TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE
PREFACE
CHAPTER
- I.MEANING
- § 1. The three tasks of epistemology
- § 2. Language
- § 3. The three predicates of propositions
- § 4. The language of chess as an example, and the two
principles of the truth theory of meaning
- § 5. Extension of the physical theory of truth to observation propositions of ordinary language
- § 6. Extension of the truth theory of meaning to observation propositions of ordinary language
- § 7. The meaning of indirect propositions, and the two principles of the probability theory of meaning
- § 8. Discussion of the verifiability theory of meaning
- II. IMPRESSIONS AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD
- § 9. The problem of absolute verifiability of observation propositions
- § 10. Impressions and the problem of existence
- § 11. The existence of ahstracta
- § 12. The positivistic construction of the world
- § 13. Reduction and projection
- § 14. A cubical world as a model of inferences to unobservable things
- § 15. Projection as the relation between physical things and impressions
- § 16. An egocentric language
- § 17. Positivism and realism as a problem of language
- § 18. The functional conception of meaning
- III. AN INQUIRY CONCERNING IMPRESSIONS
- § 19. Do we observe impressions?
- § 20. The weight of impression propositions
- § 21. Further reduction of basic statements
- § 22. Weight as the sole predicate of propositions
- IV. THE PROJECTIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORLD ON THE CONCRETA BASIS
- § 23. The grammar of the word "existence"
- § 24. The different kinds of existence
- § 25. The projective construction of the world
- § 26. Psychology
- § 27. The so-called incomparability of the psychical experiences of different persons
- § 28. What is the ego?
- § 29. The four bases of epistemological construction
- § 30. The system of weights co-ordinated to the construction of the world
- § 31. The transition from immediately observed things to reports
- V. PROBABILITY AND INDUCTION
- § 32. The two forms of the concept of probability
- § 33 Disparity conception or identity conception
- § 34. The concept of weight
- § 35. Probability logic
- § 36. The two ways of transforming probability logic into
two valued logic
- § 37. The aprioristic and the formalistic conception of logic
- § 38 The problem of induction
- § 39. The justification of the principle of induction
- § 40. Two objections against our justification of induction
- § 41. Concatenated inductions
- § 42. The two kinds of simplicity
- § 43. The probability structure of knowledge
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