

9 From Soviet to Independent Ukraine: The Coup and Aftermath

THE VIEW FROM THE CENTRE

The first draft of the new Union Treaty was heavily criticised for devolving too little power from the centre to the republics. Only nine republics participated in its discussion. Gorbachev hoped to speed up the adoption of a new Union Treaty by holding the referendum on a 'renewed federation' in March 1991. Of the nine republics which had participated in the new Union Treaty discussions, Ukraine and Azerbaidzhan added a second question in the March 1991 referendum calling for a 'renewed confederation'. The three Baltic states had declared independence and refused to recognise the new law on secession. Georgia and Armenia agreed to hold referendums on independence in March and September 1991 while Moldova refused to participate in the Union Treaty discussions.

Despite the outcome of the March 1991 referendum the republics steadfastly stuck to their demands for a Soviet confederation. By May 1991 the republics were being termed 'sovereign states' while Gorbachev dropped his earlier insistence that autonomous republics be granted the same status as republics in the new Union Treaty. Those outside the new Union Treaty though would be subject to *de facto* economic blockade and pressure, especially *vis-a-vis* energy supplies. The republics, however, ensured that the new Soviet confederation would be built from the bottom up through proposals advanced by the republics.

The August 1991 putsch changed the balance of power between the centre and periphery completely. Yeltsin, after defeating Gorbachev, allied Russia with the Soviet centre in a last ditch attempt to save the Union (in contrast to his alliance with the republics against the centre

prior to August 1991). Yeltsin assumed that Russia would, of course, 'naturally' rule the USSR through a new confederation.

The new draft Union Treaty therefore began to look increasingly unpalatable to the non-Russians who interpreted the defeat of the August 1991 putsch differently: 'To the Russians, it meant a historic "democratic defeat" of the communists. To non-Russians, it signified an open Russian hegemony over the nations of the multi-national country in which they all lived.'¹

The main problem remained Ukraine. It had declared independence and was gearing up to a referendum, which many Russians, Gorbachev especially, could not believe would obtain 50 per cent of the vote, let alone two-thirds. They pinned their hopes on eastern-southern Ukraine and the Crimea. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, therefore, badly misjudged the domestic evolution of events within Ukraine after August 1991.

The new Union Treaty was to be signed on 25 November 1991 by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the four Central republics as well as the Soviet centre. But there still remained considerable disagreement between Yeltsin and Gorbachev over whether the new Union of Sovereign States would be a loose union or a new state. The signing ceremony was therefore postponed to give a chance to the republican parliaments to discuss the issue further. The demand for a confederation would have made Gorbachev, or any Soviet president, into a *de facto* puppet of the republics. The republics therefore demanded their own citizenship, control over their own territory and governments but accepted integrated armed forces. The republics would become sovereign subjects of international law. Those that refused to join the new Union of Sovereign States would be regarded as having seceded and liable to follow the law on secession adopted earlier that year.²

The Ukrainian referendum result of 90 per cent in favour of secession on 1 December 1991 sealed the fate of the USSR.³ Nevertheless, even after the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on 7-8 December 1991 Yeltsin still believed that Ukraine would opt to remain in a CIS confederation. As Yeltsin said five years later: 'Yes, I was very much upset, because I did not want the Union to fall apart ... to say at that time that I wished for disintegration is not, and, I repeat not, the case.' As for the CIS accords, Yeltsin regarded them, as, 'a sort of attempt to salvage at least something you know. We had to prevent the republics running away from each other for good.'⁴ Ukraine and Russia, or to be more precise Kravchuk and Yeltsin, therefore entered the post-Soviet era with vastly different interpreta-

tions of what the CIS was meant to be - a mechanism for 'civilised divorce' or the Union of Sovereign States minus the Soviet centre, but dominated by Russia.

THE VIEW FROM UKRAINE

From 19 to 21 August Ukraine was rocked by the *coup d'etat* that was designed to forestall the Union treaty, which Ukraine had ironically already indicated it would not yet be a party to. Although the People's Council and nearly all political parties immediately condemned the coup, Kravchuk equivocated, and it seemed for a time that the 'national communists' were reverting to type. However, in the aftermath of the coup's failure and the collapse of the old imperial centre, the logic of national communism reasserted itself with a vengeance, and virtually the entire CPU threw in its lot with the opposition, as the only way to save their skins. This resulted in Ukraine's Declaration of Ukrainian Independence by 346 votes to 1, and the adoption of a range of other radical measures from 24 August onwards.

Not all in the CPU were, of course, sufficiently flexible to make the necessary political mutations, resulting in the creation of a Socialist Party of Ukraine, in opposition to the national communist-nationalist alliance.

THE COUP IN UKRAINE

Kravchuk was first informed of the coup at 6.30 on the morning of 19 August by General Chichevatov, commander of the Kyiv military district.⁵ Kravchuk later claimed to have phoned Yeltsin on his way to the Supreme Council, and agreed that neither would recognise the junta, but this was not made public at the time.⁶ At 9 a.m. Kravchuk, along with Hurenko, met with the junta's representative, General Varennikov, who threatened the extension of the state of emergency to Ukraine if there was any resistance to the junta. Kravchuk had refused Varennikov's request to meet in the central committee of the CPU, saying that real power in Ukraine lay with the Supreme Council, and reportedly resisted pressure to commit himself to the junta.⁷ At 11 a.m., however, a delegation from the People's Council was rebuffed by Kravchuk, when it asked him to condemn the coup.⁸

Meanwhile, *Rukh* and most political parties had rushed out statements condemning the plotters. The Democratic Party called on the

population to 'be prepared for an all-Ukrainian strike and other acts of civil disobedience', the Republican Party for 'all party organisations to organise open party meetings in the streets, squares and factories', and condemned the attempt 'to start a civil war in the republics'. The PDRU more soberly called 'on all citizens of Ukraine to maintain calm ... [and] not to engage in any provocation'.⁹ *Rukh's* call for a general strike was even published in *Vechirnii Ky'iv* on the 20th. In western Ukraine a 'people's guard' (*L'vivs'ka varta*) which had been used to steward *Rukh* demonstrations, had already drawn up plans to launch a mass political strike, defend postal, telephone and local-authority buildings, and blockade train stations, airports and important roads in the event of martial law.¹⁰

On Ukrainian television at 4 p.m., Kravchuk appealed for Ukrainians to be 'calm and patient', but, while stressing that the state of emergency did not apply in Ukraine, he neither condemned nor condoned the coup.¹¹ On Soviet television that evening, his statement that 'what has happened was bound to happen' was more compromising, although he later claimed that his remarks were censored.

During a 'turbulent and fruitless' meeting of the Presidium from 6 to 9 p.m., Kravchuk blocked attempts by lukhnovskyyi, Taniuk, lemets, Pavlychko and Iavorivskyyi both to condemn the plotters and to call an emergency session of the Supreme Council.¹² According to deputy Serhii Holovatyyi, meanwhile, Ievhen Marchuk and then Deputy Prime Minister Vitalii Masyk along with various Presidium members had set up the necessary structures to implement the junta's orders in Ukraine.¹³ Ukraine's press published all the junta's declarations, and lukhnovskyyi later listed all those who had collaborated with the junta at a local level.¹⁴

On the 20th the deadlock continued as Kravchuk continued to wait on news from Moscow. After an all-day meeting, 15 out of 25 members of the Presidium voted for a statement which stressed that the Ukrainian constitution remained in force and restated Ukraine's defence of her sovereignty, but stopped short of actually opposing the junta. Kravchuk had again prevaricated on the calling of an emergency session of Parliament (and stonewalled again when visited by Grinev, lemets and lukhnovskyyi at 3 a.m. at the height of the events outside the Moscow White House), and prevented Iavorivskyyi's statement of support for Yeltsin from even being discussed.¹⁵ The national communists on the Presidium, in other words, were inching back towards the People's Council, but were still waiting to see how the chips would fall in Moscow.

Rukh and the political parties, which had already met in the Writers' Union building on the 19th, formed a coalition for an 'Independent Democratic Ukraine' and at 6 p.m. called for an all-Ukrainian strike to begin at noon the next day (although the opposition's ability to organise one was never put to the test).

Kravchuk only came off the fence on the 21st, when it was clear the coup was failing, and after the necessary 150 signatures had been collected to force his hand and call an emergency session of the Supreme Council. (The signatories included 57 non-Party deputies, and 30 members of the CPU, indicating that national communists like Saliy and Ievtukhov were beginning to raise their heads again.)¹⁶ Kravchuk contacted Yury Lukianov, chairman of the Moscow Supreme Soviet, condemned the unconstitutionality of the coup, and demanded the return of Gorbachev to Moscow. On television, Kravchuk stated 'the so-called emergency committee ... no longer exists ... and actually never existed. This was a deviation from the democratic process, from the constitution and the legal process.'¹⁷

The People's Council now had the initiative, and on Thursday the 22nd the Presidium voted 15-11 to call the emergency session on the 24th, and in the working group set up to prepare an agenda leading opposition figures, such as Taniuk and Lemets, were prominent.¹⁸ The People's Council asked for a demonstration outside parliament in support of their agenda on the 24th.¹⁹

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

On 24 August, Kravchuk survived calls for his departure by resigning from his positions in the CPSU/CPU (and from the Party altogether on the 27th) and moving swiftly to support the opposition's agenda. Even before the key notes, he was talking of his desire to see Ukraine 'turned into a truly independent sovereign state'.²⁰

The resignation of 20 further national communist deputies from the CPU deprived the 'Group of 239' of the voting majority they had hitherto possessed (half the total of 450 deputies), and with the CPU discredited and in disarray, the majority traded support for Ukrainian independence for the maximum possible salvation of CPU influence.

Most importantly, by 346 votes to 1 (Albert Korneev, a Russian member of the CPU from Donetsk) the Supreme Council voted to declare Ukrainian independence. The Act stated that 'In view of the deadly threat posed to our country on the night of 18-19 August, and

continuing the thousand year old tradition of state-building in Ukraine ... the Supreme Council solemnly proclaims the Independence of Ukraine ... The territory of Ukraine is indivisible and inviolable. From now on only the Constitution and laws of Ukraine will be in force on its territory'.²¹ This Declaration of Independence was subject to a referendum to be held on 1 December, the same day as the presidential elections already scheduled.

By 331 votes to 10, the Supreme Council also voted to remove political parties from the KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Prosecutor's Office, and 321 voted to remove parties from all state structures, television and radio, and enterprises 'at the discretion of work collectives'.²² By 256 to 13 all armed forces on Ukrainian territory were to pass under Ukrainian control, and a Minister of Defence was to be created,²³ and 328 voted to introduce a Ukrainian currency.²⁴ Kravchuk's *volte-face* was rewarded by granting him emergency powers, with opposition members such as Ivan Zaiets and Mykola Porovskyi openly stating that such measures were conditional on Kravchuk using them for the further build of Ukrainian statehood.²⁵

Just as interesting, however, were the measures that failed to get a majority. A more radical proposal for sweeping compulsory removal of political parties from all state organs and enterprises failed, with only 217 votes, and a call to prevent the destruction of incriminating documents received only by 177.²⁶

Events continued to move rapidly. As evidence accumulated concerning the CPU's complicity in the coup, and Russia banned the Communist Party outright, the CPU had its assets frozen by the Presidium on the 25th, was 'suspended' on the 26th and was banned on the 30th. Moroz, who on the 24th had announced that if the Central Committee 'did not declare the autonomy of Ukraine's Communists, I will take the responsibility onto myself to organise a Ukrainian Communist party',²⁷ officially dissolved the CPU majority in the Supreme Council on 4 September.

The vote for secession left Ukraine independent - but still primarily under national communist control. The exceptions were areas controlled by democratic councils, in particular western Ukraine, where the old structures had been progressively dismantled since the victory of the Democratic Bloc in the March 1990 elections.

The attempt to isolate Ukraine from anti-communist, democratic influences emanating from the RSFSR, as well as the radicalisation of public opinion and the contrast between Kravchuk's and Yeltsin's actions both during and after the coup, now made national communism the only feasible survival option for the CPU.

Ironically, the CPU was now less interested in any Union treaty with Yeltsin's democratic RSFSR (or that proposed by Gorbachev at the USSR Supreme Soviet). The only way, they believed, that they could maintain power and some degree of influence, even after the CPU was suspended, would be by going it alone. This danger - 'the possibility of the Albanian variant in Ukraine: the CPU having a majority in Parliament and remaining the most reactionary force that will attempt to "build" Communism in a separate state'²⁸ - had long been considered dangerous by some of the opposition. On the 24th, Taras Stetskiv had warned against 'Ukraine becoming a game reserve of Communism'.²⁹ Lukhnovskyi had outlined Ukraine's dilemma - either to press for independence first and foremost, or to copy Yeltsin and place decommunisation at the top of the agenda.³⁰

Most members of the opposition had clearly shown their preference for the former route, though the PDRU's liberals preferred the latter. As argued throughout this book, the nationalists had always needed an alliance with the national communists to secure their aims. With the majority of, or at least the commanding heights of, the ex-CPU now in the national communist camp, nearly all political forces in Ukraine were working towards independence, and this was likely to prove an unstoppable force. An atavistic minority however remained.

THE COMMUNISTS' SUCCESSORS

The Supreme Council Presidium banned the CPU on 30 August, despite the Central Committee of the CPU attempting to forestall the decision by declaring the autonomy of the party on the 26th.³¹ Its considerable assets were frozen, until a decree on 20 December transferred all of its property to the state.³² However, Oleksandr Moroz, following his declaration of intent on 24 August, established an organising committee for a successor party as early as 18 September, under 'the working name of the Party of Social Progress'.³³

After a series of regional conferences, the party was reborn as the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) on 26 October in Kyiv.³⁴ Moroz was elected leader, and claimed a membership of 60 000, making the party again the largest in Ukraine (in reality, this was closer to 30 000 but the next largest, the Republican Party, still had only 10 000 members.). Although over 100 Supreme Council deputies still supported hard-left positions only those were prepared to join the Socialists openly.³⁵ Moroz however deliberately did not ask senior figures from the old CPU onto the SPU's leading organs. He sought a new image for the

party, and, in any case, most of the old establishment was now supporting Kravchuk.

Instead, the party represented middle-ranking apparatchiks concerned for their privileges, as well as a hard-core atavistic element such as Professor Viktor Orlov of the Higher Party School, 'who is remembered for stating at one of the plenums of Ukraine's Communist Party that he was ready to take up a Kalashnikov machinegun to protect the system'.³⁶ Only 42 of the 287 delegates were under 35.³⁷ Moroz steered the Congress away from calls to boycott the December referendum and presidential election, and to declare the SPU the legal successor to the CPU.

His strategy was instead to copy the Polish Communist party, and create an economically populist party to capitalise on the inevitable hardship and unemployment created by economic reforms. By the new year, the SPU was already denouncing 'speculation' and posing as the defender of the common man.³⁸ As the economic situation continued to worsen, there was every sign that such a strategy could bring considerable success, especially as the national communist-nationalist alliance preferred to concentrate on defence and state-building measures, rather than on practical economic reforms.

The SPU's statute, although declaring itself a parliamentary party, retained certain Communist Party practices by talking only of the right to 'unite in platforms', but not to form fractions within the party, and proposing that party cells be formed in workplaces, as well as on the territorial principle.³⁹

On 25 January 1992 a rural equivalent to the SPU, the Peasants' Party, was formed in Kherson by representatives of the collective farm *nomenklatura*, and the agro-industrial complex, one of whom, Serhii Dovhan', was elected leader.⁴⁰ The Minister of Agriculture, Oleksandr Tkachenko, was a member of the council, and the party's guiding force (Tkachenko's alliance with Moroz could be seen in his promotion to the post of deputy chairman to the Ukrainian parliament after March 1994). The party was established to oppose Plachynda's radical Ukrainian Peasants' Democratic party and preserve the rural privileges of the old *apparat*, although not necessarily by obstructing land privatisation, as its members were the most likely purchasers.

RED ENTREPRENEURS

Whereas some former communists joined the SPU, others transferred capital into joint and business ventures. According to evidence given

to the parliamentary commission on the nationalisation of the property of the CPU and *Komsomol*, from January to August 1991 the central committee of the CPU passed 19 935 000 roubles to its local branches in order to establish small and joint ventures, stock exchanges and other economic spheres of activity.⁴¹ Again, civil society was still too weak. Few 'new' businessmen were genuinely new. Most came from the old *apparat*, as only they had the capital and the contacts to take advantage of new opportunities.

Much of the money was deposited in and/or used to open co-operatives, banks, small enterprises and commercial associations. The commercial bank '*Ukrinbank*', for example, had over 40 million roubles on deposit from the CPU. The parliamentary commission found 37 examples of the CPU organising small enterprises to the tune of nearly 9 million roubles. Often the CPU would finance the starting capital for brokers' offices in the regional commodity exchanges. The CPU also invested funds into foreign trade associations, such as '*Zhoda*'.

The purpose of this was to launder CPU funds into commercial and business ventures in order to both control the newly emerging private sector and hide the large amount of funds creamed over the years from the state. As the former first secretary of the L'viv *oblast* CPU, Sekretariuk, told his members: 'as long as there's an *apparat*, there's a Party'.⁴² Often former high-ranking members of the CPU would become directors of factories, or presidents of banks and foreign trade associations, claiming that they had resigned from the CPU, but, in reality, continuing secretly to pay their membership dues.⁴³

Two business lobbies, the Congress of Business Circles of Ukraine formed in September 1991⁴⁴ (which aspired to become a Ukrainian equivalent of the Confederation of British Industry) and the Ukrainian League of Businesses with Foreign Capital formed on 16 November,⁴⁵ had strong links with the old *apparat*, and helped fund the Kravchuk presidential campaign.

The more radical parties therefore, such as the Republican Party were soon attacking '*nomenklatura* privatisation' and the *apparat's* renewed 'control of the national wealth'.⁴⁶ Despite the Republican Party's (and *Rukh's*) supposed free market ideology, their populist economic rhetoric began to echo that of the SPU. This was especially true of radical right parties.

Disillusion with the slow pace of economic reform and continued *nomenklatura* domination of industry led to the formation of the PDRU-business group 'New Ukraine' as a liberal economic reform lobby and potential 'shadow cabinet' in January, however.⁴⁷ Fifty-eight

deputies had signed 'new Ukraine's' founding statement by 15 March 1992.⁴⁸ whilst the nationalists in the Republican and Democratic parties, and the *Rukh* leadership (Chornovil excepted) moved closer to support Kravchuk after his 1 December victory (see below), the 'New Ukraine' lobby kept its distance and remained in opposition to the national communists. New Ukraine would become the basis for Leonid Kuchma's 'Party of Power' after he defeated Kravchuk in the summer 1994 presidential elections.

STATE-BUILDING MEASURES

The dominance of the nationalist-national communist alliance was apparent after the Supreme Council reassembled on 4 September, and during its fourth (autumn) session, and set about giving substance to the Declaration of Independence. Outside observers were surprised at the priority given to military and state-building measures over economic reforms, largely delayed until Spring 1992, but Ukraine's leaders were only following Lenin's dictum that the first task in a revolutionary situation is to secure power. Moreover, Kravchuk and the former opposition both subscribed to the view that Ukraine's independence bid in 1917-20 had failed because of the lack of adequate armed forces. Ukraine's new elites had first to secure Ukraine's statehood in order to take control over their own society, and therefore concentrated on measures to this effect, including a Law on State Frontiers on 5 November,⁴⁹ and a draft Citizenship Law.⁵⁰

Because the process of creating an independent state was largely controlled by the national communists, the new state was often simply built on the old. Many institutions were simply renamed. For example, the KGB became the 'National Security Service of Ukraine' on 20 September (later the 'National' was dropped).⁵¹ The new head appointed on 6 November, Marchuk, was the old deputy head.⁵² The Supreme Council's Committees on Reform of the Security Service, and Defence and State Security, vetted positions in the new service, but the shortage of qualified staff meant that a large proportion came from the old service.

In a similar fashion, the *Komsomol* metamorphosed at its Twenty-Seventh Congress on 21 September into the 'Union of Youth Organisations of Ukraine'.⁵³ (The *Komsomol's* contacts with disaffected youth had, however, already led to it distancing itself from the old regime.)

Ukrainian newspapers also changed names, if not character. *Leninskoe znamia* turned into *Narodna armii* (People's Army) on 12 October, and became the official organ of the new Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, while the CPU stalwart *Radians Tea Ukraina* became *Demokratychna Ukraina* on 8 October.

On national symbols, Kravchuk's national communists had to tread a careful path. On the one hand, they were now forced to steal the clothes of the former opposition, in order to create a new national ideology that would legitimate their right to govern. On the other hand, Kravchuk was well aware of the fragile nature of the young state, and was prepared to go slow on the adoption of potentially divisive symbols until the election and referendum campaigns were over. On 17 September, all references to Ukraine's 'socialist choice' were expunged from the constitution, but only 265 voted to fly the blue-and-yellow flag over the Supreme Council building on 4 September,⁵⁴ and the adoption of the flag, trident, and national hymn 'Ukraine has not yet died' as the sole official state symbols had to wait until the new year.⁵⁵ Even then, 72 voted against the trident, and 70 were against the flag, or abstained.⁵⁶ Three-quarters of these were Russian-speaking members of parliament.

There was as yet, however, little constitutional reform to replace the chaotic 'institutional pluralism' described in Chapter 7. Creeping Presidentialism gathered pace after 1 December, but there was still no proper cabinet system of professionalised civil service to replace CPU discipline as a backbone for the state system. In any case, Ukraine's new leaders were unlikely to pay much attention to supplanting the old CPU *apparat* with a professionalised bureaucracy, as the former was the central component of their power base. The new elite was also reluctant to devolve much of its newly won power to institutions such as the National Bank, soon embroiled in political controversy.⁵⁷

In order to build a nation-state however, security issues were of supreme importance.

SECURITY POLICY

The concentration on security measures in Autumn 1991 also reflected a two year campaign for the establishment of Ukrainian armed forces, however. Radical right groups, such as the Ukrainian National Party, had begun to raise the issue as early as autumn 1989,

but military disputes only became part of mainstream politics in 1990 with rising controversy over the draft and the use of Soviet troops in nationalist hot-spots outside Ukraine. As stated in Chapter 7, the July 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty had given Ukraine 'the right' to form armed forces. The Supreme Council also responded to controversy over the draft and the campaigning of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers with a resolution on 30 July 1990 calling on local conscripts to do their service only on Ukraine soil, and a call on 10 October for all conscripts to be returned to Ukraine by 1 December. But, 'unfortunately the mechanism for fulfilling these decrees was not made. The decision remained on paper'.⁵⁸

At two congresses on 27-28 July and 1-2 November 1991, the Union of Officers of Ukraine (UOU) was formed.⁵⁹ Having seemed a radical, marginal group in July (the UOU was close to the Republican Party), the November gathering was addressed by the new Ukrainian Minister of Defence. By then, the UOU claimed 25 000 members, and was being consulted on all key legislation, as Ukraine struggled to win the loyalties of those troops deployed on its territory.

The emergency session of the Supreme Council on 24 August 1991 began the process of creating a legal framework for the formation of Ukrainian Armed Forces, as described above.⁶⁰ It was swiftly followed by the appointment of Konstantin Morozov, a Russian, to the newly created position of Minister of Defence on 3 September.⁶¹ On 7 September the Presidium responded to rumours of military hardware disappearing to Russia with a decree banning the redeployment of troops and equipment. On 10 September the decree 'On Military Formations of Ukraine' placed all interior troops of the Ministry of Interior, and border troops, their weapons, technology and administrative staff under Ukrainian jurisdiction.⁶²

The Cabinet of Ministers decided on 8 October to launch a Ukrainian National Army over the course of two years, with a provisional strength of 450 000 troops. This figure was arrived at simply by taking a supposed European average of 0.8 per cent of the population for the size of a suitable armed force.⁶³

A National Guard was established on 4 November, and its commander named as Colonel Volodymyr Kukharets.⁶⁴ The first units were 6000-strong, and drawn from Ministry of Interior troops already stationed in Ukraine. A force of 30 000 was envisaged by April 1992, to be armed with requisitioned Ministry of Interior equipment.⁶⁵

After the Supreme Soviet took control of all border guards stationed in Ukraine on 23 October, the Law on State Frontiers of 4 November

gave them something to police. The guards, under the command of Valery Hubenko, were to patrol Ukraine's land, sea, air, river and 'economic' frontiers, together with 12 miles of territorial waters.⁶⁶

On 6 December, the Law on Armed Forces and Law on the Defence of Ukraine were passed. Kravchuk then made himself Commander-in-Chief of Ukrainian forces in one of his first decrees on 12 December, which announced the formation of Ukrainian Armed Forces on the basis of the troops of the three Soviet military districts covering Ukrainian territory (Kyiv, Odesa and Transcarpathian), plus the Black Sea Fleet, and 'other military formations deployed on Ukrainian territory', but excepting the strategic forces by then belonging to the CIS.⁶⁷ A voluntary oath of loyalty was also prepared for the above troops to swear 'never to betray the Ukrainian people', and administered after 3 January 1992.

Ukraine thus consistently pursued the control of the forces on its territory as its rightful 'inheritance'. However, this obviously led to problems with Russia, as outlined below. Ukraine's right to form its own armed forces was disputed by those who placed a broad interpretation on the notion of CIS control of 'strategic forces', by those who thought that Russia should be the sole inheritor of USSR Armed Forces by right, and by those who simply disliked the idea of Ukraine as a well-armed neighbour.

The one great exception to Ukraine's desire to build a militarily strong state was nuclear weapons. The 1986 Chornobyl' disaster left Ukrainian public opinion profoundly anti-nuclear, and this sentiment had been embodied in the 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty, which committed Ukraine 'not to accept, not to produce and not to acquire nuclear weapons'. This was then reaffirmed by a Declaration of Ukraine's non-nuclear status on 24 October 1991.⁶⁸ Ukraine eventually removed all tactical nuclear weapons for destruction by summer 1992, and all strategic weapons by June 1996.

Although *realpolitik* may have indicated that it was irrational for Ukraine to abandon such strategic bargaining chips for no concrete return, only the far right objected at the time. Iurii Shukhevych, leader of the Ukrainian National Assembly (as the Inter-Party Assembly had restyled itself from September 1991), argued in October that nuclear weapons were 'a guarantee of respect' and a defence against 'the territorial pretensions of Russia'.⁶⁹ Such pressure was, however, for the time more than counterbalanced by the prestigious Green Party, whose renewed call for Ukraine to respect its non-nuclear commitments in September was echoed by nearly all political parties.⁷⁰ The

growing conflict with Russia however would mean that other nationalists, led by the Republicans and Democrats, were close to Shukhevych's position by Spring 1992.

UKRAINE, RUSSIA AND THE UNION

Ukraine's defence ambitions and independence drive, therefore, brought it into increasing conflict, first with the old USSR, and then with Russia.

Ukraine had signed a bilateral agreement with Russia, recognising each others' sovereignty and inviolable borders, as early as 19 November 1990.⁷¹ However, comments by Yeltsin's press secretary in the aftermath of Ukraine's Declaration of Independence that implied Russian territorial pretensions on the Russian-speaking areas of eastern and southern Ukraine instantly poisoned the atmosphere. The row was temporarily defused by a Russian delegation's hastily arranged trip to Kyiv on 28-29 August, but proved easy to rekindle. The Ukrainian-Russian border, hotly disputed even under Soviet rule in the 1920s, had never sharply delineated spheres of influence, and the pressure to intervene in each other's affairs would remain.

As far as relations with the old centre were concerned, it was clear from an internal perspective, particularly if one looked at the campaign for the 1 December votes, that Ukraine was heading for full independence. The fact that Ukraine did not yet make a clean break with the Union, and continued to toy with some of the ideas emanating from the centre had more to do with the practical difficulties of disengagement, than with any serious hesitation on Ukraine's part.

Moreover, despite some nationalists voicing the opinion that the referendum was unnecessary,⁷² Kravchuk understood that large sections of Ukrainian society still had to be prepared for the idea of independence, and that forcing the issue would make such groups easy prey for separatist forces. Kravchuk was also fairly confident that enough of the old power structures remained to ensure victory after a careful period of manipulation.

Ukraine therefore blew hot and cold over at least maintaining its economic links with the old Union. Despite Gorbachev trying to force the pace on a treaty of economic union, Ukraine sent only observers to the signing ceremony in Moscow on 18 October. Pliushch argued that horizontal ties between the republics were more important for Ukraine, while Kravchuk firmly stated his opposition to the resurrection of traditional vertical channels of control.⁷³

Prime Minister Vitold Fokin, on the other hand, as the ex-head of Ukraine's *Gosplan*, was much keener on the concept of maintaining a single economic space. His threats to resign, plus Russian insistence on linking the treaty to a promise to reiterate the November 1990 agreement and respect Ukrainian borders on 6 November,⁷⁴ forced the Supreme Council to approve initialling, but not signing, the treaty on the same day, although the People's Council voted against.⁷⁵ However, 26 qualifications were added, while Ukraine maintained both that its obligations were contingent on the 1 December result, and that it saw the accord purely instrumentally, as an 'exit towards international co-operation' and as a means of securing international credits.⁷⁶ Ukraine had accordingly agreed joint responsibility for the USSR's debt on 28 October.

Ukraine's qualified agreement was probably also a device to forestall pressure towards renewed political union. On 25 October, the Supreme Council resolved against any further participation in inter-republican structures that threatened Ukrainian sovereignty. Henceforth, Ukrainians only attended the USSR Supreme Soviet as 'observers'.⁷⁷ Kravchuk was stalling, refusing to consider any new political arrangements until after the 1 December vote, which he hoped would then bury the Union.

Once armed with a 90.3 per cent vote in favour of independence (see below), Kravchuk was able to use the Minsk meeting on 7 and 8 December to trade Ukraine's desire to see the end of the empire for Yeltsin's wish to get rid of Gorbachev by the creation of a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to replace the USSR (Kravchuk claimed the idea had been hatched as long ago as 15 November).⁷⁸ Although the former centre was now impotent, it still monopolised the attention of the West, and from Ukraine's perspective, the CIS originally seemed the ideal device to somehow emerge from under its carapace.

The new accord pleased the West, and ditched Gorbachev and the old Union, while its anodyne documents did not restrain Ukraine with any significant obligations. It announced that henceforth 'the USSR as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality ceases its existence'.⁷⁹ From the Ukrainian perspective, the republics, rather than the CIS itself, would be its successor states, although the retention of the rouble as a common currency and CIS control over 'strategic' military forces (including all nuclear weapons) was envisaged by the Minsk and Alma-Ata agreements.

In any case, despite ratifying the agreement with 288 votes, the Supreme Soviet added 13 crucial amendments, stressing that 'Ukraine

will form its own Armed Forces on the basis of the Armed Forces of the former USSR deployed on its territory', and Ukraine's right to adopt its own currency.⁸⁰ Similarly, the Alma Ata accords that completed the CIS's creation on 21 December did not threaten Ukrainian priorities, as the attempt to resurrect an all-CIS conventional armed force was defeated.⁸¹

Nearly all political forces in Ukraine saw the CIS as instrumental, as a happy solution to the dilemma of 'either Gorbchev, or a civilised form for the collapse of the Union'.⁸² By January, when it threatened to become something more, the Republican and Democratic Parties were already calling for Ukraine's departure from the CIS.⁸³

This was because the one serious disadvantage for Ukraine of the CIS was that, by removing the centre, Ukraine now stood in direct confrontation with Russia. Firstly, even on the Ukrainian interpretation of the CIS as nothing more than a holding arrangement between successor states, the logic of imperial disentanglement implied a struggle over the division of the resources of the now non-existent centre. Secondly, it soon became clear that it was in Russia's interest to follow a twin-track policy of declaring itself the legal successor to the USSR and/or granting the CIS statehood, and then blurring the two concepts to its own advantage. This was also bound to lead to conflict with Ukraine, as the latter would lose its expected inheritance to the extent to which the USSR's assets (foreign embassies, the Black Sea Fleet)⁸⁴ were declared to be 'strategic' and under CIS control.

Kravchuk therefore erred at the Alma-Ata when he conceded the principle of Russia inheriting the USSR's seat on the UN Security Council. Although the PDRU remained in favour of the accord, Ukrainian nationalists were soon arguing that 'it is becoming obvious that, under the abbreviation CIS certain forces are planning the reanimation of the Russian empire'.⁸⁵

REFERENDUM AND PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS

In order to secure control over their own society, the national communists also had to secure a favourable vote for independence. The fact that both the independence vote and the election of the first Ukrainian executive President were to be held simultaneously on 1 December 1991 was a further factor forcing the old opposition and the national communists into the same camp. Kravchuk's pursuit of office soon became indistinguishable from his advocacy of independence, and

therefore the People's Council and the political parties found it difficult to oppose him, as he had stolen their clothes. Many in fact supported him. The fact that all significant political forces in Ukraine supported independence, even at the last moment the SPU,⁸⁶ meant that the eventual 90.3 per cent vote was perhaps not that surprising.

Ninety-five candidates for the presidency were whittled down by 1 November to a final seven (six after the Agriculture Minister Tkachenko withdrew in favour of Kravchuk) by requiring all candidates to collect 100 000 signatures in order to stand. Kravchuk was the only candidate of the former CPU, and had no challenger to his left.

The People's Council, however, was split between five candidates. Ukraine's political parties faced a classic Rational Choice dilemma. As they were organisationally weak and not yet well known to the public, it was individually rational for each to put forward a candidate to promote the party's face, but of course collectively disastrous when they all did so.⁸⁷ Only the two best-organised parties managed to collect 100 000 signatures, the Republican Party because of its tight internal discipline (for Lukianenko), and the PDRU because of its relatively strong intelligentsia support (for lukhnovskyi as its official candidate, and for Grinev as a Russian-speaking wild card). The leader of the tiny People's Party, Leopold Taburianskyi, secured his candidature with the help of the resources of his 'Olimp' co-operative.

Rukh's official candidate was Chornovil. However, given the Republican Party's entryism, key figures in the *apparat*, Drach included, and *Rukh's* Political Council (led by the Republican Party's Mykhailo Horyn) supported Lukianenko. *Rukh's* disunity was exacerbated by the decision on 1 September by *Rukh's* Grand Council to allow local branches to campaign for any democratic candidate.⁸⁸ The Donets'k branch ended up supporting Kravchuk.⁸⁹

The far right candidate from the Inter-Party Assembly (now the Ukrainian National Assembly), Iurii Shukhevych, the Greens' Shcherbak and the Democratic Party's Pylypchuk fell short of the necessary number of registration signatures required. The SPU's supported Kravchuk; the United Social Democrats, the Russian Kadets, the eastern branches of the PDRU and some of the Donbas strike committees Grinev; the SDPU Chornovil; and the Ukrainian Language Society (now called 'Prosvita') and Union of Ukrainian Students Lukianenko.⁹⁰

The key to the campaign, however, was Kravchuk's candidature, and the mass media barrage in favour of independence and the new national ideology that accompanied it. The media were still in the

hands of national communists, as the People's Council had failed in its bid to remove the television and radio boss Mykola Okhmakevych for complicity in the coup on 17 September. (In other words, the national communists had a clear understanding of where their power lay.) Despite the Supreme Council's resolution on 9 October that all candidates should have equal access to the mass media,⁹¹ Les Taniuk, an ally of Chornovil's, claimed that 62 per cent of airtime went to Kravchuk (and initially Tkachenko).

The state no longer had a formal monopoly of the press, as papers like *Vechirnyi Kyiv* (Kyiv's evening paper) had been communicating an independent message for some time, and where the opposition had controlled the local councils since 1990 it had converted council-supported papers into opposition organs, such as *Za vil'nu Ukraïna* (For a Free Ukraine) in L'viv, or the DPU paper *Volia* in Ternopil'. However, the government press received preferential treatment in the supply of paper.⁹² *Vechirnyi Kyiv* was only a double broadsheet at the most, for example.

The government's dominance of the mass media, however, was now being used to push an entirely one-sided national message. Even the official Supreme Council Appeal to the People talked of independence as 'an objective requirement ... the dream of our fathers and grandfathers', and stated 'Any other path, apart from independence, does not exist for Ukraine.'⁹³ The All-Ukrainian (and all-confessional) Religious Forum in Kyiv on 20 November, and the equivalent All-Ukrainian Inter-Ethnic Congress in Odesa on 16 and 17 November, were carefully stage-managed to bridge the religious and ethnic divides, and produce declarations in support of independence.⁹⁴ Kravchuk drew support across the board, eventually triumphing with 61.6 per cent of the vote. Like the early Gorbachev, he was successful in appearing as all things to all men, and bridging the many divisions that threatened the unity of the young state. However, the overall voting patterns and distribution of opposition and CPU strengths showed a remarkable similarity to those of 1990 and March 1991, as shown in Table 9.1.

Kravchuk won 13.3 per cent in Galicia, 52.4 per cent in Volhynia-Polissia, 52.2 per cent in Transcarpathia and Chernivtsi, 66.1 per cent in the Left Bank, 73.3 per cent in the more rural Right Bank, 72.4 per cent in the East and 66.7 per cent in the south.⁹⁵ (Some of Kravchuk's natural support in the east and south was taken by the Russian-speaking Grinev, who called for a federalised Ukraine with increased autonomy for

Table 9.1 Results of the presidential elections of 1 December 1991 (per cent)

<i>Oblast</i>	<i>Grinev</i>	<i>Kravchuk</i>	<i>Lukianenko</i>	<i>Taburianskyi</i>	<i>Chomovil</i>	<i>lukhnovskiyi</i>
<i>Galicja</i>						
L'viv	0.83	11.58	4.70	0.16	75.86	4.43
Ternopil'	0.43	16.79	19.6	0.18	57.45	3.19
Ivano-Frankivs'k	0.55	13.70	11.63	0.14	67.10	3.32
<i>Volhynia</i>						
Rivne	0.80	53.07	13.38	0.43	25.55	3.57
Volyn'	0.83	51.85	8.90	0.34	31.39	3.25
<i>Other West</i>						
Transcarpathia	1.32	58.03	4.98	0.39	27.58	2.83
Chernivtsi	1.42	43.56	4.40	0.42	42.67	1.97
<i>Left Bank</i>						
Kyiv (city)	3.54	56.13	6.36	0.54	26.71	3.52
Kyiv (oblast)	1.68	65.99	5.62	0.48	21.23	1.51
Kharkiv	10.90	60.85	2.08	0.44	19.66	0.97
Poltava	2.46	75.05	4.21	0.61	13.63	1.26
Sumy	2.53	72.35	3.88	0.52	14.73	1.81
Chernihiv	1.46	74.15	6.69	0.40	12.34	0.90
<i>Right Bank</i>						
Kirovohrad	1.65	74.77	3.54	0.55	13.55	1.06
Cherkasy	1.36	67.14	1.96	0.38	25.03	0.98
Vinnytsia.	1.39	72.34	3.25	0.36	18.25	1.62
Zhytomyr	1.12	77.59	3.30	0.35	13.97	1.05
Khmel'nyts'kyi	1.19	75.46	3.25	0.42	15.40	1.65
<i>East</i>						
Donets'k	10.98	71.47	3.11	0.71	9.69	0.93
Luhans'k	6.75	76.23	2.01	0.52	9.94	0.74
Dnipropetrovs'k	3.20	69.74	2.47	1.85	18.15	1.21
Zaporozhzhia	3.87	74.73	3.07	0.65	12.98	1.32
<i>South</i>						
Mykolai'v	5.63	72.33	2.26	0.39	15.06	0.69
Kherson	3.27	70.23	2.23	0.54	18.13	0.97
Odesa	8.38	70.69	2.77	0.52	12.83	1.13
Crimean ASSR	9.43	56.68	1.93	0.86	5.03	0.90
Sevastopol' city	8.38	54.68	1.80	0.84	10.93	0.89
Black Sea Fleet	6.00	74.40	4.00	1.50	23.00	1.10
Total	4.17	61.59	4.49	0.57	23.3	1.69

84.2% of those eligible to vote turned out.

Totals do not always add up to 100 per cent because of spoiled ballots (although such figures were not provided directly by the Electoral Commission).

Source: Electoral Commission, official results.

Russian-speaking areas, and polled 10.9 per cent in Kharkiv, 11 per cent in Donetsk, 8.4 per cent in Odesa and 9.4 per cent in Crimea).

Kravchuk's national communist coalition was strongest in the countryside, where the control of collective farm chairmen remained almost feudal, in small-town Ukraine, and among the less-educated and lower social groups where the government's control of the mass media had most effect. Non-Ukrainians were more likely to support him than the more nationalist candidates. The old *apparat*, and the official trade unions, still saw him as one of their own, and supported him as the best guarantor of their privileges.⁹⁶

According to opinion poll evidence, Kravchuk was supported by 34.6 per cent of managers and specialists (the low figure is explained by the poll using the percentage of all in the group, rather than of those who actually voted), 31.1 per cent of employees and non-specialists, 31.3 per cent of qualified workers, 38.8 per cent of workers with few qualifications, 38.1 per cent of peasants, 36.5 per cent of pensioners and 22.6 per cent of students.⁹⁷ Those with higher education gave 39.7 per cent support to Kravchuk, those with middle education 41.8 per cent and those with middle or uncompleted education 45.0 per cent.⁹⁸ In one early poll, 39.9 per cent of Ukrainians chose Kravchuk, 16.5 per cent Chornovil and 4.4 per cent Lukianenko, whereas the figures for Russians were 34 per cent, 9.3 per cent and 1.1 per cent respectively.⁹⁹ The data for selected *oblasts* by *raion* showed that Kravchuk's score in the countryside was usually 10-30 per cent higher than in the *oblast* centre.¹⁰⁰ (Interestingly, one poll showed that 43.8 per cent evaluated Kravchuk's role in the coup more or less positively, and only 25.3 per cent more or less negatively, showing both how successfully he had wrapped himself in the flag since then, and the conservatism of Ukrainian public opinion in general.)¹⁰¹

The leading challenger Chornovil's 23 per cent, and the support for the other three People's Council candidates (leaving out the wild card Grinev) was a mirror image to Kravchuk's, and again was remarkably similar to the March 1990 and 1991 results. The opposition's stronghold were in Galicia, Kyiv and other central urban centres. The polls mentioned above showed 10.4 per cent of managers and specialists supporting Chornovil, 6.3 per cent of employees, 9.8 per cent of qualified workers, 7.8 per cent of the low-qualified, 8.5 per cent of peasants (given the strength of rural nationalism in the west), 9.4 per cent of students and 5.9 per cent of pensioners.¹⁰² Eleven per cent of those with higher education supported Chornovil, 11.2 per cent of those with middle or specialised education, 7.2 per cent of those with middle and 7.9 per cent of those with incomplete or middle.¹⁰³ The

pattern of intelligentsia support was more pronounced for the urbane lukhnovskiy, but less so for the more populist Lukianenko.

As shown in Table 9.2, support for independence was almost universal. The total vote of 90.3 per cent, on a 84.2 per cent turnout, exceeded all expectations, although it was in line with the rising trend of support displayed throughout the autumn. Even Crimea voted 54.2 per cent in favour. Although support sagged as expected in the south and east, it was as high as 85.4 per cent in Odesa and 83.9 per cent in Luhans'k. Poll evidence showed more men (72 per cent) than women (58 per cent) in favour (again, these figures are percentages of the total group, not of those who voted).¹⁰⁴ Among the under-35s support was 68 per cent; among those aged 36-55, 67 per cent; and in the over 55s, 57 per cent. Seventy-three per cent of specialists supported independence, 73 per cent of students, 73 per cent of those employed in education, 67 per cent of workers, but only 58 per cent of those employed in agriculture, and 56 per cent of pensioners. Those with higher education gave 75 per cent support to independence, as against 63 per cent for those with only middle education and 57 per cent for those with incomplete or middle.

The inhabitants of larger towns gave 68 per cent support, those in medium-sized towns 66 per cent, those in the villages 58 per cent. Sixty-eight per cent of Ukrainians, 55 per cent of Russians and 46 per cent of other minorities were in favour. Finally, a very high 87 per cent of both UAOC and UCC believers voted in favour, but only 60 per cent of ROC (now the Ukrainian Orthodox Church) believers.

The conservative nature of public opinion and the dominance of practical concerns was well demonstrated. Nationalist cultural priorities came well behind economic worries. In a typical poll, 78.6 per cent gave 'escape from economic crisis' top priority, 62.4 per cent 'stabilisation of the economy and a better standard of living', 60.3 per cent ecological improvement, 54.9 per cent an 'effective struggle with crime', but only 21.2 per cent listed 'the cultural rebirth of Ukraine', and only 18.3 per cent 'the securing of the political sovereignty of the republic'.¹⁰⁵

In other words, the most socially mobilised sections of the population showed highest support for independence, as predicted by Krawchenko. The gulf between the intelligentsia and the mass of the population remained large, however, both in terms of values and priorities, and in terms of the organisational ability of the intelligentsia. The state was still the predominant factor in political communication; the free press and autonomous social institutions of a civil society were only just beginning to emerge. However, the state had usurped the intelligentsia's national ideology to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of communism and promoted it with a vengeance. Moreover, it

Table 9.2 Support for independence in the 1 December 1991 referendum (per cent)

<i>Oblast</i>	<i>Yes' vote</i>	<i>'No' vote</i>
<i>Galicia</i>		
L'viv	97.45	1.86
Ternopil'	98.70	0.78
Ivano-Frankivs'k	98.42	1.03
<i>Volhynia</i>		
Rivne	96.80	2.56
Volyn'	96.32	2.29
<i>Other West</i>		
Transcarpathia	92.59	4.49
Chernivtsi	92.78	4.13
<i>Left Bank</i>		
Kyiv (city)	92.67	5.28
Kyiv (<i>oblast</i>)	95.52	2.87
Kharkiv	86.33	10.43
Poltava	94.93	3.67
Sumy	92.61	4.90
Chernihiv	93.74	4.10
<i>Right Bank</i>		
Kirovohrad	93.88	4.38
Cherkasy	96.03	2.76
Vinnitsia	95.43	3.03
Zhytomyr	95.06	3.58
Khmel'nyts'kyi	96.30	2.62
<i>East</i>		
Donets'k	83.90	12.58
Luhans'k	83.86	13.41
Zaporizhzhia	90.66	7.34
Dnipropetrovs'k	90.36	7.71
<i>South</i>		
Mykolai'v	89.45	8.17
Kherson	90.13	7.20
Odesa	85.38	11.60
Crimean ASSR	54.19	42.22
Sevastopol' city	57.07	39.39
Black Sea Fleet	75.00	
Total	90.32	7.58

Source: Electoral Commission, official results.

had adapted it to the task of preserving power in Ukraine's fragile and multifaceted society, and probably made a better job of maintaining cohesion along the path to independence than the nationalists would have done.

The gap between the 25-33 per cent support for the Democratic *BlockRukh* in 1990-91 and the 90.3 per cent vote for Independence was clearly due to the addition of the resources (communicative, coercive and material) of the state.¹⁰⁶ The majority so easily assembled soon began to appear fragile, however, especially given Ukraine's minority problems.

REGIONALISM IN UKRAINE

As argued in Chapter 2, Ukraine is a multi-ethnic state whose divergent regions have different historical and cultural traditions. The passing of the 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty and 1991 Declaration of Independence forced Ukraine's minorities to show more concern for their future, a development exacerbated by many local ex-CPU elites stirring up minority grievances as a means of holding on to power after the banning of the CPU on 30 August.¹⁰⁷

The Supreme Council's response to developing problems with minorities and separatist pressures was ambiguous. On the one hand, it passed the conciliatory 'Declaration of Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine' on 1 November 1991, whose seven articles promised full minority rights, and promised that in 'territorial units, where a certain nationality lives compactly, their language may function on an equal footing with the state language' (i.e. Ukrainian), while 'the Ukrainian state guaranteed to its citizens the right to freely use the Russian language'.¹⁰⁸ The Supreme Council and *Rukh* were also the joint sponsors of the first All-Ukrainian Inter-Ethnic Congress held on 16 and 17 November in Odesa. A thousand delegates representing 150 ethnic organisations endorsed Ukrainian independence on a multi-ethnic basis.¹⁰⁹

On the other hand, however, the Supreme Council of Ukraine passed on 11 October a law criminalising 'appeals and other activities aimed at the violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine', with punishments of up to three years' imprisonment, or fines up to 100 000 roubles. The nationalist Republican and Democratic parties were soon clamouring for its application, and other firm action against 'separatists'.¹¹⁰

The Crimea

The Crimean peninsula's population in 1989 was 67 per cent Russian, 26 per cent Ukrainian (47 per cent of whom are Russian-speaking) and 7 per cent others. Schooling and the mass media are almost entirely in Russian, which was adopted as the local state language in 1991. The Crimea was only added to Ukraine in 1954, and many of its inhabitants are post-war settlers from Russia. In addition, many of the 269 000 Crimean Tatars, deported by Stalin in 1944 for alleged collaboration with the Germans (when they made up some 19 per cent of the Crimea's 1 million or so population),¹¹¹ began to return in increasing numbers after the USSR Supreme Soviet started their rehabilitation in 1989.

The Tatars had been demonstrating for a return to their ancestral lands since 1987. After much procrastination, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a resolution on 14 November 1989 condemning their unlawful expulsion, and on 24 July 1991 the USSR Council of Ministers approved a decree 'Concerning the Organisation of the Return of the Crimean Tatars and Guarantees for their Arrangements'. However, their return has been consistently impeded by the Crimean Supreme Soviet, which has effectively banned the resettlement of Tatars in the prosperous southern coastal, Simferopol', and Bakhchysarai regions, and has sought to play on the fears of post-war settlers that they will lose their property to the Tatars.¹¹² After a meeting between the Tatars and Kravchuk in September 1990 a special commission of the Supreme Council was established, and eventually began limited state funding of resettlement.¹¹³

Frustration at the slow pace of return (less than 300 000 by 1991) led to the OKND (Organisation of the Crimean-Tatar National Movement), led by Mustafa Jemilev, replacing the conformist NDKT (National Movement of the Crimean Tatars) as the most vocal representatives of the Tatars. On 26-30 June 1991 in Simferopol', the former elected a *Medzhlis*, or Supreme Tatar Assembly, which on 28 June passed the 'Declaration of Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar People', Article 1 of which states that the 'Crimea is the national territory of the Crimean-Tatar people, on which they alone possess the right to self-determination'.¹¹⁴ The *Medzhlis* therefore boycotted the Crimean Supreme Soviet, evoking the memory of the short-lived Tatar republic of 1917 instead. It also sought to mobilise the support of the 5 million or so Tatar diaspora, especially in Turkey.

The strengthening of Ukraine's nationalist movement and the Tatar challenge simultaneously threatened the power of the local CPU lead-

ership, led by Nikolai Bagrov, and, at the same time, allowed them to play on fears of enforced Ukrainisation/Tatarisation in an attempt to preserve their position. They had much to hang on to, as a high proportion of the CPU's assets - sanatoria, dachas and the like - were on Crimean territory, as was the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet Headquarters in Sevastopol'.

On 12 November 1990 the Crimean *oblast* Soviet condemned the 1954 transfer to Ukraine from the RSFSR, and in a referendum organised by Bagrov on 20 January 1991, 93 per cent (on a 80 per cent turnout, with the Tatars boycotting) voted to restore the Crimea's status as an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (within the Ukrainian SSR).¹¹⁵ On 12 February the Supreme Council of Ukraine passed a 'Law on the Renewal of the Crimean ASSR', and on 26 June by 303 (mainly Communist) votes confirmed Crimea's new status as a constituent part of the Ukrainian SSR, but with a separate constitution. The draft version of the Crimean ASSR constitution adopted in Sevastopol' on 22 July 1991 rejected the presidential form of government chosen for Ukraine as a whole, and established Russian as the state language.

During the coup of 19-21 August 1991, when President Gorbachev was held in the Crimea, the local elite showed its conservative colours. Only two members of the 13-strong Presidium of the Crimean Soviet supported a motion to condemn the plotters, with one abstaining.¹¹⁶ In the backlash after the coup's failure, Bagrov sacrificed many of his colleagues on 29 August 1991, when most of the Crimean Presidium resigned, but ensured his own survival. The still-dominant communists, however, reacted to the 30 August decision by the Kyiv Supreme Council of Ukraine to nationalise CPU property by declaring Crimean state sovereignty on 2 September, and by passing the 'Law on the Organs of State Power' of Crimea on 10 September 1991.¹¹⁷

Moreover, the 'Republican Movement of Crimea' (headed by Crimean deputy, Iurii Meshkov), the 'Russian Society of Crimea' (headed by Anatolii Los), the 'Citizens' Forum of Crimea' and the 'Organisation of the 20 January' founded on 5 October¹¹⁸ began campaigning for a referendum to annul the 1954 decision, and transfer Crimea to the RSFSR. Their campaign was financed by the economic association *Tmpeks-55 Crimea*, formed with CPU funds.

The democratic or pro-Ukrainian opposition in Crimea, on the other hand, was decidedly weak, although 28 local deputies announced the formation of a Democratic Bloc on 28 April.¹¹⁹ Even the Citizens' Forum of Crimea, headed by Ukrainian SSR deputy Volodymyr Sevastianov, which on 22 September called for the dissolution of the

Crimean Soviet, multi-party elections, and a multi-ethnic state, with full rights for Crimean Tatars, still supported Crimea's potential separation from the Ukrainian SSR. The 'Democratic Crimea' group united all-Ukrainian groups such as *Rukh* and the Republican Party, but its influence was minimal.

Kravchuk attended the crucial session of the Crimean Soviet on 23-25 October, persuading it to side-step the question of a referendum, provoking a walkout by Meshkov, and his commencement of a hunger strike outside the building. It must be presumed that Kravchuk promised not to threaten the power of the local elite, if they, in turn, refrained from supporting separatist agitation. Kravchuk was soon under fire from nationalists in Kyiv for offering too little stick and too much carrot, and for feeding Bagrov's appetite for further concessions. Meshkov's supporters, having collected a petition of 30 000 and the support of 66 deputies, soon persuaded the Crimean Supreme Soviet to backtrack on 5 November, and call another emergency session on the 22nd, when, as expected, a local referendum law was duly adopted, paving the way for a potential future vote on secession.

In the 1 December referendum, Ukrainian independence secured a surprisingly high majority of 54.2 per cent in Crimea (57.1 per cent in Sevastopol'), on a turnout of 67.5 per cent (63.7 per cent in Sevastopol'). However, Ukraine's designs on the Black Sea Fleet after January 1992 seemed to tilt the balance of power again in the separatists' direction, as Russia was drawn openly in to the struggle (a delegation of deputies from the RSFSR, members of the Democratic Party and Christian Democratic Movement of Russia, had first arrived in Crimea on 19 and 20 October 1991 to support separatist agitation) and sought to make it clear that Ukraine could have the fleet or the Crimea, but not both.¹²⁰

The vote by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on 23 January 1992 to instruct its committees to re-examine the 1954 decision dramatically raised the stakes, and threatened Ukraine with a conflict it seemed at the time likely to lose. The 1 December vote had probably reflected Crimeans' judgement that short-term living standards were likely to be higher in Ukraine than in Russia, but Ukraine had yet to establish the cultural ties with Crimea that would guarantee its long-term loyalty. Crucially, Crimea remained isolated from the new national message promoted by the Kyiv media. The press was Russian-language, and Ukrainian television was often jammed. Kravchuk's policy of accommodation with local elites seemed not to work in the Crimean case, when Bagrov could also court Russia as an alternative sponsor.

Transcarpathia

Minority problems also exist in Transcarpathia at the other end of Ukraine.¹²¹ Officially, its population of 1.2 million in 1989 was 78 per cent Ukrainian, 13 per cent Hungarian, 4 per cent Russian and 5 per cent others. However, many of the 1 million or so Ukrainians have in the past considered themselves ethnically distinct Ruthenians or Rusyns, and there have been some signs of this tendency re-emerging, albeit at the urging of the local Communist Party, since 1989. An international scientific conference in Uzhhorod on 17 April 1991 on 'The Traditions of the Regional Culture of Rusyns - Ukrainians in Transcarpathia and the Diaspora' heard claims by the Canadian professor Paul Robert Magocsi and others that, despite similarities of language and religious traditions (the local religion is Uniate Catholic, as in Galicia), the Rusyns' subjective sense of separateness should be considered sufficient grounds in itself for their identification as a separate Slav ethnica (a claim hotly contested by Ukrainian nationalists). The Hungarian consulate in Kyiv claimed that the Transcarpathian population in fact consisted of 200 000 Hungarians, 800 000 Rusyns, and 125 000 Ukrainians proper.¹²² The region was added to Ukraine by a Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of 1945, having previously belonged to Hungary until 1918, and Czechoslovakia until 1938, although it enjoyed brief quasi-independence as the Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine until the Hungarian invasion in 1939. The Society of Carpatho-Rusyns (SCR) was originally established as a cultural-educational society in the *oblast'* capital of Uzhhorod on 17 February 1990, but on 29 September 1990 it published a declaration demanding 'the return of the status of an autonomous republic to Transcarpathia *oblast'*. The local CPU, led by Mykhailo Voloshchuk, supported the SCR, as a way of building a local power base after Ukrainian nationalists took power in Galicia in spring 1990 and cut the Transcarpathian Communists off from the rest of the Soviet Union. It also campaigned for Transcarpathia to become a 'free economic zone', to take advantage of links with Central Europe and increased their freedom of manoeuvre as '*nomenklatura* capitalists'. (The Minister for Foreign Trade, Vitalii Kravchenko, announced in November 1991 that Transcarpathia, Mariupol, and Odesa would enjoy such status.)¹²³

On the other hand, the local Hungarian minority, represented since February 1989 by the Hungarian Cultural Association of Transcarpathia and with 18 deputies on the *oblast'* Soviet, had relatively good relations with the Ukrainians, although these began to worsen after the more

politicised Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Ukraine was set up in October 1991 to campaign for autonomy.

As in the Crimea and Chernivtsi, outside forces were accused of fomenting agitation. Since 1990, the extremist Czechoslovak Republican party demanded the return of Transcarpathia, and the Slovak government hosted the World Congress of Rusyns in Medzilaborce on 23 April 1991.¹²⁴ However, the Czechoslovak government rejected a call by the SCR on 23 December 1991 to annul the 1945 treaty,¹²⁵ and on 25 May 1992 a Ukrainian-Czechoslovak treaty committed both parties to renouncing territorial claims on each other.

The local CPU, discredited by support for the August coup, attempted to save its position by proroguing the *oblast'* Soviet that gathered on 30 August until 27 September, and by passing various populist measures, including additional places for local students at Uzhhorod and Mukachiv universities. On the 27th, with rival groups of Rusyns and Ukrainians demonstrating outside, a motion of confidence in Voloshchuk received 57 votes, 4 short of the necessary majority, and a motion for his removal was defeated 53—51.¹²⁶

However, the attempt to further prorogue the session until 1 October provoked hunger strikes in the square outside the Soviet by local deputies and students, and confrontations with the local OMON. After the students called for a political strike throughout the *oblast'* on 30 September, Voloshchuk and his deputy Iurii Vorobets bowed to the inevitable and resigned. The hunger strikers won partial victory on their other demands. Free, multi-party, elections in Transcarpathia were to be held before 30 March 1992, and a commission was promised to look into the events of 19-21 August and 27-30 September 1991.

On 1 December 1991, 92.6 per cent of Transcarpathians voted to support Ukrainian independence on a turnout of 82.9 per cent; 78 per cent, meanwhile, voted in a second ballot for the status of 'a special self-governing administrative territory' within Ukraine¹²⁷ (the phrasing having been carefully moderated by Kravchuk from the SCR's original demands) and a corresponding law was drawn up by the following February.¹²⁸ Meanwhile, in the Berehove region on the Hungarian border, 81.4 per cent supported the Hungarian Democratic Alliance's call for the formation of a Magyar 'national district'.¹²⁹

Transcarpathia differs from Crimea in its relative closeness to Central European political culture and because separatist forces are balanced by a strong local Ukrainian national movement. Slovakian independence would lessen the pull from the West, but if the area

fulfills its potential for tourism and as an economic crossroads, the locals may be reluctant to share their new wealth with Kyiv. Kyiv, meanwhile, mindful of the mistakes made in Crimea, may be reluctant to deliver on promises of autonomy.

The Donbas

The two Ukrainian *oblasts*' in the Donbas (15 per cent of which is inside the RSFSR), Donetsk and Luhansk (formerly Voroshylovhrad) are heavily industrialised and Russified. Forty-four per cent of the Donetsk population was Russian in 1989, 45 per cent in Luhansk. Moreover, 34 per cent of Donbas Ukrainians gave Russians as their mother tongue (in 1989). Much of the area's industry is non-economic and environmentally hazardous, and is therefore likely to be threatened with closure by a young and impecunious Ukrainian state.

Consequently, relations between the Ukrainian national movement and the area's radical trade unions, formed after the miners' strikes of 1989 and 1991, have always been difficult. As in Transcarpathia, conservative local Communists had been pressing for a regional 'free economic zone' in 1990-1, but then discredited themselves by support for the August putschists. Attempts to form a Baltic-style 'Interfront' had never previously gained much momentum,¹³⁰ but after the banning of the CPU, local Communists such as Iurii Smirnov, head of Donetsk *oblast*' Soviet, sought to revive similar organisations as an alternative local power base. The revived SPU also provided support.

Such groups included the 'United Society for the Protection of the Russian Language Population of the Donbas', formed in Mariupol, on 15 September 1991. Despite a split at the congress, the Society issued demands for a federal Ukrainian state, with the Donbas having its own legislative institutions and militia, and the right to use Russian as the local state language. At the Donetsk *oblast*' Soviet, an organising committee for a referendum on the re-establishment of the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih Republic, that had a brief existence after February 1918, was set up on 24 September under the leadership of USSR deputy, Oleksandr Boiko, and the Ukrainian deputies Albert Korneev (the only man to vote against Ukrainian Independence in August) and Aleksandr Chyrodeev.

A close ally of Smirnov's, Boiko was also the chief instigator of the 'Democratic Movement of the Donbas', formed at a meeting of delegates from Donetsk, Mariupol, Makiivka, Ienakiievo and Shakhtarsk

in Luhans'k on 5 October. It attacked Ukraine's Declaration of Independence for 'ignoring the will of the people', called for a renewed Union treaty and 'single economic space', and for an autonomous Donbas within a federal Ukraine.

Demands for federalisation and local state status for the Russian language were supported by the Russian-speaking Vladimir Grinev, one of the leaders of the PDRU, who campaigned hard for the Presidency in the Donbas, capturing 11 per cent in Donets'k and 6.8 per cent in Luhans'k (compared with 4.2 per cent in Ukraine as a whole). However, the key meeting of the Donets'k *oblasf* Soviet on 8-11 October showed strong opposition to such changes from the local *Rukh* (although it has formally split in Donets'k), and other nationalist parties, such as the local Republican Party under Maria Oliinyk, both inside the chamber and in demonstrations outside. Consequently, the session moderated its tone. On 25 October 1991 in Donets'k, Boiko organised a joint assembly of Peoples' Deputies from local Soviets throughout eastern and southern Ukraine (in imitation of the Galician Assembly) and renewed calls both for a federated Ukraine, and for Ukraine to sign a new Union treaty.

Kravchuk, meanwhile, was calling for Ukrainian unity. As in the Crimea, the relative quiescence of separatist forces in the Donbas was undoubtedly predicted on the assumption that Kravchuk would win in December and leave existing local elites be. Despite the separatist actions of the former CPU at a local level, the great virtue of Kravchuk's national communism was that its *raison d'etre*, the adoption of a national ideology to retain elite privilege, encouraged potentially fractious regional elites into an accommodation with the centre. This strategy seems to have worked in the short run, with the Donbas seemingly integrated more smoothly into the young state than the Crimea, and the pull from impecunious Russia less strong. The independence votes in Donets'k and Luhans'k on 1 December were accordingly surprisingly high, at 84 per cent (turnout 76.7 per cent) and 83.9 per cent (turnout 80.7 per cent) respectively.

However, Ukraine still had a long-term problem with incorporating the Russian population of the Donbas, Odesa and elsewhere. As *Rukh* became more of a specifically nationalist movement in 1990-1, and less of a movement for democracy in general, the Russian population became dangerously passive, unlikely to participate in collective action organised around Ukrainian myths and symbols. The Donbas became the centre of radical left political forces from winter 1992-3.

Despite the best efforts of the PDRU and Ukrainian Social Democrats to involve Russians in the political process, and Kravchuk's appointment of Russians to key posts, such as Grinev and Morozov, the Minister of Defence, the Russian population increasingly had to face problems of ethnological disorientation. In the past, Russians had seen themselves as part of Russia and/or the USSR, but their cultural framework became tainted with the discredited symbols of empire. Unless they developed an alternative capacity to imagine themselves as 'Russians of Ukraine' they were likely to develop a complex of ethnic discomfort or inferiority, and became fertile ground for populists seeking to over-compensate for the traumas of ethnic transition, and campaign against the oppression of 'Russian culture'. Again, Kravchuk had been surprisingly successful in coping with such transitional problems. The symbolism that he had sought to revive from the past was that of the multinational Cossacks, and Ukrainian humanists such as Hrushevs'kyi¹³¹ not that of the more particularist history of Galicia and the OUN.

The Donbas is not the Crimea, but the loyalty of the local Russians, and those who live in smaller numbers around Kharkiv and in southern Ukraine had yet to be tested in a serious conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

Chernivtsi

The Western *oblast'* of Chernivtsi, made up of North Bukovyna and Bessarabia, plus the district of Hertsa, was joined to the Ukrainian SSR in 1940 as a result of the Nazi-Soviet pact and Stalin's division of former Moldovan lands. Chernivtsi's population in 1989 was 71 per cent Ukrainian, 11 per cent Romanian, 9 per cent Moldovan and 9 per cent Russian and others. In 1990-1, both Moldova and Romania condemned the pact and made revanchist claims on Chernivtsi, and on the province of Southern Bessarabia (part of Odesa *oblast'* since 1954) which was incorporated into Ukraine at the same time.

The local *oblast'* council was quick to nationalise CPU property on 25 August and conceded to Romanian and Moldovan demonstrators on 17 September 1991 that in areas of 'compact settlement', (mainly the Hlyboka region) the Romanian language and national symbols could be used alongside the Ukrainian.¹³² On the other hand, the council declared on 3 November 1991 (the anniversary of the abortive attempt by local Ukrainians to join Northern Bukovyna to the Ukrainian National Republic in 1918 before invasion by Romania) a

public holiday, and this seems to have been welcomed by the local Ukrainian population.¹³³

Meanwhile on 28 November 1991 the Romanian parliament welcomed the forthcoming Ukrainian votes, but stated that it would not recognise the results on the territories claimed by Romania, and urged other states to take the same line. This caused Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatolii Zlenko to turn back at the border, cancelling a planned trip to Romania which should have resulted in the signing of a treaty of Romanian-Ukrainian friendship, and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Romania also condemned attempts by the self-styled 'Dnister Republic' (part of the Ukrainian SSR until 1940) to break away from Moldova, particularly after the virtual military coup designed to prevent the holding of Moldovan Presidential elections east of the Dnister on 6-8 December 1991.

Romania, in turn, was accused of fanning anti-Ukrainian sentiment among the 166 000 Bulgarians and 27 000 Gagauz (Christian Turks) of Odesa *oblast*, who mainly live in the Bolhrad *raion* of Southern Bessarabia. Such agitation resulted in the question, 'Do you find it necessary to form in the Bolhrad *raion* a Bulgarian national *okruh* within Ukraine, where people of different nationalities would have the freedom to freely develop their languages, culture and traditions?' being added to the 1 December ballot, and receiving 73 per cent support.

The 'Christian Democratic Alliance of Romanians in Ukraine' formed in Chernivtsi on 26 November as 'a national movement for the protection of the legitimate rights and freedoms of Romanians in northern Bukovyna and other parts of Ukraine' called on Romanians to boycott the 1 December polls in support of the Romanian parliament's position. However, 92.8 per cent of the population eventually voted for Ukrainian independence, and the turnout was a relatively high 87.7 per cent. The boycott made a small impact in some Romanian areas. 89.3 per cent voted for the area to be given a 'special economic status'.¹³⁴

Romania's historical claims and the general unravelling of the Nazi-Soviet pact clearly destabilised the situation in the area. However, even if the 20 per cent Romanian-Moldovan minority proves receptive to Romanian propaganda, it is up against a strong local Ukrainian tradition and Chernivtsi's experience of inter-war rule by Romania, including the attempt at forced Romanianisation from 1924 on, which was much harsher than Transcarpathia's in relatively liberal, and prosperous, Czechoslovakia. The Romanian/Moldovan minority is too

small to dominate the politics of the *oblast* in the manner of the Russians in Crimea, but the issue is sufficiently poisonous for Romanian revanchism to be second only to the Russian problem as a threat to Ukraine's national security interests. It is noteworthy that by 1990 Ukraine had signed treaties with all of its neighbours apart from Russia and Romania. These were only to be signed eventually in May and June 1997 respectively.

'Dnister Republic', Moldova

The portion of Moldova east of the River Dnister was part of the Ukrainian SSR until 1940, and its 742 000 population is 29 per cent Ukrainian and 26 per cent Russian.¹³⁵ It also contains much of Moldova's heavy industry. After Moldovan nationalists swept to power in 1990 and began to restore ties with Romania, separatist inclinations on the left bank grew rapidly, although it was initially oriented to Russia or the USSR rather than Ukraine, especially as without schools or cultural facilities under the USSR the local Ukrainians are in practice highly denationalised.

In September 1990, the 'Dnister SSR' was proclaimed, and its leaders established a network of paramilitary forces and a 'Joint Council of Work Collectives' to enforce their rule in the area. In 1991, they also benefited from the assistance of Cossack mercenaries and the local forces of the USSR's 14th Army (its head, Gennadii Iakovlev, became Dnistran 'Defence Minister' on 13 December 1991).¹³⁶

The self-styled republic's leaders, mainly hangovers from the highly conservative local Communist Party, welcomed the August 1991 coup, and its promise of a return to the 'good old days'. Correspondingly, in the wake of the coup's collapse and the Declarations of Independence by both Ukraine and Moldova, the area declared its independence on 25 August, while at the same time calling to be a part of a reconstituted USSR.¹³⁷ Armed conflicts with Moldovan forces became increasingly common as the Dnister leaders attempted to consolidate their hold on government buildings and the mainly Moldovan countryside. In late November, the situation became critical, in the run-up to rival presidential polls in the two zones.

By now the geopolitical situation had changed, however. Ukrainian independence had cut the 'Dnister republic' off from the rest of the USSR, and Ukraine was dragged into the conflict. The first reason for this was that the Dnister leaders now began to appeal to their newly

discovered 'brother Ukrainians' for support. An 'Appeal to the People of Ukraine' was published in the Ukrainian press in October, and on 7 December the inaugural congress of the Union of Ukrainians of the Dnister region took place in the regional capitol of Tyraspol' under the leadership of Oleksandr But.¹³⁸

Second, the Dnistrans developed links with other separatist and ex-communist circles in nearby Odesa. A delegation from the Odesa city council had visited the area on 2 October, and the prospect of a united separatist front from the Dnister to Crimea was of obvious concern to Kyiv.¹³⁹ Moreover, Odesa *oblast'* had to cope with 50 000 refugees by the spring of 1992.

Third, it was widely reported that Romania was becoming more openly supportive of Moldova, both diplomatically and militarily, provoking further escalation of the conflict.¹⁴⁰ Fourth, radical nationalists in Kyiv began openly to call for support for 'fellow Ukrainians'. Up to 200 UNSO paramilitaries went to join in the fighting in Spring 1992.¹⁴¹

Consequently, Ukraine stepped in with a rather plaintive appeal for calm and an offer of mediation in December, although it preferred to keep its distance from an unstable area that threatened Ukraine's hard-won reputation as an oasis of ethnic calm.¹⁴²

Despite suggestions that Ukraine could arrange a swap deal with Romania and/or Moldova, surrendering Chernivtsi and Southern Bessarabia in return for the Left Bank, Romania did not really have a winning position in either area. Rather the problem for Ukraine concerns firstly Russia's continued role as a patron in a region far from its borders, and the dangerous precedent of Russian intervention in support of its stranded diaspora, and secondly the risk that nationalist pressure at home could drag it into the conflict.

CONCLUSION

The future for ethnic relations in Ukraine seems delicately poised. Ukraine's leaders, by making skilful use of territorial rather than ethnic nationalism and by soft-peddalling on Ukrainisation, have thus far avoided creating the centrifugal forces that many predicted would overwhelm the young state. However, although the PDRU and the Ukrainian Social Democrats called for a federalised Ukraine, the system is likely to remain unitary and inflexible to minority needs,

especially because of the prominence of local ex-communist elites in leading separatist agitation.

Furthermore the legacy of past Russification will surely mean growing nationalist pressure to redress the undoubted current under-provision for Ukrainian language, schools and culture, particularly by strengthening the 1989 Languages Law. Consequent fears of Ukrainianisation, whether justified or not, would provide fertile ground for populist minority leaders, as was seen in the 1994 elections.

9 From Soviet to Independent Ukraine: the Coup and Aftermath

1. Roman Laba, 'How Yeltsin's Exploitation of Ethnic Nationalism Brought down an Empire', *Transition*, vol. 2, no. 2 (12 January 1996), p. 10. See also Anita Inder Singh, 'Managing National Diversity through Political Structures and Ideologies: the Soviet Experience in Comparative Perspective', *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 1, Part 2 (July 1995), pp. 197-220.
2. See Roman Solchanyk, 'The Gorbachev-Yeltsin Pact and the New Union Treaty', *Report on the USSR*, vol. 3, no. 19 (10 May 1991); and Ann Sheehy, 'The Union Treaty: A Further Setback', *Report on the USSR*, vol. 3, no. 49 (6 December 1991),
3. On the distinegration of the former USSR, see Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Svoboda, *Soviet Disunion. A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990); Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and John Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Union* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
4. Russian Television, 14 March 1996.
5. Nearly all references in this section are from the protocol of the Supreme Council's emergency session on 24 August: *Pozacherhova sesia verkhovno'i rady Ukra'insko'i RSR: Dvanadtsiatoho skykannia. Biuletyn'* nos 1-2 (Kyiv: Verkhovna Rada URSR, 1991). This reference: Bulletin 1, p. 25.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
9. All quotes from leaflets distributed in Kyiv on the 19th and 20th. Copies are in the authors' files.
10. Two-page document in the authors' files.
11. Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukraine: Kravchuk's Role', *Report on the USSR*, RL 322/91 (6 September 1991).
12. *Pozacherhova ...*, pp. 91, 24 and 78-9.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 37 and 40.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
17. Solchanyk, p. 49.
18. *Pozacherhova ...*, Bulletin 2, p. 11.
19. *Vechirni Kyiv*, 23 August 1991.
20. *Pozacherhova ...*, Bulletin 1, p. 18.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

22. Ibid., pp. 33-4 and 70.
23. Ibid., p. 73.
24. Ibid., p. 48.
25. Ibid., pp. 71-4.
26. Ibid., pp. 52 and 76.
27. Ibid, Bulletin 1, p. 84.
28. *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 1 June 1991.
29. *Pozacherhova ...*, Bulletin 1, p. 74.
30. Ibid, p. 95.
31. Volodymyr Lytvyn, 'Sotsialistychna partiia Ukrainy', *Polityka i chas*, nos 17-18 (December 1991) pp. 80-5.
32. *Demokratychna Ukraina*, 22 December 1991.
33. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 5 October 1991.
34. *Holos Ukrainy*, 30 October 1991.
35. For example, 100 according to the SPU's Mykola Zaludiyak; *Slovo*, no. 21, December 1991.
36. *News from Ukraine*, no. 45, 1991. (Prof. Orlov's first name is not given).
37. Lytvyn, p. 83.
38. See the resolutions of the party's council on 11-12 January, attacking the economic reforms. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 14 January 1992.
39. 'Statut sotsialistichnoi partii Ukrainy', *Polityka i chas*, nos 17-18 (December 1991) pp. 88-92. Quote on p. 89.
40. *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 28 January 1992; *Holos Ukrainy*, 29 January and 14 February 1992.
41. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 14 November 1991.
42. *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 20 November 1991.
43. Ibid.
44. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 19 September 1991.
45. *Moloda hvardiia*, 18 November 1991.
46. *Samostiina Ukraina*, no. 2 (January 1992).
47. *Nezavizimost'*, 17 January 1992.
48. *Holos Ukrainy*, 18 March 1992.
49. *Holos Ukrainy*, 18 December 1991.
50. *Holos Ukrainy*, 13 November 1991.
51. *Holos Ukrainy*, 29 October 1991.
52. TASS news agency, 6 November 1991.
53. *Molod Ukraina*, 17 October 1991.
54. *Samostiina Ukraina*, no. 12 (September 1991).
55. Both groups were listed in the URP's *Samostiina Ukraina*, no. 7, February 1992, and no. 10, March 1992.
56. The flag was adopted on 28 January 1992, see *Holos Ukrainy*, 15 February 1992; the trident on 19 February, see *Holos Ukrainy*, 20 and 21 February; and the hymn on 15 January, see *Holos Ukrainy*, 18 January 1992. Even then, a compromise was reached whereby the trident would be part of, but not the whole of, the official state emblem. See *Vechirni Kyiv*, 20 February 1992.
57. Both groups were listed in the URP's *Samostiina Ukraina*, no. 7 (February 1992), and no. 10 (March 1992).

58. *Moloda Halychyna*, 22 February 1992; *Demokratychna Ukraina*, 25 February 1992.
59. *Molod Ukrainy*, 20 December 1990.
60. On the first, see *Literaturna Ukraina*, 25 July 1991; *Samostiina Ukraina*, no. 10, August 1991; on the second, see *Literaturna Ukraina*, 31 October and 7 November; and *Samostiina Ukraina*, no. 17, November 1991.
61. See Kathleen Mihalisko, 'Laying the Foundations for the Armed Forces of Ukraine', *Report on the USSR*, RL 393/91 (8 November 1991); 'Defense and Security Planning in Ukraine', RL 417/91 (6 December 1991); and 'Ukraine Asserts Control Over Nonstrategic Forces', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 1, no. 3 (24 January 1992).
62. *Za vil'nu Ukraïnu*, 7 September 1991. To all intents and purposes he was Ukraine's first Defence Minister, although the post had existed formally until 1945.
63. *Pravda*, 12 September 1991.
64. As Morozov explained at the Twelfth International Conference on Policy and Strategy in Munich on 17-19 November 1991.
65. *Izvestia*, 24 October 1991; *Holos Ukrainy*, 5 November 1991.
66. *Za vil'nu Ukraïnu*, 12 December 1991.
67. *Holos Ukrainy*, 18 December 1991.
68. *Za vil'nu Ukraïnu*, 14 December 1991; Radio Kyiv, 13 December 1991.
69. *Holos Ukrainy*, 26 October 1991.
70. *Neskorena natsiia*, no. 3, October 1991.
71. *Zelenyi svit*, September 1991.
72. On Ukrainian-Russian relations, see Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukraine and Russia: Before and After the Coup', *Report on the USSR*, RL 346/91 (27 September 1991); 'Ukraine, the Kremlin, and the Russian White House', RL 348/91 (1 November 1991) and 'Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation over the Crimea', *RFE/RL Research Report* (21 February 1992).
73. Such as at the all-Ukrainian *Viche* (Assembly) in St Sophia Square, Kyiv on 15 September: *URP-Inform* (press bulletin) no. 21, 17 September 1991.
74. *Pravda*, 21 October 1991; *Molod' Ukrainy*, 22 October 1991.
75. *Holos Ukrainy*, 15 November 1991.
76. *Holos Ukrainy*, 12 November 1991.
77. Kravchuk, *ibid.*, p. 2.
78. Radio Kyiv, 25 October 1991.
79. In, of all places, *Paris Match*, no. 22-6, December 1991.
80. The text of the agreement was published in nearly all Ukrainian papers on 10 December 1991.
81. *Holos Ukrainy*, 11 and 21 December 1991.
82. *Holos Ukrainy*, 24 December 1991.
83. *Za vil'nu Ukraïnu*, 12 December 1991. See also Roman Solchanyk, 'Kravchuk Defines Ukrainian-CIS Relations', *RFE/RL Research Report* (13 March 1992).
84. The URP on 13 January (*URP-Inform*, no. 2, 15 January 1992); the DPU in the Declaration *Zvil'nytysia vid zahrozy novoho GKChP!* 18 January 1992, copy in the authors' files.

85. Douglas L. Clarke, 'The Saga of the Black Sea Fleet', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 1, no. 3 (24 January 1992) and 'The Battle for the Black Sea Fleet', vol. 1, no. 4 (31 January 1992).
86. People's Council statement in *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 18 January 1992.
87. Moroz in *Kyivs'kyi visnyk*, 28 November 1991.
88. In September, 2 per cent considered themselves 'well-informed' about the IP A, 18.3 per cent about the DPU, 16.5 per cent about the URP, and 7.4 per cent about the PDRU. The Greens scored highest with 21.5 per cent. Even *Rukh* only managed 50.9 per cent. *Ukrains'kyi nezaleznyi tsentr sotsiolohichnykh doslidzhen'*, 20-24 September 1991. Information was supplied by Dmytro Vydrin, Director, International Institute for Global and Regional Security.
89. *URP-Inform*, no. 19, 3 September 1991.
90. *L'vivs'ki novyny* (URP newsletter) no. 39, 1991.
91. The Peasant Democratic and Christian Democratic parties were split between their support for Chornovil and Lukianenko respectively.
92. *Radio Kyiv*, 9 October 1991.
93. *Za vil'nu Ukraina*, 8 February 1992.
94. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 24 October 1991.
95. *Holos Ukrainy*, 21 November 1991.
96. On the regional definitions given in Chapter 2. See Table 9.1.
97. *Kyivs'ka pravda*, 14 September 1991.
98. Institut Sotsiologii AN Ukrainy. *Obshchestvennoie mnenie naseleniia Ukrainy o predstoiashchikh vyborakh Prezidenta Ukrainy i respublikanskom referendume o podtverzhenii akta provozglasheniya nezavisimosti* (Kyiv: Institut Sotsiologii AN Ukrainy, September 1991) table 2.
99. Sekretariat verkhovnoi rady Ukrainy: *Hrupa sotsiolohichnykh doslidzen'*, *Informatsiinyi biuletin'*, no. 14, 9-15 September 1991, table 5.
100. *Holos Ukrainy*, 1 November 1991.
101. Data obtained from a minority of *oblast'* electoral commissions, and copies in the authors' files. For example, Kravchuk obtained 65.3 per cent in the town of Dnipropetrovs'k, but up to 83.2 per cent in the surrounding countryside; 61.7 per cent in the town of Sumy, but up to 85.3 per cent outside.
102. *Sekretariat...; Biuletin'*, no. 13, 9-15 September 1991, p. 10.
103. Institut sotsiologii...
104. Sekretariat...
105. All the referendum evidence below is taken from Valerii Khmel'ko, *Khto pidtrymav i khto ne pidtrymav nezalezhnist' Ukrainy na referendumi*, by the kind permission of Eugene Paitha at RFE/RL in Munich.
106. *Holos Ukrainy*, 1 November 1991. Respondents could opt for up to four of the possibilities.
107. See also Khmel'ko.
108. See Roman Solchanyk, 'Centrifugal Movements in Ukraine and Independence', *Ukrainian Weekly*, 24 November 1991.
109. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 7 November 1991.
110. *Ukrainian Weekly*, 24 November 1991.
111. For the URP see *Samostiina Ukraina*, no. 15, October 1991. In *Zvernennia do prezydii Verkhovnoi Rady, do uriadu ta heneral'noho*

- prokurora Ukrainy*, 2 October 1991, the DPU called for the new law to be applied. Copy in the authors' files.
112. *Natsional'ni vidnosyny na Ukraini* (Kyiv: Ukraina, 1991) p. 32.
 113. *Hobs Ukrainy*, 4 October 1991.
 114. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 18 September 1991.
 115. *Avdet: Vozvrashcheniie*, nos 15-16, 11 July 1991.
 116. Kathleen Mihalisko, 'The Other Side of Separation: Crimea Votes for Autonomy', *Report on the USSR*, RL 60/91 (1 February 1991).
 117. *Za vil'nu Ukrainy*, 11 October 1991.
 118. *Hobs*, nos 16 and 17, 1991.
 119. *Hobs Ukrainy*, 9 October 1991.
 120. *Hobs Ukrainy*, 4 October 1991.
 121. Roman Solchanyk, 'Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation over the Crimea', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 1, no. 7 (21 February 1992).
 122. Alfred A. Reisch, 'Transcarpathia's Hungarian Minority and the Autonomy Issue', *RFE/RL Research Report* vol. 1, no. 5 (7 February 1992) and 'Transcarpathia and its Neighbors', *ibid.*, vol. 1, no. 5 (14 February 1992).
 123. *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 31 August 1991.
 124. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 27 November 1991.
 125. Fedir Myshanych, 'Zakhystyty Zakarpattia', *Respublikanets*, no. 2 (November-December 1991) pp. 41-6.
 126. Reisch, 14 February 1992, p. 45.
 127. *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 23 October 1991.
 128. *Demokratychna Ukraina*, 5 December 1991.
 129. *Novyny Zakarpattia*, no. 13, 1 February 1992.
 130. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 3 December 1991.
 131. See, for example, *Robitnychna hazeta*, 2 December 1990.
 132. *Hobs Ukrainy*, 22 and 26 November 1991.
 133. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 19 September 1991.
 134. *Samostiina Ukraina*, no. 15, October 1991.
 135. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 4 and 5 December 1991.
 136. *Hobs Ukrainy*, 4 January 1992.
 137. Vladimir Socor, 'Creeping Putsch in Eastern Moldova', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 1, no. 2 (17 January 1992).
 138. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 29 August 1991.
 139. *Za vti'nu Ukrainu*, 29 October 1991.
 140. *Za vil'nu Ukrainu*, 17 October 1991.
 141. *Hobs Ukrainy*, 17 December 1991.