(B) Textbook View of Science.
Closely related to the Baconian view of science described previously is the so-called textbook view.{9} As the title suggests, this view of science has been expressed in textbooks of the particular sciences such as physics, chemistry, etc. The major presuppositions of the textbook view are that scientific ideas can be divided into those which are correct, right, true and those which are erroneous. Those scientists who were first to present the ideas found in the most up to date textbooks are classified as the good scientists and the rest fall into the class of bad scientists because they, so to speak, missed the boat. The history of science is thus sprinkled with white ideas, i.e., those in agreement with the newest textbooks and black ideas, i.e., those that were abandoned, dropped from the pages of the most up to date textbooks.{10} To give the young science student some idea of the development of the particular scientific field, textbooks contain references to the scientists who are responsible for the introduction of the particular white idea under discussion. Such presuppositions obviously require that the history of science be rewritten every time a textbook appears which has introduced radical innovations reflecting the scientific revolution that has just taken place. The view of science implicit in textbooks finds expression also in many histories of science which are written not only for the layman but also for the scientist. Such histories of science have as their main objective the highlighting of those ideas which are considered "white," since in the context of such a view there seems to be little reason to present the "black" side. Why be interested in the "erroneous" ideas, except possibly as historical curiosities? Some historians who are adherents of the textbook view of science feel, however, that there is a heuristic reason for presenting the "black" ideas as well. The argument seems to be as follows: we must study not only the correct scientific ideas; i.e., those contained in the newest theories (white), but we must also study the erroneous ideas (black) so that future scientists will not make the same mistakes. "Erroneous" ideas will serve as guide posts for future scientists in their arduous task of searching for the truth. Some historians of the textbook view of science hold that science should start without any preconceived notions, it must start from the "facts" or with observation. Metaphysics starts with speculation and therein lies the difference between the two fields.{11} Sarton,{12} who has introduced such a view, goes even farther, arguing that science must also purge itself of any influences that might come from philosophy of science. According to this view, therefore, the main function of the historian of science seems to be the clear presentation of the discovery of "facts" and how these "facts" led to the development of the newest accepted scientific theories. Agassi neatly describes the job of such a historian of science.
Since an inductivist historian of science is chiefly interested in chronology and in giving marks to past scientists, the range of his problems is rather definitely set for him. His formula is: In year X scientist Y made discovery A. Consequently, he has three kinds of problems: (a) chronological problems; (b) priority problems; (c) authorship problems. Chronological problems concern the dating of events; priority problems the awarding of medals for the discovery of a given fact or white idea: to which person goes the honor of having discovered a given fact or white idea; authorship problems concern the reasons for having given medals to white persons: What discovery of fact or white idea was made by a particular great person?{13}There is little attempt to present each scientific tradition in its entirety; to describe what problems worried a scientist of a particular period; what were the proposed solutions, and an evaluation of the ingenuity and skill of that type of solution to the problems at hand.
Critique of the Textbook Conception of Science
I have no arguments with the textbook presentation of the results of scientific research and techniques of problem solving, as such. Pedagogically speaking, the systematic presentation of an idea in a scientific theory together with the reports of the experimental evidence supporting it is an excellent way of teaching science. Furthermore, the emphasis on problem solving usually found in science textbooks is also extremely useful for acquainting the student with immediate application and interpretation of the scientific idea presented. Exhibiting solutions to standard problems is also an excellent way of learning strategies which might be useful in the solution of problems not yet solved. Every student of logic has learned the hard way that only by doing many problems can one develop the skill essential for solving the more difficult new problems. What then is wrong with learning the newest scientific theory via the newest textbook in the field? If the question is posed in the above way, then there is nothing wrong with the textbook presentation and almost everything is right about it. If the question is, however, "Does a textbook provide a student of science with the correct picture of the development of the field under study?", then the reply has to be "No," but with the following qualifications. In the first place, the textbook is not to be confused with a history book of a scientific field and therefore one can say that it was not designed for presenting an accurate picture of the historical development. It is usually designed to teach the student the concepts and laws of the newest theory and their application to problem solving. The quality of the text, in large measure, depends on how well it executes this task. Well, then, what is the criticism that can be made of the view of science implicit in science textbooks? In most cases the criticism can be made only indirectly. The criticism is not usually in what the textbook says explicitly but in what readers extract from the textbook about the nature of science. Some textbooks distort the ideas of particular men in the history of science when they cite either in footnotes or in the body of the text the founders or inventors of certain modern conceptions such as those of "element ," "force," "atom," etc. Inaccuracies are always criticizable, including the kind described above. If this, however, were the only problem, then it would certainly be a minor point. More important, however, is that the study of science, solely from textbooks, results in the view that science undergoes linear development, that science is a simple accumulation of facts and theories. In short, that science is a cumulative activity.{14} No doubt, science is to some extent a cumulative activity. But the precise meaning of this is difficult to specify. It doesn't seem to be cumulative on the theoretical or conceptual level. But the citing of men of science who presumably were responsible for the introduction of a certain idea does often give the erroneous impression that the idea had, from its initial introduction to its final incorporation into the newest theory, not undergone radical modification along the way. Such sliding over fine changes in theoretical notions results in the fact that scientific innovations in theoretical concepts are not appreciated. Above all, since textbooks are always written after a scientific revolution, they hide such revolutions. It becomes difficult to see the occurrence of scientific revolutions.{15} The theoretical innovations that are introduced in textbooks are taken for granted by the student and the student rarely has a feeling for the problems that led the old theory into crisis or the advantages of the new theory when compared with the old. Textbooks thus try to present science as a continuous enterprise, which it isn't. Scientific progress, I think, can be compared better with quantum jumps of electrons rather than with a ray of light which is straight and continuous. More pernicious is the view of science presupposed in books on the history of science which praise only those scientists who have in one way or another contributed ideas similar to those that are to be found in the newest textbooks. Such histories of science do not give proper credit to the contributions that particular scientists made to the problems of their day. For only in evaluating the solutions proposed by scientists to the problems of their own dominant theories do we do justice to the place of a scientist among the great men of science. The attempt to just discuss and praise those men who anticipated the concepts presented in the newest textbooks usually necessitates the distortion of the ideas as originally presented by the scientist. What is required is not just to paint the history of science in terms of black and white, but a large number of shades of grey must be available for an adequate picture of the development of an idea. The philosophies of science based on the problems and concepts to be found in the newest textbooks have in the past presented a truncated view of science. For they have usually just tried to explicate the concepts of the newest period of normal science.{16} This is work that needs to be done. But, in order to get a total picture of scientific development, one must look further than the newest scientific textbook. This additional aspect of science has yet to be adequately handled by philosophers of science. It is hoped that this work can serve as a small contribution in that direction.
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Notes
{9} Professor Kuhn discusses the textbook view of science in SSR, pp. 135-142.
Closely related to the textbook view of science is the so-called "inductivist history of science" a critique of which can be found in Joseph Agassi's Towards an Historiography of Science (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1963). [Back] {10} L. Pearce Williams' review of George Sarton's A History of Science, Volume II, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, XI (1960), 159-161. [Back]
{11} Joseph Agassi describes and rightly criticizes those who would like to separate science and philosophy following Bacon. He states:
"The demand that the history of science be separated from the philosophy of science is a modification of Bacon's demand that science and metaphysics -- and thus the history of science and the history of metaphysics -- be separated. He based this demand on his claim that science begins with observation and metaphysics with speculation. Bacon's demand is still supported by S. Sambursky in his The Physical World of the Greeks (New York, 1956) . . . The inductivist demand that science be divorced from metaphysics is not, I think, as objectionable as the crypto-inductivist demand of Sarton and McKie that the history of science be purged of any trace of philosophy of science." (Towards a Historiography of Science, p. 83.) [Back] {12} For Sarton's critical remarks concerning philosophy see his A Guide to the History of Science (Waltham, Mass., 1952). He states there, "The teaching of the history of science should be as concrete and as clear as possible rather than philosophical and foggy." p. 60. [Back]
{13} J. Agassi, Towards an Historiography of Science, p. 7. [Back]
{14} SSR, p. 137-138. [Back]
{15} SSR, p. 136. [Back]
{16} It is difficult to cite any particular work in philosophy of science which could be taken as an illustration. Suffice it to say that such anthologies as Herbert Feigl's and May Brodbeck's Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953), as well as philosophical journals of the thirties and forties, do not seem to contain any studies of scientific specialties in their infancy. Nor did they attempt to explain how a group of scientists can function as a school in the absence of a developed theory.
For further indication of the strong emphasis on the most highly developed theories see Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim "The Logic of Explanation" in the above-quoted collection of readings by Feigl. There they demand that for purposes of scientific explanation the sentences of the explanans, including laws of nature, must be true and not just probable or highly confirmed (p. 322, and p. 337). It appears to me that such a condition is much too strong. It is doubtful if any explanation of a physical event can meet such a condition. [Back]
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