Paul Nursey-Bray, Anarchist Thinkers and Thought: An Annotated Bibliography, 1992.

On the Margins of Liberal Theory


The Text:

1107. In Defense of Anarchism. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. Wolff's seminal essay on authority, democracy and the State, in which he investigates the consequences of the conflict between authority and the desire for autonomy on the part of individuals. He argues that, given the incompatibility of authority and autonomy, anarchism must be the logical outcome of the conflict. The weaknesses of the majoritarian model of democracy are considered as part of a discussion of the difficulties of constructing a viable model of an anarchist society.

The Debate:

1108. Bates, S. "Authority and Autonomy." Journal of Philosophy 69,7 (6 April 1975): 173-9. Suggests that the concept of a prima facie obligation adequately resolves the supposed conflict between authority and autonomy.

1109. Baugh, G. "The Poverty of Autonomy: The Failure of Wolff's Defence of Anarchism." Our Generation 17,1 (Fall-Winter 1985-6): 105-21. An examination of the ethical theory underlying Wolff's work which concludes that his contribution is anything but a defense of anarchism.

1110. Bayles, M. "In Defense of Authority." Personalist 52A (Autumn 1971): 755-58. Contests Wolff's argument that authority and autonomy are incompatible.

1111. Beauchamp, T. and Witkowski, K. "A Critique of Pure Anarchism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2,4 (June 1973): 533-39. Criticizes Wolff's inconsistent characterizations of legitimacy as a poor foundation for his defense of anarchism. Briefly sketches non-anarchist alternatives.

1112. Curtler, H. M. "Freedom and Civil Obedience." Journal of Thought 14 (April 1979): 153-63. Contests the idea that democracy fosters positive liberty. Rather, it is argued, positive liberty is the outcome or active obedience to law, regardless of the form of government.

1113. Frankfurt, H. G. "The Anarchism of Robert Paul Wolff." Political Theory 1,4 (Nov. 1973): 405-14. Argues that Wolff is inconsistent and confused and that it is inappropriate to label him an anarchist.

1114. Kirwan, K. A. "The Poverty of Robert Paul Wolff." Political Science Review 5 (Fall 1975): 333-59. Criticizes Wolff's assessment of key concepts and thinkers and expresses concerns about his program for reform in the American political system.

1115. Laszlo, E. "A Moralizing Note to Professor Wolff's Reply." Journal of Value Inquiry 7A (Winter 1973): 307-8. Argues that the logical extension of Wolff's thesis is the inevitable dissolution of social systems, and condemns Wolff's lack of moral responsibility in expounding such a theory.

1116. Martin, M. W. "Reason and Utopianism in Wolff's Anarchism." Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (Fall 1980). Suggests that Wolff's contention that all political authority is unjustified has little of value to offer.

1117. Martin, R. "Wolff's Defense of Philosophical Anarchism." Philosophical Quarterly 24,95 (April 1974): 140-9. Suggests that Wolff's argument against obligation still leaves an opening for political philosophers to develop a doctrine based on de jure political authority.

1118. Menzel, P. T. "Wolff's Critics: Confusing the Confusing." Personalist 57,3 (Summer 1976): 308-24. A qualified defense of Wolff's argument which, while pointing out some inadequacies in his conceptual analysis, claims that it has definite applicability in the real world.

1119. Nowell-Smith, P. "What is Authority?" Philosophic Exchange 2, (Summer 1976). Based on an examination of the concepts of authority, autonomy, command and obedience the article disputes Wolff's conclusion that there is no such thing as legitimate authority. Suggests that it is possible to submit to authority without sacrificing moral autonomy.

1120. Perkins, L. H. "On Reconciling Autonomy and Authority." Ethics 82,2 (Jan. 1972): 114-123. Argues, in opposition to Wolff, that the state can be legitimate and that obligation to the state is a function of the duty to maintain one's autonomy.

1121. Pritchard, M. S. "On Understanding Political Power." Journal of Value Inquiry 13,1 (Spring 1979): 21-31. Examines Wolff's analysis of the concept of political power by looking at the theories which link his books The Poverty of Liberalism and In Defense of Anarchism.

1122. Pritchard, M. S. "Wolff's Anarchism." Journal of Value Inquiry 7,4 (Winter 1973): 296-302. Part of a discussion on Wolff in the Winter issue. See entries 1126 and 1131. Asserts that Wolff's argument is superficially persuasive but that he glosses over vital distinctions and ignores awkward questions. He fails, it is argued, to analyze autonomy, authority, legitimacy and consent with the care necessary to allow his use of the concepts to bear the weight of his argument.

1123. Reiman, J. H. "Anarchism and Nominalism: Wolff's Latest Obituary for Political Philosophy." Ethics 89,1 (Oct. 1978): 95-110. When, in a later edition of In Defense of Anarchism, Wolff replied to Reiman's original critique, op.cit., entry 1124, Reiman made this response in order to address what he perceived to be a major in Wolffs premise regarding the legitimacy of the state.

1124. Reiman, J. H. In Defense of Political Philosophy. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. A reply to Robert Paul Wolff's In Defense of Anarchism, claiming that Wolff fails to argue in defense of anarchism because he reaches no real conclusions about the possibility of, or rejection of, the state.

1125. Shipka, T. A. "A Critique of Anarchism." Studies in Soviet Thought 27,3 (April 1984): 247-61. Reviews the critiques of Wolff's position from a Lockean perspective. Since political authority and personal autonomy are not irreconcilable then citizens are morally bound to uphold legitimate government. Thus, the anarchist aim of a non-coercive substitute for government must fall short of the mark.

1126. Smith, M. B. E. "Wolff's Argument for Anarchism." Journal of Value Inquiry 7,4 (Winter 1973): 307-8. Part of a discussion on Wolff in the Winter issue. See entries 1122 and 1131. Wolff is berated for seeking to destroy faith in the legitimacy of the state in what is said to be a cavalier manner.

1127. Sobers, D. "Wolff's Logical Anarchism." Ethics 82,2 (Jan. 1972): 173-6. Suggests that the problems Wolff sees as being associated with majority rule are the product of a set of inconsistent premises rather than being inherent in democracy.

1128. Sterba, J. P. "The Decline of Wolff's Anarchism." Journal of Value Inquiry 11,3 (Fall 1977): 213-17. Argues that the ethical theory proposed in Wolff's The Autonomy of Reason. New York: 1973, provides a weaker basis for anarchist conclusions than the argument in In Defense of Anarchism.

1129. Steward, D. "A Pseudo-Anarchist Belatedly Replies to R. P. Wolff." Journal of Critical Analysis 4 (July 1972): 51-61. Contends that Wolff's case for moral autonomy as an individual's primary obligation does not lead to anarchism as the only practical outcome.

1130. Wilson, K. D. "Autonomy and Wolff's Defense of Anarchism." Philosophical Forum 8,1 (Fall 1976): 108-21. Argues that, despite its apparent simplicity and straightforwardness, Wolff's argument for the irreconcilability of political and moral authority is deceptive, with a weakness grounded in his approach to the concept of autonomy.

1131. Wolff, R. P. "Reply to Professors Pritchard and Smith." journal of Value Inquiry 7A (Winter 1973): 303-6. See entries 1122 and 1126. Part of the discussion of Wolff in the Winter issue. Wolff responds and seeks to rebut the critiques.


The Text:

1132. Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell, 1975. Also New York: Basic Bks., 1974. Nozick's influential and controversial libertarian treatment of individual rights, the origins of the political state and the source of its legitimacy. The study concludes that a minimal state, providing basic protection against fraud, theft and coercion and establishing a legal framework for the enforcement of contractual obligations, can be justified. A state more broadly empowered, however, would be a violation of the rights of individuals. Nozick seeks to demonstrate that the state is superior even to the "most favored situation of anarchy" where people behave within the limits of moral constraint. Arguing that the state arises naturally from a state of nature, seen as "the best anarchic situation one reasonably could hope for," Nozick concludes that the most desirable Utopian model is, in fact, the minimal state.

The Debate:

1133. Allen, B. G. and Patten, S. C. "Getting out of Harm's Way." Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 21,2 (June 1982): 293-305. Argues that Nozick's claim for the State arising from an individual's right to punish cannot be sustained. Rather, the right to punish is a right not transferred from its members but a right peculiar to any form of political association.

1134. Altham, J. E. J. "Reflections on the State of Nature." In Rational Action, edited by Ross Harrison, 133-46. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.Pr., 1979.

1135. Altman, A. "Nozick's Theory of Value and its Implications." Southern journal of Philosophy 22,2 (Summer 1984): 139-53. A critical analysis of the implications of Nozick's theory of value. Concludes that it begs the question of how 'value' is to be defined and explained.

1136. Andrew, E. "Inalienable Right, Alienable Property and Freedom of Choice: Locke, Nozick and Marx on the Alienability of Labour." Canadian Journal of Political Science 18,3 (1985): 529-50. A critical comparison of the respective approaches to property rights of Locke, Nozick and Marx. The main aim is to distinguish between inalienable and alienable forms of property so that claims to rights can be clarified.

1137. Arneson, R. J. "The Principles of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems." Ethics 92,4 (July 1982): 613-33. Argues that Nozick cannot, as he would like, abandon the principle of fairness, because this would entail abandoning the central commitments of his political philosophy. It might be possible, however, for Nozick's egoist principle to be modified to support a revised principle of fairness.

1138. Arrow, K. J. "Nozick's Entitlement Theory of Justice," Philosophia (Israel) 7,2 (June 1978): 265-79. A generally sympathetic though critical discussion of Nozick's entitlement theory of justice. Argues that Nozick's case lacks decisive, systematic argument but it nevertheless raises issues usually ignored by the utilitarian tradition. Possible roles for the state are not negated by Nozick's account.

1139. Axinn, S. "The Law of Land Warfare as Minimal Government." Personalist 59,4 (Oct. 1978): 374-85. An analysis of international relations which argues for the need to evolve a Nozick-type minimal state on an international scale. See entries 1149,1152,1177,1182,1196,1222,1228,1237.

1140. Barber, B. "Deconstituting Politics: Robert Nozick and Philosophical Reductionism." Journal of Politics 39,10 (Feb. 1977): 2-23. Suggests that it is possible to get beyond anarchism, without violating anarchist premises, to construct a defense of political legitimacy on wholly non-political grounds. Nozick's arguments about freedom, free market relations, entitlement and distributive justice are considered and refuted.

1141. Barnett, R. E. "Whither Anarchy: Has Robert Nozick Justified the State?" Journal of Libertarian Studies 1,1 (Winter 1977): 15-21. Argues that Nozick fails to meet his burden of proof and that the state remains unjustified.

1142. Barry, N. P. "Robert Nozick and the Minimal State." In On Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism, 132-60. New York: St. Martin's Pr., 1987. A critical analysis of Nozick's ideas within the context of a discussion of modern libertarianism. Anarchy, State and Utopia is acclaimed as the "most important book to be published on libertarian political thought since the war."

1143. Becker, L. C. "Against the Supposed Differences between Historical and End-State Theories." Philosophical Studies 41,2 (March 1982): 267-72. Argues that the supposed contrast between historical and end-state theories has been overdrawn. Historical theories are as substantive, and constrictive of liberty, as end-state theories.

1144. Bell, N. K. "Nozick and the Principle of Fairness." Social Theory and Practice 5,1 (Fall 1978): 65-73. Contends that Nozick, in arguing against the principle of fairness as presented by H. L. A. Hart and John Rawls, misses the point. He is wrong in concluding that he has lessened the force of the fairness principle or demonstrated that certain kinds of obligations do not arise from it.

1145. Berger, F. R. "Mill's Substantive Principle of Justice: A Comparison with Nozick." American Philosophical Quarterly 19,4 (Oct. 1982): 373-80. Attempts to draw out the theory of justice used by Mill when discussing the principle of economic rewards being proportional to effort Applied to the issue of taxation on wages and compared with the position taken by Nozick, it is concluded that Mill's view is equally plausible.

1146. Bernick, M. "A Note on Promoting Self-Esteem." Political Theory 6,1 (Feb. 1978): 109-18. Criticizes Nozick's view that nothing can be done to promote the self-esteem of individuals within a given society.

1147. Beversluis, E. H. "Benefit Rights in Education: An Entitlement View." Philosophy of Education Society Proceedings 40 (1984): 381-90. Distinguishes between "benefit rights" and "liberty rights" and modifies Nozick's view of entitlement so that it accords with a better understanding of people's "liberty rights."

1148. Biesenthal, L. "Natural Rights and Natural Assets." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 8,2 (June 1978): 153-71. Suggests that Nozick has only promised rather than argued for a theory of natural rights. Despite his claims, he is closer to Rawls' position on individualism than would at first appear to be the case.

1149. Blackstone, W. T. "The Minimal State: An Assessment of Some of the Philosophical Grounds." Personalist 59,4 (Oct. 1978): 333-43. Part of a symposium on the minimal state. See entries 1139, 1152, 1177, 1182, 1196, 1222,1228,1237.

1150. Buchanan, A. "Distributive Justice and Legitimate Expectations." Philosophical Studies 28,6 (Dec. 1975): 419-25. Argues that Nozick's assumptions about end-state or patterned principles mean that his theory might undermine legitimately generated expectations.

1151. Buchanan, A. "Exploitation, Alienation and Injustice." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9,1 (March 1979): 121-39. Primarily an exposition of Marx's theory of exploitation. Provides a brief but concise critique of Nozick's interpretation of Marx's analysis.

1152. Burrill, D. R. "Distributive Justice and the Minimal State: A Response to Blackstone." Personalist 59A (Oct. 1978): 394-97. Part of a symposium on the minimal state. See entries 1139,1149,1177,1182,1196,1222,1228,1237.

1153. Carey, G. W. "The Just and Good State: Rawls and Nozick Read Anew." Modern Age 20,4 (Fall 1976): 372-82. Asserts that neither Rawls's A Theory of Justice, nor Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia are deserving of the lavish praise and high reputation they have attracted. To the extent that either book opens up new areas or develops new conceptual approaches to the just or good state, it does so within structures and premises that are extremely limited.

1154. Chapman, B. "Rights as Constraints: Nozick vs. Sen." Theory and Decision 15,1 (1983): 1-10. Defends Nozick's views of rights as constraints, against Sen's view that individual rights cannot be adequately met through a preference maximization framework. See entry 1270.

1155. Coburn, R. G. "Distributive Justice and 'the Arbitrariness of Fortune'." Philosophical Inquiry 2 (Spring-Summer 1980): 441-57. Argues, against the position developed by Nozick, in support of a "qualified egalitarianism."

1156. Cohen, G. A. "Nozick on Appropriation." New Left Review 150 (March-April 1985): 89-105. Argues that even if self-ownership is a good thing, it does not warrant the unequal distribution of resources advocated by Nozick's position. This is particularly true of his theory dealing with the original appropriation of private property.

1157. Cohen, G. A. "Robert Nozick and Walt Chamberlain: How Patterns Preserve Liberty." Erkenntnis 11,1 (May 1977): 5-23. Seeks to provide a refutation of Nozick's argument that liberty cannot be achieved in a socialist society. Cohen also argues that the libertarian capitalist society favoured by Nozick is ultimately inimical to liberty. See entries 1193,1209.

1158. Cohen, G. A. "Self-Ownership, World Ownership, and Equality: Part II." Social Philosophy and Policy 3,2 (Spring 1986): 77-96. A continuation of the argument begun in "Nozick on Appropriation." See entry 1156. Concludes that Nozick's claim that freedom and equality are inconsistent cannot be upheld.

1159. Coleman, J. S. "Individual Rights and the State: A Review Essay." American Journal of Sociology 82,2 (Sept. 1976): 428-42. An extended review in which Coleman uses a discussion of Nozick's work as a means of putting the discussion of liberty, equality, justice and autonomy back on the agenda of sociology.

1160. Cummiskey, D. "Desert and Entitlement: A Rawlsian Consequentialist Account." Analysis 47,1 (Jan. 1987): 15-19. Primarily a defense of Rawls' key position on entitlement in which Cummiskey discusses Nozick's views.

1161. Danielson, P. "Taking Anarchism Seriously." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 8,2 (June 1978): 137-52. Criticizes Nozick on his own ground, namely from a natural rights perspective. Argues that Nozick's political theory does not match up to his moral theory of natural rights.

1162. Danley, J. R. "Contracts, Conquerors and Conquests." South West journal of Philosophy 10 (Spring 1979): 171-77. Argues that Nozick's method commits him to placing the interests of aggressors above those of the conquered.

1163. Danley, J. R. "An Examination of the Fundamental Assumptions of Hypothetical Process Arguments." Philosophical Studies 34,2 (Aug. 1978): 187-95. Argues that both Nozick and Rawls employ versions of the hypothetical process argument. He suggests that such arguments involve logical anomalies which render them problematic for determining moral obligations in any given society.

1164. Danley, J. R. "Robert Nozick and the Libertarian Paradox." Mind 88,351 (July 1979): 419-23. A response to Sampson's critique, entry 1261, of Nozick's attempt to resolve the perceived paradox of liberalism.

1165. Davidson, J. D. "Note on Anarchy State and Utopia." journal of Libertarian Studies 1,4 (Fall 1977): 341-8. A critique of Nozick's "invisible hand" explanation of the origin of the state which, it is argued, fails to provide a satisfactory explanation of its emergence.

1166. Davis, L. "Comments on Nozick's Entitlement Theory." Journal of Philosophy 73,2 (Dec. 1976): 836-44. A constructive criticism of Nozick's entitlement theory.

1167. Davis, M. "Necessity and Nozick's Theory of Entitlement." Political Theory 5,2 (May 1977): 219-32. Argues that Nozick is successful in refuting anarchism but not in defending libertarianism. The crucial problem for Nozick is the theory of distributive justice.

1168. De Gregori, T. R. "Market Morality: Robert Nozick and the Question of Economic Justice." American Journal of Economics and Sociology 38,1 (Jan. 1979): 17-30. Asserts that Nozick's attempts to use normative arguments to justify free markets are inconsistent, illogical and unscientific.

1169. Den Uyl, D. and Rasmussen, D. "Nozick on the Randian Argument." Personalist 59,2 (April 1978): 184-205. Nozick is criticized because, it is argued, his analysis of Ayn Rand's argument, that individuals have a natural right to liberty, distorts her position.

1170. Diggs, B. J. "Liberty without Fraternity." Ethics 87,2 (Jan. 1977): 97-112. Examines some alleged shortcomings of Nozick's theories with particular reference to entitlement and the 'difference principle'.

1171. Drury, S. B. "Locke and Nozick on Property." Political Studies 39,1 (March 1982): 28-41. Seeks to demonstrates that the differences between Locke and Nozick concerning private property are substantial, in that their theories stem from quite different moral and political premises.

1172. Ehman, R. R. "Nozick's Proviso." Journal of Value Inquiry 20,1 (1986): 51-6. Draws out the implications of Nozick's theory of property rights, particularly his use of Locke's proviso. Nozick's reworked version of this is argued to be far narrower than he claims.

1173. Exdell, J. "Distributive Justice: Nozick on Property Rights." Ethics 87,2 (Jan. 1977): 142-9. Argues that, contrary to Nozick's view, the idea that people may not be used as means is not necessarily incompatible with the notion that certain resources must be managed for the common good.

1174. Exdell, J. "Liberty, Equality and Capitalism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11,3 (Sept. 1981): 457-72. Argues that Nozick is mistaken in his view that liberty and equality are in moral conflict. The basis for inequality is located in the process of production.

1175. Farrell, D. "Punishment without the State." Nous 22,3 (Sept. 1988): 437-53. After showing that punishment was possible within a Lockean state of nature, Farrell goes on to argue that punishment, as a deterrent, need not always violate the Kantian imperative.

1176. Fishkin, J. S. Tyranny and Legitimacy: A Critique of Political Theories. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Pr., 1979. Analyzes various theories of legitimacy in terms of three categories: procedural principles, structural principles, and absolute rights principles. All three of these involve a violation of the condition of non-tyranny, which Fishkin specifies as a necessary condition for any adequate theory of legitimacy. In Nozick's case, the reliance on absolute rights is problematic.

1177. Flower, E. and Edel, A. "What Does Minimal Government Minimize?" Personalist 59,4 (Oct. 1978): 386-93. An examination of the problems experienced by theories of minimal government, specifying what such theories seek, but usually fail, to minimize. Part of a symposium. See entries 1139,1149,1152,1182,1196,1222,1228,1237.

1178. Fowler, M. "Self-ownership, Mutual Aid, and Mutual Respect: Some Counter-Examples to Nozick's Libertarianism." Social Theory and Practice 6,2 (Summer 1980): 227-45. Suggests that the strength of Nozick's theory rests on his claim that rival theories are inconsistent with particular moral judgements. Fowler argues that these judgements are open to question. In particular, Nozick's arguments about property rights and self-ownership are not necessarily proven by his use of counter-examples, especially if the notions of "mutual respect" and "mutual aid" are taken seriously.

1179. Fowler, M. "Stability and Utopia: A Critique of Nozick's Framework Argument." Ethics 90,4 (July 1980): 550-63. Contends that all of Nozick's innovations within the liberal tradition are quite implausible.

1180. Francis, L. P. and Francis, J. G. "Nozick's Theory of Rights: A Critical Assessment." Western Political Quarterly 29 A (Dec. 1976): 634-44. Argues that Nozick's claims are too strong and are not supported by historical evidence. By drawing on an empirical example the authors seek to demonstrate the inflexibility of Nozick's position on absolute rights with respect to actual historical, technological and social change.

1181. Francis, M. "A Critique of Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia." Political Science (N.Z.) 29,2 (1977): 152-70. Begins by examining Nozick's fundamental explanation of the political realm. Nozick explains politics by referring to Locke's theory of property. But, since Locke does not provide a notion of property which is distinct from politics, it cannot, it is argued, be used in the way Nozick attempts.

1182. Gill, E. R. "Responsibility and Choice in Robert Nozick: Sins of Commission and of Omission." Personalist 59,4 (Oct. 1978): 344-57. Argues that Nozick's theory of freedom is one-sided, consisting only in the absence of impediments to individual actions, thus giving positive acts, rather than failures to act, exclusive attention. See entries 1139, 1149, 1152, 1177,1196, 1222,1228,1237.

1183. Goldman, A. H. "The Entitlement Theory of Distributive Justice." The Journal of Philosophy 73,21 (2 Dec. 1976): 823-35. Sees Nozick's position as a philosophical extreme and seeks a more rational middle ground between it and egalitarianism.

1184. Goldsmith, M. M. "The Entitlement Theory of Justice Considered." Political Studies 27 A (Dec. 1979): 578-93. Suggests that the three principles underlying Nozick's entitlement theory of justice raise difficulties in application. In particular, Nozick's theory fails to specify what rights may be acquired, transferred or bequeathed.

1185. Goldsworthy, J. D. "Nozick's Libertarianism and the Justification of the State." Ratio 29,2 (Dec. 1987): 180-89. Argues that Nozick's attempt to justify the state ultimately fails. Without such a justification libertarianism collapses into anarchism.

1186. Gorr, M. "Nozick and the Opposed Preferences Theory of Exchange." Theory and Decision 8,3 (July 1977): 289-92. Points out that Nozick's argument about the ranking of value for exchange purposes is not as strong as he supposes. Preferences for exchange of goods, or services, may well be exercised in terms of some mutually agreed notion of exchangeability rather than in terms of perceived utility.

1187. Gorr, M. "Nozick's Argument against Blackmail." Personalist 58,2 (April 1977): 187-91. Claims that Nozick's arguments against blackmail should be rejected.

1188. Grafstein, R. "The Ontological Foundations of Nozick's View of Politics: Robert's Rules of Order." Philosophical Studies 44,3 (Nov. 1983): 401-24. Suggests that Nozick's argument lacks a precise justification of the particular rights accruing to individuals. In essence, Nozick posits an individualist ontology that takes priority over the social.

1189. Gransrose, J. T. "Anarchy, State and Utopia, by Robert Nozick." Social Theory and Practice 3,4 (Fall 1975): 487-96. A critical review suggesting that Nozick's arguments for the minimal state rest on a theory of rights which may not be as absolute as he claims.

1190. Haksar, V. Equality, Liberty and Perfectionism. London: Oxford Univ. Pr., 1979. Argues that egalitarianism cannot bypass the notion of perfectionism.

1191. Harris Jr., C. E. "Kant, Nozick and the Minimal State." South West Journal of Philosophy 10,1 (Spring 1979): 179-87. Argues that Nozick's use of the Kantian principle that humans are ends not means is misguided. Kant would have accepted that the state could act in a benevolent fashion for the common good.

1192. Harrison, F. "Rights and the Right Wing: Nozick Reconsidered." Our Generation 16,2 (Spring 1984): 27-34. Argues that Nozick's views provide a sophisticated but erroneous support for Friedmanism, and defends anarchism and socialism against Nozick's critique.

1193. Harsanyi, J. C. "Liberty under Socialism and the New Socialist Man: Comments on Cohen's Paper." Erkenntnis 11,3 (May 1977): 427-28. Suggests that the historical examples of existing socialism do not bear out Cohen's claims about the compatibility of liberty and socialism. See entries 1157, 1209.

1194. Hart, H. L. A. "Between Utility and Rights." Columbia Law Review 79,5 (June 1979): 828-46. Argues that while Nozick's critique of utilitarianism offers some useful insights, his argument that morality stems from inviolable individual rights fails to convince.

1195. Held, V. "John Locke on Robert Nozick." Social Research 43,1 (Spring 1975): 169-95. Argues that Nozick's framework derives not from John Locke but from Locke's protagonist Robert Filmer.

1196. Held, V. "What is Minimal Government ?" Personalist 59,4 (Oct. 1978): 405-9. A definitional discussion forming part of a symposium on the minimal state. See entries 1139,1149,1152,1177,1182,1222,1228,1237.

1197. Henley, K. "Children and the Individualism of Mill and Nozick." Personalist 59A (Oct. 1978): 415-19. Discusses the views of Mill and Nozick on the rearing and educating of children. While Nozick notes the problem he does not address it.

1198. Himmelfarb, M. "Liberals and Libertarianism." Commentary 59,6 (1975): 65-70. Suggests that Nozick's argument in Anarchy, State and Utopia is basically tautological. Contrasts Nozick's position with Jewish philosophy to show that Nozick's atomistic individualism is false.

1199. Hiskes, R. P. Community without Coercion. Newark: Univ. of Delaware Pr., 1982. Critically examines the notion of "community" in the work of three individualist thinkers: Robert Nozick, Benjamin Tucker, and Herbert Spencer. Argues that each of them values the notion of community and that each attempts to redefine "community" through a re-evaluation of the notion of "self-interest".

1200. Holmes, R. L. "Nozick on Anarchism." Political Theory 5,2 (May 1977): 247-56. Argues that since, in disadvantaging independent agents through a monopoly of force, the movement from the ultraminimal to the minimal state involves a morally impermissible step, the state has not been justified by Nozick's own criteria.

1201. Horn, W. "Libertarianism and Private Property in Land: The Positions of Rothbard and Nozick, Critically Examined, Are Disputed." American Journal of Economics and Sociology 43,3 (1984): 341-56. A critical examination of Rothbard and Nozick. Suggests that both of their positions are untenable because of their vagueness and ambiguity over the definition of value.

1202. Hurka, T. "Rights and Capital Punishment." Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 21,4 (1982): 647-60. Argues for a new approach to capital punishment based on natural rights principles.

1203. Hustvedt, A. "Robert Nozick's Entitlement Theory of Distributive Justice: An Explication and Critique." Dialogue 24 (April 1982): 29-34. Argues that despite his use of Kant's categorical imperative, Nozick fails to prove that his envisaged social system, in which some prosper and others are left in need, does not violate Kant's injunction.

1204. Johnson, K. "Government by Insurance Company: The Anti-Political Philosophy of Robert Nozick." Western Political Quarterly 29,2 (June 1976): 177-88. Attempts to draw out the implications of Nozick's views on the state, arguing that his views are anti-political.

1205. Kavka, G. S. "An Internal Critique of Nozick's Entitlement Theory." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63,4 (Oct. 1982): 371-80. Nozick's entitlement theory suffers, it is argued, because two of his main principles, namely the Lockean proviso and the rectification principle, do not perform the task that he requires of them.

1206. Kelley, D. "Life, Liberty and Property." Social Philosophy and Policy 1,2 (Spring 1984): 108-18. A critical examination of three perspectives, including that of Nozick, that attempt to ground the justification for private ownership in a principle of liberty. Argues that such approaches fail because they lack appropriate consideration of the social ends or goals of human activity.

1207. Klosko, G. "Presumptive Benefit, Fairness and Political Obligation." Philosophy and Public Affairs 16,3 (1987): 241-59. Examines the ideas of Simmons, Rawls and Nozick, discussing the grounding of general political obligation on the principle of fairness. See entries 1531 and 1537.

1208. Knowles, D. R. "Autonomy, Side-Constraints and Property." Mind 88,350 (April 1979): 263-5. Examines the relationship between moral theory, property rights and justice in distribution.

1209. Kolm, S. "Comment on Cohen's Paper." Erkenntnis 11,3 (Nov. 1977): 429-30. Suggests that Cohen's approach, entry 1157, to distributional justice is useful when contrasted with the "cut-throat anarchism" of Nozick and others. See also entry 1193.

1210. Kuflik, A. "Process and End-State in the Theory of Economic Justice." Social Theory and Practice 8,1 (Spring 1982): 73-94. Analyzes Nozick's claim to have provided a "pure-process" solution to the problem of distribution. Suggests that Nozick's appeal to the Lockean proviso is analogous to Rawls' difference principle, and that their respective solutions to the problem of distribution are similar in form.

1211. Ladenson, R. F. "Does the Deterrence Theory of Punishment Exist? A Response to Nozick." Philosophy Research Archives (A Bilingual Microfilm Journal of Philosophy). Fiche 5. 2,1090 (1976): 391-405. Nozick's critique of the utilitarian theory of deterrence is faulty, it is asserted, because he wrongly assumes that knowledge of penalties will be sufficient to deter potential wrongdoers. Ladenson argues that a utilitarian does not need to make any such assumption.

1212. Ladenson, R. F. "Nozick on the Law and the State: A Critique." Philosophical Studies 34,4 (Nov. 1978): 437-44. Argues that Nozick's account rest on three false assumptions: first, that a state is defined by its control of territory; second, that his protective associations function as states; third, that there is no necessary correlation between political authority, that is rights of sovereignty, and the duties of subjects.

1213. Lederkramer, D. L. "Quest on the Entitlement Theory." Analysis 39,4 (Oct. 1979): 219-22. A response to Quest's critique of Nozick, entry 1251. Argues that Quest's case is not proven because Quest's argument confuses aspects of Nozick's approach.

1214. Lieberman, J. K. "The Relativity of Injury." Philosophy and Public Affairs 7,1 (Fall 1977): 60-73. Contends that Nozick's argument for the minimal state has broader reach than he concedes. Suggests that the law derives from an already legitimate state rather than, as Nozick claims, the reverse.

1215. Lind, D. "The Failure of Nozick's Invisible-Hand Justification of the Minimal State." Auslegung 15 (Winter 1989): 57-68. Argues that Nozick's justification of a minimal state rests on a flawed conception of the state of nature.

1216. Litan, R. E. "On Rectification in Nozick's Minimal State." Political Theory 5,2 (May 1977): 232-46. Suggests that Nozick fails to apply libertarian principles to his theory of rectification, since it can be argued that nothing in Nozick's exposition precludes a strictly egalitarian distribution of entitlements.

1217. Lyons, D. B. "Rights against Humanity." Philosophical Review 85,2 (April 1976): 107-21. An examination of Nozick's arguments for the minimal state.

1218. Machan, T. R. "Fishkin on Nozick's Absolute Rights." Journal of Libertarian Studies 6,3-4 (Summer-Fall 1982): 317-20. Argues that Fishkin's claims about Nozick's arguments, in his Tyranny and Legitimacy, entry 1176, are in error since he does not appreciate Nozick's distinction between political/legal propriety and moral propriety.

1219. Machan, T. R. "Nozick and Rand on Property Rights." Personalist 58,2 (April 1977): 192-5. A brief analysis of Nozick's discussion of Ayn Rand. Contends that Nozick has misread Rand and that her argument has more substance than Nozick claims.

1220. Machan, T. R. "Some Recent Work in Human Rights Theory." American Philosophical Quarterly 17,2 (April 1980): 103-15. A survey of a number of important and influential philosophers in the field of human rights. Includes Blackstone, Dworkin and Nozick.

1221. Mack, E. "Distributive Justice and the Tensions of Lockeanism." Social Philosophy and Policy 1,1 (Autumn 1983): 132-50. While primarily concerned with a critical analysis of the views on property developed by Hillel Steiner, entry 1279, the paper contains an informed discussion of Nozick's theory of property and entitlement. It emphasises the existence and persistence of the Lockean tension between the idea of an individual as "proprietor of his own person" and the claim that God gave nature to humanity in common.

1222. Maneli, M. "Expanding the Functions of the State and the Freedom of the Individual." Personalist 59,4 (Oct. 1978): 424-27. Part of a symposium on the minimal state. See entries 1139,1149,1152,1177,1182,1196,1228,1237.

1223. Margolis, J. "Political Equality and Political Justice." Social Research 44,2 (Summer 1977): 308-29. Primarily concerned with an analysis of general theoretical presuppositions for equality and justice. Deals with Nozick towards the end of the analysis only to dismiss his account as tantamount to an apology for acquisitive individualism.

1224. Mayo, B. "Justice, Truth and Nozick." Analysis 40,3 (June 1980): 119-23. Argues that Nozick confuses justice with truth While logical modes of inference may be truth preserving, they need not necessarily preserve fairness or justice.

1225. Meyers, D. T. "The Inevitability of the State." Analysis 41,1 (Jan. 1981): 46-9. Questions Nozick's assumptions that procedural rights are not a necessary basis for the state's existence.

1226. Miller, D. "Justice and Property." Ratio 22,1 (June 1980): 1-14. Argues that theories of property presuppose theories of justice since the Lockean principle of acquisition implies a prior theory of distribution of desert.

1227. Miller, R. W. "Rights and Reality." Philosophical Review 90,3 (July 1981): 783-407. A critical comparative analysis of the natural rights arguments of Nozick, Rawls, and Dworkin, arguing that it is not certain that such absolute rights can be defended in the ways that the three theorists intend.

1228. Moffat, R. C. L. "'Minimal government': An Introductory Appraisal." Personalist 59,4-Oct. 1978): 321-32. A critical introduction to Nozick's key claims. Suggests that Nozick's account omits any understanding of the dominant power wielded by social and economic institutions. See also entries 1139,1149,1152,1177,1182,1196,1222,1237.

1229. Morris, C. W. "Human Autonomy and the Natural Right to Be Free." Journal of Libertarian Studies 4,4 (Fall 1980): 379-92. Argues that the natural right to be free can be argued for from the premise of autonomy. Reference is made to the work of Rawls and Nozick.

1230. Mulholland, L. A. "Rights and Utilitarianism." Journal of Philosophy 83,6 (June 1986): 323-40. A comparison of Nozick, Rawls and Hart. Contends that Nozick's arguments are insufficient to prove the inadequacy of a utilitarian theory of rights.

1231. Mumy, G. E. "What Does Nozick's Minimal State Do?" Economics and Philosophy 3,2 (Oct. 1987): 275-305. A discussion of what Nozick's minimal state might be like if it existed. Suggests that such a state may well be inefficient and generate considerable social disadvantages.

1232. Naverson, J. The Libertarian Idea. Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Pr., 1989. A sympathetic exposition of libertarianism written from a contractarian perspective. Discusses moral theory and theories of private property rights in some depth.

1233. Neumann, M. "Entitlements: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing." Journal of Value Inquiry 14,2 (Summer 1980): 149-56. Argues that Nozick's critique of a utilitarian based morality, confuses a general theory of entitlements with his own specific theory. Thus, his critique does not provide sufficient grounds for rejecting the utilitarian approach.

1234. Nielsen, K. "Nozick's Critique of Egalitarianism." Indian Political Science Review 18,1 (Jan. 1984): 73-80. Attacks Nozick's implicit claim that people in inferior jobs are inferior people by pointing out that such a view ignores the socialization process.

1235. Norton, D. "Individualism and Productive Justice." Ethics 87,2 (Jan. 1977): 113-25. Argues that Nozick's normative conception of the individual is the result of an unacceptable separation of political and moral philosophy. As such it undermines the validity of any arguments based on individualism.

1236. Obler, J. "Fear, Prohibition and Liberty." Political Theory 9,1 (Feb. 1981): 65-80. Nozick's theory of the minimal state rests on a dilemma. Either liberty is tenuous or the minimal state must be built on a violation of the rights of some at least.

1237. O'Connor, F. W. "Minimalist Presumptivism: A Response." Personalist 59,4 (Oct. 1978): 420-3. Part of a symposium on the minimal state. See 1139,1149,1177,1182., 1196,1222,1228.

1238. O'Neill, O. "Nozick's Entitlements." Inquiry 19,4 (Winter 1976): 468-81. Criticizes Nozick for failing to show adequately how entitlement arises over previously unsecured resources.

1239. O'Neill, P. "The Inadequacy of Contract Theory in Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia." Personalist 60,4 (Oct. 1979): 429-32. An analysis of the method used by Nozick to establish the claim that only the minimal state can be justified.

1240. Paul, E. F. "The Just Takings Issue." Environmental Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Journal dedicated to the Philosophical Aspects of Environmental Problems 3,4 (Winter 1981): 309-28. Notes that legal judgements of the takings issue rarely exhibit a foundational theory of justice regarding property rights. Evaluates the theories of Rawls and Nozick in terms of their suitability for real world issues.

1241. Paul, J. "Nozick, Anarchism and Procedural Rights." Journal of Libertarian Studies 1,4 (Fall 1977): 337-40. Denies Nozick's claim that private agencies or associations can be used to defend procedural rights because they are, in some sense, pre-legal. Nozick is wrong to assume the burden of proof rests with the pro-governmental party.

1242. Paul, J., ed. Reading Nozick: Essays on Anarchy, State and Utopia. Totewa, N. J.: Rowan & Littlefield, 1981. An excellent collection of articles devoted to the critical assessment of the positions put forward by Robert Nozick. A good introduction is provided by the editor. Contributors include Robert Paul Wolff, Bernard Williams, Peter Singer, Thomas Nagel, David Lyons, Thomas Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson.

1243. Paul, J. "The Withering of Nozick's Minimal State." Philosophy Research Archives (A Bilingual Microfilm Journal of Philosophy). Fiche 4. 5,1347 (1979): 275-85. Argues that Nozick's justification for the minimal state violates his own principles of entitlement. Consequently the attempt to legitimize the transformation of the "dominant agency" into a nightwatchman state fails.

1244. Perelli-Minetti, C. R. "Nozick on Sen: A Misunderstanding." Theory and Decision 8,4 (Oct. 1977): 387-93. Argues that Nozick's principle of distributive justice requires the very aspects of Sen's approach that Nozick claims to have avoided. See entries 1154,1270.

1245. Pettit, P. "Rights, Constraints, and Trumps." Analysis 47,1 (Jan. 1987): 8-14. An analysis of the respective positions of Nozick and Dworkin on rights. Pettit argues that the two positions are analytically equivalent.

1246. Pettit, P. "Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia." Theory and Decision 8,4 (Oct. 1977): 399-411. A review of Nozick which focuses on the extent to which he has made the case for a legitimate and optimal form of political association.

1247. Phillips, D. L. "The Equality Debate: What Does Justice Require?" Theory and Society 4,2 (Summer 1977): 247-72. A comparison of Nozick's and Rawls' respective theories of justice focussing on their implications for economic equality.

1248. Philmore, J. "The Libertarian Case for Slavery: A Note on Nozick." Philosophical Forum 14,1 (Fall 1982): 43-8. In the light of Nozick's libertarian argument for voluntary contractual slavery, it is argued that, since liberal arguments must include the employment contract of the free enterprise system, they must also include the logical possibility of contractual slavery.

1249. Plattner, M. F. "The New Political Theory." Public Interest 40 (Summer 1975): 119-28. A critical though sympathetic review of Nozick, which, noting his reduction of humans to "economic man," argues that his grasp of the wider tradition of political theory is somewhat limited.

1250. Postema, G. J. "Nozick on Liberty, Compensation and the Individual's Right to Punish." Social Theory and Practice 6,3 (Fall 1980): 310-37. Focussing on Nozick's analysis of the justification for punishment, Postema argues that, since Nozick's position entails a greater degree of coercion than he admits, his conception of individual liberty is weakened.

1251. Quest, E. "Whatever Arises from a Just Distribution by Just Steps is Itself Just." Analysis 37,4 (June 1977): 204-8. Suggests that there are inherent faults in a logic that argues that a series of individual actions based on good decisions will necessarily have a cumulative effect that is also desirable. See entry 1213.

1252. Reiman, J. H. 'The Fallacy of Libertarian Capitalism." Ethics 92,1 (Oct. 1981): 85-95. Argues that "libertarian capitalism" is a contradiction in terms because of its supporters uncritical and over-simplified assumptions about the nature of property rights and their acquisition.

1253. Replogle, R. "Natural Rights and Distributive Justice: Nozick and Classical Contractarians." Canadian Journal of Political Science 17,1 (March 1984): 65-86. Contrasts Nozick's arguments with the classical tradition of natural rights arguments and concludes that the latter are better able to resolve political dilemmas.

1254. Roemer, E. K. "Nozick, Rawls, and Equal Athletic Opportunity in Education." Philosophy of Education: Society Proceedings 36 (1980): 322-31. A comparison of Nozick's and Rawls' respective theories as appropriate frameworks for guiding decisions about equal opportunities in school sport.

1255. Roemer, J. E. "A Challenge to Neo-Lockeanism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18,4 (Dec. 1988): 697-710. Challenges Nozick's claim that allegedly self-evident property rights can justify, even with the Lockean proviso, inequalities in the distribution of income.

1256. Rollins, M. "Distributive Justice." Kinesis 14 (Spring 1985): 79-105. A comparison of Nozick's and Rawls' views on distributive justice.

1257. Rothbard, M. N. The Ethics of Liberty. New York: Atlantic Highlands Humanities Pr., 1982. An often perceptive critique of various theories of liberty, including Nozick's, leading to Rothbard's own libertarian proposals.

1258. Rothbard, M. N. "Robert Nozick and the Immaculate Conception of the State." Journal of Libertarian Studies 1,1 (Winter 1977): 45-57. An extended critique concluding that Nozick has not justified either the state or individual rights.

1259. Russell, P. "Nozick, Need and Charity." Journal of Applied Philosophy 4 (Oct. 1987): 205-16. A four part argument which first, provides an analysis of Nozick's theory of entitlement, second, demonstrates that "need" is an appropriate basis for distribution, third, argues that this does not necessarily violate individuals' rights, and finally draws out the general significance of this analysis.

1260. Ryan, C. C. "Yours, Mine, Ours: Property Rights and Individual Liberty." Ethics 87,2 (Jan. 1977): 126-41. Criticizes Nozick for treating the link between private property and freedom as self-evident and for failing to address conceptions of justice which reject that premise.

1261. Sampson, G. "Liberalism and Nozick's 'Minimal State'." Mind 87,2 (Jan. 1978): 93-7. Argues that the premises on which Nozick bases his defense of liberalism are flawed and therefore counter-productive. See entry 1164.

1262. Sandel, M. J. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. New York: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1982. An analysis of the conceptual limits of liberalism in its approach to justice. Chapter 2 provides an extended discussion of Nozick and Rawls and their contrasting views.

1263. Sanders, J. T. The Ethical Argument against Government. Washington D.C.: Univ. Pr. of America, 1980. A critique of ethical arguments for government written from a perspective sympathetic to, but critical of, Nozick's ideas.

1264. Sanders, J. T. 'The Free Market Model versus Government: A Reply to Nozick." Journal of Libertarian Studies 1,1 (Winter 1977): 35-44. Asserts that Nozick's claims concerning the rationale for statehood are assertions lacking adequate analytic support, and argues for the free market model of social organization.

1265. Sarkar, H. "The Lockean Proviso." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12,1 (March 1982): 47-59. Asserts that Nozick's claim that the Lockean proviso is not an end-state principle can be shown to be false. Thus the Lockean proviso can lead to interference with individual liberty.

1266. Sayward, C. "Should Persons Be Sacrificed for the General Welfare?" Journal of Value Inquiry 16,3 (1982): 149-52. Suggests that the basis for Nozick's theory of the inviolability of the individual lacks substance.

1267. Sayward, C. and Wasserman, W. "Has Nozick Justified the State?" Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62,4 (Oct. 1981): 411-15. Argues that neither of Nozick's two claims regarding the state, namely that it emerges in a morally permissible way and that this therefore justifies its existence, stands up to close scrutiny from an anarchist perspective.

1268. Scanlon, T. "Nozick on Rights, Liberty, and Property." Philosophy and Public Affairs 6,1 (Fall 1976): 1-25. Argues that Nozick's particular framework of property rights does not provide an adequate basis for economic liberty.

1269. Schaeffer, D. "Libertarianism and Political Philosophy: A Critique of Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia." Interpretation 12,2-3 (May- Sept. 1984): 301-34. A detailed critical analysis arguing for the weakness of Nozick's conception of justice. Claims that separating the study of politics from morals, as both Nozick and Rawls seek to do, cannot be supported.

1270. Sen, A. "Rights and Agency." Philosophy and Public Affairs 11,1 (Winter 1982): 3-39. Examines three key problem areas; rights and moral theory, agent-relative values and the nature of moral evaluation. See entries 1154,1244.

1271. Shapiro, I. The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1986. A comparative analysis of contemporary liberal rights theorists. Argues that normative questions must also take note of empirical debates. The implication of this are drawn out and applied to contemporary debates.

1272. Simmons, J. A. Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Pr., 1980. A broad-ranging discussion of political obligation and consent theory within the liberal tradition with specific consideration of "Nozick's Arguments," pages 118-36.

1273. Simmons, J. A. "The Principle of Fair Play." Philosophy and Public Affairs 8,4 (Summer 1979): 148-74. Principally a defense of Nozick's interpretation of the principle of fair play as against the arguments expounded by Rawls and Hart. A revised and shortened version of Chapter 5 in Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, op.cit, entry 1272.

1274. Smith, A. A. "Robert Nozick's Critique of Marxian Economics." Social Theory and Practice 8,2 (Summer 1982): 165-88. Nozick's criticisms of Marx cover three areas: the concept of exploitation, the notion of risk, and the question of value. Smith examines each area and concludes that Nozick has not refuted Marx's position.

1275. Sonstegaard, M. "Nozick on Sen: A Reply to Perelli-Minetti." Theory and Decision 22,2 (May 1987): 203-7. A response to the specific claims made by Perelli-Minetti. See entry 1244.

1276. Sorensen, R. A. "Nozick's Justice and the Sorites." Analysis 46,2 (March 1986): 102-6. Notes that a key aspect of Nozick's entitlement theory is the view that whatsoever arises from an already just situation by just steps is itself just. Following Quest, Sorensen argues that Nozick's position remains prone to the sorites objection. See entry 1251.

1277. Steiner, H. "Justice and Entitlement." Ethics 87,3 (Jan. 1977): 150-2. A brief look at the question of entitlement and inheritance.

1278. Steiner, H. "Nozick on Hart on the Right to Enforce." Analysis 41,1 (Jan. 1981): 50. A brief statement concluding that Nozick's argument is self- contradictory.

1279. Steiner, H. "Slavery, Socialism, and Private Property." In Property, edited by Roland J. Pennock, 244-65. New York: New York Univ. Pr., 1980. (Nomos, 22). Demonstrates that a categorical condemnation of slavery is justified only on the basis of a principle entitling each person to equal liberty. Proprietary rights are justified on similar grounds but extend only to non-human objects since the principle of liberty implies that humans can veto any initial assignment of holdings.

1280. Steiner, H. "Vanishing Powers; a Reply to Miller and Wilson." Analysis 42,2 (March 1982): 97-8. A brief response in which it is pointed out that Nozick's position entails both the admissibility and the non- admissibility of the same enforcing action. See 1227 and 1291.

1281. Sterba, J. P. The Demands of Justice. Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Pr., 1980. A critical analysis of what Sterba sees as the appropriate foundations of justice. Nozick is discussed in Chapter four, and is also mentioned in the discussion on neo-libertarianism and the "nightwatchman state."

1282. Sterba, J. P. "In Defence of Rawls against Arrow and Nozick." Philosophia (Israel) 7,2 (June 1978): 293-303. Argues that Nozick's objections to Rawls' position can be rejected since it can be demonstrated that Rawls' two principles of justice involve an historical process perspective.

1283. Sterba, J. P. "Recent Work on Alternative Conceptions of Justice." American Philosophical Quarterly 23,1 (Jan. 1986): 1-22. A critical evaluation of libertarian, welfare socialist, and perfectionist theories of justice.

1284. Swanton, C. "Outline of an Intuitionist Response to Nozick." Politics 18,2 (1983): 68-75. Addresses arguments that Nozick has no basis for his theory of property rights and outlines an intuitionist response to his views.

1285. Teitlemah, M. "Anarchy, State and Utopia by Robert Nozick." Columbia Law Review 77,3 (April 1977): 495-509. Compares Nozick's arguments to those of Rawls in A Theory on Justice and examines their contrasting conclusions.

1286. Thigpen, R. B. "Two Approaches to the Principles of Justice in Recent American Political Philosophy: A Review Essay." Journal of Thought 21 (Winter 1986): 118-26. Argues that recent American discussions of justice exhibit two major approaches. Rawls, Nozick and Ackerman use a hypothetical procedure, while others such as Unger proceed from principles based on conceptions of human nature.

1287. Tucker, D. "Nozick's Individualism." Politics 14,1 (May 1979): 709-21. While noting that Nozick's claims about justice rely on his particular assumptions about economic activity, it is argued that it may still be possible for Nozick to develop a theory of justice organized around an egalitarian notion of fairness.

1288. Ullmann-Margalit, E. "Invisible-Hand Explanations." Synthese 39,2 (Oct. 1978): 263-92. A comparison of the relative merits of intentional design versus invisible-hand type explanations, with a focus on Nozick.

1289. Van der Veen, R. J. and Van Parijo, P. "Entitlement Theories of Justice: From Nozick to Roemer and Beyond." Economics and Philosophy U (April 1985): 69-81.

1290. Von Magnus, E. "Risk, State and Nozick." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1982): 121-32. A critical analysis of Nozick's views on risk in the context of his wider philosophy.

1291. Wilson, P. "Steiner on Nozick on the Right to Enforce." Analysis 41,4 (Oct. 1981): 219-22. Argues that Steiner's argument, entry 1278, is incorrect. See also 1280.

1292. Wolff, J. Robert Nozick, Property, Justice and the Minimal State. Cbxford: Polity/Blackwells, 1991. Nozick, it is argued, disappoints expectations, since a commitment to liberty leads not to equality and community but to private enterprise and inequality. It is contended that Nozick does not demonstrate that any important inconsistency exists between liberty and equality, and that his views have much in common with any defense of laissez-faire capitalism. Sections deal with Lilbertarianism, rights, the minimal state, the entitlement theory of justice and Nozick as a political philosopher.

1293. Wood, D. "Nozick's Justification of the Minimal State." Ethics 88,3 (jVpril 1978): 260-62. Points out that the argument for protection in the minimal state can be made just as strongly for other vital needs such as education. In which case, there is the foundation of an argument for the welfare state.

1294. Yanal, R. J. "Notes on the Foundation of Nozick's Theory of Rights." Personalist 60,4 (Oct. 1979): 349-59. Noting the moral principles which provide the basis for Nozick's theory of natural rights, Yanal defends the latter's theory of entitlement, but argues that the Lockean proviso can only be justified on utilitarian grounds.

1295. Young, F. C. "Nozick and the Individualist Anarchists." journal of Libertarian Studies 8,1 (Winter 1986): 43-9. It is argued that, despite Nozick's arguments, his defense of the state would not satisfy the moral reservations of an individualist anarchist.

1296. Yuan-King, S. "Nozick on Marx's Labor Theory of Value and Exploitation." Philosophical Forum 11 (Spring 1980): 244-9. Argues that Nozick's criticism of Marx is based on a misunderstanding of the labor theory of value.

1297. Zimmerman, D. "Coercive Wage Offers." Philosophy and Public Affairs 10,2 (Spring 1981): 121-45. Attempts to overcome what he perceives to be the weaknesses in Nozick's view that capitalist wage contracts are not coercive.