Teaching Theory of Knowledge

13. Rationality

      The main areas of inquiry in this module concern recent experimental findings about how people reason and the philosophical implications of these findings. The results suggest that people often do not reason in ways that conform to the norms associated with logic and probability theory. Kahneman and Tversky have written a central paper stating ralevant empirical findings. A large body of related literature is summarized in Nisbett and Ross.

      Philosophers have responded to the experimental results in diverse ways. Cohen claims that no empirical findings can show that people are systematically irrational. Stich claims that the findings do reveal widespread irrationality. (For a critml discussion of Stich, see Feldman). Other philosophers have defended a more moderate position (Cherniak, Elster, Goldman). Some philosophers have argued on a priori grounds that if something has beliefs at all, then it must be rational (Davidson, Dennett). For a related view, see Harman. Another theme emerging from some of these papers is that people must be rational because they are the product of natural selection (Dennett).

Cross References

For an example of how some of these issues can be incorporated into an introductory course on epistemology, see the sample course "Knowledge, Rationality and Science" in the "Epistemology: The First Course" section.

For recent work on normative theory, see the sample course, "Probability and Induction" in the "Bridge Courses" section.

Readings

Cherniak, C. "Minimal Rationality." Mind 90 (1981), 161-83.

Cohen, L. J. "Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (1981),317-331. Commentary and response, 331-59.

Davidson, D. "Radical Interprelation.'' In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Dennett, D. "Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The Panglossian Paradigm' Defended." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6. 343-55. Commentary and response, 355-88.

Elster,J. Ulysses and the Sirens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Feldman, R. "Rationality, Reliability, and Natural Selection." Philosophy of Science, forthcoming.

Goldman, A. I. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986. See especially chapters 14-16.

Harman,G. Change in View. Cambridge, Mass.: MITPress, 1986.

Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. "Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases." Science 185, 1124-1131. Reprinted in D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 3-20.

Nisbett, R. and Ross, L. Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment. Englewood Cliffs, N. J. Prentice-Hall. 1980.

Stich, S. "Could Man Be an Irrational Animal?" Synthese 64 (1984), 115-35.