ukrainian Central Information Service*, 120/91 (8 November 1991).
5. David Marples, 'Ukrainian Premier on the Way Out?', *Report on the USSR*, RL 446/90 (26 October 1990).
6. Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukrainian Communist Party on the Offensive', *Report on the USSR*, RL 111/91 (8 March 1991).
7. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 4 October 1990. For the latter point, see the remarks by V. Filenko in *Komsomol's'koie znamia*, 15 June 1991.
8. See *Materialy XXVII z'izdu Komunistychnoi parti'i Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Ukraina, 1991).
9. *Moloda Halychyna*, 6 August 1991.
10. *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 1 May 1991.
11. *Zakhidnyi kurier*, 13 October 1990.
12. *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 10 July 1991.
13. *Ideolohiia i taktyka URP: Materiialy teoretychno'ikonferentsii* (Kyiv: URP, 1991) especially pp. 14-17, 48-9, 57-8. Or see Volodymyr Iavors'kyi in *Prapor antykomunizmu*, no. 5 (December 1990).
14. The Cherkasy branch of the URP, for example, joined the Ukrainian National Party en masse in late 1990. *Visti*, no. 1, 1990.
15. David Marples, 'Radicalisation of the Political Spectrum in Ukraine', *Report on the USSR*, RL 306/91 (30 August 1991).
16. *Shliakh peremohy*, 16 December 1991.
17. Roman Koval', *Hobs*, no. 8, 1991.
18. The disputes are summarised in *Hobs*, nos. 8 and 9, 1991.
19. *L'vivs'ki novyny* (newsletter of L'viv URP) no. 16, 1991.
20. On the URP's second congress, see *Hobs Halychyny: Rozdumy pro doliu Ukrainy na 2-mu z'i'zdi URP* (Boryslav: URP, September 1991).
21. See the speech by Lukianenko, 'URP na suchasnomu etapi', *Samostiina Ukraina*, no. 5 (January 1992).
22. *News from Ukraine*, 1991, no. 1.
23. Protocol for the meetings of the DPU's party council 12 April 1991, and Grand Council 14 May 1991. Authors' files.
24. *Visnyk: Informatsiinyi biuleten' DPU*, no. 1 (28 June-19 July 1991), p. 8.
25. *Ukrainian Reporter*, vol. 1, no. 4; Ievhen Boltarovykh. 'L'vivshchyna: Politychni sylu i politychnyi spektr', *Respublikanets*, no. 2 (November-December 1991) p. 25.
26. *Ukrainian Reporter*, vol. 1, no. 5 (March 1991).

27. For the resolutions of the Congress, see *Literaturna Ukraina*, 7 February 1991.
28. Meetings were held in Erevan (12-15 January 1988); Tbilisi (19-20 March 1988); L'viv (11-12 June 1988); Riga (24-5 September 1988); Vilnius (28-9 January 1989); and Loodi, Estonia (29 April-1 May 1989). See Bohdan Nahaylo, 'Representatives of Non-Russian National Movements Establish Coordinating Committee', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 283/88 (22 June 1988); 'Non-Russian Democratic Movements Hold Another Meeting', RL 465/88 (10 October 1988); and 'Non-Russian National-Democratic Movements Adopt Charter and Issue Appeal to Russian-Intelligentsia', RL 87/89 (24 February 1989).
29. Joint declarations are in authors' files.
30. *Ukrainian Reporter*, vol. 1, no. 3 (February 1991).
31. *Pravda*, 4 February 1991.
32. Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukraine Considers a New Republican Constitution', *Report on the USSR*, RL 215/91 (7 June 1991); and 'The Changing Political Landscape in Ukraine', *Report on the USSR*, RL 222/91 (14 June 1991).
33. *Molod' Ukrainy*, 17 April 1991.
34. *Komsomol's'kaia pravda*, 27 April 1991.
35. Roman Solchanyk, 'The Changing Political Landscape in Ukraine', *Report on the USSR*, RL 222/91 (14 June 1991).
36. *Molod' Ukrainy*, 27 March 1991.
37. *Vechirniy Kyiv*, 20 June 1991.
38. Roman Solchanyk, 'The Draft Union Treaty and the "Big Five"', *Report on the USSR*, RL 177/91 (3 May 1991).
39. *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 25 May 1991.
40. Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukraine and the Union Treaty', *Report on the USSR*, RL 263/91 (26 July 1991).
41. *Holos*, no. 20, November 1990 gives a list of those deputies who supported the motion. See also Dominique Arel, 'The Parliamentary Blocs in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: Who and What Do They Represent?', *Journal of Soviet Nationalities*, vol. 1, no. 4 (Winter 1990-1) pp. 109-11.
42. *Trud*, 26 June 1991.
43. *Temopil' vechirniy*, 15 June 1991.
44. *Vechirniy Kyiv*, 17 June 1991.
45. See the series of articles by Hurenko in *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 14, 15 and 18 June 1991; and *Holos*, no. 4, 1991.
46. Mark Beissinger, 'Ethnicity, the Personnel Weapon, and Neo-Imperial Integration: Ukrainian and RSFSR Provincial Party Officials Compared', *Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol. XXI, no. 1 (Spring 1988) pp. 71-85.
47. Steven L. Burg, 'National Elites and Political Change in the Soviet Union', in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger (eds), *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1990) pp. 31-2.
48. Arel, 1990-1, pp. 133-8.

49. When the PDRU, other centrist parties, government ministers and deputies and business organisations combined to form the 'New Ukraine' movement as a lobby for a market economy and as an alternative 'shadow cabinet' to the Fokin government. *Nezavisimost'*, 17 January 1992.
50. John A. Armstrong, 'The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union: The View of the Dictatorship', in Erich Goldhagen (ed.), *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1968), especially the section on 'younger brothers'.
51. Burg, 1990, op. cit.
52. 'Prohramni pryntsyipy diial'nosti kompartii Ukrainy' in *Suchasni politychni partiï ta rukhy na Ukraini* (Kyiv: Institute of Political Research, 1991) p. 32.
53. *Holos Ukrainy*, 14 July 1991.
54. Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukraine Considers a New Constitution', *Report on the USSR*, RL 215/91 (7 June 1991).
55. *Zakon Ukraïns'koi RSR pro vybory prezydenta Ukraïns'koi RSR* (Kyiv: Ukraïna, 1991) pp. 3-4.
56. *Holos Ukrainy* (Interview with Kravchuk) 15 August 1991.
57. On the evolution of Ukraine's relations with Russia, see Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukraine and Russia: Before and After the Coup', *Report on the USSR*, RL 316/91 (27 September 1991).
58. Natalie Melnyczuk, 'Ukraine Develops an Independent Foreign Policy: The First Year', *Report on the USSR*, RL 379/91 (25 October 1991).
59. See the TV address by Fokin, reprinted in *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, 8 August 1991.
60. *Ikva* (*Chasopys Demokratychno'i partii Ukrainy*), no. 1, 22 June 1991.
61. 'Narodna rada: 4 fraktsii', *Holos*, no. 10, 1991.
62. Such as those again commemorating Ukrainian independence and unification on 22 January, the campaign to release Khmara in March-April, alternative 1 May rallies and mass demonstrations against Ukraine signing any Union treaty on 23 June.
63. Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (London: Macmillan/St Antony's, 1985) p. 211.
64. Roman Solchanyk, "Tntermovement" Formed in Donbass', *Report on the USSR*, RL 513/90 (21 December 1990).
65. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 15 November 1991.
66. *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 20 March 1991, p. 1.
67. 'Ohliad straikovoho rukhu na Ukraini', *Nezalezhnist'*, no. 7, 1991, p. 1. (organ of the radical Ukrainian Peoples' Democratic Party).
68. *Ukrainian Reporter*, vol. 1, no. 10 (May 1991) p. 3.
69. *Ukrainian Reporter*, vol. 1, no. 17 (September 1991) pp. 4-5.
70. As each delegate represented 3000 workers, the minimum founding strength of VOST would be one million. The higher figure was claimed by People's Deputy Larysa Skoryk at the subsequent press conference. See *Moloda Halychyna*, 25 June 1991.
71. See the manifesto issued on 23 June. *Materialy z'izdu VOST* (Kyiv: Ukraïns'ka mizhpartiina asamblia, 1991).

72. Speech to the second URP congress.
73. *Za vil'nu Ukra'inu*, 27 June 1991.