Box 3.1 Difficulties of building up 'constructive majorities': the example of taxation If the government needs more revenue it may well propose a solution that maximises the chances of success in a vote. It can reduce the tax burden for a great number of modest-income households by a small amount and raise taxes by a larger amount for a smaller group with higher incomes, for instance. By doing so the government can expect the majority of citizens to vote for a net fiscal gain. These hopes can be dashed for two main reasons. Firstly, the proposed solution may have an impact on participation behaviour: higher-income classes, highly affected by and opposed to the bill, may mobilise and participate more in the vote than people with modest incomes. Moreover the government cannot be sure that the class with a modest income will vote for the bill offering them only a small gain: voters of lower social or economic status sometimes do not vote according to their actual status, but according to the status to which they aspire. So they may vote no, as if they belonged to a higher-income class. Still the government may find a majority. But secondly, opponents may bring up the argument of 'federalism', saying that new taxes are much more important on the cantonal than on the federal level. This argument is very strong because in many issues it is able to divide the entire electorate. In this example, opponents use it to sway the supposed supporters of the lower-income group.
Thus the government will end up with a coalition of three groups voting against the bill but for different reasons:
On the supporting side there is one group only: lower-income groups preferring federal taxes. The supporting side thus may be smaller than expected and can therefore lose against a heterogeneous opposition.
- higher income groups affected by higher taxes (irrespective of their preference for federal or cantonal taxes);
- lower-income groups voting as if they are of higher-income status;
- lower-income groups preferring cantonal taxes.