PREFACE

This book is intended to introduce students and general readers to the branch of philosophy called "ethics." I shall try, among other things, to present some of the standard material of ethics that beginners and others should know. This will not, however, be a summary of what moral philosophers are agreed upon, as introductions to other subjects may be summaries of what the experts in those fields agree upon. Such a substantial body of agreement does not exist in philosophy. Nor will this be simply an introductory review of the various differing positions moral philosophers have taken, although many of these positions will be presented and discussed. My aim in this book is not just to introduce the problems and positions of moral philosophers, but also to do moral philosophy. That is, I shall try to write an essay in moral philosophy in which I put forward some of my own views and reasoning, and at the same time, provide an introduction to the subject in general.

I try to do this because the proper purpose of an introduction like this must be, not merely to pass on information, but to stimulate and help the reader to do better, clearer, and more philosophical thinking about ethical questions than he would do otherwise. Such an introduction will involve my presenting answers or partial answers to some of these questions; however, these are not meant dogmatically and should not be taken as final unless they stand up under the reader's own scrutiny. I do not think that the only way for others to think better or more clearly is by their coming to agree with me. Their coming to disagree clearly and on carefully reasoned grounds will serve the purpose of this book as well. It is an introduction to the kind of thinking that is moral philosophy as I understand it.

In the spirit just indicated, let me say something about my arguments in this book. When I give arguments for or against a certain ethical position, I am not thinking of them as conclusive proofs or disproofs. Such conclusive proofs or disproofs are as difficult as they are rare in philosophy. More about the nature of ethical judgments and their justification will come out as we go along, especially in Chapter 6, but I recognize that it is always logically possible for my opponent to stand pat in his position in spite of my arguments. My arguments are meant as arguments for or against positions all right, as they should be in philosophy, but not as irresistible forces or immovable objects. Rather they are statements of my reasons for taking or rejecting a certain view and invitations to the reader to consider whether they convince him that he should do likewise. My point is not to push him around; it is to bring him to see what position seems most reasonable to him, when, with such help as I can give him, he thinks things over. He always can hold out against me; the question then is whether he thinks his position is the most sensible one to take -- not whether he can take it but whether he is willing to take it. The method is that of Socrates.

There are also times when I do not actually give arguments for what I say. This does not mean that I am simply being dogmatic. Partly, the reason is that there is not space to debate everything, but, mainly, it is that I am asking the reader to think about the matter in hand and to see if what I say does not seem on the whole the most reasonable thing to say and to hold. Once more, however, what matters is not whether he agrees or disagrees but whether he comes out with a more adequate ethical theory.

In this revised edition I have made many corrections, some stylistic or verbal, some expository, some doctrinal and substantive. There are also many additions of various sizes and sorts. The chief changes are: (a) a discussion of the divine command theory of right and wrong in Chapter 2, (b) a more elaborate review of utilitarianism in Chapter 3, (c) a further presentation of my own theory of obligation in Chapter 3, (d) more on the ethics of virtue in Chapter 4, (e) additional material on the good life in Chapter 5, (f) more on the distinction between moral and nonmoral judgments and on the moral point of view in Chapter 6, and (g) a revised and expanded bibliography.

I may also mention that Introductory Readings in Ethics, edited by W. K. Frankena and J. T. Granrose and closely correlated with my book, will be published by Prentice-Hall, Inc. shortly. I am indebted to my friends, students, family, and to other writers, for their assistance, which I gratefully acknowledge here.

William K. Frankena