Teaching Theory of Knowledge

Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science: Changes in the Empiricist Concept of Justification

CONTRIBUTORS:

Brad Armendt, Drew Christie, Stephen Leeds, Keith Lehrer, Bonnie Paller, Paul Roth.

      The purpose of the course outlined below is to trace certain fundamental changes in the notion of justification in this century. Charting the changing relation between epistemology and the philosophy of science illuminates the connection between the sort of problems which troubled epistemologists at least through the 1950's and the seemingly disparate epistemological concerns represented by the Gettier problems, i.e., by the sort of problems about justification which have preoccupied many philosophers since the publication of "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?". The question of why the Gettier problem is important is seldom discussed. [For examples of very different evaluations of this problem, see Robert Shope, The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), chapter I ("The Significance of the Gettier Problem for an Analysis of Knowing"), and Michael Williams, Groundless Belief (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), pages 5-6].

      What explains the close relation between epistemology and the philosophy of science in the first half of the twentieth century, and what accounts for the subsequent split? To answer this question, we must look at the changing relations between the justification of knowledge claims and the confirmation of scientific hypotheses. For once the entire structure of scientific reasoning begins to appear problematic (and not just the justification of theoretical entities), Gettier problems raise the question of how knowledge is possible in even the most mundane sort of cases.

      The close connection between epistemology and the philosophy of science, in the general positivist view, was a function of the fact that the natural sciences provided the clearest cases of human knowledge. It was the philosophical task to explain the logical form and evidential basis of this knowledge. What Quine calls first philosophy is just this attempt to underwrite the legitimacy of the natural sciences by appeal to extra-scientific methods. The inability of positivism to provide this philosophical underpinning for science left a void with regard to the criteria of what to count as knowledge and justification. We propose a course that considers whether some form of fallibilistic justification (based, for example, on reliability, coherence, or consensus) can fill the void.

      This course has its origins in an attempt by some members of the 1986 Summer Institute on the Theory of Knowledge to explain two very different views on the epistemological agenda which were held by Institute participants. One group took the primary purpose of contemporary epistemology to be to respond, via formulation of the appropriate necessary and sufficient conditions, to the challenge set by Gettier and post-Gettier problems for the analysis of knowledge and justification. Others perceived the central epistemological task to have been set by the collapse of positivism in the face of holistic and fallibilistic criticisms. On this view, the problem is whether there exists some neutral framework for the evaluation of knowledge claims. Thus, for the former group, the notion of knowledge is assumed to be unproblematic, what is at issue is its proper analysis. For the latter group, however, what is problematic is precisely whether there is some notion of knowledge to be analyzed.

      We suggest that fallibilism provides the basis for a course reconnecting epistemology and philosophy of science. Fallibilism is the doctrine that our most evident and best justified empirical beliefs may be false, and it sets a problem with respect to establishing the relation between justification and knowledge. The positivist's confidence in unproblematic starting points -- basic beliefs whose truth is somehow guaranteed, for example -- is undercut by the acceptance of fallibilism. The epistemological assumption that justified basic beliefs yield truth, and, therefore knowledge, must be abandoned. The rejection of this assumption creates, at the same time, the epistemological problem noted by Gettier, namely, that even justified true belief falls short of knowledge since justified true belief may be inferred from a justifies false belief. Fallibilism leaves us with the problem of showing how fallibilistic justificatory practices can secure knowledge and, more specifically, scientific knowledge.

      The proposed course should not be thought of as primarily historical; it is, rather, meant to establish how, within the discipline of philosophy as presently constituted, the notion of justification might be explicated. As the course outline indicates, how the account of justification (and knowledge) is further developed will be at least a partial function of one's assessment of holism and fallibilism. Quine proposes to naturalize epistemology because he despairs of finding a reductive analysis of empirical knowledge. Those who pursue a more traditional analysis of knowledge can also seek a naturalistic account in which justification is based, as Goldman and Lehrer for example have proposed, on probability or reliability. Naturalized epistemology may, therefore, be adapted to the ends of those who seek an analysis of knowledge. The remaining question is whether the resulting analyses intended, in part, to solve the Gettier problem, also may be applied to solve the problem of explicating the basis of scientific knowledge.

      The syllabus first prescribes readings which offer a characterization of some of the central epistemological theses of positivism; the next two sections suggest readings which chart the collapse of the positivist program and its ramifications for epistemology and the development of science. One further consequence of this development, discussed below, is that the rationality of both the epistemological and the scientific enterprises is challenged. The last section offers readings which indicate the role of the Gettier problem within the context of the developing divorce between confirmation in science and justification in epistemology. Topics in this section include discussions of naturalized epistemology, the consequences of holism for epistemology and philosophy of science, and various attempts to formulate alternatives to the holist view which grew up in response to disillusionment with positivism.

      We lave starred (*) readings which we consider to be central to the discussions of these issues; the bracketed numbers following some of the citations offer our assessments of the difficulty involved: [1 = easy; 2 = moderate; 3 = difficult].

Cross References

For additional materials on the project of naturalizing epistemology, see also "Naturalistic Epistemology" in the "Contemporary Sources" section.

For a discussion of the role of the Gettier problem in recent epistemology, see also "The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge" and "The Gettier Problem" in the "Contemporary Sources" section.

For a course that considers some of the challenges to positivist science discussed in this module, see "Knowledge, Rationality and Science" in "The First Course" section.

Readings

1. Logical Positivism: Some main doctrines

   Ayer, A. J. Logical Positivism. New York: Free Press, 1959. This book contains an outstanding bibliography of the writings central to logical positivism; hereafter cited as 'Aver'.

   Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth and Logic. [1] A classic statement of positivist epistemology.

   * Carnap, R. "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language." In Ayer. [1]

   Carnap, R. "The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts." Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Volume I.

   Carnap, R. "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology." In Morick, H. (ed.), Challenges to Empiricism, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980. [3] This book contains a useful annotated bibliography. However, the bibliography is from the original (1972) edition, and so it does not contain more recent discussions. Hereafter cited as 'Morick'.

   Carnap, R. "Testability and Meaning." In Feigl and Brodbeck (eds.), Readings in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953. 47-92.

   Schlick, "The Turning Point in Philosophy." In Ayer.

2. The Collapse of the Positivist program

   Feyerabend, P. Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. London: New Left Books, 1975.

   * Hempel, C. "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning." Reprinted in many places, including Ayer, op. cit., and Hempel, C., Aspects of Scientiffc Explanation.

   * Hesse, M. "Duhem, Quine, and a New Empiricism." In Morick. [1]

   * Kuhn, T. S. "Incommensurability and Paradigms." In Morick. [2]

   * Quine, W. V. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." In Morick. [2]

   Sellars, W. "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind." (excerpts) In Morick. [to

   Wittgenstein, L. excerpts from either On Certainty, and/or The Blue and the Brown Books.

3. Implications for the Philosophy of Science: The Rise of Fallibilistic Holism in the Philosophy of Science
   1. The Emergence of Fallibilism

      * Popper, K. Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. Excerpted in Morick. [2]

      * Popper, K. Logic of Scientifc Discovery. London: Hutchinson. 1968.[2]

      Popper, K. Objective Knowledge. London: Oxford University Press, 1972. [2]

      * Newton-Smith, W. H. "The Underdetermination of Theory by Data." Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume LII. 1978, 71-91 [2]

   2. The Emergence of Holism

      * Hanson, N. R. Patterns of Discovery, especially Chapters 1, 2,

      * Kuhn, T. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. [1]

      Quine, W. V. "Speaking of Objects." In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. [2]

      Quine, W. V. "On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World." Erkenntnis 9 (1975),313-28. [3]

4. Gettier Problems and Fallibilistic Justification

      Readings from the first three sections should show how the inability to establish a first philosophy of the sort longed for by the positivists leads to the progressive estrangement of epistemology and the philosophy of science The beginnings of the challenge to science as a paradigmatically rationai enterprise is also seen in these developments. Quine's now classic paper, "Epistemology Naturalized," is not so much a discussion of how to embed epistemology in empirical psychology but rather, provides Quine's own idiosyncratic overview of the development of empiricism from Hume to Quine. The failure of empiricism is, on this account, its failure to forge the desired link between observations and theoretical entities. It is Harman's survey of the state of affairs in epistemology which provides a sufficiently broad perspective to see phenomenalism, behaviorism, problems concerning induction, and Gettier problems as variations on the general theme of how to articulate an account of knowledge based on fallibilistic reasoning.

Gettier, E. "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 23, 121-23.

Harman, G. Thought. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1973. See especially chapter 1. [2] Chapter 1 was published independently as a survey article on epistemology. See "Epistemology," in E. C. Carterette and M. P. Friedman (eds.), Handbook of Perception: Volume 1. Historical and Philosophical Roots of Perception. New York: Academlc Press, 1974. Harman's discussion makes clear that what links various epistemological concerns through Gettier is the attempt to cash out the justificatory basis for varying types of knowledge claims.

* Quine, W. V. "Epistemology Naturalized." Originally printed in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. Reprinted in H. Kornblith (ed.), Naturalizing Epistemology. Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford/MIT, 1985. [2] The Kornblith anthology also contains an excellent bibliography on the naturalized epistemology literature.

Pragmatic Holism

      This response to fallibilistic holism stresses that there can be no rules for rational belief acceptance.

* Rorty, R. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. [2]

Social Constructivism:

* Collins, H. "Son of Seven Sexes." Social Studies of Science II (1981), 33-62. [2]

Collins H. "Stages in the Empirical Programme of Relativism." Social Studies of Science II(1981), 3-10. [2]

Knorr-Cetina, K. The Manufacture of Knowledge. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981. [2]

5. Escape from Holism: Causal Theories, Reliabilism and Bootstrapping

         Proponents of this position claim that the only way to save rational belief acceptance is to reject holism.

   Glymour, C. Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1980.

   * Glymour, C. "On Testing and Evidence." In J. Earman (ed.), Testing Scientific Theories. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. [3]

6. Rational Holism

   Rational theory choice and belief acceptance are possible despite fallibilistic holism.

   Boyd, R. "Realism, Underdetermination and Causal Theory of Evidence." Nous 7 (1973), 1-12. [3]

   Boyd, R. "On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism." Erkenntnis 17 (1983), 135-69. [3]

   * Boyd, R. "Lex Orandi Est Lex Credendi." In Churchland and Hooker (eds). Images of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, 3-34. [3]

   * Churchland, Paul. Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. [3]

   Lehrer, K. "Social Information." The Monist 60 (1977), 473-87.

7. Embracing Holism

         A number of philosophers have welcomed what they see as the liberating, broadening effect of the fall of positivism and the subsequent rise of holism. So-called "scientist characterized as the tendency to take mathematical physics a the paradigmatic model of rationality against which all other approaches are measured, is decried as bad science and poor epistemology. Analogies, not differences, between on the one hand the "hard" sciences and on the other hand the social sciences, literary theory, philosophy, etc., are emphasized. Important issues for philosophers who embrace holism and Quine's rejection of the dogmas of empiricism include: How is one to answer the inevitable charge of relativism? How is one to preserve the emancipatory power of critical reflection while rejecting efforts of formulate value-free, neutral, and universal standards of rationality.

   * Rajchman, J. and West, C. (eds.). Post-Analytic Philosophy. Columbia University Press, 1985. [2] Contains relevant essays by many key figures in the debate, such as Kuhn, Rorty, Putnam, Bernstein and Hacking.

   Hollis, M. and Lukes, S. (eds.) Reason and Rationality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982. [2]

         Feminist epistemologists are exploring in depth a detailed critique of scientism. One area of investigation focuses on the points of similarity and dissimilarity between feminist critiques of positivism and neo-positivism and those made by Rorty, Kuhn, Quine, etc. Sandra Harding, whose early work examined Quine and Duhem, is particularly illuminating in relating the critique of the "dogmas of empiricism" to feminist concerns.

   * Harding, S. The Science Question in Feminism. Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1986. [2]

   * Harding S. and Hintikka, M. (eds.). Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983. [1]

   Jaggar, A. Feminist Politics and Human Nature. Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1983. See especially chapter 11, "Feminist Epistemologies". [2]

         Books which explicitly wrestle with the epistemological and cultural significance of accepting holism include:

   Putnam, H. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. [1]

   * Rorty, R. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. [2]

   Rorty, R. Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982. [1]

   Habermas, J. Knowledge and Human Interests. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. [3]

   Bernstein, R. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983. [1]

   Cross Reference

   For an example of a course that develops some of the themes discussed in this module, see also "Knowledge, Rationality and Science" in "The First Course" section.