Michael Palij, The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 1918-1921: An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution, 1976.

20. The Last Phase of the Makhno Struggle

Wrangel had been the last major enemy the Bolsheviks had to deal with. Once that threat had passed, they had sufficiently established their power in South Ukraine to dispense with Makhno's aid. Makhno, for his part, seems to have hoped the Bolsheviks would allow a degree of autonomy for the region of the Makhno movement. According to Victor Serge: "Trotskii was much later (1938, I think) to recount that Lenin and he had thought of recognizing an autonomous region for the anarchist peasants of Ukraine, whose military leader Makhno was." Makhno assumed the coming conflict with the Bolsehviks could be limited to the realm of ideas, feeling that the strong revolutionary ideas and feelings of the peasants, together with their distrust of the foreign invaders, were the best guarantees for the movement's territory. Moreover, Makhno believed that the Bolsheviks would not attack his movement immediately. A respite of some three months would have allowed him to consolidate his power and to win over much of the Bolshevik rank and file. It seems Makhno was not the only one who contemplated the idea of Red troops deserting to the partisans. According to the British war correspondent:

General Keyes, the chief British political officer in South Russia, went down to Sochi from Novorossisk in a British man-of-war to get into touch with the Greek commanders. He found that the prevailing impression among them was that, once Denikin's forces were disposed of, the Bolshevik armies would crumble, from desertion and mutinies. 2

According to a Bolshevik officer who fought against Makhno, it was under the impact of repeated Makhno attacks and the hardships of the march that desertions began in the cavalry. Daily the percentage of those who lagged behind or were lost increased. Desertions occurred even among the mounted reconnaissance patrol, usually under the guise of changing a horse in the village. Thus the Makhno partisan movement adversely affected and promoted the demoralization of the cavalry.

The gravity of the problem of desertion from the Red Army to Makhno can be judged from the wording of the military agreement between Makhno and the Bolsheviks on October 15, 1920, against Wrangel. According to the second clause and the "remarks" that followed it:

While moving through Soviet territory, or across the fronts, the Revolutionary Partisan Army of Ukraine (Makhnovites) would accept into its ranks neither detachments nor deserters from the Red Army. Red Army units and isolated Red soldiers, who have met and joined the Revolutionary Partisan Army behind the Wrangel front, should reenter the ranks of the Red Army when they again make contact with it.4

However, events moved too fast for Makhno. On November 23, an order was issued by Frunze at Melitopil':

With the termination of military action against Wrangel because of his defeat, the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the southern front considers that the task of the Partisan Army is completed and asks the Revolutionary Military Council of the Partisan Army to begin immediately the work of integration of the partisan insurrectionary detachments into regular military units of the Red Army. The existence of the Partisan Army as a separate organization is no longer required by the military circumstances. On the contrary, its existence alongside the Red Army detachments, but with separate organization and purpose, would give rise to a completely inad-missable situation.5
Frunze concluded that he would wait till November 26 for the response to his order. This order, however, was not made public till mid-December in the Kharkiv newspaper, The Communist.6

As soon as Karetnyk took Symferopil' he was ordered to occupy the coast from Saky to Zamruk, south from Evpatoriia, where the Red Army command intended to surround him. On November 26, the plan was ready: one cavalry corps and a division on the north and northeast; one division and three brigades on the west; four brigades on Karetnyk's south; three in the northwestern part of the Crimea—all were to attack and destroy on November 27.7 However, on the evening of November 26, Karetnyk learned about the plot and promptly advanced to the Sym-feropiP-Perekop highway, where he soon encountered and defeated the Seventh Cavalry Division and proceeded toward Dzhuma-Ablam. Although the other divisions pursued him they failed to halt his advance.

On the night of November 27 Karetnyk arrived at Armians'kyi Bazar, where he divided his troops into two groups, sending one across the Syvash Lagoon, and the other to Perekop, which was held by the First Red Sharpshooters Division. The second group learned the enemy password and passed through their lines at night.8 On the morning of November 28 both groups united at Strohanivka, north of Perekop. In two days Karetnyk had advanced 130 kilometers. On November 30 a cavalry regiment barred his advance, but he passed it by and attacked and captured a regiment at Tymoshivka. However, the other regiments and two brigades of the Fourth Cavalry Division rescued the prisoners and forced Karetnyk to retreat. Meanwhile, large forces had been concentrated in the area of Karetnyk's advance and on December 1 the Red troops attacked Karetnyk near Fedorivka, north of Melitopil', where half of his troops were destroyed. Karetnyk and his staff were captured and executed there. The troop train and all machine guns and rifles were lost. The other half, in loose formations, penetrated the Red lines. Not all, however, managed to get away: some were killed, about 200 were captured, and Marchenko's cavalry detachment escaped with only 250 of 1,50D men.9

Simultaneously the Red Army command had decided to destroy Makhno in Huliai-Pole and its environs. This task was assigned to the Melitopil' group that on November 25 completed a double encirclement of Makhno's forces.10 On November 26, prior to attacking Huliai-Pole, the 126th Brigade, a cavalry regiment, and an armored car unit surrounded Makhno's Third Regiment at Mala Tokmachka, while the Boguchar Brigade seized the Second Regiment at Voskresenka. However, on the evening of November 26—27, a few hours before the Red troops were to attack Huliai-Pole, Makhno learned about the plot and with his bodyguard of about two hundred cavalrymen, attacked the enemy and routed them. From there he moved to Novo-Uspenivka. On his way he encountered a cavalry regiment, which hastily retreated, and an International Cavalry Brigade. He avoided heavy engagement and slipped away at night.

Instead of pursuing Makhno, the brigade proceeded to Huliai-Pole as ordered, but after reaching the town, the commander failed to notify the other units in the vicinity. Consequently on the morning of November 27 a Red unit attacked Huliai-Pole and fighting ensued for the entire day. Meantime the Second Cavalry Corps took up pursuit of Makhno, forcing him to retreat to Rozivka and the Starodubivka area. During this week of campaigns Makhno not only managed to escape from the enemy's encirclement, but destroyed some Bolshevik units, including a cavalry regiment, and captured two Bolshevik batteries. Moreover, he organized a number of new detachments from independent partisan groups and Red troops who left their units, all of which increased his army to 2,500 including 1,000 cavalry.

After this failure, the Red command decided to surround Makhno with more troops in a larger area between the Dnieper and the Sea of Azov. Moreover, to prevent possible cooperation between the Red troops and the Makhno partisans, they used international units, Russian troops from the trans-Volga region, and Kirghizians.12 In addition, on December 6, they decided to replace the Melitopil' group with the augmented Fourth Army. This force formed a Melitopil'—Berdians'k— Huliai-Pole western front line. Simultaneously a northern group was established that formed a Pokrovs'ke—Velyka Mykhaihvka—Bahatyr front line. The Second Cavalry Corps operated against Makhno from the east.13

As the Red command concentrated its forces against Makhno, his units were in the vicinity of a Greek town, Staryi Kermenchyk, in Mariupil' district. On December 7 Marchenko's cavalry detachment arrived at Kermenchyk. Marchenko reported to Makhno: "I have the honour of announcing the return of the Crimean Army. . . . Yes, brothers . . . now, at last, we know what the Communists are." Some time later Makhno declared in the same vein:

In this difficult and responsible revolutionary position the Makhno movement made one great mistake: alliance with the Bolsheviks against a common enemy, Wrangel and the Entente. In the period of this alliance that was morally right and of practical value for the revolution, the Makhno movement mistook the Bolshevik revolutionism and failed to secure itself in advance against betrayal. The Bolsheviks and their experts treacherously circumvented it and, although with difficulty, for the time being defeated [us] .15

Later, Volin, who in the Cheka prison in Moscow told the chief of the operations section of the Cheka that the Bolshevik action against Makhno was treacherous, received this answer:

Ah, you call it treacherous? That only demonstrates your ineradicable na'ivete. As for us Bolsheviks, we see it as a proof that we learned much since the beginning of the Revolution and have now become really skilful statesmen. This time we did not let ourselves be victimized. When we needed Makhno, we took advantage of him, and when we had no further need of his services, and he began to be something of a nuisance, we got rid of him completely.16

As the Bolsheviks were closing the circle, Makhno, instead of breaking through the line as the Bolsheviks expected, by a skillful maneuver advanced toward the Sea of Azov. On December 12 Makhno attacked Berdians'k, destroyed its garrison, a cavalry brigade of the Second Don Division, the Cheka, and Communists. Also he captured war material, including three guns.17 Again the Red Troops surrounded Makhno and scheduled an attack on December 15. However, on the evening of December 14 Makhno advanced north and made a surprise attack on the 126th Brigade in the early morning; after four hours, he defeated it at Andriivka. Simultaneously other Makhno units fought the Kharkiv Brigade of the Elite Troops, units of the 124th Brigade, and the Ninth Cavalry Division. According to Makhno, in the battle at Andriivka he imprisoned the entire Forty-Second Division and half of the Fortieth Division thus capturing over eight thousand prisoners, of whom a large number volunteered to join him. The same night Makhno released his prisoners, divided his troops into small groups, and slipped through the enemy lines. Early the next morning he routed a cavalry regiment and two brigades at Popivka, and several miles away, at Kinski-Rozdory, Makhno captured their supply base.

A Bolshevik author asks:

How did it happen, how could it happen, when, in order to catch Makhno, an entire army was brought into action? Very simple. At this time our command failed to take into account the speed of Makhno's advance, lost track [of him] for one day, and was very skeptical about the likelihood of Makhno's attack on Berdians'k because it was indeed already enclosed, as if in a sack. However, by his audacity and speed Makhno not only defeated Berdians'k and slipped out of the sack, but also escaped from the circle of our troops before they took up their positions for putting their plan into action.20

That night when Makhno left Andriivka, units of the Forty-Second Division and a composite division occupied the town. Later the Second Cavalry Corps attacked the town, creating panic and confusion in both groups. Meanwhile Makhno advanced northwest toward Nikopil', crossing the frozen Dnieper to the Right Bank and bypassing the First Cavalry Army sent from Katerynoslav against him. From there he moved north; having passed Katerynoslav he again crossed the Dnieper and advanced through the Poltava province to Biriuch, Voronezh province. Then he turned west and by way of Kupianka, Lyman, and Bakhmut was by the end of January 1921 back at Huliai-Pole. This long raid was made at such speed that the Red troops pursuing Makhno frequently lost touch with him. Moreover, the presence of other partisan groups on the Left Bank further confused the Bolshevik command and made the pursuit of Makhno yet more difficult. Thus the Bolsheviks failed to surround and destroy Makhno both at Huliai-Pole and at Staryi Kermenchyk. Later a Bolshevik author regretfully declared that the plan "to finish Makhno at one stroke failed."

After the attack on Huliai-Pole the partisans found undated leaflets on the captured Bolshevik prisoners, issued by the political section of the Fourth Army, entitled Forward against Makhno! and Death to Makhno! They admitted they had received them on November 15—16. These leaflets accused Makhno of violating the agreement, of having refused to go to the Caucasian front, and of having planned an uprising against the Bolshevik regime. At the same time that Karetnyk was attacked in the Crimea and Makhno at Huliai-Pole, the Bolsheviks, in a concerted series of moves, arrested all the known anarchists in Ukraine under their control. The entire Makhno delegation in Kharkiv was seized and sent to Moscow, where they were executed in 1921. All anarchist organizations and presses were destroyed.22

During the 1920—21 winter campaign, to assure a victory over Makhno, the Red Army command employed the device of mass encirclement. This tactic, however, proved ineffective, for they moved aimlessly without close coordination or adequate information, among a hostile population. According to Robert P. Eideman, the commander of the Red troops pursuing Makhno: "The struggle against Makhno at this period was of an extremely unsystematic, almost chaotic, character. Units were advancing, marching as if blind.' According to a Bolshevik officer: "After the end of the Crimean campaign our command selected very large forces to destroy Makhno, but the result turned out to be insignificant. Makhno slipped away, kept his army almost intact, made deep raids throughout Ukraine."24 In contrast to the Red Army, the Makhno troops maneuvered skillfully and swiftly, violently attacking the enemy when and where he was least expected. Eideman admitted:

After careful study of Makhno's routes of advance, it appeared that his advance was not dominated by such chaotic freedom of action as it seemed to us during the first period of the struggle. The basic advantages of a partisan are his speed of movement combined with a constant change of horses (slogan: each village has a horse depot); familiarity with the countryside and hence advantage in battle; an intelligence system and perfect reconnaisance that was based on the sympathy of the population. [However], all that taken together limits the partisans' freedom of action and binds them to certain areas. [Moreover], Makhno never burdened himself with unnecessary supply trains; the wounded were left to the care of the sympathetic population, and superfluous arms and cartridges were hidden in certain spots and areas.25

The support of the population was a significant advantage to Makhno, for they supplied the partisans with needed material, including horses and food, while the Red troops operated among a foreign and hostile people. Moreover, they not only "met Red Army detachments maliciously, refusing to give anything, [but they also] gave no answers to questions; when there were answers, then [they were] extremely vague and confusing."26 In contrast to the Bolsheviks, Makhno partisans received detailed, accurate information from the population at all times. A Bolshevik officer complained that Makhno's informers were everywhere and knew about the movement of the Red troops:

All the region of Katerynoslav, Synel'nikove, Hryshyne, Dolia, Volnovakha, Mariupil', Berdians'k, Melitopil' was full of bandit groups of different sizes and different kinds. Spies and informers of the Makhno partisans were in each village, in each grange, roamed all the time and everywhere, appearing as beggars, Red Army men seeking their units, workers from mines exchanging coal for bread, seemingly repentant deserters, or even former Communists, injured women, widows, and orphans looking for "shelter and justice, and others." This is why the staff of Makhno men was always provided with accurate, verified, and timely information.27

With great determination Makhno continued to fight the pursuing Red troops. His numerous victories gave him a large supply of arms and ammunition, and his army more than doubled. At the turn of 1920, it consisted of ten to fifteen thousand men. Eideman admitted that:

The problem of this prolonged campaign lies not only in general conditions (political, weakness of the Soviet apparatus in Ukraine, especially the village, and others), but in the army itself, and above all, in its lack of knowledge in fighting an adversary who was using partisan tactics. . . . brought to perfection by Makhno. All of these were new to most of the commanders; it required experience on the battlefield itself, and sometimes there was a high cost for the lesson.29

The growing strength of the Makhno army and its successes caused serious concern in the Bolshevik regime, so it was decided to increase the number of troops opposing Makhno. Before long he was being opposed by several divisions of infantry and cavalry, but by skillful maneuvers he succeeded in breaking through the enemy lines and attacking their rear. Still, the situation was growing worse as the number of Red troops was increasing. Makhno learned from captured Red officers that the command was planning to surround his army with four army corps, two cavalry, and two mixed, and that several divisions were coming soon. Similar information was supplied by peasants, and it also agreed with Makhno's own observations and conclusions.30

In view of the enormous mass of Red troops assembled in the region, it became apparent that the defeat of two or three Red divisions was of no importance. Makhno's previous illusions that by winning some victories he would force the Red troops to retreat from his region soon evaporated. The question was no longer one of achieving victory over the Red troops, but of escaping complete annihilation. In addition, the Bolshevik command began to study the areas where people were sympathetic to Makhno, his supply centers, and his moves. Gradually it began to understand that their tactics of fighting Makhno were wrong because, as one Bolshevik officer pointed out,

this "small war" requires different organization, different training of troops, from the war against Wrangel or, let us say, against the White Poles. Our units maintained a cumbersome, burdensome rear; hence, we acted slowly, heavily, while Makhno, on the other hand, [used] speed and bold maneuver. We have not considered the environment that nourishes the criminal bands. They have their bases, that is, certain segments of the population, a flexible structure, stand behind them.31

Consequently the Red command worked out new plans to fight Makhno by stationing whole regiments, primarily cavalry, in the occupied villages to terrorize the peasants and prevent them from supporting Makhno. The movement of multitudes of Red Army troops through the countryside created difficulties and did great damage to the population. Also the Cheka punitive units were constantly trailing the partisans, executing Makhno's sympathizers and the partisans' families.32 According to Eideman:

Our punitive policy directed against the bandits among the "kulaks" and the "atamans" themselves, assisted by a general amnesty for common criminals, brought about a decay in Makhno's band [and] undermined the confidence of his own subjects.33
To pursue Makhno more effectively, the Red Command improved the communication system and established an intelligence service to watch and inform Red units and local authorities about his movements.

In view of the Bolsheviks' enormous numerical superiority the Revolutionary Military Council agreed there was no prospect of holding the southern region. Consequently Makhno began to expand his territory of movement, covering all Ukraine, and even beyond its borders to the Don, Volga, Kuban, and Kursk-Saratov regions. As a result, the Bolsheviks began to apply new tactics in fighting Makhno, and Frunze was placed in charge of Eideman's operations. The strategy was

a continuous pursuit of Makhno without respite. Formation of flexible, specially designed mobile units, and armored car detachments. Denial of partisan access to the areas sympathetic to them. Broad propaganda work among the population to explain the measures taken by the Bolshevik authorities in the village to win all the layers of poor and middle peasants to their side.34

Makhno was contantly surrounded by a network of Red troops and pursued by small detachments, especially by cavalry and armored car units.35 All his movements either along or across railroad lines were watched and harassed by armored trains. Moreover, the partisans were barred from the main roads and they had to move across the fields and roadless steppes. During the winter and most of the spring such routes were covered with snow, ice, and mud. Although Makhno was thus able to avoid encounters with large Red units, the conditions necessitated abandoning all his artillery and certain supplies. Makhno had to divide his army into small detachments to facilitate crossing enemy lines, after which they would reassemble in an agreed place. During these movements the partisans destroyed railroad lines, blew up trains and bridges, and seized military supply stores. In spite of the difficult conditions Makhno was able to attract some Red Army soldiers and even whole units to his side. When the partisans were fighting Budenny's Fourth Cavalry Division, their First Brigade, commanded by Maslak, joined Makhno.37

In early spring the partisans were chased back and forth across southern Ukraine. In mid-March a Makhno detachment of 1,500 cavalry and two regiments of infantry was attacked by large Red units, but Makhno counterattacked, capturing many prisoners and war material. Two days later, however, he was attacked again by fresh Bolshevik troops. During a counterattack Makhno was badly wounded and the partisans, assuming he was killed, lost spirit and retreated. He lost much blood and was unconscious for one day, subsequently retiring with a small unit to safety, but on March 16, the Ninth Cavalry Division came upon the unit and pursued it for thirteen hours over 180 versts. Although the next day Makhno eluded his pursuers, changing horses at Slobidka, on the shore of the Azov Sea, soon he was attacked again. Near Starodubky, in the Mariupil' district, the unit undertook delaying action against the Red troops with heavy machine-gun fire.

According to Makhno:

Five of my machine-gun men surrounded me, bidding me farewell and saying: "Bat'ko, you are needed by our peasant organization. This cause is dear to us. We will die now, but by our death we will save you and all who are faithful to you and guard you; do not forget to convey this to our parents." Someone kissed me, and then I saw none of them around me. ... I heard only the rattle of machine guns and the detonation of grenades; these were the machine-gun men blocking the way of the Bolsheviks.39

Although the entire force died, Makhno escaped in a peasant cart. After his recovery Makhno assembled about two thousand men, mostly cavalrymen, in Kobeliaky district, Poltava province, and advanced against the Bolshevik headquarters at Kharkiv. His troops, however, encountered several divisions of cavalry and infantry and over sixty armored cars. During the ensuing weeks of combat in the area, Makhno's troops suffered many losses, including a few commanders. Makhno retreated to the south and ran into Budenny, whose Nineteenth Cavalry Division was advancing from Katerynoslav province toward the Don on May 18 to put down a peasant uprising. Budenny had ordered his sixteen armored cars to advance along the main road toward Novo-hryhoriivka while he and part of the division moved across the fields. Budenny arrived before the cars, was overtaken by Makhno, and the following battle became a nightmare. Budcnny's unit consisted of Russians, including Siberians, who came to Ukraine unfamiliar with the situation and the Makhno movement. They had been assured the Makhno partisans were common bandits and it was a point of honor not to retreat before bandits. Subsequently many of Budenny's soldiers deserted and victorious Makhno formed a combat unit from the Siberians, under the command of Glazunov, that was sent to Siberia to fight the Bolsheviks.41

On another occasion Budenny's unit ran into a small detachment of Makhno men. An eyewitness described the reaction of the Makhno men:

They had evidently not seen us and were taken by surprise. . . . We prepared to pursue them—we were sure they'd turn and flee—we outnumbered them five to one. Well, before we knew it, they had galloped straight into us, slashing right and left with their sabres and shouting "Liberty or death." Their attack was so unexpected, so incredibly reckless, that our men became panicky. We fled.42

The unequal fighting continued during the summer. The Bolsheviks began to use smaller, more flexible Red units and armored cars in fighting Makhno. Meanwhile, through combat losses, hardship, and sickness, the number of Makhno partisans was diminishing and they were cut off from their main sources of recruits and supplies. The Ukrainian peasants were tired of the endless terror caused by the successive occupation of village after village by the Red troops and the Cheka. The continuous fighting and requisitions were leaving the peasants with little food and horses for the partisans. They could not live in a state of permanent revolution. Moreover, there was extreme drought and consequently a bad harvest in Ukraine, especially in the region of the Makhno movement. Some moved to the region of Kuban, Tsaritsyn, and Saratov; others toward Kyiv and Chernihiv; while Makhno moved to the Volga and back across the Don.44 Finally, the impact of economic and other conditions in Russia and the occupied lands, and the Kronstadt uprising at the beginning of March, forced Lenin to find a way out of the chaotic situation that War Communism brought about. Consequently, on March 8, a compromise economic system, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was inaugurated that annulled the hated requisitions. This measure reconciled or pacified some of the revolution-weary peasants.

In the light of these conditions and of the severity of Makhno's wounds, it was decided that Makhno would go abroad for medical treatment. On August 13, Makhno, accompanied by a cavalry unit consisting of one hundred men and several commanders including Kozhyn, Petrenko, and Zabud'ko, who also were wounded, set out west toward the Dnieper. Three days later they crossed the Dnieper between Kremenchuk and Orlyk.45 When Makhno turned westward, Vasilii K. Bliukher, who arrived in the Makhno region in the summer of 1921 to study his campaign movements,46 learned about the direction of Makhno's movement from the peasants. He concluded that Makhno was moving toward Bessarabia and wired Frunze in Kharkiv about his assumption concerning Makhno's plan. Bliukher's aide expressed his optimism: "Now Makhno will not escape from Ukraine; he will not be allowed to slip through into Bessarabia."47

On August 19, Makhno came upon the Seventh Cavalry Division camping along the Inhulets River, about 12 versts from Bobrynets. Since he was seen by Red troops, Makhno felt there was no retreat; he attacked the division's machine-gun unit stationed in a nearby village, overwhelming it and capturing sixteen machine guns. Later Makhno attacked the other troops, including the Thirty-Eighth Regiment, cut a passage through and rode 110 versts, pursued by the enemy without respite. In the course of the struggle Makhno lost seventeen brave friends and on August 22 was again severely wounded. Four days later the unit was again attacked and two commanders, Petrenko and Ivaniuk, were killed. Subsequently Makhno changed the course of the advance and on August 28 he and his remaining eighty-three followers crossed the Dniester, near IAmpil into Romania.


1. Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, p. 119.

2. Bechhofer, In Denikin's Russia, p. 180.

3. M. Rybakov, "Deistviia letuchego korpusa tov. Nestorovicha," in Sbornik trudov Voenno-nauchnogo obshchestva pri Voennoi akademii, 4 (1923): 110.

4. Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, p. 172; see also Danilov, "Vospominaniia," 16:163.

5. Frunze, Sobranie sochinenii, 1: 176.

6. Voline, Unknown Revolution, p. 202.

7. Efimov, "Deistviia protiv Makhno," pp. 212—13; Men'ehukov, Istoricheskii ocherk boev, pp. 182—83.

8. P. A. Pavlov, "Voennye khitrosti," p. 13.

9. Men'ehukov, Istoricheskii ocherk boev, pp. 182—84; Nikulin, "Gibel' Makhnovshchiny," p. 192; Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, p. 159; Lebed', Itogi i uroki trekh, p. 40; Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, pp. 221—22, 188—89; Efimov, "Deistviia protiv Makhno," pp. 216—17; Berkman, "Nestor Makhno," p. 26; Semanov, "Makhnovshchina i ee krakh," p. 58; Omelianovych-Pavlenko, Zymovyipokhid, 2:28.

10. The first circle consisted of the Forty-Second Division's 125th Brigade, the 126th Brigade, the 124th Brigade, the Boguchar Separate Sharpshooter's Brigade, the International Separate Cavalry Brigade, and the Third Reserve Cavalry Brigade. The reserve circle included the Trans-Volga Cavalry Brigade, two sharpshooter regiments of the internal security troops, the Second Cavalry Corps, the First Cavalry Army, the Fourth Cavalry Division, and the Composite Division of Elite troops (Efimov, "Deistviia protiv Makhno," p. 213; Men'ehukov, Istoricheskii ocherk boev, p. 184).

11. Men'ehukov, Istoricheskii ocherk boev, pp. 184—86; Efimov, "Deistviia protiv Makhno," pp. 215, 217; Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, p. 189; Voline, Unknown Revolution, p. 206.

12. Dubrovs'kyi, Bat'ko Nestor Makhno, p. 18.

13. Men'ehukov, Istoricheskii ocherk boev, p. 186; Efimov, "Deistviia protiv Makhno," p. 217.

14. Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, p. 189; see also Voline, Unknown Revolution, p. 204; Omelianovych-Pavlenko, Zymovyi pokhid, 2: 28.

15. Makhno, "K 10-oi godovshchine," p. 7. Some twenty years later one of the best of European diplomats and statesmen, Eduard Benes, president of the Czechoslovak Republic, echoed Makhno's disappointment. In 1947, while writing his memoirs, Benes asked himself about his treaty with the Bolsheviks of December 1943: Was I right or wrong?" At the end of August 1948, a few days before he died, he answered the question himself: "My greatest mistake was that I refused to believe to the very last that even Stalin lied to me cynically, both in 1935 and later, and that his assurances to me and to Masaryk were an intentional deceit" (E. Taborsky, "Benes and Stalin, Moscow, 1943 and 1945," Journal of Central European Affairs 13, no. 2 [1953] : 162n).

16. Voline, Unknown Revolution, pp. 204—5.

17. Esaulov, "Nalet Makhno na Berdians'k," LR, no. 3 (1921), pp. 84 ff.; Men'chukov, Istoricheskii ocherk boev, pp. 186—87; Efimov, "Deistviia protiv Makhno," p. 218;Danilov, "Vospominaniia," 16:176.

18. Efimov, "Deistviia protiv Makhno," pp. 218—19; Danilov, "Vospominaniia," 16:176; Men'chukov, Istoricheskii ocherk boev, p. 187; Makhno, Makhnovshchina, p. 37; Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, pp. 189—90; Voline, Unknown Revolution, p. 206. According to a Bolshevik source Makhno released 1,200 prisoners (Men'chukov, Istoricheskii ocherk boev, p. 187).

19. Makhno, Makhnovshchina, p. 37; Efimov, "Deistviia protiv Makhno," p. 219; Men'chukov, Istoricheskii ocherk boev, p. 187.

20. Esaulov, "Nalet Makhno na Berdians'k," p. 83.

21. Danilov, "Vospominaniia," 16:176; Men'chukov,Istoricheskii ocherk boev, p. 187; Efimov, "Deistviia protiv Makhno," pp. 219—20; Nikulin, "Gibel' makhnov-shchiny," p. 192.

22. Voline, Unknown Revolution, p. 199; Nomad, "Epic of Nestor Makhno," no. 7, p. 416; Kubanin, Makhnovshchina, p. 213; Semanov, "Makhnovshchina i ee krakh," p. 58; Voline, Nineteen-seventeen, pp. 157—58; Gorelik, Goneniia na anarkhizm, p. 32; lAkovlev, "Makhnovshchina i anarkhizm," Krasnia nov, no. 2 (1921), p. 255; G. Maksimov, "Vsevolod Mikhailovich Eikhenbaum (Volin)," DT-P, no. 16 (1946), p. 17; Emma Goldman, My Further Disillusionment in Russia, p. 80.

23. Eideman, "Piataia godovshchina odnogo uroka," p. 36; see also Esbakh, "Poslednie dni makhnovshchiny na Ukraine," no. 12, p. 41.

24. Komandarm Uborevich, p. 82.

25. Eideman, "Piataia godovshchina odnogo uroka," p. 37.

26. Rybakov, "Deistviia letuchego korpusa tov," p. 111.

27. M. Rybakov, "Makhnoskie operatsii v 1920 g.," KA, no. 12 (March 1922), pp. 12—13, as quoted in Dubrovs'kyi,Bat'feo Nestor Makhno, p. 18; Kapustians'kyi, "Makhno i makhnovshchyna," p. 2; see also Esbakh, "Poslednie dni makhnovshchiny na Ukraine," pp. 41—42.

28. Premysler, "Razgrom banditizma na Ukraine, 1921 g.," pp. 44; N. P-pa, "Protybol'shevyts'ki povstannia na Ukraini v 1921 r.," no. 6, p. 22. According to Esbakh, at the beginning of 1921 the Makhno army consisted of 5,000 to 6,000 men (Esbakh, "Poslednie dni makhnovshchiny na Ukraine," p. 40).

29. Eideman, "Piataia godovshchina odnogo uroka," pp. 36—37.

30. Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, pp. 190—91; Semanov, "Makhnovshchina i ee krakh," p. 58.

31. Komandarm Uborevich, p. 82.

32. Esbakh, "Poslednie dni makhnovshchiny na Ukraine," p. 42; Men'chukov, Istoricheskii ocherk boev, p. 189; Varetskii, "Marshal V. K. Bliukher," p. 258; Makhno, Makhnovshchina, pp. 37—39.

33. Eideman, "Piataia godovshchina odnogo uroka," p. 38.

34. Esbakh, "Poslednie dni makhnovshchiny na Ukraine," p. 42; see also Sergeev, "Poltavaskaia operatsiia protiv Makhno," pp. 124—25; Szpinger, Z pierwsza konna, p. 178.

35. Eideman, "Piataia godovshchina odnogo uroka," p. 35.

36. Footman, "Nestor Makhno," p. 125; M. P. Belyi, R. A. Kuznetsova, and K. F. Chumak, comps., Vospominaniia o G. I. Kotovskom, p. 32.

37. Premysler, "Razgrom banditizma na Ukraine, 1921 g.," p. 44; Danilov, "Vospominaniia," 16:175; Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, p. 194.

38. Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, pp. 196—97. This and subsequent information referring to Arshinov's book Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia is taken from a letter that Makhno wrote to Arshinov from abroad and that was later incorporated into the latter's book.

39. Ibid., p. 197.

40. Premysler, "Razgrom banditizma na Ukraine, 1921 g.," p. 44; Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, pp. 197—98.

41. Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, pp. 198—99.

42. Berkman, "Nestor Makhno," pp. 5—6.

43. Eideman, "Piataia godovshchina odnogo uroka," p. 35;Esbakh, "Poslednie dni makhnovshchiny na Ukraine," pp. 44—45.

44. Omelianovych-Pavlenko, Zymovyi pokhid, 2:27; Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, p. 199; Semanov, "Makhnovshchina i ee krakh," p. 196.

45. Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, pp. 199—200; Nikulin, "Gibel' makhnoshchiny," p. 196.

46. Varetskii, "Marshall V. K. Bliukher," p. 254.

47. Ibid., p. 259.

48. Arshinov, Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia, p. 200; Semanov, "Makhnovshchina i ee krakh," p. 60; Nikulin, "Gibel' makhnovshchiny," p. 197; Rudnev, Makhnovshchina, p. 95; Premysler, "Razgrom banditizma na Ukraine, 1921 g.," p. 44; Woodcock, Anarkhism, p. 424; Footman, "Nestor Makhno," p. 126; Esbakh, "Poslednie dni makhnovshchiny n Ukraine," p. 48; R. S., "Platone Makhno, il libe-ratore dell'ukraina, assassinato?," L'Avvenire Anarchico (Pisa), September 23,1921.