2 Federalism

2.1 INSTITUTIONS

2.1.1 The Swiss Interpretation of Federalism

Until the time of the French Revolution, Switzerland was not a nation but an ensemble of cantons bound together by a number of treaties. In modern terms we could define this as a system of small independent states united by an international treaty. Since all the cantons claimed to be autonomous or sovereign states, common decisions in this loose confederation had to be unanimous and therefore all the decisions proposed by the assembly of cantonal delegates, the Tagsatzung, had to be ratified by the cantons. The question was how to create a single political unit out of this multi-state-system in order to guarantee political autonomy while neighbours were forming modern nations and to provide a common market for its growing industry.

An obvious answer could have been to fuse the cantons into a single, larger territorial state in the way that European monarchies -- such as Italy and Germany -- had in the middle of the nineteenth century. This solution, however, was impossible for two reasons. First, the Swiss people had already had experience of a unitary state in the period between 1798 and 1803, when all power had been in the hands of a central government. This model, which had been imposed by France, was at odds with every tradition of the Swiss people who were -- and mostly still are -- rooted in their cantons. The idea of such a system was therefore not feasible -- it was inconceivable that the Swiss people, who had successfully decentralised in 1803, would reestablish a unitary system 50 years later of their own free will. The second reason why the solution would be impossible to achieve was probably even more important. As described in Chapter 1, the creation of a common government for Switzerland was highly controversial between conservative Catholic and radical Protestant cantons, and the latter's struggle for political unification succeeded only after the short civil war of 1847. A peaceful solution for successful nation-building, however, had to take into account the interests of the cantons of the Catholic minority.1

Thus the creation of the Swiss federation was destined to follow a middle path between the status quo of an unsatisfactory confederation and an unwelcome unitary system. But it was also an institutional compromise between the conservatives, who were hostile to centralisation, and the radicals, who favoured a federal government strong enough to make the necessary decisions in the common interest. The constitution of 1848 proposed the creation of a central authority by the cantons, who were to renounce part of their sovereignty as individual states. Nowadays we would probably not accept the logic of such a divided sovereignty. Logically there can not be two supreme powers. Politically, however, it was the common understanding of the fathers of the federal constitution that the cantons had not lost their sovereignty, merely part of their responsibilities -- and their right to divide power between the federation and the cantons in the future. In their determination to maintain a large degree of political autonomy, the cantons retained most of their powers as well as participating in the future decision-making of the new federation. This solution rested on three factors:

After the victory of the protagonists of a Swiss federation in the civil war, the drafting of the federal constitution in 1848 and its ratification by a majority of the people and the cantons were achieved within a few months. Thus Switzerland became not only the first continuously functioning democracy, but also the first modern federation in Europe. In many ways the Swiss constitution resembles that of the US.

Since 1848 the Swiss federal system has consisted of three levels: the federation, the cantons and the communes. Despite the fact that the communes are not mentioned in the constitution, they play an important role in Swiss political life. They are given a large degree of autonomy and are considered to be the foundation stone of political life and culture. Communes, cantons and the federation each have specific and limited powers. Under the terms of the federal constitution, they cooperate with each other and they are all bound to guarantee democratic election of their authorities and decision-taking. Furthermore they must respect the principle of separation of legislative, executive and judicial power. Therefore the Swiss are citizens of their commune, their canton and the federation. They elect authorities and vote on all three levels, exercise their rights and fulfill duties based on federal, cantonal and communal law.

2.1.2 The Division of Powers between the Federation and the Cantons

The cultural diversity of the Swiss cantons, their political power and their claims for autonomy set narrow limits to central authority. In 1848 the powers of the federation were limited to a few essential areas. Its most important powers were to maintain all foreign relations and protect Swiss independence by maintaining an army and to ensure peaceful relations among the cantons. Moreover the federation was authorised to conduct a federal postal service, provide a common currency and coinage, and abolish cantonal customs duties. If we look at the information in Box 2.1 which shows the actual distribution of responsibilities between the federation, the cantons and the communes, we find that the responsibilities of the central Swiss government have considerably increased with the passage of time.

2.1.3 Non-Centralisation -- Not Decentralisation

Even on the abstract constitutional level the distribution of powers between central government and the cantons cannot be defined once and for all. A federal state must provide rules on how to deal with changes in the distribution of central and decentralised power, and it must decide whom to entrust with new responsibilities that have come about because of changes in the economy and society.

The question of what rules should apply with the redistribution of future responsibilities between central government and member states is crucial for federal systems because it implies shifts in power. In Switzerland, as in other federal states, centralisation or decentralisation is a constant political issue that prompts ideological, social and economic conflict. Centralisation is often urged by protagonists of a strong state, economic intervention and modernisation, and extensive social programmes. Decentralisation, on the other hand, is preferred by interests which fear big government, by protagonists of decentralised autonomy or a 'minimal state', and by minorities.

The Swiss solution exhibits a marked preference for extensive cantonal autonomy, thus preventing any uncontrolled growth in the power of the federation. The constitutional rule in Article 3 says that all (future) powers shall be invested in the cantons, unless the Swiss people and the cantons decide, by constitutional amendment, that they shall be attributed to the federation. Here again we find similarities to the US constitution, which says, in its 10th amendment, that all powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by the constitution to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. In both countries, any major centralisation of powers has to be decided by constitutional amendment, whereas in other systems, for example those of France and Britain, a governmental decision can create or eliminate local powers or even authorities. Thus, we could say that the US and Switzerland share a common institutional arrangement which characterises federalism more as a system of non-centralisation than one of decentralisation.

Article 3 of the Swiss constitution has been highly effective for two reasons. First it prevents new powers being assumed without changing the constitution (as can happen in the USA by an interpretation of 'implied powers'). Thus the establishment of a national bank, any form of federal taxes, the creation of a social security system, the construction of federal highways, subsidies to the cantonal universities, and the introduction of environmental policies, all need formal constitutional amendment and ratification. Second, the procedure implies mechanisms of direct democracy. The proposition to confer any new power on the federation needs not only a majority in both chambers of parliament, but also a majority of the cantons and of the people at a popular vote. This procedure, which requires a large consensus among the chambers, cantons and people, is risky. Many proposed amendments fail several times before being accepted. The procedure has thus had a braking effect on centralisation, and this partly explains why central-government expenditure as part of the total public budget in Switzerland is far lower than in other countries (Table 2.1).

2.1.4 Relations between the Federation and the Cantons

Although the role of the federation is in many ways restricted, within the bounds of its authority it exercises substantial control over the cantons and communes.4 The juridical foundation of this control is an important rule; federal law is superior to cantonal law. Some key issues of federal control are the following:

2.2 FEDERALIST ELEMENTS IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

The non-centralised distribution of powers between the federation, the cantons and the communes is not the only characteristic of Swiss federalism. There are also important elements of cantonal participation in the decision-making process of the federation.

2.2.1 A Bicameral Legislature

2.2.1.1 Election to the National Council and the Council of States

The Swiss parliament consists of two chambers, the National Council and the Council of States. The mode of election reflects different ideas of representation.

The National Council represents the people and its 200 members are elected on the democratic principle of one person one vote. Thus the 200 National Council seats are divided among the cantons according to population. The fact that the national Council is elected in 26 electoral districts corresponding to the 26 cantons has two consequences. First, the choice given to the electorate differs between small and large cantons. The citizens of the canton of Zurich can elect 35 candidates, since its population of more than one million represents about one sixth of the Swiss people, whereas a citizen of the canton of Uri (34,000 inhabitants) will elect just one candidate. Second, the different size of cantons as constituencies is a relevant factor to the proportional mode of election. The proportionality rule, which replaced the winner-take-all majority system in 1918, should give smaller parties in the segmented party system of Switzerland a better chance. This objective is fully realised in large cantons such as Zurich, where a small party can win one of the 35 seats with less than 3 per cent of the votes. But in a small canton with say, two seats, the same party would need 34 per cent of the votes to be sure of winning one seat. For this reason the effects of proportional representation are weakened in small cantons, where small parties risk being left with nothing. Overall, the proportional rule favours the relative electoral strength of the larger, historical parties, and it can leave small parties underrepresented (Table 2.2).

The Council of States, following the federal role of equal representation of all cantons, is composed of two members from every full canton, and one member from each of the half-cantons. The election of the Council of States differs in two ways from that of the National Council. First, the cantons themselves determine the modes of election for the 46 members. Before direct election by the people became the rule, many cantons allowed their parliaments to nominate their representatives. Second, the members of most cantons are elected by majority rule. This means that a candidate must gain at least 50 per cent of the votes cast to be elected. Therefore it is rare for a candidate of a small party, even if she or he has a strong personality, to win an election. On the other hand, if a party enjoys the support of a good 50 per cent of the electorate it can secure both seats, as was the case in those small rural Catholic cantons that were strongholds of the conservatives (today the Christian Democratic Party) for decades. Currently the major bourgeois parties - the Radical Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, the Christian Democratic Party and the Swiss People's Party - put up joint lists, and in 1991 this enabled them to take 41 of the 46 seats. The Social Democratic Party, even though a member of the governmental coalition, is the clear loser. Despite electoral support of about 20 per cent, it is rarely able to beat the bourgeois parties at the cantonal level because of the latters' common interests and past successes.

2.2.1.2 Bicameral lawmaking

Lawmaking in the Swiss parliament reflects equal importance of democratic and federal influence on all decision-making (see Box 2.2). Both chambers may initiate constitutional amendments, new bills and regulations, as well as propose the revision of existing laws and regulations. All bills must be passed by the committees and floors of both chambers, a common bureau deciding which chamber should consider the bill first. Every proposition or bill destined to become federal law has to be approved by a relative majority in both chambers.

What happens if a bill or some of its propositions fails to gain a majority in one of the chambers? In such events the two chambers try to eliminate their differences through a procedure which can comprise different steps. If the second chamber proposes changes, the bill is sent back to the first chamber before being returned to the second. If differences still remain, the chambers appoint an equal number of delegates to a joint committee which then tries to find a common solution. Should the committee's solution fail to be approved by one of the chambers, the bill does not go through.

This procedure reflects the sacrosanct rule of absolute equality of the two chambers in all matters of legislation. The desire of the founders of the Swiss constitution for strong federalism went further than in other European nations. In Germany, for instance, the Bundesrat, which represents the subnation-states of the republic, is composed of members of the governments of the Lander. The number of members of each Land, however, varies according to population size, and the Bundesrat is empowered to exercise its powers of veto only for constitutional revisions or in matters concerning relations between the republic and the Lander.

How does this strong element of federalism work out in lawmaking? Some say that the Council of States may not represent a truly federalist point of view. The argument is that its members are representatives of the same vested interests as those which dominate economic issues in the National Council. In other words, they defend group interests, such as banks, farmers or craftsmen, rather than those of the cantons as a whole. Until recently the Council of States has the reputation of favouring the status quo and blocking innovations of federal policies proposed by the government or the other chamber. A historical perspective reveals a further dimension. In the early stages of the Swiss federation the main division was between the victorious radicals, who favoured a strong central state, and the conservative Catholic minority from small cantons who were resistant to the idea of central power. This preference of the Catholics was evident, and their 'retreat' to the cantons permitted them to maintain their conservative policies within the bounds of their majority influence. The Catholics' strong deputation in the Council of States was therefore bound to prevent power shifting from the cantons to the federation. Later, in the first half of the twentieth century, the main division was between bourgeois forces (often uniting Catholics and Protestants) and socialists, who were concentrated in industrial and urban cantons. The bourgeois majority, who enjoyed almost total control of the Council of States, were not opposed to new federal powers in general, but they weakened or blocked measures aimed at improving the conditions of the working class that had been proposed in the National Council, where the socialists had much more influence. While cleavages may have changed, there has been a constantly high representation of the rural regions in the Council of States. Because of this dimension, there is also some evidence of a constant pattern in the council's concern to eliminate inequalities between poor and rich regions and between urban and rural society, rather than those between upper and lower social classes.

We might conclude that the Council of States has not primarily subscribed to the federal ideal of maintaining decentralisation and the prerogatives of the cantons. A more convincing perspective is that different political forces - the Catholics, then the bourgeois coalition and the rural cantons - used their overrepresentation in the Council of States to their own advantage. Thus the Council of States has often played a conservative role, protecting the status quo against innovations proposed by the government and the other chamber. Yet this is an effect of the specific political composition of its majority, and not of the system itself. If socialists or urban cantons had profited from overrepresentation, the role of the Council of States could have been different.

2.2.2 The People's and the Cantons' Vote

All constitutional amendments and some international treaties proposed by the Federal Assembly, and all popular initiatives proposing to change or amend the constitution, have to be approved by popular vote. With (mandatory) referenda and popular initiatives, we again find that democratic and federal principles are equal elements of the decision-making process. As in decisions taken by the Federal Assembly, there must be a double majority obtained: on the one hand a majority of all voters, on the other hand a majority of the cantons. The latter is calculated in a simple way: the yes or no majority of every full canton counts as one vote, the result of half cantons as a half vote, which makes a total of 23 votes. If the result is tied (11.5:11.5) the proposal is rejected. As in the Federal Assembly, there can be a collision between the principles of democracy and those of federalism. A particular constitutional amendment may obtain a majority from the people, but a majority of the cantons may reject it, and vice versa. The characteristics of the popular vote prohibit the application of a negotiation process; in the case of negative majority of one, the amendment fails.

The details of the mechanisms of direct democracy are explained in Chapter 3, but here we should note two points about the way in which the cantons participate in federal decision-making. First, every canton is entitled to hand in proposals for a federal bill. This is called the right of cantonal initiative. The proposal has to be approved by the Federal Assembly, and if it is rejected by one of the chambers it fails. In addition a collective of eight cantons has the right to demand a popular vote on every bill passed by the Federal Assembly. This provision, however, has so far not been used. Second, the most usual and effective way of cantonal influence lies in preparliamentary consultation rather than in later decisions of parliament or popular vote. Given the importance of power-sharing in Switzerland, consultations preceding formal decision are a process of intensive negotiation, which we shall consider in Chapter 3. During such consultations* the cantons are influential actors involved in agenda-setting as well as in the drafting of federal legislation whenever its subject concerns them.

2.2.3 The Importance of Local Government

So far we have been mainly concerned with the federation and the cantons, but emphasis should also be given to the importance of local government, which is the foundation stone of the three-staged federal system (Box 2.3). An (unwritten) constitutional tradition guarantees political autonomy to the 3000 communes.5 Despite variations in the degree of autonomy, which depends on cantonal law, we can identify a core of 'autonomy, of the commune' that is characterised by the following rights:

  1. A (constitutional) right to exist, including the freedom to merge with other communes or to remain independent, which cannot be withdrawn by the cantons. This means that the reform of local government 'from above', as was seen in Germany in the 1960s when the Länder forced small communes to merge, would be almost impossible in Switzerland. Indeed the number of communes has barely decreased since the last century, even though almost half of them claim less than 500 inhabitants. If they do not merge into larger units, which can be more efficient from an economic point of view, it is because the majority of people participating in local politics seem to have a high esteem for their local community and its historical heritage. Geographical separation by topographical features may add to the popular view in small villages that there is no one more different from them than their neighbouring villagers.
  2. The freedom to choose, within the boundaries of cantonal legislation, an adequate political structure and administration. The fact that the specific degree of autonomy depends on cantonal law has one first implication: that communes follow traditions of political culture that vary from canton to canton. Thus there are cantons with numerous small communes and others with fewer but larger ones. Furthermore the traditions of direct and assembly democracy are stronger in communes in the German- and Romansch-speaking part of Switzerland, whereas communes in the French- and Italian-speaking regions favour indirect democracy with a legislative and executive body. However, the most important factor defining adequate political organisation is population size. In small communes, local government consists of a few elected part-time officials who are poorly remunerated. The larger cities have a parliamentary council and a full-time political executive heading professional services. This leads to somewhat strange proportions: the 18 000 local government officials in Zurich, the country's largest city with about 350 000 inhabitants, outnumber the total population of the smallest canton, Appenzell Innerrhoden, which has 14 000 inhabitants.
  3. The right to impose taxes for their own needs. Many social services, land-use planning, roads and public utilities are the responsibility of local government, and they cost money. Whereas in Britain and the US local taxes are mostly determined by the value of real estate, the Swiss communes are entitled to impose an income tax. The right to impose taxes and to decide the rates by themselves is a most important element in assuring the autonomy of local government (Figure 2.1 provides a comparison of federal, cantonal and local revenue and expenditure.)
  4. Freedom of action in matters that are not in the competence of the cantons or the federation. The consequences of this principle are twofold. First, it defends local autonomy in situations of conflict. A corporation seeking a site, even it if claims to be offering something of public benefit, such as a nuclear power plant, normally cannot impose itself on a commune with the help of cantonal or federal authorities. Therefore, depending on the circumstances, the communes are also protected against their canton. The Federal Supreme Court protects the autonomy of the communes in a similar way as it protects individual human rights. Second, the principle can encourage political innovation because the communes are in a first-hand position to spot the need for new public services. Some social services, schools for social workers, AIDS prevention and the recycling of waste are examples of new public activities that started in the communes. When those activities are further developed on the cantonal or federal level, we can speak of a bottom-to-top process which permits the use of small-scale experiences for large-scale policies.

2.2.4 Citizens' Self-Administration

In many sectors of Swiss administration, not all public tasks are fulfilled by employed civil servants or administrators. Instead ordinary people take part for a few hours or up to several days per week. In German this is called Milizverwaltung, a form of self-administration by people who have been nominated to work for a period of several years or to perform a specific task for the commune or the canton. This part-time work is sometimes remunerated, sometimes not, depending on the nature and the volume of the work. In some cantons the system dates back to the Middle Ages. In the canton of Valais, for instance, the water-supply system in the high valleys was realised in forms of Gemeinwerk (community work) in which every adult man was periodically drafted for several weeks to help with its construction.6

In its modern form, Milizverwaltung has three functions:

The main field of Milizverwaltung is local government. In small communes of up to 1000 inhabitants there are often just two full-time professional posts: president and president's clerk. The other seats of the communal council, as well as positions in social services and the fire brigade, in commissions for land-use planning and school administration, are occupied by part-time volunteers or are part-time jobs. In larger communes and cities Milizverwaltung does not disappear, but is combined with professional administration.

Milizverwaltung is found at the cantonal and federal level too, for instance in the form of expert commissions. A study dating from 1981 found almost 400 federal expert commissions with some 4000 persons involved.8 About 10 per cent of these commissions were engaged in giving advice during the legislative process, the rest were involved in administrative tasks. Moreover many cantonal and district courts work on the basis of Milizverwaltung, and all members of all parliaments -- federal, cantonal and local -- exercise the mandate on a part-time basis. With the exception of executive members, most elected politicians in Switzerland hold another job besides their mandate.

Advocates of Milizverwaltung claim that it is cheaper than professional administration, that politicians remain in contact with their voters and that the system keeps the political elite from becoming an isolated class. Opponents, on the other hand, consider it has led to too much amateurism and not enough professionalism in Swiss politics, as well as hidden transactions or even corruption if politicians do not carefully distinguish between their private and the public interests.

2.3 FEDERALISM AT WORK

2.3.1 Cooperative Federalism: How Federal Tasks are Implemented by Cantons and Communes

In the middle of the nineteenth century divisions between federalist and anti-federalist factions led to a clear distinction and division of power between the federation and the cantons. This concept, however, has subsequently been overruled by the mechanisms of intensive cooperation between the three levels of the federal system. The complexities of modern infrastructure, economic intervention and social programmes stimulated the completion of federal legislation by the cantons, the implementation of federal programmes by cantonal and local authorities, and extensive finance- and revenue-sharing.

The Swiss social security system provides a good example of this kind of 'cooperative federalism'. Its main element, which gives a minimum income to all retired persons as well as to widows and their children, was introduced in 1948 and has been regularly revised since then. The federation is responsible for legislation, it supervises the implementation of the programme, finances part of the costs and, through the Federal Court, it guarantees equal application of the law.

Citizens may look to the national politics section of their newspaper to find the latest changes to social security payments, but it is the local and cantonal authorities or even private organisations with whom they have to deal. The monthly contributions of employees and employers are collected by regional agencies of the different industries, a reminder of the time when social security was based on private organisations. The regional agencies and cantonal authorities are then responsible for most of the redistribution, along with the postman, who in earlier times took the money directly to pensioners. Indeed, the postal and telephone service (PTT), together with the federal railways (SBB), belong to the few federal services which deal directly with the public. Most federal programmes are implemented by the cantons and the communes, and there is no parallel federal administration, with its own regional services, agencies or even courts, like that in the United States. Where the social security system is concerned, the cooperation between the federation, the cantons and the communes goes even further. If a retired citizen is so poor that he or she cannot live on the federal allowance, she or he may go to the local authority and apply for an additional grant provided by the cantons. The fact that the federal government pays a substantial part of that grant is an incentive for the cantons to run complementary social programmes (otherwise they would not obtain a share of this part of the central budget), but the cantons are in sole charge of the programmes. Implementation, then, is delegated to the communes, which are closer to the clients and therefore have a better information based on which to evaluate the needs of claimants. At the local level, most of the other social services for which personal relations with clients are essential -social work, homes for elderly people, mobile-meal and health services -are organised by the communes, although sometimes they are delegated to private organisations and subsidised by the cantons.

This kind of cooperation reflects the strong belief of the Swiss in the subsidiarity principle, which means that functions are attributed to the lowest level possible. Thus public intervention and public help should only occur in situations where private means would not suffice to achieve a goal. Furthermore, if a public programme is necessary, the Swiss look to the institution closest to its clients. Consequently cantonal programmes are feasible only when local programmes do not suffice, and only if a task exceeds the capacities of the cantons do the cantons relinquish power to the federation. But even in federal matters not all responsibilities are centralised. Whereas the federation has become responsible for legislation on many issues that once came under cantonal rule, the implementation of federal programmes is delegated to the cantons and the communes whenever possible.

2.3.2 How a Deadlock Over a Federal Programme Allows Experiments: The Energy-Saving Policies of the Cantons

When the first oil crisis in 1973 shocked the industrialised world, the Swiss became aware of their extremely inadequate energy supply. While water from the Alps can meet a good deal of the electricity demand, this constitutes the only renewable energy resource in Switzerland. For almost 90 per cent of its energy consumption it was dependent on international markets: oil from the Middle East and Africa, gas from northern Europe and Russia, and uranium from Canada and the US. In the view of the Swiss government, a national energy policy was then considered urgent and necessary. A commission of experts was appointed to provide long-term forecasts of energy supply and consumption. After assessing the roles of oil, gas, coal, wood, water and nuclear power plants, as well as possible alternative and renewable energy sources, the commission made three recommendations:

In 1980 the Federal Council, taking into consideration the commission's recommendations, proposed a constitutional amendment which would have enabled a national energy policy to be developed. The two chambers of parliament eventually passed a bill that was somewhat more modest than the original proposals. In a referendum in 1983 the constitutional amendment gained the people's vote but failed to win a majority amongst the cantons. It was not until 1990 that the federal authorities presented a new proposal, containing more moderate suggestions for a national energy policy, that survived the referendum process. Thus it took the Federation 17 years to acquire a mandate for a new energy policy whose limited ambitions were far from the original hopes of the government.9

This long delay, however, was nothing extraordinary in federal politics. There have been other occasions when the people have rejected federal projects several times before finally accepting them in a different version. Even then it should be noted that the people may reject bills to implement a new policy when they have already approved its constitutional amendment. This was the fate, for instance, of a maternity allowance bill that was successfully challenged in a popular referendum in 1987, despite it having been approved in principle in 1945.10 In Swiss law two-step legislation of a constitutional base and an ordinary law is necessary for every large-scale policy programme. But the second step can also fail at a popular vote, as with the above-mentioned maternity allowance bill, which was designed to give women some income during and after pregnancy. One of the most common arguments against innovations from Bern is mistrust of the federal government and defence of the cantons' autonomy. Anti-state, anti-centralist, as well as conservative and neo-liberal motives fit equally well into this pattern. They also played a role in the vote on the energy issue. It was argued that new federal initiatives to intervene in the market system were not necessary. Such activities by the federation would weaken the cantons' competences, and it was said that the cantons were already doing all that was necessary. Thus federal innovations are not guaranteed success, and they take time, because of the high consensus required in the double majority of the people and the cantons, and because of the double hurdle of two stages of legislation: constitutional base and regulatory enactment. Table 2.3 shows that almost one-third of all constitutional amendments proposed by the Federal Assembly 1848-1990 were rejected.

The case of the national energy policy, however, needs further explanation. It involved that most controversial and polarising of issues: nuclear energy. In the 1970s the anti-nuclear movement successfully stopped the construction of a power plant after several months of occupation of the site. When first the greens and then the social democrats opposed the construction of new nuclear power plants, the issue divided parliament, political parties and the people. Nuclear power was controversal where technical risks and gains were concerned, but below this there lurked a fundamental conflict of values. Proponents of nuclear power considered that economic growth and technical progress were at stake; opponents were fundamentally engaged in the protection of nature and of future generations against the dangers of nuclear technology. A popular initiative against the construction of new power plants failed in 1979, but 49 per cent of the people voted for the initiative -- the anti-nuclear movement had successfully reached the masses. On the other hand the protagonists of nuclear power were equally unable to win enough support for the continuation of the programme. When in 1985 the federal chambers authorised the resumption of construction of a nuclear power plant in Kaiseraugst, it encountered unanimous protests by the two neighbouring semi-cantons of Basel. Public opinion throughout Switzerland to large degree disapproved of resumption of the work, and some federal authorities were convinced that completion would be impossible without police guards or even military protection.

The work was not resumed, and in 1989 the federal parliament dropped the project, paying Sfr 350 million in indemnities to the electrical company that had been licensed to undertake the work.11 This was two years after the nuclear accident at Chernobyl, whose radioactive fall-out reached large parts of Western Europe, and the decision not to go ahead was highly praised throughout Switzerland. Here again, we find a federalist motivation: the federal authorities did not think it politically wise to impose the plant against such decided and committed resistance in the surrounding region.

Thus neither the opponents nor the protagonists of nuclear power could win the argument. It was a deadlock that paralysed national energy policies for years. However in 1990 a typically Swiss compromise was found. The cantons and the people accepted a popular initiative for a ten-year moratorium on the authorisation and construction of new plants.

However the paralysis of national politics in the 1970s and 1980s did not prevent important innovations in some cantons. In the canton of Baselland for instance, where opposition to two nuclear power plant projects was particularly strong, the authorities found a constructive way out of the dilemma by compensating for energy shortfalls resulting from the rejection of nuclear power by instituting energy-saving programmes. The authorities charged experts with analysing the potential for energy-saving in all household appliances, and in industry, public buildings and transport. Specialists in the administration then worked out programmes using the most effective and efficient measures. In the canton of Baselland an advanced energy-saving law took effect as early as 1980.

The success was considerable. The new regulations for housing insulation stimulated innovation in the construction industry. Within ten years energy consumption for heating per square meter in new houses dropped nearly 40 per cent because of better insulation and more efficient heating systems. The law also required that apartments in blocks be metered and charged individually for their heating so that occupants had an incentive to economise, for instance by turning off the heating while absent. This regulation was controversial, particularly among the owners of the buildings, but in a few years 90 per cent of old buildings were equipped and, according to an official evaluation, average energy savings of up to 25 per cent proved to be possible.

The success of these measures should not, however, be overestimated. Some cantons flatly rejected energy-saving programmes, others were reluctant or constrained by the national controversy about nuclear energy. Those who did participate had to realise that stabilising overall energy consumption was not an obtainable goal. The cantons were able to stimulate the use of new technologies, such as solar energy, but cantonal markets are much too small to hope for economies of scale by mass production. Cantonal states are not authorised to raise energy prices, which more than any other measure would stimulate a reduction in consumption, and the introduction of alternative, renewable resources.

Cantonal efforts have not been in vain however. The decentralised policy can be seen as a universal experiment, with cantons as laboratories where work was going on to solve the problem of how to live with less energy without giving up comfort. Their experiments were realistic and allowed for the risk of failure and dead ends. Furthermore the cost of the risk was small as it was shared amongst the participants. Experiences were also exchanged between the cantons. In the 1990s the federal authorities will be able to coordinate the efforts of the cantons and complement them with measures at the national level. There is therefore a chance that Switzerland may not only solve its own energy problem, it may also be able to export the related technology, which is something that Switzerland has particular experience of. Should all this come about, the credit for it will be due to technical and economic innovation stimulated by the political structure of federalism.

2.3.3 How Federalism Copes with Inequalities: The Example of Swiss Primary Schools

While travelling in rural regions or hiking in the Alps, visitors to Switzerland are often astonished to see pretty and well-maintained school houses even in small and evidently poor villages. Indeed, having their own schools for their own children and a good schoolteacher is the pride of each commune. Another story, linked again to federalism, is how even small and poor villages are able to live up to this ideal.

In the middle of the last century education differed from canton to canton. In some cantons basic schools were run by the (Catholic) church, others were public. In mountain regions school lessons were given only in winter, when children were not needed to help in the fields. Curricula and the length of children's basic education varied considerably. The radical majority in 1848 allowed education be a cantonal matter. This allowed for cultural diversity. Aware of the importance of education to a young nation and its democracy, however, the radicals stipulated that there should be some federal control. Thus Article 27.2 of the constitution requires that 'the cantons provide sufficient basic education'. This regulation was, above all, a plea for the state monopoly of schools and was directed against the Catholic church, which then controlled parts of the educational system. Second, the regulation obliged the cantons to offer a minimum standard of basic education, with a minimum number of years of schooling being free of charge but compulsory for everybody.

These requirements greatly influenced the evolution of the Swiss educational system. Providing equal-quality education and training became the common concern of the cantons. In earlier times there has been a 'brain drain' of the best teachers to rich communes offering better salaries. Although still nominated and paid by the communes, teachers today receive an almost equal salary throughout each canton. Curricula are coordinated by intercantonal bodies. Poor communes receive subsidies for the salaries of their teachers and the construction of their schoolbuildings - but these have to follow construction standards that prohibit luxury buildings as well as insufficient class rooms. However not all differences between cantons and their schools have been eliminated. Inadequately coordinated curricula may create difficulties for schoolchildren when parents move from one canton to another. This is a cost of federalism. Whilst it makes sense, for example, for Bernese schools to concentrate on the cultural specificities and history of their own canton, the argument for federalism is less strong when there are 26 different cantonal teaching programmes in mathematics.

More importantly, some cantons send more students to institutions of higher education than others. Whereas the decentralisation of such establishments has facilitated access by peripheral regions, social inequalities still exist. As in every country, social differences in access to higher education are more difficult to overcome than barriers set up by geographical distance. Nonetheless, progress to achieve equal standards and quality in basic education for all children, regardless of the living conditions of their parents, has constantly been made.

2.3.4 Swiss Federalism Means Regional Solidarity, not Competition

The federal policy of minimum standards is not limited to schooling; other public services work in the same way. Public transport now reaches practically every commune, even those in high mountain valleys. A dense and decentralised network of public infrastructure has helped to maintain the private services of doctors, local banks or grocery stores even in small villages. If Swiss statistics define communes with 10,000 inhabitants as 'cities', there is some reason for doing so. In these small centres one can find lawyers and other professional specialists, computer and book shops, various other commodities and services, and even a local industry producing a particular product for export.

Instead of people flocking to where the money is, Swiss federalism has seen to it that the money is sent to where the people are, thus maintaining a decentralised economic and social structure. In the 1970s, when young people from mountain valleys found better jobs by moving to the cities, a large federal programme for public investment in the mountain regions was launched. Subsidies were given on the condition that different communes were willing to agree on a common regional-development plan. This plan had to demonstrate the intracommunal development potential of a larger region12 and coordinate the federal investment in roads, schools, sports sites and other facilities. The programme helped to develop new tourist industries, and, together with other programmes, provided agriculture in mountain regions with a better chance of survival. In many regions the population drain was stopped. While evaluations of the programme are sometimes critical about its direct economic effects, its socio-political success is undeniable. The programme provided the communes with an incentive to get together to analyse their own situations from a wider horizon and find common perspectives of development.13 Encouraging a social experiment of 'endogenous development', some experts say, was even more important than money.14

Equalising policies for the different cantons and their regions are at the core of Swiss 'cooperative federalism'. The idea is that of a commonwealth of all regions, and of mutuality. Institutionally it involves different levels of government cooperating in the same policy programme. Moreover cooperative federalism has developed a broad system of financial compensation between the federation, the cantons and the communes that comprises revenue-sharing as well as financial compensation by block grants and subsidies15 (see Box 2.4 and Figure 2.2).

The equalising policies of cooperative federalism are not uncontested. Some complain that shared responsibility makes actors less responsible, or that cooperative federalism encourages too much public spending. Despite these criticisms most people would not want to forego the equalisation provided by cooperative federalism. And it is not only the cantons which receive federal aid who would defend it. A majority of residents in industrial or suburban areas, for instance, still believe that people from the mountain regions should be given public help to improve their living conditions.

This concept of cooperative federalism is different from other ideas of federalism. Economic theory, for instance, relates federalism to competition. Some economists prefer many decentralised authorities to the monopoly of central government. According to this view, the ideal situation is where governments have to compete and where citizens have the option to vote for the government they prefer. One could say that US federalism is, and probably always was, influenced by this idea. The variety of US states is considered as something amongst which one chooses. Individuals migrating from east to west or from north to south are trying to make the best choice they can. US cities and communities are felt to be in competition with each other. Living in a wealthy residential area or a poor suburb can mean a difference between excellent or poor public services. People who find that the local public school is not good enough for their children send them to private schools or move to a better area. This can lead to vicious cycles where poor communities get poorer, and rich ones eventually become richer. It may be part of the American civic culture that favours free options, and it is a heritage of people who once opted to leave their former country as emigrants.

The attitude of the Swiss is different. The Swiss passport does not mention 'place of birth', but the commune of family origin, dating back generations. In older times this kind of citizenship was of great importance. Before the creation of the modern social security system, the commune of origin was legally obliged to provide for its elderly, homeless and poor. Today most Swiss are still aware of their cultural roots, and feel emotionally attached to the communes and regions in which they live. Many feel that choosing to make a living in another canton means the loss of familiar surroundings and mentalities. One finds Swiss people of all professions who prefer to stay in their own region rather than accept better job offers in other cantons. Moreover there are the language boundaries. Only a very small proportion of the population changes linguistic regions. Many of those who do so for professional reasons may later return to their region of origin. Students from Tessin, for instance, are forced to further their education at a German- or French-speaking university because there is no university in the Italian-speaking canton. Because of this many Tessin students speak three languages fluently. During their studies, however, they maintain intense social relations among themselves, and having gained their degree, their first choice - not available to everyone though - is to go back to their own canton. Under these conditions we can understand the great importance of regional solidarity in Swiss politics. Creating fairly equal living conditions in the different regions is vital if collective values of local cultures are to be maintained and if people continue to feel emotionally attached to their place of origin.16 In contrast with the US, the Swiss culture of federalism is not based on competition, nor on voting with one's feet by migrating. By compensating for existing inequalities, Swiss federalism makes it possible for people to stay in their own region or commune and thus favours the 'loyalty option'.17

2.3.5 Dealing with the Separatist Issue: The Dolorous Birth of a New Canton

The problems of the Jura region have already been mentioned in Chapter I (Section 1.4.4). The Jura represents an exception to Swiss integration of cultural minorities. Historical factors and worsening language, religious, cultural and socioeconomic differences instead led to its separation from

1 Q

the canton of Bern. The Jura region, which is mainly Catholic and French-speaking, was incorporated into Protestant, German-speaking Bern in 1815 at the Vienna Congress by arrangement with Prussia, England, Austria and Russia. As a minority located at the northern periphery of the canton, the people of Jura felt they were being discriminated against both politically and economically. An escalation of political clashes after the Second World War gave rise to a separatist movement, which triumphed in 1978 when the new Jura canton was created. Things were complicated by the fact that the population of Jura was itself divided: three southern districts had been Protestant since the sixteenth century, were economically better off and had traditionally better relations with the old canton. Thus the deepening conflict was not only between Jura and Bern, but also between 'separatists' and (Bernese) 'loyalists' within the population of Jura.

How were the authorities to deal with a region that wanted to separate from an existing canton and form a new one? The founders of the constitution had not anticipated this problem, so before the game could be played the rules had to be invented.

As far as the game was concerned it was clear that three actors would take part:

If Bern had long underestimated the importance of the Jura question, showing little regard for the cultural minority, it eventually was responsible for taking the most important initiatives to settle the conflict. In 1967 the Bern government presented the people of Jura with three options from which to choose: the status quo, a statute of autonomy, or separation from Bern by the creation of a new canton. In the following year a task force or 'federal advisory commission' was created: two former members of the Federal Council and two members of the Swiss parliament were appointed to investigate the implications of a statute of autonomy or of the separation of the Jura region from Bern. Institutionally this meant not the appointment of an intermediate third party, but also the unofficial involvement of a federal authority in a conflict that had become of nationwide importance.

In succeeding years the separatist forces continued to espouse independence, so the Bernese government proposed a cascade system of popular votes for Bern and the Jura region:

The purpose of this cascade system was clear. The first votation would establish whether the Jurassian people did indeed wish to create their own canton, but given the internal division of the Jura people between separatists and loyalists, no district or commune would be forced to stay with the old canton or go with the new one against its own will. Thus the second and third votation would protect regional and local minorities on either side of the debate.

In 1970 the Bernese people accepted the cascade system as a constitutional amendment by an impressive majority of six to one. In this particular votation the Bernese people did not vote on separation itself, but on the procedure relating to future separation which would permit the people of Jura to take an autonomous decision on whether or not to create their own canton. In other words, the Bernese majority had agreed to allow the Jura minority to separate from the canton if it so wished.

In 1974 and 1975 the people of Jura played the game according to the rules. In the first votation the inhabitants of all the Jura districts voted 37000 for and 34,000 against independence. The cleavage between separatists and loyalists was clear: the northern districts voted for separation by three to one, whereas the three southern districts voted by almost two to one to stay with the old canton. Two of the three districts confirmed their preference to stay in the canton of Bern in the second votation in 1975, but in one of the southern districts the vote was split. Here a third votation was held: Moutier, the main city of the district, decided to stay with Bern whilst some northern communes in the district chose to join the new canton.

After these votations the boundaries of the new canton, Jura, were known, and in 1976 its people elected a constituent assembly which then drew up a draft constitution for the new canton. The constitution was accepted by the people of Jura in 1977, and one year later the Swiss people and the cantons accepted Jura as the twenty-sixth canton of the federation. The result of the national vote (1,310,000 for 280,000 against, with a large majority in all cantons) was interpreted as revealing the great respect and understanding of the Swiss people for its minority groups.

The creation of the new canton had split the Jura region, which was contrary to the political objectives of a good part of the separatist movement which, on grounds of ethnicity, culture and language, had embraced the idea of independence for the whole of Jura. They had proposed other procedural rules, for instance that the right to vote for the creation of the canton should be given to all persons originating from Jura, regardless of their present place of residence. Instead of the separatists' dream of uniting the entire ethnic group within a single boundary, three districts remained within the boundary of the Bern canton. Yet this solution was modern in the sense that it rejected the nationalist formula of 'one people, one language, one culture, one state', which always leads to insoluble minority problems. In fact migration and industrialisation have made single-cultural societies and their states more and more an exception. In this respect all boundaries become artificial. In Jura they were founded on the principle of territorial self-determination on the smallest possible scale: first the region as a whole, then its districts and finally its communes were allowed to choose. Because of its rationality the procedure may well be used again. There is nothing, in principal, to prohibit a future generation in the southern districts from demanding the reopening of the cascade procedure. In fact it has already been used by another district, the German-speaking but Catholic Laufenthal, which joined the Baselland canton in 1993.

We could have witnessed a quite different outcome to the Jura question. Bern, instead of opening the way to separation, could have tried to continue a policy of oppression against the separatist movement. Further escalation of the conflict between the Bernese majority and the Jurassian minority without any realistic hope of solution could have made federal intervention inevitable. Instead the Jura minority, despite discrimination, profited from individual and political liberties that were broad enough to allow it to organise its successful separation. Federal intervention was limited to an informal task force that was able to gain the confidence of both sides, and the majority of the Bernese people, while anything but enthusiastic about the Jura minority, were willing to allow the Jurassians to separate from the 'grand old canton' if so wished.

2.4 THE LIMITS OF SWISS FEDERALISM

2.4.1 Limits of Implementation: Why Some Foreigners Can Buy Real Estate in Switzerland and Others Can Not

In the 1960s xenophobes complained not only that the foreign-resident figure of 15 per cent was too high, but that there was reason to fear a sellout of Swiss land to foreign capital. When the xenophobe movement announced the launch of a popular initiative to stop this development and the price of land soared, the government coalition had to react. It adopted a regulation limiting the acquisition of land and real estate by persons and firms with residence abroad. The issue was highly controversial. Liberal forces were against any state regulation of the real-estate market. The political left, on the other hand, wanted new regulations on land-use planning and on the protection of tenants, but not in the sense that the xenophobe forces meant. Yet the government coalition felt forced to do something to curb the political growth of the movement, which had begun to make demands which went much further than their original ones. Because of the highly controversial nature of the question the regulations that were finally implemented were not very clear. The bill contained exceptions and it left room for complementary legislation by the cantons, which had to implement the programme.

After ten years of implementation the success of the programme was hardly convincing. Whereas in some cantons the sale of land and houses to foreigners stabilised or even fell, it rose sharply in others. What had happened? A closer analysis19 reveals that the cantons had made full use of their legislative and implementing powers, thus adapting the federal law to their own needs. In some cantons the objectives of the federal law coincided with their own strategies, as in Lucerne which aimed at the slow and gentle development of tourist sites. The federal programme and its cantonal complements were protective of the environment and were implemented in Lucerne without reservation. In the canton of Geneva the result was somewhat ambiguous. The city's most urgent need was to provide housing, especially for low-income residents. Thus the city said no to foreigners who wanted to buy existing villas. But it said yes to foreign investors willing to construct large apartment blocks on condition that some of the apartments were rented to families on low incomes. In a third canton, however, the objectives of the federal regulation were distorted in a contrary way. Ambitious development plans for new tourist sites in the canton of Valais were financed by foreign capital. At that time one could find advertisements in the business section of foreign newspapers saying: 'For foreigners, it's still possible to realise their dream of a Swiss Chalet'. Indeed it was, because Valais offered much more liberal conditions of authorisation than other cantons, thus attracting foreign capital to finance its development plans.

Whereas it is common for the cantons to adapt federal legislation to their own needs, it is rare for them to go as far as inverting its objectives. Yet, the Valais example shows that implementation of central government programmes in a federal system cannot be taken for granted. First, it depends on political will. If the political consensus is large, the cantons and the communes will make it a success, even if there are different technical problems in its implementation. Second, in a federal system consensus is required at different levels of government, but it may not be forthcoming. Programmes almost unanimously welcomed by the Federal Assembly may be controversial in particular cantons. An analysis of the federal housing programme has shown that its subsidies were not used where housing was most needed, but in cantons where political forces willing to protect tenants were the strongest.20 Third, lack of administrative resources can hinder a federal programme. Small cantons or small communes are often unable to implement environmental policies because the necessary resources and expertise to analyse, implement and control environmental standards are beyond their reach.21

2.4.2 The Weakness of Federal Authorities, or How a Canton Can Deny Human Rights to its Citizens

In the nineteenth century Switzerland was one of the first countries to attain a democracy that was free of property -- and other restrictions on an adult male's right to vote. The realisation of women's equal rights in Switzerland, however, was a long and difficult process. The first attempts to introduce women's suffrage at the cantonal level failed in 1920-1 in Neuchatel, Basel, Glarus, Zurich, Geneva and St Gallen. In 1929 a petition demanding women's suffrage at the federal level was handed in with a quarter of a million signatures. This petition led to nothing. In 1959, in a popular vote, Swiss men voted two to one against women's suffrage. In 1971 Switzerland became one of the last countries to give women the right to vote, but it was a further ten years before women were given equal rights and constitutional protection against discrimination.

People often ask why recognition of women's political and civil rights took so long in Switzerland. One answer may be that women's organisations, after their early setbacks in the 1920s, had lost much of their courage to demand equal rights.22 Another reason may be that Swiss society is generally more conservative than others. In fact the Swiss, who had had to defend their traditional values and autonomy during the First and Second World War and had never suffered a social revolution in the twentieth century, were particularly late in recognising the need for a change in women's societal position.23 When in 1958 Iris Von Roten published Frauen im Laufgitter -- a very critical report on the economic, political, sociological and sexual situation of Swiss women -- the author and her feminist work were destroyed by the media and were effectively silenced.24 Only in 1991, when the almost forgotten book was re-edited, was Frauen im Laufgitter hailed as the Swiss equivalent of Simone de Beauvoir's Le deuxieme sexe (1949) or Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystic (1963). This clearly illustrates the late change of mind about the position of women in Swiss society.25

From the perspective of a political scientist another factor should be recalled. The problem of the introduction of women's suffrage was that women were not able to participate in the decision. Men alone decided whether they were willing to abandon their historical privilege and share their political rights with women. In parliamentary democracies that situation is easier to deal with. A party that wishes to introduce women's suffrage can combine this proposition with other issues, for instance job security or minimal wages, in its election programme. Thus a worker fearing for his job would probably vote for that party, even if he was at odds with the idea of women's suffrage. Should that party win the election the introduction of women's suffrage would be likely, because once introduced the new voting power of women would most probably go to support the government that had enfranchised them. This procedure was not possible in Switzerland, where women's suffrage had to be introduced by popular vote.

Moreover, in order to prevent one issue from riding on the back of another, and to ensure that voters have the opportunity to express their preferences clearly, the constitution prohibits the combining of different questions in a single popular vote. Thus, when attempting to introduce women's suffrage in 1959, the federal authorities were not able to offer men some sort of incentive to share their electoral monopoly with women. All that the government was able to do was to convince men that women were equal or that human rights should be universal. The most helpful thing, however, was the example provided by the cantons and a number of communes which, during the 1959 votation and later, introduced women's suffrage at the lower level. In 1971 the federal government tried again. This time it was successful.26

A few bastions of all-male democracy withstood all attempts at persuasion, which they perceived as outside interference. The Landsgemeinde (popular assembly) of the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden steadfastly refused to introduce women's suffrage until 1990. Finally, when deciding on an appeal brought by a number of Appenzell women, the Federal Court ruled that this situation was unconstitutional. Moreover the court intervened drastically: it redefined Appenzell Innerrhoden's constitution in such a way that it gave women the right to participate at the next Landsgemeinde.27

One may again ask why this process took so long. Was there no possibility of the federal government intervening earlier to end the unconstitutional situation in Appenzell Innerrhoden? Theoretically the answer is yes. The Swiss federation has several means of intervening if cantons fail to comply with federal law. In the event of public disorder it can send in troops. Under certain circumstances it can also withdraw subsidies. Both sanctions, however, would not have been of much help in this case. Moreover they are used very rarely - official relations between the federation and the cantons being very delicate. Federal authorities deal with the cantons with almost as much respect as they deal with foreign states. More common is intervention by the Federal Court. Since every cantonal decision is subject to the charge that it violates federal constitutional law, the court's role in implementing equal protection is most important. Indeed as the Federal Court deals with basic rights -- freedom of the press, freedom of speech, the right to own property, freedom of association, equal protection by and due process of the law, and habeas corpus -- it is probably the strongest authority of the central state. It says what can and can not be done under the flag of federalist autonomy. In setting common standards of constitutional law and equal protection, it acts as a counterbalance to the political variety of the cantons.

The case of women's suffrage, however, was rather special. When introduced at the federal level in 1971, the amendment provided for a certain delay on the part of the cantons to allow them to adapt their own regulations. This was done for two reasons. First, the delay-clause was likely to improve the chances of a successful popular vote on the federal amendment. Second, it symbolised the hope that the male majority in those cantons that still refused women's suffrage would change their minds more quickly if the federal authorities refrained from exerting pressure. This hope was fulfilled in several cantons, but not in Appenzell Innerrhoden, where the Federal Court finally had to decide on this substantive issue and also to declare that the transitional period, after almost 20 years, had finally run out.28

The belief of Swiss political culture that it is better to refrain both from coercive power and from direct confrontation between cantonal and federal authorities seems to be indestructible, at least among the political elite. It is significant that the women's suffrage case was brought to the Federal Court by a few 'ordinary women' who had the guts to resist threats of harassment when doing so. The Swiss political elite, on the other hand, was not very creative in finding means of helping the Appenzell Innerrhoden women. They even renounced symbolic politics. When it was the turn of an Appenzell Innerrhoden member of the Federal Council to become president in 1989, parliament could have said: we do not wish a representative of this canton to be the head of our state as long as it denies women's essential human rights. Nobody did. When it comes to its smallest member-states, the federation speaks softly and does not carry a big stick.

In a more general way the question of how to enforce and implement human or civil rights poses problems in every federal state. Its central authorities have to guarantee equal rights, but they also have to protect minority rights and the historic particularities of local cultures. If equalisation is a question of money, it poses no problems. Money is divisible, and economic equalisation can therefore be negotiated through compromises. This is not always so with the equalisation of human or constitutional rights. Politically, problems of ethical values are often perceived as binary questions. There is either the right to have an abortion or there is not. The death penalty is either constitutional or it is not. Possibilities of compromise are limited. Because of the fundamental nature of these questions, and because of their importance for the whole of society, governments sometimes decide them constitutionally for the whole of society.

If federal states, because of specific values predominating in their society, insist on a single solution for all, is there a right to difference in the name of federalism? Given the perspective that human rights are fundamental and universal, there can be no tolerance for federal particularities which deny them. Federal states should then be forced to comply with the solution made for all. But such solutions can evoke fundamental conflicts. If the ethical question is highly controversial, the conflict can threaten other values -- social peace for instance. In federal systems it may therefore be prudent to avoid single solutions when the issue is very controversial. Moreover, if human rights are perceived as an historical product of economic, social and cultural development and not as God-given, there may be an argument for different solutions in federal states. Autonomous solutions for particular member-states may not only prevent conflicts, but also allow the development of the endogenous cultural patterns that are necessary to make human rights effective in daily life. According to the constitutionalist Walter Kalin, the Swiss Federal Court seems to have followed both lines: after an initial 'unifying' period, it has later tried to valuate not only the federal, but also the cantonal tradition of constitutional rights, allowing regional and particular solutions.29

2.5 CHALLENGES

2.5.1 Federalism vs Democracy: Why one Citizen from Uri Outweighs 34 Citizens from Zurich, or to What Extent is Federalism Compatible with Democracy?

Chapter 1 argued that federalism was an important institutional mechanism in Swiss democracy for protecting minorities and dealing with cultural divisions. However this institutional arrangement implies a conflict between two principles of decision-making. Democracy insists on the equal representation of every individual, that is, one person one vote, whereas federalism guarantees equal representation to the member-states of a federation, that is, an equal vote for every state. If the two modes of decision-making are used to decide the same question, they can lead to different results. There can be a collision between the principles of democracy and those of federalism.30 In Switzerland such collisions may happen not only in a parliamentary decision when the Council of the States and the National Council disagree, but also in a popular vote, when the majority of the cantons and the majority of the people may not coincide. Table 2.4 shows instances of the latter.

Most of these collisions are recent. The number of polls on constitutional matters has increased by about 100 per cent every 20 years since 1930. Constitutional amendments, once an exception, have become the norm for the introduction of new activities by central government. This leads to a greater risk of collision between the democratic and the federalist majority.

Moreover the differences in population size between cantons have increased because of migration from rural to urban regions. This has had an effect when popular votations require a double majority. It increases the importance of the federal principle, while the weight of the democratic principle is reduced. Whereas in 1848 one person from the small canton Uri cancelled out 17 persons from the largest canton, Zurich, when the majority of the cantons was counted, today it is 34 persons.31 When the 11.5 smallest cantons vote together, they constitute a blocking federalist majority representing a tiny democratic minority. Theoretically the smallest federalist veto power (51 per cent of the votes in the smallest cantons against all the other votes) represents just 9 per cent of the Swiss population. This means that 9 per cent of the population could block democratic majorities of 91 per cent in all popular votations on constitutional amendments. In reality it would be unlikely to find a 51 per cent against in the small cantons and 100 per cent for in the large cantons. We can determine, however, the practical 'minimal veto power' from the votes in Table 2.4, where in six out of eight cases the cantonal majority blocked a democratic majority. Germann has done this for the five votations in the twentieth century, calculating the no-votes from the 11.5 smallest cantons as a percentage of all votes cast.32 We see that the practical veto power of the small cantons represents a democratic minority of just 20-25 per cent (see Table 2.5).

The above cases were important and controversial. Political analyses show that the voting behaviour of the cantons on specific issues is relatively stable. One of the issues where small rural cantons vote differently from large urban cantons is foreign policy. When voting on a trade agreement with the EC (1972), membership in the UN (1986) and the Bretton Woods institutions (1992), the small cantons maintained classical attitudes of neutrality or autonomy and preferred non-engagement in foreign policy, whereas the large cantons were more open to Swiss participation in international affairs and organisations. As political scientists had predicted, this pattern also held in the votation on Swiss membership of the European Economic Area, where 50.3 per cent and 19 cantons rejected the treaty; 30 per cent of all votes, coming from the small cantons, were enough to block a federalist vote in favour. For a 'yes' to the treaty, on the other hand, a very strong majority of 59 per cent of the people would have been necessary to reach a minimum majority of 12 cantons. It is evident, therefore, that every future government proposal to join the EEA (EC) will meet a particular difficulty when it comes to the popular vote. A simple majority of the people will not suffice. To participate in European integration a very strong preference of 55-60 per cent of the people will be necessary to achieve the compound democratic and federalist majority required for the constitutional change.

To what extent is it justified that a small minority can overrule the democratic majority? 'Do not mix up two different things', would say protagonists from small cantons. To protect minorities against democratic majorities is the very aim and legitimacy of federalism. If you accept its principle of 'one state, one vote', you have to accept a federalist majority no matter how small a part it may be of the democratic electorate. 'Of course, minority rights are important', others might say. They might object, however, that a federalism weighing the votes of some persons 34 times more heavily than those of others is denying democracy and its principle of 'one person, one vote'.

Every federal democracy is faced with this problem. There is a contradiction, and a trade-off, between the principle of equal rights of the member states and that of 'one person, one vote'. It is not possible to find a general answer to the question of to what extent federalism may legitimately be allowed to outweigh democracy. Different solutions depend on a country's historical situation, and on the importance a federation gives to minority rights or to the autonomy of its member states. The collision between democratic and federalist majority rule may be settled more easily in bicameral parliamentary decisions, where there are ways of negotiating between the two chambers, than in popular votations which lack this possibility. Some countries may not be worried by and therefore not become aware of the problem of the collision between federalism and democracy. In the US the difference between the smallest and the largest states can reach a ratio of one to fifty or more, as in Switzerland. But small states such as Alaska, Wyoming, Vermont and Delaware do not often form themselves into a coalition in the way it is done in Switzerland.

There is, however, an important lesson to be drawn from the Swiss example. Because of migration among cantons the weight of the principle of federalism has increased in comparison with democratic majority rule. One could argue that this is against the logic of Swiss history, because the classical federal cleavages of religion and language have reduced during the past hundred years. Why not therefore reassess the relative importance of federalism and democracy? Why not go back to the equilibrium, for instance, of 1848?

Solutions could be found by redistributing the seats in the Council of States. Given the increasing difference in the population size of cantons, one could modify their equal representation, for instance, giving large cantons three seats, the middle-sized cantons two seats and the small cantons one seat. The majority of the cantons in a popular votation could be calculated in a similar way. Or one could imagine rules for a division of power that would allow the federation to undertake new activities without amending the constitution in every single case. Some such attempts have been made, but their failure was to be expected. Changing the rules of federalism is a game to be played under the existing rules of federalism, and there is no reason for minorities to renounce their long-held minority rights when asked to do so.

The institution-building of federalism has to be considered carefully. Long-standing equilibria between the principles of democracy and federalism may change under circumstances not foreseeable at the moment. The institution of federalism can be a one-way street. Federal minority rights may be reinterpreted and adjusted to new situations by constitutional courts, but once introduced, they cannot be revoked by the democratic majority.

2.5.2 Urban Regions -- the Lost Dimension in Swiss Federalism

Urbanisation in Switzerland follows the same pattern as in other countries. It crystallises around historic centres, once complete microcosms where the same people were working, shopping, lodging and spending their leisure time. With the development of public transport and motoring, the 'complete' historic city has been torn apart, its centre attracts the service industry, and the more services concentrate in the centre, the more they can specialise and the more they attract people from far distances to use them. The service industry is able to pay higher rents than residents. Land prices rise. Residents are driven out. They may still work in the city, now a central business district, but they have to find an apartment in the suburbs. Old industrial plants, too, move out of the city into its surrounding areas: modern automatic production processes require single-storeyed buildings and therefore more space. Once car-ownership reaches a certain level, consumers buy their commodities in shopping centres built close to motorways. Traffic grows faster than anything else. Urban people become commuters. Part of their growing income and leisure time has to be spent on longer daily travel between workplace, shopping and recreation areas and home. The old city is transformed into an urban region, or an agglomeration, as it is called in Switzerland, which overruns traditional communal boundaries and is composed of a central city with perhaps thirty or more peripherical communes.34

Swiss urban areas, or agglomerations, may be smaller than those in other countries, but according to official statistics more than 60 per cent of the Swiss population lives in them. However, there is no political organisation for the common needs of their inhabitants. For military matters, there is the federation. For hospitals, there are cantons, and for sports facilities the communes are responsible. When it comes to the infrastructure of agglomerations however, there is no common authority. Ways are found to finance and run public facilities of common interest. For public transport systems several organisations may work together: federal railways, private railways, buses run by the postal services and communal tramways or buses. In some agglomerations this kind of cooperation works well. In others it fails because every single suburban commune may exercise a kind of a veto on most issues. Central cities, after years of unsuccessful negotiations, have grown tired of suggesting large-scale solutions for town planning and the decentralisation of services and other facilities, and have become inactive.

The balance between the quality of life in cities and suburbs has been disturbed. Central cities are worried about the concentration of pollution and noise, and about the runaway cost of public services such as theaters and schools, which are supported by city tax payers alone even though the whole region uses them. Through social migration and segmentation the poor concentrate in the cities, whereas rich taxpayers - including firms -move out to suburban residential areas.

In the last 20 years the idea that wealthy cities are the motors of their surrounding urban areas has changed considerably. Scholars differ in their assessments of whether or not central cities overall are loosing out economically to suburban communes. There is evidence, however, that in today's urbanisation process Swiss cities are living through a difficult period. They are hampered in their development and are running out of planning options that do not extend into surrounding communes. They risk being overrun by barely controllable commuter traffic, and are becoming increasingly indebted, despite levying higher tax rates than apply in suburbia. No wonder political tensions between central cities and the surrounding communes are growing. We see a revival of historical conflicts between the urban and the rural. As in other countries, this may indicate the development of deeper divisions. Rural and urban societies seem to be faced with different problems. They develop different preferences in lifestyles and politics. Contrary to historical tradition, cities seem to be on the losing side.

Should there be a kind of a metropolitan authority for all shared services and public goods in urban areas? There is a strong theoretical argument for it in the idea that electoral and fiscal responsibility for a public good should coincide with those who benefit from it. Yet metropolitan-area governments who decide on all public goods, from transport systems and area planning to health services, are rare in Europe. Instead of one political authority we find a multitude of special agencies, each dealing with one particular metropolitan service. In Switzerland the idea of a political statute for agglomerations runs counter to the tradition of local autonomy. One could argue that the country does not need a fourth tier in a federal system that is already too complex. But the problem remains. European urbanisation is transgressing national boundaries and pushing for larger dimensions. These pressures will probably help the Swiss to find their own solution. Such institution-building could follow two courses. Either the cantons and communes will see a revitalisation of historical districts,35 with the advantage that the old geographical patterns of common political culture will be able to be utilised. Or consolidation of urban government will be achieved by the statutory creation of a special region. Urban regions can be designed to cover effectively the common geographic range of public goods. Yet people may consider them artificial because their boundaries do not represent patterns of common political culture or reflect a sense of political community. If both ways are unsatisfactory, a third option was recently proposed for the agglomeration of Bern. It consists of a flexible organisation in which just those communes cooperate who are willing to share part of their facilities and public services. Prices for common public services are higher for non-members than for members. Thus the organisation helps to keep eventual benefits of cooperation among members and creates incentives for initial non-members to become members.

2.53 Intel-nationalisation and Decentralisation - Can they Go Together?

Swiss banks, Nestle, and the chemical and pharmaceutical products of Ciba-Geigy or Sandoz are known on all continents. Political neutrality and stability have attracted investors and finance capital. With a domestic market too small for mass-production, Swiss industries rely on producing highly specialised goods and participate in the international division of labour. Switzerland's export and import rates are higher than those of most other industrial nations. The Swiss economy is highly dependent on European and world markets.

Political Switzerland, on the other hand, is a very discrete actor on the international stage. Although willing to take part in international cooperation on economic matters, it refuses to participate in international organisations with a political mandate. Though a member of UNESCO and other sub-organisations of the UN, in 1986 Switzerland rejected the idea of becoming a full member and taking a seat in the UN Assembly in New York. The idea of neutrality, the advantageous experience of non-engagement during the twentieth century, and the common sense of the small which leads them not to speak out too loudly in the presence of the great have made the Swiss somewhat distrustful of international politics. Perhaps, they have been spoiled by enjoying economic advantages without international political responsibilities. In fact political neutrality has been used to facilitate financial transactions and commerce with every regime and in every field -- with no political restrictions and with little regard to the political consequences. If criticism of this kind of liberalism was for a long time the preserve of such domestic groups as ecologists, Third-World or human rights organisations, it has begun to attract the attention of foreign observers. An example is the speech made by Al Gore, now vice-president of the US and a former member of the influential US Senate Armed Services Committee, on the role of certain countries in helping the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in his belligerent policy (Box 2.5).

While Al Gore may not have known that the Swiss government had forbidden all arms exports to Iraq and Iran years ago, the statement may be representative of a declining Swiss image abroad. As a result, concerned politicians and economists have come to believe that the time of Switzerland's splendid isolation (or the separation of political responsibility and economic activity) will soon be over. To a certain extent it is already vanishing. In 1992 Switzerland became a member of the International Monetary Fund and was given a seat on the executive board of the World Bank. As a member of the European Free Trade Association, Switzerland has participated in the negotiations for an enlarged single market with the European Community in the shape of the EEA (European Economic Area). The Swiss people, however, rejected joining the treaty in a popular vote in December 1992 (see Chapter 4.4)

For the moment, therefore, we cannot say whether the Swiss will follow their government's steps towards European integration and further political internationalisation. Among other reasons for this uncertainty, the political inclination of the Swiss for the past two decades has gone very much in the other direction: towards regionalism and decentralisation. Local opposition to large-scale infrastructural projects, such as federal highways or nuclear power plants, was new in the 1970s but has now become routine for grassroots movements. Movements in urban neighbourhoods called for more participation in self-administration of public services. The cry for decentralisation was not limited however, to marginal and protest movements. Mainstream politics likewise favoured policies of moving away from central government, toward decentralised social services for instance, or of the endogenous development of mountain regions. Along with a revival of parochial cultures, German cantons have experienced a renaissance of dialects that are barely understood by Swiss French- or Italian-speakers. The Green Party and other movements advocating post-industrial values had much success with their slogan 'small is beautiful'. It also meant 'small government', which is directly in the tradition of Switzerland's political culture.

On the other hand the Swiss have become more aware that not all problems can be resolved by 'small government'. Even if Switzerland, for the moment, is not a member of the European Economic Area it cannot escape the tendencies of market liberalisation initiated by the European Community or GATT and must therefore adjust its own rules of trade. The Swis's, who are proud of the success of their national environment policy, are beginning to realise that acid rain is not bound by local or national borders, and that most ecological problems have international, even worldwide dimensions.

The Swiss are discovering that domestic policy and foreign affairs are more and more interdependent. In the late 1980s European authorities urged Switzerland to allow more heavy trucks to cross the Alps. This was refused as Switzerland prefers to encourage rail transportation, and for good reasons: long-distance railroad traffic is ecologically superior to the pollution that comes from increased numbers of lorries, and it is economically cheaper in the long run - not only for Switzerland but for large parts of Europe. But Switzerland had to realise that putting an 'Alps closed' sign by the roadside would not solve the problem. In tough negotiations Switzerland agreed to extend its rail-transit facilities and to shoulder its share of the growing burden of freight traffic between southern and northern Europe. Moreover, whilst trying to convince other European nations that rail is a superior solution to many traffic problems, Switzerland began to realise that participating in supranational organisations is probably better than standing alone.

Whereas the nation state is too large for many problems, it is too small for others. Thus even the strongest advocates of decentralised autonomy must one day admit that more international cooperation and participation is needed. This realisation will not be a new experience for the Swiss. Trading cantonal autonomy for national codecision is exactly what they did in 1848. Yet today, when faced with the question of whether or not to become a member of the European Community, the Swiss are hesitant about trading national autonomy for supranational codecision.

Behind the fear of losing the advantages of smallness and giving up part of national autonomy there is a deeper reason. The creation of a European Community of nation states had many things in common with the creation of Switzerland through its cantons in 1848. In both cases the members had to relinquish some of their sovereignty. In both cases creating a larger economic market was an important objective. The Swiss federation, like the European Community, protects minorities and the autonomy of its members by the institutional mechanisms of federalism. In one respect, the veto powers of the small countries of the EC go even further than those of Switzerland in 1848: in most institutions of the EC -- the European Council, the European Commission, and even the European Parliament -- small countries are overrepresented in comparison with their population size. Denmark for instance, which represents less than 2 per cent of Europe's 300-million population, has up to 6 per cent of the seats in the European institutions. Table 2.6 illustrates the advantage of overrepresenta-tion given to a small country in the European Community.

There is a saying that the European Council would not dare to overrule a small nation like Luxembourg. The European Community is thoroughly federalist. From this point of view the Swiss could not be happier to join.

There is a fundamental difference, however. Swiss and US federalism means that power is delegated to a central authority while respecting two principles of representation: federalism and democracy. The European Community, on the other hand, has rules of federalism, but lacks democratic representation and legitimation. Its parliament is merely a consultative body that has little or no decision-making power. The European Council, composed of prime ministers, ministers or presidents of the member states, can claim some democratic legitimacy. The institution that does take Community decisions is the European Commission, whose members are appointed by their respective national governments. The EC also lacks the constitutional separation of power of its constituent member states. There is a bias towards executive power and bureaucratic politics.

The EC is aware of its lack of democratic representation and legitimation and proposals have been made to strengthen the influence of, and transfer power to, the European Parliament. Maurice Duverger, one of the most famous scholars of institutional political science and a member of the European parliament, proposes a system of double legitimacy: that the parliament should represent the European people and the European Council should represent countries.37 Achieving this would mean combining federalism and democracy on a supranational level. It could be a step towards a democratic European federation.

Notes

1. Edgar Bonjour, Die Gründung des schweizerischen Bundesstaates (Basel: Schwabe & Co., 1948), Kapitel vü: Das Zustandekommen der Bundesverfas-sung.

2. See: Alfred Kolz, Neuere schweizerische Verfassungsgeschichte (Bern: Stampfli; 1992) pp. 301-540.

3. For institutional development and dimensions, see Jean Francis Aubert, Traite du droit constitutionnel suisse, Troisieme partie: La structure federate (Neuchatel: Ides et Calendes, 1967), pp. 510-894.

4. For the different aspects of political federalism in Switzerland, see Handbuch Politisches System der Schweiz, vol. III: Föderalismus (Bern; Haupt, 1986). For relations between the federation and the cantons regarding constitutional law, see Peter Saladin, 'Bund und Kantone. Autonomic und Zusammen-wirken im schweizerischen Bundesstaat', Zeitschrift fur Schweizerisches Recht, NF. 103, ü (1984) pp. 431 ff.

5. For a comparative law inquiry into the direct relationships between the federal and local levels of government in the Federal Republic of Germany, the USA and Switzerland, see Daniel Thurer, Bund und Gemeinden (Berlin: Springer, 1986).

6. See Arnold Niederer, Gemeinwerk im Waltis (Basel: Krebs, 1965).

7. Hans Geser, Peter Farago, Robert Fluder and Ernst Graub: Gemeindepolitik zwischen Milizorganisation und Berufsverwaltung (Bern: Haupt, 1987).

8. Raimund Germann Ausserparlamentarische Kommissionen, Die Milizver-waltung des Bundes (Bern: Haupt, 1981).

9. For further details see Wolf Linder, Politische Entscheidung und Gesetzesvollzug in der Schweiz (Bern: Haupt, 1987), pp. 29-91; Christine Mironesco, Turhan Boysan and loannis Papadopoulos, Debat sur l'energie en Suisse. Les processus legislatifs federaux de 1973 a 1983 (Lausanne; Presses polytechniques romandes, 1986); Annee politique suisse 1973-1992 (Bern: Forschungszentrum für Schweizerische Politik).

10. Article 34 quinquies (family protection) was added to the federal constitution on 25 November 1945.

11. Annee politique suisse 1988 (Bern: Forschungszentrum fur Schweizerische Politik, 1989), p. 132.

12. The use of the term 'region' is ambiguous in Switzerland. It can designate (a) the geographical boundaries of the four languages, or other geographical subdivisions of the country with a number of common characteristics (mountain, urban, rural, suburban regions); (b) the geographic boundaries of several communes, belonging sometimes to different cantons, defined for the purpose of a specific federal policy programme, as in the case of the development of the mountain regions; (c) administrative organisations, formed by several communes, for regional land-use planning and economic development. None of these regions are political organisations representing a 'fourth tier' in the federal system. In cases (b) and (c) we could speak of administrative organisations that are confined to one specific function.

13. Barbara Stuckey and Ernst A. Brugger (eds), Endogenous Development. Arbeitsberichte Nationales Forschungsprogramm Regionalprobleme (Bern: Programmleitung NFP 'Regionalprobleme', 1985).

14. Michel Bassand and Francois Hainard, Dynamique socio-culturelle region-ale, PNR, vol. 35.5, Synthese des problemes regionaux (Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques Romandes, 1985).

15. See Gaston Gaudard, 'L'interd6pendence et les disparity 6conomiques entre les cantons', and Ernst A. Brugger, 'Foderalismus als Ziel und Voraussetzung fur die Regionalpolitik, both in Handbuch Politisches System Schweiz, vol. III (Bern: Haupt, 1986), pp. 267ff, 299ff.

16. See Michel Bassand et al., Les Suisses entre la mobilite et la sedentarite (Lausanne: Presses polytechniques romandes, 1985); Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach et al., Soziale Strukturen und rdumliches Bewusstsein (Bern: Haupt, 1985).

17. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970).

18. For more details of historical events see Jean-Franfois Aubert, Expose des institutions politiques de la Suisse a partir de quelques affaires controversies (Lausanne: Payot, 1983); J.R.G. Jenkins, Jura Separatism in Switzerland (Oxford University Press, 1987).

19. Jean-Daniel Delley et al. Le droit en action, Etude de mise en oeuvre de la loi Furgler (St Saphorin: Editions Georgi, 1982).

20. Michel Bassand, Gerard Chevalier and Erwin Zimmermann, Politique et logement (Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques Romandes, 1984).

21. Wolf Linder, Politische Entscheidung und Gesetzesvollzug in der Schweiz (Bern: Haupt, 1987), pp. 224-7.

22. For the early politics of Swiss women's organisations, see Beatrix Mesmer, Ausgeklammert, Eingeklammert. Frauen und Frauenorganisationen der Schweiz des 19. Jahrhunderts (Basel and Frankfurt: Helbling und Lichten-hahn 1988).

23. The first comprehensive sociological report on the position of women in Swiss society dates from 1974 (Thomas Held and Rend Levy, Die Stellung der Frau in Familie und Gesellschaft (Frauenfeld: Huber, 1974).

24. Iris von Roten, Frauen im Laufgitter (Zurich and Dortmund: Efef, 1991 (1958); for the response to the book see the politically illustrative biography of Iris von Roten: Yvonne-D. Kochli, Eine Frau kommt zu früh (Zurich: ABC, 1992).

25. Today the situation of Swiss women is still somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, women's representation in national, cantonal and local parliament is higher than in most other European countries. On the other hand, Swiss women still lack the legal protection against discrimination that is afforded to women in EC-countries. See Eidgenossische Kommission fur Frauenfragen, Berichte: Die Stellung der Frau in der Schweiz / Gleiche Rechte fur Mann und Frau / Die politische Reprasentation der Frauen in der Schweiz (Bern: Eidg. Kommission für Frauenfragen, 1980-1990). On of equal pay; see Wolf Linder, Untersuchungen zum Lohngleichheitsgrundsatz nach Art. 4 Abs. 2 der Verfassung. Teil 1: Analyse und Vergleich auslandischer Implementation-serfahrungen zur Lohnungleichheit von Mann and Frau. Teil 2: Die Wirksamkeit einzelner Instrumente und Moglichkeiten zur Ubertragung auf die Schweiz (Bern: Eidgenossisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement, 1987/1988).

26. This interpretation is not at odds with Lee Ann Banaszak, 'The Influence of the Initiative on the Swiss and American Women's Suffrage Movements', Schweizerisches Jahrbuch fur Politische Wissenschaft, No. 31 (Bern: Haupt, 1991), pp. 187-207. She compares not only the influence of the initiative but also the 'various dimensions of the political opportunity structure' and finds that the Swiss women's suffrage movement lacked the support of other movements and parties. The reason for this was weak, and in many cantons nonexistent, party competition.

27. The cantons of Appenzell Ausserrhoden and Innerhoden, Nidwalden and Obwalden as well as Glarus still hold an annual assembly of all citizens, the Landsgemeinde, where the election of authorities and ballots on some important issues take place. See Silvano Mockli and Peter Stahlberger, 'Die schweizerischen Landsgemeinde-Demokratien', Stoat und Politik, no. 34 (Bern: Haupt 1987). pp. 237-260.

28. Decision of the Federal Court no. lb/294/1990 of 27 November 1990.

29. Walter Kalin, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Demokratie (Bern: Stampfli,

1987), pp. 187-200. For a comparison of the tradition of the US Federal Court, see Archibald Cox, 'Federalism and Individual Rights under the Burger Court', Northwestern University Law Review 93,1978, pp. Iff.

30. The following paragraphs are based on Raimund Germann, 'Die Europatauglichkeit der direktdemokratischen Institutionen in der Schweiz', Schweizerisches Jahrbuch fur politische Wissenschaft, no. 31: Direkte Demokratie (Bern: Haupt, 1991) pp 257ff.

31. Bundesamt fur Statistik, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1980 (Basel: Birkhauser Verlag, 1980) and Bundesamt far Statistik, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1990 (Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1991).

32. Raimund Germann, 'Die Europatauglichkeit der direktdemokratischen Institutionen in der Schweiz', Jahrbuch fur Politische Wissenschaft, no. 31 (Bern: Haupt, 1991), p. 266.

33. Among others, Germann (op. cit. p. 269) predicted a 'blocking federalist majority' of 33 per cent of the votes, and a majority of the cantons for the EEA treaty only if 57 per cent of the people voted for it.

34. Schweizerische Studiengesellschaft für Raumordnung und Regionalpolitik (ROREP), Agglomerationsprobleme in der Schweiz (Bern: Peter Lang,

1988).

35. Districts (German, Bezirke-, French, districts) are subdivisions of cantons, comprising a number of communes. Originally the districts were created to decentralise cantonal power and cantonal authorities, an idea that was mostly substituted by direct delegation of cantonal tasks to the communes. Today the responsibilities of districts are limited to judicial organisation and some police tasks. Furthermore they serve as constituencies for the election of the members of cantonal parliaments.

36. Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe 'Zusammenarbeit in den Agglomerationen' (Bern: Forschungszentrum fur schweizerische Politik, 1992).

37. Maurice Duverger, Le lievre liberal et la tortue europeenne (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1990).