1 Building a Multicultural Society by Political Integration

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Switzerland today seems to be one of the most privileged countries in the world. When its direct neighbours were engaged in the destructive conflicts of the First and Second World Wars, Switzerland survived as a successfully neutral and independent small nation in the heart of war-torn Europe. At the end of this century its inhabitants are enjoying one of the highest living standards among industrialised countries. Switzerland lacks natural resources, but Swiss industry produces high-quality goods: precision machines and tools, watches, electronic devices, pharmaceutical and chemical products, and services such as banking, insurance and tourism, which are appreciated all over the world. With high import and export rates Switzerland is strongly dependent on the European and world markets yet has maintained its ability to compete in many fields. Although Switzerland's population is small, the country can compete in exports and foreign investments with the largest of industrialised nations. In exported goods Switzerland ranks tenth in the world and among foreign investors it lies fifth. If we consider bank credits to foreign countries, we find that Switzerland ranks as high as third. Once a poor region of mountain farmers, it has become a rich nation and is seen as a model case of successfully finding a profitable niche in world markets (Boxes 1.1 and 1.2).

Moreover, the Swiss people pay relatively low taxes for the many benefits they receive from their government. There are high-quality, reliable public transport systems which not only link cities but also extend up to small mountain villages. The infrastructure of roads, energy supply and telecommunications is comprehensive and well maintained. Public education is of a high standard, especially in professional schools. In some fields of research, the federal institutes of technology have a worldwide reputation. Health services and social security are available to everybody.

The political stability of Switzerland is outstanding. For more than thirty years the Federal Council, the seven-member head of the Swiss government, has been composed of a successful coalition between the same four parties, which represent about 70 per cent of the electorate. Despite the fact that the electorate votes every year on up to six proposals to change the constitution, Switzerland is not a country of political revolution. Outsiders wonder not only about Swiss conservatism, but also about a seeming absence of serious social or economic conflict.

Switzerland, in maintaining its own interpretation of the principle of neutrality, has until now played a lesser role on the stage of international politics than other neutral countries such as Sweden and Austria. In doing so it has avoided many of the conflicts and complications in international affairs that could have been dangerous, perhaps even catastrophic, for a small, young nation.

It would be fundamentally wrong, however, to think of Switzerland as a country without historical conflicts. Modern Switzerland was not created by one homogeneous ethnic people, but by different ethnic groups speaking different languages and following different religions. The processes of nation-building, urbanisation, industrialisation and modernisation were accompanied by societal conflicts just as in other countries. Moreover they were in many ways comparable with processes in developing countries today. At the beginning of the political federation of Switzerland there was a civil war between conservative Catholics and progressive Protestants. Thereafter, despite its political neutrality, in the First World War Switzerland almost broke apart when the political elites opted for different sides in the conflict between its neighbours: the majority of German-speaking Swiss identified with the German side whereas the French-speaking population sympathised with France.2 During industrial development there were economic inequalities and a class struggle developed between workers and capitalist entrepreneurs which culminated in a nationwide strike and intervention by federal government troops in 1918. The workers whose claims were all denied by the bourgeois government became a radicalised opposition group during the following decade. After the Second World War an important minority conflict broke out in the canton of Bern when the French-speaking population of the Jura region denied the legitimacy of the state government. After a long political struggle they succeeded in creating a canton of their own.

So how has the Swiss nation state, once Utopian idea, become a reality? How was Switzerland able to keep its independence as a political nation and deal with its economic, social and cultural conflicts? And finally, how was Switzerland able to turn itself into a modern, industrialised nation, and develop a form of democracy that in the nineteenth century went further than in all other European countries?

In saying that Switzerland represents a 'paradigmatic case of political integration', I echo the view of Karl Deutsch, a scholar looking at Switzerland from the outside.3 Indeed Switzerland has become a society with its own identity only through and because of its political institutions. The role of the political institutions was fundamental in uniting a people with four languages, two religions and different regional cultures and in turning these disadvantages into advantages. The key to this process was integration and a particular way of dealing with conflicts and problems in a peaceful manner. In this chapter as well as in many other parts of the book, I shall illustrate, using specific examples, what integration meant and how it worked.

1.2 THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SWITZERLAND

After the Vienna Congress in 1815, when much of the prerevolutionary old order was restored in Europe, nobody could have foreseen that Switzerland would become one of the first democracies and a small nation state.

Three tiny alpine regions had declared themselves independent of the Habsburgs in the thirteenth century. Other regions and cities then followed suit and by the time of the French Revolution 13 Swiss cantons had formed a loose confederation. However what had once been a product of peasant revolution transformed itself into a feudalist regime of privileges, in which the old cantons exploited the resources and people of newly acquired regions. This moribund 'old regime' broke down when troops of the French Revolution, promising to bring democracy, invaded Switzerland as they had other European countries. While France was successful in breaking the privileges of the old cantons, it failed, not surprisingly, to merge the cantons into a united Helvetic Republic in 1798. Five years later, on the order of Napoleon Bonaparte, part of the autonomy of the cantons was restored in the so-called 'Mediation Act', but in 1815 the Swiss chose to return to the old system. A loose confederation of 25 independent cantons, who considered themselves sovereign states, was reestablished. The 'eternal' treaty guaranteed collective security by mutual assistance. A conference of canton delegates was empowered to implement common decisions. But the delegates were bound by the instructions of their cantonal governments. Agreements and decisions were difficult to reach. Thus the Swiss confederation did not have a real parliament, let alone an executive body. In other words, Switzerland was not yet a true nation state.

There is often confusion about the meaning of the term 'confederation': here it is used to describe a treaty-based system of independent states, whereas the term 'federation' designates a state wherein power is shared between one central government and a number of non-centralised governments having the status of constituent or member states. Thus Switzerland will be called a confederation for the period 1815-48, and thereafter a federation.

In the decades after 1815 the Swiss confederation lived through a period of internal polarisation between two forces, the Conservatives and the Radicals. The Conservatives were Catholics from mainly rural regions. Being a minority, they insisted that decisions taken at the Conference of Delegates should be unanimous. They were sceptical about the idea of strengthening the authority of central government -- just as the anti-federalist forces in the United States had been a few decades before. In a time of early democratisation in the cantons the Conservatives wanted to preserve the traditional cultural and political roles of the Catholic Church. The Radicals, on the other hand, were rooted in mainly Protestant, industrialising cantons. The Radicals strove foremost for democracy under the slogan 'people's sovereignty' with the aim of public control of all authorities. The democratic revolutions in many cantons sought not only political rights for all people, the division of power, and publicity for the debates of the elected parliament, but also the separation of state and church. Radicals denied the Catholic minority the old social privileges of their church. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, the old confederation suffered four internal religious wars -- but it also achieved agreements between Catholics and Protestants that led to periods of peaceful coexistence. With the arrival of democracy religious differences again led to conflict (Box 1.3).

Religion was not the only conflict between Radicals and Conservatives, but it was the one that concentrated many other political issues within and among the cantons. It led to rebellions and repression by military force, as when armed volunteers (Freikorps) of Radicals from other cantons wanted to 'liberate' the Lucerne canton from its Catholic government. In 1845 the Catholic cantons signed a separate treaty (the Sonderbund) to defend their common interests. They also demanded a revision of the treaty setting up the confederation and tried to obtain diplomatic help (and more) from Austria, France and Sardinia to defend their cause. In 1847 the Catholic cantons left the Conference of Delegates, or Tagsatzung. This was interpreted by the Protestant cantons as secession. The differences over religion, culture and secession then escalated into a short civil war, which ended -- after 26 days and with only about a hundred casualties -- with the defeat of the secessionists.

The way was then free for the creation of a nation state fundamentally different from that established by the confederative treaty of 1815. The victorious Radicals were the leading force in drafting a constitutional framework that involved:

The draft was submitted to a popular vote in 1848. The votation did not conform to the same standard in all cantons because there was no common procedure. In Freiburg and Graubiinden it was the cantonal parliament which decided 'in the name of the people', and there were some doubts about the results obtained in the canton of Lucerne: its radical government declared that the people had accepted a federal constitution when in fact the government had counted the 30 per cent of non-voters as yes-voters. Despite these irregularities, two thirds of the cantons accepted the project, and on 12 September 1848 the Tagsatzung declared that the federal constitution had been accepted by a large majority of the people and the cantons.4 Revised in 1874, the constitution of 1848 contained most of the organisational framework of today's polity (Boxes 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6). Table 1.1 shows that the Swiss federal system consists of legislative, executive and judicial organs at each level. Note, however, that the Swiss system conforms less with the classical concept of separation of powers than with an idea of mutual cooperation and control that is partly comparable with the checks and balances of the US constitution.

1.3 TURNING POOR ODDS TO GOOD, OR FACTORS THAT MADE SWISS NATION-BUILDING A SUCCESS

As the short historical account in the previous section suggests, the transition from confederation to federation was not an easy one. First, the Conservatives' desire to maintain key elements of the old order made them directly opposed to giving away the sovereign rights of their cantons, preferring instead to maintain the status quo. The innovating forces, on the other hand, were firmly opposed to this. Second, there was the problem of cultural differences. Besides the issue of religion there was the question of language. German was, and is, the language of more than 70 per cent of the population. Those in the French- and Italian-speaking regions feared that, as minorities, they would be made worse off by yielding their political power to a central government. Third, economic structures differed from canton to canton, as did preferences for trade regulations protecting the interests of farmers, craftsmen and traders. Fourth, nationalism, at the beginning, was a kind of abstract Utopia. What is called nationalism today in East European countries, for instance, is an appeal to a common cultural heritage or ethnic group when striving for independence from a central government. In Switzerland, the reverse applied: the people of the cantons represented different languages, ethnic groups and religions and had to be convinced that they should form a common nation, which to them was artificial in every respect. Certainly the people of the cantons were known as 'the Swiss', but they really felt themselves to be from Zurich, Uri, Geneva or Tessin, with little in common with people from other cantons. Last but not least, some cantons had serious internal conflicts. In Basel, for instance, the city was not willing to give up its political control over the surrounding regions. When a compromise failed to be reached, Basel city and Basel county separated to form two independent semi-cantons.5 Thus, it was not easy to push the idea of a nation state when political perspectives and horizons were shrinking rather than widening in many cantons. Instead of forming a single territorial state, the cantons could have been stuck with their internal quarrels and disappeared from the map of Europe. So what did bring Switzerland together?

1.3.1 Economy

By the middle of the nineteenth century industrialisation had reached many cantons. New elites, whose status was based on industrial wealth and capital rather than on family standing, entered the public arena. The harnessing of power from rivers led to a pattern of decentralised industry, reaching far up into the valleys of the Alps. The first railroad between Baden and Zurich opened in 1847 and from then on it became evident that the boundaries of cantonal markets were obstacles to growing industrial activities. The federal constitution promised not only to remove those obstacles but also to create a common economic market. It banned cantonal toll barriers and empowered the federal government to issue a Swiss currency as well as introduce a federal postal service. Moreover the constitution aimed to promote 'common wealth', and it promised equal rights as well as the freedom to reside in any canton to all those who became Swiss citizens. One historian has gone so far as to say that the economic necessity of creating a common market was more important than political ideas of Swiss nationalism.7

1.3.2 Pressure from the Outside

When the great powers, at the Vienna Congress of 1815, restored the patterns of Old Europe, Metternich and the delegates of the other countries were not unhappy about the presence of a neutral zone between Austria, Sardinia-Piemont and France. The Swiss confederation thus gained some recognition of its political neutrality (see Box 1.7), which the cantons had begun to observe from 1648. During the period 1815-48, however, the cantons learned that they were somewhat dependent on the good, or bad, will of their powerful immediate neighbours. The latter were far from thinking of annexing the cantons, but this did not make them refrain from diplomatic intervention in Swiss affairs. This situation was exacerbated by some of the cantons seeking diplomatic help from outside, as did the members of the Sonderbund.

In the middle of the nineteenth century the cantons witnessed important experiments in nation-building when the small neighbouring kingdoms of Sardina-Piemont, Lombardy-Venetia, Baden, Wurttemberg and Bavaria became parts of Italy and Germany. What would be the future of the small cantons when their neighbours developed as members of larger and more powerful nation states? In fact the process of Swiss unification developed a strong momentum by assuring a better collective security for all the cantons. Indeed the Swiss constitution of 1848 speaks of federal responsibilities to guarantee the independence of the Swiss nation in 'unity, force and honour', as well as to uphold internal security and order.

1.3.3 Democracy and Social Values

Enthusiastic nineteenth-century writers praised the Swiss for their 'innate taste for democracy'. The Swiss were certainly not the inventors of democracy -- such ideas were brought to Switzerland through the French revolution, and for their modern form of democratic government the Swiss owe much to the constitutional model of the United States of America.10 However, Switzerland did have a cultural heritage that had prepared its people both to learn about democracy and to live with it. For centuries the Swiss cantons were independent of monarchial rule. Their old regimes were elitist, but they were still very much part of their own community. As small societies, the cantons were not able to develop complex regimes. Most lacked the resources, for instance, to build up bureaucracies, the modern form of 'rational power'. Especially in rural regions, public works -- such as road-building and the construction of aqueducts in the Alps in the Valais canton -- were done on a community basis: every adult man was obliged to work for several days or weeks a year for the common good. In addition many other economic activities -- for example farming in rural regions and crafts in the cities -- were bound up in organisations which required collective decision-making. This, and the mutual dependence of people in small societies, promoted communalism.

This was reflected in the slogans used in the democratic revolution in the cantons and the calls for 'sovereignty of the people'. It is difficult to say whether Swiss democratisation came from 'above' or from 'below'. Certainly the democratic revolutions, which began in 1831 and swept through many cantons, involved more than just the elites. In the small canton of Thurgau, which then had less than 80,000 inhabitants, more than 100 petitions with 3,000 propositions for a new democratic constitution were collected and discussed in the communes.12 Some scholars however say that democratisation did not eliminate power elites, but rather redistributed the cards for a new game under the same rules. Democratic revolution neither took away inherited economic wealth from old patrician families nor prevented the concentration of industrial capital in the hands of a few.13 And it is true that the rules of these democracies were -- by the standards of today -- less than perfect: women were denied political rights, while some cantons established electoral rules that excluded poor or unmarried men from the vote. The citizens elected a parliament, but were denied the right to elect its executive. Yet at the same time political rights were extended to allow the people to participate in the current decisions of parliament. This was the beginning of the unique political culture of semi-direct democracy, which will be described in Chapter 3.

The concept of democracy -- implying equality and an equal right to vote -- was universal. However it was especially meaningful among all the different cultures of the regions. When it succeeded at canton level the experience of democracy helped the process of unification: sovereignty of the people was one of the few things that almost all the different cantons had in common, and what they wanted and agreed upon (see Box 1.8).

1.3.4 The Combining of Democracy with Federalism

Democracy is founded on the principle of 'one person, one vote' and on the rule of the majority, which makes collective decisions binding on all. But is it defensible that a minority with different opinions and interests should have to comply with the decisions of the majority? One of the answers to this controversial question of political theory is that no majority decision is final. The minority has the right to propose a reconsideration of the decision, and if its arguments are convincing a new majority will be found for a revised decision. Whereas this may hold good for different opinions on common interests, it would not satisfy minority groups with interests or values inherently different from those of the majority. French ethnics cannot become German ethnics and Catholics do not become Protestants because of democracy. If inherent minority and majority interests are different, democracy cannot help the problem of 'frozen' or 'eternal' minority or majority positions. For the eternal majority, who can afford not to learn, power can become pathological.14 The minority, which has no chance to win, is likely to be frustrated and discriminated against.

This was the exact problem when the Swiss cantons were ready to set up their central government: for good reasons Catholic and non-German-speaking cantons were fearful of being systematically overruled on questions of religion, language and culture. Thus, if a popular desire for government by the people gave momentum to unification, democracy was at the same time disadvantageous to the prospects of the creation of a Swiss nation-state. It threatened minorities, especially those in the Catholic and the French-speaking cantons.

Combining democracy with federalism provided the answer. Federalism allowed the sharing of power between central government and the cantons. In all matters that were the responsibility of the cantons, different answers to the same questions were possible - answers that corresponded to the preferences of different ethnic or religious group. Thus federalism permitted -- and permits -- cultural differences to coexist, and it protects minorities. As we shall see when discussing federalism in the next chapter, the division of power between the federation and the cantons was in favour of the latter, providing the utmost autonomy for the cantons and their ethnic or cultural particularities. In 1848 the division of power in favour of the cantons also meant a concession to the Catholic conservative minority, which gave the project a better chance of succeeding in the forthcoming referendum on the new constitution.

Federalism also allowed the cantons to become participants in central-government decision-making. The constitution provides for a system of parliamentary bicameralism similar to that in the US. The National Council -- representing the people -- is complemented by a Council of the States, where the cantons are equally represented regardless of the size of their population. Moreover the cantons participate in the popular vote on constitutional amendments. The popular majority for such a decision has to be matched by a majority amongst the cantons for it to become effective. In both mechanisms therefore, the democratic majority rule of 'one person, one vote' has to match a federal majority rule of an 'equal vote for every canton'. As we shall see in Chapter 2 the requirement for a cantonal majority has become very important.

1.4 RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES: FROM COEXISTENCE TO PLURALISM

The constitution of 1848 provided an institutional framework able to give unity to the nation. It promised peacefully to resolve conflicts between minorities and majorities. A constitution, however, is only a legal document at first; later it is a framework for political life, not political life itself. In this section we turn from the framework to the picture and ask: how did formal political unity further develop the integration and identity of Swiss society? Instead of treating this subject in a general form, I prefer to concentrate on the two minorities which were most important at the time, and for whom the success or failure of integration was crucial: the Catholics and the linguistic minority.

1.4.1 Political Catholicism: from Segmentation to Integration

In the middle of the nineteenth century the Catholic minority comprised about 40 per cent of the Swiss population. The cantons more or less represented religious boundary lines. In 1860 ten cantons were over 75 per cent Protestant and eleven, rather smaller, cantons were over 75 per cent Catholic. Only four cantons (Geneva, Graubiinden, Aargau and St Gall) had a more even distribution of religions. Despite the fact that Catholic conservatives eventually achieved a good constitutional compromise, history first led to segregation of the Catholic minority rather than to integration. Politically they retired to the strongholds of 'their' cantons and let the radical majority take the initiative in forging the national projects of the young federation.

The Catholic regions were mostly rural, cut off from the industrialisation that was the main concern of the political elites of their progressive Protestant counterparts. The First Vatican Council of the Catholic Church, held in Rome in 1871, was hostile to the modernisation of society and scientific progress, as well as to the separation of religion and state, and tried to enforce the position of the Pope as the binding authority in all respects of Catholic life. All this led to segregation. Many Catholic cantons entrusted the Catholic church with the task of public education or maintained segregated public primary and secondary schools. Even in a few mixed cantons, religious segregation in schools was continued up to the second half of the twentieth century. In Fribourg a Catholic university was founded. A tight web of social and para-political organisations kept Catholics together and close to the church both in the home cantons and in the diaspora regions where Catholics were a minority. Catholics not only had their own party, they also had their own trade unions, newspapers and bookshops. In mixed regions they remained loyal to the Catholic butcher, cafe, plumber and carpenter, even when the quality of a protestant competitor was said to be better. This kind of segmentation was also to be found on the other side, but to a lesser extent as Protestant Switzerland lacked the political leadership of a confessional party able to integrate all social classes on a continuing basis. No wonder that conflict over religious issues became acute, especially in the mixed cantons. Swiss history books speak of 'the cultural struggle' (Kulturkampf) because the issue went beyond religion to different views of society.

The revision of the Federal Constitution in 1873-74 was influenced by this cultural struggle, which reached its culminating point around 1870. The constitution of 1874 aimed at a fully secularised state and led to the elimination of public functions of the church. Several articles of the constitution confirmed the anticlerical character of the federation and the isolation of the Catholics. Some examples of this were:

The relations between state and church today vary from canton to canton. Usually there is no complete separation of state and church: the Protestant, Roman Catholic and the small Christ-Catholic churches are acknowledged as public institutions, called Landeskirchen. There is also now a tendency to give a similar status to the Jewish community.

The historic cultural conflicts between Catholics and Protestants have now faded away. Many of the issues were settled by the establishment of a modern, liberal democracy, which reduced the direct influence of religious organisations on the state. However the more than four generations in which federalism permitted 'in between' solutions to these conflicts needs to be noted. Thus cultural issues were less 'settled' than given time to cool down.

This cooling down and the decline of the confessional schism was helped by several factors. First, the separation of Catholic and Protestant societies was overcome by the modernisation process. Geographically, a strong and steady migration between Catholic and Protestant regions opened 'ghetto-oriented minds' to religious tolerance and cooperation. Migration led to desegregation, which helped lead to integration. The declining influence of religion on people's lives opened the way to pragmatic solutions: smaller communities, instead of building two churches, constructed one that was used by both Catholics and Protestants. Marriage between Protestants and Catholics became common. Industrialisation and the modern economy did not distinguish between Catholic and Protestant money. Divisions also disappeared as more and more Catholics gained equal access to those economic and social activities which had once been seen as typically Protestant. Cultural and political Catholicism itself developed pluralist attitudes about the state. At the beginning of the 1970s the former Catholic Conservative Party renamed itself the Christian Democratic Party. The new label suggests the promotion of more general values of Christian belief and culture and acceptance of the separation of state and religion. This was similar to the programmes of Christian democrats in Germany and Italy after the end of the Second World War.

This brings us to the second, political, factor. Federalism permitted Catholics to maintain the particularities of their culture in their 'own' cantons during the first decades of the nation state. But later the devices of direct democracy permitted the Catholic minority to participate, with considerable success, in federal decision-making. After the introduction of the referendum in 1874 the Catholic conservatives were able successfully to challenge the proposals of the radical-dominated parliament. Majority politics became impossible - the Catholics had to be integrated through participation in the government. Moreover in 1918 a coalition of Catholic conservatives and social democrats succeeded in breaking the majority rule for elections to the National Council. The introduction of proportional rule meant the end of the absolute majority of the radical democrats in parliament. Since then radical democrats, Christian democrats and social democrats have each held between 20 and 25 per cent of the seats in the National Council, which fairly represents their electoral strength. For the Catholics at least it was the beginning of power sharing and consociational democracy in Switzerland. The Catholic opponent of the nineteenth century became the closest government partner of the radicals in the twentieth century.

Power-sharing, beyond participation in the Federal Council and in key positions within the federal administrative services, meant compromises on legislative issues between radicals and Catholic conservatives. It brought political influence, recognition and success to the Catholic part of society - and that success is enduring. Despite the fact that religious cleavages have gone, the Christian democrats still constitute one of the three main governmental parties. Economically, they have become advocates of business almost as much as their radical partners in government. Culturally, they have adopted policies that are shared by non-Catholic conservatives, for instance over the question of legalising abortion. Even so, it should be noted that some crucial questions of cultural schism -- such as the prohibition on the activities of Jesuits who m the nineteenth century were regarded by Protestants as advocates and conspiratorial actors of counter reformation -- were only resolved long after the practical relevance of the issue had disappeared. Questions of fundamental values and religious belief take time to be settled -- or even a long period of voluntary non-decision which avoids the reawakening of old cultural conflicts.

1.4.2 Multilingualism: Understandings and Misunderstandings

Multilingualism constitutes the second aspect of the historical integration of cultural minorities into Swiss society.20 Today about 75 per cent of Swiss citizens speak German, 20 per cent French, 4 per cent Italian and 1 per cent Romansch, a minor language largely descended from Latin and spoken in a few Alpine regions in south-eastern Switzerland. The issue of multilingualism, however, differs in two ways from the subject previously discussed. Multilingualism - with the important exception of the Jura problem, which is discussed below - never became as crucial as the question of religious minorities. Thus, as we shall see, societal segmentation by language played, and plays a different role.

Let us consider the institutional arrangements that protect linguistic minorities. Federalism, first, lets Romansch-, Italian- and French-speaking minorities live within their own culture inside the boundaries of 'their' cantons. Moreover, as cantons, the minorities have a political voice in the decision-making of central government. The historical importance of this voice may be illustrated by the fact that the members of the National Council are primarily seated in linguistic and not partisan blocs. Second, there are statutory rights for linguistic minorities. Linguistic autonomy is guaranteed by the principle of 'territoriality': the cantons are authorised or even charged to guarantee the traditional language of their regions, so that no commune can be forced to change its language for official use. German, French, Italian and Romansch are all defined as national languages. Hence federal-government documents or banknotes are worded in four languages. The Romansch language however, which is spoken by only about 50 000 inhabitants, does not figure as one of the official languages of the federation. For practical reasons most legal texts are translated only into German, French and Italian.

Third, we find a strongly enforced proportional rule that leads to political quotas. An unwritten rule says that two of the members of the Federal Council should be of French- and one of Italian-speaking origin, and over time, this has been well observed.23 In federal commissions of experts, or in parliamentary commitees, linguistic proportions are observed more than any other proportional rule. Complaints about 'German predominance' -more common among the French- than the Italian-speaking community -are not well founded when looking at federal personnel statistics: at all levels of government proportionality is observed to a high degree (Table 1.2).

The consequences of this proportional or quota rule can thus have astonishing results for the fair representation of different cultural minorities.

This does not necessarily mean, however, that proportional influence is guaranteed. If we imagine a table of ten Swiss with seven German-speakers, two French-speakers and one Italian-speaker, the proportional rule is well observed, even in favour of the smallest minority. However the seven German-speakers can provide a two thirds majority decision without even speaking or listening to the French- and Italian-speakers. Moreover the latter are forced to learn German in order to understand what the discussion is about. Of course the minority has the right to speak French or Italian. But knowing that the majority would not understand all the subtleties of those languages, it would probably, for the sake of the argument, be better to hold the discussion in German. If this were not enough, the French- and Italian-speaking members may also have to face a situation where the German majority, at the end of the formal session, begins to converse in their regional dialects, which are very different from standard or 'high' German and therefore barely understandable by French- and Italian-speakers. This worst case is in sharp contrast to the best case, where the polite German-speaking majority loves to speak French and makes French the official language of the discussions. Both of these examples do happen. At the federal level, discussions in parliament are simultaneously translated into all three official languages. However, while the official record of Swiss laws and regulations is published in Italian, French and German, much of the documentation for parliamentarians is available only in one or two languages. The same is true of many government reports. Canada, for instance, goes much further, requiring every official document to be published in both English and French - probably because Canada has a more serious problem with the linguistic minority.

The Swiss are very conscious of the need for multilingualism: in all schools children are instructed in at least two languages. It is a myth, however, that these efforts lead to widespread bi- or tri-lingualism. Most people find it difficult to read newspapers or listen to news in a language other than their own. When face to face with a person speaking another language, it is normal, however, to try to communicate. Traditionally, German-speakers try to speak French to a Romand, even if their French is poor. Today young people, in order to overcome the language barrier, are more and more using English as the lingua franca among themselves. The Swiss are actually rather proud of the multilingual aspect of their society and would find the question of whether German-, Italian-, French- or Romansch-speakers are better Swiss people rather silly. Multilingualism requires public expenditure and fiscal redistribution in favour of the minority, both of which the Swiss are willing to bear. There are three complete public radio and television networks, one for each linguistic group. The smallest network, Radio Television della Svizzera Italiana, in 1992 received SFrl50 million, or 25 per cent of the whole budget of public radio and television, which is about five times more than its proportional share would be.

These notions about language can be extended to cultural life in general. Cultural specificities exist also in life style. There is a popular saying that German-speakers live to work, whereas French- and Italian-speakers, who are more sophisticated in their drinking and eating habits, work to live. These and other differences are an enriching element of Swiss life. They may sometimes create difficulties in communicating, but they are accepted as part of normal life. Thus cultural and linguistic segmentation has disappeared less than that of religion. It has been kept -- or rather has been reproduced -- within the protecting boundaries of the cantons. Differences appear also in political behaviour, for instance with respect to federal vota-tions. French-speakers are more open to government foreign policy proposals such as joining the UN or the European Economic Area, while in issues such as ecology or speed limits they reject government proposals more often than German-speaking voters. With one exception, discussed below, subcultural segmentation has not however been a major political problem for Swiss society as a whole. The virtues of pluralism may lie partly in the fact that the different cultures are separated from each other by the political autonomy and territorial boundaries of the cantons. Each of the 26 members of the 'federal house' has its own room and can shut the door whenever it wants. Federalism thus provides a kind of horizontal segmentation which allows German-, French- and Italian-speakers to live apart without bothering each other too much.25

1.4.3 The Jura -- the Exception to Integration

Compared with the many multicultural societies which have difficulty in coping with their cleavages, one could ask why Swiss society has integrated so successfully. As we shall see, the Swiss are not more peaceful by nature than others, and the elite is not brighter than in other countries. However the literature of comparative politics suggests that there are factors which favour or hamper processes of integration, and in the Swiss case we can identify a number of favorable factors for religious and multicultural integration:27

  1. Pressure from the outside. The right to peaceful coexistence and cooperation among different nations was not guaranteed in Europe until the end of the Second World War. Switzerland, as a small country, was surrounded by much larger and more belligerent nations. Pressure from the outside helped the Swiss to establish their own identity. The common interest in survival as an independent nation was more important than internal differences on cultural issues.
  2. The absence of clear-cut socio-economic, religious and linguistic geographical boundaries. Among French-speakers, for example, there are both Catholic and Protestant cantons. Among socio-economically poor cantons, there are both German- and French-speaking states. Thus religious, linguistic and socio-economic cleavages do not coincide with geographical boundaries of the cantons, rather they cross-cut each other. The cumulation of different issues into one two-sided political conflict - for instance with poor Catholic French-speakers on one side and rich Protestant German-speakers on the other - could never develop. In practice, Protestant and linguistic majorities differ and vary from issue to issue. Most of the cultural groups have at the same time experienced being part of a minority, and this has been very important for the development of a culture of tolerance and pluralism.
  3. Political institutions favorable to power-sharing. Switzerland has fashioned a nation out of independent sovereign states whose vote counted both when constitutional changes were ratified and in the bi-cameral lawmaking process of parliament. This favoured institutional power-sharing from the very beginning of the modern federation. Furthermore, the rule of proportional representation of minorities was, by and large, extended to most federal authorities and government bodies.

There is an important case in modern Swiss history, however, where integration failed. It concerns the Jura region, once the northern part of Switzerland's second-largest canton, Bern. In a struggle of more than forty years which included riots and violence, the Jura minority, who felt discriminated against by Bern, fought for separation from the old canton and for autonomy. The creation of the new canton in 1978 will be described in Chapter 2, but the case is worth mentioning here because of the factors of integration discussed above. First, the Jura region had a double minority -French-speakers practising the Catholic religion in a Protestant canton populated by German-speakers (Figure 1.1).

Moreover there were socio-economic differences. The Jura region, located on the periphery of the canton next to the border with France, claimed to be economically neglected. Despite the fact that these conflicts were longstanding, separatism became an issue only after the Second World War, when pressure on, or interference in, Switzerland by its neighbours had become minimal. In the Jura region, therefore, we find the rare case of overlapping socioeconomic, language and religious differences. This overlap, however, was not equal throughout the region. The southern part was economically better off and had a Protestant majority. Thus the population was divided into pro and antiseparatist movements. After a series of votations the new canton of Jura was created, but the southern districts had voted to stay with the old canton and therefore the small ethnic Jurassian population, because of its internal fragmentation, has not been integrated into a single political unit.

Whereas the creation of the new canton was widely praised as the solution that corresponded most to the principle of self-determination by the people concerned, some separatist groups still claim that the southern districts should be reunited with the Jura canton. In other words the potential for ethnic conflict was not removed by the 1978 solution. Catholics and French-speakers in the southern districts still complain about being a minority, cut off from the ethnic body to which they feel they belong. However if the southern districts were to be integrated into the Jura there would be a new problem for the Protestant minority, which feels more akin to the Bern canton. The lesson to be drawn is evident; the ideal of ethnic and political unity, which is very common and popular in today's movements for nationalism, is a pipe dream. In most cases, while it does eliminate some minority problems, it cannot be realised without the creation of new problems.

1.5 THE CHALLENGES OF SOCIOECONOMIC INEQUALITY

1.5.1 A Working Class without A Homeland

Compared with other European countries the industrialisation of Switzerland took place early, but it was somewhat different. Instead of concentrating in urban areas, important industries such as watchmaking, textiles and embroidery settled in rural areas. This decentralised industralisation prevented the sudden concentration of a mass proletariat in the cities. But, as in every capitalist country, industrialisation led to growing inequalities and the impoverishment of a new social class of workers whose jobs were insecure and whose earnings were low. As in other countries, democracy did not prevent the economic exploitation of workers nor inhuman working conditions.28 One hundred years ago Friedrich Bernet, a radical politician, wrote: 'The Swiss constitution of 1848 has put much political and economic power into the hands of a few. This has allowed the rich to grow richer, whereas other groups such as farmers, craftsmen and industrial workers are downgraded to an indistinguishable proletariat'.2

At that time neither a socialist party nor a strong union organisation for workers yet existed. So it was a faction of the Radical Party which sought to defend the interests of the working class by a policy of 'entrepreneur-socialism' . They were concerned about growing social inequalities, which in their eyes were unacceptable in a democracy worth the name. The faction was the driving force behind the first regulations to protect workers and to make the use of child labour unlawful. This policy was strongly opposed by the liberal wing which, in the fashion of 'Manchester liberalism', wanted to avoid government intervention in the free market. This marks the emergence of two issues which slowly superseded the older cultural schisms in Swiss politics:

Unlike in other countries, such as Austria and Norway, business itself was divided on the question of the free market. Whereas some larger industries pushed for unconditional liberalisation, farmers wanted to be protected from international markets by levying duties on foreign products. Small trades and crafts enterprises were organised into corporations and they also sought protectionist state regulations for things that were beyond their own capacity to deal with. The first vocational schools, for instance, were run by trades and crafts corporations, but the state gave subsidies and declared professional schools mandatory for apprentices. This eliminated the problem of free riders: enterprises that abstained from investing in professional education but would hire employees from other enterprises that had invested in it. Thus from the very beginning Switzerland's economy tended to develop organised relations with the state. In a kind of highly fragmented corporatism, a great number of professional and business organisations cooperated with the state. They sought particular advantages through state regulations or subsidies, which eliminated the risks of free competition. In return they offered to help in the implementation of government activities. Farmers' organisations, for instance, furnished the statistical data used in drafting agricultural policies, which helped to keep down the number of public administration staff. Despite their high praise of economic liberalism, and despite their tradition of anti-government ideology, organised professions and businesses have strong and influential relations with government up to today.30

In the race for the organisational build-up of economic interests, the workers were late starters and did not enter until the end of the nineteenth century. Workers had a common interest to defend: the betterment of their economic conditions, which was promised by emerging socialism in other European countries at that time. But this common interest proved difficult to organise in Switzerland. Workers were spread all over the country and were to a large degree isolated in smaller towns and villages, where the ties of traditional society and patterns of paternalism may have dampened the effects of economic inequality but also hampered collective identity and the organisation of the new working class. When the Social democratic party eventually became organised it achieved rapid electoral success. Social democrats and unions were among the first to use the instrument of the popular initiative as an instrument at the federal level. In 1894 they demanded the right to work and a programme of public industrial policy -40 years before Keynes. But the hope that direct democracy would be the lever of social reform was dashed. In a popular vote the proposed constitutional amendment was rejected by a ratio of four to one. Later, cultural ties often proved stronger than economic cleavages. The Catholic conservative party, its social organisations and unions successfully united Catholic-only workers. Thus the working class was divided. This did not prevent the social democrats from becoming one of the largest parties, but they never managed to form a coalition of equal strength to the bourgeois forces. Neither did unions succeed in influencing industrial politics as much as business did. This minority position of labour in politics and industrial relations is a Swiss characteristic. It differs from other small European countries, such as the Netherlands, Austria, Norway and Sweden, where more of an equilibrium between labour and capital, and between the political left and right, can be observed. Cultural segmentation was a greater obstacle to the organisation of the political left in Switzerland, and labour forces were never able to make up the organisational lead of business or farmers.

1.5.2 From Class Struggle to Economic Partnership

In the first decades of the twentieth century the conditions of the Swiss working class worsened. For the period before the First World War, historians note the development of a conservative, nationalist, sometimes reactionary and anti-democratic political right which resorted to a 'class struggle from above'.33 Politically marginalised by the cooperation of bourgeois forces, the social democrats and the unions could not prevent the working class from bearing most of the burden of economic setback during and after the First World War. The worldwide economic crisis of the 1930s brought mass unemployment to Switzerland. Several strikes by angry workers were suppressed by federal troops, more than once ending in bloodshed. The political left was denied what Catholics and farmers had achieved: recognition, political influence and participation in the Federal Council. Principles of proportional rule and participation were used to integrate cultural minorities, but not to resolve the problems of a growing socioeconomic cleavage in Swiss society.

The socialist movement split. A communist faction claimed that bourgeois democracy was a fake, an instrument of the capitalist class, and that the betterment of the working class could come only through political and economic revolution. In their view it was inevitable that a policy of class warfare would overcome the market and profit systems and install the working class in power. Social democrats, on the other hand, insisted on proportional participation in all democratic institutions and trusted in limited reforms, even if the state was in the hands of a bourgeois majority. They also aspired to a mixed economy, with a strong public sector and state intervention on behalf of social equality. This would not only improve the situation of the workers, but also protect the Swiss economy from the deep, worldwide market crisis that then seemed inevitable.

For almost four decades, until the Second World War, workers' movements, politically discriminated against, hesitated between polarising a class struggle and cooperation in the hope of achieving integration.34 Outside events in the end gave the latter the upper hand. Faced with the threats of fascism from Hitler's Nazi Germany, the social democrats gave up their opposition to militarise and voted for the modernisation of the army. An important treaty between employers' organisations and the trade unions of the mechanical-engineering industry was signed in 1937: the so called 'Labour Peace Convention' (Friedensabkommen) accepted unions as representative organisations of the workers, proposed to resolve all conflicts in their relations by negotiation, and promised to end strikes and lock-outs.35

Economic and social inequalities - the predominant political issues in the twentieth century - thus finally began to be addressed through cooperation and integration. The social democrats obtained their first seat in the Federal Council during the Second World War and they were given proportional representation in the federal government in 1959. The unifying experiences of the generation that had defended Swiss independence and neutrality from 1939-45 had their effects. Ideological differences between the political left and right shrank. A large consensus amongst all political forces allowed the building up of a social security system, a health care and insurance service and a higher educational system, which reduced many areas of social and economic inequality. Economic growth led employers' and workers' organisations toward cooperation and away from confrontation. Collective contracts, similar to the 1937 Labour Peace Convention, became the rule. Despite the fact that the labour force was less unionised than in other European countries, Swiss workers and employees had a fair share in the growth prosperity.

By the early 1970s the highest degree of integration of different social classes in Switzerland had been reached. Employers and workers had become used to partnership, and the political left had been integrated into the once purely bourgeois state. Political parties and economic organisations were able to reach consensus by compromise and power-sharing was effective. However since then the social integration of Swiss society has somewhat declined. When economic growth turned into recession in 1974, the political left learnt that proportional participation did not mean proportional influence. In 1984 a minority of the Social Democratic party wanted to quit the Federal Council because political power-sharing was not shifting influence from the haves to the have-nots. Unions, who were willing to share the burden of recession by accepting pay cuts, were losing members and political influence. Consensus became more difficult to maintain, as we shall see in Chapter 3.

1.6 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: THE UNIVERSAL KEY TO POWER-SHARING

In the preceding sections we saw how linguistic and religious minorities became integrated, and then how conflicts arising from the social cleavages of modern industrial society were resolved. Conflict-solution in Switzerland relies on power-sharing rather than on competition for power. Federalism and proportionality are not the only elements of power-sharing - we shall discuss the third element of direct democracy later on. We have seen the great importance of the proportionality rule. It is a universal key to power-sharing in a double sense: it opens many doors to political participation, and it can be used by new groups arising from new cleavages.

Let us first discuss the 'doors to power'. The proportional rule today is the key that unlocks the door to almost all political institutions (Table 1.3).

Moreover the proportional rule is used for different criteria - or groups -in the same body. In the 'magic formula' of the Federal Council, for example, party affiliation is not the only criterion of proportionality. As already mentioned, the Federal Assembly follows the rule of linguistic proportionality, normally granting French- and Italian-speakers two or three seats. In addition a provision in the constitution says that there may not be more than one representative from the same canton. Not only candidates for the federal Council, but also replacement army generals, top managers of the Swiss railways and the postal services and many other government officials must fulfill more than one criterion of proportionality to be eligible for a position. There is some criticism that this system means that the real job requirements are too often neglected (Box 1.9).

There is some flexibility in the system, however, in that over- or under-representation is allowed but is compensated for over time. Moreover, we can speak of real 'group rights' only in a political sense because rights of representation cannot be enforced by law. Proportionality, therefore, is a political rather than a legal practice. Finally, proportional rule does not apply OI,ly t0 politics and positions in government. It is practised in the organisation of the economy, in social life and even in sport. This is true at least for the linguistic proportional rule. As Jiirg Steiner (1990) writes: 'It is unimaginable that the executive committee of the Swiss Soccer Association would consist of German-speakers only'.

1.7 THE LIMITS OF SWISS PLURALISM -- NEW CHALLENGES FOR INTEGRATION

The integration of minorities with different cultural and social backgrounds can be fairly called political pluralism when no group is discriminated against and every group has a fair chance of exercising influence through political institutions. This does not require a value-free state, but a state that refrains from privileges for or discriminations against specific groups and whose laws enforce values common to all its inhabitants: human rights, basic rights and democracy, with all its implications of equality. Switzerland's multicultural society, thanks to the way it has been integrated, has achieved a remarkable standard of political pluralism. Peaceful conflict-resolution is not only a pattern of political but also of social life. Aggression and violence run at quite low levels in Swiss society (Table 1.4).

There are limits, however, to peace and pluralism in Swiss society. In sharp contrast to the mutual respect among the larger groups, there has sometimes been shameful discrimination against smaller religious and ethnic groups. Children of gypsies, a group at odds with the rather rigid Swiss sense of order, have been taken away from their parents and raised in 'proper' homes. During the Second World War Jewish refugees were sent back to the German border in order to avoid additional difficulties with the Nazi regime. For a long time, the rights of patients in psychiatric clinics and of sentenced and remand prisoners, did not meet the standards of other European countries.37 During the Cold War and after, the federal intelligence service not only spied on extreme left-wing militants, but on several hundred-thousand citizens who had done nothing more than support unorthodox political opinions or actions. It is not only intellectuals and writers who are subjected to strong pressure to conform.

Another problem is gender. For a long time Swiss women had to live in a society which only reluctantly began to abandon traditional male-female roles. Until 1971 Switzerland was a comparatively incomplete democracy because it denied women the right to vote, let alone be given a political mandate. As we shall see in Chapter 2, federalism and direct democracy made womens' suffrage a difficult task. When, in 1981, a constitutional amendment introduced legal, social and economic equality for women, the Swiss became aware that despite political pluralism much discrimination had persisted. Since then legal discrimination against women - in the areas of family law and social security for instance - has mostly disappeared. The representation of women in the parliaments of all federal levels is fast progressing. In 1993, in Bern, women held almost 50 per cent of the seats of the legislative body and in the seven-member executive body, four are women. On the other hand, women in Switzerland are still concentrated in less qualified jobs, are sometimes far from getting equal pay and are rarely represented in the higher ranks of private management, public administration or universities. Whereas highly industrialised countries such as the US and Sweden have practised policies of affirmative action or equal pay for almost thirty years, Switzerland is just beginning to realise that developing equal opportunity for women needs a collective approach and cooperation between public authorities, private enterprises and civil society.38

Finally, there is the question of foreign residents. From the 1960s onward the rapidly fast growing economy needed additional labour. Workers from Italy, Germany, France and Austria, and later from Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia and Turkey, found jobs in Switzerland. Foreigners account for more than one million or 17 per cent of the total population, and most of them work in jobs that the Swiss avoid if they can. They pay taxes and contribute to social security systems, but they have no political rights. Obtaining Swiss citizenship is difficult; until recently it was only possible after at least 12 years' residence. While in the past Swiss enterprises actively sought foreign workers, with the arrival of refugees from Third-world countries severe political tensions have arisen (Table 1.5). Xenophobic parties and groups developed and brought pressure on the political authorities to restrict immigration and protect against the 'alienation' of Swiss society. Foreign workers, asylum seekers and immigration remain highly controversial issues as we shall see in Chapter 3.39

To integrate foreigners in the same way as the native minority groups of the past will be much more difficult for Swiss society! It will take more effort than simple peaceful coexistence. Contrary to the past it will mean the integration of non-European cultural patterns, values, religious beliefs and mentalities. Switzerland has less space and less uncommitted resources than larger countries have to devote to such a multicultural experiment. The fact that Swiss society itself has become more homogeneous may not help the further integration of new immigrant groups, and all 'melting-pot' theories may be wrong. On the other hand Switzerland already has the highest proportion of foreigners of all European countries except Luxembourg, and integration of new immigrant groups could turn out to be a continuation of the successful historical experiment.

1.8 CONCLUSION

Until the middle of the nineteenth century Switzerland was neither a unified society nor a nation state. It was composed of small societies with differing ethnic backgrounds, languages and religions that had become too limited to survive independently. Together, the cantonal societies founded a single state. It was artificial, a product of historical circumstances, and could have failed. It lacked a coherent society. It could still have been too small. It could have been divided up or have fallen apart.

Yet, thanks to its political institutions, Switzerland became a nation and has found its own identity as a modern society. The case of Switzerland is a model insofar as it has resolved the problem of integrating different cultures and of dealing with social inequalities. It combined democracy, federalism and proportional representation in a system of power-sharing. Power-sharing - instead of competition for political power - seems to facilitate peaceful conflict-resolution among culturally different groups. Affiliation to an ethnic group, to a language or a religion bears prescriptive characteristics and fixed attitudes or interests that cannot change their majority or minority positions in a competitive democracy. Power-sharing, as an alternative model, avoids the alienation arising from perpetual winner or loser positions. Federalism offers a degree of autonomy to minorities so that they may live their own lives and maintain their own cultural values. Proportional rule favours non-discriminatory participation. Even if it does not guarantee proportional influence, it can favour effective and peaceful conflict-resolution and integration.

Power-sharing is more than an institutional arrangement. It needs a political culture leading to societal pluralism, a process that takes time. Democratic pluralism in Switzerland could probably not have developed, however, without compensation for growing social inequalities in the process of industrialisation.

The small size of Switzerland may have been an important factor in its success. The ideas of integration and power-sharing are more realistic in a small society where people are more interdependent. Switzerland is surrounded by the much larger German, French and Italian nation states. Creating political unity was the only chance of developing a common Swiss identity whilst at the same time maintaining the identity of the different segments of society. It was pointed out earlier that neutrality was an integrating factor as well as a political means of surviving European conflicts and wars. Switzerland did build up its military defences but in doing so it threatened nobody; nor was it tempted to become a new political actor influencing the power games of larger nations. All these factors may be relevant for a small society of six million people, but less convincing for a middle-sized nation of 30 million, and not valid at all for larger nations of 80 million or 300 million inhabitants.

The most important factor behind Switzerland's success may be that it never had the choice of building a state based on one religion, one culture of one language alone. Forming a nation-state on the basis of one culture of language does not resolve existing minority problems. Whether in merging smaller units with a larger one or in dividing up a larger unit into smaller ones, eliminating one minority problem merely creates another. In having no choice other than all minorities living together, Switzerland avoided the mistakes of mono-cultural nation-states.


Notes

1.      Language of Latin origin spoken in the canton of Graubünden.

2.      H.U. Jost writes that the division between French- and German-speaking Swiss was mainly a matter of the political 61ites and their activist press, whereas at the level of the common people relations seemed to be much more unconstrained. See Hans Ulrich Jost, Menace et repliement 1914-1945, in: Nouvelle histoire de La Suisse et des Suisses, (Lausanne: Payot) 1986.

3.      Karl Deutsch, Die Schweiz als paradigmatischer Fall politischer Integration (Bern: Haupt, 1976).

4.      Alfred Krjlz, Neuere Schweizerische Verfassungsgeschichte (Bern: Stampfli, 1992), pp. 608-10, Roland Ruffieux, 'La Suisse des Radicaux 1848-1914', in Nouvelle histoire de la Suisse et des Suisses, vol. II (Lausanne: Payot, 1983), pp. 10-11.

5.      In 1830 Basel Country demanded proportional representation in the cantonal parliament, that is, a number of seats according to the size of population. After Basel City refused this proposition, a civil war broke out in which people were wounded and killed. Finally the Swiss confederation approved in 1833 the separation between Basel City and Basel Country in two semi-cantons and brought the conflict to an end. See Georges Andrey, Auf der Suche nach dem neven Staat, in: Geschichte der Schweiz und der Schweizer, vol. II (Basel and Frankfurt am Main: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1983), pp. 247-49.

6.      See Walter Kalin, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Demokratie, Funktionen der staatsrechtlichen Beschwerde (Bern: Haupt 1987).

7.      William E. Rappard, Le facteur economique dans I'avenement de la democratie moderne en Suisse (Geneve: Georg, 1912).

8.      Alois Riklin, Funktionen der schweizerischen Neutralitdt (St. Gallen: Institut fur Politikwissenschaft der Hochschule St. Gallen, 1991), p. 6. Riklin, op. cit., quotes three additional functions: (a) the free-trade function, (b) the function of maintaining political equilibrium in Europe, (c) the function of offering 'good offices' in international relations.

9.      For Swiss foreign policy from 1848 to 1991 see Georg Kreis, Jean-Claude Favez and Urs Altermatt 'Geschichte der Schweizerischen Aussenpolitik 1848-1991', Neues Handbuch der Schweizerischen Aussenpolitik (Bern: Haupt), pp. 27-78, 1992.

10.      According to James H. Huston, The Sister Republics (Washington: Library of Congress, 1991), there were several periods of mutual influence. Especially important were three periods: (a) in the debate between American federalists and anti-federalists, the latter took the model of the old Swiss confederation as their reference; (b) the Swiss, in 1848, had the American constitution very much in their minds when combining the principles of federalism and democracy; (c) towards the end of the nineteenth century the institutions of Swiss direct democracy were taken as a point of reference for those western US states which first introduced the referendum and the initiative.

11.      Arnold Niederer, Gemeinwerk im Wallis: bauerliche Gemeinschaftsarbeit in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart (Basel: Krebs, 1965).

12.      Rolf Soland, Joachim Leonz Eder und die Regeneration im Thurgau 1830-1831. Ein Kapitel aus der thurgauischen Verfassungsgeschichte (Weinfelden: Miihlemann, 1980).

13.      Francois Masnata and Claire Rubattel, Le pouvoir Suisse: 1291-1991 deduction democratique el repression suave (Lausanne: Editions de l'Aire, 1991).

14.      Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 214-43.

15.      Georg Germann, Die Staatsnation Schweiz sucht ihre kulturelle Identitat, in Francois de Capitani and Georg Germann (eds), Auf dem Weg zu einer schweizerischen Identitat 1848-1914 (Freiburg: Universitatsverlag, 1987), p. 448.

16.      Ulrich Im Hof, Die historische Dimension der nationalen Identitat (Bern: Nationales Forschungsprogramm 21, 1991), p. 14.

17.      Brigitte Ruckstuhl, 'Die Schweiz - ein Land der Bauern und Hirten', in Silvia Ferrari et al., Auf wen schoss Wilhelm Tell? (Zurich: Rotpunktverlag, 1991), p. 136.

18. In the years after the foundation of the federal state the Catholics were going to extend their educational system step by step (establishing new schools, founding of a university). See Urs Altermatt, Katholizismus und Moderne (Zurich: Benziger, 1991), p. 147.

19 See Urs Altermatt, 'Die Wirtschaftsfliigel in der CVP; Die "dynamische Mitte" unter Druck', in Schweizerisches Jahrbuch fur Politische Wissenschaft No. 26 (Bern: Haupt, 1986).

20. See Kenneth D. McRae, Switzerland: Example of Cultural Coexistence (Toronto; The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1964); Eidgenossisches Department des Innern, Zustand und Zukunft der viersprachigen Schweiz (Bern: Eidgenossisches Departement des Innern, 1989), pp. 36-53; Uli Windisch, Les relations quotidiennes entre Romands et Alemaniques (Lausanne: Editions Payot, 1992).

21 If the total population, including the 16 per cent made up of foreigners, is taken into consideration, the proportion of Italian speakers increases, whereas the proportion of German speakers decreases. See also Table 1.1.

22. In 1938 Article 116 of the constitution was amended to include Romansch as the fourth national language of Switzerland. This was the result of a request of the executive of the Grisons in 1935 at the time of Italian fascism under Mussolini. The initiators understood the request 'primarily as an aid to Romansch in its uphill struggle for survival against the inroads of modern communications and tourism'. See Kenneth D. McRae, Switzerland: Example of Cultural Coexistence (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1964), p. 9.

23 The exception is for Italian-speakers. They had a representative only about half of the time. Yet their representative was almost always provided at the expense of the German-speakers.

24.      An official report on questions of Swiss multilinguism (Zustand und Zukunft der viersprachigen Schweiz. Abklarungen, Vorschlage und Empfehlungen einer Arbeitsgruppe des Eidgenossischen Departementes des Inneren. Bern, 1989) gives a rather critical account of multilingual communication between German-, French- and Italian-speakers in Switzerland.

25.      See Richard J. Watts, 'Linguistic minorities and language conflict in Europe: Learning from the Swiss experience; in Florian Coulmas (ed.), Language Policy for the EC (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991).

26.      See Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) and Joseph V. Montville, Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990).

27.      For Switzerland's cultural integration under power-sharing, see Jiirg Steiner, 'Power-sharing: Another Swiss "Export-Product", in Joseph V. Montville, op. cit., pp. 107-14; Jiirg Steiner, Amicable Agreement Versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1974).

28.      See Erich Gruner, Arbeiterschaft und Wirtschaft in der Schweiz 1880-1914, vol. I-III (Zurich: Chronos, 1988).

29.      Erich Gruner, "100 Jahre Wirtschaftspolitik, Etappen des Staatsintervention-ismus in der Schweiz", Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, 1964, pp. 34-70.

30.      See Erich Gruner, 'Zur Theorie und Geschichte der Interessenverbande', Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, no. 95 (1959) pp. 335-42; Peter J. Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change. Austria, Switzerland, and the Politics of Industry (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984); Wolf Linder, "Entwicklung, Strukturen und Funktionen des Wirtschafts- und Sozialstaats in der Schweiz", in Alois Riklin, Handbuch Politisches System der Schweiz, Band I (Bern and Stuttgart: Haupt, 1983); Peter Farago, Verbdnde als Trager offentlicher Politik (Griisch: Riiegger, 1987).

31.      See Hanspeter Kriesi, Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Schweizer Politik (Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 1980), and Wolf Linder (1983), op. cit.

32.      Katzenstein (1984), op. cit.; Manfred Schmidt, 'The Welfare State and the Economy in Periods of Economic Crisis: A Comparative Study of 23 OECD Nations', European Journal of Political Research, vol. 11, no. 1 (January 1983), pp. 1-26.

33.      See Erich Gruner, Arbeiterschaft and Wirtschaft in der Schweiz 1880-1914, vol. I-III (Zurich: Chronos, 1987); Hans Ulrich Jost, Die reaktionare Avant-garde; Die Ceburt der neuen Rechten in der Schweiz um 1900 (Zurich: Chronos 1992); Gordon A. Craig, Geld und Geist (Munich, 1988).

34.      Hansueli von Gunten and Hans Voegeli, Das Verhaltnis der Sozialde-mokratischen Partei zu andern Linksparteien in der Schweiz 1912-1980 (Bern: Verlag fur politische Bildung, 1980); Oskar Scheiben, Krise und Integration: Wandlungen in den politischen Konzeptionen der Sozialdemokrati-schen Partei der Schweiz 1928-1936 (Zurich; Chronos, 1987).

35.      The 'Labour Peace Convention' of 1937 was not an entirely new concept. Since the beginning of the twentieth century there had been collective contracts between individual employers and unions. There were two important innovations, however: first, the 'Labour Peace Convention' bound employers directly through the decisions of their organisation. Second, strikes and lock-outs were also banned in cases of conflict over modifications of the convention.

36.      In the yearly statistics of the European Council, Switzerland, with a rate of about 75 prisoners per 100 000 inhabitants in 1988, ranks in a middle position among the European countries. See Bundesamt fur Statistik, Kriminal-statistik no. 9, Bern, September 1990.

37.      See Otto K. Kaufmann, 'Frauen, Italiener, Jesuiten, Juden und Anstaltsver-sorgte. Vorfragen eines Beitritts der Schweiz zur Europaischen Menschen-rechtskonvention', St. Galler Festgabe zum Schweizerischen Juristentag 1965 (Bern: Stampfn 1965), pp. 245-62.

38.      See Beatrix Mesmer, Ausgeklammert-Eingeklammert (Basel and Frankfurt a.M.: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1988); Eidgenossische Kommission fur Frauenfragen, Berichte; Die Stellung der Frau in der Schweiz / Gleiche Rechtefiir Mann und Frau/Die politische Representation der Frauen in der Schweiz (Bern: Eidg. Kommission fur Frauenfragen, 1980-1990).

39.      Wolf Linder, 'Migrationswirkungen, institutionelle Politik und politische Offentlichkeit', in Walter Kalin and Rupert Moser (eds), Migration aus der Dritten Welt (Bern: Haupt, 1989), pp. 145-58.