3 Direct Democracy and Power-Sharing

3.1 INTRODUCTION: THE VOTE TO ABOLISH THE SWISS ARMY

On 27 November, 1989 the New York Times reported the following news from Switzerland:

Swiss Reject Plan to Scrap Army

Geneva. Switzerland today voted to keep its army as the best way of maintaining its neutrality. An initiative to abolish the army was turned down by a margin of almost two to one. "A majority of the states rejected it", a Government spokesman said. Only in Geneva and Jura did the majority vote in favour of the proposal. The initiative, forced by a petition signed by 111 300 citizens, set off a fierce national debate on the usefulness of an army in a small neutral country.

Readers of the New York Times may well have been stunned:

In this chapter I shall try to answer some of these questions.

3.2 INSTITUTIONS AND THE HISTORICAL MEANING OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY

3.2.1 Obligatory and Optional Referenda

'Referendum' in this context concerns a popular vote on parliamentary decisions, with the citizens having the last word: they decide whether a parliamentary proposal becomes law or is rejected. In Switzerland there are two types of referendum. First, all proposals for constitutional amendments and important international treaties are subject to an obligatory referendum. This requires a double majority of the Swiss people and the cantons, thus offering a kind of federal participation (see Chapter 2). The obligatory referendum is relatively frequent. Since Article 3 of the constitution leaves all powers to the cantons unless specifically delegated to the Federation, the authorities have to propose an amendment for every major new responsibility undertaken by the federation. Second, most parliamentary acts and regulations are subject to an optional referendum. In such cases a parliamentary decision becomes law unless 50,000 citizens, within 90 days, demand the holding of a popular vote. If enough signatures are collected within the stipulated period a popular vote must be held, and a simple majority of the people decides whether the bill is approved or rejected, the wishes of the cantons being irrelevant. Since the obligatory referendum refers to constitutional amendments and the optional referendum to ordinary legislation, the two instruments are often distinguished as the 'constitutional' referendum and the 'legislative' referendum.1

At cantonal and local levels referenda occasionally go further. Some cantons hold an obligatory referendum for most laws and important acts, and referenda may be held for some financial decisions about investments for large-scale government projects. Semi-direct democracy is, on the whole, more widely used in the Swiss-German cantons and communes.2 In the French- and Italian-speaking parts of Switzerland the opportunities for popular referenda are more restricted, especially at the local level.3

Table 3.1 Types of referendum and popular initiative (federal level)

3.2.2 The Popular Initiative

100,000 citizens can, by signing a formal proposition, demand a constitutional amendment as well as propose the alteration or removal of an existing provision. The proposition can be expressed in a precise amendment, or in general terms upon which the Federal Assembly can make a formal proposition. After deposition the initiative is discussed by the Federal Council and parliament, which then adopt formal positions on the proposed changes. This can involve drawing up an alternative proposition or, if the popular initiative is couched in general terms, formulating precise propositions. Initiatives and their eventual counterpropositions are then presented simultaneously to the popular vote. As with all constitutional changes, acceptance requires majorities of both the individual voters and the cantons.

Whereas at the federal level the popular initiative is restricted to constitutional matters, it can be used to propose ordinary laws and acts at the cantonal or local level. The process leading to such popular votes, for instance the number of signatures required and the time allowed for their collection, varies markedly from canton to canton. Not only the absolute number of signatures, but also the percentage of required signatures in relation to the number of voters varies among the cantons. One would imagine that the height of this hurdle would influence the use of the referendum and the popular initiative, which varies also from canton to canton. However this is not the case. There is no statistical evidence to suggest that in cantons with high hurdles referenda or initiatives are used less than in cantons with low hurdles.4

3.2.3 Direct and Semi-direct Democracy: Historical Meanings and their Development

Swiss popular rights have resulted from cultural patterns and history, political struggles and coincidences. There are some myths about direct democracy. Its protagonists in the nineteenth century claimed that it was a revival of old democratic freedoms. In reality the Swiss confederation in medieval times had its landlords and familial oligarchies just as their neighbours had their nobility. The French Revolution ended the ancien regime and the privileges of old cantons over subject regions in Switzerland. Democracy was imposed by Napoleon, not invented in old Switzerland. Alfred Kölz, in his book on the history of the Swiss constitution, proves that Swiss institutions were directly influenced by theorists of the French Revolution, but official history in the nineteenth century declared them to be of Swiss origin.5 Nonetheless the idea of direct participation and collective decision-making has deep cultural roots in Swiss history, as Jürg Steiner argues:

In medieval times, the pastures high in the mountains were communal property; thus, decisions about these pastures were made communally. All cow owners assembled under the open sky and decided, for example, on what day the cows should be brought down to the valley in order not to be trapped by the first snow. When modern Switzerland was established with the constitution of 1848, its founders drew on these ancient traditions.6
When in 1831 the progressive cantons began to reestablish democracy, it was under the slogan 'sovereignty of the people', and the constitutional framework provided for the division of power and the free election of representatives. But the representative system was not only seen as strange by Swiss democrats, it also reminded them too much of the old regime and its power elites. Thus democratic forces called for full democracy, lawmaking by the people and self-government. Whereas the holding of referenda would give the people direct control of parliament by ensuring they would have the last word on its decisions, the initiative would bring in the citizens' own ideas on lawmaking. The democratic forces were successful. The referendum and the initiative were introduced first in the cantons, and later in the federation, whose original 1848 constitution more resembled a parliamentary democracy. When the legislative referendum and the initiative for partial revision of the constitution were introduced at the federal level in 1874 and 1891, there was a second motive behind the calls for direct democracy: to prevent political and economic power being concentrated in the same hands. Karl Buerkli, a fervent democrat and union leader, wrote in 1869:
Our law-makers, elected by the people, are incapable of making good laws for the working class, even if they make excellent laws for the bourgeois class. Why? Because the representative bodies, in their majority, consists of capitalists and their servants who are hostile to social progress. As slave-holders are incapable of making laws in the interests of slaves, capitalist-representatives are incapable of making laws in the interest of the workers. Representative democracy is not the form of government able to improve the living conditions of the working class and to resolve social problems.7
But unlike Karl Marx, who 20 years previously had demanded a revolutionary class-struggle against the 'bourgeois' and their state, Buerkli put all his hopes in direct-democracy as 'law-making by the people'. If direct democracy is realised, he wrote, 'the people will find the right way to social freedom, because they feel themselves its daily sorrows and the need for change'.

From the very beginning this expansion of the people's right not only to elect its authorities but also to vote on certain issues led to another understanding of democracy. The model of representative democracy - as realised in the USA at that time - promotes the idea of an elected government and parliament who decide for the people. They are entitled to do so because they represent the people or its majority. Moreover the division of power provides mutual checks and balances. Regular elections lead to personnel changes in the presidency and in the composition of congress, and occasionally allow popular endorsement of the authorities' policies.

In Switzerland this idea was conceived as 'government of the people, for the people'. Democrats in the Swiss cantons wanted more, in other words 'government through the people'. They insisted on direct control of parliamentary decisions through referenda, and active participation of the people in lawmaking through the initiative.

The Swiss were aware that government through the people was not possible for every decision. However they wanted the people to participate in the most important ones. Democrats demanded both that the people should not be excluded from participation in the most important decisions, and that there should be agreement between the authorities and the people on all important issues. The constitutional system can be seen as a concept involving three types of procedure (see also Table 3.2):

These three classes of issues are linked to different legal forms, deliberating authorities and forms of popular participation. Since there are decisions in which the people do not participate, this system is often called 'half, or semi-direct democracy'.8 Put simply, the formula can be defined as follows: the most important issues go to the people, important issues go to parliament, and issues of less importance go to the government. The underlying logic of semi-direct democracy is obvious. In the ideology of 'sovereignty of the people', the people's own decisions are seen as the 'purest' form of democracy. 'Authentic' decisions by the people enjoy the highest legitimacy, whereas parliament and the government represent a kind of indirect democracy. Therefore their decisions are of second or third level legitimacy.

In the last hundred years much of the great enthusiasm for direct democracy has disappeared. Meanwhile many of the hopes put on the effects of 'people's lawmaking', as expressed by Buerkli in 1869, have been dashed by the experiences of semi-direct democracy. On the other hand popular rights have indeed become popular: in public opinion the initiative and the referendum are considered the most precious elements of Swiss democracy, even by those who may not take advantage of them.9 Esteem for the culture of semi-direct democracy seems to be so high that criticism of its actual functioning is not always well received. I prefer, however, to give a sober account of direct democracy, based on scholarly findings, and to give the reader a fair assessment of its strengths and weaknesses.

3.3 PARTICIPATION IN DIRECT DEMOCRACY

3.3.1 The Deciding Majority, or Who Are The People?

On the evening after a popular vote, the news readers on television and radio often say: 'The Sovereign of Switzerland has accepted (or rejected) the following propositions ...' The allusion to the 'Sovereign' is an old expression for the highest democratic organ or authority, but who or what is that? The expression 'direct democracy' implies that it is the people, or at least '51 per cent of them. We shall see that, in practice, it is far from this.

First, the number of people who are qualified to vote in Switzerland is about only 60 per cent of the total population. Those under the age of 18 and foreign residents, who make up about 16 per cent of the population, are not allowed to vote. Then again not all those who do qualify take part in a vote -- participation averages about 40 per cent. If voters are split roughly 50:50, the deciding majority may be very small. Using the above figures, 100 per cent x 0.6 x 0.4 x 0.5 = 12 per cent of the entire population. Figure 3.1 shows the deciding majority in federal votations as a percentage of the total Swiss population since 1945.

Decisions in direct democracy rarely represent the majority of the people but rather the preference of a fairly small part of the population. Second, the size of the deciding majority fluctuates depending on the participation rate and on whether the results are close or not. Third, if a deciding majority of between 12 and 18 per cent of the population over the last 20 years seems to be low, it was considerably lower before 1971. During the long decades of male-only democracy, before women's suffrage was introduced, the deciding majority of the 'Sovereign' was as low as 5-14 per cent.

The point of this demonstration is not to denounce direct democracy, but to prevent certain illusions or misunderstandings. The first is that direct democracy does not rely on the will of the whole people but on the expressed preferences of a minority. A representative survey of, say 2,000 persons, could give a different result of a vote, or even establish more accurately empirical preferences for a bill. But for the authorities who are interested in these preferences, the survey would not be of much value when it came to legitimation of the decision. Thus, democratic legitimation is produced more by the process of participation; and the expression of will of those who vote is more important than the true preferences of all individuals.

Certainly there is a strong belief that even a small deciding majority truly represents the majority will of the people, but this presumption is also true for a parliamentary majority. Thus the legitimating effect may lie in the fact that all citizens are offered the chance to participate, and in that those who do so put time and effort into making up their minds and casting their votes. Furthermore a popular vote is sometimes accompanied by intensive campaigns for and against the proposal, including conflicting public meetings, party recommendations, lobbies slogans and extensive coverage in newspapers and other media. This process of public deliberation and decision-making may lead to changes in public opinion and individual preferences. Thus the whole procedure creates legitimacy -- which is the belief that a decision is just and acceptable to everybody.

From a normative point of view one could still argue about two imperfections of direct democracy. First, what about the foreigners living in Switzerland who, despite paying taxes, are excluded from participation? Indeed, while a large part of the Swiss citizens would not be willing to change this rule, others call it an imperfect state of democracy. This reminds us that the concept of democracy continues to change. The entitlement to vote has changed over time: once it was restricted to adult married men with some degree of wealth. This restriction was later abolished. While Switzerland may have been late in granting political rights to women, there is one canton that introduced political rights for foreigners as long ago as the nineteenth century: in the communes of the canton of Neu-chatel, foreigners have participated in elections and votations since 1850.10 At the moment several popular initiatives in other cantons are calling for political rights to be given to foreigners after a given period of residence. Second, does low participation not discredit direct democracy despite its procedural values? Should not a turnout of, say, 40 or 50 per cent be required, the result being invalidated if participation falls below that level -an idea that is applied in Italy for example? In order to answer this question, let us have a closer look at popular participation.

3.3.2 Regular Voters, Occasional Participants and Abstentionists

Since 1977 there have been regular surveys on federal votations. The VOX analyses, a cooperation between one survey and three university institutes allows us to draw a precise picture of the voting behaviour of Swiss citizens.11 As shown in Figure 3.2, the level of participation in federal votations varies above and below an average of 40 per cent, depending on the attractiveness of the issue to be voted on. Controversial subjects of great importance to everybody attract the most voters, as do popular initiatives, such as those to abolish the army, limit the number of foreign residents, or amend the constitution in order to join the UN.

Swiss voters fall into three groups which differ in behaviour and motive.

The criticism is often made that the low level of participation, which occasionally can go down to 15 per cent in some cantons, discredits direct democracy. However proposals to introduce a minimum participation rate have been widely rejected by politicians and the public. Indeed such a measure would probably be more likely to punish and disappoint active voters than incite the inactive majority to take part in the vote. If political freedoms include the freedom to leave politics to others, low participation may not, a priori, be a bad thing. We also have to recognise that participation in direct democracy is very demanding. Voters in Swiss democracy are supposed to vote on issues that are sometimes very complicated. To read the official documentation on four or five proposals can take several hours. Every year there are about eight federal issues at stake. Together with votations on cantonal and local affairs, a voter is supposed to give his or her preference on up to 20 or 30 issues a year. In none of these can the voter expect to have more than an infinitesimal chance of being the one who makes the outcome decisive. Rational choice -- in terms of individual advantages -- would indicate that they should stay at home. So if many deplore the low participation rates, it could be argued that a turnout of 30 or 40 per cent is surprisingly high. Thus there is no satisfactory criteria to judge whether 40 per cent participation is low or high. And we cannot say whether this participation rate is a bad or good sign for sound democracy and a mature civic culture.

There is even a tradition of scholars interpreting low participation rates as a positive sign,12 starting from the observation that high participation correlates with a high level of societal conflict. So one could argue that low participation indicates a society that has successfully reduced social cleavages and managed to satisfy most voter groups. However there are other reasons for worrying about low participation. First, abstention cannot generally be interpreted as satisfaction. As mentioned above, many of the abstainers are disappointed or feel unable to participate. Direct democracy therefore does not provide guarantees against political frustration or alienation. More importantly, international research into participation reveals two common findings:

In Switzerland both factors come together. Its direct democracy is demanding, and participation rates fluctuate fairly widely. So, especially when participation is low, the choir of Swiss direct democracy sings in upper or middle-class tones.13 VOX analyses reveal that in such cases workers and lower-grade employees participate less than high-grade employees or independent professionals by a factor of up to 3. As in other countries, educated middle-aged males with higher incomes are more likely to vote than their working-class counterparts (Table 3.3). The most important restriction on the democratic norm of equal and general participation therefore lies in the unequal representation of the social classes. And it is increasing inequality of representation that makes low overall participation problematic.

3.4 A CLOSER LOOK AT THE REFERENDUM AND THE INITIATIVE

3.4.1 The Issues

Here we must remember the call of democratic forces for 'sovereignty of the people' when fighting for popular rights. They believed that no decision of great importance should be excluded from the influence of the people. This historical expectation was probably too optimistic. But when looking at the list of federal votations in Table 3.4 we can say that there is practically no kind of issue that is not subject to referendum or initiative.

3.4.2 Direct Democracy's Role in Political Agenda-Setting

Table 3.4 shows a wide variety of issues that have been put to popular vote, ranging from minor bread subsidies to the abolition of the army. We could certainly ask whether these should both be removed from a future list of votations -- the first because it is of too little importance to rate a popular vote and the second because it is of too great importance. Yet this possibility would not be in accord with Swiss thinking. First, it is left to the people, political parties and other organisations to decide what they consider to be a case worth putting to referendum or a popular initiative. Politicians complain about the overloading of direct democracy with minor issues, but they would not overtly deny the right of any group to place a 'bothersome' problem on the agenda if it successfully attracts the required number of signatures.

As regards popular initiatives, there is first a formal control by the Federal Chancellery and then by the Federal Council over whether or not the proposal is compatible with constitutional law. With the proposed abolition of the army, for example, some department officials claimed that the proposal was unconstitutional because it would make impossible the fundamental task of the Swiss federation to defend its independence and neutrality in times of war. The Federal Council, however, did not find it politically wise to follow this advice and preferred a democratic vote to be held on the issue -- they were convinced that the people would vote the 'right' way.

A role of the Federal Assembly is to ensure that popular initiatives are in accordance with the principle of 'unity of matter'. This means that a popular initiative has to refrain from combining different questions in one proposal, so citizens can express their preference on a single issue at a time. If an initiative should contain more than one issue it has to be split up into separate initiatives that are voted upon individually. On the other hand the Federal Assembly is reluctant to exclude an initiative on the ground that it concerns questions that do not belong in the constitutional domain.15 In Switzerland the constitution is much less an historical document to preserve the spirit of the founding generation than an open book to which every generation of people and parliament are authorised to propose amendments. This has had two effects. First, the Swiss constitution has become a rather unsystematic charter, a collection of important principles as well as of rather unimportant regulations. Second, the Swiss have become free to choose any political issue as the subject of a popular initiative.

The fact that any question can be made into a political issue is an important feature of direct democracy. The openness of the political agenda is an unresolved problem in theories of representative democracy because, by tacit arrangement, ruling political Elites can agree to circumvent questions that would impair their reelection. Some scholars go as far as to say that the 'politics of non-issues' -- that is, withholding 'bothersome' questions from the agenda -- represents the core of a hidden power game. It limits democratic discussion to questions of conformity and suppresses issues disliked by the power elites.16 Direct democracy may correct some of these imperfections. In fact, many issues -- the abolition of the army, restrictions on foreigners, laws against advertising alcohol and tobacco and so on -- were brought forward by means of popular initiatives and against the firm convictions of almost all of the political elites. Thus government and parliament do not have complete control of political agenda-setting, and direct democracy enables decisions to be taken on questions which the political elite would prefer to remain 'non-issues'.

3.4.3 The Use of Referenda and Initiatives

Despite the frequent use of referenda and initiatives, lawmaking remains primarily in the hands of the Federal Assembly. Table 3.5 shows the number of popular initiatives and referenda.

The first section refers to constitutional amendments proposed by the Federal Assembly. In these 148 cases the referendum was obligatory. The high rate of rejected proposals reflects the rather sceptical attitude of the Swiss people towards giving the federal government new responsibilities.

The popular initiative is widely used, but it does not always lead to a votation. In one quarter of the 183 cases the initiative proposal was withdrawn, sometimes after successful negotiations with the authorities. At 10 per cent, the success rate of popular initiatives in votations is rather low. Counter proposals by the Federal Assembly, mostly voted upon in direct confrontation with the initiative, have had a considerably higher success rate of about one third.

The optional referendum is an instrument challenging the 'ordinary' legislative activity of the Federal Assembly. However groups contesting a bill may fail to collect the required number of signatures within the 90-day limit. From the statistics above, we see that only about 7 per cent of all bills passed by the Assembly are challenged by a referendum. If, however, the referendum threat turns into a real challenge, opponents of the bill have an almost 60 per cent chance of success.

From these quantitative observations we can draw some preliminary conclusions. Constitutional policies of the Federal Assembly, which is mainly concerned with providing legal bases for new federal responsibilities, suffer frequent defeats, being rejected once in every three votations. On the other hand groups of citizens who wish to promote new federal activities by means of the popular initiative have even less chance. Their success rate is a mere 10 per cent. From a first glance at statistics on ordinary legislation we might think that the optional referendum is of comparatively low effect. In fact the reverse is true for two reasons. First, the 7 per cent of referenda cases typically represent important bills of a controversial nature and, if there is a vote, the chances of the opponents of the bill are high. Therefore the risk of the referendum is seen as high by federal authorities. Second, and as we shall discuss later, the perceived omnipresent risk of a referendum being called leads the federal authorities to avoid the referendum trap by two means. An intensive preparliamentary consultation phase is undertaken to ascertain the degree of opposition by interest groups, and the legislative bill itself is considerably transformed by a compromise backed by a large coalition of interest groups and parties.

3.4.4 'Braking' Referenda and 'Innovating' Initiatives -- Two Different Devices of Direct Democracy

Our previous discussion shows that both initiatives and referenda in some ways 'correct' the policies of the government and parliament. Yet for the rest the two instruments of direct democracy have fundamentally different functions. The referendum, particularly the optional form, allows people to raise objections to proposals by the authorities. The popular initiative, however, is conceived as an active way of shaping constitutional legislation - in most cases against the explicit will of the government or parliament. From a citizen's point of view we could argue that the referendum has a 'braking' effect and the initiative an innovative one. Let us take a closer look at the distinction.

3.4.4.1 The braking effect of the referendum

Democrats -- the faction of the radicals that fought for the introduction of the referendum in the nineteenth century -- considered themselves 'progressive', and they saw the referendum as a tool to promote progressive politics with the help of the people. Yet things turned out differently. From the very start, in 1874, when the referendum was introduced, if was used by the Catholic conservative opposition to their own advantage and the projects of the radical liberal majority were shot down as if with a machine gun.17

The democratic forces had to learn a lesson important to many institution-builders: the consequences of institutional rearrangements are very hard to foresee. Decision-making devices are tools which can be used by other actors and for purposes other than these envisaged by their protagonists. In many cases only history can reveal the effects of institutional mechanisms.

If the referendum is used as a plebiscite to give the authorities' policy greater backing and legitimation, the government should have the power to define under what conditions and on which occasions it should be held. This happens to be the case with referenda in France. The president of the French republic organises a plebiscite when, confident that he has the backing of the popular majority on an important issue, the popular vote would help him to continue the general policy of his presidential mandate. Even then this procedure is not without risks, as De Gaulle learned in 1969, when the defeat of his proposal for regionalisation and reform of the senate forced him to resign.18

The Swiss referendum is different. On the constitutional level every decision is subject to the referendum, and for some of them it may be particularly difficult to obtain a majority. New taxes for example, are not very popular in any state. In parliamentary democracies political leaders impose them after elections in the hope that the people will have forgotten such an unpopular decision by the next election. This is not possible in Swiss direct democracy, where the political authorities have to convince the people that higher taxes are necessary. In the optional referendum things are less difficult in that the issue may not be put to a vote, and in any case a double majority of the cantons and the people is not

required. However it is an uncontrollable number of interest groups, of minorities or of ordinary people who decide which laws and on what grounds a referendum should be called. This is effective for two reasons. First, parliament is bound to be cautious in lawmaking because even a relatively small group, dissatisfied with a proposed bill, can challenge it. Second, it seems that negative majorities are easier to build up than coalitions of supportive majorities (Box 3.1).

For these reasons, the referendum favours the status quo. It is considered the favourite device of conservative forces and an advantageous instrument for conservative politics. The conservative bias of the referendum, however, has a systemic nature and can be used against any innovation. On certain occasions, therefore the political left can also profit from it, as in 1970s, when a proposal to strengthen the federal police force failed in the votation; the political left, which was opposed to the proposition, gained much support from conservative voters who favoured strengthening the cantonal police but were opposed to the federal police force. As for optional referenda, there is evidence of more and more challenges by groups who consider themselves progressive, such as the social-democrats, the greens and other environmental groups. It may therefore be misleading to identify the referendum too clearly with particular political persuasions. The referendum appears to be a versatile vessel, comparable to a sailing ship propelled by that wind of popularity, no matter from which direction that wind blows. But there is no doubt about the rock the opposing crews on referenda ships are heading for: the defeat of a bill. And this means the maintenance of the status quo.

These characteristics of the referendum have profoundly changed the Swiss way of political decision-making. When, at the end of the nineteenth century, the radical majority realised it could be overcome by a 'destructive' conservative minority via the referendum, it changed its policy of pure majority rule in government, allocating one of the seven seats of the Federal Council to a Catholic conservative. The majority thus began to seek political compromise with the minority, and this is the integrative course that Swiss decision-making has followed since then. We shall consider this in detail in Section 3.6.

We can conclude, therefore, that the effect of the referendum is not just a 'braking' one, it has also led to a typical pattern of law-making that encourages compromise - solutions that do not threaten the status quo of groups capable of challenging the bill. But compromise also means that clear-cut solutions to issues are an exception. As a result, radical innovations are less likely than incremental changes.

So, if we look at the effects of braking and integrating referenda, the following provide important points of comparison with other countries:

  1. The historically late development of the activities of Swiss central government, especially in economic and social policy. This is because of the fact that proposals for amendments to the constitution suffer so many defeats. Typically, new responsibilities of the federation requiring a constitutional amendment achieve a majority of people and cantons only after several attempts.
  2. The low (30) percentage of total public expenditure accounted for by central government and the small public sector, which accounts for less than 30 per cent of Switzerland's GNP (social security transfers not included);
  3. The unique fact that, of all countries in the world, Switzerland is the only one where central government has never managed to levy an income tax except on a provisional and temporary legal basis;
  4. A small federal bureaucracy, with less than one third of all Swiss state employees working for the federation, especially in its postal and rail services;
  5. Compared with other neutral states, a rather discreet position in international affairs, because the referendum has blocked most efforts by government to become a member of important international organisations such as the UN, or to join the European Economic Area. Hence until recently there has been a tendency of Swiss diplomacy to keep international commercial policies distinct from political decisionmaking in domestic affairs.

3.4.4.2 The innovating effect of the popular initiative

We have already discussed one such innovating effect: the initiative, which widens the political agenda and gives voice to problems that remain non-issues as far as the elites' policy is concerned. Yet agenda-setting does not mean gaining majority approval of a proposal. Statistics show that hopes of political change by means of the initiative are dashed in 90 per cent of cases that come to a vote. But defeat does not always leave proponents with nothing. Sometimes the federal authorities pick up ideas from the initiatives by drafting a counterproposal or simply by fitting them into a current legislative bill. In this way the long shots of popular initiatives are transformed into proposals that are more in line with conventional wisdom and therefore stand a better chance of being accepted. At the heart of many important federal policies - from social security to the environment, or equal rights - we can find a popular initiative. In this way, outsiders' ideas can sometimes be transformed into proposals that are acceptable to the majority. Some scholars think that these indirect effects of the initiative are more important than the rare direct success.19

Should proponents then seek to set the agenda, rather than strive for direct or indirect success? Proponents are aware that there is a trade-off between these options, and their choices may differ.

'Realist' groups seek direct or indirect success. Therefore they prefer to draft proposals that are not too far from mainstream parliamentary concerns or current public opinion. By doing so, the chances of some of the ideas being passed following negotiations with government or parliament are increased. In this case the initiative becomes a pawn in the negotiating game. The social democrats and trade unions typically use the initiative to compensate for that lack of support for social reform in parliament.

The choice of radical groups may be different. They prefer agenda-setting and discussion of political taboos and non-issues, which is provided by the arena of a popular vote. They refuse to pay the price of negotiation and compromise. Therefore these groups draft 'long-shot' propositions, even if their chances in the vote seem to be minimal or even zero. The initiative on the abolition of the Swiss army is a good example. From the very beginning, its proponents did not aim to win a majority of the vote, but used the four years' discussion to change political attitudes on the formerly taboo subject of Swiss military and peace politics, and with considerable success.

A third group -- small parties and single-issue movements -- uses the initiative as a platform for electoral success. Popular initiatives not only create issues but also help to establish new social movements or political parties. This is typical of the way in which parts of the grass-root movement of the 1970s put environmental issues onto the national agenda and finally established a new, national Green Party. The xenophobe movement in the 1960s also began with popular initiatives almost all of which, despite being rather long-shot propositions, gained a majority in popular votes. The far-right Republican Party, National Action (now the Swiss Democrats) and Automobile Party never attained more than 8.4 per cent of votes in elections and were sometimes threatened with extinction. However, they continued to use the popular initiative to raise their profile during electoral campaigns, thus keeping alive the issue of foreign residents and overpopulation, as well as their movement.

If we sum up the innovating effects of the popular initiative, we can distinguish three facets:

  1. Initiatives allow new issues to be put on the agenda, issues that are either different from the preoccupations of or neglected by the political establishment or the government coalition;
  2. Initiatives can lead to an acceleration of institutional processes when used as a support for innovations desired by the government coalition, such as in environmental policy, which Switzerland was to implement earlier than other European countries;
  3. Initiatives allow discontent with the establishment to be expressed which can lead to policy changes inside the government coalition.

3.5 UNDERSTANDING THE PEOPLE'S VOTE

This section will address some key questions about direct democracy: why do citizens participate in a vote, and why not? Do they understand the issues they vote upon? What are their motives when saying yes or no to a proposal? And is it true that, given enough money and propaganda, any votation can be won? When discussing these questions, we can draw upon many scholarly studies of voting behaviour in Switzerland. We have to bear in mind, however, that empirical research on voting behaviour is far from definitive.20

3.5.1 An Example of a Vote: Should there be Tougher Restrictions on Refugees Seeking Asylum in Switzerland?

In the 1980s the number of refugees seeking asylum in Switzerland grew from about 3000 per annum (1980) to more than 37 000 (1990), and federal and cantonal resources became overstrained. Many refugees had to wait for several years for a decision on whether they would be awarded refugee status. A negative decision meant expulsion, which was considered to be inhuman by many Swiss, who even tried to hid or protect refugees who faced expulsion. On the other hand there was a growing reluctance among a section of the population to allow the refugees to stay in Switzerland, in addition to the more than one million other foreigners. In 1985 the federal parliament passed a revised asylum law. It sought to process more rapidly the growing number of demands for asylum and to effect expulsions more efficiently.

The revision of the law was a compromise: extreme right-wing and xenophobe forces were against encouraging a 'growing mass of refugees', who according to their view were mostly 'false asylum seekers' coming for economic reasons and not because of political persecution. These proposed severe measures to keep refugees out of the country and a simplification of the legal procedure. Refugee organisations, the greens and the political left, on the other hand, were opposed to changes in the liberal existing law and its procedure, which offered refugees many ways (and the time) in which to appeal against negative decisions on asylum. Parliament finally chose a middle way, restraining the procedure for asylum, but leaving doors open to refugees according to the standards of international law and the humanitarian tradition of Switzerland. The revised law was not to the taste of Swiss refugee organisations, which, together with the greens and parts of the left, successfully launched a referendum challenge that was voted on 5 April, 1987. The challenge failed: 1 180 082 voted for the revised law and 572 339 voted against it, giving a majority of 67.4 per cent (see Box 3.2).

3.5.2 Shaping Opinions in a Voting Campaign: The Actors

Citizens cast their votes individually and secretly, but they make up their minds during public discussions on the issue. Votations are preceded by intense political campaigns. Different actors provide information, try to convince, praise or denounce, to mobilize and attempt to lead the voter to say yes or no. Even the most complex issues must in the end result in a simple yes or no. Therefore, especially at the end of a campaign, the issue has to be treated as a simple message. Let us first consider the actors involved in a voting campaign, and then, in Section 3.5.3, evaluate their impact on voting behaviour.

In the political asylum case many people would have had first-hand experience of the problem under discussion. They might have had a job where their colleagues or customers were foreigners, who after all make up about 16 per cent of the population. The resident population may have liked or disliked the newcomers. Those who liked them may have been pro-Third World activists insisting on solidarity with foreigners and refugees. Many may have liked foreigners and refugees because they were good customers or were willing and cheap workers doing jobs the Swiss had refused. But, even if people liked foreigners for these reasons, they may have said that there were already too many of them in Switzerland. They may have felt like strangers themselves because their colleagues at work all come from Yugoslavia, Turkey or Algeria. They may have feared that their children would learn less in school because the majority of their classmates were foreigners speaking perhaps five languages but only rudi-mentary German, French or Italian. First-hand experience would have led to attitudes which influence peoples' opinions on issues and proposals about foreigners or refugees. People would have talked among themselves about their experiences and attitudes: at work, in the bistro, among neighbours. It is the first element of public opinion.

Political and economic elites may have tried to influence individuals' outlooks by demonstrating that opening the door to more immigration would be good or bad for the country. When speaking of economic effects, future demographic advantages or disadvantages, of more immigration, or trying to explain the complex mechanisms that have led to 25 million refugees worldwide, and asking what Switzerland should do about it, the arguments of politicians went beyond individual experiences. Politicians, party leaders and spokesmen for interest groups tried to influence voters by pointing out the collective interests involved.

In earlier times, cantonal and local parties were an important element in Swiss social life, nourishing voting campaigns with their congresses, reunions and conferences. The latter have not disappeared, but they now attract few more than the party faithful. Parties as well as politicians are more and more dependent on the mass media to put their message across. However, authorities, politicians and parties still play an important part in shaping public opinion.

The mass media contribute much to voting campaigns. Not only do they investigate people's opinions and air the views of government and its opponents, they also present their own view of the issue. The electronic media, however, being mostly a public monopoly, is bound to observe a balance between pro and con. During television debates opponents and proponents have to make the most of each second they are allowed by producers. In earlier times a great number of newspapers were affiliated to specific parties and therefore represented their views. Today, when much of the press has become as commercial as almost any other product, these affiliations have been greatly loosened; in most cases they have disappeared. Yet their positions are not 'neutral', rather they reflect the preference of editors or what-are presumed to be the preferences of readers (see also Box 3.3).

The last, but not least, element in shaping public opinion is propaganda. This is information whose only objective is to forge the majority desired by those who pay for it. By its very nature propaganda need not to tell the whole truth, and sometimes it has little to do with the issue or nothing to do with the truth. Political advertising in newspapers and on posters prefers slogans, photographs, graphics or cartoons, whose message is aimed at mobilising good or bad feelings about a particular issue. There are other forms of propaganda, such as direct mailing by interest groups. Moreover periodicals put out by different professions, businesses or interest groups as physicians, house owners or insurance clients comment on an issue to be voted on as soon as they feel concerned about it. They can do that discreetly, relying on their confidential relationships with their clientele.

Modern public relations is probably the most sophisticated way of influencing public opinions. In the 1970s, following a major scandal, the social democrats launched an initiative for tougher restrictions on banks. To counter this one of the three main Swiss banks began an information campaign, regularly taking an entire page in many newspapers to describe banks activities and their importance to Switzerland's economy. Just occasionally there was a mention of the popular initiative. Four years later the banks had succeeded in positively changing their image. In the last months of the campaign on the initiative the banks deemed it unnecessary to run a propaganda campaign as this was being done by others. The initiative failed.

3.5.3 Factors that Influence Voters' Behaviour: Knowledge, Trust and Propaganda

Unconditional supporters of direct democracy laud the merits of initiative and referenda campaigns, seeing them as processes which make even non-voters aware of political questions, and as fora for new political issues. The culture of direct democracy, its advocates say, leads to almost permanent discussion amongst and between the people and the authorities. It also leads to a learning process that changes minds, attitudes and preferences. On the other hand, sceptics argue that voting campaigns lack the quality of parliamentary deliberation and that the issues at stake are too complex to be understood by ordinary people. They fear that big money spent on propaganda may subvert the well-intentioned institutions of direct democracy.

The most comprehensive voting survey so far, conducted by Gruner and Hertig,21 is based on a sample of 4000 persons on about 40 issues in twelve ballots during the period 1977-80. It provides empirical evidence in favour of the sceptic's point of view, showing that people's knowledge about the issues at stake was low even after an intensive campaign. Only about a quarter of those interviewed one to four weeks after the vote could recall the specific content of the issue. Even on issues where voters were directly affected and therefore had good reason to be well-informed, as with tax reform in 1977, two thirds could give no answer as to what it was all about. Sometimes people voted against their own preferences, not knowing, for example, if a proposal called 'Nuclear Initiative' aimed to continue or stop a nuclear power-plant programme. Moreover the knowledge of voters and non-voters was not significantly different.

One can argue, however, that knowledge of an issue is not what direct democracy is about. Just as in daily life, when we are at the limits of our knowledge we begin to rely on trust. To drive a car safely we need some instructions on how to handle it, but we do not need to know how the engine works. If the car breaks down we call a mechanic and rely on him to fix it. Nobody knows precisely how all the complex components of a nuclear power plant work. It is designed, built and run by specialists who each trust in the professional knowledge of others. The same mechanism, substituting trust for knowledge, works with voters. They rely on other persons who are supposed to know more about the tax or nuclear issues at stake. So we should not blame voters for knowing little about the subject of the vote; substituting trust for knowledge is behaviour not specific to direct democracy. Professional politicians also may not fully understand all the subjects on which they are supposed to vote. Parliamentary members specialise in some preferred fields, and experts on social policy, for example, may rely on the advice of colleagues when it comes to a vote on fiscal policy.

Thus, if citizens are able to rely on good advice, the limited knowledge of voters is not a serious problem. But whom do they trust when going to the ballot? Here again, empirical evidence from the Gruner and Hertig study is rather sobering. First, the views of authorities and politicians were known by about 60 per cent of the interviewees, regardless of whether or not they were affiliated to a party. Five out of six voters who indicated a party preference, and said that they knew what their party was recommending, voted according to the latter. This rather impressive picture is called into question by evidence that the impact of party recommendation falls drastically when it diverges from the general image of the party. Thus we cannot be sure that knowing one's own party's recommendation is more than the result of an intuitive guess. More importantly, even partisan voters did not mention the recommendation of their party as the principle reason for their choice. Like all voters, they tended to recall the slogans of anonymous propaganda. Therefore, Gruner and Hertig's conclusion is that voters know little about the issues they vote upon, and that they are less likely to follow the arguments presented by the authorities, the parties or the press than to respond to simple propaganda slogans.

3.5.4 Can Money and Propaganda Buy Votes?

Further inquiry into the impact of propaganda showed that it indeed has a bearing on the outcome of votations. Gruner and Hertig found a strong statistical relationship between success and propaganda in all 41 federal votations between 1977 and 1981. When the winning side was the 'Yes' side, it had spent three times more on advertising than the losing camp. When the 'No' camp won, its protagonists had spent almost double the amount spent by the 'Yes' side. An even stronger correlation was found in 20 cases where the propaganda effort was very lopsided; that is, when the propaganda of one side dominated the other by a ratio of at least three to one. Predominant 'Yes'-propaganda was 12 out of 13 cases, whereas predominant 'No'-propaganda was successful in all of its 7 cases. These statistical correlations, however, do not provide absolute proof that votes can be bought. It is possible that some votations could have been won without money being spent on propaganda, or that one-sided propaganda results from existing one-sided preferences. Thus neither can we say with certainty that money can buy votes, nor can we certify the contrary. Yet it cannot be denied that propaganda does exert a significant influence.22

Further studies reveal an important distinction.23 The effectiveness of propaganda depends on the kind of issue involved. As far as abortion, speed limits and the abolition of the army were concerned, propaganda campaigns did not lead to a change in people's preferences, as was revealed by opinion polls. This may be explained by the assumption that people relate such concrete questions to their own experiences and personal values. Confronted with this kind of question voters have a predisposition to decide for themselves and neither need nor listen to propaganda. On the other hand propaganda can exert an influence in complex and abstract issues, where more changes of preferences are observed. Questions relating to reorganisation or cooperation between the federation and the cantons are like empty labels on a blackbox. The voter cannot rely on first-hand experience or find personal values to relate to. Here we speak of non-predisposi-tioned voters, and propaganda has a chance to fill the empty labels with slogans that relate positively or negatively to existing values and experiences. It is likely that, given the limited time in which citizens have to grasp complex issues, simple propaganda has an advantage over discussion by politicians or in newspapers on the contents of the blackbox. The latters' efforts to explain issues and widen voters' political horizons in voting campaigns can require an extra mile that only a minority of the electorate are willing to go.

Two questions can be asked about propaganda. First, should political propaganda, which may be considered by some as exaggerated or misleading, be allowed to say absolutely anything in order to achieve the goals -even tell lies? Supervision is delicate, as in controversial issues there may be more than one truth. Control of the substance of propaganda may therefore lead to political censorship rather than to fairer debate. Yet propaganda is often paid for by anonymous interest groups who do not take any responsibility foi it. Unlike politicians, they are not subject to sanctions against what is said. Therefore, the case can be made for making known who is paying, and how much, for political propaganda.

This leads to the second question: how much money should be permitted to be spent on a campaign, and to what degree is it tolerable that one side may spend more than the other? Estimated direct campaign spending of 1.5 million Swiss francs by a particular side seems to occur quite frequently. This does not appear to be a particularly large sum, however the amount spent by one side can outweigh that spent by the other by a factor of ten to one and more. Money influences direct democracy in other ways too. With a time-lag on the USA, a specialised sector of the Swiss public relations industry nowadays attracts a clientele willing to pay for the professional collection of signatures for popular initiatives or optional referenda. In 1991 opponents of a proposed reform to modernise the Swiss parliament paid 300,000 francs to a professional team organising and collecting 50,000 signatures. This means that money can substitute for political activists and organisations. Moreover money is becoming an important factor in deciding which issues are put to a popular vote.

Swiss law guarantees voters a constitutional right for fair conditions to express their undistorted preferences. The historical meaning of this guarantee was that public authorities should abstain from influencing voters. One may ask however, whether the idea of fair conditions of voting has become an illusion because of the influence of powerful private actors. Surprisingly, in Switzerland there is little of the regulation of political propaganda that exists in US states such as California and Colorado.24

3.5.5 Models of Voter Behaviour

Voting behaviour is puzzling not only to politicians, who more often than not are surprised by the results of a vote. It is also a challenging enigma to scholars who, by basing explanations on past behaviour, seek to predict it for the future. Empirical research is more and more used by politicians to help them win campaigns. But unfortunately, or fortunately, such research is still in many cases far from being able to predict accurately the final outcome. Nevertheless models of voting behaviour can shed light on what makes voters tick.

3.5.5.1 The socio-political values approach

Sociologists and most political scientists think of society as being divided by different interests and values. Political parties and interest groups aggregate and express these interests and values, carry them through parliamentary negotiations and mobilise their supporters to vote for or against, depending on whether or not they are satisfied with the results.

On the general level there is empirical evidence for this model. During the 1970s parliamentary proposals, when supported by the government's three bourgeois parties, won 85 per cent of all votations.25 The record was even better when the fourth socialist coalition partner was not playing its occasional oppositional role - proposals by the 'great coalition' were successful in 90 per cent of all ballots.26 When considering the weak position of the main parties in the Swiss political system, this result may seem surprising. Moreover it suggests that the political elites are able to exercise relatively strong control of the voters.

The future usefulness of the model, however, may be less than this suggests for two reasons. First, the parties forming the governmental coalition, after 30 years of concordance, are now experiencing considerable difficulties in finding a common denominator. Their electorates are shrinking, party elites are experiencing conflicts with their constituencies. While some younger voters are engaged in new social movements or small single-issue parties, a considerable part of the electorate has turned away from any party loyalty (Figure 3.3).

What we observe in Switzerland is not unique. Value changes in modern industrial societies have freed voters from traditional party loyalties and ideologies. Individualisation and personalisation have also seemed to reduce the influence of collective values in society as a whole. Post-industrial values -- seeking individual self-realisation - have a comparatively strong influence on Swiss voting behaviour.27

There is a second point on which Switzerland seems an exception from the general model. When looking at a geographical map of voting in Switzerland, we find some constantly 'deviant' areas which do not share general attitudes and behaviour. First, in a few cantons voter turnout is considerably higher than in others. Second, a number of small communes always vote differently -- more to the left, for instance -- from others around them. Both forms of deviation have been going on for decades but cannot be explained by the usual factors such as religion, language or socioeconomic composition. The most plausible explanation relies on the concept of 'collective memory' or political culture. It assumes that a collective memory of values may structure political behaviour. Both may remain relatively intact in some geographical regions where migration is low and modernisation slow. If the explanation holds, it would suggest the importance of regional political culture and its socio-cultural values.28 It would also imply that the political preferences of a collective regional memory are able to resist successfully the influence of political elites or other outside actors.

3.5.5.2 The economic model of rational choice

Economists claim that individuals maximise personal advantage, and that this is also true for political behaviour. From the economic perspective on democracy, politicians and their parties seek power. Their programmes are designed to maximise votes in elections. Voters - like consumers - have a choice in elections, preferring the party that offers them more. This 'rational choice model' provides the common framework for economists analysing politics. The basic idea of the model has also been used to describe voting behaviour in direct Swiss democracy.29 Schneider et al. set out to define the policies of the four governmental parties and the four most important interest groups in terms of the shared economic interests of their supporters. The study showed that in 75 political decisions on economic issues, the actors had mainly followed a line that would maximise advantages for their supporters. For instance farmers' organisations would push for fanning subsidies, but they would not help the unions to fight for increased salaries for workers, and vice versa.

Moreover the voting recommendations of parties and interest groups reflected their economic preferences. Empirical evidence was provided that two of the parties and associations have a significant influence on poll results. But on the whole the popularity of the government measured in terms of economic performance is more important than political campaigning for the outcome of a ballot. Government propositions have a significantly better chance of being accepted by the people if economic growth is high and if inflation, unemployment and government debts are low.

The limits of this perspective are threefold. In more recent studies, which reflect changes in Swiss politics during the 1980s, the economic approach seemed to work out less convincingly.30 The rational choice model does not treat the motives of citizens as an open question. It presupposes that individuals and groups, seeking to maximise their own advantage, behave egoistically. The theory excludes the possibility of altruistic behaviour based on cultural or political values. Therefore it fails to include this aspect in empirical investigations. Finally, the 'rational choice' model fails to explain one of the most important aspects of direct democracy: why people vote at all. When discussing the participation of different groups (Section 3.3.2), we would expect the utility-maximising voter to stay at home. The reason for this is simple: the chance that his vote would be the one that would determine the final result is marginal and therefore it is not worth the effort to participate in the ballot.31 So, rational choice may explain abstention, but it sheds little light on the real motives of the 40 per cent of Swiss voters who still participate in 20 or 30 votations every year.

3.5.5.3 A further reflection

The two approaches to voter behaviour leave us with different, contradictory and puzzling results. Most political scientists insist on the importance of collective social values, and stress the significance of public debates which shape and change the preferences of the electorate. Their approach leads to differentiated explanations of the past. Economists, however, do not refrain from prediction and draw on a simple model of presumed political behaviour that seems to reduce the complexity of the political world: voter behaviour is much less dependent on what economists would see as political rhetoric than on the economic performance of the government. When the economy is going well, the government attracts more votes. But so far both approaches have been at odds with each other, and both leave many questions unanswered.

In further research it would therefore be useful to combine the two approaches. There is evidence that the utility-maximising behaviour of groups and individuals plays an important role. This has probably been underestimated by politicians and political scientists, who can be the victims of their own discourse or of existing value patterns and cleavages. On the other hand, the impact of social values, too, is an empirical fact. Observable preferences for cultural values can also include egoistic and altruistic behaviour, which cannot be explained by economic benefits.

To return to the example of regulating the number of foreign residents, we first find a division between two groups: firm and constant preferences for or against foreigners living in Switzerland correspond with a typical set of sociocultural values. The convictions of both groups are robust - neither propaganda nor party recommendations are able to change their minds. Moreover a good part of both groups are willing to accept economic disadvantages because of their preference: small businessmen, for instance, who are willing to sell less in order to have fewer foreigners in Switzerland; or union workers who are willing to accept the competition afforded by extra foreign workers in the labour market. As with discrimination or nondiscrimination, there are people willing to pay for it. On the other hand we can observe a third group, which seems to consider the issue pragmatically: depending on what effect the proposed benefits will have on their individual short-term position, they vote either for or against the bill.32

Not all scholars and politicians would see real progress in understanding the political behaviour described above. In fact the more social science makes progress in predicting voter behaviour, the more attractive it becomes for specific interest groups. Parties, as well as interest groups, may be willing to pay considerable amounts to obtain exclusive forecasts on specific issues, thus gaining an advantage over opponents who are denied such information. If, however, the information is open to everybody, it may well itself influence the preferences of some of the voters. As with propaganda then we may need regulations on the use of opinion polls and forecasts in political campaigns.

3.6 POWER-SHARING BY DIRECT DEMOCRACY, OR HOW THE REFERENDUM HAS CHANGED THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

3.6.1 The Referendum as a Power-Sharing Device

So far we have discussed direct democracy as a form of participation by the people in specific cases of political decision-making that include a votation. But the instruments of direct democracy are important for all decision-making - even in cases where there is no ballot. The federal chambers, up until 1990, passed more than 1500 bills (see Table 3.5). Only 106, or some 7 per cent, of them were challenged in an optional referendum. In the following section we shall discuss how and why the referendum has an influence on lawmaking, even in the 93 per cent of cases where the bill was not challenged. Moreover, it will be argued that these 'indirect effects' of the referendum are probably more important than the direct effects of popular participation. As we shall see, the referendum has, more than anything else, become a device that enforces political power-sharing in Switzerland.

3.6.1.1 Impacts on the composition of the government

The reader is reminded of the period following the introduction of the optional referendum in 1874 (see 3.4.4), when the Catholic conservative minority used the device like a machine gun to shoot down important projects of the radical majority.33 The latter could see no other possibility than to come to an arrangement with the opposition. To integrate the Catholic minority the radicals offered them a seat in the previously one-party government. The conservatives accepted and from thereon they had a voice in the Federal Council. But this also meant sharing political responsibility for the solutions proposed by the collegiate council. So behind this 'amicable agreement' was an incentive or even a coercive pressure to cooperate. The radicals saw their large majority in parliament becoming useless if referendum challenges by the Catholic minority were not curbed. On the other hand the Catholic minority, who were unlikely to obtain a parliamentary majority, could win more through partial cooperation with federal government projects than they could through systematic opposition.

Concern for similar integration of all other important political forces led to wider power-sharing in the Federal Council. The Catholic conservatives negotiated to increase their number of seats. In 1928 the farmers and burgers, who ten years before had split off from the liberal radicals, were reintegrated with a seat in the government that they have held ever since. In 1935 the social-democrats became the largest political force in the National Council. Some cities had left-wing majorities. Social-democratic claims for participation in the federal government, however, were turned down by the bourgeois parties because of the prevailing class struggle. In 1943, however, during the Second World War when political integration and unity were most needed, the socialists were given their first seat. In 1959, following a short period with no social-democrat participation, the 'Magic formula' was born. Since then the Federal Council has comprised two radicals, two christian-democrats (formerly Catholic conservatives), two social-democrats and one member of the People's Party (formerly the Farmers and Burgers Party). Power-sharing in the government is supposed to produce solutions acceptable to a sufficiently large majority in parliament for the risk of the optional referendum to be reduced.

3.6.1.2 Impacts on the legislative process

Integrating the main political parties into a governmental coalition was important, but it was not enough to achieve political compromise. In the period of world-wide economic depression in the 1930s the bourgeois coalition not only came under pressure from the political left but also from their 'own' interest groups who challenged bills put forward in the federal chambers. Moreover extremist forces, impressed by nazi and fascist propaganda in Germany and Italy, tried to undermine trust in democracy and parliamentary institutions. Their so-called 'Frontist Initiative', which proposed a new political order, was overwhelmingly rejected in a popular vote, but the legislative process became blocked by referenda challenges from all sides. The Swiss political authorities had to learn that the referendum could also be successfully used by relatively small groups, and that it was difficult to obtain a sufficient majority even with the support of interest groups and parties. In the years before the Second World War the Federal Assembly began to implement the 'urgency clause' of Article 89 of the constitution which authorises parliament to pass laws without a referendum when rapid decisions are required. Bypassing ordinary legislative procedure in this way helped to overcome the economic crisis of the 1930s. Democratic movements, however, criticised the utilisation of the clause.

After the Second World War the legislative process was modified. A popular initiative in 1949 successfully restricted the rules of the 'urgency procedure' (now Article 89 bis; see Box 3.4). Moreover the authorities developed mechanisms for a better integration of political parties, interest groups and the cantons into the lawmaking process. A constitutional amendment introduced in 1947 gave interest groups the right to be consulted in the shaping of economic legislation that affected them. However it is the authorities who decide who is affected by a particular project, and the 'right to be consulted' does not mean that the authorities have to accept the views of the interest groups. Nonetheless, since the war preparliamentary consultation has become an important -- some say the most important -- element of the Swiss legislative process.

The preparliamentary process has two major elements. First, the Federal Council, when confronted with the need for new legislation, nominates a study group or a committee of experts which evaluates the necessity of and the various options on a new bill. The composition of these committees is interesting. Some of the members may simply be experts, but most of them combine knowledge and power. The Federal Council is concerned to appoint members who represent the standpoints of the different groups affected by proposed legislation. Individual members may have a reputation as experts on an issue, but the composition of the committee is made as representative as possible in order to cover all positions that could prove divisive during later discussions on the issue. Second, there is a consultation procedure whereby the department in charge of the project, following completion of the report by the committee of experts, circulates the first draft of the bill to the cantons, the political parties and the relevant interest groups. Only after evaluation of the responses from this procedure does the Federal Council decide whether to further the project. If the decision is made to go ahead, it is then handed over to the federal chambers. Figure 3.4 provides a summary of the process and Box 3.5 details the actors.

Both elements of the preparliamentary procedure have the same objectives: to reduce the risk of a referendum challenge, and, in the case of the obligatory constitutional referendum, to reduce the chances of failure in the popular vote.35 How does this work?

The existence of committees of experts gives interest groups, who may otherwise call for a referendum, the chance to announce their positions on the legislation in question. This is first and foremost an information process that allows the different actors to become familiar with the project as well as with the different views on the issue. But the procedure also leads to negotiation. The actors declare under which conditions they would support or fight the bill. This leads to mutual adjustments, for instance between employers and trade unions on a social-security reform. The administration will defend the government project, especially against excessive claims for subsidies, but will also try to play a mediating role in conflicts not directly negotiable between antagonistic interests. The subsequent consultative process involves further organisations, who each try to formulate a position that represents the view of their members. When evaluating the results of the consultative procedure, the administration seeks to maintain only those reforms that have found sufficient support. It also seeks to avoid leaving actors worse off than before. If the draft happens to fulfil these conditions its chances of becoming law are good, and the administration has good reason to believe that the participating actors will support the constitutional amendment in the obligatory vote or refrain from an optional referendum in the much more frequent event of an ordinary legislative proposal. The Federal Assembly may add other propositions or change the draft, but the original draft has a story to tell: parliament knows which issues were controversial and which were accepted unanimously. Some members of parliament may have already participated as experts in the preparliamentary process. They know all about the difficulties and fragility of any compromise that has been reached, and about the robustness of a solution, and they inform their parliamentary faction about the forces supporting or opposing the bill. Parliament, too, will try to avoid the risk of a referendum being called, and look for a compromise that is supported by as many parties as possible.

Legislation has become a process of power-sharing. It is a cooperative process mainly involving economic interest groups in the preparliamentary phase, and political parties in the governmental and parliamentary arena.

The idea of reaching consensus in the system of 'concordance', as the Swiss call it, is simple: no single winner takes all, everybody wins something from the negotiation (Box 3.6). It is an idea that cannot be abandoned without changing the institutions: as long as the referendum exists it will act as a constraint on all political actors. Swiss political parties and interest groups are bound to look for compromises, even in cases of major conflict.

There are many terms available to describe the above process of lawmaking. 'Amicable agreement' stresses the importance of a high degree of consensus, without which lawmaking is likely to fail. 'Mutual adjustment' reflects the idea that negotiations can lead to a collective learning process, in which actors are able to reevaluate the issue and reassess their preferences. The term 'system of concordance', used by Swiss observers of political life, describes preparliamentary, governmental and parliamentary cooperation, in which there is no fundamental opposition except from marginal parties. 'Power-sharing' underlines the roles of institutional cooperation and institutional mechanisms; it prevents exclusive exercise of power and it leads to a political culture of cooperation. 'Consociational democracy' distinguishes this type of democracy from systems based on competition between political parties for a majority and on the alternation of government and opposition. The negative term '61ite cartel' refers to the fact that the negotiation system can be rather closed and that, occasionally, a very limited number of political actors may monopolise political power. I shall now give an account of these different aspects, but throughout reference will be made to the referendum, which more than any other element has changed the Swiss lawmaking process in the twentieth century and thus has forged the Swiss way of democracy.

3.6.2 The Referendum as an Instrument of Vested Interests

The above discussion leaves us with a paradoxical conclusion: The optional referendum exerts its greatest effects when all referendum threats are eliminated through successful preparliamentary and parliamentary negotiation so that finally no popular vote is held. Let us take a closer look at these indirect effects, asking what kind of solutions are reached by political actors when acting under the constraints of mutual adjustment.

3.6.2.1 The negotiating actors and their influence

Consider the actors first. We already know that the most important criterion for being selected to participate, and to be heard, in the preparliamentary procedure is the capacity to mount a successful referendum challenge. This can involve different groups on different issues. If all groups were to have an equal chance to participate when 'their' issue is involved, we would have a perfect pluralism of different interest groups and parties, with direct democracy serving to check that Elites truly express the preferences of their members. From a theoretical point of view, however, some difficulties are likely to be encountered.

First, as negotiators, elite actors use the referendum threat in order to impose their preferences, but only on rare occasions do they use the referendum itself. When some of their propositions have been accepted, they are likely to join the large coalition preferring the compromise to the status quo. So, just as in the cases of successful compromise during ordinary lawmaking, when referenda fail to materialise, there is not empirical test as to whether or not the elites represent the interests of the members of their organisation. Moreover the referendum changes character: from being a popular right, it becomes a right of interest groups

Second, the referendum may increase the influence of some actors on some issues, but not all actors have the same chance of carrying out the threat on all issues. According to the theory of collective action, the negotiating power of a group depends on two factors: its organisational ability (for instance, to mobilise people) and its capacity to deny contributions that other actors need.36 In negotiations and lawmaking by mutual adjustment, the 'haves' are better off than the 'have-nots', whose refusals have no trade-in. Moreover, organisations which defend specific short-term benefits for their members are likely to be stronger than those promoting general and long-term interests. Manufacturers' organisations, for instance, can easily mobilise producers of aluminium cans against state regulations restricting their use.37 The organisation offers specific advantages on an exclusive basis to its members. Consumer organisations and environmental groups, on the other hand, constitute much larger groups, but probably less powerful ones. Their interests may conflict: consumers may favour a returnable deposit for used cans, whereas environmentalists would like to forbid their use altogether because their production consumes excessive energy.

Environmental groups, in particular, face the problem of having to fight for a long-term public good. A majority of people may find it a good thing that such groups exist, but they may not choose to join them. These people will benefit from the groups' successes even if they are not members. On the whole, therefore, negotiations in the shadow of direct democracy do not necessarily eliminate the threefold objections against political pluralism: elites are able to act relatively independently, the 'haves' retain their advantage over the 'have-nots', and fragmented negotiation favours particular short-term benefits at the cost of general long-term interests.38 The last point coincides with an assessment of many constitutionalists and political scientists: they believe that the referendum strengthens economic-interest organisations rather than political parties.39

Two findings of an empirical study of negotiation based on thirty important issues in the 1970s are interesting.40 First, the structure of Swiss pluralism seems to be ambiguous. On the one hand, Kriesi's study identifies a large number of occasional participants, which corresponds to the image of a process open to the many forces capable of using the referendum device. On the other hand, the author finds a very small power elite influencing all issues of preparliamentary negotiation. This would mean that elitism and direct democracy are not mutually exclusive. Even if the ideology of political culture would not admit it, Elitism is present as a complementary element in the Swiss system of semi-direct democracy. Second, the fact that they are integrated into the political negotiation system does not mean that all actors have the same influence. Kriesi provides empirical evidence that the social democratic influence is less than that of the other governmental parties. According to Kriesi, their position is one of 'formal cooperation': social-democrats share responsibility and provide legitimacy for consoci-ational democracy without having the political influence which corresponds to their electoral strength. Voters seem to feel the same way: in a recent survey 40 per cent of social-democrats considered themselves to be 'regular losers' in decisions of direct democracy, whereas only 1-3 per cent of radical, christian democrat and the Swiss People's Party voters felt the same way.41 Similar findings are presented in studies on corporatism (see Box 3.7): labour organisations are weaker than employers' organisations. In a cross-national comparison, Switzerland does not fit into the predominant scheme of other European countries, which show more of a balance of influence between employers and labour.42

3.6.2.2 The output of negotiated legislation

Negotiation and compromise are highly valued in Swiss culture and politics. Indeed the pattern of consociationalism, despite its shortcomings, seems to have provided important advantages. In the absence of electoral change, there are no abrupt discontinuities in federal policy. The sobering effect of negotiation cools down ideological exaggeration and promotes pragmatic solutions. Cooperation in commissions, in government and in parliament leads to mutual adjustments where learning processes occur over the substantive issues of legislation. Reaching a satisfactory compromise may take several years, but once the agreement becomes law most actors are prepared for it. This context increases the chances of new laws and policy programmes being implemented.

Yet criticism of consociationalism is as old as its praise. In the 1960s the predominance of short-term interests over fundamental strategies and policies, and the advantages enjoyed by well-organised interest groups over the 'non-organised and non-represented', were identified as the shortcomings of Swiss democracy.43 Political scientists have noted that consociationalism has made a strong opposition impossible. The referendum does grant occasional participation and opposition. But the same mechanism also acts as a constraint. It forces all political parties and economic organisations to cooperate. Elections, therefore, do not provide the possibility of the government and the opposition changing places the way they do in parliamentary democracies. Therefore the Swiss system also lacks the larger innovatory and social learning processes that are brought about by changes of power in parliamentary democracies. In 1975 Raimund Germann, a young policial scientist, proposed scenarios for a comprehensive institutional change to a parliamentary system.44

When efforts at a fundamental reform of the Swiss constitution were made in the 1970s, a commission of experts identified the need for profound organisational changes. They were however forced to realise that, in a pluralist society preoccupied with special group interests, there was no room for structural reforms of Swiss democracy. At the end of the 1980s new criticism arose. A group of economists focused on the negative economic impact of negotiation practices in Swiss legislation. Taking up the point of political scientists that the referendum had become a negotiating device used by vested interest groups they blamed Swiss enterprises for seeking state rents instead of taking their chance in the market. By using the referendum threat in negotiations according to the argument presented by Borner's study,47 economic actors are able to protect their position in the market, which gives them a short-term benefit. But branches and professions which protect themselves from market competition by relying on state or private-trust regulations, in the long-run lose their capacity to innovate and compete. The message of the study was clear, but it was not appreciated by politicians or the public: more competition is necessary not only for the Swiss economy, but also for Swiss politics. In Borner's view the referendum which has been appropriated as an instrument of vested interests, should be abandoned. Without the referendum power-sharing in the great coalition would no longer be a 'systematic necessity'.48 It would also become possible to alternate government and opposition, thus providing a better chance of achieving political innovation.

3.7 CONCLUSIONS

3.7.1 Direct Democracy -- an Exceptional System

The Swiss system is at odds with much political theory and with mainstream of political thought. It provides evidence that intensive political participation beyond the occasional election of a political elite is possible and can play an important role. It shows that a substantial proportion of the population are willing to discuss and express their preferences, even regarding the most complex political issues. And if there are shortcomings in direct democracy, Switzerland has neither suffered anarchy as some feared in the nineteenth century, nor has it experienced the political revolutions others dreamed of. Direct democracy and the complexity of modern society are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, direct democracy is an important device for social learning processes which make people politically aware and able to deal with political complexity. The federation, the cantons and the communes fulfil their responsibilities and functions just as well as political authorities in other countries.

Moreover direct democracy has changed the political system. Use of the referendum has enhanced the historical experience of consociationalism and power-sharing and has led to the institutional system of 'concordance'. This evolution has, on the other hand, altered the conditions and functions of the political participation of ordinary Swiss people. The constraint of cooperation among all major forces has led to negotiated legislation and mutual adjustment among interest groups and political elites, which has often resulted in the referendum being avoided altogether. The indirect effects of the referendum on the legislation process have become more important than those of direct votes.49 Finally, the impact of the people's voice in elections has been reduced. Under the constraints of an all-party government, voters dissatisfied with the government have no chance to bring an opposition party to power.

The consociational system works differently from the parliamentary systems predominant in Western Europe. Table 3.6 compares the two types of democracy, taking Switzerland and Great Britain as examples.

Let us compare how the two countries deal with the most important question of democracy: how are citizens best able to express their preferences in the complex world of politics? Here a fundamental difference in the underlying ideas of the two systems shows up. In Great Britain, which provides an almost ideal example of the parliamentary system, political power is concentrated in the hands of the political party that wins a majority. Intense preelection campaigning is linked with fierce inter-party competition in which the winner takes all. The electoral system is designed to bring about changing parliamentary majorities, formed of one or two parties at most. The elected government sets out to implement the programme it had laid before the electorate, but if it fails to carry its programme through both houses of parliament, defeated in a vote of no confidence, it is possible to attempt to create another coalition or dissolving parliament and calling for a new election. The influence of the voters can be regarded as programmatic since it is they who choose among the programmes of the major parties and thus set the political agenda for several years. Sometimes the programmes call for major policy changes, so elections provide political legitimation, innovation and change all at the same time.

Semi-direct consociational democracy, on the other hand, places its trust in final control of all the important issues on the political agenda. Institutional legitimation comes from the most important decisions being taken by the people. The traditional idea of direct democratic control of parliament and government is still alive. Proportional rule in elections and

mutual adjustment in legislative decision-making favour the idea of 'no single winner takes all, everybody wins something'. The public is aware of the influence exerted by vested interests during legislative negotiation but this does little harm to the integrative and legitimising function of compromise through mutual adjustment. In a direct democracy voting is on a single issue at a time. A popular vote, even when about a fundamental issue, involves just one clear decision and can be affected by the actions of interested bodies, both before and after the vote. But the Swiss government, which is free of the fear of not being reelected will not spend much time on programmatic policies. The narrow limits of manoeuvre imposed by an all-party government and the risk of a referendum being called drastically curtail any efforts to design comprehensive governmental programmes.

In parliamentary democracies the voters have a programmatic influence in that they choose the government whose programme is to their taste, but they have almost no voice between elections. In Switzerland citizens exert their greatest influence on single issues of constitutional policies. When voting on whether the Swiss government should take on new activities, they have the last word. Yet they have little impact on elections. It seems as if there is a trade-off in influence between elections and ballots, which is illustrated in Figure 3.5.50

At the either end of the spectrum ranging from parliamentary or major-itarian to direct consensus democracy, we set the 'ideal' cases of Great Britain and Switzerland, each of which maximises one of the forms of participation - election or votation -- while offering the least influence in the other. In between we find intermediate types of democracy. In Swiss cantons and their communes, a local election offers a greater degree of influence than elections at the federal level because the executive branch -- the cantonal or communal council - is elected by the people. This leads to changing compositions in cantonal and communal councils. In some cantons there is less power-sharing between the parties than at federal level, or a less frequent use of the initiative and the referendum. The USA is situated more on the side of parliamentary or majoritarian democracy. As in Britain the competitive and majoritarian election of state parliaments and governors provide an opportunity for political change. In many US states we find a frequent use of the initiative and the referendum, although in the USA this form of direct democracy has not led to intense power-sharing (this will be discussed further in Chapter 4).

Which democracy is 'best' in terms of maximum citizen influence -elections or votations? This is not easily answered because we would have to know how citizens evaluate the two forms of influence. The fact that people in many European countries now seek some form of direct democracy may be an indicator that majoritarian parliamentary democracies need some complement to their purely electoral participation system. It is obvious, however, that regular referenda in Britain, for instance, would weaken not only the ability of the government to achieve its programmes, but also the importance of elections. Similarly competitive elections in Switzerland could give more influence to the electorate. Yet a majority government, and therefore no power-sharing, would be impossible to realise without cut-backs in direct democracy. Thus it seems that we cannot have it both ways. Maximum influence in both votations and elections are impossible to realise in the same political system. We are therefore limited to looking for 'optimal' voters' influence. In other words: finding combinations of single-issue voting and programmatic election that best serve the electorates influence on democracy. We shall come back to this question in Chapter 4.

3.7.2 Direct Democracy - a Different Political Culture

Some Swiss may criticise their politicians - but even more of them reelect the same politicians and the same parties. Many people complain that political innovations are not possible, but a regular majority rejects popular initiatives. There is one thing, however, which almost nobody would criticise, even though only a minority exercises it: the political right of the people.

The popularity in Switzerland of direct democracy is enormous. In a 1991 survey for instance, just 14 per cent of interviewees agreed with the idea of restricting the referendum in favour of more parliamentary power.51 The fear that something of the people's right to the referendum or initiative may be lost if Switzerland enters the European Community is one of the most important obstacles for those Swiss authorities and parties who are advocating membership. For many Swiss 'democracy' means 'direct democracy', and some find it difficult to believe that other countries are real democracies. An unbiased outside observer, however, would probably be astonished that the values of direct democracy have not had more impact on Swiss society beyond politics. He would find no evidence that Swiss schools are more participative than those in Germany or Italy. Some resident German and American parents say that their suggestions have had very little influence on Swiss school authorities. Moreover, our observer might be stunned to realise that workers and employees in Switzerland have fewer formal rights of codetermination at the workplace than their colleagues in Germany and Sweden, despite the fact that industrial relations between Swiss employers and unions have been regulated by a 'Labour peace convention' for more than fifty years.

We may conclude, therefore, that direct participation has had little influence on Swiss economic and societal life. Rather it is conceived as the specific Swiss culture of institutional democracy. With such a perspective, we can better understand the popularity of people's political rights. They are considered to be the most important particularity distinguishing Switzerland from other countries. The idea of living in a different democracy helped to develop a common identity of all Swiss and was important for Switzerland to survive as a nation.

More than participation and direct democracy has the pattern of power-sharing become a part of social culture. It includes the patience to listen to each other, to value common interests more highly than differences, and to have considered the point of view of those concerned before deciding. The Swiss are not at ease with open conflict. Sometimes they sweep it under the rug, or negotiate it away. Some foreigners feel that there exists a kind of an invisible contractual scheme, leading people to recognise each other as partners sharing benefits whenever possible. These qualities are part of consociational democracy.

3.7.3 Direct Democracy - Between Integration and Innovation

Many points of our discussion on consociationalism, negotiated legislation and the system of concordance can be summarised in one hypothesis: Swiss semi-direct democracy provides high political integration, but low, slow and continuous innovation. Without going into detail, it would certainly not be wrong to place competitive parliamentary systems like those in Britain and Germany on the other side of the table: their political systems provide less integration, but greater, faster and discontinuous innovation (see Table 3.7).

In the past direct democracy's institutions and political culture led to integration. The minority Catholic conservatives, and later the social democrats became partners in governmental power-sharing. Social and economic conflicts have not divided the country. In crucial times during the twentieth century a high national consensus helped overcome threats to the country's independence. The perfection of consociationalism after the Second World War was undoubtedly beneficial. Switzerland passed smoothly through growing wealth to societal modernisation: the stability of its political system was an advantage for the Swiss economy in many respects. The infra-structure of Swiss industry did not have to be rebuilt, just adapted to larger domestic and foreign markets. Whereas some West European democracies went from liberalism to socialism and back, Swiss politics held its middle course. The policy of integration, and of conservative adaptation rather than risky innovation, was important and it worked.

After 1974 many things changed. Industry in Switzerland was hurt more than in other countries by the recession, when employment decreased by 10 per cent. Foreign workers were sent home, but that did not resolve the structural problems: too many industrial goods had become outdated and lost their markets. Innovation was needed. Not all industries were as successful as the Swiss watch industry. The latter, during a decade of painful reconstruction, lost two thirds of its jobs, but it later regained its lost international markets and in 1991 held 50 per cent of the Japanese market, where it has its most important competitors. In other industries, however, the problem of greater international competition still exists. At the same time political consensus among government parties was vanishing. With reduced economic growth, organised labour and the political left lost part of their influence. Some politicians called for a break-up of the great coalition, but could not indicate with whom they would make a majority on more than one issue. Moreover, new social movements - progressive as well as reactionary - and the fragmentation of the party system indicated a loss of the Swiss system's capacity to integrate all parts of society. Many political problems remained unsettled.

Switzerland has also come under outside pressure. Since the breakdown of the communist systems in East Europe, Swiss neutrality has lost much of its significance. Between 1988 and 1992 the government took part in the negotiations on the European Economic Area and, together with the governments of the other EFTA countries, signed the treaty. The people, however, did not support the government's policy change towards European integration and rejected the EEA treaty (see Chapter 4.4). Having lost many of its economic advantages of the past, Switzerland's position in the international markets will be more difficult, and pressure from GATT and from the EC for liberalisation will not ease up. Swiss political structures, however, are not made for promoting industrial innovation. Despite the constraints of concordance, consensus by negotiation has become difficult. Conflicts arise, integration is lacking, and political innovation fails to keep up with events. The system does not seem suited to a situation demanding political commitment to innovation.

Should the Swiss therefore change their system?52 Some say yes, indicating that without more economic and political innovation, Switzerland could lose out in all markets and become an isolated anachronism in the heart of Europe. They suggest a transformation towards a representative democracy, wherein the loss of the referendum would be outweighed by the greater influence of elections. So far most Swiss have remained sceptical, preferring single-issue voting to programmatic influence through elections. And, after the negative vote on the EEA treaty that left a divided country, the Swiss, above all, are concerned about how to find new ways of integrating.


Notes

1. For a concise description of the institutions, see Jean-Francis Aubert, Traite du droit constitutionnel suisse (Neuchatel: Ides et Calendes, 1967, 1982); Cinqui&me Partie, L'exercice du pouvoir, pp. 393-426.

2. See Christian Moser, 'Die Gesetzgebungsverfahren der Kantone', Bulletin no. 13 des Nationalen Forschungsprogramms Nr. 6, Entscheidungsvorgange in der schweizerischen Demokratie (Lausanne and Bern: 1985).

3. Patricia Lafitte, Les institutions de democratie directe en Suisse au niveau local (Lausanne: Cahiers de 1'IDHEAPno. 34, 1987).

4. Christian Moser, 'Erfolge kantonaler Volksinitiativen nach formalen und inhaltlichen Gesichtspunkten', in Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für politische Wissenschaft, no. 27 (Bern: Haupt, 1987), pp. 59-188.

5. Alfred Kolz, Neuere schweizerische Verfassungsgeschichte (Bern, Stampfli, 1992), pp. 615-620.

6. Jürg Steiner, European Democracies (London: Longman, 1991), p. 173.

7. Karl Buerkli, Direkte Gesetzgebung durch das Volk (Zurich and Geneva: 1869).

8. I will therefore use the term 'semi-direct democracy' when referring to the Swiss political system and its elements of representative and direct democracy as a whole, and 'direct democracy' when referring to the two instruments of the referendum and the initiative, as well as to their use.

9. 'The initiative and the referendum are rooted very deep and in an effective way in the consciousness of Swiss citizens.... This holds largely independently - no matter if these instruments are used or not'. See Wolf Linder and Claude Longchamp, Die europdische Integrationspolitk in der direkten Demokratie. UniVox Jahresbericht IIB (Bern: Forschungszentrum fur schweizerische Politik, p. 16.

10. One of the deputies in 1850 explained his motive as follows: 'If we have to allow citizens of other cantons to vote on national issues, there is no reason why French or Italians should not have this same right'. See Pierre-Andr6 Schmitt, 'Neuenburg ist alien andern hundertvierzig Jahre voraus', in Die Weltwoche, 13 July, 1989.

11. After each federal vote surveys are carried out in order to explain and understand the voters' behaviour and the shaping of opinions. Vox surveys are made in cooperation between three research teams from three universities (Bern, Zurich and Geneva) and a private research institute. The inquiry includes 1000 standardised interviews with Swiss citizens - selected by a random-quota process - within a period of three weeks after the vote.

12. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Newbury Park: Sage, 1965).

13. See Schattschneider's earlier criticism of Dahl: 'The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent', E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People. A Realist View of Democracy in America (Hinsdale: Dryden Press, 1960), p. 35.

14. Data from VOX analyses of federal voting, vol. 41 (Adliswil/Geneva: Gesellschaft für praktische Sozialforschung and University of Geneva, 1991).

15. On the cantonal level, we find similar procedures for cantonal initiatives, with the difference that the final decision on the validity of a popular initiative can be demanded from the Federal Court.

16. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework', American Political Science Review, vol. 57, (September, 1963), pp. 632^2.

17. Jean-Francois Aubert, Petite histoire constitutionnelle de la suisse (Bern: Francke, 1974), pp. 43-44.

18. See Jürg Steiner, European Democracies (London: Longman, 1991), p. 139.

19. See Jean-Daniel Delley, L'initiative populaire en Suisse. My the et realite de la democratie directe (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1978); Oswald Sigg, Die eidgenossischen Volksinitiativen 1892-1939 (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1978); Hans Werder, Die Bedeutung der Volksinitiative in der Nachkriegszeit (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1978).

20. For an overview on current research, see Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Politische Wissenschaft, no. 27 (Wahlen und Abstimmungen) and no. 31 (Direkte Demokratie) (Bern: Haupt, 1987, 1991).

21. Erich Gruner and Hanspeter Hertig, Der Stimmburger und die neue Politik (Bern: Haupt, 1983).

22. For further discussion and comparison with direct democracy in the USA, see Chapter 4.

23. Hans Hitter, Die Werbung der Printmedien zu den Volksabstimmungen vom 4.12.88 und 26.11.1989 (Bern: Forschungszentrum für schweizerische Politik, 1989, 1990); Claude Longchamp, 'Herausgeforderte politische Oeffentlichkeit', Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für politische Wissenschaft, vol. 31 (Bern: Haupt, 1991), pp. 303-26.

24. See Thomas E. Cronin, Direct Democracy (Cambridge, Mass and London: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 99-113 and Chapter 4 of this book.

25. William Ossipow,'Concurrence politique et democratie directe en Suisse', in W. Ossipow and J. Papadopoulos, Deux etudes sur la democratie directe en Suisse (Geneva: 1981).

26. Ibid., pp. 1-62.

27. In comparison with other European countries Switzerland is among the leading group of countries in which postmaterialist values largely condition voter's behaviour: 20 per cent of the people entitled to vote regard themselves as pure postmaterialists, 58 per cent as mixed and 22 per cent as pure materialists. See Claude Longchamp, Politische Kultur der Schweiz im Wandel. Schlussbericht Quantitativ-Studie (Bern: Forschungszentrum für schweizerische Politik, 1991), p. 59.

28. Some of the studies following the socio-political values approach are the following: Peter Gilg, 'Stabilitat und Wandel im Spiegel des regionalen Abstimmungsverhaltens', in Schweiz. Jahrbuch für Politische Wissenschaft, vol. 27, (Bern: 1987), p. 121-57; Rolf Nef, 'Struktur, Kultur und Ab-stimmungsverhalten', in Schweiz. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, vol. 6 (1980), pp. 155ff; Dominique Joye, Structure politique et structures sociales. Analyses des dimensions ecologiques des votations en Suisse 1920-1980, doctoral thesis Geneva 1984.

29. Friedrich Schneider, Werner W. Pommerehne and Bruno S. Frey, 'Politico-Economomic Interdependence in a Direct Democracy: The Case of Switzerland', in Douglas A. Hibbs (ed.), Contemporary Political Economy: Studies on the Interdependence of Politics and Economics (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1981).

30. Longchamp (1991), op. cit. For a comprehensive empirical test of the rational choice model see: Adrian Vatter, Eigennutz als Maxime des Politik? Doctoral thesis, Bern, Forschungszentrum für Schweizerische Politik, 1993.

31. For a survey on the actual discussion, see for instance Nicholas R. Miller, 'Public Choice and the Theory of Voting, A Survey', in Samuel Long (ed.), Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1 (Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1986).

32. Wolf Linder, Claude Longchamp and Regula Stampfli, Politische Kultur der Schweiz im Wandel -- am Beispiel des selektiven Urnengangs (Basel: Nationales Forschungsprogramm 21, 1991); Wolf Linder, 'Migrations-wirkungen, institutionelle Politik und politische Offentlichkeit', in Walter Kalin and Rupert Moser (eds), Migrationen aus der Dritten Welt (Bern and Stuttgart: Haupt, 1989).

33. Jean-Francois Aubert, Petite histoire constitutionnelle de la suisse (Bern: Fraucke, 1974), pp. 43-44.

34. Andreas Auer, 'Les d&ours du "retour I la democratic directe". Le droit federal d'urgence 1971-1975', in Memoires publies par la faculte de droit Geneve, Melanges offerts il la Socidtd Suisse des Juristes (Genfeve: 1976).

35. For a comprehensive study of the development of the pre-parliamentary procedures and the indirect effects of the referendum, see Leonhard Neidhart, Plebiszit und pluralitare Demokratie (Bern: Francke, 1970).

36. See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965).

37. Adrian Vatter, 'Die Getrankeverpackungsordnung', Tages-Anzeiger (Zurich), 11 November 1990.

38. Fritz Scharpf, Demokratietheorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung (Konstanz: Universitatsverlag, 1970).

39. Hans Huber, 'Staat und Verbande', in Rechtstheorie, Verfassungsrecht, Volker-recht, Ausgewahlte Schriften 1950-70 (Bern, 1971); Raimund Germann, Politische Innovation und Verfassungsreform (Bern: Haupt, 1975); Paolo Urio, 'Le systfeme politique suisse, Entre pluralisme, 61itisme et neo-corporatisme', Il Politico no. 4 (University di Pavia, Italy, 1985) pp. 589-630.

40. Hanspeter Kriesi, Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Schweizer Politik (Frankfurt and New York: Campus-Verlag, 1980).

41. Claude Longchamp and Sybille Hardmeier, UNIVOX-Jahresbericht Direkte Demokratie 1991 (Bern and Zurich, GfS Forschungsinstitut und Forschun-gszentrum fur Schweizerische Politik, 1991), p. 19.

42. Peter J. Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change. Austria, Switzerland, and the Politics of Industry (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984).

43. Max Imboden, Helvetisches Malaise (Zurich: EVZ-Verlag, 1964).

44. Raimund E. Germann, Politische Innovation and Verfassungsreform (Bern: Haupt, 1975).

45. See Walter Steinmann, Zwischen Markt und Staat. Verflechtungsformen von Staat und Wirtschaft in der Schweiz (Konstanz: Wisslit, 1988); Peter Farago: Verbande als Trager offentlicher Politik Aufbau und Bedeutung privater Regierungen in der Schweiz (Griisch: Ruegger, 1987).

46. See Robert Jorin and Peter Rieder, Parastaatliche Organisationen im Agrarsektor (Bern: Haupt, 1985).

47. Silvio Bonier, Aymo Brunetti and Thomas Straubhaar, Schweiz AG: Vom Sonderfall zum Sanierungsfall? (Zurich: Verlag Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 1990).

48. Germann (1975), op. cit.

49. Leonard Neidhart, Plebiszit und pluralitare Demokratie (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1970).

50. Wolf Linder, 'Representative und direkte Demokratie, Systeme im Spannungsverhaltnis', in Eugen Antalovsky (ed), Die Burger und ihre Stadt (Wien: Magistrat der Stadt Wien, 1991).

51. Longchamp and Hardmeier (1991), op. cit., p. 23.

52. This question is further discussed in Wolf Linder 'Die Zukunft der schweiz-erishen Demokratie', in Stiftung für Geisteswissenschaften (ed.) Die Schweiz: Ausbruch aus der Verspdtung (Zurich: Weltwoche), pp. 14-69.