Michael Palij, The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 1918-1921: An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution, 1976.

12. The Overthrow of the Hetman and the Establishment of the Directory

Over-all popular dissatisfaction with the national, social, and agricultural policies of the hetman government brought about not only peasant uprisings but sharp opposition from the political parties. Although in the early days of the coup the hetman "had a clear intention to give the government a national Ukrainian character,"1 by inviting the leaders of parties to enter the government and administration, they chose to form an opposition rather than to accept the hetman's invitation. In mid-May they organized the Ukrainian National Political Union (Ukrains'kyi Natsional'no Derzhavnyi Soiuz) in Kyiv "to save threatened Ukrainian statehood and to consolidate all forces for the purpose of creating an independent Ukrainian state." It was composed of the Independist-Socialists, the Socialist-Federalists, the Labor party, the Democratic Farmers party, the Council of the Railroad Trade Unions of Ukraine, and the Council of the All-Ukrainian Post and Telegraph Association. The Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries participated only on a consultative basis.

On May 24 a delegation of the Union presented a memorandum to the hetman charging that the cabinet was Ukrainian neither in its composition nor in political orientation. Largely Russian Kadets, Octobrists, and other non-Ukrainian groups inimical to Ukrainian statehood, such a cabinet could not possibly enjoy the confidence of the broad masses of population. Further, the memorandum pointed °ut, under the hetman government many Russians of different views had joined forces in working against Ukrainian statehood and for "one and indivisible Russia." It also criticized the bans on congresses of zemstvos, cities, workers, and peasants, which had brought strong protests and denounced the new administration's policy of restoring the old regime with its national and social injustices, and the ministers of education and justice for failing to Ukrainize the schools and courts. The situation in the other ministries, the church, and the army, was still worse. It appeared, the memorandum continued, that the government was ignorant of the occurrence of the Revolution. The growth of anarchy and disorder in the villages and the spread of bolshevism have been attributed to the hetman government. The solution of these problems supposedly lay in the establishment of a Ukrainian national government that would enjoy the confidence of the Ukrainian people.

On May 30 the Union issued appeals to the German people, calling upon them to abide by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by ceasing to intervene in the internal affairs of Ukraine and ceasing to support the non-Ukrainian element against the Ukrainian statehood. The memoranda remained unanswered.

The Congress of the All-Ukrainian Union of Zemstvos, which had developed into a center of opposition to the government, met in mid-June and sent a protest to the hetman criticizing the government for such oppression as widespread arrests, punitive expeditions, denial of civil liberties, and suppression of zemstvo and Prosvita societies. When this protest failed to change the hetman's policy, Symon Petliura, who under the Central Rada was secretary of military affairs, sent, as head of the Kyiv provincial zemstvo and All-Ukrainian Union of Zemstvos, a memorandum to the German Ambassador Mumm, with copies to the ambassadors of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, informing them of arrests, which included national leaders, by both the government and the Germans. He pointed out that such action would not promote Ukrainian-German friendship. Petliura's activities and popularity worried both the hetman regime and the Germans. He was, therefore, arrested on July 12. Although there were strong protests against his arrest and petitions for his release, Petliura was kept in jail until the beginning of November. In the meantime, a strike of civil service employees in the Ministry of Agriculture was precipitated by the dismissal of a number of employees who had stayed on from the period of the Central Rada. The strikers demanded the reinstatement of these employees, dismissal of the "Russifiers" hired in their place, and the use of the Ukrainian language. Employees from some of the other ministries joined the strike, demanding the use of Ukrainian in the offices.

In July the leaders of the opposition, in order to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the government, transformed the National Political Union into the Ukrainian National Union (Ukrains'kyi National'nyi Soiuz), which was composed not only of political parties, including the Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries, but also of cultural, professional, peasant, and labor organizations. Its first president was the editor of the newspaper Nova Rada Andrii V. Nikovs'kyi, a Socialist Federalist, who on September 18 was succeeded by Volodymyr Vynny-chenko. The principal aims of the new organization were: establishment of a strong and independent Ukrainian state; a legal government responsible to a parliament; democratic suffrage on a direct, general, equal, secret, and proportional basis; and the defense of the rights of the Ukrainian people and their state in the international sphere.

For some time the hetman had planned to strengthen his cabinet and to bring into the government representatives of the national democratic group. He accepted the new National Union as the embodiment of this group, and on October 5 invited its leaders to negotiate reorganization of the government. After a short period of cabinet crisis, on October 24 a new cabinet, headed by Fedir Lyzohub, was formed. Although Dmytro Doroshenko remained as foreign minister, he was not a candidate of the National Union. On October 29 the hetman proclaimed that-he would strengthen the independence of Ukraine, introduce land reform, and call a diet. Although the new cabinet carried through various measures that previously had been delayed, including land reform, it had neither genuine support among the more radical circles nor enough time to complete its planned work. The National Union participated in the formation of the new government, but Vynnychenko soon publicly announced that the National Union could not accept responsibility for the actions of the new cabinet and would stand in opposition to it.6 The hetman not only distrusted the National Union but he suspected that it was plotting against his government.

The tense and confused situation was brought to an end by the defeat of Germany on the Western front and the signing of the Armistice on November 11. The hetman and Ukraine in general were confronted with a dangerous situation because "the Armistice had prescribed the immediate evacuation by the Germans of the Ukraine," hence the possibility of a new Soviet Russian invasion.7

To prevent this, it was imperative for the hetman to come to an understanding with the Entente. Although the leaders of the Entente welcomed a union of all anti-Bolshevik forces for a struggle against Soviet Russia, they did not favor Ukrainian independence, demanding instead federation with non-Bolshevik Russia. The hetman decided upon federation, hoping this policy would convince the Entente of his good faith and loyalty. The new orientation was expressed on November 14 by a declaration of a federative union with a future non-Bolshevik Russia. Simultaneously, almost all Ukrainian ministers left the government, and a new cabinet was formed under Sergei N. Gerbel.

The declaration of a federation only accelerated the long-planned mass insurrection against the hetman government. On November 13 the leaders of the National Union met in secret in Kyiv and elected the "Directory," an executive organ of the National Union consisting of five members, to lead the insurrection: Vynnychenko, president; Petliura, commander in chief, both Social Democrats; Fedir Shvets, Socialist Revolutionary; Panas Andriievs'kyi, Independent Socialist; and Andrii Makarenko, Railroad Trade Union.9

One of the first acts of the Directory was a proclamation to the people issued on the night of November 14 that stated:

On behalf of organized Ukrainian democracy, from the whole active national population, who elected us, we, the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic, proclaim: General Pavlo Skoropads'kyi is a coercionist and usurper of the people's authority. His whole government is proclaimed to be annulled because it is anti-people, antinational.l"

The government was accused of oppression and destruction of the people's rights. The hetman and his ministers were advised to resign immediately to preserve peace and prevent bloodshed. All Russian officers were told to surrender their arms and leave Ukraine or be deported. The hope was expressed that the soldiers of the democratic German Republic would not intervene in the internal struggle. An appeal was made to all honest Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians to stand together with the Directory as a friendly armed force against the enemies; subsequently, all the social and political achievements of the revolutionary democracy were to be restored. "And the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly shall firmly strengthen them in the free Ukrainian land."11

Bila Tserkva, where the Sich Riflemen had recently reassembled with the consent of the hetman after being disarmed at the end of the previous April, was chosen as the center of insurrection and the headquarters of the Directory. On November 16, the Riflemen took the city; the next day, they captured Fastiv and began to move toward Kyiv. Although other Ukrainian units and thousands of peasants joined the Sich Riflemen, they encountered a serious obstacle in the German troops. After some armed clashes an agreement was concluded with the Germans in the Bila Tserkva area by which the Directory promised not to attack the Germans if they did not intervene in the internal Ukrainian struggle. This was, however, only a local success. At that time the hetman sent the Russian volunteer units and some Ukrainian troops, altogether about three thousand men, against the Directory's advancing forces. On November 18 between Motovylivka and Vasyl'kiv the hetman forces were routed, the best Ukrainian unit, the Serdiuks, defected to the Directory, and the remnant retreated to Kyiv. In the meantime the whole of Ukraine was aflame with partisan uprisings and gradually the partisans began to join the regular Ukrainian troops. In the countryside German troops proclaimed neutrality while the Russian volunteers and the punitive units ran away or joined the Directory. Within a few weeks the Right Bank was under the control of the Directory.12

On November 21 the Directory's troops began the siege of Kyiv and could have taken the city if the Germans had not reversed the Bila Tserkva agreement and decided to hold Kyiv. Subsequently a line of demarcation was established between the Ukrainian and German troops.13 The Germans, however, recognized the futility of their position: their troops in Ukraine were demoralized by the defeat in the West, the revolutions in Ukraine and at home, and the hostility of the Ukrainian population, and now their only desire was to go home. In the German garrison in Kyiv, the German higher command sent its representative to Koziatyn to meet with the representatives of the Directory, Dr. Osyp Nazaruk and General Mykhailo Hrekiv. On December 12 they signed an agreement guaranteeing the Germans safe passage home in return for German neutrality. Simultaneously the Ukrainian troops attacked the hetman's units, consisting of Russian officers, and in two days of fighting defeated them. About two thousand were interned but most of the units withdrew to the Left Bank or hid in the city. There was sporadic resistance by the hetman's units in the Chernihiv area and Volyn' province. On December 14 the Ukrainian troops entered Kyiv.14

The hetman, having cast his lot with the Germans, was now compelled to share their fate. The same day, one month after the declaration of a federative union with a future non-Bolshevik Russia, the hetman abdicated:

') hetman of all Ukraine, have employed all my energies during the past seven and °ne-half months in an effort to extricate Ukraine from the difficult situation in which she finds herself. God has not given me the strength to deal with this prob-m and now, in the light of conditions that have arisen and acting solely for the good of Ukraine, I abdicate all authority.15

Simultaneously the government also resigned; a few days later, the hetman, disguised as a wounded German soldier, along with his wife dressed as a nurse, left Kyiv for Germany by way of Holoby, Volyn', in a German troop train.

The hetman worked throughout the period of his administration under highly unfavorable conditions inherited from the Central Rada. Moreover, he had not assumed office by the will of the people and thus he lacked popular support. Although the title "hetman" was appealing to the population, the very conservatism it reflected was incompatible with the radical period. The hetman's government and administrative apparatus were weakened by being erected in part on a foundation of non-Ukrainian elements that either had no understanding of the social and national problems or were opposed to Ukrainian statehood. Moreover, Russian organizations and military formations in Ukraine made attempts to discredit the hetman regime in the eyes of the population, tolerating the hetman state only as long as the circumstances of international politics made it necessary. The hetman's government was also weakened by the refusal of many Ukrainians to join it for political and psychological reasons and by the systematic Austro-German interference in Ukrainian internal affairs. In effect, there were two governments side by side. Government policy was characterized by a number of reactionary decrees and by punitive expeditions that turned the population, especially the peasants, against it.

Finally, the international situation was unfavorable to Ukrainian statehood. The hetman's association with the Germans prevented him from establishing cordial relations with the Entente, which supported the non-Bolshevik Russian forces, with whom it induced the hetman to federate. Federation was considered by the people to be foreign rule and a return to the hated old political system, and moreover, it implied that Ukraine would continue to be the main base of the struggle for a non-Bolshevik Russia. These sociopolitical and national factors explain the spontaneity and success of the uprising.

On December 19 the Directory entered Kyiv. As the government of the reestablished Ukrainian People's Republic, the Directory issued a declaration17 on December 26 proclaiming Ukraine free from punitive expeditions, gendarmes, and other repressive institutions of the ruling classes. It restored individual autonomy, and reinstated the eight-hour workday, collective bargaining agreements, and the right to strike. It declared that the right to govern the country should belong only to those classes that created material and spiritual values; the nonworking classes should have no voice in the government. The sociopolitical objectives stated in the declaration satisfied neither those on the Left nor those on the Right, and its appeal to the populace was blunted because news of the declaration did not reach the provinces for some time.

Simultaneously the three parties that were represented in the Directory, the Social Democrats, Socialist Revolutionaries, and the Independist Socialists, formed a cabinet headed by Volodymyr M. Chekhivs'kyi, a Social Democrat, who also held the portfolio of foreign affairs. No effort was made to reconvene the Central Rada because it had been discredited by its cooperation with the Germans prior to the hetman coup. The new government had to face difficult foreign problems and such domestic problems as the organization of administration and defense. Most of the administrative personnel of the hetman regime either escaped or went into hiding, leaving the new government without enough trained administrators to fill the positions. The inability of the government to establish a firm and effective administration brought about anarchy. Some local partisan leaders were cut off from the center by Russian military operations and thus were unable to work with the government. Others were unwilling to subordinate themselves to the government and even followed independent courses in opposition to it because the objectives of the masses were far more radical than those of the government.

Defense, however, soon became the main issue of the time. During the uprisings against the hetman regime the Directory's call to arms was obeyed by hundreds of thousands of peasants and workers. When the Directory entered the capital, it had some one hundred thousand troops, thirty thousand near Kyiv alone. Moreover, "the troops that entered Kyiv were admired by all for their discipline, training, and their lusty and strong bearing." However, the enthusiasm of the volunteers soon began to evaporate and the forces rapidly dwindled. To prevent their disintegration and to reorganize many of the partisan units that were dedicated to the national cause, vigorous measures were needed to organize them into a disciplined force. The creation of a reliable regular army to meet the threat of an imminent Soviet Russian invasion was beyond the Directory's power because it had an inadequate number of officers, arms, and uniforms.19 It would have been impossible, even under the most favorable conditions, to organize a strong army in two or three weeks.

The most positive development during the critical period of the Directory was in the relations between the National Republic and the western part of Ukraine. The breakup of the Hapsburg monarchy in October 1918 created the opportunity for former Austro-Hungarian subjects to establish their own independence. In the Ukrainian region of the monarchy the population had organized a National Rada in L'viv, which subsequently proclaimed an independent state, the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, on November 1, 1918. The National Rada decided to seek unification with the Ukrainian National Republic.

As early as December 1, the representatives of the Western Ukrainian Republic, Lonhyn Tsehel's'kyi and Dmytro Levyts'kyi, signed a preliminary agreement with the Directory at Fastiv in which both sides agreed to unite. They also agreed that West Ukraine because of its cultural, social, and legal particularism was to enjoy autonomy. On January 3, 1919, the National Rada unanimously ratified the Fastiv Agreement, and on January 22 the act of union was finally approved by the Directory.20

By this agreement, sovereignty was to reside in the Directory. The National Rada, however, was to exercise authority in West Ukraine until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. Although the union was a significant historic act, it was more nominal than actual since both parties were soon at war against different enemies: the Western Province (Oblast) of the Ukrainian People's Republic, as it was named after the act of union, against Poland, and the People's Republic against the second Bolshevik invasion.

The problems of union, consolidation, and defense were to be dealt with by the Congress of Toilers, a parliamentary assembly consisting of 528 indirectly elected delegates from the Ukrainian People's Republic and 65 from the West Ukrainian Republic, which was convened in Kyiv on January 22, 1919. However, the Congress was interrupted on January 28 by the Bolshevik frontal advance on Kyiv. The Congress sanctioned the principle of general democratic elections to parliament and organs of local government and adopted a resolution expressing "full confidence in and gratitude to the Directory for its great work in liberating the Ukrainian people from the landlord-hetman government." The most important achievements of the Congress, however, were the formal proclamation of the union of the two Ukrainian republics and the legal confirmation of the Directory, which it invested with supreme authority, including the right to enact laws and the defense of the state, until the next session of the Congress.

After the triumph of the Directory, the most serious threats to Ukrainian political independence were the French intervention in the south and the new Soviet Russian invasion. The intervention stemmed from the Anglo-French Convention of December 23, 1917, which was rooted in the Entente's resentment of the Bolshevik negotiations with the Central Powers, the disclosure and rejection of the secret treaties, and the repudiation of tsarist debts. France, in particular, had special interest in Ukraine, where it had large investments before the war.22 Consequently, the Entente decided to support the Russian anti-Bolshevik movement to overthrow the Soviet Russian regime.

To achieve this goal, France and Great Britain divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence:

Under the agreement of the 23rd December, 1917, between ourselves and France, we assume responsibility for the Cossack territories, Armenia, the Caucasus, Georgia, and Kurdistan, while the French control is extended to Bessarabia, the Ukraine and Crimea. Northern Russia is recognized by the French Government as under our control. Poland falls to France. . . .23

Hence both powers not only decided to intervene in the former Russian empire, but to aid the tsarist generals by supplying them with arms, ammunition, equipment, money, and instructors. From November 17 to 23, 1918, representatives of various Russian political groups and the Entente held a conference at Jassy, Romania, requesting help against the Bolsheviks. They also worked out a plan of political action for the Entente in "South Russia." Although the groups were sharply divided over the type of government, the conference accelerated the intervention.

On December 17, the French 156th Division, consisting of 1,800 men under the command of General Borius reached Odessa from Salonika. Subsequently Borius went ashore to discuss the military situation with the French consul, Denikin's representative in Odessa, the commander of the Polish troops, and the commander of the Volunteer Army forces. He proclaimed the purpose of the intervention to the local population:

France and the Allies have not forgotten the efforts made by Russia at the beginning of the war and now they are coming into Russia to provide the opportunity for healthy elements and Russian patriots to establish in the country the order that was disturbed during the long period of the terrible civil war. 26

Simultaneously he announced his assumption of authority and command of all military units in the Odessa region, including the Volunteers, and appointed General Aleksei Grishin-Almazov, commander of the Volunteers, military governor. By it Borius created a problem for the French because Grishin-Almazov was Denikin's officer, but Denikin operated in the British Zone and had no authority over Odessa, which was French Zone. Moreover, the authority in Odessa was in the hands of the Directory. Thus an open conflict between the French and General Denikin ensued. According to Denikin, to deny the French "the honor of 'taking' Odessa and thereby providing a pretext for its occupation," Grishin-Almazov offered to clear the city of Ukrainian troops, using his unit from the steamer Saratov, which was anchored in the harbor, to secure the French disembarkation. Borius accepted the offer and the Volunteers, under the cover of the guns of the Allied warships, landed and attacked the Ukrainian troops.

The French troops who disembarked on December 18 did not participate in the actual fighting, but two battalions of the 176th Regiment seized control of the public buildings and protected the Volunteers' rear from a Ukrainian counterattack. The Ukrainian troops, consisting of about four thousand men, hesitated to employ their full fire power lest they precipitate a clash with the French, which the Directory had proscribed, assuming that French troops would be used only against the Bolsheviks. After hours of prolonged fighting the Ukrainian troops withdrew from the city to throw up a defensive perimeter around its outskirts.

By the evening of December 18, the Ukainians sought a truce; their sole condition was the removal of Grishin-Almazov from the military governorship. Borius rejected their demand and laid down his own conditions: an immediate cease-fire, the surrender of their arms, and the evacuation of the city, warning that if his demands were not met the Ukrainian troops would be regarded not as belligerents, but as bandits, and shot on sight. Consequently the Ukrainian troops capitulated, although many refused to surrender their arms, and by December 22, Odessa was under the control of the Allies.

Although this was a humiliating experience, the Directory was not in a position to enter into a war with France; rather, it was seeking understanding and technical aid from her. On January 14, 1919, General Philippe d'Anselme arrived in Odessa to take personal command of operations in Ukraine. The following week the combat strength of the Allies was augmented by the arrival of the first contingent of Greek troops, the remainder of whom reached Odessa in February. In March, French units were moved from Romania into Ukraine. Their arrival brought the total Allied strength in Odessa to 12,000 men: 6,000 French, 4,000 Poles, and 2,000 Greeks.30

It is evident that the French military had no intention of doing serious fighting, fearing that "their troops were not reliable and combat orders would not be carried out." However, the separation of Odessa from its supplies of food, water, petroleum, and other necessities, and the threat of open rebellion among the poorly fed, unemployed, and Bolshevik-agitated workers, impelled the Allied forces to expand the occupation along the Black Sea coast to include the major cities in Tyraspil, Birzula, Voznesenske, Mykolaiv, and Kherson.

The state of war between the Ukrainian troops and the Volunteers in South Ukraine thwarted d'Anselme's mission, which depended upon the concerted action of all anti-Bolshevik forces and neither the Directory nor Denikin could hope to defeat the Bolsheviks while fighting each other. General d'Anselme tried to avoid favoring any one anti-Bolshevik force to the exclusion of the others, but in his opinion, it was Denikin who was primarily responsible for preventing reconciliation of differences between the various anti-Bolshevik forces, thus undermining the success of the Allied mission in Ukraine. General d'Anselme was interested mainly in the military aspects of the situation in Ukraine, and left political matters to his chief of staff, Colonel Freidenberg.

Although the French Command favored the restoration of a united Russia, it preferred to negotiate with the Directory rather than to fight it. This was not a new policy, but a temporary change stipulated by circumstances, according to Freidenberg:

France remained faithful to the principle of a United Russia. But now it is not a matter of decision of this or that political question, but exclusively a matter of making use of all anti-Bolshevik forces, including Ukrainian, in the struggle against the Bolsheviks.33

General Henri Berthelot, commander in chief of Allied troops in southern Russia and Romania, spoke in the same vein: "I can assure you most firmly that I am supporting a United Russia and I do not recognize independent Ukraine. But under the circumstances, for a time I must negotiate with the independists."34

As early as January 1919, the Directory dispatched Generals Mykhailo Hrekiv and Matveiev to Odessa with the intention of establishing contact with the French military and obtaining technical aid. Although the mission of General Hrekiv failed to achieve any immediate results, the Directory sent Dr. Osyp Nazaruk, press chief of the government, and Serhii Ostapenko, minister of trade and industry, with full authority to conclude political, trade, and military agreements with the French.35

Colonel Freidenberg gave them an arrogant reception, presenting a long list of demands and conditions: Vynnychenko and Chekhivs'kyi were to resign because of their alleged bolshevism, and Petliura, known for his pro-Entente sympathies, had to be ousted because the French army could not cooperate with a "bandit chieftain"; the Directory's members should be acceptable to France; the sovereignty of Ukraine would be decided only at the Paris Peace Conference; during the struggle against the Bolsheviks France was to control the railways and finances of Ukraine; the Directory was to organize an army of 300,000 men in three months, in which Russian officers from the Volunteer Army must be given commissions; and the Directory must request France to accept Ukraine as a protectorate.

The Directory responded to the French conditions on March 6, 1919, at the Birzula railroad station, insisting, in turn, upon recognition of the independence of Ukraine and the sovereignty of the Directory; permission for the Directory's delegation to participate in the Paris Peace Conference; return of the Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine; recognition of the autonomy of the Ukrainian Army with a position for its representative in the supreme Allied command; and prohibition of service in the Ukrainian Army by Russian officers.

Although the negotiations in Odessa were becoming more and more disappointing, the Directory persevered in its efforts because Ukraine was under attack from all sides: the Bolsheviks were advancing from the north and the east, the Poles were pressing in the west, and the Allied and Volunteer units were threatening to move from the south. In the light of these circumstances the Directory sent another delegation headed by Justice Arnold Margolin to Odessa, on January 26, 1919.

This delegation attempted a new approach by presenting on February 5 a joint memorandum of the representatives of Ukraine, Belo-russia, the Don, and the Kuban concerning their countries' political aspirations, the methods of fighting the Bolsheviks, and the aid they expected from the Entente. The delegations expressed their opposition to federalism imposed from above, requesting instead support for their national aspirations and their governments, arguing that bolshevism could be combated most effectively by appealing to national patriotism. Therefore, they asked the Allied Command for technical aid: firearms, ammunition, heavy artillery, tanks, armored cars, shoes, boots, clothing, and medical supplies. In return, they agreed on the principle of a general staff that would direct military operations on the basis of mutual agreement, without intervening in the internal political life of the new states.

After several weeks of conferences between Ukrainian and French representatives, the French military, with d'Anselme representing the Entente, presented a draft of a French-Ukrainian agreement that recognized the Directory as a sovereign government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, and the Ukrainian Army as an internally independent unit of the anti-Bolshevik army in the Ukrainian Zone, with representatives on the supreme command of the Entente. The French further agreed to take steps to admit the Directory's representatives to the peace conference, promised agrarian reforms, and consented to convoke a parliament based on universal, equal, secret, and proportional suffrage. France assured the Directory that during the war no units of the Volunteer Army should be present, or participate, in military operations on the territory of Ukraine, and that the Odessa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson districts would be part of the Ukrainian zone under the authority of the Directory. On the other hand, the proposal also stipulated that changes in the Directory's membership during the war against the Bolsheviks could be made only with the approval of the Entente, and the supreme staff of the Entente would control Ukrainian railroads and the transportation of all armed forces, as well as Ukrainian financial affairs. However, in late March the French in Odessa received orders from Paris not to sign the agreement, apparently because of conflicting interests of France, Britain, and Italy in regard to the future economic possibilities in Ukraine.39

The intervention of the Allies in southern Ukraine and the Directory's negotiations with the French in Odessa greatly complicated the situation in Ukraine by creating two conflicting points of view in the Directory and the parties. One group, represented by Vynnychenko, wished to seek an understanding with the Bolsheviks against the Entente. The other, led by Petliura, desired coalition with the Entente against the Bolsheviks. Petliura's viewpoint finally prevailed, and although the representatives of the Entente had no understanding of the Ukrainian cause, the Directory continued to try to negotiate an agreement to the very end of the intervention.40 At the end of September 1919, Petliura expressed his feelings concerning the Entente's attitude toward Ukraine:

We might have been the best means in the hands of the Entente for driving the Bolsheviks back into Russia. But, for reasons of their own, the Great Powers back[ed] Denikin against us and so split our joint strength. It almost seems as if the Entente does not want to beat the Bolsheviks.*1

The Bolsheviks exploited these negotiations with the Entente, spreading propaganda that the Directory had made a secret agreement against the interests of the people. The Bolsheviks : . . . unmasked to the people the Directory's betrayal. To prove it the Bolshevik committee in Kyiv printed and spread, even among the delegates of the [Labor] Congress, the agreement signed by the Directory with the French command according to which the Directory handed Ukraine over to the disposition of French imperialism. Thus, the "toiling" mask was ripped off the Directory and it was shown to the masses that it is the enemy of freedom and national independence of the Ukrainian people.42

They suggested that the Directory was planning for a new form of intervention in Ukraine and intervention was not popular after the experience with the Austro-German troops. The peasants, in particular, distrusted the forces of the Entente because they associated them with the Volunteer Army and believed they would renew the rule of big landowners. Thus the French intervention strengthened pro-Bolshevik sympathies among the population.

Moreover, political developments in Germany and Hungary greatly assisted the Bolsheviks, who convinced some Ukrainian leaders that the world-wide social revolution was taking place and that Ukrainian national questions would be solved automatically by the revolution. The Bolsheviks were adroit in the use of untruth, knowing from experience all the ways to use propaganda. The Ukrainian government, not able to match the Bolshevik propaganda skills, found that its orientation toward the Entente undermined its prestige and aroused opposition from both the Right and the Left.

As well as propagandizing Soviet Russia was preparing for a new invasion. For this purpose a Ukrainian Revolutionary Council, consisting of Stalin, Piatakov, Zatons'kyi, and Antonov-Ovseenko, was established on November 17 and masked by the name "Group of the Kursk Direction." There were disagreements among the Bolshevik leaders concerning the intervention in Ukraine. The assumption of the rightist group was that the potential for revolutionary action in Ukraine was too small and they would not gain a following among the workers and peasants. The leftist group, however, thought that in the event of Austro-German withdrawal from Ukraine they could succeed in seizing power before the Ukrainian national leaders could take the initiative. Their opinion was shared by Stalin.45

Subsequently on November 20 a Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine was secretly formed in Kursk, a Russian city near the Ukrainian border. On November 28 the new government formally held its first assembly at Kursk, attended by Antonov-Ovseenko, Sergeev (Artem), Zatons'kyi, Emanuil I. Kviring, and Chairman Piatakov. The aim of Moscow's appointed government was to shield Soviet Russia's invasion of Ukraine. On December 6, 1918, the troops of the "Kursk Direction" launched military operations against Ukraine on two axes toward Gomel-Chernihiv-Kyiv and toward Vorozhba-Sumy-Kharkiv.46 According to Antonov-Ovseenko, the commander in chief of the Bolshevik Army, there were three main objectives: to take Kharkiv, with its railway junction, as a base for further expansion; to occupy the Donets Basin with its industries and coal mines, breaking military and economic ties between central Ukraine, the Donets Basin, and the Don; and to advance southward to Crimea to forestall the Entente's interven-tion.47

The Bolsheviks took the Allied intervention as a serious threat. Leon Trotsky identified Bolshevik policy with regard to the intervention as derived from:

. . . the need to forestall the possibility of an advance by the Anglo-French forces from the South. The more swiftly and resolutely we push our possible Ukrainian-Entente Front to the south, away from Moscow, the more advantageous it will be for us. In the event of a real attack of large forces the greatest advantage for us would be in establishing our line along the left bank of the Dnieper and destroying all lines of communication and bridges on the right bank. For this we need to advance to the Dnieper as soon as possible.48

To accomplish these objectives Antonov-Ovseenko dispatched orders to all who might be useful to the Bolsheviks, including the rebel units and local Bolshevik organizations, to foment insurrections along the lines of their advance, to organize intelligence systems, and to seize ammunition factories and even certain towns. At the same time they were "to prevent by every means possible the advance of counterrevolutionary forces from Kyiv toward Kursk and Briansk. The combination of strong conventional attacks with fifth-column activities and rebellions enabled the Bolshevik forces to advance successfully into Ukraine. The advance was also facilitated by the seizure of large stores of German and Ukrainian military material, left by the hetman government.50

Consequently the Ukrainian minister of foreign affairs, Volodymyr Chekhivs'kyi, on December 31, 1918, and on January 3 and 4, 1919, sent a series of notes of protest to the Soviet Russian government concerning its military operations in Ukraine, demanding an explanation and seeking an agreement to avoid war. On January 5, the Soviet Russian commissar of foreign affairs, Georgii V. Chicherin, denied all Chekhivs'kyi's allegations, entirely misrepresenting the situation as a Ukrainian civil war: "Military action on Ukrainian territory at this time is proceeding between the troops of the Directory and the troops of the Ukrainian Soviet Government, which is completely independent."51

On January 9, 1919, the Ukrainian government's reply called the denial "either a willful distortion of the truth or a complete lack of information.' However, the Directory expressed its willingness to enter into peace negotiations and commercial relations if Soviet Russia would withdraw the troops from Ukraine in forty-eight hours. Chicherin reiterated his previous denial, but nevertheless proposed Moscow as a meeting place for peace negotiations. The Directory, under pressure from Chekhivs'kyi and his supporters, accepted this proposal and sent a small delegation headed by Semen Mazurenko to Moscow. It was instructed to seek a settlement with Soviet Russia even at the price of introducing a soviet form of government in Ukraine. It was also authorized to conclude an economic agreement and a military alliance for defensive purposes only, if Soviet Russia would end the invasion and recognize Ukrainian independence.

This attempt to find a modus vivendi with Soviet Russia can be understood only in the light of the weakness of the Directory and of the growth of a revolutionary radicalism in the working classes and in both of the main Ukrainian parties—the Social Democratic and the Socialist Revolutionary. Although the Ukrainian delegation was engaged in negotiation in Moscow, the Bolshevik troops continued the invasion. Consequently, on January 16, 1919, the Directory declared that a state of war existed between Soviet Russia and Ukraine.54

While the Bolshevik troops were advancing from the north and southeast, the anti-Bolshevik Russian forces were moving into Ukraine from the Don, the Romanians occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina, the Poles were fighting the Ukrainians in Galicia, and the Entente was moving troops north from Odessa and the Crimea. At that time the Ukrainian Army, except for a few regular formations left from the hetman period, was just in the process of organization. The best military units, those on which the Directory relied, were the Sich Riflemen Corps and the Zaporozhian Corps. The Directory's forces consisted largely of partisan detachments, some of which were undisciplined and commanded by politically and nationally immature leaders.55 In the course of time, a few of the detachments were swayed by Bolshevik propaganda and chose some critical period to proclaim their neutrality or even to defect to the Bolsheviks. Given this deteriorating military situation, the Directory could offer no effective resistance to the advancing Bolshevik troops.

In early January 1919, the Bolshevik troops occupied Kharkiv and Chernihiv. As the enemy approached the Dnieper near Kyiv, the Directory evacuated on the evening of February 2 to Vinnytsia, which then became its temporary capital. On February 5, after heavy fighting, the Ukrainian forces retreated from Kyiv to the west. The next day Bolshevik troops occupied Kyiv.5

Chekhivs'kyi's and Vynnychenko's abortive efforts to find an agreement with Soviet Russia brought about a cabinet crisis. The decision to send a peace delegation to Moscow and the prospect of a Soviet form of government was not approved by Petliura and the military commanders. Moreover, with the success of the Bolshevik invasion, the leading circles increased their efforts to gain the Entente's support of their resistance. To facilitate the Directory's negotiations with the French representatives in Odessa, the Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries on February 9 withdrew their members from the government. Petliura, however, resigned from his party while Vynny-chenko, president of the Directory, on February 11 handed over his authority to Petliura and left the country. On February 13, Serhii Ostapenko, the former minister of trade and industry, set up a new cabinet that consisted mainly of Socialist-Federalists. However, because it based its plan on the support of the Entente, ignoring Ukrainian national interests, the Ostapenko cabinet not only failed to achieve support from the Entente against the Bolsheviks, but it antagonized a large segment of"the Ukrainian population. Moreover, the absence of such prominent leaders as Hrushevs'kyi and Vynnychenko, and the Socialist parties, which had substantial popular support, gave the Ostapenko cabinet the appearance of a "bourgeois" government, which the Bolsheviks used in their anti-Directory propaganda. At the end of March 1919, Red troops forced the Ukrainian Army to retreat to the former Austrian border and isolated its left flank, in the area of Uman'. Some military leaders, attempting to counteract the influence of the Bolshevik propaganda among the population and the troops, adopted some of their slogans and opened independent negotiations with the Bolsheviks or even joined them.

In the light of the deteriorating military situation and the lack of support for the Ostapenko cabinet, the Directory called upon Borys Martos to form still another cabinet on April 9, in Rivne. By including Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries, as well as representatives of western Ukraine, the Directory hoped to gain popular support.58 The new cabinet issued a declaration on April 12, 1919, directed "to all Ukrainian Socialists, peasants and workers who, unable to stand the foreign yoke, rose behind the front against the Russian Communists to fight for a free and independent Ukraine."

The Bolshevik occupation authorities had no intention of granting political or cultural concessions. On March 19, 1919, at the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Lenin remarked: "Ukraine was separate from Russia by exceptional circumstances, and the national movement has not taken deep roots there. Insofar as it did exist, the Germans stamped it out." The policy of Russification and exploitation of Ukraine went on at full speed. The Ukrainian language was completely proscribed in state institutions and printing houses. As early as February 13, 1919, the head of the Provisional Soviet Government of Ukraine, Christian Rakovskii, at a meeting of the Kyiv City Council of Workers' Deputies, declared that the attempt "to institute Ukrainian as a state language is a reactionary measure, and entirely unnecessary to anyone." The administration requisitioned buildings of Ukrainian cultural institutions for state purposes. Former tsarist gendarmes, police, and secret agents who had entered the Cheka persecuted the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The Bolsheviks regarded Ukraine as a colony, primarily as a source of food. Lenin admitted receiving reports that "stocks of food are immense, but it is impossible to transport everything at once because of lack of apparatus."

Therefore, the Ukrainian villages were invaded by the Russian foodstuff requisitioning units:

The Workers' and Peasants' Government was tirelessly exporting from Ukraine to Muscovy everything it could lay its hands on: bread, sugar, meat, factory machine tools and equipment, farm implements, furniture from buildings, and even musical instruments—all these were taken and requisitioned without any kind of compensation. . . . With this brutal requisition policy in the villages, a policy that did not differentiate between poorer peasants and the richer or "kurkuls," the Committees of the Poor were disregarded and by a simplified system of requisitioning, the Red Army men seized from Ukrainian peasants everything that could be removed— grain, cattle, poultry, plows, even women's clothes.62

This policy was passed off by Lenin on March 13, 1919, as voluntary assistance from a friendly Soviet Republic:

In Ukraine, we have a fraternal Soviet Republic, with which we have the best of relations. This republic resolves the question of help, not in terms of petty trading, not in profiteering, but is guided by an exceptionally warm desire to help the hungry north. The first special obligation of each citizen of Ukraine is to help the north.63

However, as Alexander G. Schlichter, then commissar of food supplies of Ukraine, wrote in 1928:

Every pood was soaked in blood: By July 1 the government had acquired not fifty, but only eight and a half million poods. However, three-quarters of this was in Ukraine and was rationed to proletarian centers (primarily to workers of the Donets Basin) and to the Red Army. Only about two million poods were sent to Moscow and Petersburg] .64

This policy of requisition and persecution of everything Ukrainian brought about mass uprisings, even among some Ukrainian Communists who were attempting to establish an independent Soviet Ukraine. From April to June 1919, there were 328 uprisings of the people against the Bolsheviks. The Directory established contact with the partisans acting in the Bolsheviks' rear and gained more response among the population for the national struggle.

During the first half of March 1919, Ukrainian troops made a coordinated attack from the north and south on the Bolshevik forces in the region of Berdychiv-Koziatyn-Zhytomyr. The Bolsheviks were forced to retreat, and at the end of March the Ukrainian troops approached Kyiv from the north.66 On March 25, 1919, Jukums J. Vacietis (Vatsetis), the commander in chief of Bolshevik forces, wired Antonov-Ovseenko:

It was necessary to pursue with full intensity the complete destruction of any sort of organization among the troops of Petliura. ... At the present, when Petliura has again appeared near Kyiv, we must undertake all measure for final destruction of Petliura. I recommend that you . . . stop the development of actions in the direction of the Romanian border as well as toward the Black Sea coast; transfer from there all unneeded troops against the troops of Petliura . . . your westward advance is necessary to lead to the borders of southeastern Galicia and Bukovina.67

Although Ukrainian troops were victorious in the central sector, their southern flank became seriously exposed after the allied troops left the Black Sea coast and Odessa under the pressure of Hryhor'iv's thrusts. After strengthening their forces, the Bolsheviks counterattacked in the Ukrainian central sector, also making heavy use of propaganda among the troops and population, and cut off the southern group from the main force. To save the situation, the southern group was ordered to drive back the Bolsheviks by a counterattack from the southeast; but the commander of the Zaporozhian Corps, Omelian Volokh, independently opened negotiations with the Bolsheviks. Subsequently, the Bolsheviks attacked again, forcing a large part of the group to retreat on April 16, 1919, to Romania, where they were disarmed. Only two weeks later the Ukrainians succeeded in making their way through East Galicia and Volyn', to rejoin the main force, but none of the equipment surrendered was ever returned, in spite of an agreement to do so.68

While the Bolsheviks were concentrating large forces against the northern group of the Ukrainian Army, its commander, Volodymyr Oskilko, attempted a coup against the government. Although his adventure failed, it demoralized and confused the Ukrainian troops and helped the Bolsheviks to defeat them. The Ukrainian forces did manage to undermine Bolshevik initiative and were, along with Hryhor'iv, responsible for preventing their advance into Romania and Hungary, yet they failed to achieve a decisive victory. Consequently, they retreated to the border of Galicia where they defended a small territory.

At the time when the Directory was struggling against the Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik Russian forces, the Western Ukrainian People's Republic was defending its territory from an invasion by Poland. The government believed that the Entente and the peace conference would, in accordance with the principle of national self-determination, compel the Poles to evacuate eastern Galicia. However, France was committed to the idea of a "strong Poland" as a future counterpoise to Germany in Eastern Europe and looked with disfavor on Ukrainian independence. Great Britain was supporting the Russian anti-Bolshevik leaders, while at the same time seeking an agreement with the Bolsheviks; neither of these policies was favorable to the Ukrainian national aspirations. The United States, on the other hand, was little interested in Eastern Europe; its attitude was that nothing should be done to prejudice the future claims of the Russia that might emerge after the victory of the anti-Bolshevik generals over the Bolsheviks. Thus Ukraine was isolated from the Western powers.

In January 1919 a peace conference commission arrived in Poland for mediation in the Ukrainian-Polish war and demanded suspension of hostilities as a condition for negotiations. The Ukrainian government acceded to this demand and on February 28, the commission presented a plan by which Ukraine was to leave to the Poles half of the ethnically Ukrainian territory, including the Drohobych-Boryslav oil fields. This decision, which was to remain in force until the peace conference

settled the Polish-Ukrainian frontier, was unacceptable to the Ukrainians.

On April 18, as the campaign continued, the Supreme Council

created a commission with representatives of the Allied and Associated

Powers, headed by General Louis Botha of South Africa, to deal with

the Ukrainian-Polish problem. After several weeks of hearings, on May

12 the Botha commission proposed a conditional armistice, leaving to

the Ukrainians the Drohobych-Boryslav oil fields and limiting Polish

and Ukrainian forces in eastern Galicia to twenty thousand men each.

This proposal was, however, rejected by the Poles.

Establishment of the Directory


While the Botha Commission was attempting to settle the conflict, the Poles were preparing for renewed aggression and on May 15, reinforced by six divisions (100,000 men) formed, trained, and equipped in France, began a general offensive. The poorly equipped Ukrainian troops could not stand for long against a large and fresh Polish army. On May 21, the Ukrainian delegation in Paris sent a note to the president of the peace conference asking for a halt to the Polish offensive, but no action was taken.

As the Poles advanced eastward, the Romanian command of the Bukovina-Khotyn front demanded that the Ukrainians evacuate the southern part of eastern Galicia. This change represented a serious setback to the Galician Army through the loss of its only supplies of ammunition and its isolation from the outside world. On May 26, the Ukrainians abandoned Stanyslaviv (Ivano-Frankivske), the temporary capital of western Ukraine, and retreated to Chortkiv. During this critical period, the Galician Army launched on June 7 the "Chortkiv offensive," driving the Polish forces back to the west about eighty miles. After three weeks of successful fighting, the Ukrainian advance halted, having expended the available ammunition and supplies. The Poles had concentrated a large force and launched a new offensive along the entire front. At the end of June the Galician Army began a general withdrawal, conducting only rearguard actions to assure an orderly retreat.

On June 25, the Supreme Council decided the fate of eastern Galicia by authorizing Poland to occupy it:

To protect the persons and property of the peaceful population of eastern Galicia against the danger to which they are exposed by the Bolshevik bands, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers has decided to authorize the forces of the Polish Republic to pursue their operations as far as the river Zbruch. This authorization does not in any way affect the decisions to be taken later by the Supreme Council for the settlement of the political status of Galicia. W

On July 2, the Ukrainian delegation in Paris protested this act, declaring: "The decision of the Supreme Council does not embody the triumph of right and justice."75 The protest, however, was ignored.

Under these circumstances the Galician Army had no recourse but to abandon its territory and retreat across the river Zbruch, where the Directory troops held a narrow but gradually expanding strip of territory. The West Ukrainian government faced two alternatives: to join the Directory against the Bolsheviks, or to accept the Bolsheviks' offer of an alliance and supplies of arms and ammunition against Poland. The government decided on the former course, and on July 16, the army of about one hundred thousand men and a majority of the civil administration began to cross the Zbruch.7

The trauma of the move was described by an eyewitness:

Grief gripped ray heart in my breast as I watched the Ukrainian people of Galicia being forced to abandon their own land. And before whom? Before Polish invaders who for an entire century had been filling Europe and America with their weeping and prayers to God and the people that they were unfortunate, enslaved. And now —they themselves were coming to enslave our land by fire and sword; they were coming not even on their own strength, but by the aid of the French.??

Almost immediately after the completion of the crossing, the two armies began their offensive because the size of their small territory, only thirty-five kilometers in breadth and fifty-five kilometers in width, did not permit a defense in depth against the repeated Bolshevik attacks. After consideration of other directions for an advance, Petliura decided to push the operation toward Kyiv, with precautionary thrusts both to the north, on Shepetivka, and to the south, on Odessa. In spite of strong Bolshevik resistance, the Ukrainian troops advanced rapidly, aided in part by the advance of Denikin and by the uprisings of the partisans in the Bolsheviks' rear. Although the Ukrainian command secured its rear in the west through the mediation of the Entente and by signing an armistice with the Poles on September 1, it neglected to coordinate its advance with Denikin's simultaneous offensive in the Left Bank or to issue a timely and precise order governing the actions of its troops in case they encountered the Denikin troops.79 Petliura hoped that the preemption of Kyiv might force Denikin to recognize a communality of interest against the Bolsheviks, and to advance north rather than open another front.

In spite of the Bolsheviks' staunch defense in the Kyiv area, after several days of fighting the Ukrainian troops entered the capital on August 30. The next day, Denikin's superior force made its way into the city and the Ukrainian troops withdrew from Kyiv to avoid opening a third front. Thus Denikin's attack not only prevented a Ukrainian advance against the Bolsheviks, but saved the latter's position in Ukraine by enabling three divisions of the Fourteenth Army, which had been cut off by the Ukrainian and Denikin troops, to pass from the region of Odessa-Voznesenske north to Zhytomyr, where they joined the main Bolshevik forces. Although the Directory tried to avert conflict with Denikin, both through negotiations with him and appeals to the Allies, it failed, and on September 24 it declared war and turned its main forces against Denikin.80

The retreat from the liberated capital was a great psychological and strategic blow to the Ukrainian Army. Exhausted by constant fighting, lacking ammunition and equipment, it could not withstand for long the attacks of Denikin's well-nourished and well-armed forces. Moreover, the cold and rainy autumn followed by an early heavy winter, coupled with the lack of clothing and medical supplies, brought about a disastrous typhus epidemic that spread among soldiers and civilians. In the area of operations, all residences and public buildings were filled with sick soldiers; hospitals intended for 100 accommodated more than 1,000 patients. Thousands of soldiers were dying from disease while others, nearly barefoot and badly clothed, froze in the open fields. The peasants were decimated by disease while giving aid to the soldiers. The blockade by the Entente prevented the Ukrainian government from obtaining medical supplies and ultimately the fighting strength of the Ukrainian Army was reduced by 70 percent by the spread of typhus.

This tragic situation was described by an American correspondent:

It is not too much to say that about every third person in Kamenets has typhus. In other cities the situation is the same. In the army it is even worse. At Vapniarka I was with Petliura at a review of a frontier garrison where out of a thousand troops at least two hundred had had typhus. Against this epidemic Petliura's government is quite powerless to make headway. The Ukrainians are condemned to death by the fact that the Entente is backing Denikin. In an interview I had with Petliura he begged that, if only for humanity's sake, the Red Cross would send over a mission to fight typhus. Let me add here that right across the river in Romania are all the medical supplies necessary. . . . We do not ask for any gratuitous help from the Allies. We only want our frontiers opened so that we can trade our products for manufactured articles and equipment. Let them open Odessa. We do not ask them to pour in supplies free of charge to us, as they do to Denikin.*®

The Galician Army, however, suffered the most. As General IUrko Tiutiunyk observed, its situation "was indeed desperate: there were neither ammunition, medicine, food, clothing, no reinforcement of men and horses. . . . [Moreover] there was no hope that the situation could soon change in our favor."83 Gradually the Ukrainian troops retreated northwest, where they found themselves surrounded by hostile forces: the Poles on the west, the Bolsheviks on the northeast, and Denikin on the south and southeast.

Therefore the commander of the Galician Army, General Myron Tarnasv'kyi, who felt the military pressure at the front, decided to negotiate with Denikin. He knew the Volunteer Army was a "living corpse," but could still crush the disease-weakened Ukrainian Army.84 Although the president of the Western Ukrainian government, Dr. Evhen Petrushevych, opposed such a venture, the general unilaterally sent a mission to negotiate for the exchange of prisoners of war and to find out on what terms Denikin would conclude an armistice with both Ukrainian armies. On November 1 the delegation contacted General Slashchov who told them Denikin was willing to negotiate with the Galician Army as an extraterritorial army, but not with the Directory's army, which, in his opinion, belonged to the Russian state and must be demobilized. 5

On November 6, 1919, the Galician delegation and representatives of the Volunteer Army signed a preliminary treaty at Ziatkivstsi, a railroad junction west of Uman'. The treaty provided for full internal autonomy of the Galician Army under control of the government of the Western Province of the Ukrainian National Republic. The army itself was guaranteed a rest period before being redeployed, during which it would be transferred to a region free of typhus, given medical support, and reinforced with Ukrainian Galician prisoners from foreign countries and Russian territories. The Sich Riflemen were not considered a Galician unit. Liaison officers would be assigned from the Denikin command. Finally, it was agreed that the Galician Army would not be employed against the Directory.

General Tarnavs'kyi and his chief of staff, Colonel Shamanek, were removed from their commands by the Western Ukrainian government and, together with others who negotiated with Denikin, were put under court-martial, but the final Galician-Russian treaty was signed in Odessa on November 17, 1919, and ratified within forty-eight hours. Although the Galician-Russian agreement was only a tactical expediency "to save the Army," the Directory considered it an act of betrayal. Facing a highly unfavorable military situation, Petliura decided to continue the fighting in the form of guerrilla warfare and seek support from the Entente via alliance with Poland.

The Directory had had to face more serious domestic and foreign problems than its predecessor, the hetman government. Although initially it had received overwhelming support from the population, it was ill prepared to guide the state in such a revolutionary period. The Directory itself was not internally united, in action or idea, concerning state problems. Such leading figures as Hrushevs'kyi and Vynnychenko found themselves outside the government and eventually left the country at the time when they were most needed. Moreover, the constant changes of the cabinet from socialist to nonsocialist to please foreign powers undermined the confidence of the radically minded population in its government. The Directory's social policy satisfied neither the upper classes, especially not the landlords, nor the revolutionary peasants and workers. It also failed to win the understanding and cooperation of the national minorities in Ukraine.

The activities of the hetman and his supporters, the Germans and Austrians, had strengthened the Bolshevik sympathies among the lower classes; the Directory's hesitant social policy only served to reinforce these sympathies. This was possible because the first Bolshevik invasion of 1918 had given the population little insight into their methods and aims in Ukraine. The Bolsheviks exploited the government's weakness through the skillful use of propaganda of untruth. In contrast to the anti-Bolshevik Russian forces, the Bolsheviks waged imperialistic war against Ukraine under the slogans of national and social liberation.

Compounding these problems of political support were several failures of leadership and administration on the part of the Directory. It failed to establish a viable regime in the country largely because of the chaos created by the Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik invasions and the Russian Civil War, which was fought largely on Ukrainian soil. Consequently some of the distant regions were controlled by politically and nationally immature partisan leaders who were unwilling to subordinate their actions to the Directory and at times followed an independent course in opposition to the government. Moreover, the existence of a group of left" Socialist Revolutionaries known as BorotTjists, who were attempting to establish a Soviet Ukrainian government independent of Russia, weakened the Directory's position. The administrative apparatus was disorganized; although some personnel left the country or went into hiding, leaving the government with a great shortage of trained personnel, the Directory failed to enlist and train the new constructive elements, including non-Ukrainians, whose participation would have increased the commitment of the various national groups to the government.

Militarily, the Directory thought more in terms of a militia than a regular army, and took no steps to remedy the shortage of well-trained, patriotic officers, and to organize a strong army. It also failed to exercise leadership in uniting the partisan groups and coordinating their activities with those of the army. Because of the lack of munitions and armament plants in Ukraine, the Directory badly needed arms and ammunition, but it could not obtain them from abroad. After January 22, 1919, when there was one Ukrainian Republic, the Directory and the West Ukrainian government did not merge and, more importantly, they neglected to unite the military commands of their two separate armies.

In its foreign policy, the Directory's diplomacy did not wield sufficient influence to gain the material aid and diplomatic support it needed from the Entente and the neutral states. The Directory had to fight simultaneously two or even three enemies, which was beyond its power, yet it failed to neutralize at least one front. Instead of doing its utmost to organize the people's support and confidence, the Directory relied too much on efforts to get aid from the Entente. Its fruitless negotiations not only undermined its own unity and aroused opposition from the parties, but gave the Bolsheviks a basis for accusing the Directory of inviting a new foreign invasion.

Thus the Directory struggled against overwhelming odds, without adequate arms, military equipment, or medical supplies. In the midst of all this, a typhus epidemic decimated the army and civilian population. Consequently the superior invasion forces of the Bolsheviks and of Denikin compelled the ill-equipped and exhausted Ukrainian Army to retreat to the western limits of the Right Bank, seeking the support of the Entente through alliance with Poland. The Directory concluded the treaty of Warsaw with the Poles; the political agreement was signed on April 21, 1920, and the military on April 24. In spite of the alliance, the sacrifice to the Poles of Ukrainian territory, and the military campaigns with the Poles against the Bolsheviks, the Directory failed to gain the support of the Entente. Moreover, after the defeat of the Bolsheviks, the Polish government, ignoring the Directory, made its own separate peace settlement.


1. Vynnychenko, Vidrodzennia natsii, 3:29; see also Doroshenko, Istoriia Ukrainy, 2:379.

2. Doroshenko, Istoriia Ukrainy, 2:103 ff.; Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy, 3:62 ff.

3. Doroshenko, Istoriia Ukrainy, 2:107 ff.

4. Ibid., pp. 111—14; Ivanys, Symon Petliura, pp. 71, 74, 77; St. Siropolko, "Dva areshtuvannia S. Petliury za het'mana P. Skoropads'koho," KD 1938, pp. 75-77; Reshetar, Ukrainian Revolution, pp. 152—53.

5. Doroshenko, Istoriia Ukrainy, 2:386 ff.; Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy, 3:87 ff.; Fedenko, Ukrains'kyi rukh, p. 160; Vynnychenko, Vidrodzennia natsii, 3:73 ff.

6. Doroshenko, Istoriia Ukrainy, 2:389, 397—98; Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy, 3:114; Fedenko, Ukrains'kyi rukh, p. 161.

7. Winston S. Churchill, The Aftermath (New York: C. Scribner, 1929), p. 168.

8. Serhii Shemet, "Do istorii Ukrains'koi Demokratychno-khliborobs'koi Partii," Khliborobs'ka Ukraina 1 (1920): 75; Viktor Andriievs'kyi, Z mynuloho, 2, pt. 1:210—11; Doroshenko, Istoriia Ukrainy, 2:408; Leikhtenbergskii, "Kak nachalas 'IUzhnaia Armiia,'" 8:38; Volia 4, no. 5 (1920): 271; Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy, 3 :120; Doroshenko, Istoriia Ukrainy, 2:114—15.

9. Zenon Stefaniv, Ukrains'ki zbroini syly 1917—21 rr., 1:112; Fedenko, Ukrains'kyi rukh, p. 163; Stewart, White Armies of Russia, pp. 75—76; Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 1: 59.

10. Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy, 3 :131—32.

11. Ibid.

12. Nazaruk, Rik na Velykii Ukraini, p. 35; Stefaniv, Ukrains'ki zbroini syly, 1 :113—15; Istoriia ukrains'koho viss'ka, pp. 452—54; Vynnychenko, Vidrodzennia natsii, 3:130—31; Stefaniv, Ukrains'kyi zbroini syly, 1:116—17; V. Stankevich, Sud'by narodov Rossii (Berlin: I. P. Ladyzhnikov, 1921), p. 90.

13. Nazaruk, Rik na Velykii Ukraini, p. 35; Leikhtenbergskii, "Kak nachalas 'IUzhnaia Armiia,' " p. 42; Vynnychenko, Vidrodzennia natsii, 3 :157.

14. Nazaruk, Rik na Velykii Ukraini, pp. 75—78; Stefaniv, Ukrains'ki zbroini syly, 1:118; Udovychenko, Tretia Zalizna dyviziia, pp. 46—47; Leikhtenbergskii, "Kak nachalas 'IUzhnaia Armiia,' " p. 45.

15. Sviatoslav Dolenga, Skoropadshchyna, p. 140; M. Ivanov, ed., "'Ot vlasti otkazyvaius," LR, no. 7 (1924), p. 224.

16. Later, Vynnychenko accused Petliura of knowing the hetman's hiding place in Kyiv but of not denouncing him (Vynnychenko, Vidrodzennia natsii, 3:163, 165); Nazaruk, Rik na Velykii Ukraini, pp. 77—78; Stewart, White Armies of Russia, p. 76; Reshetar, Ukrainian Revolution, p. 204; Sergey Markow, Armee ohne Heimat, p. 95.

17. For the text of the declaration, see Vynnychenko, Vidrodzennia natsii, 3:168 ff.; Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy ,4:15 ff.

18. Arnold Margolin, Ukraina i politika Antanty, p. 98; Ivanys, Symon Petliura, p. 85; Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 1: 75; Vynnychenko, Vidrodzennia natsii, 2:184; Fedenko, Ukrains'kyi rukh, p. 176; Vynnychenko, Vidrodzennia natsii, 3 : 244—45.

19. Vynnychenko, Vidrodzennia natsii, 3:151; Andriievs'kyi, Z mynuloho, 2, pt. 2:20-21.

20. Lonlyn Tsehel's'kyi, Vid Legend do pravdy, pp. 143—45; 258—60; Kovalevs'kyi, Pry dzherelakh borot'by, p. 536; Vynnychenko, Vidrodzennia natsii, 3:242-43.

21. Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 1:88; Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy, 4:57—68; Tsehel's'kyi, Vid legend do pravdy, pp. 273—83; Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 1:87—95; Fedenko, Ukrains'kyi rukh, pp. 180—81; Moissey G. Rafes, Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine, pp. 143—52; Reshetar, Ukrainian Revolution, pp. 231—32.

22. Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 1:66—67.

23. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919— 1939, ed. E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (London, first series), 3:361—62.

24. Stewart, White Armies of Russia, pp. 154—55; Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 1:67.

25. Denikin, Ocherki, 5:10; Jean Xydias, L'intervention francaise en Russie, 1918-1919, p. 165; Reshetar, Ukrainian Revolution, p. 239.

26. Vladimir Margulies, Ognennye gody, pp. 6—7.

27. Ibid.; Xydias, L'intervention frangaise en Russie, p. 170; Denikin, Ocherki, 5:11.

28. Denikin, Ocherki, 5:11; Udovychenko, Tretia zalizna dyviziia, p. 55.

29. F. Anulov, "Soiuznyi desant na Ukraine," in A. G. Shlichter, ed., Chernaia kniga, p. Ill; Xydias, L'intervention francaise en Russie, pp. 160, 170—72.

30. Terry L. Smart, "The French Intervention in the Ukraine, 1918—1919," (Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 1968), p. 102; Manuil S. Margulies, God inter-ventsii, 1:225; A. Gukovskii, "Inostrannaia intervetsiia na Ukraine, 1917—1919 goda," IM 1, no. 71 (1939) :93; Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, 2:165; Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 1:68—69; Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy, 4:28—29.

31. "Ocherk vzaimootnoshenii vooruzhennykh sil IUga Rossii i predstavitelei frantsuzskago komandovaniia," ARR 16: 249—50.

32. Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 1:69; E. N. Trubetskoi, "It putevykh zamietok biezhentsa," ARR 18:194—95; Margulies, God interventsii, 1:163 ff.; Kapu-stians'kyi, Pokhid ukrains'kykh armii, 1:31.

33. Denikin, Ocherki, 5 :34.

34. Trubetskoi, "Iz putevykh zamietok biezhentsa," 18:174; John Bradley, Allied Intervention in Russia, p. 148.

35. Nazaruk, Rik na Velykii Ukraini, pp. 119—20.

36. Ibid., pp. 126—31; Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 1:97—98; Vynnychenko, Vidrodzennia natsii, 3:259; Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy, 4:42; Reshetar, Ukrainian Revolution, p. 241.

37. Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 1:99—100.

38. Margolin, Ukraina ipolitika Antanty, pp. 113—19.

39. Margolin, From a Political Diary, pp. 37—38.

40. Ibid., p. 70; Nazaruk, Rik na Velykii Ukraini, pp. 124—33.

41. Henry G. Alsberg, "The Situation in the Ukraine," The Nation 109 (1919): 570.

42. Narys istorii Ukrainy, ed. K. Huslystoho, L. Slavina, and F. Iastrebova (Ufa: Vyd-vo Akavemii nauk URSR, 1942), pp. 172-73.

43. Fedenko, Ukrains'kyi rukh, pp. 177—78; Grazhdanskaia voina na Ekaterino-slavshchine, fevral' 1918-1920gg., pp. 72-73.

44. On November 11 the Council of People's Commissars "decided to direct the Revolutionary Military Council of the [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist] Republic to launch an attack within ten days in support of the workers and peasants of Ukraine who rose against the Hetman" (Antonov-Oseenko, Zapiski, 3:11, 14).

45. The fears of the rightist Communist group were expressed by a Communist from Katerynoslav: "Although the workers and many peasants, especially in the Chernihiv province, are on our side, there is no basis to think that a [pro-Bolshevik] revolutionary movement can arise, let alone succeed, in Ukraine without the support of considerable forces of the Red Army" (Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, 3:12). See also V. Zatonskii, "K voprosu ob organizatsii Vremennogo Raboche Krest'ianskogo Pravitel'stva Ukrainy noiabr' 1919 g.," LR, no. 1 (10) (1925), pp. 139 ff.

46. Zatonskyi, "K voprosu ob organizatsii," p. 149; M. Rubach, "K istorii grazhdanskoi bor'by na Ukraine," LR, no. 4 (9) (1924), p. 164;Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 1:72; Vynnychenko, Vidrodzennia natsii, 3 :209—10.

47. Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, 3 :13—14.

48. LevTrotskii, The Trotsky Papers 1919-1922, 1 :242.

49. Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, 3:17.

50. Nazaruk, Rik na Velykii Ukraini, pp. 135—36; Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, p. 113.

51. Vynnychenko, Vidrodzennia natsii, 3:205—8; Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy, 4:35—36.

52. Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy, 4:37.

53. Ibid., p. 39; Vynnychenko, Vidrodzennia natsii, 3:221—23; Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 1: 72—73.

54. Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy, 4:40; Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 1:73.

55. Zynaida Shepel', "Bat'ko povstantsia," LCK, no. 2 (1932), p. 5; Antin Krezub, "IAk zhynuv otaman Zelenyi," Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk, no. 10 (1927), pp. 110-13; Mykhailo Sereda, "Otamanshchyna," LCK, no. 2 (1930), pp. 6—8, no. 9, pp. 14—16; Iv. Kozub, "Povstannia proty het'manshchyny ta petliurovshchyny," LR, no. 5 (44) (1930), p. 284.

56. Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 1: 72, 96; Stepan Lazurenko, "Povstannia proty Het'mana i druha viina z bol'shevykamu, 1918-1919 rr.," TR, no. 41 (1966), p. 8; I. Drabatyi, "Epizod z evakuatsii Kyieva v 1919 r.," TR, no. 30 (1964), pp. 3—5; Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy, 4:91; Tsehel's'kyi, Vid Legend do pravdy, p. 294; Udovychenko, Tretia Zalizna dyviziia, pp. 52—53; Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, 3:162; Goldenveizer, "Iz kievskikh vospominami, 1919—1921 gg.,"ARR 6:236.

57. Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy, 4:94—98; Vynnychenko, Vidrodzennia natsii, 3 : 276-77; Udovychenko, Tretia Zalizna dyviziia, p. 56.

58. Vynnychenko, Vidrodzennia natsii, 3:289—90; Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy ,4:119 20.

59. V. I. Lenin, Sochineniia, 24:154.

60. Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy ,4:172—73.

61. Lenin, Sochineniia, 24: 75.

62. Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy, 4:130—31.

63. Lenin, Sochineniia, 24:47—48.

64. A. Shlikhter, "Bor'ba za khleb na Ukraine v 1919 godu," LR, no. 2 (29) (March- April 1928), p. 135.

65. Fedenko, Ukrains'kyi rukh, p. 185.

66. Kapustians'kyi, Pokhid ukrains'kykh armii, 1:33—34.

67. Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, 3:324.

68. Kapustains'kyi, Pokhid ukrains'kykh armii, 1:37; Khrystiuk, Zamitky i materiialy, 4:116; Bulavenko, "Kuban u pershii polovyni 1919 r.," Rozbudova natsii, nos. 5-6 (1934), pp. 135-36.

69. Kapustians'kyi, Pokhid ukrains'kykh armii, 1:35—36; Shandruk, Arms of Valor, p. 83.

70. Mykhailo Lozyns'kyi, Halychyna v rr. 1918-1920, pp. 747 ff.; Reshetar, Ukrainian Revolution, pp. 79—80.

71. Matthew Stachiw and Jaroslaw Sztendera, Western Ukraine at the Turning Point of Europe's History, 1918-1923, 2:54; Lozyns'kyi, Halychyna, pp. 134 ff.; Marian Kukiel, Zarys historii wojskowosci w Polsce, p. 231; Roman Dashkevych, Artyleriia Sichovykh Stril'tsiv u borot'bi za zoloti kyivs'ki vorota, p. 181; Liu-bomyr Savoika, "IAk povstala arraiia Halliera," Visti, no. 122 (1966), p. 66; Marion Romeyko, Przed i po Maju (Warsaw, Wydawn. Ministerstwa Obromy Narodowej, 1967), 1:76.

72. Stachiw and Sztendera, Western Ukraine at the Turning Point, 2:247—49; Reshetar, Ukrainian Revolution, p. 272.

73. Istoriia ukrains'koho viis'ka, pp. 506—14; Fedenko, Ukrains'kyi rukh, pp. 188—89; Shandruk, Arms of Valor, pp. 86—87; Stachiw and Sztendera, Western Ukraine at the Turning Point, 2: 245 ff.; Volodymyr Galan, Bateriia smerty (New York: "Chervona Kalyna," 1968), pp. 82—84; Zepon Stefaniv, "Dva roky v Ukrains'kii armii," LCK, no. 11, p. 14.

74. Lozyns'kyi, Halychyna, p. 143.

75. Ibid.

76. Kapustians'kyi, Pokhid ukrains'kykh armii, 2:52—59; Stachiw and Sztendera, Western Ukraine at the Turning Point, 2:259; Nazaruk, Rik na Velykii Ukraini, pp. 183, 187; Lozyns'kyi, Halychyna, p. 168; Osyp Levyts'kyi, Halyts'ka armiia na Velykii Ukraini, pp. 9—11; Luka Myshuha, Pokhid ukrains'kykh viis'k na Kyiv, serpen' 1919, pp. 6—S;Istoriia ukrains'koho viis'ka, p. 515.

77. Nazaruk, Rik na Velykii Ukraini, p. 184.

78. IAromir Diakiv, "Strategichne polozhennia UHA po perekhodi cherez Zbruch litom 1919 r.," Ukrains'kyi skytalets', no. 6 (28) (1923); Myshuha, Pokhid ukrains'kykh, pp. 6—8; Levytsky, Halyts'ka armiia, pp. 10—11; Mazepa, Ukraina v ohni, 2:17—23; Reshetar, Ukrainian Revolution, pp. 284—86; Oleksander Dotsenko, Litopys ukrains'koi revoliutsii, 2, pt. 4: 14; Pro ukrains'ki povstannia, pp. 8—9; Andrii Holub, "Zbroina vyzvol'na borot'ba na Khersonshchyni v zapilliu voroha, 1917—1919 roku," Za derzhavnist', 11:183.

79. When the Ukrainian troops approached Kyiv, the command issued a vague order: "It is absolutely essential not to enter into hostile action; ask the Denikin troops not to occupy those localities which are already in our hands, or which we will soon take; ask them to withdraw from the region of our advance in order not to delay us; apply all efforts to find out details of the organization, condition of the troops, strength, intent, morale, armament, uniform, and ammunition of the Denikin Army. Furthermore, [you] must find out the attitude of the Denikin troops toward the Ukrainian state and toward our troops" (Dotsenko, Litopys ukrains'koi revoliutsii, 2, pt. 4: 9—10).

80. Dotsenko, Litopys ukrains'koi revoliutsii, 2,pt. 4: 15—16; Shandruk, ^4rms of Valor, p. 104; Levyts'kyi, Halyts'ka armiia, pp. 51—53; Istoriia ukrains'koho viis'ka, p. 560; Udovychenko, Tretia zalizna dyviziia, pp. 112—13, 115—16; Myshuha, Pokhid ukrains'kykh, pp. 12—18; Denikin, Ocherki, 5:123; Istoriia ukrains'koho viis'ka, p. 562.

81. Shandruk, Arms of Valor, p. 112; Istoriia ukrains'koho viis'ka, pp. 563—64; Omelianovych-Pavlenko, Zymovyipokhid, 1:41—43.

82. Alsberg, "Situation in the Ukraine," pp. 569—70.

83. Tiutiunyk, Zymovyi pokhid, 1:9.

84. Myshuha, Pokhid ukrains'kykh, p. 23.

85. Levyts'kyi, Halyts'ka armiia, pp. 103-9, 122-24.

86. Lozyns'kyi, Halychyna, pp. 193—94; Levyts'kyi, Halyts'ka armiia, pp. 139-41.

87. For the text of the treaty see Lozyns'kyi, Halychyna, pp. 198—99; Tiutiunyk, Zymovyi pokhid, 1:12—13; Dmytro Paliiv, "Zymovyi pokhid," LCK, nos. 7-8 (1935), p. 8.