Abstract

The paper investigates the positions of Richard Rorty's the "end of philosophy " and Arthur Fine's the "Natural Ontological Attitude" or NOA. The first part contains a brief outline of the phenomenon of the "end of philosophy" as it has unfolded in the history of Western Philosophy. As it turns out pronouncements of the end of philosophy are nothing new. It is shown further that Rorty's position has been undergoing continual transformations from the end of philosophy to the end of Philosophy with a capital "P" to a forgetting of this or that problem in philosophy.

Problems are raised for Fine's critique of realism and instrumentalist as well as for his defense of the NOA position.

The paper concludes with a summary of the tasks of philosophy for post-foundationalist times as well as with a new position on scientific realism called here "Contingent Scientific Realism."

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Table of Contents

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