Teaching Theory of Knowledge

3. The Gettier Problem

      The Gettier Problem arises out of a defect in the so-called traditional analysis of knowledge brought to the attention of epistemologists by Edmlmd Gettier in his 3-page paper in Analysis in 1963. According to the traditional analysis, what distinguishes knowledge from mere true opinion is that knowledge rests on some form of justification. Thus, knowledge is said to be justified true belief. Gettier showed in his brief paper that there are cases of justified true belief that clearly are not cases of knowledge, and hence that the traditional analysis is defective.

      The response to Gettier's paper has been overwhelming. At first, some philosophers argued that he had failed to show that the traditional analysis was defective. The most prevalent response, however, has been to propose one or another additional requirement on knowledge. Causal theorists hold that knowledge requires that there be an appropriate causal connection be tween the belief and the fact the belief is about. Defeasibility theorists say, roughly, that a person lacks knowledge of a proposition, p, when there is some truth such that, if the person knew it, s/he would not be justified in believing p. Others have argued that one knows a proposition only if one's evidence for that propsition justifies no falsehoods. The readings listed below are representative of these and other important responses to the Gettier Problem. It is clear that at this time there is no generally accepted solution.

Cross References

For additional readings on the relationship between the Gettier problem and the traditional analysis of knowledge, see "The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge" in this section.

For an account of the relationship between epistemology and philosophy of science, and for a discussion of the importance of the Gettier problem to that relationship, see the sample course "Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science" in the "Bridge Courses" section.

Readings

Three anthologies contain excellent selections of readings on the Gettier problem:

Moser, P. and vander Nat, A. (eds.). Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Hereafter cited as 'Moser and vander Nat'

Pappas, G. S. and Swain, M. (eds.). Essays on Knowledge and Justification. Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1978. Hereafter cited as 'Pappas and Swain'.

Roth, M. D. and Galis, L. (eds.). Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge. New York: Random House, 1970. Second edition published by University Press of America, 1984. Hereafter cited as 'Roth and Galis'.

The papers in the Pappas and Swain volume are, in general, more difficult than those in the Roth and Galis volume. Another volume which summarizes the literature on the Gettier problem is:

Shope, R. K. The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research. Princeton. N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1983.

The following papers are important contributions to the literature on the Gettier Problem. Many equally important papers are omitted. The Shope volume mentioned above contains an excellent bibliography.

Armstrong, D. M. Belief, Truth and Knowledge. New York, London: Cambridge University Press, 1973. See especially chapters 10 and 11.

Chisholm, R. Theory of Knowledge. 2nd edition. Englewood Cliffs. N. J.: Prentice-Hall. 1977.

Dretske, P. "Conclusive Reasons." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49, 1-22. Reprinted in Pappas and Swain.

Feldman, R. "An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52. 68-69. Reprinted in Moser and vander Nat.

Gettier, E. "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 23, 121-123. Reprinted in Roth and Galis and in Moser and vander Nat.

Goldman, A. I. "A Causal Theory of Knowing." Journal of Philosophy 64, 357-72. Reprinted in Roth and Galis and in Pappas and Swain.

Goldman, A. I. "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge." Journal of Philosophy 73, 771-91. Reprinted in Pappas and Swain, and in Moser and vander Nat.

Harman, G. Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973. Selections reprinted in Pappas and Swain.

Kaplan, M. "It's Not What You Know That Counts." Journal of Philosophy 82, 350-63.

Klein, P. "A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge." Journal of Philosophy 68, 471-82.

Klein, P. "Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility." Journal of Philosophy 73, 397-413.

Lehrer, K. Knowledge. London: Oxford University Press, 1974. See especially chapters 1 and 9.

Lehrer, K. and Paxson, T., Jr. "Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief." Journal of Philosophy 66, 225-37. Reprinted in Pappas and Swain.

Shope, R. K. "The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy." Journal of Philosophy 75, 397-413.

Sosa, E. "How Do You Know?" American Philosophical Quarterly 11, 113-22. Reprinted in Pappas and Swain.

Swain, M. "Reasons, Causes and Knowledge." Journal of Philosophy 75, 229-49.

Swain, M. Reasons and Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981.

Thalberg, I. "In Defense of Justified True Belief." Journal of Philosophy 66, 794-803.

Unger, P. "An Analysis of Factual Knowledge." Journal of Philosophy 65. 157-70. Reprinted in Roth and Galis.