Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (1900).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface to the Second Edition (1937)
Preface to the First Edition (1900)

CHAPTER I
LEIBNIZ'S PREMISSES.
  1. Reasons why Leibniz never wrote a magnum opus
  2. Functions of the commentator on Leibniz
  3. Two types of inconsistency in his philosophy
  4. His premisses
  5. Course of the present work
  6. Influences which formed Leibniz's opinions
CHAPTER II
NECESSARY PROPOSITIONS AND THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION.
  1. Leibniz's philosophy begins with an analysis of propositions
  2. Outline of Leibniz's logical argument
  3. Questions raised by this argument
  4. Are all propositions reducible to the subject-predicate form?
  5. Analytic and synthetic propositions
  6. Necessity and contingency
CHAPTER III
CONTINGENT PROPOSITIONS AND THE LAW OF SUFFICIENT REASON.
  1. The range of contingent judgments in Leibniz
  2. Meaning of the principle of sufficient reason
  3. Its relation to the law of contradiction
CHAPTER IV
THE CONCEPTION OF SUBSTANCE.
  1. Cartesian and Spinozistic views on substance
  2. The meaning of substance in Leibniz
  3. The meaning of activity
  4. Connection between activity and sufficient reason
  5. The states of one substance form one causal series
  6. How does a substance differ from the sum of its predicates?
  7. Relation of time to Leibniz's notion of substance
CHAPTER V
THE IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES AND THE LAW OF CONTINUITY, POSSIBILITY AND COMPOSSIBILITY.
  1. Meaning of the Identity of Indiscernibles
  2. The principle necessary, but not a premiss of Leibniz's philosophy
  3. Is Leibniz's proof of the principle valid?
  4. Every substance has an infinite number of predicates. Connection of this with contingency and with the identity of indiscernibles
  5. The Law of Continuity: three forms of continuity maintained by Leibniz
  6. Grounds of the Law of Continuity
  7. Possibility and compossibility
  8. Common properties of all possible worlds
  9. The three kinds of necessity
CHAPTER VI
WHY DID LEIBNIZ BELIEVE IN AN EXTERNAL WORLD?
  1. Leibniz accepted matter as a datum
  2. The existence of the external world has only "moral certainty"
CHAPTER VII
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATTER: (a) AS THE OUTCOhlE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF DYNAMICS.
  1. The general trustworthiness of perception is a premiss of Leibniz's philosophy
  2. Various meanings of matter and body
  3. Relation of Leibnizian and Cartesian Dynamics
  4. The essence of matter is not extension
  5. Meaning of materia prima in Leibniz's Dynamics
  6. Materia secunda
  7. The conception of force and the law of inertia
  8. Force and absolute motion
  9. Metaphysical grounds for assuming force
  10. Dynamical argument for plurality of causal series
  11. Three types of dynamical theory confused by Leibniz
  12. His grounds against extended atoms
  13. Against the vacuum
  14. And against action at a distance
  15. Force as conferring individuality
  16. Primitive and derivative force
  17. Antinomy of dynamical causation
CHAPTER VIII
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATTER (CONTINUED), (b) AS EXPLAINING CONTINUITY AND EXTENSION.
  1. There must be simple substances, since there are compounds
  2. Extension, as distinguished from space, is Leibniz's startingpoint
  3. Extension means repetition
  4. Hence the essence of a substance cannot be extension, since a substance must be a true unity
  5. Tbe three kinds of point. Substances not material
  6. Motion is phenomenal, though force is real
CHAPTER IX
THE LABYRINTH OF THE CONTINUUM.
  1. Difficulties about points
  2. Assertion of the actual infinite and denial of infinite number
  3. Continuity in one sense denied by Leibniz
  4. In number, space, and time, the whole is prior to the part
  5. Space and time, for Leibniz, purely relational
  6. Summary of the argument from the continuum to monads
  7. Since aggregates are phenomenal, there is not really a number of monads
  8. Difficulties of this view
CHAPTER X
THE THEORY OF SPACE AND TIME AND ITS RELATION TO MONADISM.
  1. Reasons why a philosophy of substance must deny the reality of space
  2. Leibniz's arguments against the reality of space
  3. Leibniz's theory of position
  4. The relation of monads to space a fundamental difficulty of monadism
  5. Leibniz's early views on this subject
  6. His middle views
  7. His later views
  8. Time and change
  9. Monadisms take an unsymmetrical view of the relations of space and of time to things
  10. Leibniz held confusedly to an objective counterpart of space and time
CEAPTER XI
THE NATURE OF MONADS IN GENERAL.
  1. Perception
  2. Appetition
  3. Perception not due to action of the perceived on the percipient
  4. Lotze's criticism of this view
  5. The pre-established harmony
CHAPTER XII
SOUL AND BODY.
  1. Relations of monads to be henceforth considered
  2. Cartesian and Spinozistic views of the relations of Soul and Body
  3. Outline of Leibniz's view
  4. The three classes of monads
  5. Activity and passivity
  6. Perfection and clearness of perception
  7. Materia prima as an element in each monad
  8. Materia prima the source of finitude, plurality, and matter
  9. And of the interconnection of monads
  10. Two theories of soul and body in Leibniz
  11. First theory
  12. Second theory
  13. The vinculum substantiale
  14. The second theory to be rejected
  15. Preformation
CHAPTER XIII
CONFUSED AND UNCONSCIOUS PERCEPTION.
  1. Two kinds of differences between monads
  2. Unconscious mental states
  3. Confused and minute perceptions
CHAPTER XIV
LEIBNIZ'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
  1. What theory of knowledge means
  2. Innate ideas and truths
  3. The New Essays inconsistent with Leibniz's metaphysics
  4. Difficulties as to innate ideas
  5. Distinction of sense and intellect
  6. The quality of ideas
  7. Definition
  8. The Characteristica Universalis
CHAPTER XV
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.
  1. Four proofs allowed by Leibniz
  2. The ontological argument
  3. Proof that the idea of God is possible
  4. The cosmological argument
  5. Objections to this argument
  6. The argument from the eternal truths
  7. Its weakness
  8. Relation of knowledge to truth
  9. Argument from the pre-established harmony
  10. Objections to this argument
  11. Inconsistencies resulting from Leibniz's belief in God
  12. God's goodness
CHAPTER XVI
LEIBNIZ'S ETHICS.
  1. Freedom and determinism
  2. Psychology of volition and pleasure
  3. Sin
  4. Meaning of good and evil: three kinds of each
  5. Metaphysical evil the source of the other two kinds
  6. Connection with the doctrine of analytic judgments
  7. The kingdoms of nature and of grace
APPENDIX



ABBREVIATIONS
G.Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz, herausgegeben von C. J. Gerhardt. Berlin, 1875-90.
G. M. Leibnizens mathematische Schriften, herausgegeben von C. J. Gerhardt. Halle, 1850-63.
F. de C. Refutation inedite de Spinoza par Leibniz, precedee d'un memoire par A. Foucher de Careil. Paris, 1854.
D. The Philosophical Works of Leibnitz, with notes by George Martin Duncan. New Haven, 1890.
L.Leibniz: The Monadology and other philosophical writings, translated, with introduction and notes, by Robert Latta. Oxfold, 1898.
N. E. New Essays concerning human understanding by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, together with an Appendix consisting of some of his shorter pieces, translated by Alfred Gideon Langley. New York and London, 1896.