Notes

1. I have discussed some of these expedients in "meditations Leibnitziennes," American Philosophical Quarterly, II, 1965, reprinted in Philosophical Perspectives, published by Charles C. Thomas, Springfield (Illinois), 1967.

2. Color words are notoriously ambiguous in the sense that they function sometimes as adjectives, sometimes as singular terms (as above), sometimes as common nouns (e.g. in 'Crimson is a (shade of red')).

3. Is 'transcendental logic' just another application of 'ordinary logic'?

4. Examples of singular terms which are not basic would be, for example, 'the average man,' 'the tallest building in Manhattan,' 'the lion,' and 'Jack and Jill' as in 'Jack and Jill is a team.' (Of course in ordinary English we would say 'Jack and Jill are a team,' but then it is quite clear that the 'are' is not functioning as it would in 'Jack and Jill are children,' which simply abbreviates 'Jack is a child and Jill is a child.'

5. It is worth noting at this point that 'species' as a classification of conceptual items would not be a category in the sense of summum genus, for it falls under the more generic notion of character.' For both 'man' and 'animal,' not to mention 'white' are ways of characterizing individual things.

6. Note that linguistic items proper -- and not just 'inner speech' episodes -- are now being treated as conceptual items. For a defense of this thesis that overt verbal behavior -- which, is the primary mode of being of the linguistic proper -- is as such conceptual, see my "Language as Thought and as Communication," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXIX, 1969, pp. ff. For an exploration of the relation between the concept of thought as 'inner speech' and the concept of thinking-out-loud (candid overt speech) see my Science and Metaphysics, Chap. III.

7. That it was not easy to appreciate this at the time is but one more illustration of the fact that the more intelligible in the order of being does not always coincide with the more intelligible in the order of knowing.

8. It is philosophically of the utmost importance that 'Men are animals' when translated into PMese becomes 'man ⊂ animal' which is short for '(x) x is a man ⊃ x is an animal.' In this sense 'are' dissolves into connectives (not relations) and quantification.

9. See Science and Metaphysics, Chapter III.

10. The relevant correctnesses are those which "give meaning to expressions" and are to be distinguished from the correctnesses which concern the role of language in communication and personal interaction. For an elaboration of this point, see Science and Metaphysics, Chapter IV; also "Language as Thought and as Communication," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 29 (1969): 506-27.

11. For an elaboration of the points I am about to make which brings out their specifically Kantian character, see "Some Reflections on Kant's Theory of Experience," Journal of Philosophy, 64 (1967): 633-47.