Teaching Theory of Knowledge
Knowledge, Rationality and Science
- CONTRIBUTORS:
- Drew Christie, Marjorie Clay, William Morris, Andy Naylor, Tom Tymoczko.
This course looks at the Western epistemological tradition from a broad thematic perspective. It emphasizes the close connections between the conceptions of knowledge, scientific method and rationality which dominate our picture of how inquiry should proceed and how it should be evaluated. The course first develops a historical account of this picture of inquiry, and examines the most prominent arguments supporting it. Then equal attention is paid to recent challenges -- some within the tradition, some without -- to this standard conception.
The course begins with a detailed study of Descartes. We stress the skeptical, methodological and scientific concerns which shape his project, and, with it, the course of Western epistemology. We also discuss the connections between Descartes' emphasis on the individual character of inquiry and the rise of individualism in political and ethical theory.
Peirce's critique of Cartesian doubt provides a useful vehicle for questioning whether Descartes' project is necessary for the acquisition of knowledge, and whether it is possible actually to apply his method. Peirce also raises probing questions about the individualistic character of Cartesian inquiry, arguing that Descartes ignores the collective character of inquiry in the scientific community.
The pragmatic spirit of Peirce's reaction to Descartes leads naturally to the Clifford/James debate, which introduces questions of rational belief, choice of belief and responsibility for belief choice.
Next we consider the emergence of induction. We look at Hume's skeptical questions about causation and inductive reasoning which emerged with it, and Mill's attempts to codify inductive methods.
These questions about causation and induction raise further issues about the nature of inductive, causal and probabilistic explanation. Questions raised by the Clifford/James debate surface in a new guise: how are we rationally to choose what to believe if we must choose among hypotheses which are merely more or less likely?
We trace the development of canons of inductive inference and causal explanation, and introduce the covering-law model of scientific explanation. That model is considered in detail, along with the picture of rational thinking as scientific thinking which historically accompanies it. The culmination of this picture is Logical Positivism, which we consider briefly alone with its characteristic scientistic outlook. This is a natural place to consider questions of demarcation: the distinction between science and non-science. Philip Kitcher's Abusing Nature, a recent study of creationism and science, provides a particularly effective way to introduce discussion of these issues.
Having developed the traditional picture of the paradigm knower as a rational, scientific inquirer, we turn to some prominent critiques of this tradition. We look first at Richard Rorty's enormously influential Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, which depicts the entire Western epistemological tradition as based upon a mistake, a myth foisted off on us by Descartes. Rorty also thinks that there is a "hidden agenda" in this program: the defense, by secular intellectual individualists, of the values of science, democracy and art.
It is helpful, in evaluating Rorty's position, to consider some reactions to his charges. We look at several recent articles which argue, from various perspectives, that the problems of epistemology arose from concerns more fundamental to the human condition than Rorty grants.
Another influential critique of the tradition questions the standard account of scientific rationality. The challenge, interestingly, comes from historians of science, who argue that examination of actual scientific discoveries and explanations reveal that science proceeds in a manner quite different from that legislated by the traditional picture. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions spearheaded this historicist critique of the positivist conception of science, and raised far-reaching questions about the critical values usually associated with modern science. These questions about rational scientific inquiry also have important critical implications for our general conception of rationality; they provide much of the focus for the succeeding topics we discuss.
Many of the questions about rationality and scientific inquiry, though raised by Kuhn as diachronic issues in the history of science, have analogues in synchronic problems about the rationality of other conceptual schemes. Discussion of these issues leads naturally to the question of relativism. Is it permissible, or merely culturally chauvinist, to criticize cultures whose explanations rely on the magical rather than the scientific? What are the standards for cross-cultural comparisons of belief-systems? Are these questions in any way different from the examination and evaluation of subsystems within our own culture?
Much recent work in the philosophy of the social sciences bears directly on this cluster of problems. We introduce the central positions as a debate about interpretation in social anthropology, and connect these views with the previously discussed topics of rational inquiry and the nature of scientific explanation.
Then we move from questions about the rationality of others to a rather different challenge to our own rationality; ironically, from within science this time. We look at some prominent results of the experimental psychologists Nisbett and Ross as well as the findings of Tversky and his colleagues. They maintain that human decision and choice behavior in experimental settings frequently violates elementary constraints of rationality. Their results are controversial, and raise deep questions about several of the issues we have already examined.
Finally, we consider an important emerging perspective which runs counter to the traditional picture of scientific inquiry, knowledge, and explanation: feminist epistemology. This label covers a variety of distinct positions; here we concentrate on some central themes relevant to the issues we have been considering. Of particular interest for our purposes is the feminist claim that the male-dominated scientific picture of "conquering and controlling" nature is seriously flawed, and should be replaced with an alternative model emphasizing our unity with nature.
We regard "Knowledge, Rationality and Science" as a first course in philosophy. It assumes no previous philosophical background. We have listed extensive readings for each topic, far more than could be covered effectively in a quarter or a semester. We have starred [*] readings desirable for any version of the course, and indicate [+] readings which are particulary advanced or difficult. Within these parameters, instructors can select readings best suited to particular course objectives and clientele. Obviously, a number of different emphases are possible. This flexibility is a desirable feature of a course designed to stress the interrelations of a number of important topics. While the course structure is designed for large introductory classes, it is also especially suitable for an honors course, or as an honors section of an introductory course.
Cross Reference
For additional readings on the themes developed in this course, see also "Rationality" in the "Contemporary Sources" section and "Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science" (especially sections V, VI and VIII) in the "Bridge Courses" section.
Topics and Readings
Section 1. Descartes
Section 2. The Ethics of Belief
Section 3. Scientific Knowledge, Causation, Induction and Scientific Method
Section 4. Science and Scientism
Section 5. Is Epistemology Dead? Reactions to the Prevailing Picture of Knowledge, Rationality and Inquiry.
Section 6. Reactions to the Orthodox Model of Scientific Explanation.
Section 7. Rationality and Relativism
Section 8. Human Irrationality: A Scientific Result?
Section 9. Feminist Epistemology
- Section 1. Descartes.
- What is certain knowledge?
- How might scientific knowledge be attained?
- Are there methods rational persons must follow if they are to attain truth?
- Skepticism: Is knowledge possible?
- Can skeptical doubt be removed? How? The problem of the criterion and the problem of circularity.
- Experience and Individualism: "The Cartesian Basis."
Readings
* Descartes. Meditations. Meditations I-III.* Descartes. Discourse on Method. Parts One and Two. The new Cottingharn, Stoothoff, Murdoch translation, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 2 volumes, Cambridge University Press, 1985, is highly recommended.
Peirce, C. S. "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man." A critique of Descartes' project from a pragmatist point of view.
Stroud, B. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. See especially chapter 2. Very helpful and persuasive in explaining Descartes' project in intuitive terms and for bringing alive the skeptical arguments of Meditation I.
- Section 2. The Ethics of Belief.
- Is the origin of one's belief relevant to whether one has the right to be sure about the content of those beliefs?
- May a rational person believe anything s/he chooses?
- What are the constraints, if any, on reasonable or rational belief?
- What is the relation between believing and acting?
Readings
* Clifford, W. K. "The Ethics of Belief."* James W. "The Will To Believe."
These articles are widely reprinted in anthologies: e.g., Philosophy: The Basic Issues, Klemke, Kline and Hollinger (eds.), New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982, pp. 53-64.
- Section 3. Scientific Knowledge, Causation, Induction and Scientific Method
- Can we obtain knowledge about the world through induction?
- What is causation?
- Mill's Methods.
- The emergence of scientific method.
Readings
+ Hacking, I. The Emergence of Probability. Helpful background reading.* Hume, D. An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Especially Sections I-V.
Mackie, J. L. "Mill's Methods of Induction." In Paul Edwards (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Hereafter cited as 'Edwards'.
* Russell,B. The Problems of Philosophy. (selections). Good statement of classical problems of induction and causation.
- Section 4. Science and Scientism.
- Scientific explanation as a paradigm for attaining knowledge, and as a paradigm of rational inquiry.
- The deductive-nomological model.
- Logical Positivism as the culmination of the Western scientistic attitude.
- Science as openness to criticism.
- Creationism and science.
Readings
Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth and Logic. Classic, easily accessible statement of Logical Positivism.+ Hempel, C. Philosophy of Natural Sciences.
* Hesse, M. "Laws and Theories." In Edwards.
* Kim, J. "Explanation in Science." In Edwards.
* Kitcher, P. Abusing Science. Cambridge: MIT Press.
+ Nagel, E. The Structure of Science. (selections). New York Harcourt, Brace & World.
+ Popper, K. See Miller, D. (ad.), Popper: Selections. Princeton University Press.
- Section 5. Is Epistemology Dead? Reactions to the Prevailing Picture of Knowledge, Rationality and Inquiry.
- Is the Western epistemological tradition based upon a mistake?
- Are there perennial questions about knowledge, certainty, and the scope and limits of science which withstand Rorty's critique?
Readings
+ Hacking, I. "Is the End in Sight for Epistemology?" Journal of Philosophy (1978).* Rorty, R. Phlosophy and the Mirror of Nature. (selections).
+ Difficult but important, influential, and effective if carefully introduced and discussedStroud, B. "Why is Philosophical Scepticism Significant?" Journal of Philosophy (1985).
+ Wilson, M. "Skepticism Without Indubitability." Journal of Philosophy (1985).
- Section 6. Reactions to the Orthodox Model of Scientific Explanation.
- Does scientific explanation really proceed in the way the covering-law model says it does?
- What does the history of science have to say about the nature of scientific discovery, scientific explanation, and scientific rationality?
Readings
Feyerabend, P. "How to be a Good Empiricist." Against Method: Science in a Free Society.+ Goodman, N. Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Hackett Publishing Company.
Hacking, I. (ed.). Scientific Revolutions. Oxford University Press. Excellent source for material by, and in reaction to, Kuhn. Contains a helpful bibliography.
* Hacking, I. "Styles of Scientific Reasoning." In J. Rajchman and C. West (eds.), Post-Analytic Philosophy, Columbia University Press. Excellent bridge article between this topic smd the next.
Kuhn, T. The Copernican Revolution. University of Chicago Press. Good supplementary reading to 'Structure'.
* Kuhn, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press.
Lakatos, I. and Watkins, J. Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
+ Laudan, L. Progress and Its Problems. University of California Press.
Morick, H. (ed.). Challenges to Empiricism. (selections). Good source for readings in positivist philosophy of science as well as for criticisms of the positivist program.
- Section 7. Rationality and Relativism.
- Is knowledge a social construct?
- Are standards of rationality culture-relative?
- Is it possible to compare cross-cultural beliefs and practices?
- Is it possible to evaluate or criticize the beliefs and practices of an alien conceptual scheme? If so, how? If not. why not?
Readings Hollis, M. and Lukes, S. (eds.). Rationality and Relativism. MIT Press. See especially articles by Barnes and Bloor, and Hacking.Wilson, B. (ed.). Rationality. Blackwell. See especially articles by MacIntyre and Hollis. Hereafter cited as 'Wilson'
* Winch, P. The Idea of a Social Science. (selections).
* Winch, P. "Understanding a Primitive Society." American Philosophical Quarterly (1965). Reprinted in Wilson.
- Section 8. Human Irrationality: A Scientific Result?
- Are human belief-forming mechanisms reliable?
- Are we really as rational as we like to think we are?
Readings
Cohen, L. J. "Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?" The Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1981).Goldman, A. I. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1986. (selections). Chapter 14 elegantly summarizes, with critical discussion, some of the central Tversky and Nisbett-Ross results.
* Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. and Tversky, A. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. (selections).
* Nisbett, R. and Ross, L. Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment. (selections).
- Section 9. Feminist Epistemology.
- Are there alternative ways of doing science?
- How might gender affect one's conception of scientific inquriy?
Readings
Harding, S. The Science Question in Feminism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.Hintikka, M. and Harding, S. (eds.). Discovering Reality. Reidel
* Jaggar, A. Feminist Politics and Human Nature. Rowan and Allenheld. See especially chapter 7.
* Keller, E. F. A Feeling for the Organism. Biography of Barbara McClintock.
Cross Reference For additional readings on some of the themes in this course, see also "Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science" in the "Bridge Courses" section.