Michael Palij, The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 1918-1921: An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution, 1976.

11. Organization and Tactics of Makhno's Partisan Army

The Dibrivka incident raised doubts in Makhno's mind as to the wisdom of his policy of vengeance and destruction. After a thorough discussion with his closest friends Makhno decided that thenceforward the real aim of partisans should be:

To expropriate as much arms and money as possible from our enemies, and to raise the peasant masses as soon as possible; to unite them, to arm them to the teeth, and to lead them on a wide front against the existing system and its supporters. 1

This opinion was motivated by his desire to free the region from all authorities and to establish a permanent operative headquarters of the partisan movement at Huliai-Pole. According to Makhno's wife: "His ultimate plan is to take possession of a small territory in Ukraine and there establish a free commune. Meanwhile, he is determined to fight every reactionary force."

With the approval of the partisans, Makhno and his associates formulated a requisition system for arms, light carts and carriages (later known as tachanky), essential supplies, horses, and money. Subsequently the partisans moved from estate to estate and from one area to another, avoiding villages and propaganda speeches, but continuing to attack and disarm Austro-German and police detachments. In the course of a few weeks Makhno collected a large number of carts, horses, supplies, and a substantial amount of money, and the number of partisans increased day by day.

Thus the Makhno detachments not only grew but changed their entire structure, being converted into light, mobile, and rapid combat detachments on carts and horses. This action showed to the population their determination in fighting "the enemies of the revolution." The increasing threat of Makhno's units caused many landlords, especially those who had returned to their estates the previous spring, to abandon their estates and settle in the population centers where they could be protected by the Austro-German troops. This shift facilitated Makhno's work and served to increase his control in the countryside.

The growing strength and increasing activities of the partisans evoked further counteractions by their enemies. On the way through the districts of Berdians'k, Mariupil', and Pavlohrad, Makhno encountered and defeated an Austrian battalion and a police detachment at Staryi Kremenchuk. However, the next day at Temerivka, where the partisans stayed overnight, they were suddenly attacked by a strong Hungarian unit that forced its way into the village. The partisans, confused and disorganized, were pushed out of the village into the fields where they became easy targets. Many were killed or wounded—among the wounded were Shchus', Karetnyk, and Makhno. This defeat, however, did not change Makhno's resolve to move to Huliai-Pole.

The partisans were involved in numerous skirmishes in the area before they could enter the town.3 Subsequently, Makhno called a meeting of partisans and some peasants to give them a report on his activities. It was" decided to disarm all the "bourgeois" in the area. Makhno also sent a telegram to the authorities at Oleksandrivs'k prison, mainly for propaganda purposes, demanding the release of the Huliai-Pole anarchists. Although the authorities did not comply, they responded favorably, assuring him that they would come to no harm.

The most important decision Makhno made at the meeting was to transform the initial local underground groups into revolutionary combat formations drafted from the villages of the Huliai-Pole area. These units were to consist of cavalry and infantry on light carts with machine guns mounted on them, able to move with great speed, one hundred versts in twenty-four hours.4 The decision was motivated by Makhno's plan to establish fronts in the areas of Chaplino-Hryshyne and Tsarekostiantynivka-Polohy-Orikhiv against the Austro-German troops, the Don Cossacks, the police and landlord detachments, and against Mikhail G. Drozdovskii, who in the spring of 1918, with a unit of about two thousand men, advanced through South Ukraine from the Romanian front to the Don Basin.

Some of Makhno's friends considered his plan impossible, pointing out they had no professional officers to lead large front operations. Vlaknno, however, felt that commissioned officers with "revolutionary passion" could manage responsible military operations. Eventually certain of his friends were persuaded of their military competence and made front commanders: Petro Petrenko was entrusted with the Chaplino-Hryshyne front and Tykhenko, Jr., and Krasovk'kyi jointly with the Tsarekostiantynivka-Polohy front. The Orikhiv front remained temporarily unoccupied. Although the commanders had local initiative, in over-all operations they were subordinated to the main staff of the partisan detachments of Bat'ko Makhno and to Makhno directly.5

As the plan of the partisans' reorganization was agreed upon, each of the new commanders with his staff moved to the area of his assignment. Meanwhile, Makhno and his partisans of the Huliai-Pole area toured Oleksandrivs'k and Pavlohrad districts for three weeks, while Makhno reorganized local partisan groups into larger combat detachments subordinate to his main staff, in order to make possible larger military operations in the region. At this time Makhno's group fought a number of Austro-German and police units and detachments of landlords and of the German colonists. Although suffering heavy losses, the partisans expelled their adversaries from the region and were then free to carry on their activities thereafter. As the number of partisans and skirmishes grew, Makhno became aware that a tighter military organization was essential if his partisans were to withstand the constant assaults of the enemy.

The organization of the Makhno Army was a process of several stages. Its troop strength changed frequently depending upon political and military conditions and the threat to the region of the Makhno movement. Its main organizer was Makhno, who had neither military training nor previous military experience, but was an able organizer and a born tactician, especially resourceful in the arts of guerrilla warfare. The character of the army was a projection of Makhno's own character. According to his chief adversary, General Slashchov:

There is one thing for which he must be given credit, that is, skill in forming quickly and in controlling his detachments, instilling, in fact, a very strict discipline. Therefore, an engagement with him always had a serious aspect, and his feats of arms, energy, and ability to direct operations gave him a great number of victories over opposing armies. 6

Slashchov recognized that Makhno's military skill in directing operations was not attributable to his previous education.

Other military men also credited Makhno with innate military talent. General Mykola Kapustians'kyi sketched him as:

A man of strong will, sound wisdom, determination, personal courage, with desire for power and good judgment of human psychology. Moreover, Makhno had organizational abilities and, finally, he had the sense, in time of danger, to ally himself with one of his adversaries who at the moment showed more power and strength. 1

General Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko confirmed that "Makhno personified the obscure rebellious demands of the masses [but] knew how to organize them into a fighting force, to work out a discipline specific for the Makhno men and even his own tactical methods. This externally unimpressive man became a dictator and leader of the masses."

Because of Makhno's brilliant military successes, it was sometimes assumed that the army's operational tactics must be in the hands of professional officers. Hence a rumor sprang up that Colonel Kleist of the German General Staff was with Makhno and directed his operations, guided perhaps by Makhno's firm will and familiarity with the local population. Omelianovych-Pavlenko maintained that "An able military organizer Vasil'ev, assisted by sergeant Dovzhenko, seaman Liashchenko, and others, gave the Makhno bands the appearance of partisan detachments.' General Kapustians'kyi even insisted that in organizing his staff, Makhno: "Under threat of execution, forced military specialists to work in it. [And] as a chief of staff, Makhno, it seems, appointed an officer with a military academy education.' A Russian general supposed that Makhno "had a regularly organized staff, with general officers, divisions, and regiments, mainly cavalry and machine gunners, their own supply bases, and regularly functioning hospitals with doctors and nurses and other staff," taken over from his enemies.

There was, however, no evidence that Makhno had any such officers on his staff. One of the Don Cossack officers who fought Makhno reported: "Once there was a feeling that the operative work and the formation of the units of his army had been in the hands of a well-trained officer of the General Staff; in reality such an assumption was simply baseless."13 Although Makhno had undoubtedly had opportunities to attract professional officers to the partisan army, he had not done so, apparently for fear of competition. For example, at the end of 1918, when Makhno attacked the Ukrainian garrison in Katerynoslav, the artillery brigade commander, Colonel Martynenko, defected and turned over sixteen field guns to Makhno. Although Makhno welcomed him into the partisan ranks, he later shot him for fear of rivalry.14

As the Makhno army gradually grew, it assumed a more regular army organization. Each tactical unit was composed of three subordinate units: a division consisted of three brigades; a brigade, of three regiments; a regiment, of three battalions, and so on. Theoretically commanders were elected; in practice, however, the top commanders were usually carefully selected by Makhno from among his close friends. As a rule, they were all equal and if several units fought together the top commanders commanded jointly. The army was nominally headed by a Revolutionary Military Council of about ten to twenty members chaired at times by Makhno, Volin, and Liashchenko, among others. Like the commanders, council members were elected, but some were appointed by Makhno. However, the council had no decisive voice in the army's actions; Makhno and his top commanders made decisions without taking account of the council's opinion, while other problems were decided by the top commanders themselves. There also was an elected cultural section in the army. Its aim was to conduct political and ideological propaganda among the partisans and peasants.15

The army was made up of infantry, cavalry, artillery, machine-gun units, and special branches, including an intelligence service. Because the success of partisan warfare depends upon mobility, the army, at first composed largely of infantry, gradually was mounted in light carts and armed with machine guns during 1918—19, and during the years 1920--21 became primarily a cavalry formation. The artillery was comparatively small because it was less applicable to partisan warfare.

Over half the troops were volunteers, including adventurers, who were the bravest men from villages and towns. The rest were conscripts, men who generally were less privileged. The troops wore whatever they pleased; some had military uniforms of different armies while others were dressed in civilian clothes or simple peasant dress, all of similarly heterodox color.16

The army had no reserves and, because of its great speed and constant movement, there were neither troop trains nor central supply bases. Makhno depended upon the peasants and his enemies. He used to say: "My supplies are the Soviet trains,"17 though he did attempt to organize his supply base in the summer of 1919, when he reorganized his army. Similarly there were no field hospitals, but only a few doctors, physicians' assistants, and nurses, some of whom had been trained m a military hospital in Katerynoslav. The army depended upon peasant houses and occasionally town hospitals.18 According to an eyewitness: "When the local peasants found that a Makhno detachment had arrived [in the village they] were very glad and immediately allocated the wounded among the houses, fed them and dried their clothing."19

When on the move, Makhno's column was several versts long. The supply train moved at the head; the infantry, on carts and other vehicles, moved behind it, followed by the cavalry, which guarded the rear and provided flank security by using adjacent roads. Makhno rode a cart or a horse either behind or alongside, and sometimes rode up and down the column to maintain order. The marching troops were occupied with singing or playing small instruments, such as mouth organs. Although many of the Makhno partisans had an inclination for drinking, during troop movements and in action the consumption of alcohol was prohibited under threat of execution on the spot; this was strikingly similar to the Zaporozhian Cossacks' policy. A teacher in whose house Makhno had once stayed later told one of Denikin's generals that "Makhno made upon him an impression of a modest, reserved, and decidedly not bloodthirsty man; he was always busy with his chief of staff of military operations and did not participate in drinking with his bands." During the stops the troops made camp in a circle with the staff in its center, forming a defense against attacks from any quarter.

Even Makhno was uncertain of the number of men he led, for the conditions of partisan warfare constantly changed the army's size and no personnel records were kept. The army's strength fluctuated with the extent of the threats and terror waged in the country by the different enemies. Makhno often counted the potential partisans in the countryside who in case of need would join his army. In his words: "The army consisted of over thirty thousand armed men and over seventy thousand organized in the villages and towns . . . who because of lack of arms remained at home."21 Moreover, there were a number of independent partisan groups that called themselves Makhno partisans to increase their prestige.

In the spring of 1918 Makhno formed several military units, consisting of about seventeen hundred men, and a medical service unit to fight the Austrian and German troops, supporting the Central Rada against the Bolsheviks. Soon, however, the units joined the Ukrainian troops. Although during the summer of 1918 Makhno organized partisan detachments to fight the Austro-Germans' and landlords' punitive expeditions, they were underground militia rather than regular combat detachments, for Makhno lacked a territory under his own control in which to erect a standing army. Toward the end of September 1918, Makhno's combat unit consisted of about fifty to sixty partisans, united in the Dibrivka forests with Shchus's well-organized and armed partisan detachment of over sixty men.22 The defeat of the Austro-German punitive expedition at Dibrivka sealed this union of a combined force of over one hundred partisans that was named "The Bat'ko Makhno Detachment" after its recognized commander.

As the activities and popularity of Makhno grew, a number of independent partisan groups joined Makhno. The Makhno partisan group steadily grew stronger in number and in weapons and eventually assumed a new name, "The Revolutionary Partisan Detachments of Bat'ko Makhno," and a unified leadership. Gradually the units changed their entire structure, being converted into light, mobile, combat detachments on carts and horses. The punitive expeditions against the peasants substantially swelled the ranks of Makhno's group. Although toward the end of 1918, he had over six hundred men, including cavalry, the lack of arms and equipment prevented Makhno from organizing an army.24 Makhno recalled that when he left the Dibrivka forest many peasants begged: " 'Give us arms, we will go now with you. . . .' We had no arms . . . and, almost with tears in our eyes, we were compelled to leave these peasants in the forests."

This situation changed when the defeat of the Central Powers in the west demoralized their troops in Ukraine and the partisans were able to disarm the troops or to buy their weapons. Before they retreated from Ukraine, however, two new enemies began to threaten the country: the Volunteer troops from the south, and the Bolsheviks from the north. In the winter of 1919, when the Denikin troops began to oppress the population and many of the peasants mobilized by Denikin went over with their arms to Makhno, the number of Makhno troops grew to over sixteen thousand. As the Denikin threat increased, Makhno joined the Bolsheviks, who agreed to supply arms to fight the common enemy. By mid-May the Makhno Army had 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry with two heavy artillery pieces, five guns, and a large number of machine guns.26

The subsequent break with the Bolsheviks temporarily disorganized the army and decreased its size, but the terror used by both Denikin and the Bolsheviks gave Makhno new recruits and new support from the peasants. Moreover, the large partisan groups of the assassinated Hryhor'iv joined Makhno. Thus by the end of July, his army had increased again to 15,000 men. After the defeat of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine and their retreat, Makhno units that had remained in the Red Army since June rejoined him, bringing arms and a number of other Red units. At the beginning of August the Makhno Army numbered 20,000.2 Toward the end of September when Makhno defeated Slashchov and stalled his advance into Denikin's rear, more independent Partisan groups joined him; thus at the beginning of October the army had 25,000 men. At the end of the month, the army's growth, including separate partisan units in the countryside, peaked at about forty thousand.

During the winter of 1919—20 Makhno suffered serious setbacks. After Denikin had been defeated and had withdrawn from Ukraine, Makhno was still confronted with the Bolsheviks, who were now free to turn their attention to the partisans. At that time, 50 percent of the partisan army, including Makhno and some of his staff, contracted typhus and went to villages for cure, while many others hid in villages waiting for further developments. However, although the partisan army was badly disorganized and substantially weakened, it remained at over ten thousand. In contrast to 1919, at the beginning of spring 1920 it was divided into small local defense detachments acting independently as an underground force. Only the core of the army—cavalry and cart-mounted machine-gun regiments—continued its previous operations under Makhno's command. As the political situation changed, the local detachments could be quickly augmented by volunteers.30

At the beginning of fall, the army consisted of 12,000 men. In mid-October, when Makhno concluded an agreement with the Bolsheviks, he dispatched against Wrangel an army of about ten thousand, including fifteen hundred cavalry, while about three thousand, including one thousand cavalry, remained with him in Huliai-Pole. However, as soon as Wrangel was defeated, the Bolsheviks turned against their ally Makhno, as they had after Denikin's defeat the year before. His Crimean Army almost completely annihilated, Makhno was left with a detachment of about three thousand. During the winter of 1920—21, the army again increased, for a while, to over ten thousand men. As the Bolsheviks ended their hostilities on all other fronts they overwhelmed Makhno by dispatching a large number of troops and armor against his detachments. Under such conditions he could not organize a large unified army. According to Makhno, in the spring of 1921 his army consisted of 2,000 cavalry and several regiments of infantry. For the rest of the campaign, which ended in August, the size of the partisan army fluctuated from 1,000 to 5,000. Moreover, for tactical reasons, it was divided into small units of 200 to 500 men each, operating separately.

Makhno's successes in the field depended not so much on the strength of his army as on military tactics, which he tailored to the conditions he faced. The secret of Makhno's triumphs was mainly in the mobility, maneuverability, bravery, and fire power of his troops. His cavalry could cover from eighty to one hundred versts a day, while a regular cavalry unit moved only forty to sixty versts. This speed was maintained by exchanging horses with peasants. The slogan was: "Each village is a horse depot." As a rule, Makhno avoided major battles with powerful adversaries. According to an eyewitness: "We tried to surround the enemy and draw him into a major battle, but Makhno was clearly avoiding a general confrontation even though he was aided by an excellent knowledge of the terrain and a widespread network of informers."33 When, however, he encountered superior enemy forces he would draw up a wide front line of infantry supported by heavy machine-gun fire and then the cavalry reserves would attack the enemy's flanks and rear to break their formation.

On other occasions, forced to confrontation, he would strengthen his lines by summoning peasants from the villages, on foot and mounted, carrying sticks and scythes to create panic among the enemy by their number. According to the same eyewitness:

Ruses that Makhno used bore witness to his unusual cunning. Once during a battle we observed on the skyline numerous troops of cavalry that, it seemed, aimed at attacking our rear. Panic spread among our ranks, but soon our reconnaissance unit explained this matter; Makhno mounted on horseback the peasants from the villages and simulated an encircling maneuver. It must be admitted that he was not without imagination.34

When this tactic failed, Makhno would contain the enemy with machine-gun and artillery fire, then skillfully retreat in a loose formation at great speed, disappearing from view and leaving behind an extra detachment to mislead the enemy. Later he would reappear with his main force in the rear to attack enemy staff and headquarters, creating panic and demoralization.35

There were, of course, other factors contributing to Makhno's success. He often took the enemy unaware by conducting operations at night, in bad weather, in difficult terrain, or in villages and towns. Moreover, Makhno had a well-organized and efficient intelligence service that was particularly effective because of the active support of the rural population. When cornered by superior forces, the partisans would disband, bury their weapons, and mingle in the villages as peaceful peasants, only to reassemble again when the enemy had passed, uncover their arms, and attack again from the least expected quarter.36 An eyewitness admits:

Makhno gave us a bad time by attacking suddenly and forcing us to be in a constant state of readiness, which prevented us from unsaddling our horses and laying our arms aside even for a minute. We pursued Makhno with a cold fury engendered of hatred of the bloody leader who gave us no respite. . . . [Therefore] the only effective way to fight Makhno was, in an encounter, to strike down his units, not allowing them their usual practice of disappearing into the woods or dispersing in the villages, hiding sabres and rifles under the straw, acting as peaceful peasants who would attack us suddenly at the least expected moment.^'

A Bolshevik officer describes an incident illustrating cooperation between partisans and peasants. As a Bolshevik unit was pursuing several partisans who vanished in a village "as if the earth had swallowed them,"

in one of the yards an old man is winnowing rye while a young man is threshing corn, urging on the horses. "Oh, old man, did you see which way the carts went?" "Of course, I saw them; they went there, to the steppe, there is the cloud of dust." "And who is threshing corn for you?" "That is my son Opanas, so stupid and mad that he doesn't utter a word." The Reds rushed in the direction indicated to overtake the carts. Meanwhile the "mad boy" pulled out a rifle from the cornstack and unhitched the horses from belt-drive; three other "mad boys" came out to help him harness the horses to the cart hidden under the straw and together they moved out from the village in the opposite direction.38

Makhno usually tried to destroy the enemy from inside, although such activity was very risky and demanded skill and personal bravery. According to an eyewitness:

The calmness of Makhno's men while preparing for the battle was amazing. At that time when the shrapnel was exploding about forty paces away, Makhno's men were washing, combing their hair, and waiting for orders. And how much military skill was manifested among the leaders and partisans. . . . Makhno's first action was to explore the area where he was staying. ™

Makhno was a good example for his men, always at the head of his troops in attack and last to retreat, fighting and showing a reckless bravery. Often his men had to stop him from going too far ahead. Makhno was wounded about twelve times, twice seriously.40 One eyewitness reported that when Makhno was forced by General Slashchov from Katerynoslav at the end of November 1919: "Makhno left last, and ten minutes later, on Sadova Street, the same along which Makhno had just quietly ridden, restraining his hot horse with difficulty, appeared riders with officers' epaulets upon their shoulders."41

One of Makhno's first uses of his unorthodox tactics was in the summer of 1918, when he organized a group of twenty partisans armed with rifles, hand grenades, and a few machine guns that were loaded on carriages and covered with rugs. This unit, disguised as a wedding party with music, and with the men dressed in festive women's garb, traveled to a village near Huliai-Pole where a German unit was garrisoned. As the curious Germans watched the "wedding party," the partisans, when they reached point-blank range, pulled out their weapons and began to shoot. At the end of October 1919, after several days of unsuccessful fighting against Slashchov to take Katerynoslav, Makhno sent a group of partisans into the city dressed as peasants on their way to buy provisions. When they reached the marketplace, they produced weapons and, in coordination with the troops outside the city, drove the enemy out.42

In the summer of 1921, when Makhno was surrounded by Red Army troops, there seemed to be no way out. While waiting for Makhno to break through the line, one of the Red brigades noted the approach of a detachment with red banners, singing the Internationale. Believing it to be a Red unit that had just defeated Makhno, the Red troops were unprepared when Makhno attacked, disarmed them, and slipped out of the circle. Throughout the campaign on many occasions, Makhno displayed similar skill and boldness.

From the beginning of his military activities, Makhno's desire was to free his region from the enemy. In contrast, therefore, to his anarchist friends who considered their main goal to be the spread of anarchist propaganda among the population, Makhno believed in organizing military force. The terror and exploitation in the wake of the foreign invasions of the region drove the people to the support of the Makhno movement; this was essential to its success. They provided Makhno with recruits, informers, horses, provisions, shelter for the wounded, and hiding places for partisans.

Although Makhno had neither military training nor previous military experience, he organized partisan units and united them with other partisan groups in his region to form a most effective, mobile partisan army. He introduced the practice of burying arms and dispersing men in small groups in the villages, to reassemble them when the enemy had passed and attack again in the least expected quarter. This operation was possible because Makhno had a well-organized intelligence service and the cooperation of the people, a host of wise and brave collaborators who turned the partisan army into a fighting force to be reckoned with.

According to a Soviet eyewitness:

From the military viewpoint, the Makhno movement represented a rather formidable and large force. In the pages of civil war history, the amazing tricks that Makhno's cavalry and machine gun units played should undoubtedly be noted. Makhno's raid during the advance from Kyiv province to Katerynoslav province, his own region, was really amazing. There were moments when Denikin units outnumbered the Makhno army many times, surrounded it so strongly that not the slightest possibility of escape could be foreseen—and here Makhno's men were saved by their bravery, boldness, and resourcefulness, which together composed a great military talent that not only Makhno, but also many other commanders, [had] M


1. Makhno, Ukrainskaia revoliutsiia, 3 :123.

2. Goldman, Living My Life, p. 149.

3. Makhno, Ukrainskaia revoliutsiia, 3:128 ff.; Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, p. 59.

4. Dm. Varetskii, "Marshal V. K. Bliukher," Novyi zhurnal 27 (1951): 259; Oleksander Udovychenko, Tretia Zalizna dyviziia, p. 49.

5. Makhno, Ukrainskaia revoliutsiia, 3 :142.

6. IA. Slashchov, "Iz opyta voiny: Materialy dlia istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v Rossii: Operatsii belykh, Petliury i Makhno v iuzhnoi Ukraine v poslenei chetverty 1919 goda," Voennyivestnik, nos. 9-10 (1922), pp. 38-39.

7. M. Kapustians'kyi, "Makhno i makhnovshchyna," SV, no. 243 (November 17, 1934), p. 2.

8. Omelianovych-Pavlenko, Zymovyi'pokhid, 2:25.

9. Slashchov, "Iz opyta voiny," pp. 38—39.

10. Omelianovych-Pavlenko, Zymovyi pokhid, 2:26.

11. Kapustians'kyi, "Makhno i makhnovshchyna," p. 2.

12. I. Danilov, "Vospominaniia o moei podnevol'noi sluzhbie u bol'shevikov," ARR 16(1925): 162.

13. V. M., "Dontsy na makhnovskom frontie," Kazach'i dumy, no. 13 (1923), pp. 9-10.

14. Mahalevs'kyi, "Bat'ko Makhno," p. 69; Belash, "Makhnovshchina," p. 213.

15. Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, pp. 167—68; V. M., "Dontsy na makhnovskom frontie," no. 13, p. 10; "Makhnovskaia armiia" (manuscript), pp. 9—10; Teper, Makhno, pp. 76—77; VI. Miroshevskii, "Vol'nyi Ekaterinoslav," p. 202; L. Nikulin, "Gibel' makhnovshchiny," Znamia, no. 3 (1941), p. 179; Volin, "V dopolnenie k 'otkrytomu pis'mu t-shchu Maksymovu' t-shcha N. Makhno," DT, no. 16 (1926), p. 16; Rudnev, Makhnovshchina, p. 73.

16. Antonov-Ovseenko, "V borot'bi za Radians'ku Ukrainu," LR.no. 5 (1932), p. 117; Teper, Makhno, p. 76; V. M., "Dontsy na makhnovskom frontie," no. 13, p. 10; Victor Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 1901—1941, p. 121; Igrenev, "Ekaterinoslavskiia vospominaniia," p. 238; Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 1:62; Vasyl' Dubrovs'kyi, Bat'ko Nestor Makhno—Ukrains'kyi natsional'nyi heroi, p. 8; E. IAkymiv, "Hostyna Makhna v Umani," IKCK 1929, p. 79; Miroshevskii, "Vol'nyi Ekaterinoslav," p. 199;Hodgson, With Denikin's Armies, p. 117.

17. "Makhnovskaia armiia," p. 3; N. Makhno, "K voprosu o zashchite revo-liutsii," DT, no. 25 (1925), p. 14; Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, p. 172; Miroshevskii, "Vol'nyi Ekaterinoslav," p. 201.

18. Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, pp. 189—90; R. Eideman, "Piataia godovshchina odnogo uroka," VR, no. 12 (1926), p. 37; N. A. Efimov, "Deistviia protiv Makhno s ianvaria, 1920 g. po ianvar 1921 g.," Sbornik trudov Voenno-nauchnogo obshchestva 1 (1921): 200; Miroshevskii, "Vol'nyi Ekaterinoslav," p. 200.

19. Osyp Tsebrii, "Vospominaniia partizana," DTP, no. 32 (1950), p. 14.

20. "Makhnovskaia armiia," p. 1; Vinogradov, "Chemu ia byl svidietelem," pp. 10—11; IAkymiv, "Hostyna Makhna v Umani," p. 79.

21. Makhno, Makhnovshchina, p. 18.

22. Makhno, Russkaia revoliutsiia, 1:198; idem, Ukrainskaia revoliutsiia, 3 : 70—71; Omelianovych-Pavlenko, Zymovyi pokhid, 2: 25.

23. Belash, "Makhnovshchina," p. 214; Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, p. 56; Rudnev, Makhnovshchina, p. 23.

24. Makhno, Ukrainskaia revoliutsiia, 3:147—48; Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, pp. 40-41; S. G. Semanov, "Makhnovshchina i ee krakh," VI, no. 9 (1966), p.39.

25. Makhno, Ukrainskaia revoliutsiia, 3 :95.

26. Belash, "Makhnovshchina," p. 221; Mykh. Mykhailyk, "Ukrains'ke selo v chasy natsion. revoliutsii,"LCK, no. 2 (1934), p. 7; Bulavenko, "Kuban' na perelomi," Rozbudova natsii, nos. 3—4 (74—75) (1934), pp. 90—91; Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, 4: 304; idem, "V borot'bi za Radians'ku Ukrainu," no. 5, p. 115.

27. Dubrovs'kyi, Bat'ko Nestor Makhno, p. 11; Meleshko, "Nestor Makhno ta ioho anarkhiia," no. 1 (1935), p. 12; "Makhnovskaia armiia," p. 3; Voline, Uknown

28. D. Kin, "Povstancheskoe dvizhenie protiv denikinshchiny na Ukraine," LR, nos. 3-4 (1926), p. 79; Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, p. 174; Miroshevskii, "Vol'nyi Ekaterinovslav," pp. 201, 208; Gutman, "Pod vlast'iu anarkhistov," p. 62; Denikin, Ocherki russkoi smuty, 5:234.

29. Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, pp. 157—59; Gutman, "Pod vlast'iu anarkhistov," p. 68; Semanov, "Makhnovshchina i ee krakh," p. 52;Teper, Makhno, p. 65; Peters, Nestor Makhno, pp. 62—63; Miroshevskii, "Vol'nyi Ekaterinoslav," p. 206.

30. Efimov, "Deistviia protiv Makhno," pp. 203—4.

31. IAkovlev, Russkii anarkhizm, p. 34; idem, "Makhnovshchina i anarkhizm," Krasnaia nov, no. 2, p. 253; Margushin, "Bat'ko Makhno," NRS, October 13, 1964, p. 2; Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, p. 188; Volodymyr Dubiv, "Ulamok z moho zhyttia," Vyzvol'nyi shliakh, no. 6 (219) (1966), p. 191; Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, p. 159; D. Lebed', Itogi i uroki trekh let anarkho-makhnovshchiny, p. 40; Premysler, "Razgrom banditizma na Ukraine, 1921 g., " Voenno-istoricheskii zhumal, no. 9 (1940), p. 44.

32. Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizhenniia, p. 197.

33. Danilov, "Vospominaniia," 16:175; E. Esbakh, "Poslednie dni makhnovshchiny na Ukraine," Voina i revoliutsiia, no. 12, pp. 41—42; Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, p. 170; Stefan Szpinger, Z Pierwsza Konna, p. 178.

34. Szpinger, Z Pierwsza Konna, p. 178.

35. Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, p. 169; Kapustians'kyi, "Makhno i makhniv-shchyna," p. 2; VI. Vygran, "Vospominaniia o bor'bie s makhnovtsami" (manuscript), p. 6; Eideman, "Piataia godovshchina odnogo uroka," p. 37; P. Sergeev, "Poltavskaia operatsiia protiv Makhno," VR, no. 9 (1927), pp. 122—23; Serge, Memoirs of a Revolution, p. 121.

According to a Bolshevik officer, "If we succeed in destroying a detachment, this still does not mean an end to the matter. Indeed, there have been cases in which a commander reports the destruction of a band, and the next day is hit by the same band, often is disarmed, and even lands in prison" (Komandarm Ubore-vich: Vospominaniia druzei i soratnikov, p. 82).

36. Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, pp. 169—70; VI. Maevskii, Povstantsy Ukrainy, 1918—1919 gg., p. 77; Kapustians'kyi, "Makhno i makhnivshchyna," p. 2; Eideman, "Piataia godovshchina odnogo uroka," p. 37.

37. Szpinger, Z Pierwsza Konna, pp. 178—79.

38. Danilov, "Vospominaniia," 16:175—76.

39. Mykhailyk, "Ukrains'ke selo v chasy natsion revoliutsii," p. 6.

40. "Makhnovskaia armiia," p. 4; Meleshko, "Nestor Makhno ta ioho anarkhiia," p. 17; Teper, Makhno, p. 28; M. Irchan, "Makhno i makhnivtsi," IKCK 1936, p. 120; Volin, "Nestor Makhno," p. 7; Esbakh, "Poslednie dni makhnovshchiny na Ukraine," p. 48.

41. Arbatov, "Ekaterinoslav 1917—22 gg.," 12:98; see also idem, "Bat'ko Makhno," 29: 111.

42. Meleshko, "Nestor Makhno ta ioho anarkhiia," no. 4, pp. 16—17; P. A. Pavlov, "Voennye khitrosti," Voennyi vestnik, no. 4 (1921), p. 13; C. E. Bechhofer, In Denihin's Russia and Caucasus, 1919 and 1920, p. 176; Nikulin, "GibeF Makhnovshchiny," p. 179.

43. Pavlov, "Voennye khitrosti," p. 13; Esbakh, "Poslednie dni Makhnov-shchiny na Ukraine," p. 41.

44. Teper, Makhno, pp. 164—65.