---

Michael Palij, The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 1918-1921: An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution, 1976.

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17. The Volunteer Army and Makhno

During the winter of 1917—18, a Volunteer Army had been formed in the Don Basin by General Mikhail V. Alekseev. the former commander in chief of the Russian Army, with the permission of General Aleksei M. Kaledin, ataman of the Don Cossacks. To aid the recruiting, Alekseev organized secret societies in Russia and Ukraine, helping officers to make their way to the Don. These societies were in close contact with public organizations that aided them financially. Initially the organization grew slowly, but the escape of generals Lavr G. Kornilov, Denikin, Ivan P. Romanovskii, Aleksandr S. Lukomskii, Sergei L. Markov, and others from Bykhov on December 2, 1917, had a felicitous effect on the movement's growth.1 Kornilov intended to proceed to Siberia and organize a strong army, but the representatives of the National Center in Moscow who came to Novocherkassk insisted that Kornilov remain in the Don and work with Alekseev and Kaledin. Kornilov finally consented and on January 7, 1918, the supreme authority of the Russian anti-Bolshevik movement was vested in a triumvirate composed of Alekseev, who assumed authority over political and financial affairs; Kornilov, who was entrusted with the organization and command of the army; and Kaledin, who was responsible for organization of the Don Army. Thus Alekseev's volunteer organization became a Volunteer Army.

Officers, military and naval cadets, students, and high school boys began to arrive and enlist, but there were very few soldiers among the volunteers. An officer of the German command in Kyiv acknowledged that the Volunteer Army was steadily growing, but that it was "All officers; there were, however, no soldiers in it."3 Hence the Volunteer Army took on a class rather than a national character, was strongly sympathetic to the old order, and had no appeal to the lower classes of society.

As the threat of the Bolsheviks increased, Kornilov decided to launch an expedition against them in Tsaritsyn; however, the Don Cossacks, especially those regiments returning from the front, were unwilling to fight; they too were imbued with bolshevism. Moreover, Bolshevik pressure on Novocherkassk compelled Kornilov toward the end of January 1918 to transfer the headquarters of the army to Rostov, but by February 22, Bolshevik advances forced him to retreat toward the Kuban Basin, where the Cossacks were less affected by Bolshevik propaganda than were those of the Don.4 Kornilov also hoped to get in touch with the British at Baku. In the meantime, Ataman Kaledin, having failed to gain support from his Cossacks in defending the Don against the Bolshevik invasion, committed suicide on February 24, 1918.5

The nucleus of the Volunteer Army retreated into the steppe, surrounded and assailed by Bolsheviks, more numerous and better armed than the Volunteers. In Ekaterinodar, Kornilov had expected to find a large quantity of war materials, reinforcements, and an opportunity to rest; -but before he reached it, it was surrendered to the Bolsheviks, and the government of the Kuban fled into the villages in the foothills of the Caucasus. Kornilov established contact with the forces of the Kuban government and with difficulty persuaded them to agree on unification of both armies. On April 8, 1918, this army of about seven thousand men attacked the Bolsheviks in Ekaterinodar. Although the army had experienced commanders and military training, it was severely beaten because of the Bolshevik superiority in numbers and artillery. On April 13, in spite of great losses, Kornilov was preparing a second attack when he was mortally wounded. Although the command immediately passed to General Denikin, the death of Kornilov and heavy losses broke the spirit of the troops and the planned attack was given up. Denikin decided, with the Kuban government and the Rada, which gave the Volunteer Army substantial material and moral support and new recruits, to retreat northward together toward the Don. The fighting continued during the movement, and after almost two weeks, on May 4, 1918, Denikin brought the five-thousand-man army to the frontier of the Don and Kuban Basins. Over four hundred of his men were killed and more than fifteen hundred were wounded.

After receiving information about the uprisings in the Don, Denikin decided to assist the Don Cossacks, hoping to gain new recruits and arms, and also to enhance his own political standing in the Don. The Kuban government and the Rada, however, decided to return to the Kuban to fight the enemy at home.

The Volunteer Army, despite the high quality of its leaders, its military training, and the courage of its men, failed to free the Kuban Basin from the Bolsheviks, just as it had failed before to defend the Don Basin. The population of those regions had not yet decided which side it would support. As General I. A. Poliakov observed: "according to a rough estimate about six thousand officers were idle in Novocherkassk." Similarly, General Kornilov complained about the attitude of young men in Rostov: "how many young men loaf in crowds at Sadova. If only a fifth of them would enlist in the army, the Bolsheviks would cease to exist.'

On the other hand, the anti-Bolshevik forces had not accepted the new order that was brought to life by the Revolution. After the death of Kornilov, the leaders of the movement strove to reestablish the old order. According to General Shkuro:

Kornilov's program was clear and understandable; with the gradual success of the Volunteer Army, its program became more and more unclear and blurred. The idea of democracy was not carried out decisively in anything. Even we, the senior commanders, now could not answer the question of what exactly is the program of the Volunteer Army at least in its basic features.^

The founder of the Volunteer Army, General Alekseev, in a letter to Vasilii Shulgin on June 5, 1918, wrote:

Concerning our slogan—Constituent Assembly—it is necessary to keep in mind that we brought it up only because of necessity. It will not be mentioned at all in our first proclamation, now being prepared. Our sympathies ought to be clear to you, but to reveal them here openly would be a mistake because the population would give it a hostile reception. We disassociate ourselves from the former slogan. To declare a new one we need appropriate conditions, especially territory under our control. This will come about as soon as we switch over to our active program. 10

After Ataman Kaledin's suicide, the Cossacks began to act on the appeals he had made and stand up against the Bolsheviks,1 but lack of good organization kept them from concerted action, and soon they went back to their settlements. The Bolsheviks gradually extended their regime to almost all the main centers of the Don, but the wholesale requisitions and plundering by the Red troops created a great deal of hostility. According to a former Bolshevik official:

In the towns were dozens of different Red detachments. Most of them were disinte- grating and addicted to banditism. They demanded much for their maintenance and refused under various pretexts to go to the front. Looting, theft, assaults, robberies increased. 12

These activities brought about widespread uprisings against the Bolsheviks at the end of March 1918. The Cossacks received support from the troops of Colonel Drozdovskii, who came from the Romanian front, and unsuccessfully attacked the Bolsheviks in Rostov on April 21—22, 1918. On April 25 he advanced to Novocherkassk and, with the Cossacks, drove the enemy from the capital of the Don. Meanwhile, German troops were advancing to the Don from Ukraine, driving the Bolsheviks from Taganrog on May 1, and from Rostov on May 8. On May 11, after General Anatolii M. Nazarov, the successor of Ataman Kaledin, and six other officers were arrested and executed by the Bolsheviks, the Assembly of Don Cossacks elected General Peter N. Krasnov Ataman of the Don. Krasnov entered into negotiations with the Germans and succeeded in obtaining arms and ammunition for the newly formed Don Army.13 He then proposed that Denikin join him to fight the Bolsheviks at the Tsaritsyn (Volgograd) front:

Tsaritsyn would give General Denikin a good, strictly Russian base, gun and munitions factories, and a great amount of different military supplies, not to mention money. [Thus] the Volunteer Army would cease to depend upon the Cossacks. 14

Denikin, however, replied that under no circumstances would he go to Tsaritsyn, arguing that the Kuban Cossacks would not follow him and without them the Volunteer Army would be too weak. The real reason, however, was Denikin's desire to acquire a large quantity of supplies, especially military ones, in the Don and to enlist the Cossacks in the Volunteer Army because he did not wish to be accompanied by a separate, though associated, army. Moreover, at the end of May 1918, Hetman Skoropads'kyi was negotiating with the Kuban delegation in Kyiv concerning a union of Kuban with Ukraine and the liberation of the Kuban from the Bolsheviks. Plans were made to transport 15,000 Ukrainian troops across the Sea of Azov, in order to prevent Denikin from obtaining control of the Kuban. Denikin wished to forestall this expedition to the Kuban.15 Thus, the roads of Denikin and Krasnov parted; the Cossacks advanced northward, driving the Bolsheviks from the Don during May, while Denikin was preparing for the second march southward toward the Kuban.

By the end of May, the Volunteer Army consisted of five infantry and eight cavalry regiments and five batteries, in all nine thousand men and twenty-one guns. Soon the Army had been strengthened by Colonel Drozdovskii's unit consisting of about twenty-five thousand well-armed and equipped men, including artillery, armored cars, and even airplanes. On June 10, the army began to advance south along the railroad lines, its ranks being gradually swelled en route by anti-Bolshevik Cossack partisans and by defecting Red soldiers, especially those who had been conscripted from the local Cossacks. By the middle of July the army consisted of about thirty thousand men. With this strength Denikin attacked an eighty-thousand-man Bolshevik force with one hundred guns and large reserve supplies, which was, however, poorly organized, led, and disciplined. Denikin captured substantial quantities of stores, locomotives, and rolling stock, and gained control of several vital railroad junctions, undermining Bolshevik military initiative. Although he had lost 25 to 30 percent of his men, Denikin attacked large Bolshevik forces in Ekaterinodar and on August 16, after three days, captured the city.

Denikin's immediate aims after capturing Ekaterinodar were to drive the Bolshevik forces out of the Kuban and North Caucasus, to strengthen the Volunteer Army, and to establish relations with the Allies. By capturing Ekaterinodar and Novorossisk, Denikin consolidated his control over the west Kuban. In the fall serious fighting developed around Armavir and Stavropol between Denikin's forces of more than thirty-five thousand men, and the hundred-and-fifty-thousand-man North Caucasian Red Army over control of the rest of Kuban and North Caucasus. Although the Volunteer Army and the Kuban Cossacks were weaker, they successfuly resisted the Red Army's offensives. Concurrently, a bitter disagreement developed among the Bolshevik leaders concerning the strategy to defeat Denikin that substantially weakened the Bolshevik effort. Moreover, the Bolsheviks' military situation was unfavorable, as they had lost the main towns, the more fertile crop lands, and many supplies to Denikin and by the beginning of 1919, they finally were routed. Denikin captured more than fifty thousand prisoners and large military stores.18

On January 24, Sergei Ordzhonokidze, the commissar on the Caucasus front, cabled Lenin:

The Eleventh Army has ceased to exist. It has finally gone to pieces. The enemy occupies cities and stanitsas almost without resistance. . . . There are no shells or bullets. . . . We are all perishing in the unequal struggle, but we will not disgrace our honor by fleeing. 19

Denikin secured his rear by defeating the North Caucasian Red Army and proceeded north in pursuit of the Bolshevik forces. In spite of a lack of cooperation between the Volunteer, Kuban, and Don armies, they succeeded in driving the Bolsheviks from the Don and Kuban basins and the North Caucasus.

While the fighting was still going on, General Alekseev, the supreme leader of the Volunteer Army, died on October 8, 1918. After his death the command of the army passed to General Denikin while nonmilitary affairs were referred to a "Special Council" (Osoboe Sovieshchanie) attached to the commander in chief in Ekaterinodar. Toward the end of the year, with the Bolsheviks in the northern Don threatening Novocherkassk, and under pressure from the British military representatives, the Don government concluded an agreement with Denikin that guaranteed the Don's autonomous status while Krasnov "reluctantly and halfheartedly" recognized Denikin as commander in chief of the "Armed Forces of South Russia," including the Don Army, in operational matters.20

In the meantime the strength of the Volunteer Army substantially increased following a forced mobilization in the occupied region outside the Kuban, and the use of the Red prisoners. Moreover, in November of 1918, about five thousand Terek Cossacks, who opposed the Bolsheviks, joined Denikin. Subsequently Denikin reorganized all his forces into three armies: the Volunteer Corps, under General Vladimir Z. Mai-Maevskii, including the original Volunteer Army, which then lost its "volunteer" character; the Caucasian Volunteer Army, including the Kuban and Terek Cossacks, under General Wrangel; and the Don Cossack Army, under General Krasnov.

Next to the liberation of the Kuban and North Caucasus, the most crucial need of Denikin was Allied aid. Prior to February 1919, the main source of war supplies was that captured from the Bolsheviks. The Allies' assistance materialized only when Denikin established contact with them by capturing Novorossisk on August 26,22 Bulgaria capitulated in September, and Romania reentered the war on the Allied side in November. At first the British government was reluctant to support the Russian anti-Bolshevik movement because, as Winston S. Churchill stated:

The Armistice and the collapse of Germany had altered all Russian values and relations. The Allies had only entered Russia with reluctance and as an operation of war. . . . Therefore every argument which had led to intervention had disappeared.23

Lloyd George later echoed this point, noting that with the end of war, 'every practical reason for continuing our costly military efforts in Russia disappeared."24

However, the British government sent a military commission to Novorossisk and upon its recommendation the War Cabinet decided on November 11, 1918, "to give General Denikin at Novorossisk all possible help in the way of military material."25 By February of 1919, the aid promised had begun to arrive in substantial quantities. According to General Wrangel: "Boats laden with war materials and drugs, things of which the Army was in great need, had arrived at Novorossisk. [Also] they promised us tanks and aeroplanes." Between February and the winter of 1919, Britain supplied Denikin with 558 guns, 250,000 rifles, 12 tanks, 1,685,522 shells, 160 million rounds of ammunition, 250,000 uniforms, and a substantial amount of medical supplies, plus about 100 airplanes.26

This aid was accompanied by a team of military advisors and technical experts whose duties were to receive and distribute British munitions to the Russian troops, and to teach them how to operate the tanks, airplanes, and other weapons. There was also a British medical staff that served many Russian officials attached to the mission at Taganrog. The amount of British military aid to Denikin could be judged from Denikin's confession to a British war correspondent on December 23, 1919: "To announce to the world that British help will cease on a certain date is almost tantamount to telling the common enemy the exact extent of our resources."2

As a result of the defeat of the Reds in the Kuban and North Caucasus, Denikin became overconfident. Prior to his advance into Ukraine, he called a war council to outline his campaign. Instead of throwing the main force released from the North Caucasian war against Tsaritsyn, the Bolshevik stronghold on the Lower Volga, to join Admiral Aleksandr V. Kolchak and advance toward Moscow, Denikin decided to concentrate most of the troops in the Left Bank, mainly in the Donets Basin. The troops in the Crimea were to strike toward Kyiv, while the rest of the forces were assigned to the Tsaritsyn front. Wrangel, however, objected to this plan and proposed:

The available troops should not be moved towards the Donets coalfield area, but into the Manych lake district, there to undertake a joint operation With Admiral Kolchak's Army, which was coming up from the Volga . . . but it was of no avail. General Denikin stuck to his point of view.28

Undoubtedly Denikin's principal objective was not only Moscow, but occupation of Ukraine. The united advance of the Ukrainian Galician and the Directory's armies from the west toward Kyiv worried Denikin, as he wished to prevent the Directory from reestablishing authority in the entire Ukrainian territory. A Soviet author admits:

Denikin's July plan foresaw the achievement of an ultimate goal: the seizure of Moscow [by units] converging on the city from several directions, none of them being definitely emphasized. A second feature of this plan, however, was the avid desire to occupy as much territory as possible, as . . . virtually no operation had been conducted in either of the mentioned directions for two months because the most attention had been given to the occupation of Ukraine. . . . when the Denikin movement had at its disposal its only chance of furthering its success along the Kharkiv-Moscow path, the most critical direction for the RSFSR. While at the time [July 1919] conditions had appeared more favorable for Denikin to make such a bold decision, to say the least, the situation in September was not at all predisposed toward him, and after September a "march on Moscow" became a senseless adventure.29

At the beginning of May 1919, the reorganized and strengthened army of 64,000 men occupied an area northwest of Rostov that gave Denikin control of the Sea of Azov, the estuary of the Don, and the hubs of important railways.30 In mid-May Denikin began a major offensive against the Bolsheviks. As his forces advanced in Ukraine, the Directory's forces were fighting the Bolsheviks in the west and the partisans were destroying the Bolsheviks' rear and demoralizing them, thus helping Denikin. To the partisans the main enemy was the Bolsheviks, because Denikin's attitude toward Ukraine was either unknown or clouded by his planting of public notices and rumors that there was an agreement between him and the Directory. Under these pressures the Bolsheviks were unable to organize an effective defense. The seriousness of the situation is admitted by the Soviet source:

The conditions at the Denikin front coincided with a radical deterioration of our front against Petliura. There our army is in a still worse situation, the partisan movement reigns to the utmost extent, the composition of commanders [and] political commissars are lacking. Moreover, the ultimate effect of the wave of "kulak" uprisings directed [against us] was to support Petliura and Denikin. Thus a most critical and complicated situation is arising for us.32

Also Denikin admits the situation in Ukraine was against the Bolsheviks:

A conflict between the Soviet government and Makhno was growing. . . . Ukraine was swarming with partisan detachments . . . not recognizing any authority, fighting in the rear, spreading propaganda, even occupying Kyiv a few times. Moscow's Izvestiia ascertained on the entire frontline area many "counterrevolutionary uprisings" in which not only kulaks and Black Hunreds counterrevolutionaries, but also some of the cheated groups, the middle and poor peasants, participated in armed actions. The reasons for this phenomenon the official organ saw in the misbehavior of the Soviet troops, in heavy recruitments, requisitions, and in the stupid wilfulness of pompadours intoxicated with power."33

The resistance of the Bolsheviks was decisively broken and they retreated in panic toward Russia, terrorizing the population on their way. Their main concern was the evacuation of Ukraine with as many men and as much rolling stock as possible. Denikin advanced rather rapidly along four axes, all of which ultimately would lead to Moscow: toward Tsaritsyn, hoping to unite with Kolchak; toward Kharkiv, to occupy the Left Bank; toward Crimea, Odessa, and Kryvyi Rih, to occupy the Right Bank; and toward Voronezh. His strategy was to control large areas by holding the main railroad junctions. As Denikin advanced, gradually extending the area of his occupation, he recovered a great amount of loot from the retreating Bolshevik troops.

Wrangel meanwhile became increasingly critical of Denikin's plan and after capturing Tsaritsyn on June 30, "proposed that we should entrench ourselves on the Tsaritsyn-Katerynoslav front for the time being, so that the Volga and Dnieper would be covering our flanks." On the next day, however, Denikin issued an order to advance toward Moscow, according to which Wrangel was to move on Moscow via Saratov and Nizhnii-Novogorod; Sidorin's Don Cossacks via Voronezh-Riazan; and the Volunteer Army, under General Mai-Maevskii, via the shortest route to Moscow, from Kharkiv-Kursk-Orel-Tula. Apparently Denikin planned for himself what he had accused Wrangel of on reading his report: "I see! you want to be the first man to set foot in Moscow!"35

Wrangel condemned Denikin's order as a "death-sentence for the armies of South Russia." He pointed out:

All the principles of strategy were ignored; there was no choice of a principal direction, no concentration of the bulk of the troops in this direction, and no maneuvering. It merely prescribed a different route to Moscow for each of the armies.36

Gradually the differences of opinion between Wrangel and Denikin had a demoralizing effect on the troops, as it became known in the spring and summer that Wrangel insisted on an advance to the east to unite with Kolchak; that he sharply criticized the extension of the front in the west toward Kyiv, and that he had forewarned of the dangers of forcing the march to Moscow.

As the Denikin forces occupied more Ukrainian territory, he introduced measures to suppress national and social currents and to deny all accomplishments of the Revolution. On the eve of the occupation of Kyiv, Denikin issued a declaration to the people of "Little Russia":

Regiments are approaching old Kyiv, "mother of Russian cities," in an unabated stream, to recover for the Russian people their lost unity, the unity without which the great Russian people, powerless and divided, losing its young generations in civil war, would be unable to uphold its independence; the unity, without which a complete and proper economic life is unthinkable. . . . Long before 1914, the Germans, wishing to weaken the Russian state before declaring war, strove to destroy the unity of the Russian race which was carved in a difficult struggle. With this aim, they'supported and encouraged in South Russia a movement aiming at the separation from Russia of its nine southern provinces in the name of a "Ukrainian State." . . . Former German supporters, Petliura and his companion-in-arms, are set on the division of Russia, they are continuing now to advance their evil effort to establish an independent "Ukrainian State" and struggle against the rebirth of a United Russia.38

In the same vein at a dinner given by Katerynoslav authorities in his honor, when the representatives of Ukrainian organizations spoke about the right of Ukraine to independence: "Denikin rose from his seat, angrily struck the table and brusquely declared: 'Your bet on an independent Ukraine is lost. Long Live One and Undivided Russia! Hoorah!'" According to General Shkuro, Denikin also referred to Petliura: "Your bet on Petliura is lost. . . . Petliura will be hanged as a traitor, if he falls into the hands of the Volunteer Army.' The regime carried on an anti-Ukrainian campaign, which it called a struggle against Bolshevism, closing cooperatives, libraries, bookstores, newpapers, Prosvita associations, and other cultural institutions. Ukrainian signs were replaced by Russian; the elected city authorities and the Zemstvos personnel were replaced largely by Russians. Even the name Ukraine was prohibited and replaced by the pejorative Little Russia. Ukrainian teachers, workers in cultural and cooperative institutions, and others were often executed, as for example, in the summer of 1919, when Denikin men killed eighteen Ukrainian cultural workers at IElysavethrad, Kherson province, including T. Bilenko, the chairman of the Union of Cooperatives and a member of the Labor Congress.40

The commander of the Volunteer Army, General Mai-Maevskii, issued a decree that bound Ukrainian schools to return to teaching in Russian. No funds from the treasury were to be appropriated for the 'Little Russian" schools. Moreover, the city authorities and the zemstvos were forbidden to open schools that would teach in Ukrainian and Ukrainian studies were abolished. General Shilling, governor-general of Tavriia province, issued an order demanding that all soldiers and officers of the Ukrainian Army return to the ranks of the Volunteer Army not later than October 26; otherwise they would be treated "as traitors to their own state." This order, however, did not apply to the higher ranking officers who, no matter when they returned to the Russian troops, would be hanged as traitors to Russia.41

According to a Ukrainian officer of the Galician Army who visited General Slashchov in his headquarters, the general handed him an official leaflet, issued by the staff of General Shilling and directed to the command of the Ukrainian Army as an "order":

In view of the victories of the Russian arms, the army should assemble in places indicated by the command of the Denikin army in order to surrender all weapons and property to the units of the Denikin army! The "soldiers" then should demobilize and wait for a mobilization order; the officers would be transferred to the Denikin army on the basis of the mobilization, except officers of the general staff, against whom an investigation would be conducted by the court for rehabilitation. In case of not obeying this order, the army would be considered rebels and would be punished according to the paragraph on war conditions.42

In a discussion with different Russian officers in headquarters, the same officer got the impression that the generals of the Ukrainian Army would be shot outright. A prominent Don Cossack statesman, A. Ageev, in a letter that received wide dissemination, wrote about Denikin's policy toward Ukraine in a similar vein:

In the struggle against the Bolsheviks, we had an ally which drew itself against a portion of the Soviet troops. And horrors! Instead of [gaining] an ally, we opened a new front, which we did not need at all to the delight of the Bolsheviks, but to our misery. Military units were sent to this front beyond the Dnieper at a time when the Don Cossacks were straining all their forces to the utmost in the struggles against the Red hordes. And when we Cossacks said: "Come to an agreement with Georgia and Ukraine, establish a federation to fight with common forces against a common enemy, the Bolsheviks," we were again accused of "separatism." . . .44

Wrangel also denounced Denikin's policy as "narrow and uncompromising," pointing out that he persecuted all whose ideas differed from his own and everyone who had any kind of connections with organizations hostile to the Volunteer cause. Hence:

He had hunted down not only those who had been in touch with the Bolsheviks in some way or another, perhaps against their will, but also anyone who had been connected with Ukraine, the Georgian Republic, and so on. This insane and cruel policy provoked a reaction, alienated those who had been ready to become our allies, and turned into enemies those who had sought our friendship. . . . [Moreover] the same relationship had been established with the civil population in the recently occupied territories.45

The anti-Ukrainian campaign of the higher echelons was practiced as well by the bureaucracy and troops. There was no difference of opinion among different representatives or supporters of the regime concerning Denikin's policy in the occupied territory. It was, in reality, a restoration of the old regime. Denikin admitted that:

The head of internal affairs, [N. N.] Chebyshev, was appointing governors almost exclusively from people who occupied those positions prior to the revolution, wishing to "use their administrative experience." . . . Behind them followed lower agents of the previous regime—some were afraid of the revolution, others embittered and revengeful.46

Although these bureaucrats had experience, they were psychologically so alien to the accomplished revolution that they could not understand it. Thus they tended to live in the past, which they tried to restore in form and in spirit. According to a member of Denikin's Special Council, N. I. Astrov, the main feature of the Denikin regime was:

Violence, torture, robberies, drunkenness, odious behavior of the representatives of the regime on the local level, impunity of known criminals and traitors, poor, inept people, cowards, and debauchers on the local level, people who brought with them to the villages their former vices, incapability, idleness, and self-confidence, [which] discredited the new regime.47

Pavel Miliukov pointed to the causes of the vices and the behavior of the bureaucracy:

The possibility of profit and class interest attracted to the administrative positions either criminal elements, former policemen, or former landlords. To these and others the meaning of "strong" authority was entirely pre-reform. [However] in view of the complete impossibility of real control, it manifested itself with a chaos and impunity which was unknown even during the old regime.48

Miliukov felt that instead of putting the state authority between the landlords and the peasants: "The circumstances of the White movement, to the contrary, dumped the peasantry into the hands of the landlords and [thus] revived the old hatred of the weak who had become strong, for the socially strong [who were] ruined by the revolution [but had] temporarily regained power."49

The behavior of the Volunteer troops in the occupied territory was even worse than that of the bureaucracy, if only because they had greater power.50 A Russian war correspondent observed:

Robbery was institutionalized. Nobody paid any attention to it up to the very end. The soldiers robbed, the officers robbed, and many generals robbed; owing to a servile press, they acquired reputations as national leaders and heroes.51

The population suffered especially from the counterintelligence service, which carried its activities to an unlimited wild arbitrariness. According to Denikin himself the counterintelligence service that was established in units and organizations at all political and military levels, created a sort of atmosphere, a painful mania, all over the country, spreading through mutual distrust and suspicion. ... It is necessary to say that these organs, covering the territory of the South with dense nets, were sometimes hotbeds of provocation and organized robbery. In these respects the counterintelligence services in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, and Rostov on the Don were especially notorious.^2

The behavior of the Volunteer Army in the occupied territory was unequivocally justified by its commander, General Mai-Maevskii, in a conversation with General Wrangel:

"You see, in wartime you must leave no stone unturned and neglect no means by which you may achieve your ends. If you insist on the officers and men living like ascetics, they will not fight much longer." I was highly indignant. "Well, then, General, "he said, "what is the whole difference between the Bolsheviks and ourselves?" He answered his own question without pausing, and he thought his answer irrefutable. "Is not the whole difference simply that the Bolsheviks have not scrupled about their means, and therefore have gained the upper hand? "53

Although the Kolchak government recommended a more flexible policy in Ukraine and the use of Ukrainian troops in fighting the Bolsheviks, Denikin refused, because this was contrary to his idea of "One and Indivisible Russia." Denikin's diplomatic expert, A. A. Neratov, confirmed Denikin's attitude toward Ukraine: "To recognize Petliura and work together with him would be to recognize the dismemberment of Russia.' The oppressive policy of the Denikin regime in Ukraine convinced the population that it was as bad as the Bolshevik regime, and brought a strong reaction that led able young men, especially after the announcement of the Denikin mobilization, to leave their homes and join Makhno or other partisan groups. Nevertheless, Denikin believed that the Ukrainian peasants and partisans were fighting the Bolsheviks as their class enemy. According to a Soviet author: "Denikin has not considered that the revolt of the peasant elements against the proletarian dictatorship still does not indicate readiness to go with the Whites."55

In the light of this development, Nestor Makhno decided to take stronger action against both the Bolsheviks and Denikin. In his words: "When the Red Army in south Ukraine began to retreat ... as if to straighten the front line, but in reality to evacuate Ukraine . . . only then did my staff and I decide to act without losing a single day.' For a while Makhno fought Denikin's troops near Oleksandrivs'k, but Denikin's superior power forced him to retreat toward IElysavethrad, on the Right Bank.57 There he encountered the Bolshevik Fourteenth Army. Although it was isolated in the region of Odessa-Kherson-Mykolaiv-Kryvyi Rih, it tried to force its way northward. Makhno recalled that he

ordered Kalashnykiv, Budaniv, Holyk, and Dermenzhi, the partisan commanders who remained with the partisans in the Red Army at the anti-Denikin revolutionary front, to seize the front line staff and its commander, Kochergin; [and to] "arrest all political commissars and unreliable commanders for disposition by the deputy commander of the front line, Kalashnykiv."59

Moreover, he sent agents among the Red troops, who with the Makhno men carried on a "devilish" propaganda along the theme: "The Bolsheviks sold Ukraine to the generals. Those who want to fight for the blood of their brothers and the country join Makhno." With such propaganda as this combined with sabotage, they demoralized the Red troops. The slogan: "Troop trains are yours!" was effective. Troop trains, garages, and military magazines were looted; railroad depots were set on fire and blown up. Moreover, there were mutinies in some Bolshevik units. An uprising instigated by Makhno men broke out in one brigade of the Fifty-Eighth Division. Mutineers destroyed the headquarters and arrested the whole staff, including the commander, G. A. Kochergin, his wife, and the commissars. When Division staff called Kochergin's headquarters the reply was: "There is no Kochergin Brigade—it was transferred to the disposition of the commander in chief of the Revolution, comrade Father Makhno. Soon we will reach you." Although later the wounded Kochergin and some members of his staff escaped, others were shot and the brigade was lost. In addition, a few armored trains joined Makhno. The uprisings spread to other units and Makhno men seized the commander of the Fifty-Eighth Division, Ivan Fedorovich Fed'ko (originally Fedotov), and the commissar, Mikhelovich. Fed'ko was accused of having: "sold all of us to Denikin. . . . Bat'ko Makhno, the commander of all armed forces of southern Russia, accepts us in his army." They labeled Fed'ko and the commissar as traitors who should be executed,61 although later they escaped, but another brigade stationed at Bobrynets' went over to Makhno. According to an intercepted Bolshevik radio telegram of August 17: "The units of the Third Brigade joined Makhno. Kochergin and the Political Commissar were executed. The entire area north of Mykolaiv is in the hands of partisans and Makhno's bands."62

Meanwhile, Makhno's detachments from the Red Army, including Red units, began to arrive, carrying with them all the arms and ammunition they could acquire. The Bolshevik command, fearing mutiny among its troops, was unable to oppose them. Also, a number of independent partisan groups joined Makhno.63

At that time Makhno's troops reached the size of a normal army, estimated at about twenty thousand. At the town of Dobrovelychkivka, Kherson province, where he stayed from the beginning of August to September 10, Makhno decided to reorganize the army into three infantry brigades, one cavalry brigade, an artillery detachment, and a machine-gun regiment. An elite squadron of fewer than two hundred of the most highly experienced and dedicated cavalrymen, led by Petro Havriushenko, called Havriusha, was formed as Makhno's bodyguard. Simultaneously, the army's staff was reorganized and substantially enlarged, including skilled personnel. The army also included an intelligence service.65

The reorganized army was renamed "Revolutionary Partisan Army of Ukraine" (Makhnovites). This army was now mobile, either on horseback or "wheels," light carriages with springs called tachanky that were drawn by two or three horses, with another in reserve behind the cart, and with the driver and usually two soldiers behind him. A machine gun was installed on the back seat between the two soldiers. This infantry on carts moved at a speed of eighty kilometers a day, and even, if necessary, over one hundred. A black flag was flown on the first carriage with the slogans: "Liberty or Death" and "The Land to Peasants, the Factories to the Workers" embroidered in silver on both sides.

As Makhno regrouped his army, he had to face not only the Bolshevik Fourteenth Army in retreat from the Crimea and Odessa forcing its way north to Russia, but also a strong Denikin force. Hoping to destroy one of the forces that opposed his occupation of Ukraine, Denikin threw his best regiments under General Slashchov into the battle against Makhno. The Fifth Division operated in the IElysavethrad area; there was a Don Cossack cavalry brigade in the Voznesenske area; to their south was the Fourth Division, while the Fourteenth Infantry Division and the Crimean Cavalry Regiment operated around Odessa. After the retreat from the railroad lines IElysavethrad and Voznesenske, Makhno operated from Novoukrainka in the area of IElysavethrad and Voznesenske. Other Makhno detachments swarmed throughout the IElysavethrad, Katerynoslav, Mykolaiv, and Uman' districts. Toward the end of August the Fifth Division and the Don Cossack cavalry brigade were ordered to drive Makhno's partisan army out of Novoukrainka. Makhno, however, launched a vigorous counteroffensive, taking a number of towns and putting Denikin troops in a critical situation, though his main concern had been to capture ammunition, which his troops badly needed. To forestall Makhno's offensive, an additional military unit was formed from the Fourth Division, consisting of its escort staff, brigades of the Thirteenth and Thirty-Fourth Infantry Divisions, the First Symferopil' Officers' Regiment, and a separate cavalry brigade consisting of the Forty-Second Don, the Labinsk, and the Tamansk regiments. Thus Makhno was confronted with an additional formation consisting of 4,700 cavalry and infantry and fifty guns. According to Makhno, Denikin concentrated a strong force against him, some twelve to fifteen regiments, including the First Symferopil' Officers' Regiment.67

Although Denikin's troops made great effort to take the initiative from Makhno, he conducted quick and demoralizing raids against them, especially on their rear. The situation, however, grew worse for Makhno when on September 10 at Pomichna, Denikin launched a major attack, capturing 400 of Makhno's men and three guns. Abandoning the railroad line, Makhno blew up two armored trains, and as his forces decreased and he ran short of ammunition, he retreated toward the Mykolaivka-Khmilove line to the Myrhorod-Uman' area, where a new phase of the fighting developed. During this fighting Makhno stubbornly resisted the enemy when he was surrounded at Novoukrainka and later at Uman'. He was retreating, fighting back stubbornly, and counterattacking, often with considerable tactical success. While his main force fought major battles, numerous separate detachments assisted him by attacking the enemy's rear. Makhno retreated until his whole army was cut off on the south and east by Denikin, and on the west and north by the Ukrainian forces.

Although the immensity of his goal was out of keeping with his military strength, Denikin continued to fight both Makhno and the Ukrainian Army. Following Makhno's footsteps, General Slashchov felt the time was ripe to surround Makhno in the Uman' area and liquidate him before he joined "His half-ally, half-enemy Petliura." At Uman' Makhno made contact with a brigade of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen who were also at war against Denikin. Realizing that an understanding between them was the only sensible solution, Makhno proposed "military neutrality." The Ukrainian troops needed to secure their eastern front, and Makhno agreed to help fight Denikin. Subsequently Makhno paid a visit to Ukrainian headquarters in the city and obtained an agreement with the Ukrainian command to take care of his 4,000 wounded and ill partisans in the city hospitals.69

Makhno, however, had no intention of keeping his agreement because his retreat was a forced strategy that brought only a temporary solution. Makhno considered that the more Denikin's troops advanced to the north and northwest, the more vulnerable they became in their rear because of the great extension of the front. Through good intelligence and close contact with the peasants he was well informed about the movement and strength of the Denikin troops and the difficult situation in the region Denikin had occupied.

Throughout the summer and early fall of 1919, Denikin enjoyed substantial success, occupying a large part of Ukraine and southern Russia. On June 24 he occupied Kharkiv; six days later, Wrangel was in Tsaritsyn; and on July 31, Poltava fell into Denikin's hands. A month later Kyiv was liberated from the Bolsheviks by the united Galician and Directory armies but soon abandoned to Denikin. In the south, Denikin occupied Kherson and Mykolaiv on August 18, and Odessa five days later. He was also successfully advancing into Russia, taking Kursk on September 21 and Orel on October 13. The path to Tula, the capital of the province and the center of the armament industry, was open. The Bolsheviks became alarmed. According to Trotsky "Denikin set himself the goal of penetrating deep into the rear of our army to appear suddenly in Tula and wreck its factories, thus destroying the great arsenal of the Red Army."70

By mid-October Denikin had reached the line of Voronezh-Orel-Chemihiv-Kyiv-Odessa and was very optimistic:

In his opinion everything was going splendidly. The possibility of a sudden change in our luck seemed to him to be out of the question. He thought the taking of Moscow was only a question of time, and that the demoralized and weakened enemy could not make a stand against us.7l

Denikin expected to reach Moscow by winter and overthrow the Bolshevik regime. To his friend N. I. Astrov, he said: "Do not worry, everything will be all right, and I will drink tea in your house in Moscow." The "Osvag" had already prepared proclamations and posters with portraits of the Volunteer Army's leaders to post in the streets of liberated Moscow.72 However, in Denikin's success lay his weakness. The line of his positions showed a considerable bulge with the concomitant danger of an open flank and rear.'Wrangel warned:

We were building on sand; we had bitten off far more than we could chew. Our front was too long in comparison with the number of our forces; we had no organized bases and strongholds in our rear. ... I drew his attention to the movements of the brigand Makhno and his rebels, for they were threatening our rear. "Oh, that is not serious! We will finish him off in the twinkling of the eye." As I listened to him talking, my mind filled with doubt and apprehension.73

Makhno's main adversary, General Slashchov, confirms Denikin's disregard of Makhno's partisans in his rear:

The "Whites," in spite of the advice of the commanders combating Makhno, looked on his liquidation as a question of secondary importance and all their attention at first was directed against Petliura. This blindness of the "Stavka" and the staff of the forces of New Russia was frequently and severely punished.74

While caught between the armies of the Directory and of Denikin, Makhno rapidly and in complete secrecy prepared an offensive against Denikin in which he displayed the greatest skill and bravery of his entire military career. He left all the wounded, sick, and unreliable men in the care of the Ukrainian troops, and cut his support to a minimum. This flexible, completely mounted army could attack without preparation by artillery fire. There was no question of failure or retreat; the decision was to attack the Denikin forces, destroy them, and penetrate behind their lines. 5

On the evening of September 25, Makhno's First Brigade launched an attack against Denikin's forward troops near the village of Kruten'ke. The enemy soon retreated to take up better positions and to draw Makhno's unit into a trap. Makhno, however, purposely did not pursue, and misled them into thinking he had moved back westward. Several hours later, after 3 A.M., Makhno made an unexpected frontal attack on the main force near Perehonivka. In the course of the ensuing intense fighting, which continued for several hours, Makhno and his cavalry escort moved in the darkness to outflank the enemy. Just as the outnumbered and exhausted major troops of Makhno began to lose ground, Makhno attacked the enemy's flank. This maneuver decided the battle. First Makhno destroyed a battalion of the Lithuanian Regiment, and a-battery of the Fourth Artillery Division, and then he attacked the First SymferopiP Officers' Regiment, forcing it into an orderly defensive retreat that ended in a rout. The men retreated in panic, abandoning their arms in an attempt to reach the river Syniukha, some fifteen kilometers distant. Makhno, however, sent his troops at full speed in pursuit, while he moved with his cavalry escort to overtake them on the other side of the river. Makhno's main force caught the enemy near the river and decimated it. Most of those who managed to cross the river were taken prisoner or killed by Makhno. Only a small number escaped.

Although Makhno exaggerated when he spoke of "complete annihilation," the regiment did suffer heavy losses; according to Denikin's sources, 637 men were killed or wounded, including 270 officers. After its defeat at the Syniukha the regiment ceased its operations against Makhno. While Makhno was fighting Denikin southeast of Uman', General Skliarov attacked Uman' from the southwest, forcing the Ukrainian troops to retreat. Makhno's sick and wounded, who were unable to retreat with the Ukrainian troops or to hide, were killed when the enemy entered the city.

Although Denikin used a large force against Makhno, he failed to destroy him in the Novoukrainka and Uman' operations because he divided his attention between Makhno and the Ukrainian Army. Moreover, there was no coordination of Denikin's various units, and communication with the armed forces command of New Russia in Odessa was poor. Makhno, energetic and well informed, took advantage of Denikin's mistakes and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. The developments resulting from his defeat decided Denikin's fate. According to a Denikin officer fighting against Makhno:

People interested in the history of the civil war, 1917—1920, came to the conclusion a long time ago that the breakthrough of "Father Makhno" in the fall of 1919 disorganized the rear of the Armed Forces of South Russia and thus tipped the scale in favor of the Reds.78

After the victory at Perehonivka the road to Denikin's important centers was open. Three parallel columns of Makhno's troops advanced eastward at the great speed of one hundred versts per day, avoiding battles with large enemy forces and joined by many independent partisan groups en route. Denikin's garrisons and the civil authorities, ignorant of the defeat at Perehonivka or Makhno's whereabouts, took no defensive measures and Makhno very often took Denikin's posts by complete surprise. In several days Makhno took Dolyns'ka, Kryvyi Rih, and Nikopil', where he destroyed three regiments.79 Subsequently he captured the Kichkas bridge on the Dnieper and on October 5, the city of Oleksandrivs'k, where he established his base.

Apart from the military problems, Makhno was confronted with the organization of the local authorities. First he called a meeting of workers from different branches of industry, informing them about the previous victorious fighting and the war situation in the region, and then asked the workers to organize the management of factories, plants, railroads, and other branches of industry by their own means and under their own control. On the question of salaries, Makhno advised the workers to set their own wages, organize their own pay office, and carry on commercial exchange directly with consumers. The railroad workers consented to go along with Makhno's policy, organizing the train system and setting fees for transportation. At the meeting in Oleksandrivs'k, in his main speech, Makhno appealed to the populace to organize a civil self-government so as to secure the territory and guarantee its people's freedom. His organizational plans did not develop sufficiently, mainly because of the proximity of this territory to the front and a lack of initiative and experience of its people.

Meanwhile, the Revolutionary Military Council convoked the Fifth Congress in Oleksandrivs'k from October 20 to 26, 1919, with about 270 delegates, including 180 peasants in attendance, It was chaired by Volin. The congress resolved to strengthen, organize, and prepare supplies for the army. It formed committees, consisting of peasants, workers, and partisans, to convene future congresses that would deal with the organization of social and economic life in the region. However, the main concerns of the congress were the current problems, the primary one being the organization of the army. In principle the congress rejected a regular army based upon compulsory mobilization, but the critical situation at the front and the need to defend the territory made it necessary to resort to voluntary mobilization of men between nineteen and forty-eight. Each new regiment was to include a staff and an economic-judicial organ, for the congress intended to make the partisan army a people's army.81

One of Makhno's proclamations illustrated what voluntary mobilization entailed:

Why do you sit at home, friend? Why are you not in our ranks? Are you waiting for a Commissar to come with a punitive detachment to take you by compulsory mobilization? Do not deceive yourself that he will not find you, that you could hide, escape. The Bolshevik regime already proved it would stop at nothing: it would arrest your family and relatives, it would take hostages and, if necessary, it would shell the entire village by artillery fire, and . . . you and your friends . . . would sooner Or later be taken by the regime into the army. And then, it would send you with arms in hand to kill your brother peasants and workers—revolutionary partisan—Makhno men.82

To assure the growth of the army, the congress resolved to organize local free social-economic organizations and commissions composed of working people, to obtain "contributions" from the bourgeoisie, and to gather uniforms for the partisans. These organizations were to cooperate closely with Makhno's army supply commission. They were responsible for providing support for the partisans' families and for the poorer population. Finally, the congress had chosen a commission to convene the next congress to deal with the social and economic organization of the region controlled by the Makhno army. Appealing to the population to support the recruitment of volunteers for the army, the congress also established a committee to provide food distribution at stations and hospitals and to take care of the wounded and the sick. The primary source of the food would be free gifts from the peasants, the spoils of victory, and requisitions from privileged groups. The congress recommended that the Revolutionary Military Council take strong measures against drinking, including the execution of offenders, to prevent a demoralization of the army.83

The basis of justice was also laid down by the congress:

On the question of the need to organize a judicial administrative apparatus, we suggest as a basic principle that any rigid court, police machinery and any fixed "codification of laws" constitute a gross violation of the population's rights of self-defense. True justice should not be administratively organized, but must come as a living, free, creative act of the community. . . . Law and order must be upheld by the living force of the local community, and must not be left to police specialists. 84

As the Revolutionary Military Council organized sociopolitical life in the region, Makhno and his staff continued to fight Denikin, occupying a number of cities and towns, including Polohy, Melitopil', Huliai-Pole, Synel'nikove, and Lozova. At that time Makhno's army increased to about twenty-five thousand men. In late October, the height of the army's growth, it consisted of about forty thousand men, including the separate partisan detachments operating in the countryside.85 When the commander of one such detachment bearing Makhno's name contacted Makhno, he replied: "All the detachments bearing my name may act independently. You are not alone; many units bearing my name are scattered throughout Ukraine. The time will come when we will all unite into one great anarchist army and will defeat the enemy."

Makhno, however, was primarily interested in the Azov Sea ports and on October 6 he decided to take Berdians'k where, according to the British war correspondent,

a huge quantity of our small-arms ammunition and 60,000 shells were stacked for months. . . . The British Mission, who considered the town to be vulnerable, warned the Russian staff repeatedly. Just as the battles were opening which should have given Denikin permanent possession of Kyiv and Orel, Makhno the brigand sprang into activity near Katerynoslav, and within ten days he had blown the Berdians'k dump sky-high."87

Attacking from the coast to prevent the enemy's escape by sea, Makhno captured large stores of war material, including sixteen British and Russian guns, thirty trucks, five cars, one airplane, and a large amount of ammunition. On October 23 Makhno captured the other main port, Mariupil', cutting Denikin off from the Sea of Azov and consequently threatening his main supply base, Volnovakha. Makhno decided to attack the city, in spite of the concentration of Denikin forces there, and although after five days of fighting he failed to capture Volnovakha, he effectively eliminated it as a supply base because all railroad junctions were in Makhno's hands. In the meantime, when Makhno appeared without warning in the area of Taganrog, Denikin's headquarters:

Panic reigned everywhere—panicked foreign missions, panicked staff ladies; some even succeeded in evacuating. Officers were called hastily. [People were] saying that the Makhno detachments were seizing Mariupil', and that Makhno partisans were eighty versts from Taganrog. There was almost no force that could oppose them. The Kuban Cossacks recalled from the front could not arrive in time because of the damage to transportation and "bandits" who were destroying trucks. A regiment of officers coming from the Caucasian coast was stopped at sea by the storm.89

In discussion with K. N. Sokolov, Denikin admitted the situation was very serious with Makhno within two days' ride of Taganrog. Some advised the chief commander to leave.9 According to another eyewitness the situation was "absolutely critical":

All Denikin could muster up were the two hundred-odd officers of headquarters, a company of war-wounded veterans and a few tanks. ... I was having tea at the British Military Mission when the news of the coming of Makhno spread. A list for volunteers to go out to fight him was passed around the tea table. I signed this list and thus for three days found myself in a force of British cavalry. We were drilled by General Thompson, commanding the British Mission. Several British naval officers also signed the list, and the sight of a long-legged naval commander on a horse was something never to be forgotten. Just as suddenly and just as mysteriously as he had appeared, Makhno vanished. Evidently he overestimated the forces defending Taganrog. If he had only dared to attack the city he would have had us, General Denikin.and all.91

Hodgson confirms this situation in Taganrog:

The British Military Mission at Taganrog, although only a staff nucleus engaged in getting supplies up and teaching Denikin's soldiers, at once put itself in a state of defence. A mounted mobile column of thirty-two officers was formed, and although it has been claimed that the effort had a calming effect on the local population, I am inclined to think that it only accentuated the panic. . . . The whole incident was nerve wracking, and should have given Denikin both a foretaste and warning of what was to come.92

Makhno continued to drive Denikin's forces out of his region. One of Denikin's important strongholds was Katerynoslav, which Makhno tried to capture. After twelve days of fighting Makhno applied his earlier military ruse, sending his partisans dressed in peasant clothes

. . . into the town, ostensibly to buy provisions; having arrived at the marketplace, they pulled out their weapons and joined with their fellows who had surrounded the town. A panic seized the inhabitants; the Governor [Shchetinin] hurried away in a special train; and, after the militiamen had put up the best fight they could against superior numbers, darkness came on, and the bandits were masters of the town.93

Toward the end of October, Makhno took the city, which he controlled for six weeks. He issued a manifesto as soon as the partisans entered the city, appealing to the populace to preserve peace, to surrender their weapons, and to turn over to him Denikin's officers hiding in the city. He demanded contributions from the richer segment of the population and expropriated whatever money had been left in the banks by Denikin, subsequently turning to the poor with a large amount of money and material support. Also he opened the gates of the prisons and burned them. Despite a prohibition by Makhno, the partisans, especially the released prisoners, were guilty of some looting. However, according to an eyewitness: "Under Makhno there was not such widespread looting as under the Volunteers. A great impression was made on the population by Makhno's personal on-the-spot execution of several looters who were caught in the market place."95

An episode occurring there sheds some light on the behavior of the partisans. An elderly gentleman taking a walk was stopped at a corner by a partisan who ordered the gentleman to remove his pants and give them to him. The gentleman protested, but promised to take the partisan to his nearby apartment and surrender his trousers. When the gentleman complied, the partisan exclaimed:

Well, that is the way it should have been a long time ago! I requested trousers from six passersby, "please give me some trousers because mine are completely worn out." All responded that they had no spares. And now I have found some. Father Makhno prohibited us from robbing. "If you do need something," he said, "take it, but nothing more." Now, I need nothing more!96

According to another eyewitness, as Slashchov drove Makhno out of the city, his troops repeated earlier practices of General Shkuro's troops:

I blushed from pain and shame when people with officers' epaulettes on their shoulders entered apartments and looted them as suddenly, openly, and shamelessly as did wild Ingushes and Chechens. ... In addition, Slashchov's men began to pull out the partisans who were left in the hospitals with typhus, and hang them from the bare trees.97

In the late fall of 1919 Makhno's military success peaked. At that time he controlled the larger part of the Left Bank from Katerynoslav to the Crimea and was threatening even Taganrog, Denikin's headquarters.98 Makhno's success against Denikin was facilitated by the population, especially the peasants, who were antagonized not only by the repressive policy of the troops, the police, and bureaucrats, but especially by the returning landlords. According to an eyewitness,

the wide peasant masses of Ukraine were indignant at the returning of the landlords to their estates, the restoration of large latifundia, and the arbitrariness and violence that had been a characteristic peculiarity of the local agents' policy. Exhausted by constant conscriptions, requisitions, and robberies by the military units, and disappointed in the land measures of the "Stavka," they readily joined Makhno-Iike bands and began to carry on a most relentless struggle against the Volunteer Army. . . . We hate the commune whole heartedly, the peasants were saying, but still more, we hate the landlords who are tearing our skin off us. We do not need Communists, either red or black.99

General Wrangel confirms this situation and the spontaneous reaction of the population against the Denikin regime:

Risings were breaking out in the interior; rebels under the command of the brigand Makhno were sacking the towns and looting the trains and commissariat depots. Disorder was at its height in the country. The local authorities had no idea how to make themselves respected; abuse of authority was the order of the day; the agrarian question was more bitter than ever.100

When General Mai-Maevskii encountered strong resistance from the peasants in Ukraine, he asked Denikin to speed up land reform because the peasants "are interested in and waiting for land reform. Promises have lost their meaning; fodder is commandeered under threat of execution." Denikin replied: "I do not attach great importance to this matter. It is unnecessary to pay attention to the peasants. Take warning measures against lawlessness [and] do not show weakness of authority. . . . With regard to the peasants—this question will be settled in Moscow." A foreign eyewitness observed:

Conditions behind the lines were more chaotic than ever. Makhno was looting trains and depots with impunity, and White officialdom was losing what little control over the civilian population it had. . . . The peasants were crying for land and getting a stone in answer. 102

Although the strength of the Volunteer Army on the fronts against the Bolsheviks and the Ukrainian Army was hardly adequate, at the end of September Denikin found that

the situation was becoming dangerous and demanded radical measures. In spite of the seriousness of the situation on the front, it was necessary to withdraw some units from it and to use all the reserves to suppress the uprising.103

Two combat groups were formed to fight Makhno. A corps under General Slashchov, with Colonel Dubiago as his chief of staff, was dispatched to the Right Bank, mainly in the region of Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Katerynoslav. It consisted of the Thirteenth and Thirty-Fourth Infantry divisions and was later joined by the Don Cossack Brigade. The other group, under General Revishin, was formed on the Left Bank with its headquarters at Volnovakha railroad station. It consisted of the Chechen Cavalry Division, the Terek Cossack Cavalry Division, a separate Don Cossack Cavalry Brigade, the Composite Regiment of the Ninth Cavalry Division, and the Composite Infantry Regiment.1

In mid-October Denikin began operations against Makhno, aiming to bottle him up between the Sea of Azov and the Dnieper. Since Denikin's supply base and immense stores of munitions were located in the towns between Volnovakha and MariupiF, Denikin threw a large force supported by armored trains and cars against Makhno. Fierce fighting developed in the area of MariupiF, Berdians'k, and Velykyi Tokmak and both sides suffered heavy losses.105 Gradually Makhno was forced to retreat north to Huliai-Pole where his army of about ten thousand men fought large Denikin forces, including the Terek Cossack Cavalry Division and the Don Cossack Cavalry Brigade. Makhno, fearing encirclement, retreated west to Oleksandrivs'k. After heavy fighting in the city he crossed the Dnieper to the Right Bank and advanced to Katerynoslav. The Chechen Cavalry Division also had crossed the Dnieper and occupied the city, trying to establish contact with General Slashchov, but Makhno attacked and drove them out. While General Slashchov was struggling against Makhno on the Right Bank, General Revishin established a defensive line along the left bank of the Dnieper to prevent Makhno from crossing the river.

After several months of hard fighting the Denikin troops came to regard Makhno's army as their most formidable enemy. According to Mai-Maevskii's aide, Pavel Vasil'evich Makarov: "The commander feared Makhno more than the Reds [because] Makhno was always appearing unexpectedly, and therefore, was impeding Mai-Maevskii's deployment for an attack." Nevertheless, Mai-Maevskii also admired Makhno, and told Makarov: "I am watching his activities and [I am] not against having such an experienced commander on my side."10

Also other commanders of Denikin troops expressed

. . . highest admiration and respect for Makhno. His military achievements are being called heroic. In their opinion Makhno also commands a good and brave soldiery. They are talking about his activities on the Left Bank, about the capture of Katerynoslav in the rear of the Denikin Army and about his attack on Taganrog (the Denikin headquarters) . . . with visible fear. 107

The conditions in Denikin's rear echoed on the Bolshevik front, and the Bolsheviks fully exploited this situation. A Soviet author admits:

A rapid growth of peasant uprisings in Denikin's rear threatened even his headquarters, Taganrog, forcing him not only to bring up all his reserves to fight them, but also to recall a number of units from the front for this purpose. . . . This, of course, greatly influenced the outcome of the battle: the Eighth Army was saved from defeat because the enemy's Voronezh group was weakened and subsequently was not only unable to develop an active operation on its own, but could not even offer a more or less firm resistance to Budenny's cavalry, soon to advance in the area of Voronezh. Already during this period of general fighting Denikin showed signs of a complete lack of strategic reserves at the front and in the rear. 108

The author's conclusion is that as a result of the partisan uprisings: "the rear of the counterrevolution [Denikin] disintegrated, and the disintegration of the rear brought with it also disintegration of the front."109

While Denikin was preparing for a final drive on Moscow via Orel-Tula, the Bolsheviks concentrated newly organized cavalry units, reinforced by infantry and machine-gun companies, for a bidirectional counterattack against the Orel-Kursk railroad line and against Voronezh. Moreover, the Bolshevik success on the Kolchak front and Wrangel's retreat to Tsaritsyn enabled them to bring additional forces to the Denikin front. When the Red Army began its successful advance on the central front, Wrangel proposed that Denikin recall from the Tsaritsyn front two cavalry corps, and unite them with Mai-Maevskii's cavalry units and a few Don Cossack cavalry divisions for a major attack in the direction of Moscow. Denikin turned it down. Later, he was forced gradually to recall the cavalry corps from the Tsaritsyn front to support the retreating Volunteer troops, but they had no decisive effect upon the situation.110

Hard fighting continued for several weeks, with the advantage inclining to the Bolshevik side. In this fighting the Bolsheviks defeated the Volunteer troops at Kursk and Kastornaia, an important junction on the Kursk-Voronezh railroad. The capture of these cities and the railroad enabled the Bolsheviks to drive a deep wedge between the Volunteer and the Don armies, forcing them to retreat.111 According to Wrangel,

The enemy's cavalry had penetrated our front line at the junction of the Army of the Don and Volunteer Army, and was now threatening the rear of the latter. Orel and Kursk had been abandoned, and the front was rapidly drawing in on Kharkiv. Further back, the province of Katerynoslav was a prey to risings. The people's discontent grew with our reverses.112

The victory commenced a new stage in the campaign and the initiative definitely passed to the Bolsheviks. Their forces advanced rapidly southward, encountering only minor resistance. Kharkiv was surrendered to the Bolsheviks on December 12 in utter confusion. Institutions were evacuated without direction or destination. A British merchant coming from Kharkiv witnessed:

Towns and stores had fallen into the Bolshevists' hands like a ripe fruit. The Volunteer General, Mai-Maevskii, had published a flamboyant circular denying the possibility of the town's falling, and ordering every one to remain quietly at his work; but, meanwhile, his staff and everybody else . . . disappeared in their trains down the line to safety, and the bibulous old man himself went away.113

Another eyewitness confirms these circumstances: "Still on December 7, 1919, the Kharkiv City Council was assured of the complete safety and strength of the city of Kharkiv, but on December 11 there were no authorities of the Denikin organizations."1

Although Denikin replaced General Mai-Maevskii with General Wrangel on December 9, he could not save the Denikin army.115 According to Churchill: "During November Denikin's armies melted away, and his whole front disappeared with the swiftness of pantomime."116 The Donets Basin was surrendered almost without a struggle. Kyiv was abandoned on December 16 and the Volunteer troops under General Bredov retreated west to Poland where they were interned. General Slashchov's Corps, which was engaged, according to Denikin, in an "exhaustive battle against Makhno in Katerynoslav province until mid-December" retreated to the Isthmus of Perekop where it made a stand. In addition, the Caucasian and Don armies were forced to retreat south.

Denikin's entire military organization was collapsing; his defeat and rapid retreat were largely determined by conditions in the rear. He admitted that his reserves and part of the line troops recalled to the rear were engaged in

putting down uprisings instigated by Makhno and other "otamans" which spread over most of the territory of Ukraine and New Russia. . . . Part of the forces of Kyiv province waged a struggle against the Petliura men and the partisans.118

Two courses of retreat were open to Denikin: to the Crimea or to Rostov. The Crimea afforded good protection and the probability of saving most of the equipment, whereas Rostov meant exposure to Bolshevik flank attacks. However, the Don, Kuban, and Terek Cossacks, who formed a majority of the army, preferred to retreat homeward, that is, to Rostov.119 Therefore, Denikin, against Wrangel's advice, decided to move to Rostov, hoping to rest his troops and to introduce some reforms. Only a small number of troops sought refuge in the Crimea. In the interim, however, the Bolsheviks captured Novocherkassk and on January 8, 1920, the Volunteer forces, after three days fighting, abandoned Rostov, fearing encirclement. In the opinion of a British war correspondent: "After the fall of Rostov, the Volunteer administration practically ceased to exist." Denikin's regime in Rostov was characterized by ever increasing speculation, disorder, and general economic chaos. In a dispatch to Denikin dated December 9, 1919, Wrangel describes the conditions of the army: "A considerable number of troops have retreated to the interior, and many officers are away on prolonged missions, busy selling and exchanging loot, etc. The army is absolutely demoralized and is fast becoming a collection of tradesmen and profit-eers."120

Although Denikin, with his front protected by the Don and Manych rivers and the rich Kuban Basin with its railway network to the rear, could have continued fighting the advancing Bolsheviks, the spirit of the Kuban Cossacks and the people had completely changed since the previous year because they had lost confidence in the Volunteer Army. Moreover, Denikin's prestige as a leader was destroyed by the overwhelming defeats he suffered. Therefore, Denikin tried to gain favor by making political concessions and introducing a number of civil reforms to liberalize his regime; the moment, however, had long since passed when any change could forestall the inevitable consequences of his previous policy. After Denikin lost the battle near Rostov, his forces retreated, fighting delaying actions to cover their retreat to the port of Novorossisk, the last foothold in the Kuban, which became "a hellhole of disease, insurrection, chaos, and confusion." Amid these conditions, on March 27, 1920, the Volunteer Army and a portion of the Don Army were evacuated into the Crimea. The Kuban Cossacks, numbering, with refugees, the Rada, and the government, over forty thousand men, plus about twenty thousand Don Cossacks, moved along the Black Sea coast toward Georgia, constantly harassed by Red troops on the way. As the Bolsheviks advanced, they greatly improved their military situation by capturing large stores of military supplies from depots and supply trains. Tens of thousands of horses, hundreds of trucks, countless tons of munitions, and invaluable modern equipment such as tanks, airplanes, locomotives, and guns supplied by the Allies, fell into Bolshevik hands.121

Denikin's radical reverse came to a great extent as a result of his defeat in Ukraine. As General Tiutiunyk rightly remarked: "Without realizing the strength of the partisan movement, it is difficult to comprehend what happened to cause the Red Army, which had retreated toward Moscow in panic, suddenly to appear in the role of a victor.122

A Soviet author admitted the weakness of the Bolsheviks:

This shock group [Kutepov's corps] from Kursk rapidly advanced toward Orel pursuing small units of the Thirteenth Army, tired by long retreat. . . . The officers' shock units encountered the [Red] shock group and the result of the battle decided the fate not only of Orel, but of Tula, because deep behind the [Red] shock group there were no reserves; [although they were] called reserves, the Siberian troops and regiments freed from the fighting against the English at the Arkhangelsk front still had not arrived.123

Denikin admits:

The activities of the partisan groups brought very serious complications into the strategy of all the contending sides, decisively weakening in turn one or the other, bringing chaos to the rear and forcing the recall of troops from the front. Objectively, the partisans were a decisive factor for us in the territory occupied by the enemy, but, at the same time, a glaringly negative one when the territory fell into our hands.124

Trotsky, like Denikin, came to the same conclusion: "Makhno's volunteers, of course, present danger to Denikin so long as Denikin rules Ukraine, but, on the other hand, they betrayed Ukraine [i.e., the Bolsheviks] to Denikin. And tomorrow, after the liberation of Ukraine, Makhno men will become a mortal danger to the workers'-peasants' state."125

Also, General Turbin, governor of the Podillia province during Denikin's occupation, admitted to a Ukrainian: "You see, it was your peasants, no one else, who drove us out of Poltava province." Therefore, the Denikin troops retreated from the Left Bank in a great hurry, leaving a large area between themselves and the Bolsheviks. The Ukrainian partisans not only speeded up Denikin's retreat, but simultaneously fought the Bolsheviks, slowing their advance. However, the Denikin staff publicly reported it was the Denikin troops who fought the Bolsheviks there. Thus the Bolsheviks crossed the entire Left Bank almost without serious opposition from the Denikin forces, because the partisans had destroyed the latter's rear, forcing them to retreat.126

As an eyewitness observed:

At the end of 1919 the defeat and disintegration of the Volunteer Army was clearly marked. Without stopping, it rolled south toward the Black Sea, almost without any pressure from its adversary. The high command was constantly losing the strings of control of the armies. The ties between the higher staffs and separate military units were getting weaker with each day until they completely disappeared. Each unit began to act on its own risk and fear, retreating where and when convenient, disregarding the general situation and ignoring combat orders. 127

The war correspondent with the Denikin troops vividly described the kaleidoscopic changes of Denikin's military fortune:

At the time when in the summer of 1919, the army, headed by Denikin, was victoriously advancing northward; when each day was bringing us always new and newer reports of victories; when the echo of the bells of Moscow, it seems, became distinctly heard in the Don, and in the Kuban, and in the Terek, and in the Crimea, and in the south of Ukraine—already at this time were heard warning voices that were indicating that the faster we advanced toward Moscow, the faster we would come to theBlack Sea. 128

There were a number of causes for the defeat of the Volunteer Army, but the main one was the overextension of the front line to a length of two thousand kilometers, from Tsaritsin on the Volga, through Orel to Odessa. As General Vinogradov remarked: "At the end of 1919, it was not the troops of the armed forces of South Russia that controlled the huge space, but the space swallowed up the troops." No reserves were available at critical points and times. Denikin appeared to be, after the death of Kornilov and Alekseev, the ablest of all the anti-Bolshevik Russian leaders, and his forces contained the best of the elements that had fled from Soviet Russia, as well as the Don and Kuban Cossacks who, in contrast to the Russian population, were violently anti-Bolshevik; yet he disregarded the very essentials of permanent conquest, failing to consolidate his position in the conquered territory by establishing sound local governments and land reform. Denikin was lulled by his rapid success into looking upon the occupation of the large territory as a pleasant, accomplished fact.

Denikin's weakness was that he was a soldier and not a statesman. To one of his political advisors, he admitted: "I am a soldier and have never taken any interest in your politics." Denikin's nationality policy was epitomized by his motto: "A United and Indivisible Russia," a slogan that denied the newly established states formerly belonging to the Russian Empire the right to independence. Such a policy satisfied neither his allies, the Don and the Kuban Cossacks, nor his Ukrainian enemies who fought him to the very end. His socioeconomic policy, manifested by the return of the estates to the landlords, likewise antagonized the peasants and brought about uprisings.

The anti-Bolshevik movement consisted mainly of two groups: the representatives of the old, reactionary Russia, to whom the achievements of the Revolution were unacceptable; and the representatives of the democratic and liberal Russia, to whom the Revolution was the foundation on which a new Russia should be constructed. Those two hostile groups were brought together only by their fear of bolshevism. The leading role in the movement fell to the first group, which brought military dictatorship and a reactionary system, whereas the other group was politically unorganized and became aware of its political power only during the Civil War. This alliance of ideological opposites paralyzed the anti-Bolshevik movement on all levels.

To strengthen his weary armies, Denikin was compelled to conscript the non-Russian population and the Red Army prisoners, neither of whom was either loyal or willing to fight for Denikin's Russia. Exhaustion, disease, and corruption on all levels of the anti-Bolshevik movement had destroyed the discipline and morale of Denikin's forces. The final and most comprehensive contribution to the deterioration of Denikin's position were the Ukrainian partisans, especially Makhno's army, which inflicted heavy losses, disorganized communications, and destroyed supply bases, thus breaking the backbone of the offensive on Moscow. Denikin admitted: "This uprising, which took on such broad dimensions, destroyed our rear and the front at the most critical period."129 As Pierre Berland, the correspondent of Le Temps in Moscow, observed:

There is no doubt that Denikin's defeat is explained more by the uprisings of the peasants who brandished Makhno's black flag, than by the success of Trotskii's regular army. The partisan bands of "Bat'ko" tipped the scales in favor of the Reds and if Moscow wants to forget it today, impartial history will not.130

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Notes

1. Lukomskii, Memoirs, pp. 129 ff., 135, 141; Denikin, Ocherki, 2:156; Vera Vladimirova, God sluzhby sotsialistov kapitalistam, p. 12; L. G. Orlov, "Osnovatel' Dobrovol'cheskoi Armii," Chasovoi, no. 329 (1953).

2. Denikin, Ocherki, 2:189; Lukomskii, Memoirs, p. 140; Orlov, "Osnovatel' Dobrovol'cheskoi Armii," no. 329.

3. Lukomskii, Memoirs, p. 141; Denikin, Ocherki, 2:157, 189; Markow, Armee ohne Heimat, p. 15; V. E. Pavlov, Markovtsy v boiakh i pokhodakh za Rossiiu v osvoboditel'noi voine 1917—1920 godov, 1:73; Stewart, White Armies of Russia, p. 32; P. N. Miliukov, "Dnevnik," Novyi zhurnal, no. 66 (1961), pp. 173. 179; Karol Wedziagolski, Pamietniki: Wojna i revolucja, kontrrewolucja, Bol-szewicki przewrot, Warszawski epilog, p. 291.

4. P. M. Volkonsky, The Volunteer Armies of Alexiev and Denikin, pp. 7—8; Roman Gul", Ledianoi pokhod, pp. 17—18; Bechhofer, In Denikin's Russia and the Caucasus, 1919-1920, p. 94.

5. Lukomskii, Memoirs, p. 147; Volkonsky, Volunteer Armies, p. 7; Denikin, Ocherki, 2:166; Markow, Armee ohne Heimat, p. 21; Pavlov, Markovtsy v boiakh, 1:93; I. A. Poliakov, Donskie kazakiv bor'be s bol'shevikami, pp. 111—12; Bunyan and Fisher, Bolshevik Revolution, pp. 420—21.

6. Gul', Ledianoi pokhod, pp. 108—9; Bunyan and Fisher, Bolshevik Revolution, p. 428.

7. Gul', Ledianoi pokhod, pp. 119—23; Vasyl' Ivanys, Borot'ba Kubani za nezalezhnist', p. 37; Bunyan and Fisher, Bolshevik Revolution, p. 428; Orlov, "Osnovatel' Dobrovol'cheskoi Armii."

8. Poliakov, Donskie kazaki v bor'be, p. 98.

9. Shkuro, Zapiski, p. 209.

10. Denikin, Ocherki, 3 : 86.

11. Poliakov, Donskie kazaki v bor'be, pp. 115—17.

12. I. Borisenko, Sovetskie respubliki na Severnom Kavkaze v 1918 godu, 1:81.

13. A. V. Turkul, Drozdovtsy v ogne, pp. 19—22; Drozdovskii, Dnevnik, pp. 133—37; Poliakov, Donskie kazaki v bor'be, pp. 196—200; Bunyan, Intervention, pp. 33, 35, 131—32; Bunyan and Fisher, Bolshevik Revolution, p. 422; Ivanys, Stezhkamy zhyttia, 2:106; Volkonsky, Volunteer Armies, p. 23.

14. Krasnov, "Vsevelikoe Voisko Donskoe," ARR 5:201; see also Denikin, Ocherki, 3:155.

15. At that time there were out of nine thousand men only over two thousand Russians (Ivanys, Stezhkamy zhyttia, 2:130; Krasnov, "Vsevelikoe Voisko Donskoe," 5:192, 201; Dmytro Doroshenko, "Deshcho pro zakordonnu polityku Ukrains'koi Derzhavy v 1918 rotsi," Khliborobs'ka Ukraina, 2:56—57; Reshetar, Ukrainian Revolution, p. 187.

16. A. I. Denikin, The White Army (London: J. Cape, 1930), p. 158; Drozdovskii, Dnevnik, pp. 139, 150.

17. Volkonsky, Volunteer Armies, p. 27; Peter P. Wrangel, Always with Honour, p. 52; Denikin, White Army, p. 184; Denikin, Ocherki, 3:197-98; Pavlov, Mar-kovtsy v boiakh, 1:304—5; Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, 2:139.

18. Denikin, Ocherki, 4:107, 111, 113; Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, 2:142; Bor'ba trudiashchikhsia mass za ustanovlenie i uprochenie Sovetskoi vlasti na Stavropol'e, 1917—apr. 1921 gg., pp. 102—3; Borisenko, Sovetskie respubliki,

2 :175—78; Wrangel, Always with Honour, p. 68; Lukomskii, Memoirs, pp. 208 ff.; Pavlov, Markovtsy v boiakh, 1 :338 ff.

19. M. Svechinikov, Bor'ba Krasnoi Armii na Severnom Katze (Moscow: Gos. voen. izd-vo, 1926), p. 221, as quoted in Chamberlin, Russian Revolution. 2:146.

20. K. N. Sokolov, Pravlenie generala Denikina, pp. 43, 91; Lukomskii, Memoirs, p. 205; Pavlov, Markovtsky v boiakh, 1:317; 2:5; Denikin, Ocherki,

3 :271—72; Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, 2: 209; Wrangel, Always with Honour, p. 68.

21. Stewart, White Armies of Russia, p. 75. At the beginning of May 1919 in Kharkiv the Volunteer Corps was reorganized and renamed the Volunteer Army, consisting of the Alekseev, Markov, Kornilov, Drozdovskii divisions, and some regiments and groups. The Caucasian Volunteer Army was renamed the Caucasian Army (Sokolov, Pravlenie generala Denikina, p. 119; Vygran, "Vospominaniia o bor'be s makhnovtsami," p. 4; Kapustians'kyi, Pokhid ukrains'kykh armii, 2:154.

22. Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, 2: 141.

23. Churchill, Aftermath, p. 165.

24. D. Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties (London: Gollancz, 1938), p. 317.

25. Churchill, Aftermath, p. 165; see also Denikin, Ocherki, 4:36; Lukomskii, Memoirs, p. 209.

26. Wrangel, Always with Honour, p. 75; Denikin, Ocherki, 4:86; George von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1967), p. 108.

27. Hodgson, With Denikin's Armies, pp. 280, 174.

28. Peter P. Wrangel, The Memoirs of General Wrangel, p. 70.

29. B. Simonov, Razgrom denikinshchiny, p. 24; see also Bulavenko, "Kuban' i 'moskovs'kyi shliak,' " RN, nos. 7-8 (78-79), p. 193.

30. George A. Brinkley, The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia, 1917—1921, p. 187. By midsummer the Denikin army had increased to about 150,000 combat troops: the Volunteer Army of Mai-Maevskii, 40,000; the Don Army, 45,000; the Crimean Volunteer Corps, 15,000; the Caucasian Army, 20,000; and Wrangel's Army, 30,000 (Brinkley, pp. 187, 363).

31. Dotsenko, Zymovyipokhid, p. CXXVIII.

32. Akademiia nauk URSR, Kiev, Instytut istorii, Radians'ke budivnytstvo na ukraini, p. 167.

33. Denikin, Ocherki, 5 : 84.

34. Lukomskii, Memoirs, pp. 226—29; Vladimir Maevskii, Gvardeiskie sapery, p. 1; idem, Povstanty Ukrainy, p. 2; Fischer, Soviets in World Affairs, p. 209; Averin, "Do borot'by," p. 126; Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, 2: 244—45.

35. Wrangel, Memoirs, pp. 88—89; Bulavenko, "Kuban i 'moskovs'kyi shliakh,' " p. 187. According to the aide of Mai-Maevskii, Makarov: While speaking to Mai-Maevskii in Katerynoslav, Denikin remarked: "Do not advance your valiant units too fast. Kolchak is approaching Viatka; [he] will cross the Volga, occupy Nizhnii Novogorod and then Moscow. We might be left out; let him be checked a little. And we always will have time to take Moscow" (P. V. Makarov, Ad'iutant generala Mai-Maevskogo, p. 32).

36. Wrangel, Memoirs, p. 89.

37. Sokolov, Pravlenie generala Denikina, pp. 195—96.

38. Denikin, Ocherki, 5 :142.

39. Arbatov, "Ekaterinoslav 1917-22 gg.," p. 94; Shkuro, Zapiski, p. 216.

40. Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 2:33; Kin, Denikinshchina, p. 241; Dubiv, "Ulamok z moho zhyttia," no. 6 (219), p. 738; M. Bohun, "Fragmentu zi spomyniv pro 'Narodniu Oboronu Khersons'koi gubernii,' " Ukrains'kyi skytalets' 4, no. 2: 36.

41. Kin, Denikinshchina,^. 241—42.

42. Levyts'kyi, Halyts'ka armiia na Velykii Ukraini, pp. 126—27.

43. Ibid.

44. Kin, Denikinshchina, pp. 243—44.

45. Wrangel, Always with Honour, p. 185.

46. Denikin, Ocherki, 4:218.

47. P. Miliukov, Rossiia na perelomie, 2: 205.

48. Ibid., 2 :162; see also Lukomskii, "Iz vospominanii," 6 :132—33.

49. Miliukov, Rossiia na perelomie, 2:205.

50. "Realdop [realization of booty] became a part of our troops at a time when [it] was still the main . . . source of means for the Volunteer Army. . . . 'gratuitous requisition' also became an 'everyday habit' in the Army. . . . robbery of the population was an unhindered and systematic [phenomenon] " (Sokolov, Pravlenie generala Denikina, p. 162; see also Kornilovskii udamiipolk, p. 148).

51. G. N. Rakovskii, Vstanie bielykh, p. 11; see also Arbatov, "Ekaterinoslav 1917-22 gg.," pp. 93-94; L. L., "V chotyrokutnyku smery," LCK, 2, no. 2 (1930): 14.

52. Denikin, Ocherki, 4:95.

53. Wrangel, Memoirs, p. 127.

54. Fischer, Soviets in World Affairs, 1:232.

55. Kin, Denikinshchina, p. 50.

56. Makhno, Makhnovshchina, p. 59.

57. S. N. Semanov, "Makhnovshchina i ee krakh," p. 46; Bulavenko, "Kuban' u pershii polovyni," p. 137; G. Gordienko, "Svidetel'stva o Makhno: Glazami iunoshi," NRS, March 16, 1970, p. 7.

58. Kapustians'kyi, Pokhid ukrains'kykh armii, 2:155; Udovychenko, Tretia Zalizna dyviziia, p. 106; Kommandarm lAkir, pp. 62, 78—79; I. E. IAkir, Vospomi-naniia o grazhdanskoi voine, p. 36.

59. Makhno, Makhnovshchina, p. 59.

60. S. Uritskii, "Mezhdu Odessoi i Nikolaevom: Boi 1919 goda," in Grazhdan-skaia voina, 1918—1921, ed. A. S. Bubnova, S. S. Kameneva, and R. P. Eideman (Moscow: "Voennyi vestnik," 1928), 1:99, 101; Semanov, "Makhnovshchina i ee krakh," pp. 45—46; Nikulin, "Gibel' makhnovshchiny," pp. 176—77; Dubrovs'kyi, Bat'ko Nestor Makhno, p. 11; Kapustians'kyi, Pokhid ukrains'kykh armii, 2 :155— 56.

61. Uritskii, "Mezhdu Odessoi i Nikolaevom," 1:98, 100; see also Kom-mandarm IAkir, pp. 86—87; V. Nikolskii, "Novye rukovoditeli Kr. Armii," Chasovoi, no. 206 (February 15, 1938), p. 5.

62. E. A. Men'chukov, Istoricheskii ocherk boev v usloviiakh okruzheniia, p. 159; Kommandarm IAkir, p. 87; Kapustians'kyi, Pokhid ukrains'kykh armii, 2:156.

63. Voline, Unknown Revolution, p. 141; Miroshevskii, "Vol'nyi Ekaterino-slav," p. 207; Ol. Dotsenko, "Reid otamana Sahaidachnoho," LCK, no. 11 (1932), p. 5.

64. "Makhnovskaia armiia," p. 3; "Zamietki k knigi Arshinova," p. 6; Voline, Unknown Revolution, pp. 142, 260—63; Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, p. 135; Makhno, Makhnovshchina, p. 49; Footman, "Nestor Makhno," p. 103; Dubrovs'kyi, Bat'ko Nestor Makhno, p. 11; Rudnev, Makhnovshchina, p. 46; Nikulin, "Gibel' Makhnovshchiny," p. 176; Fischer, Life of Lenin, pp. 365— 66; Teper, Makhno, pp. 76—77; Kapustians'kyi, "Makhno i makhnovshchyna," no. 243.

65. Originally it had a punitive function, but because of improper treatment of prisoners of war, it was deprived of its punitive function, and commanders and partisans were categorically prohibited from shooting prisoners upon their own initiative. A commission was organized in the Revolutionary Military Council to deal with prisoners. The representatives of the anarchists had the right to participate in its decisions (Teper, Makhno, pp. 81—82; Rudnev, Makhnovshchina, pp. 74-75).

66. Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, p. 95; Voline, Unknown Revolution, pp. 110, 140; Udovychenko, Ukraina u viini, p. 106; R. L. Suslyk, Kryvavi storinky z nepysanykh litopysiv, p. 80; Esbakh, "Poslednie dni makhnovshchiny na Ukraine," pp. 41—42; Semanov, "Makhnovshchina i ee krakh," p. 42; Efimov, "Deistviia protiv Makhno," p. 204; lAkymiv, "Hostyna Makhna v Umani," p. 78.

67. IA. Slashchov, "Materialy dlia istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v Rossii," Voennyi vestnik, nos. 9—10, pp. 38, 39; Men'chukov, Istoricheskii ocherk boev, p. 176; Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, p. 135; V. Al'mendinger, Simfero-pol'skii ofitserskii polk 1918—1920, p. 18; N. Makhno, "Razgrom Denikintsev," Put' k svobode, no. 4 (October 30, 1919), as quoted in Al'mendinger, Simfero-pol'skii, p. 23.

68. Slashchov, "Materialy do istorii," p. 40; Al'mendinger, Simferopol'skii, pp. 18—20; "Makhnovskaia armiia," p. 4; "Zamietki k knigi Arshinova," p. 7; Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, pp. 135—36; Nikulin, "Gibel' makhnovshchiny"; Denikin, Ocherki, 5 : 234.

69. Slachshov, "Materialy do istorii," p. 41; Voline, Unknown Revolution, pp. 143—44; Al'mendinger, Simferopol'skii, p. 20; Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, p. 137; lAkymiv, "Hostyna Makhna v Umani," pp. 79—80; V. Kalyna, "V Umani"; M. Irchan, "Makhno i makhnivtsi," p. 116; Denikin, Ocherki, 5:234; Dubrovs'kyi, Bat'ko Nestor Makhno, p. 12; Rudnev, Makhnovshchina, p. 48; Omelianovych-Pavlenko, Zymovi pokhid, 2:26; Dotsenko, Zymovi pokhid, p. CXXXIV.

70. Trotskii, Materialy i dokumenty po istorii Krasnoi Armii, 2, pt. 1:304.

71. Wrangel, Always with Honour, p. 101.

72. Sokolov, Pravlenie generala Denikina, p. 119; Vinogradov, "Chemu ia byl svidietelem," p. 15.

73. Wrangel, Always with Honour, pp. 98, 101.

74. Slashchov, "Materialy do istorii," p. 39.

75. Meleshko, "Nestor Makhno ta ioho anarkhiia," no. 4, p. 15; Semanov, "Makhnovshchina i ee krakh," p. 48.

76. Mustafin, "Proryv Makhno," Pereklichka, no. 21, p. 13; G. Sakovich, "Proryv Makhno," Pereklichka, no. 116, p. 14.

77. Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, pp. 139—41; Al'mendinger, Simferopol'skii, pp. 21—23; Semanov, "Makhnovshchina i ee krakh," p. 48; Nikulin, "Gibel' makhnovshchiny," p. 177; "Prilozhenie: Svodka o reide Makhno po denikinskim tylam oseniu 1919 g.," PR, no. 9, p. 208; M. Makhnovskii, "Pravda o Makhno," NRS 59, no. 20 (March 2, 1969): 8; Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, p. 86; Denikin, Ocherki, 5:234; Alain Sergent, Les anarchistes, pp. 135—37; Mustafin, "Proryv Makhno," pp. 11—13; Sakovich, "Proryv Makhno," pp. 12—13, 14; Makhno, "Razgrom denikintsev," in Al'mendinger, Simferopol'skii, p. 23.

78. Sakovich, "Proryv Makhno," p. 11.

79. Nomad, "Epic of Nestor Makhno," no. 7, p. 410; "Prilozhenie," p. 208; Dubrovs'kyi, Bat'ko Nestor Makhno, p. 13; Denikin, Ocherki, 5:234; Fedenko, Mynulo pivstolittia, p. 14; Rudnev, Makhnovshchina, p. 49; Sakovich, "Proryv Makhno," p. 14.

80. Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, pp. 145—46; "1919 god v Ekaterinoslave i Aleksandrovske," pp. 81—82; Miroshevskii, "VoPnyi Ekaterino-slav," p. 203; Erde, "Politychna prohrama anarkho-makhnivshchyny," no. 2, pp. 36-37; Kubanin, Makhovshchina, p. 103.

81. Voline, Unknown Revolution, pp. 163—73; Miroshevskii, "Vol'nyi Ekaterinoslav," pp. 201—2; Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, pp. 146-47; "1919 god v Ekaterinoslave i Aleksandrovske," pp. 81-82, 91-92. The Fourth Congress, called for June 15, 1919, did not take place because the Bolsheviks prevented it. According to Kubanin, the congress took place on October 26 and was composed of about 300 delegates (Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, pp. 91—92).

82. Rossum, "Proclamations of the Makhno Movement, 1920," p. 263.

83. "1919 god v Ekaterinoslave i Aleksandrovske," p. 92; Voline, Unknown Revolution, pp. 171—73.

84. Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, p. 115.

85. Kin, "Povstancheskoe," p. 79; "Prilozhenie," no. 9, p. 208; Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, p. 174; Panas Fedenko, Isaak Mazepa, p. 80; Gutman, "Pod vlast'iu anarkhistov," p. 62; Denikin, Ocherki, 5 : 234.

86. Tsebrii, "Vospominaniia partizana," no. 32, p. 14.

87. Hodgson, With Denikin's Armies, pp. 184.

88. Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, pp. 86—87; Margushin, "Bat'ko Makhno," p. 2; Denikin, Ocherki, 5:234; Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, pp. 142-43; "Prilozhenie," no. 9, p. 208.

89. Sokolov, Pravlenie generala Denikina, p. 190.

90. Ibid.

91. A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, The Grinding Mill, p. 359.

92. Hodgson, With Denikin's Armies, pp. 119—20.

93. Bechhofer, In Denikin's Russia, p. 176.

94. Ibid., p. 178; Rudnev, Makhnovshchina, p. 53; Arbatov, "Ekaterinoslav 1917-22 gg.," pp. 96-97; Denikin, Ocherki, 5:235; Gutman, "Pod vlast'iu anar-khistov," p. 65; P. Teslenko, "K vospominaniiam V. Belasha," LR, no. 3 (1928), p. 230.

95. Gutman, "Pod vlast'iu anarkhistov," p. 63.

96. Ibid., pp. 63-64.

97. Arbatov, "Ekaterinoslav 1917-22 gg.," p. 98.

98. V. Primakov, "Srazhenie pod Orlom, oktiabr'—noiablr' 1919 goda," Bor'ba klassov, no. 2 (1931), p. 52; Nikulin, "Gibel' makhnovshchiny," p. 179; "Prilo-zhenie," no. 9, p. 208; Kin, "Povstancheskoe," nos. 3—4, pp. 78—79; Dubrovs'kyi, Bat'ko Nestor Makhno, p. 13; Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, p. 90; Teper, Makhno, p. 48.

99. Rakovskii, V stanie bielykh, pp. 11—12.

100. Wrangel, Memoirs, pp. 98-99.

101. Makarov, Ad'iutant generala Mai-Maevskogo, p. 62.

102. Marion Aten and Arthur Orrmont, Last Train over Rostov Bridge, p. 161.

103. Denikin, Ocherki, 5 : 234.

104. Vygran, "Vospominaniia o bor'be s makhnovtsami," p. 6; V. M., "Dontsy na makhnovskom frontie," Kazach'i dumy, no. 13, p. 16; Denikin, Ocherki, 5 : 258; Simonov, Razgrom denikinshchiny, p. 27.

105. V. M., "Dontsy na makhnovskom frontie," no. 10, pp. 11—13.

106. Makarov, Ad'iutant generala Mai-Maevskogo, p. 29.

107. Levyts'kyi, Halyts'ka armiia, pp. 121—22.

108. Simonov, Razgrom denikinshchiny, pp. 27—28.

109. Ibid., p. 60.

110. P. N. Shatilov, "Petr Nikolaevich Vrangel," Obshchestvo Gallipoliitsev, October 1953, p. 3.

111. Denikin, Ocherki, 5 : 232-33; Lukomskii, Memoirs, pp. 230-31.

112. Wrangel, Memoirs, p. 106.

113. Bechhofer, In Denikin's Russia, p. 117.

114. P. Zaliesskii, "Glavnyia prichiny neudach bielago dvizheniia na IUgie Rossii," BA 2-3:160.

115. Lukomskii, Memoirs, p. 231.

116. Churchill, Aftermath, p. 266.

117. Denikin, Ocherki, 5:235.

118. Ibid., p. 232.

119. Miliukov, Rossiia na perelomie, 2:212.

120. Bechhofer, In Denikin's Russia, p. 149; Wrangel, Always with Honour, p. 112.

121. Brinkley, Volunteer Army, p. 224; Rakovskii, V stanie bielykh, pp. 223, 236—37, 257—58; Zaliesskii, "Glavnyia prichiny neudach bielago dvizheniia na IUgie Rossii," pp. 161—62; V. Dobrynin, Bor'ba s bol'shevizmom na iugie Rossii, p. 109; Stewart, White Armies of Russia, pp. 346—47; Lukomskii, Memoirs, p. 246; Vinogradov, "Chemu ia byl svidietelem," p. 22; G. N. Rakovskii, Konets bielykh: Ot Dniepra do Bosfora, p. 6.

122. Tiutiunyk, Zymovyipokhid 1919-20 rr., 1: 74.

123. Primakov, "Srazhenie pod Orlom," pp. 53, 54.

124. Denikin, Ocherki, 5 :134.

125. Trotskii, Materialy i dokumenty po istorii Krasnoi Armii, 2, pt. 2:28.

Notes, Chapters 17, 18

303

126. Bohun, "Fragmenty zi spomyniv pro 'Narodniu Oboronu khersons'koi gubernii,' " pp. 35, 36; Dotsenko, Zymovyipokhid, p. CXLI.

127. F. Shteinman, "Otstuplenie ot Odessy," ARR 2:87.

128. Rakovskii, V stanie bielykh, p. 1.

129. Denikin, Ocherki, 5 : 235.

130. Pierre Berland [Georges Luciani] , "Makhno," Le Temps, August 28, 1934.