1. Conditional properties can, of course, be occurrent properties in the sense that things may come to have them, as when a piece of iron becomes magnetized. Thus the character of being occurrent does not pick out the properties these philosophers have in mind. In between pure occurrent properties and what might be called pure conditional properties is the category of what Ryle has called "mongrel properties." i.e., "mixtures" of occurrent and conditional properties -- which he illustrates by migrating.
2. The most perspicuous account of the analysis is to be found in "Abstract Entities," The Review of Metaphysics, 16 (1963) [reprinted in Philosophical Perspectives (Springfield, IL: Charles Thomas, 1968; also Reseda, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1976)]. A systematic elaboration and defense of the analysis is to be found in Naturalism and Ontology (Reseda, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1980).
3. For an account of these quoting devices which takes into account the distinction between quoting as forming mere designations of sign designs and quoting as forming descriptions of sign designs qua having specific semantical roles, see "Meaning as Functional Classification" in Synthese, 27 (1974); also chap. 4 of Naturalism and Ontology, cited in n2, above.
4. In "Time and the World Order" in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 3, Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven and Grover Maxwell, eds. (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1962); and, more recently, in "Metaphysics and the Concept of a Person," in The Logical Way of Doing Things, Karel Lambert, ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1969) [reprinted as chap. 11 in Essays in Philosophy and its History (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel, 1974).
5. "Time and the World Order," cited in n4, above. The reference is to p. 552.
6. Of course, attempts have been made to construe sentences as singular terms, and for certain purposes no great damage is done. But murder will out, and though I shall not argue the point here, when all things are considered, the attempt breaks down. For relevant reflections on predications and singular terms, see Naturalism and Ontology, cited in n2, above, chap. 3.
7. For an account of discourse about events which developed out of these considerations, see Jack Norman, Events (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Pittsburgh, 1974, available on microfilm).
8. To strip down the exposition to the essentials, I have so far left out of account such modifiers as 'in London', 'in 1979', etc. I will touch on 'in London' in a later section. I have already commented (paragraph 22, above) on the uniqueness expressed by 'the'.
9. C. D. Broad, Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, vol I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933). The reference is to pp. 141-66.
11. After all we can countenance white snow in the extra-conceptual order, without countenancing (the state of affairs) that snow is white.
12. I say "at first sight," because, when the larger story is in, expanses of color in the environment turn out to be miscategorized states of perceivers. This, however, is part of the burden of the third and concluding lecture.
13. Should we not write 'everything' -- which, of course, is not the same as 'every thing'. For a discussion of this point see Naturalism and Ontology, cited in n2, above, chap. 1.
14. One can also ask "Is time in the world?" I shall not attempt a full answer to this question on the present occasion. Readers who are interested will find an earlier accounting in "Time and the World Order" referred to in paragraph 27, above. For present purposes they can construe time as the continuum of real numbers qua correlated with overlapping processes by virtue of metrical procedures. Our present problem concerns the ontology of this "overlapping."
15. Of course, we can now catch up time itself into the whirl of process. But, after all, is not time as a moving image of eternity? And, to pick up the theme of the previous note, the assignment of numbers to process is itself process.
16. It is, of course, a philosophical neutral fact that C#ings have a finite duration. It might, indeed, have been a law of nature that all C#ings last only one minute.
17. I have not called attention to the fact that no more than in the context of changing things are these expressions relation words. One who reflects on Whitehead's "method of extensive abstraction" should take this into account.
18. I originally developed the fundamental principles of this account m Appendix A to Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967).
19. The Philosophy of C. D. Broad, Paul A. Schilpp, ed. (Evanston, IL: Library of Living Philosophers, now published by Open Court Publishing Co., La Salle, IL).