C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, 1930 (C) PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT MOTIVES AND VOLITIONS:
(1) Reason as Motive.
Here again, after what I have said in connexion with Hume and with Kant, there is very little for me to add. It is a fact that in most human beings the belief that a certain course of action is right, whatever their criterion of rightness may be, is pro tanto a motive for doing it; and it is a fact that the belief that a certain course of action is wrong is pro tanto a motive against doing it. We are perfectly familiar with this motive and can watch its conflict with other motives. It is a further fact that, when it does conflict with other motives, we judge that it is right that it and not they should prevail. This, I take it, is what is meant by the "authority" of this motive, which moralists insist upon and which Butler contrasts with its actual psychological power. Now rightness and wrongness, as we have seen, are characteristics which can be grasped only by a rational being, since the concepts [180] of them are a priori. It follows that this kind of motive can act only on a rational being. It does not follow that it must act on every rational being, as such; unless you choose to define "rational being" in such a way as to include the property of being susceptible to this motive. With these explanations and qualifications it seems clear to me that "Reason is a motive," though I think that this is an abominably loose way of expressing the very important facts which it is meant to convey.
(2) Psychological Hedonism.
This is the doctrine that my volitions are determined wholly and solely by my pleasures and pains, present and prospective. It is thus a particular species of Psychological Egoism. It is not the only species; one might quite well be a Psychological Egoist without being a Psychological Hedonist, and, so far as I can see, T. H. Green in his Prolegomena to Ethics and Bradley in his Ethical Studies are non-hedonistic psychological egoists. It is plain that any refutation of the generic doctrine of Psychological Egoism would, ipso facto, be a refutation of its specifically hedonistic form, whilst the converse would not be true. We have already considered at some length attempted refutations of Psychological Egoism by Butler and by Hume. But Sidgwick's is probably the best discussion of the whole subject that exists. We have to deal with two questions, viz.: (2, 1) the relation or want of relation between Psychological and Ethical Hedonism, and (2, 2) the truth or falsehood of Psychological Hedonism itself.
(2, 1) Since Ethical Hedonism can take either an egoistic or a universalistic form, we must consider in turn the relation of Psychological Hedonism to (2, 11) Egoistic Ethical Hedonism, and (2, 12) Universalistic Ethical Hedonism or [181] Utilitarianism. Sidgwick discusses the first point in Book 1, Chap. IV, Sect. I of the Methods of Ethics. He discusses the second rather briefly in Book III, Chap. XIII, Sect. 5.
(2, 11) Egoistic Ethical Hedonism is the doctrine that it is my duty to aim at the greatest possible amount of happiness in my own life, and to treat all other objects as subservient to this end. Now, Sidgwick argues, it cannot be my duty to aim at anything which it would be psychologically impossible for me to aim at. So, if Psychological Hedonism implies that it is psychologically impossible for me to aim at anything but my own greatest happiness, it implies that any ethical theory which says that it is my duty to aim at any other end must be false. It would thus entail the rejection of all rival ethical theories, though not necessarily the acceptance of Egoistic Ethical Hedonism. On the other hand, it can hardly be said to be my duty to aim at my own greatest happiness unless it be psychologically possible for me to aim at something else instead. For duty seems to imply the existence of motives which may conflict with the one which it is a duty to obey. It seems to follow that Psychological Hedonism, if taken to mean that I can aim only at my own greatest happiness, is incompatible with every ethical theory, including Egoistic Ethical Hedonism. If, however, Psychological Hedonism, whilst holding that nothing can act on my will except my present and prospective pleasures and pains, admits that I may wittingly or unwittingly prefer what will give me less pleasure or more pain to what will give me more pleasure or less pain, this conclusion will not follow. Although, even in this form, it will not entail Egoistic Ethical Hedonism (for no purely psychological theory could entail any purely ethical theory), still Egoistic Ethical Hedonism might fairly [182] be regarded as the only reasonable ethical theory to hold in the circumstances.
This is the gist of Sidgwick's doctrine of the connexion or lack of connexion between the two theories. It may be remarked that, if it be valid, it would apply equally to any psychological theory which asserted that there is one and only one object which I can desire as an end. For I could be under no obligation to aim at any other end, since this would be psychologically impossible for me. And I could be under no obligation to aim at this end, since there could be no motives conflicting with my desire for it. But, although the notion of duty or obligation would have ceased to apply, the notion of right might still have application. It might be the case that the only end which I can desire is also the end which it is right or appropriate or fitting for me to desire. I should simply be in the position of God, who is assumed to be incapable by nature of desiring anything but what is right for him to desire.
Even if Psychological Hedonism be put in the extreme form that I can desire nothing but my greatest happiness on the whole, this must presumably mean that I shall always choose at any moment that course which then seems to me to involve most private happiness. This may differ from the course which would in fact involve most private happiness. Thus, even on this interpretation of Psychological Hedonism, the agent might diverge from the ideal of Egoistic Ethical Hedonism through intellectual defects, though not through succumbing to the influence of rival motives. But, on the more usual interpretation, he can also diverge from the ideal of Egoistic Ethical Hedonism through volitional and emotional defects. Though nothing can move him but the expectation of private pleasure or [183] pain, he may prefer a nearer, shorter, and intenser pleasure to a more distant, longer, and more diffused pleasure, though he recognises that the latter is greater than the former. Or he may refuse to purchase what he recognises to be a more than equivalent future pleasure at the cost of suffering a present short intense pain. In deciding whether to have a tooth stopped or not we may be moved by none but hedonistic considerations, and we may recognise that there will be a nett balance of happiness in having it stopped; and yet the prospect of immediate intense pain may prevent us from going to the dentist. Such a decision will certainly be wrong on the theory of Egoistic Ethical Hedonism, and we can say that the agent ought to have gone to the dentist if we accept this milder form of Psychological Hedonism.
(2, 12) Universalistic Ethical Hedonism is the doctrine that it is the duty of each to aim at the maximum happiness of all, and to subordinate everything else to this end. It is perfectly plain that this ethical theory is incompatible with any form of Psychological Egoism, and therefore with Psychological Hedonism. For Psychological Egoism denies that anyone can desire as an end anything but some state of himself, e.g., his own happiness or the greatest development of all his faculties. And if, as would follow, no one can desire as an end the happiness of humanity in general, this cannot be the right or fitting object of anyone's desire, nor can it be anyone's duty to aim at this end.
Yet Mill, in his Utilitarianism, professed to deduce Universalistic Hedonism from Psychological Hedonism. Mill starts by assuming that "desirable" means "desired by someone." Though this rests on a confusion which we have already noted, there is no need to insist on that fact here. [184] For Mill's argument involves another fallacy which would invalidate it even though the above premise were granted. The argument may be put as follows. If Psychological Hedonism be true, each man's happiness is desired by someone, viz., by himself. Therefore each man's happiness is desirable. But the happiness of humanity is simply the whole composed of the happinesses of each man and of nothing else. Mill concludes that the happiness of humanity is desirable. But the only legitimate conclusion from these premises is that the happiness of humanity is a whole composed of a set of parts each one of which is desirable. It does not follow from this that the happiness of humanity is itself desirable. For, on Mill's definition of "desirable", this would mean that the happiness of humanity is desired by someone. And it does not follow from the fact that every part of this whole is desired by someone that the whole itself is desired by anyone. On the contrary, it would follow from the premise that no one can desire anything but his own happiness, that no one can desire the happiness of humanity and therefore, on Mill's definition, that the happiness of humanity is not desirable.
(2, 2) Having now considered the relation of Psychological Hedonism to the two forms of Ethical Hedonism, we can deal with the question whether Psychological Hedonism be itself true. Let us begin with certain undoubted facts which must be admitted. The belief that a future experience will be pleasant is pro tanto a motive for trying to get it, and the belief that it will be painful is pro tanto a motive for trying to avoid it. Again, the felt pleasantness of a present pleasant experience is pro tanto a motive for trying to make it last, whilst the felt painfulness of a present experience is pro tanto a motive for trying to make it stop. [185] The question is whether the expected pleasantness of a future experience is the only feature in it which can make us want to get it, whether the felt pleasantness of a present experience is the only feature in it which can make us want to prolong it, whether the expected painfulness of a future experience is the only feature in it which can make us want to avoid it, and whether the felt painfulness of a present experience is the only feature in it which can make us want to get rid of it.
I must begin with one explanatory remark which is necessary if the above proposition is to be taken as a perfectly accurate statement of Psychological Hedonism. No sane Psychological Hedonist would deny that a pleasure which is believed to be longer and less intense may be preferred for its greater duration to one which is believed to be shorter and more intense. Nor would he deny that a nearer and less intense pleasure may be preferred for its greater nearness to a more intense but remoter pleasure. And this implies that duration and remoteness are in some sense factors which affect our desires as well as pleasantness and painfulness. This complication may be dealt with as follows. There are certain determinable characteristics which every event, as such, must have. Date of beginning and duration are examples. There are others which an event may or may not have. Pleasantness, colour, and so on, are examples. Let us for the present call them respectively "categorial" and "non-categorial" determinable characteristics of events. Then the accurate statement of Psychological Hedonism would be as follows. No non-categorial characteristic of a present or prospective experience can move our desires for or against it except its hedonic quality; but, granted that it has hedonic quality, the effect on our [186] desires is determined jointly by the determinate form of this and by the determinate forms of its categorial characteristics.
Now, so far as I am aware, no argument has ever been given for Psychological Hedonism except an obviously fallacious one which Mill produces in his Utilitarianism. He says there that "to desire" anything and "to find" that thing "pleasant" are just two different ways of stating the same fact. Yet he also appeals to careful introspection in support of Psychological Hedonism. Sidgwick points out that, if Mill's statement were true, there would be no more need of introspection to decide in favour of the doctrine than there is need for introspection to decide that "to be rich" and "to be wealthy" are two different expressions for the same fact. But, as he also points out, Mill is deceived by a verbal ambiguity. There is a sense of "please" in English in which the two phrases "X pleases me" and "I desire X" stand for the same fact. But the verb "to please" and the phrase "to be pleasant" are not equivalent in English. In the sense in which "X pleases me" is equivalent to "I desire X" it is not equivalent to "I find X pleasant". If I decide to be martyred rather than to live in comfort at the expense of concealing my opinions, there is a sense in which martyrdom must "please me" more than living in comfort under these conditions. But it certainly does not follow ex vi termini that I believe that martyrdom will be "more pleasant" than a comfortable life of external conformity. I do not think that "pleasantness" can be defined, or even described unambiguously by reference to its relations to desire. But I think we can give a fairly satisfactory ostensive definition of it as that characteristic which is common to the experience of smelling [187] roses, of tasting chocolate, of requited affection, and so on, and which is opposed to the characteristic which is common to the experiences of smelling sulphuretted hydrogen, of hearing a squeaky slate-pencil, of being burnt, of unrequited affection, and so on. And it is certainly not self-evident that I can desire only experiences which have the characteristic thus ostensively defined.
I think that there is no doubt that Psychological Hedonism has been rendered plausible by another confusion. The experience of having a desire fulfilled is always pro tanto and for the moment pleasant. So, whenever I desire anything, I foresee that if I get it I shall have the pleasure of fulfilled desire. It is easy to slip from this into the view that my motive for desiring X is the pleasure of fulfilled desire which I foresee that I shall enjoy if I get X. It is clear that this will not do. I have no reason to anticipate the pleasure of fulfilled desire on getting X unless I already desire X itself. It is evident then that there must be some desires which are not for the pleasures of fulfilled desire. Let us call them "primary desires", and the others "secondary". Butler has abundantly shown that there must be some primary desires. But, as Sidgwick rightly points out, he has gone to extremes in the matter which are not logically justified. The fact that there must be primary desires is quite compatible with Psychological Hedonism, since it is quite compatible with the view that all primary desires are for primary pleasures, i.e., for pleasures of taste, touch, smell, etc., as distinct from the pleasures of fulfilled desire. Still, introspection shows that this is not in fact so. The ordinary man at most times plainly desires quite directly to eat when he is hungry. In so doing he incidentally gets primary pleasures of taste [188] and the secondary pleasure of fulfilled desire. Eventually he may become a gourmand. He will then eat because he desires the pleasures of taste, and he may even make himself hungry in order to enjoy the pleasures of fulfilled desire.
There is a special form of Psychological Hedonism of which Locke is the main exponent. This holds that all desire can be reduced to the desire to remove pain or uneasiness. The one conative experience is aversion to present pain, not desire for future pleasure. The position is as follows. When I am said to desire some future state X this means that the contemplation by me of my non-possession of X is painful. I feel an aversion to this pain and try to remove it by trying to get X. Since in the case of some things the contemplation of my non-possession of them is painful, whilst in the case of others it is neutral or pleasant, the question would still have to be raised as to why there are these differences. Perhaps the theory under discussion should not be counted as a form of Psychological Hedonism unless it holds that my awareness of the absence of X is painful if and only if I believe that the possession of X would be pleasant. This is in fact Locke's view, though he adds the proviso that my uneasiness at the absence of X is not necessarily proportional to the pleasure which I believe I should get from the possession of X. We will therefore take the theory in this form.
As regards the first part of the theory Sidgwick points out that desire is not usually a painful experience, unless it be very intense and be continually frustrated. No doubt desire is an unrestful state, in the sense that it tends to make us change our present condition. It shares this characteristic with genuine pain. But the difference is profound. When I feel aversion to a present pain I simply try to get rid of it. [189] When I feel the unrest of desire for a certain object I do not simply try to get rid of the uneasiness; I try to get that particular object. I could often get rid of the feeling far more easily by diverting my attention from the object than by the tedious and uncertain process of trying to gain possession of it. As regards the second part of the theory, it seems plain on inspection that I may feel uneasiness at the absence of some contemplated object for other reasons than that I believe that the possession of it would be pleasant. I might feel uncomfortable at the fact that I am selfish, and desire to be less selfish, without for a moment believing that I should be happier if I were more unselfish.
The Psychological Hedonist, at this stage, has two more lines of defence:
It is plain that this assertion cannot be proved; and, unless there be some positive reason to accept Psychological Hedonism, there is not the faintest reason to believe it.
- He may say that we unwittingly desire things only in respect of their hedonic qualities, but that we deceive ourselves and think that we desire some things directly or in respect of other qualities.
The case of the miser who has come by association to desire money for itself, though he originally desired it only for its use, is commonly quoted in support of this view. Mill, in his Utilitarianism deals with the disinterested love of virtue on these lines. Sidgwick makes the following important observations on this contention. In the first place it must be sharply distinguished from the doctrine that the original causes of all our desires [190] were previous pleasant and painful experiences. The question is what were the original objects and motives of desire, not what kind of previous experiences may have produced our present desires. Secondly, the important question for ethics is what we desire here and now, not what we may have desired in infancy or in that pre-natal state about which the Psycho-analysts, who appear to be as familiar with the inside of their mother's womb as with the back of their own hands, have so much to tell us. If Ethical Hedonism be the true doctrine of the good, it is no excuse for the miser or the disinterested lover of virtue that they were sound Utilitarians while they were still trailing clouds of glory behind them. Lastly, such observations as we can make on young children point in exactly the opposite direction. They seem to be much more liable to desire things directly and for no reason than grown people. No doubt, as we go further back it becomes harder to distinguish between self-regarding and other impulses. But there is no ground for identifying the vague matrix out of which both grow with one rather than with the other.
- He may say that our desires were originally determined wholly and solely by the hedonic qualities of objects; but that now, by association and other causes, we have come to desire certain things directly or for other reasons.
I think that we may accept Sidgwick's argument here, subject to one explanation. It may well be the case that what very young children desire is on the whole what will in fact give them immediate pleasure, and that what they shun is what will in fact give them immediate pain; though there are plenty of exceptions even to this. But there is no ground to suppose that they think of the former things as likely to be pleasant, and desire them for that reason; or that they think of the latter things as likely to be painful, and shun them for that reason. It is unlikely that they have the experience of desiring and shunning for a reason at all at the early stages. And, if this be so, their experiences [191] are irrelevant to Psychological Hedonism, which is essentially a theory about the reasons or motives of desire.
(2, 3) Psychological Hedonism is now refuted, and the confusions which have made it plausible have been cleared up. It remains to notice a few important general facts about the relations of pleasure and desire and of pain and aversion. (a) Just as we distinguished between the pleasure of fulfilled desire and other pleasures, such as the smell of roses, so we must distinguish between the pain of frustrated desire and other pains, such as being burnt. And just as there are secondary desires for the pleasures of fulfilled desire, so there are secondary aversions for the pain of frustrated desire. Secondary aversions presuppose the existence of primary aversions, and it is logically possible that an primary aversions might be directed to pains. But inspection shows that this is not in fact the case. (b) Among those pleasures which do not consist in the experience of fulfilled desire a distinction must be drawn between passive pleasures, such as the experience of smelling a rose, and the pleasures of pursuit. A great part of human happiness consists in the experience of pursuing some desired object and successfully overcoming difficulties in doing so. The relations of this kind of pleasure to desire are somewhat complicated. The pleasure of pursuit will not be enjoyed unless we start with at least some faint desire for the pursued end. But the intensity of the pleasure of pursuit may be out of all proportion to the initial intensity of the desire for the end. As the pursuit goes on the desire to attain the end grows in intensity, and so, if we attain it, we may have enjoyed not only the pleasure of pursuit but also the pleasure of fulfilling a desire which has become very strong. All these facts are illustrated by the playing [192] of games, and it is often prudent to try to create a desire for an end in order to enjoy the pleasures of pursuit. As Sidgwick points out, too great a concentration on the thought of the pleasure to be gained by pursuing an end will diminish the desire for the end and thus diminish the pleasure of pursuit. If you want to get most pleasure from pursuing X you will do best to try to forget that this is your object and to concentrate directly on aiming at X. This fact he calls "the Paradox of Hedonism."
It seems to me that the facts which we have been describing have a most important bearing on the question of Optimism and Pessimism. If this question be discussed, as it generally is, simply with regard to the prospects of human happiness or misery in this life, and account be taken only of passive pleasures and pains and the pleasures and pains of fulfilled or frustrated desire, it is difficult to justify anything but a most gloomy answer to it. But it is possible to take a much more cheerful view if we include, as we ought to do, the pleasures of pursuit. From a hedonistic standpoint, it seems to me that in human affairs the means generally have to justify the end; that ends are inferior carrots dangled before our noses to make us exercise those activities from which we gain most of our pleasures; and that the secret of a tolerably happy life may be summed up in a parody of Hegel's famous epigram about the infinite End, [Die Vollfürhung des untendlichen Zwecks ist so nur die Täuschung auzuheben, als ob er noch nicbt vollführt sei.] viz., "the attainment of the infinite End just consists in preserving the illusion that there is an End to be attained."
FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM.