Teaching Theory of Knowledge

Perception, Perceptual Belief, and Knowledge

CONTRIBUTOR: Joseph Thomas Tolliver

      This course is intended to provide the student with an introduction to issues and problems linking psychology, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. The idea is to introduce the student to some of the theories, methodologies, arguments, and results current in cognitive science, and to show their relevance to epistemology. Since it is a philosophy course, the topics and readings emphasize work in philosophy of mind/psychology and epistemology. As a result, no attempt is made at producing a representative sample of work in the psychology of perception. The goal in choosing the psychology literature is to give the student some feel for:

1. the phenomena that perceptual psychology undertakes to explain;
2. the role of theory in psychological research;
3. techniques and methodologies employed and their relation to theory;
4. results and successes, and
5. work yet to be done.

The course is aimed at advanced undergraduates and graduate students who, ideally, have some background in one of the three areas.

      Stars (*) indicate readings which are central to the discussions.

Cross Reference

For additional readings on the role of perception in epistemology, see "Perception" in the "Contemporary Sources" section, and the other sample syllabi in this section.

Topics and Readings

I. Psychology of Perception

* Fodor, J. and Pylyshyn, Z. "How Direct is Visual Perception?: Some Reflections on Gibson's 'Ecological Approach'." Cognition 9 (1981), 139-96.Gibson, J. J. "The Theory of Affordance." The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1979.

Gibson, J. J. "A Theory of Direct Visual Perception." In Royce, J. R. and Rozeboom, W. (eds.), The Psychology of Knowing. New York: Gordon and Breach, 1972, 215-27.

Hoffman and Richards, "Parts of Recognition." In Pinker.

Kosslyn, Brunn, Cave, and Wallach. "Individual Differences in Mental Imagery Ability: A Computational Analysis." In Pinker.

* Marr, D. and Nishihara, H. "Visual Information Processing." Technology Review, 1978.

Pinker, S. "Visual Cognition: An Introduction." In Pinker, S. (ed.), Visual Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985. Hereafter cited as Pinker'.

Pylyshyn, Z. "The Imagery Debate: Analog Media vs Tacit Knowledge." Psychology Review 87 (1981),1645.

Turvey et. al., "Ecological Laws of Perceiving and Acting: In Reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn." Cognition 9 (1981), 237-304.

Ullman, S. "Visual Routines." In Pinker.

II. Philosophical Theories of Perception and Sensation

Aristotle. De Anima, Book II, and De Sensu.

Austin, J. L. Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.

* Berkeley. Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision.

Campbell, K. "Colors." In Brown, R. and Rollins, C. D. (eds.), Contemporary Philosophy in Australia. London: Allen and Unwin. 1969. 132-57.

* Churchland, Paul. "Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspection of Brain States." Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985).

Dennett, D. "Quining Qualia" The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming. Also Tufts University Center for Cognitive Studies, report #CCM-85-3, Nov. 1985.

Descartes. Dioptrics.

* Dretske, F. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981. See especially chapter 6.

* Dretske, F. Seeing and Knowing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. See especially chapters 1-3.

Grice, H. P. "The Causal Theory of Perception." Aristotelian Society Proceedings, Supplementary Volume 35 (1961), 12152.

* Jackson, F. "Epiphenomenal Qualia." Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982), 27-36.

Jackson,F. Perception. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press. 1977.

Jackson, F. "What Mary Didn't Know." Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986). Reply to Churchland.

McGinn, C. The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Perkins, M. Sensing the World. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983. See especially chapters 4 and 8.

Plato. Theaetetus.

Price, H. H. Perception. London: Methuen, 1932.

Sosa, E. "Experience and Intentionality." Philosophical Topics 14,1 (1986).

Shoemaker, S. "Phenomenal Similarity." Critica 20.

Stroll, A. "Seeing Surfaces." In French et. al. (ads.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy vol. X. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.

* Tye, M. "The Adverbial Approach to Visual Experience." Philosophical Review 93, 2 (1984).

III. Perceptual Belief

* Dennett, D. "Intentional Systems." In his Brainstorms. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978.

Dretske, F. "Misrepresentation." In Bogdan, R. (ed.), Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.

* Field, H. "Mental Representation." Erkenntnis 13, 2 (1978),

* Fodor,J. "Semantics Wisconsin Style." Synthese 57, 3 (1184).

Haugeland, J. Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985. See especially chapter 1 "The Saga of the Modern Mind."

* Hintikka, J. "On the Logic of Perception." In Models for Modalities. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969, 151-83.

Lewis, D. "Attitudes De Dicto and De Se." In his Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1.

Lycan, W. "Form, Function, and Feel." Journal of Philosophy 78, 1 (1981), 24-50.

Stalnaker, R. Inquiry. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984. See especially chapters 1-4.

Stampe, D. "Toward a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation." Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Volume 2. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979.

IV. Perceptual Knowledge

* Campbell, D. "Pattern Matching as an Essential in Distal Knowing." In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), Naturalizing Epistemology. Cambridge, Mass.: MITPress, 1985.

Carnap, R. "Testability and Meaning." Philosophy of Science 3 and 4, 1936-37,420-71 and 2-40.

Chisholm, R. "The Directly Evident." In Pappas, G. (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979, 115-27.

* Chisholm, R. "The Problem of the Criterion." In Foundations of Knowing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982

* Chisholm, R. "Transcendental Evidence and Perception." In his The First Person. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981, 92-106.

Churchland, Paul. Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. See especially chapters 2 and 5.

Canman, J. Perception, Common Sense, and Science. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1975.

Doppelt, G. "Dretske's Conception of Perception and Knowledge." Philosophy of Science 40 (1973), 433-46.

* Dretske, F. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981. See especially chapters 4and S.

* Fodor, J. The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983. See especially Parts 2 and 3.

Fodor, J. "Observation Reconsidered." Philosophy of Science 51 (1984). 23-43.

* Goldman, A. I. "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge." In Pappas, G. and Swain, M. (eds.). Essays on Knowledge and Justification. Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press, 1978, 120-45.

Goldman, A. I. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress,1986. Seeespeciallychapter 9.

Goodman, N. "The Way the World Is." Review of Metaphysics 14 (1960), 48-56.

Goodman, N. Ways of Worldmaking. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.. 1974.

Harrison, B. Form and Content. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973. See especially chapters 3 and 4.

* Lycan, W. "Epistemic Value." Synthese 64, 2 (1985), 137-64.

Pollock, J. Knowledge and Justification. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. See especially chapters 3-5.

* Quine, W. V. "Epistemology Naturalized." In his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 69-90.

Quine, W. V. "Grades of Theoreticity." In Foster, L. and Swanson, J. W. (eds.), Experience and Theory. Arnherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970, 1-17.