Eugene Lashchyk, Scientific Revolutions, 1969

(D) Scientific Change

On the question of scientific change from one paradigm-theory to another there are at least three major interpretations of Professor Kuhn's position in SSR.

  1. In one interpretation, paradigm-theory change is not based on good reasons. It is a purely subjective decision by one group of scientists. The reasoning behind such a conclusion seems to be as follows:

    1. Since there is no neutral observation language, the realm of significant facts is paradigm-determined. Each paradigm restructures the realm of significant facts in order to establish a closer fit between theory and nature.
    2. The meaning of a scientific term is determined by the relation of that term to the other terms in the paradigm-theory. Because scientific terms are differently interrelated in different theories, if some term appears in two theories, then it will differ in meaning in each theory.
    3. "Proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds. Due to this as well as to the reasons given in A1 and A2, any two paradigms are incommensurable. ". . . the transition between competing paradigms cannot be made a step at a time, forced by logic and neutral experience. Like the gestalt switch, it must occur all at once . . . or not at all."
    4. Criteria for an adequate paradigm-theory are determined by the dominant paradigm. Due to this, arguments in support of a theory are circular. Such arguments cannot be made logically compelling. A scientist who does not adhere to a new paradigm-theory cannot be considered illogical.

    Due to the above considerations, Professor Kuhn has made scientific change an arbitrary affair. Change is not based on good reasons. What is considered a good reason is determined by the scientific community which made the decision. The above constitutes one reading of Kuhn's SSR. It comes very close to Dudley Shapere's interpretation of SSR. Professor Shapere states:

    Neither Kuhn nor Feyerabend succeeds in providing any extratheoretical basis (theory-independent problem and standard experiences) on the basis of which theories (paradigms) can be compared or judged indirectly. Hence there remains no basis for choosing between them. Choice must be made without any basis arbitrarily.{42}

    It may be said that on this first reading Kuhn is consistent, but wrong.

  2. The second reading of SSR consists mainly in maintaining that Kuhn's position is inconsistent or contradictory. For, on the one hand, Kuhn argues that scientific change is to be compared to a gestalt switch, that it is arbitrary, irrational, that ultimately, change is a matter of faith. Conversion is a more appropriate description when scientists change from one theory to another than the categories of logic. And on the other hand, Kuhn lists reasons for preferring one paradigm over another. Some of these reasons are the "applications of the logical method". Because these reasons are independent of paradigms Kuhn is inconsistent.

    Both Mary Hesse and Israel Scheffler interpret Kuhn as upholding two inconsistent theses. Mary Hesse states:

    It seems contradictory to claim on the one hand that there is no logical method of passing from paradigm to paradigm and that there is 'no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community' and on the other hand to list reasons for preferring one paradigm to another (pp. 151 ff) at least some of which are applications of 'logical method.'{43}

    In concluding his section on change and objectivity, Scheffler states:

    What is most important from the standpoint of the present lecture is that he seems to reinstate the very distinction between discovery and justification with which we started. For despite his strong emphasis on the conversion experience and the gestalt switch, he suggests several considerations relative to the critical evaluation of theories as actual elements of scientific functioning; the predictive criterion lately mentioned, the existence of anomaly and crisis, the preservation of previously acquired problem solving abilities, and the promise 'to resolve some outstanding and generally recognized problem that can be met in no other way.' (SSR, p. 168) Such a condition of evaluation contradicts the main thesis appealing to the history of science with which we have here been concerned, namely, that paradigm change in science is not subject to deliberation and critical assessment.{44}

  3. I think that there is a third way to interpret the variety of things that Kuhn says in SSR, a way in which consistency is restored. On the first reading (A) Kuhn was interpreted consistent but wrong. Wrong because scientific change is not an arbitrary matter. On the second reading (B) what Kuhn says in SSR comes out partly wrong and partly right. In any case, even though he is partly right, he is still inconsistent. On my reading, what Kuhn is saying cannot only be made consistent but it can be made into a plausible description of the various parts of scientific change. Basically, I propose to show how T4 and T5 can be held simultaneously without contradiction.

Scientific Change -- Not Arbitrary

I have already shown that the claim that there is no neutral observation language need not entail that scientific change is arbitrary and not based on good reasons. I have also discussed the various interpretations of the incompatibility and incommensurability thesis and nothing there necessarily implies that scientific change is unreasonable and irrational.

I would like to turn next to what I take to be the central part of my interpretation of Kuhn on scientific change. In this connection I would like to discuss both the circularity thesis T4, as well as T5.

I believe that a careful reading of Kuhn's SSR will reveal that scientific change is not arbitrary and furthermore that good reasons can be developed which make the change from the old paradigm-theory to a new theory a reasonable decision.

I will first discuss T4 -- the circularity thesis. In support of T4 Kuhn states:

Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life. Because it has that character, the choice is not and cannot be determined merely by the evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science, for these depend in part upon a particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue. When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular. Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm's defense.{45}

Further down Kuhn states: ". . . the status of the circular argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be made logically or even probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step into the circle . . . As in political revolutions so in paradigm choice there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community."{46}

In another place, Kuhn states: "In the partially circular arguments that regularly result, each paradigm will be shown to satisfy more or less the criteria that it dictates for itself and to fall short of a few of those dictated by the opponent."{47}

Before further analyzing Kuhn's arguments on circularity, it might be valuable to review the idea of circular arguments in logic. As logicians define such arguments, an argument is said to be circular if its conclusion is assumed as an added premise in the proof or if the justification of a premise involves appealing to the truth of the conclusion.{48}

In order to see better in what way Kuhn claims that paradigm choice is circular, I will reconstruct his argument. Given two theories A and B. and given that CAl - CA are criteria which comprise the relevant considerations to be employed in selection of an adequate paradigm-theory, the reconstructed argument might be:

Pl Any competing theory which better satisfies criteria CA1 - CAn earns the title of a paradigm theory.

P2 Of two competing theories, A and B, theory A satisfies criteria CA1 - CAn better than theory B.{49}

Therefore, theory A earns the title of a paradigm-theory. For the sake of argument, let us assume that the notion of better satisfying the criteria is well explicated; then the first premise P1 needs further justification. P1 is a general principle which serves as a norm in paradigm choice. How will it be supported? According to Kuhn, such criteria which serve as norms are prescribed by the dominant paradigm-theory. In our example, such criteria are supplied by the dominant paradigm theory A. But this justification of P1 presupposes our conclusion. Since, by definition, any argument which contains a premise that is Justified by an appeal to the truth of the conclusion is circular, this argument is circular. This reconstruction should help us to understand what Kuhn means by the claim that paradigm choice is circular.

I would like to turn next to a closer examination of the reconstructed argument for the circularity thesis. The crux of this argument rests on the justification of the first premise, which proceeds from the claim that the criteria of an adequate theory follows from the dominant paradigm-theory. Paradigms, besides determining what problems and solution to problems are scientific, also perform a normative function in that they supply scientists with criteria for paradigm theory selection. For students of philosophy of science brought up in the spirit of the logical positivists' and empiricists' work in the field of confirmation theory and inductive logic these are strange sounding claims indeed. It behoves me, therefore, to attempt a plausible and sympathetic explanation of this claim. Some might say, however, that this will not be possible here because I have already prejudiced the discussion by differentiating between the scientific and the meta-scientific meaning of the word "paradigm". By doing so, I have implied that there are two different paradigms in Kuhn's SSR: (1) those which determine scientific problems and solution to problems -- C1, and (2) those which supply scientists with criteria of theory selection -- C2. It seems that I am faced with the problem that no matter what I do I cannot satisfy the Kuhnians or the logical empiricists. Basically, the problem is as follows: "Is it possible to reconcile the following two claims: (1) that the dominant paradigm theory supplies scientists with criteria for an adequate theory in science; (2) that a distinction can be made within the context of Kuhn's view between the scientific and the meta-scientific clusters." Some might say that by making a distinction between the scientific and metascientific clusters I have prejudiced the case against Kuhn, particularly when it comes to his claim that the dominant paradigm supplies scientists somehow with criteria for an adequate scientific theory. Let us see how things would stand if I did not distinguish between the first and the second clusters. It can be argued that the same kind of entity which serves to illustrate the kind of work that is to be done in science, the kinds of problems and solutions to problems that are to serve as models in the solution of other problems, can also supply the scientists with criteria for an adequate scientific theory. In other words criteria for an adequate scientific theory can come from the dominant theory of the time. Thus, Newtonian mechanical theory for hundreds of years served as a model of what an adequate scientific theory should look like; in the nineteenth century, scientists, at least in England, argued that a necessary condition of the acceptability of any scientific theory must be the construction of a mechanical model for a theory. It was demanded that the condition be satisfied in the case of the ether theory. Maxwell also felt the need to develop a mechanical model for his electromagnetic theory before his theory could be found acceptable by the scientific community of his time.{50} The distinction between the scientific cluster and metascientific cluster thus appears to be arbitrary for the same theory can serve to illustrate to scientists how scientific research ought to be conducted as well as serve as a model of what an adequate theory should look like. To put the point in Kuhnian terminology we can say that the same paradigm defines a period of normal science as well as for a time defines science per se. The distinction between science and meta-science is left over from the logical positivist tradition which drew a sharp line between the context of discovery and the context of justification. According to Reichenbach, epistemologists are to be concerned with "rational reconstructions".

The way, for instance, in which a mathematician publishes a new demonstration, or a physicist his logical reasoning in the foundation of a new theory, would almost correspond to our concept of a rational reconstruction and the well known difference between the thinker's way of finding this theorem and his way of presenting it before a public may illustrate the difference in question. I shall introduce the terms context of discovery and context of justification to mark this distinction. Then we shall have to say that epistemology is only occupied in constructing the context of justification.{51}

Scheffler recently stated that "the process of critical appraisal is then, integral to science, its operative canons reflecting, not the course of theory generation but rather the practice of theory assessment".{52} Further on he states:

The distinction between theory genesis and theory evaluation, between the context of discovery and the context of justification enables us to say with considerable plausibility that objectivity characterizes the evaluative or justificatory process of science rather than the genesis of scientific ideas.{53}

But the distinction between the scientific and meta-scientific cluster need not be as abstract and seemingly removed from live situations in theory debates as Reichenbach's distinction suggests.

Let me look more closely at the claim that the same kind of thing which illustrates the tradition of normal science also supplies scientists with normative guides for theory selection. Kuhn does not mean that among the statements of the paradigm-theory are statements which comprise the criteria of judgment of what an adequate scientific theory should be. If a paradigm must somehow supply a scientist with such criteria, then this is clearly an extension of meaning not included in the first cluster. How then do such criteria come from the dominant paradigm-theory? The answer seems to be that the whole paradigm-theory is taken as a model of what an adequate theory in the scientific area in question should be like. This is understandable because when a particular theory proves exceptionally successful in solving problems and explaining various puzzles about nature, scientists assume that other theories, if they are to be adequate scientific theories, must have some of those characteristics which are deemed essential in the dominant theory. Because Newtonian mechanics proved so successful, scientists for hundreds of years assumed that any new theory, even in a different field, must be like it in certain respects.

Both claims are therefore not necessarily incompatible and I have shown one way in which they can be resolved. The important point to remember is that saying that a whole paradigm-theory serves as a model of an adequate theory is not to be taken as a final answer, on the contrary it is just the beginning of more extensive work that still remains to be done. Precisely what characteristics of a dominant paradigm are essential and thus ought to be satisfied by other adequate theories, and which are accidental and unimportant is not given by the statement - look at Newtonian mechanics. Once certain specifiable aspects are taken as essential to a particular paradigm it then appears understandable why other theories must possess them. In view of the above considerations I think that Kuhn's circularity thesis becomes much more plausible. It does not seem unreasonable for scientists to demand that new theories conform to certain aspects of a successful theory in the present. What is unreasonable to hold is the stronger thesis that all criteria for an adequate scientific theory somehow follow from the dominant paradigm theory.

There seem to be at least three separate positions one can take with respect to the Justification of the first premise in the argument above. I shall name them as follows:

1. Radical Contextualism (R. C.) All criteria of judgment in theory selection are derived from the dominant paradigm-theory of the time.{54}

2. Radical Objectivism (R.O.) No criteria of judgment in theory selection comes from the paradigm theory. Such criteria are and must of necessity be independent of scientific theories for otherwise there is no objectivity in science. Such criteria come from inductive logic which prescribes what theories will be cognitively significant and scientifically adequate.{55}

3. Moderate Contextualism (M.C.) Some criteria of judgment in theory selection are based on the dominant theory and some are independent of the dominant theory. Such independent criteria might have been suggested by some past theory but this information is only of historical interest. It remains true to say that there are criteria which have been consistently applied throughout the history of science when decisions had to be made as to which is the better of a set of competing theories. Furthermore such criteria appear to be reasonable and justifiable in themselves partly on intuitive grounds and partly in that they have consistently been successful in convincing scientists.

A heavy emphasis on Theses 4 is the pivotal point of interpretation A about which Kuhn maintains that scientific change is an arbitrary affair, and that it is not based on good reason. Central to the circularity thesis, as I have already pointed out, is the assumption that criteria for paradigm selection are dependent on each of the paradigms under consideration. It is also important for the plausibility of the first interpretation (A) that not only some but all criteria be dependent on the dominant paradigm. In other words, Kuhn must be interpreted as upholding the R.C. thesis for interpretation A to appear at all plausible. Furthermore, criteria in T5 also must be interpreted as dependent on a paradigm and certainly ought to be classified as de facto rather than de jure.

Each paradigm satisfies the criteria that it dictates for itself and normally fails to satisfy the criteria dictated by competing paradigm. Because of this arguments in support of paradigm are circular and more important only appear persuasive to those who already have adopted it.

Such results from the circularity thesis coupled with Kuhn's de scription of scientific change as a matter of faith as well as the claim that paradigm change is analogous to a gestalt switch, all fit well with interpretation A.

The following difficulties arise particularly with attributing the R.C. thesis to Kuhn:

1. What about those passages where Kuhn states that "the evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science . . . depend in part upon a particular paradigm."{56} Here Kuhn seems to imply that only some criteria are paradigm determined.

2. More importantly, what about the types of arguments that can be developed which are based on reasons given on pp. 152-158 in SSR? Such reasons as predictive accuracy, or solution of crucial experiments, seem to be independent of any particular paradigm.

This second aspect of Kuhn has been missed by reviewers and commentators on SSR who seem to uphold interpretation A. See for example, Dudley Shapere's review of SSR. He states:

For Kuhn has already told us that decision of a scientific group to adopt a new paradigm is not based on good reasons; on the contrary, what counts as a good reason is determined by the decision.{57}

In connection with a contribution that he feels Kuhn has made to our understanding of past scientific theories, namely that they are not less scientific than present theories, he adds:

Yet perhaps that deep impression has effected too great a reaction; for that there is more to those theories than was once thought does not mean that they are immune to criticism -- that there are not good reasons for their abandonment and replacement by others. And while Kuhn's book calls attention to (good) reasons for scientific change, it fails itself to illuminate those reasons and even obscures the existence of such reasons.{58}

Shapere thus interprets Kuhn as holding the view that acceptance or rejection of a scientific theory is arbitrary. Professor Shapere, in a long article evaluating particularly Feyerabend, states:

Neither Kuhn nor Feyerabend succeeds in providing any extra-theoretical basis (theory-independent problem and standard experiences) on the basis of which theories (paradigms) can be compared or judged indirectly. Hence there remains no basis for choosing between them. Choice must be made without any basis, arbitrarily.{59}

Kuhn thinks that the following types of arguments are effective in support of new paradigm-theories:

(1) Crucial Experiments -- Any theory which solves the problem which has led the old paradigm-theory to crisis is the better theory p and should be adopted as a paradigm. These crucial experiments were proposed many times before any new theory was available.{60}

(2) Predictive Accuracy -- Any theory which is able to make pre dictions which are much more precise and accurate than the old paradigm is again the better theory.{61}

(3) Prediction of New Phenomenon -- Any theory which is capable of predicting new phenomena completely unsuspected by the old paradigm is the better theory.{62}

(4) Simplicity -- Any theory which is much simpler and has fewer assumptions than the old paradigm is the better theory.{63}

These arguments certainly are the types of arguments that philosophers of science have presented as constituting some of the good reasons for the adoption of a new paradigm-theory.{64} The suggestion that such criteria as are listed in T5 are really paradigm determined won't save R.C. as well as interpretation A. For then the criteria given in T5 will be part and parcel of every paradigm. This would enable scientific change to be justified by criteria acceptable to all paradigms and thus objectivity would be reinstated. Kuhn, however, makes enough positive statements in praise of the above four arguments to discount the possibility that he finds them dependent on the dominant paradigm. He states:

This is not to suggest that new paradigms triumph ultimately through some mystical aesthetic. . . . But if a paradigm is ever to triumph it must gain some first supporters, men who will develop it to the point where hardheaded arguments can be produced and multiplied. And even those arguments, when they come, are not individually decisive. Because scientists are reasonable men, one or another argument will ultimately persuade many of them. But there is no single argument that can or should persuade them all. Rather than a single group conversion, what occurs is an increasing shift in the distribution of professional allegiances.{65}

In the above quotation, Kuhn does admit that "hardheaded arguments can be produced" in support of new paradigms. What else could he mean by "hardheaded arguments" except arguments which are good, and reasonable. He would most likely rule out the possibility that these reasons are dependent on some paradigm for he believes that such reasons are powerful in persuading scientists who are committed to another paradigm. Furthermore, Kuhn states that "scientists are reasonable men" and, therefore, "one or another argument will ultimately persuade them." But what sorts of arguments can persuade reasonable men? Obviously good, reasonable arguments, be they deductive or inductive.

Further evidence can be found in support of my claim that the first interpretation is to be eliminated. To each of the four arguments in support of new paradigms, Kuhn adds that such arguments can legitimately be made and cites clear historical examples of these types of arguments.

Concerning the "crucial experiments" argument, he says, "When it can legitimately be made, this claim is often the most effective one possible."{66} In support of quantitative precision arguments, Kuhn says: "Newton's success in predicting quantitative astronomical observations was probably the single most important reason for his theory's triumph.{67}

There seems to be little doubt, then, that Kuhn admits of good, hardheaded arguments in support of paradigm-theories. Because of this fact, I believe that interpretation A of such men as Dudley Shapere are unacceptable. Interpretation B can therefore be viewed as an improvement because it recognizes that Kuhn upholds T5 besides upholding T4. But on interpretation B. Kuhn's position in SSR is inconsistent. Kuhn can't hold consistently the following two sets of claims:

I. (a) that paradigm change is to be described as a sudden gestalt switch; (b) that a new paradigm is usually adopted in the face of evidence which supports the older paradigm; (c) that paradigm change cannot be forced by logical proof.

II. T5 -- that good reasons can be developed in support of a paradigm like predictive accuracy, prediction of novel phenomena, etc. which are independent of any paradigm. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that these criteria in T5 are de jure rather than de facto.{68}

Therefore, Kuhn is inconsistent.

Interpretation B is an improvement over interpretation A, but it still has a serious defect. Its weakness lies in not paying close enough attention to the ambiguities in the term "paradigm." I would like to argue that interpretation C is the most plausible interpretation of the many things that Kuhn is saying in SSR. My interpretation has the added advantage that Kuhn's position will no longer be inconsistent.

I would like to suggest that those descriptions of paradigm change given in Roman numeral I, such as gestalt switch, etc., pertain to the earliest stages of the development of a paradigm -- scientific cluster part a. At this early stage paradigms are usually nothing more than a permanent solution to an outstanding problem (p. 44). At this early stage of a new paradigm the old paradigm explains more of the diverse observations that have been collected. Because of these reasons Kuhn has described paradigm change as a matter of faith, faith in the promise of success that the new paradigm seems to offer, but as yet unavailable for inspection. All of this seems too obvious to need further explanation. Certainly at such early stages of development of a paradigm theory adoption of the theory will appear unreasonable in view of the abundance of evidence to the contrary. But even at this early stage Kuhn has suggested that some conditions must be satisfied by the new candidate for paradigm.

(1) The new candidate must resolve anomalies that have been responsible for leading the old paradigm into crisis.

(s) The new paradigm must preserve a large part of the problem solving ability that has accrued in science under the older paradigm.{69}

The types of good reasons that are part of T5, such as predictive accuracy etc., can usually be developed only at a much later time when the new scientific paradigm theory has been developed on various fronts as a regular procedure of normal scientific activity. Ultimately scientific change can be made to appear reasonable and justifiable, but only after the development of the new paradigm theory both on the theoretical as well as the factual level.

Kuhn is therefore not inconsistent because his seemingly conflicting descriptions of scientific change T4 and T5 pertain to different stages of the development of a paradigm-theory. Inconsistency arises if two logically incompatible descriptions pertain to the same thing at the same time. But the time condition is definitely not satisfied in this case, therefore Kuhn's position on scientific change can be interpreted as consistent.

The part of Kuhn's description which originally appeared to be wrong turns out to be a very illuminating description of what really occurs at the inception of a new paradigm-theory.

How is it possible that readers of Kuhn's SSR should have missed such an important, because correct, interpretation? Part of the answer can be found in the various senses of the term "paradigm" with which I began my discussion of this chapter. By paradigms, even within the scientific cluster C1(a), Kuhn means, sometimes, just a solution to some outstanding problems in the field, at other times within the same cluster C1 a paradigm can be a fully developed scientific theory very far advanced in the normal scientific research. The descriptions of change will be different at the initial stages and at the later stages. Kuhn also speaks of paradigms in sense C3 where they are determinant of a world view, and constitutive of nature. Ptolemaic astronomy toward the end of the Middle Ages was just that, constitutive of a world view. Because the reader of Kuhn is unaware of such a wide range of meanings of the term "paradigm" much of what Kuhn says seems paradoxical or even contradictory. I have therefore set myself the task in Chapter II of redefining the term "paradigm" and revising in part the terminology in SSR.

The radical obiectivism thesis proceeds to the other extreme by holding that all criteria for an adequate scientific theory are independent of the dominant paradigm-theory. This is not the place for a thorough critique of the R.O. thesis for neither Kuhn nor I sub scribe to such a thesis. Some of the remarks I made previously, how ever, should make it evident that at least some criteria which have been used and are presently used in deciding which of a set of alter native theories is the better theory are based on the dominant accepted paradigm-theory of the time. As I have already pointed out this should not be too surprising, for scientists will try to select theories which possess some of the features that are possessed by the most adequate theory of the time. Thus a theory in mechanics which does not utilize differential equations will just on this point be immediately suspect, for the complexity of the number of different and interdependent para meters makes it almost impossible to have reliable predictions and explanations without the use of differential equations. Besides such counter examples to the R.O. thesis there appears to be no obvious a priory argument for such a totally independent set of criteria for theory selection, even though I believe that some of the criteria can be justified on independent grounds as I will try to show shortly.

Let me now turn to a further analysis and development of the MC thesis. One way of reconciling the simultaneous existence of two sets of criteria for theory selection is to opt for a two tier view of such criteria. In the higher tier would be found such criteria as: (1) predictive accuracy; (2) prediction of novel phenomena; (3) crucial experiments; (4) simplicity; (5) coherence with other theories, particularly if they are more basic scientific theories; (6) falsifiability of the laws of a theory or of certain statements which are logical consequences of the theory. On the lower tier would be found such criteria which spring from the dominant scientific theories of the particular time. The list of examples I will give is not to be taken as comprising such lower tier criteria in effect at the present time, but only such considerations which have at one time or another in the past served as important considerations that were to be taken into account in theory selection. Criteria which can be considered theory dependent have consisted of such consideration as (1) the ability of developing a mechanical model for a scientific theory; (2) in dispensability of differential equations, primarily for theories in physics; (3) admissibility of behavior data only; (4) validity of introspective data; (5) necessity of operational definitions; (6) reduction to an observational language. The considerations listed at the lower level have usually been selected because a particular scientific theory for a time was very successful in solving problems and guiding research. Scientists then, usually selected those aspects of a theory which were presumed to be responsible for the theory's exceptional success. Naturally, with the downfall of a particular scientific theory the particular aspects deemed essential for future adequate theories would normally be abandoned. All criteria are in principle subject to modification but the criteria in the lower tier because of their very essence are more readily susceptible to reexamination and possible change after every scientific revolution. Objectivity is preserved not only because of the criteria that a scientific paradigm must satisfy in the very early stages such as preserving problem e solving ability of the older paradigm and solving anomalies that lead to crisis, but also because of the objectivity of criteria in the upper tier. As I have already pointed out, criteria in the upper tier seem to be independent of any particular paradigm-theory. Various considerations support their independence as well as lend credibility to the view that these criteria are to be weighed more heavily than the lower level criteria.

In the first place, as Kuhn has shown, these upper level considerations, whenever they could be developed, scientists appealed to them no matter what paradigm-theory was at issue. In other words, when scientists have defended their decisions for one theory or another such upper level considerations as prediction of novel phenomena or greater precision on prediction etc. have been consistently developed. Furthermore, there seems to be almost universal agreement among scientists that such considerations are of primary importance in weighing which of a set of theories is the better theory. The historical argument tends to support the independence of the higher criteria from any particular paradigm theory.

Secondly, I would like to suggest that these upper level criteria stand on their own, independently of any scientific theory, because they incorporate the essential properties of an adequate scientific theory in the general case. If we ask ourselves "what do we demand of a good scientific theory?" I think we can answer such a question. Since the primary function of a scientific theory is accurate prediction and explanation of observed phenomena, any theory which performs the above functions best ought to be the best theory. Since the upper level criteria are reducible to such essential considerations, they are justifiable on that ground. Thus, the criteria of greater precision in prediction makes more precise the demand that a scientific theory must be capable of predicting and not just explaining phenomena. "Prediction of novel phenomena" is a demand for the accuracy of pre diction in the breadth of phenomena and not only in depth, as was true in the case of considerations for greater precision. The demand for coherence of new special theories with our basic theory spring from the consideration of explanatory power of our basic theory. Economy and simplicity of our conceptual scheme is also a desirable characteristic which bears on our demand for coherence. Adoption of that theory which is capable of explaining the anomalies which lead the old theory into crisis, is obviously reducible to the essential characteristics of explanation and prediction. For if the anomalous phenomena can be logically deduced from a theory, they will no longer be anomalous just because they can be subsumed under a scientific theory.

In conclusion it can be said that on the moderate contextualists thesis scientific debates are explainable on a rational basis and the arguments adduced in support of decisions to adopt one or another theory could be reasonable because there are objective criteria which can at times be appealed to. It should be added, however, that choice among alternative scientific theories, when they are not fully developed, always involves a gamble. The scientist or the group of scientists adopting a new theory, Ta are in essence placing a bet on Ta. At the time of adoption there might be very few good arguments available from the upper tier, but the scientists are betting that these can be developed after the theory is developed and stated with greater precision. Faith in the success of the paradigm in the early stages will be rewarded when these scientists come up with the successful development of arguments of the upper level sort, which will be very convincing to those scientists who for a time withheld their support of the new theory. The decision to adopt a new theory can thus appear to be more and more reasonable with the development of more arguments of the upper level sort. At no point will it be a matter of logical proof, but it can nevertheless be a reasonable decision.

Table of Contents -- Go to Chapter 3

Notes

{42} Shapere, "Meaning and Scientific Change," pp. 41-85. [Back]

{43} Mary Hesse, Review of SSR, ISIS, LIV (1963), 286-287. [Back]

{44} Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, p. 89. [Back]

{45} SSR, p. 93. [Back]

{46} SSR, p. 93 [Back]

{47} SSR, p. 93 [Back]

{48} One logic text defines circular argument as follows:

"If the conclusion of an argument seems dubious, one should of course examine the argument's connections and, if they are adequate, raise the question of the acceptability of the reasons. But from this point all the reasons should be judged on their merits independently of the conclusion they support. There is, however, at least one way in which it is legitimate to reject a statement as a reason, when it is identical with the conclusion, thus making the argument circular . . . A person who presents a circular argument is begging the question. The question is: 'What reasons can be given to support your conclusions?' Since 'reasons' mean 'beliefs more readily accepted and logically related to the conclusion,' the conclusion itself (not being more readily accepted), cannot be said to provide a reason for itself. To accept such a statement as a reason would be to accept the very statement which (as conclusion) is in need of support, and therefore in doubt."

Richard B. Angell, Reasoning and Logic (New York: Appleton Century-Crofts, 1964), pp. 393-394. [Back]

{49} To see the relevance of the inclusion of two theories in paradigm theory debates, see the following references. Kuhn states:

"To the historian, at least, it makes little sense to suggest that verification is establishing the agreement of fact with theory. All historically significant theories have agreed with the facts, but only more or less. There is no more precise answer to the question whether or how well an individual theory fits the facts. But questions much like that can be asked when theories are taken collectively or even in pairs. It makes a great deal of sense to ask which of two actual competing theories fits the facts better. Though neither Priestley's nor Lavoisier's theory, for example, agreed precisely with existing observations, few contemporaries hesitated more than a decade in concluding that Lavoisier's theory provided the better fit of the two."(SSR, p. 141)

"In the sciences the testing situation never consists, as puzzle-solving does, simply in the comparison of a single paradigm with nature. Instead, testing occurs as part of the competition between two rival paradigms for the allegiance of the scientific community." (SSR, p. 144) [Back]

{50} "Clerk Maxwell shared with other nineteenth-century proponents of the wave theory of light the conviction that light waves must be propagated through a material ether. Designing a mechanical medium to support such waves was a standard problem for . . . his . . . contemporaries. His own theory, however, the electromagnetic theory of light, gave no account at all of a medium able to support light waves, . . . Initially, Maxwell's theory was widely rejected for those reasons. But, . . . Maxwell's proved difficult to dispense with, and as it achieved the status of a paradigm, the community's attitude toward it changed. . . . The result, again, was a new set of problems and standards, . . ." (SSR, pp. 106-107) [Back]

{51} Hans Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 67. [Back]

{52} Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, p. 72. [Back]

{53} Ibid., p. 73.54 [Back]

{54} There are some passages in Kuhn's SSR which can be interpreted as claiming that all criteria or standards for an adequate paradigm theory are derived from the dominant paradigm.

". . . paradigms prove to be constitutive of the research activity. They are also, however, constitutive of science in other respects, . . . In learning a paradigm the scientist acquires theory, methods, and standards together, usually in an inextricable mixture." (SSR, p. 108)

"The result, again, [of paradigm change] was a new set of problems and standards, one which in the event, had much to do with the emergence of relativity theory." (SSR, p. 107)

"There are no external standards to permit a judgment of that sort. What occurred was neither a decline nor a raising of standards, but simply a change demanded by the adoption of a new paradigm." (SSR, p. 107)

In spite of these and a few other unguarded passages I do not think that Kuhn embraces the R.C. thesis. My misgivings are due to other passages which I think explicitly deny that all criteria are paradigm dependent. I will discuss these in detail when I discuss, the M.C. position. There are many others who seem to hold this thesis. See for example Toulmin's "Conceptual Revolution in Science," Synthese, XVII, 1 (March, 1967), 75-91. There he states:

"In generalizing about the merits of rival scientific theories as of any other creative innovation, we should concern ourselves with the selection which in fact guide the choices men make between the available conceptual innovations at any operative time . . . and . . . a corollary: that the criteria legitimately invoked in a given specific situation are likely to be dependent on the context, just as much as the criteria of moral rightness and wrongness before and after an action." (p. 88)

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Notes

{54} Also see, R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1940). [Back]

{55} It seems that logical positivists generally held something like (R.O.). Also Israel Scheffler propounds a view similar to R.O. in Science and Subjectivity. [Back]

{56} SSR, p. 93. See also the passage quoted earlier where Kuhn speaks of "partially circular arguments," p. 108. This also seems to imply that only some criteria are paradigm determined. [Back]

{57} Dudley Shapere, Review of SSR, Philosophical Review, (1964), pp. 383-394, see particularly p. 392. [Back]

{58} Ibid., p. 393. See also pp. 388-389. [Back]

{59} Shapere, "Meaning and Scientific Change," pp. 41-85. [Back]

{60} "Probably the single most prevalent claim advanced by the proponents of a new paradigm is that they can solve the problems that led the old one to a crisis. When it can legitimately be made, this claim is often the most effective one possible. . . . 'Crucial experiments' -- those able to discriminate particularly sharply between the two paradigms -- have been recognized and attested before the new paradigm was even invented." (SSR, p. 152) [Back]

{61} "Claims of this sort are particularly likely to succeed if the new paradigm displays a quantitative precision strikingly better than its older competitor. The quantitative superiority of Kepler's Rudolphine tables to all those computed from the Ptolemaic theory was a major factor in the conversion of astronomers to Copernicanism." (SSR, p. 152-153) [Back]

{62} "In those other areas particularly persuasive arguments can be developed if the new paradigm permits the prediction of phenomena that had been entirely unsuspected while the old one prevailed." (SSR, p. 153) [Back]

{63} ". . . another sort of consideration that can lead scientists to reject an old paradigm in favor of a new. . . . are the arguments, . . . that appeal to the individual's sense of the appropriate or the aesthetic -- the new theory is said to be 'neater,' 'more suitable,' or 'simpler' than the old." (SSR, p. 154). [Back]

{64} See Carl Hempel's Philosophy of Natural Science, Foundations of Philosophy Series (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), Chapter IV, "Criteria of Confirmation and Acceptability," or Mario Bunge's article, "The Weight of Simplicity in the Construction and Assaying of Scientific Theories," in Probability Confirmation and Simplicity, ed. by M. H. Foster and M. L. Martin (New York: Odyssey Press, Inc., 1966), p. 300. [Back]

{65} SSR, p. 152 [Back]

{66} SSR p. 152 [Back]

{67} SSR, p. 153 [Back]

{68} Mary Hesse in her review of SSR implies that these criteria are de jure. She states: ". . . to list reasons for preferring one paradigm to another (pp. 151 ff.) at least some of which are applications of 'logical' method." ISIS, 1963, p. 287. [Back]

{69} "Furthermore, even when that has occurred and a new candidate for paradigm has been evoked, scientists will be reluctant to embrace it unless convinced that two all-important conditions are being met. First, the new candidate must seem to resolve some outstanding and generally recognized problem that can be met in no other way. Second, the new paradigm must promise to preserve a relatively large part of the concrete problem-solving ability that has accrued to science through its predecessors. Novelty for its own sake is not a desideratum in the sciences as it is in so many other creative fields. As a result though new paradigms seldom or never possess all the capabilities of their predecessors, they usually preserve a great deal of the most concrete parts of past achievement and they always permit additional concrete problem-solutions besides." (SSR, p. 168) [Back]

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