35 Pointing to Another Wrong

Though many give lip service to the adage "Two wrongs do not make a right," few are not tempted to mitigate blame for wrongs on one side by citing those on the other, Justice seems to demand that that one who complains of wrong-doing should himself have "clean hands." Powerful advantage can be taken of this feeling to turn away attention from charges that are difficult to answer, by showing that the accuser himself is guilty of misconduct. This device is an effective rejoinder in controversy since it both deflects attention from the original grievance and creates sympathy for the accused party. And in the practical affairs of life a sort of rule-of-the-game approach is often adopted so that the misdeeds of one side are set over against those of the other. Yet even when the countercharges are deserved, all that is demonstrated is that neither side is right when both are wrong. Recently, when certain teams in a big football conference were found guilty of paying their players, moderate penalties were assessed against these teams. Some sports writers and alumni opposed the penalties, alleging that other teams in the conference were equally guilty of the forbidden practices. If these allegations were substantiated, then the other schools should have received equal penalties; justice certainly demands equal treatment for all. But the apologists were by no means urging the imposition of further penalties, but rather the suspension of the penalties already imposed. As in this instance, the citation of other wrongs is at its best a generously motivated confusion of the issue. At worst, crimes can be condoned and criminals excused or even praised because others have committed crimes against them.

Sometimes man's propensity for revenge creates a sort of tradition which bedevils human relations by piling wrong upon wrong for decades or even centuries. Thus individuals have their vendettas while whole peoples nourish traditional hostilities on a diet of past grievances. The historical animosities between England and Ireland, France and Germany, Russia and Turkey, Japan and Korea, of colonial areas throughout the world and their former colonial governors -- all these provide instances in which old grievances remain living forces dominating present relationships.

EXAMPLECOMMENT
Pointing out that Breslau had been a German city for over five hundred years before 1945, a debater maintains that the action of driving the German inhabitants out of the city at the conclusion of World War II was a great injustice to the people concerned. His opponent replies, "I don't see that it was wrong. After all, when the Germans had the upper hand in Warsaw, we all know how they behaved." The question raised is whether the German inhabitants of Breslau were treated justly. No amount of past injustice has any relation to this problem. In fact, the more moral indignation the speaker feels against Hitler's brutal creation of "living space" by the sword, the more sympathetic one might expect him to feel toward victims of similar treatment anywhere, even in Germany. The opposition argument amounts to this: "Injustice has been done in the past to Poles living in Warsaw; therefore, I favor a further act of injustice to Germans living in Breslau."
Paul: "Why are you late, friend Peter?"

Peter: "Huh? Since you failed to show up at all on Friday night, you live in a glass house, Paul. You really shouldn't throw stones."

The moral of the glass house adage is nonsense. There is also an ad hominem appeal here (see #20).
Paul: "Liberty USSR style is a travesty on individual freedom. Free speech does not exist, voting is a farcical ratification of official candidates, to strike is punishable as treason, the slightest opposition is dealt with by the secret police and the slave labor camp."

Peter: "I don't think it behooves us to criticize other nations in view of our racial discrimination and the way legislative investigations are carried on in this country."

Paul advances the proposition "Liberty USSR style is a travesty on individual freedom" and brings forth certain supporting facts. Peter ignores the supporting facts; instead he alleges other wrongs. Peter's argument, called by Arthur Koestler the "soul searching fallacy," should not be permitted to hamstring thought or action. Saints and sinners alike have a right to rational criticism, and the thief confined in his cell may justly complain when his watch has been stolen.
Francis Bacon, the great English philosopher, served as Lord Chancellor under James I. In 1621 he was convicted of accepting bribes in chancery suits. All his biographers have pointed to the wide-spread practice of the jurists of the day of accepting "presents" from contending parties. A climate of opinion condoning practices that are recognized as immoral does tend to mitigate the culpability of an individual who is merely doing what everybody else does. The evidence offered by Bacon's biographers is relevant for assessing the grievousness of the crimes for which Bacon was convicted. Yet it is significant that Bacon himself did not rely on the prevalence of the practice when arguing in his own behalf. He said simply, "I do plainly and ingenuously confess that I am guilty of corruption, and do renounce all defense. I beseech your Lordships to be merciful to a broken reed."